United States Central Command (CENTCOM) has command authority over U.S. forces in the Middle East and West/Central Asia. Spanning more than 4.6 million square miles, the Middle East has for millennia been a geographic and geopolitical crossroads and site of cooperation, competition, and conflict. Rich in cultural heritage but with unevenly distributed natural resources, the region is also beset by internal conflict and instability. More than a third of global container traffic transits the Suez Canal and more than a quarter of global oil transits the Strait of Hormuz. The region is home to almost 50% of the world’s known oil reserves and more than 40% of the world’s national gas.
As outlined in the chap. 1 (strategic environment) of OPFOR SMARTbook 4 – Iran & the Middle East (Forces, Conflicts & Threats) and as identified in the Statement of General Michael “Erik” Kurilla on the Posture of U.S. Central Command – SASC Hearing Mar 16, 2023, the following are Central Command’s (CENTCOM) strategic priorities:
Strategic Priority 1: Deter Iran (See OPFOR4, chap. 2.)
Deterring Iran is arguably more urgent than at any time in CENTCOM’s history due to Iran’s cutting-edge missile and UAV capability as well as its uranium enrichment program. As it was at the time of CENTCOM’s formation, Iran is the most destabilizing actor in the region. Today, Iran is undeterred from its malign activities, which include conventional threats to neighbors, support to violent proxy groups that spread chaos and instability throughout the region, and support to Russia’s war in Ukraine.
The greatest single day-to-day threat to regional security and stability remains Iran, which challenges the U.S. and its allies by pursuing regional hegemony, breaching its JCPOA commitments, and posing a conventional threat to partner nations while facilitating and conducting coercive and malign activities.
Iran will continue to use Syrian (and likely Iraqi) territory as a critical hub and resupply route for maintaining its campaign against Israel. Iran will also remain focused on supporting Lebanese Hezbollah, whose illegal weapons stockpiles exceed those of most legitimate partner militaries in the region. The least restrained and most destabilizing of all of Iran’s affiliates in the region are the Houthis of Yemen. Aside from being active combatants in that country’s seven-year-old civil war, they are also engaged in a near-daily long-range fires conflict with Saudi Arabia.
Strategic Priority 2: Counter Violent Extremist Organizations
While Iran poses the most ominous threat to the central region, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) operating in the Middle East, Levant, and Central Asian States also represent a danger to security and stability. The Central Command Area of Responsibility serves as the epicenter of violent extremism, with 19 of 21 top tier terrorist groups operating across the region. ISIS and Al Qaeda are the principal Sunni violent extremist organizations in the Middle East and Levant. Both groups maintain numerous affiliates pursuing local, regional, and global objectives.(See OPFOR4, chap. 8.)
While Iran poses the most ominous threat to the central region, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) operating in the Middle East, Levant, and Central Asian States also represent a danger to security and stability. The Central Command area of responsibility serves as the epicenter of violent extremism, with 19 of 21 top tier terrorist groups operating across the region. ISIS and Al Qaeda are the principal Sunni violent extremist organizations in the Middle East and Levant. Both groups maintain numerous affiliates pursuing local, regional, and global objectives.
Strategic Priority 3: Compete Strategically
In addition to its primary role as a redoubt against the spread of Iranian-directed instability across the region, this command was established in 1983 to maintain a military advantage over the Soviet Union amidst Great Power Competition. This was, after all, in the moments after the surprising 1979 Christmas Eve Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – the first major combat operation involving Soviet troops outside of Warsaw Pact territory since the close of World War II. Today, CENTCOM’s role in Great Power Competition, clearly defined in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, is more urgent and complex. (See OPFOR4, chap. 7.)
Strategic Competition with PRC. China’s goal to serve as the world’s leading superpower by 2049 puts this region squarely in its crosshairs. The US Central Command area of responsibility shares a 2,200-mile border with the People’s Republic of China – larger than the U.S. border with Mexico. China looks across that border and sees only opportunity for advantage in influence. Beijing’s willingness to take on higher-risk projects threatens American preferential ties and unfettered access. On its current trajectory, the increased technological and military presence serves as a growing strategic challenge to US partnerships, access, force presence, and security in the region.
Strategic Competition with Russia. Today, 32 years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia’s objectives are to weaken Western security structures in the Middle East and Central Asia and continue to challenge U.S. security interests and critical relationships in the region. The U.S. Central Command region holds a 4,750-mile border with Russia – more than six times the length of NATO’s border with Russia – through the Central Asian States. Today, Putin’s interests in the Middle East range from energy transit to security relationships to military sales. His overall strategy in the region remains largely unaffected by the war in Ukraine. Despite the recent damage to its reputation and influence, Russia continues apace on several fronts to preserve its influence and access in the Middle East.
OPFOR4 topics and chapters include the strategic environment, U.S. & Iran relations (Iran’s foreign and defence policies, conflicts and tensions, sanctions), Iran’s military (history, doctrine and strategy, core capabilities), force structure, nuclear and missile threat, regional issues and conflicts (Iran’s partners and proxies, instruments of national security strategy), strategic competion (China, Russia, and others), and terrorist threats (VSEOs, Iran’s support for terrorism, etc.)
This article is an extract from "OPFOR SMARTbook 4 - Iran & the Middle East (Forces, Conflicts & Threats)" by The Lightning Press. Download a free PDF sample and learn more at: OPFOR SMARTbook 4 - Iran & the Middle East (Forces, Conflicts & Threats).
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