Russian forces learned to defend in depth through the lessons of 100 years of modern combat. In 2022, when Russian engineer entrenching and mine-scattering vehicles began work on trenches, tank traps, and dense minefields in eastern Ukraine, Western military analysts were incredulous. Jokes about “obsolete tactics” were inevitable in Western news media. However, the much promised Ukrainian counterattack with modern NATO armored weapons repeatedly stalled in the Russian fortifications. From November 2022 through April 2024, Russian forces held a consistent 18 percent of Ukrainian territory. Over the summer of 2024, territory gains by Russian forces brought 20 percent of Ukraine under Russian control.

Sustainability in Defense

Russian forces sustain the defense through dispersal of covered and concealed resources to mask their positions from enemy targeting systems. This involves:
• Electromagnetic warfare (EW) systems to defeat enemy drone observation
• Air Defense Artillery (ADA) to defeat enemy air strike, airborne and air assault attack
• Artillery to defeat enemy ground attacks
• Entrenchment vehicles to protect Russian forces and trap enemy vehicles
• Antitank weapons to defeat enemy tanks and armored vehicles
• Established lines of communication for logistic support

Active Defense

Russian forces coordinate defensive positions to place the enemy under planned and integrated fires, while creating dilemmas for the enemy to manage in battle. Active defensive measures
include extensive maneuver of systems and forces during the conduct of battle. Two key attributes of the active defense are the effort to funnel enemy forces into engagement areas advantageous to Russian integrated fires, and the ability to conduct decisive counterattacks.

Depth is the third attribute of an active defense. A series of trenches connect strong point defense positions along the first line. In turn, the first line of defense is connected by trench to the second and third lines of defense, each line able to bring their weapons to bear against an enemy in the defined engagement area. Alternate lines of defense can be occupied to defend against separate engagement areas in the event of an enemy breakthrough or flanking maneuver.

It is not the case that the entire entrenched frontline be occupied 100 percent at all times. Rather, Russian commanders flexibly assign and reassign units to occupy sectors of the defense depending on risk calculations. This flexibility allows for sustainment through rest cycles.

Integrated Supporting Fires

Russian forces integrate supporting fires of the defense in depth. At distances of thousands of kilometers are strategic assets such as fighter-bombers with glide bombs that can be dropped as far away as 70 kilometers from the enemy target. Positioned at a hundred kilometers or more are CAS airframes that can attack enemy targets at low altitude and are particularly effective for attacking enemy if they manage to breakthrough Russian frontline defenses.

Positioned at 30 to 60 kilometers behind the frontline are gun and rocket artillery. These systems provide indirect fire into the engagement area. Heavy mortars are positioned at 3 to 6 kilometers behind the frontline. Russian forces direct armored tanks to move forward 1 to 2 kilometers of the frontline to provide direct fire support into the engagement area.

During the war in Ukraine, the Russian defense ministry refurbished thousands of older tanks kept in storage facilities. As discussed in the “Military Production” section of this book, those tanks were upgraded with more powerful engines, additional armor, and thermal optics. Russia never intended to use 1950 era tanks to battle 2000 era enemy tanks. Instead, older tanks are leveraged in direct fire support of the frontline defense with 100mm, 115mm, and 120mm guns. This is a role for which upgraded older tank models are well suited.

Russia views the defense in depth from strategic to tactical. Armored vehicles are routinely placed into long-term storage precisely so they can be called back into service with as little refurbishment as possible, and yet provide a critical asset to tactical success. Air defense and air attack are layered to include strategic bombers, tactical CAS airframes, and drone surveillance and attack. Russian defense in depth goes far beyond the engineered minefields, obstacles, and networked trench systems of the forward battalion tactical group (BTG). It is effective.

This article, by Dr. Christopher E. Larsen, was written in support of “OPFOR SMARTbook 3-3: Russian Military (Forces, Operations & Tactics)” by The Lightning Press. See p. 7-3 for associated content in OPFOR 3-3, as related to the Russian defensive operations (chap. 7). Download a free PDF sample and learn more at: OPFOR SMARTbook 3-3 – Russian Military, 3rd Ed.

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