Chinese Forces, Operations & Tactics

OPFOR1 topics and chapters include the strategic environment (understanding China, defense & military strategy, strategic & operational environments, territorial disputes), force structure (PLA: Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force), system warfare, information operations, reconnaissance and security, offensive and defensive actions, antiterorrism and stability actions, equipment and capabilities (maneuver, fire support, air defense, aviation, engineer and chemical defense, network and communications, and special operations forces).

For over two thousand years, China has been surrounded by enemies, adversaries, and other competitors. Invasion, occupation, raids, and other incursions into Chinese territory were commonplace. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views protecting Chinese sovereignty and security as a sacred duty. China traditionally viewed military resistance as an affair for the entire population: mass resistance, guerrilla warfare, and winning a war of attrition.

The People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA) has approximately 975,000 active-duty personnel in combat units. The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of approximately 355 platforms, including major surface combatants, submarines, aircraft carriers, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, and fleet auxiliaries. The Air Force (PLAAF) and PLAN Aviation together constitute the largest aviation forces in the region and the third largest in the world, with over 2,800 total aircraft (not including trainer variants or UAVs) of which approximately 2,250 are combat aircraft (including fighters, strategic bombers, tactical bombers, multi-mission tactical, and attack aircraft). The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) is the largest missile force in the world, operating well over 1,000 short-range, medium-range, and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and over 300 long-range cruise missiles.

With a force that totals approximately two million personnel in the regular forces, the PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains so that as a joint force it can conduct the range of land, air, and maritime operations as well as space, counterspace, electronic warfare (EW), and cyber operations. Recognizing that joint operations, information flows, and rapid decision-making are vital in modern warfare, the PRC continues to place a high priority on modernizing the PLA’s capability to command complex joint operations in near and distant battlefields.

The PRC has stated its defense policy aims to safeguard its national sovereignty, security, and development interests. China’s leaders view these interests as foundational to their national strategy. In 2020, the PRC’s defense policy and military strategy primarily oriented the PLA towards “safeguarding” its perceived “sovereignty and security” interests in the region counter the United States. At the same time, China’s leaders increasingly cast the armed forces as a practical instrument to defend Beijing’s expanding global interests and to advance its foreign policy goals within the framework of “Major Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics.”

North Korean Forces, Operations & Tactics

OPFOR2 topics and chapters include the strategic environment (intro to North Korea, capabilities & intent, framework for military operations), force structure (KPA: Ground Forces, Navy, Air & Air Defense Force, Strategic Force, Special Operations, Reserve and Paramilitary forces, Internal Security & Intel Services), functional tactics, reconnaissance & security, offensive and defensive actions (operational level divisions & regiments, tactical level, complex operational environments), counterstability actions, electronic intelligence warfare, equipment and capabilities.

North Korea is one of the most militarized countries in the world and remains a critical security challenge for the United States, our Northeast Asian allies, and the international community. The Kim regime has seen itself as free to take destabilizing actions to advance its political goals, including attacks on South Korea, development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, proliferation of weapons, and cyberattacks against civilian infrastructure worldwide.

The Korean Peninsula is a location of strategic interest for the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific Command due to its proximity to China, South Korea’s historical relationship with the U.S. over the past 7 decades, and the booming South Korean economy that makes it an important U.S. trading partner. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, commonly known as North Korea or the DPRK, remains one of the United States’ most critical security challenges for many reasons. These include the country’s provocative and destabilizing behavior, such as unprovoked attacks on the Republic of Korea (South Korea; ROK); its pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles; and its willingness to proliferate weapons in contravention of international treaties. For over 50 years, North Korea has sporadically conducted operations directed against its foes, especially South Korea.

North Korea’s military poses two direct, overlapping challenges to the United States and its allies: a conventional force consisting mostly of artillery and infantry that can attack South Korea with little advance warning, and a ballistic missile arsenal, intended to be armed with nuclear weapons, that is capable of reaching bases and cities in South Korea and Japan, and the U.S. homeland.

North Korea’s conventional military consists of the ground, air, naval, and special operations forces. KPA Ground Forces operate thousands of long-range artillery and rocket systems along the entire length of the DMZ. These weapons include close-range mortars, guns, and multiple rocket launcher systems (MRLs) trained on South Korean military forces deployed north of Seoul, and longer-range self-propelled guns, rockets, and ballistic missiles that can reach Seoul and some points south of the capital. Collectively, this capability holds South Korean citizens and a large number of U.S. and South Korean military installations at risk. The North could use this capability to inflict severe damage and heavy casualties on the South with little warning.

Red Team Army: Forces, Operations & Tactics (OPFOR3-2)

It has been nearly thirty years since a holistic explanation of the Soviet-based Opposing Force (OPFOR) was examined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-2 series. Recognizing this, OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army re-examines and outlines the doctrinal operational construct and historical foundations of Soviet-era military forces from the FM 100-2 series, which is now out-of-print and largely unavailable. Second, OPFOR SMARTbook 3 reorganizes that foundational material and aligns it in keeping with contemporary military doctrinal taxonomy. Third, OPFOR SMARTbook 3 translates and bridges the strategic- and operational-level doctrine into tactical application at the small-unit level. Through this triangulation, a more modern rendition of Red Team Armies emerges.

OPFOR3-2 is the second edition of OPFOR SMARTbook 3 - Red Team Army, completely revised for 2019. In addition to the base FM 100-2-1/2/3 Soviet Threat series, new/updated material includes the FM/TC 7-100 Opposing Forces series, FM 3-0 Operations (Oct ‘17), ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Aug ‘18), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May ‘13), a review of modern (present-day) Russian forces, and more than a dozen historical vignettes. At 264 pgs, this second edition also features an additional 32 pages over the original first edition.

