After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the “west” embraced the newly independent countries that had once been held in the Soviet sphere. The Warsaw Pack collapsed as former Soviet satellite states and autonomous zones moved quickly to ensure they would never fall under Russian influence again. For many nations in Eastern Europe, NATO “partnerships” and membership were a quick and advantages solution. The important distinction to make is that “NATO expansion” after 1991 was not aggression on the part of the “Western Powers”. It was fundamental rejection of Russian influence on the part of the new member states. The exponential improvement of quality of life that was experienced by the newly independent states was all they needed to confirm that they never wanted to be part of the “Russian Empire” again. Membership in NATO or participation in the Partnership for Peace program was their path to protection from future Russian control.
The further east into Asia, and further away from NATO strong holds, the desire for independence from Russian influence took other forms. Countries like Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan chose neutrality and independence, leaving the NATO / Warsaw Pact issue behind.
The issue of contention is that the territories held by these newly formed independent states encompassed seven (7) natural geographic barriers that formed nine (9) corridors into the historically Russian held lands. Without control of these 7 barriers and 9 corridors (or Gaps) Russia is militarily indefensible with conventional weapons. This situation is fundamentally unacceptable to the Russian Federation and is a significant factor in Russia’s motivations and endeavors. Russia has only three options for power projection as a nation; political, military, and economic.
Politically Russia enjoys some benefits as a former super power. Their dominant position in the United Nations and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council allows the Russian Confederation a platform from which to force issues in their favor. Without military or economic might to back up their positions this influence is limited.
Russia’s economic options are limited because they did not successfully integrate (by their own fault or foreign design) into the free world economy. When the soviet government fell, all that remained was the institutionalized corruption that had plagued the Soviet government and business practices it for years. After 1991, the privatized remnants of the Soviet state-owned industries remained encumbered by the ingrained graft and inefficiency.
All this means Russia must fall back on old habits of intimidation. The Russian Federation must project military power, supported to the extent possible by political and economic strength, to secure its borders. This is highly problematic. Not only must they build military power, they must also project that military power into the sovereign territories of newly installed, Eastern European NATO member states and Partners in order to secure the key terrain the Confederation views as essential to Russian security.
Geographic Fronts
Russia is geographically huge and must contend with potential threats from three fronts: Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Each of these regions offers Russia unique challenges.
To the east, the European front has seen dynamic changes, both economically and militarily, and is Russia’s most immediate concern. Russia has been losing ground along the post-World War II “Cold War” front lines and territorial spheres of influence for decades with the greatest changes coming after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The loss of the satellite states that formed the “buffer” between Russia and the Allied, and later, NATO forces is of significant concern to Russia.
To the south on the Middle-Eastern front, the cultural encroachment of Islam from the Middle East, primarily through the Caucasus region. The economic losses in oil and other resources that came with the creation of Kazakhstan have taken a toll on Russia’s finances. Although not currently a “hot” region, resources are required to hold the Caspian Mountains and territories east of the Ural Mountains.
The Asian front includes China and Japan. China and Japan have not been a direct threat to Russia since the end of WWII. Japan currently has neither the desire nor capacity for a land war in Asia, and China is perfectly willing to stand back-to-back with Russia as it is focusing its expansionist energies on Africa, Taiwan, and the South China Seas.
Natural Defenses
Given these three “fronts”, military power alone cannot secure Russia’s borders. Russia has historically depended upon three natural factors for its defense: Weather, Distance, and Terrain.
Weather: With the exception of the Caucuses Mountain region (Southern Russia), the vast majority of Russian territory lay north of the 50 Degree Latitude. To put this in prospective, the northern most point of the contiguous United States (Northern Maine) extends to Latitude 47.5 degrees north. Winter in Russia is long and bitterly cold. Of the over 50 documented invasions into Russia territories, arguably only two were halted by Russia military power alone. All the others (including Napolean’s France & Hitler’s Germany) were halted by Russian winters. If the Russians can delay an invader into a Russian winter, the chances of a successful invasion are virtually eliminated. Armies have literally been frozen in their tracks.
Distance: Most of Russia’s population, infrastructure, agriculture, and industry lay west of the Ural Mountains. The distance from China or the Eastern coast (Bering Sea) to the Urals is too great and too difficult to traverse militarily. An examination of the Japanese invasions into mainland Asia in the 19th and 20th century provides ample proof of this. The Russians successfully finished the Trans-Siberian Railway in the hope of expanding their influence to the Pacific Ocean and secure a warm water port. Even with time, money, and manpower the Russians were unable to maintain a stable and effective transcontinental transportation route.
Weather and Distance are uncontrollable factors in Russian geographic security. Although the terrain does not change, the control of geographically important territories is a much more dynamic factor.
Terrain: Imperial Russia shared over 6,000 miles of border with historically hostile neighbors over the centuries. By 1900 Imperial Russia had positioned its territorial holdings to reduce the militarily traversable borders from over 6,000 miles of open terrain to around 500 miles of constricted terrain. This was accomplished by seizing control of seven (7) major geographic obstacles that surround Russia. They are:
Carpathian Mountains – The Carpathian Mountains span 450 miles north-west to south-east from the South of Poland through Slovakia, across the south west border of Ukraine, and most of the way through Romania. This range forms a significate obstacle from south central Europe. Russia lost control of this barrier and the two land corridors to the north and south in 1991.
Caucuses Mountains – The Caucuses Mountains span 450 miles east to west between the Black and Caspian Seas. The northern portions of Caucuses are in Russia, but the southern portions reside in Georgia to the west and Azerbaijan to the east. These mountains effectively limit passage through this land corridor to the coastal roads on the shores of the Black and Caspian Seas. Russia still holds the northern side of these mountains and can control both of the coastal approaches.
Caspian Sea – the Caspian Sea is a land locked, inland sea that lacks the infrastructure, ports, or road networks sufficient to support large scale military operations. Iran occupies the southern shore. Kazakhstan occupies the eastern shore. Russia holds portions of the western shore north of Azerbaijan.
Karanam Desert – The Karanam desert is a 1,000-mile-wide loose sand, dune desert east of the Black Sea in what is now Uzbekistan to the north and Turkmenistan to the south. It is effectively impassable for most modern military vehicles. Russia lost control of the entire region in 1991. The northern edge of the Karanam desert is now 400 miles south of Russian territory.
Tain Mountains – The Tain Mountains span 1,000 miles west-south-west to north north-east on the southeastern Kazakhstan border and occupying most of Kyrgyzstan. They form a natural barrier between China and Kazakhstan. Russia lost control of the region in 1991. The northern edge of the Tain mountains are now over 600 miles south of the Russian boarder in Kazakhstan.
Altai Mountains – The Altai Mountains span 500 miles west, north west to east, south east through western Mongolia. They form a natural barrier between China and Russia. The Russian territorial borders have not change significantly in this region for over two hundred years.
Khangai / Khentii Mountains – The Khangai / Khentii Mountains span for over 2,000 miles Natural barrier through Mongolia, China, and Russia from the Altai Mountains to the Bering Sea between Russia and China. The Russian territorial borders have not change significantly in this region for over two hundred years.
Gaps (Corridors)
When Russia held control over these 7 terrain factures. They could concentrate military power on the defense of 9 “gaps”, or corridors, into Russia territory. Five (5) of these “gaps” lead from Europe, two (2) from the Middle East, and two (2) from Asia.
These “gaps” represent nine corridors, by land or sea, that offer direct access into areas the Russians traditionally considered their “Security Zone”. The Russian Empire had been generally successful in holding direct or political control of these corridors for generations, losing ground, figuratively and literally, as the 20th century came to a close.
Corridors from Europe (1-5)
With the advent of the democratic and socialist movements of the early 20th century, the imperial hold on traditional Russia territories waned, as it did the influence of royalty all across Europe. Upon the death of Czar Nicholas II and his family in 1918, the pan-European royal familial and diplomatic ties that had held the Russian territories in place began to crumble. Direct Russian control of the White Sea (Finland), the Baltic States, and Poland were lost in the aftermath of WWI. In the 1930’s and 40’s, Russia used the threat of German occupation to gain political control and “mutual assistance treaties” with the governments of the Baltic States. As WWII ended, Russia occupied Poland and West Germany. The traditionally contentious relationship between the Bessarabian region (Ukraine, Moldova, and Romania) and Russia came to a head in WWII as these governments aligned or collaborated with Nazi Germany. As WWII ended, Russia seized control of these countries and the areas in the southern Caspian Mountains. Russia’s relationships with all of these European “buffer states” remained stressed throughout the Cold War (1945 – 1991). Russia’s hold on all five of the European corridors collapsed completely with the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.
1. White Sea: The White Sea provides access to and from the North Atlantic Ocean. The 270-mile land bridge between the White Sea and the Gulf of Bothnia has historically proven impassable by modern conventional forces although Finland successfully conducted winter time guerrilla operations in this area during WWII against Nazi Germany. Finland has traditionally been an ally with Russia. The White Sea is frozen much of the year and although it is “path by sea”, historically it offered little military advantage. As of 2022, the situation is completely different. Now that Sweden and Finland have joined NATO, the White Sea corridor is a potentially significant threat to Russian security.
2. Baltic Sea: The Baltic Sea provides access to the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean. The coast of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania along the Baltic Sea have the infrastructure, port facilities, and road networks to allow direct access into Russia. Russia lost control of the Baltic States when these coastal people claimed their independence in 1991. Now that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have joined NATO (2004), the Baltic Sea corridor is a potentially significant threat to Russian security. NATO is inside the Russian “security zone” in this corridor.
3. Polish Gap: The Polish Gap consists of just over 300 miles of flat lands north of the Carpathian Mountains between Gdansk and Krakow in Poland. These flats have several north/south rivers that serve as effective natural barriers. With Poland’s acceptance into NATO in 1999, this gap is now 500 miles from the Russian border. Even with Belarus being a NATO Partnership for Peace member, it is politically allied with Russia. Even with Belarus support, the Polish Gap is still 150 miles from Russian influence. NATO is inside the Russian “security zone” in this corridor.
4. Bessarabian (Romanian) Gap: This land corridor consists of 120 Miles between the southern Carpathian Mountains and the Black Sea in Romania, with Moldova and Ukraine to the north. Currently 500 miles from the Russian border. Russia would have to hold Ukraine, Moldova, and eastern half of Romania to control this gap. Russia lost control of this corridor in 1989 when Romania declared its independence. Ukraine and Moldova followed suit in 1991 and 1992 respectively. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, beginning in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea, and continued aggression in 2022, are a specific attempt to move to and control this gap. With Romania having joined NATO in 2004, NATO is inside the Russian “security zone” in this corridor.
5. Crimea: Black Sea ports. Crimea was Russia’s only warm water port and served as a multifaceted aspect of Russian national security; including the submarine component of their nuclear triad. As a corridor, Crimea’s ports allow sea access to Ukraine via land bridge and into Russia via a single vehicle/rail bridge. Russia seized Crimea in 2014. Although this stops forces from entering into Russia from the Black Sea, Russia is also potentially kept from exiting the Black Sea by Turkey, under the “belligerent vessel” clause (article 19) of the Montreux Convention of 1936. Turkey became a NATO member in 1952 and holds the Bosphorus Straight in Istanbul and Dardanelles Straight at the Mediterranean mouth of the Marmara Sea. NATO can restrict the corridor, but it is not in the Russian “security zone”.
Corridors from Middle East (6-7)
These two gaps offer direct land access into Russia along the coasts of the Black and Caspian Seas. On the west side along the Black Sea coastal approach, Turkey has access through Georgia. On the east side along the Caspian Sea coastal approach, Iran has access through Azerbaijan. As Russia held the northern portions of the Caucuses Mountains, the independence of George and Azerbaijan in 1991 was not a significant setback. Of more concern to the Russians was the Muslim insurgencies that attempted to gain independence for Chechnya in 1994 and 1998. These efforts failed, but Islamic separatists and Mujaheddin terrorists (primarily from Afghanistan) have continued to disrupt the Caucuses region and will take full advantage of any weakness in Russia’s ability to project military power into the area.
6. Caucuses, Black Sea Coastal Approach: Coastal roads in Georgia between the Caucuses Mountains and the eastern shore of the Black Sea. This corridor provides turkey with direct access into Russian territory. Georgia is predominantly Orthodox Christian (84%) and although adamantly independent, aligns more closely with Russian society than middle eastern culture. Russia currently has an adequate, but tenuous, grip on this corridor.
7. Caucuses, Caspian Sea Coastal Approach: Coastal roads in Azerbaijan between the Caucuses Mountains and the western shore of the Caspian Sea. This corridor provides Iran with direct access into Russian territory. Azerbaijan, although a secular state per its constitution, is 97% Muslim. It is a criminal offense to “carry out religious propaganda”. This prohibition is not directed specially at Christians as the country has both Shia and Sunni Muslims divided by ethnic as well as religious differences. Azerbaijan’s inherent cultural instability allows foreign fighters ready access into Russian’s Chechen territories. The irregular nature of the threat weakens Russia’s control of this corridor.
Corridors from Asia (8-9)
From the Russian Imperial years through the end of the Soviet Union, the Central Asian Corridor and the Trans-Altai Gap separated Russia from China. As these two great super powers were both engaging in regular conflicts on their respective opposite boarders, it was in their best interests to keep the peace in these regions.
The Kazakh region, within the Russian territories, has historically resisted Russian influence. Quelling this resistance required military force projected through a series of forts and outposts, as well as Russian settlement. Resistance was ruthlessly crushed resulting in great hardships and loss of nomadic traditions among the people native to the region.
Russian insistence on holding these territories was based on the control of the two corridors as well as the presence of oil, natural gas, and abundant mineral deposits. When Kazakhstan declared its independence from Russia in 1991 it took 1 million square miles of land and seized the oil and gas infrastructure. Kazakhstan generates 60% of the GDP of Central Asia and possesses the political and administrative wherewithal to successfully manage and harvest the natural resources under its control. Russia has lost its influence in the region and military control of the Gaps, as well as access to billions of tons of oil, gas, and mineral reserves. Russia now has a border of over 4,000 miles of open steppe to its south which is ruled by an authoritarian Muslim government with a long standing and arguably justified animosity towards Moscow.
8. Central Asian Corridor: A series of roads along the Syr Darya river valley that runs south from the Aral Sea. Currently in South Central Kazakhstan, the Central Asian Corridor is 500 Miles from the Russian border.
9. Trans-Altai Gap: A 35 Mile gap between Lake Zaysan and Western spur of the Altai Mountains. Currently in Eastern Kazakhstan, the Trans-Altai Gap is about 400 miles from the Russian border.
Russian Strategic Security
When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, Russia lost control of 8 of these “Gaps” with the White Sea and a friendly Finland being their only secure corridor. This last gap was lost to NATO expansion in 2002. Since 1992 and the formation of the Russian Confederation, there has been a concerted effort on the part of the Russians to regain control of all 9 of these Gaps by either military or political means. Because NATO is “inside the wire” in Europe and Islam is “inside the wire” in Asia, Russia is very defensive about the situation and is resolute about regaining control of these Gaps. To Russia, this is not aggression, it is survival; and success is imperative. Russia cannot fight a simultaneous two front conflict with NATO in Europe and Islam in Asia.
To meet these goals in Europe, Russia must hold the Baltic States as well as both ends of the Caspian Mountains. This would include parts of Poland, all of Ukraine, Moldova, Eastern Romania, and Crimea. Russia does not have enough conventional military resources and reserves to fight NATO, or even western support, in Ukraine or Poland while NATO is at full strength and the US is not involved in another major regional conflict.
Russia perceives Islam is an invasive cultural threat as well as a military challenge. Both Russia and Western Europe are experiencing an influx of Islamic population and cultural ingress, in addition to increasingly frequent Jihadist separatists and terrorist activities. The question of the “stans” that threaten the Caucuses corridors and the loss of the Central Asian Corridor and Trans-Altai Gap will be a major factor in the coming years.
This article, by Colonel (Ret.) Kyle Ferlemann, was written in support of “OPFOR SMARTbook 3-3: Russian Military (Forces, Operations & Tactics)” by The Lightning Press. See pp. 1-10 to 1-11 for associated content in OPFOR 3-3, as related to the strategic environment (chap. 1). Download a free PDF sample and learn more at: OPFOR SMARTbook 3-3 – Russian Military, 3rd Ed.
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