OPFOR3 topics and chapters include an Opposing Force Overview/Introduction, Red Team Army Overview (Military Doctrine, Operational Concept, Personnel & Training, Force Structure, Motorized Rifle Regiment, Modern Russian Land Forces), Offensive Operations (Front & Army Operations, Division and Lower Tactics, Small Unit Tactics), Defensive Operations (Prepared Defense, Hasty Defense, Withdrawal & Relief, Small Unit Tactics), Specialized Warfare (Airborne, Heliborne, Amphibious, Unconventional Warfare), Tactical Enabling Tasks (Reconnaissance, River Crossings, Troop Movement, Relief in Place, Passage of Lines, Checkpoints), Small Unit Drills (Movement & Formations, Dismounted and Mounted Patrols), Urban & Regional Environments (Urban, Mountain, Desert, Cold Wx, and Nighttime Operations), and Rear Area Operations & Logistics.

Editor's Note: Future editions will be updated to focus centrally on modern Russian forces, operations, tactics and lessons learned in the Ukraine.

Forces, Conflicts & Threats

OPFOR4 topics and chapters include the strategic environment, U.S. & Iran relations (Iran’s foreign and defence policies, conflicts and tensions, sanctions), Iran’s military (history, doctrine and strategy, core capabilities), force structure, nuclear and missile threat, regional issues and conflicts (Iran’s partners and proxies, instruments of national security strategy), strategic competition (China, Russia, and others), and terrorist threats (VSEOs, Iran’s support for terrorism, etc.)

Spanning more than 4.6 million square miles, the Middle East has for millennia been a geographic and geopolitical crossroads and site of cooperation, competition, and conflict. Rich in cultural heritage but with unevenly distributed natural resources, the region is also beset by internal conflict and instability. More than a third of global container traffic transits the Suez Canal and more than a quarter of global oil transits the Strait of Hormuz. The region is home to almost 50% of the world’s known oil reserves and more than 40% of the world’s national gas.

The greatest single day-to-day threat to regional security and stability remains Iran, which challenges the U.S. and its allies by pursuing regional hegemony, breaching its JCPOA commitments, and posing a conventional threat to partner nations while facilitating and conducting coercive and malign activities.

To achieve its goals, Iran continues to rely on its unconventional warfare elements and asymmetric capabilities—intended to exploit the perceived weaknesses of a superior adversary—to provide deterrence and project power. This combination of lethal conventional capabilities and proxy forces poses a persistent threat. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force leads Iranian power projection through a complex network of state and nonstate partners and militant proxies.

Iran will continue to use Syrian (and likely Iraqi) territory as a critical hub and resupply route for maintaining its campaign against Israel. Iran will also remain focused on supporting Lebanese Hezbollah, whose illegal weapons stockpiles exceed those of most legitimate partner militaries in the region. The least restrained and most destabilizing of all of Iran’s affiliates in the region are the Houthis of Yemen. Aside from being active combatants in that country’s seven-year-old civil war, they are also engaged in a near-daily long-range fires conflict with Saudi Arabia.

While Iran poses the most ominous threat to the central region, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) operating in the Middle East, Levant, and Central Asian States also represent a danger to security and stability. The Central Command area of responsibility serves as the epicenter of violent extremism, with 19 of 21 top tier terrorist groups operating across the region. ISIS and Al Qaeda are the principal Sunni violent extremist organizations in the Middle East and Levant. Both groups maintain numerous affiliates pursuing local, regional, and global objectives.

Irregular & Hybrid Threat Forces, Operations & Tactics

OPFOR5 topics and chapters include irregular and hybrid threat (components, organizations, strategy, operations, tactics), insurgents and guerillas forces (characteristics, organizations, TTPs), terrorists (motivations, behaviors, organizations, operations and tactics), criminals (characteristics, organizations, activities), noncombatants (armed & unarmed), foreign security forces (FSF) threats, and functional tactics.

A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. The term “hybrid” has recently been used to capture the seemingly increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional categories of conflict. While the existence of innovative adversaries is not new, today’s hybrid approaches demand that U.S. forces prepare for a range of conflicts.

Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.The irregular OPFOR can be part of the hybrid threat (HT). The irregular OPFOR component of the HT can be insurgents, guerrillas, or criminals or any combination thereof. The irregular OPFOR can also include other armed individuals or groups who are not members of a governing authority’s domestic law enforcement organizations or other internal security forces.

Irregular forces are unregulated and as a result act with no restrictions on violence or targets for violence. Time-honored concepts of “conventional” and “unconventional” war and “traditional” methods versus “adaptive” methods are weapons to a hybrid threat. One of the most significant capabilities of the irregular OPFOR is the ability to manipulate and/or ignore the restrictions and sanctions that apply to regulated military forces, law enforcement agencies, and internal security forces belonging to a sovereign state. The ability to combine and transition between regular and irregular forces and operations to capitalize on perceived vulnerabilities makes hybrid threats particularly effective.

Insurgents are armed and/or unarmed individuals or groups who promote an agenda of subversion and violence that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority.

A guerrilla force is a group of irregular, predominantly indigenous personnel organized along military lines to conduct military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held, hostile, or denied territory.

Terrorism is a tactic. Terrorism can be defined as the use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Often motivated by philosophical or other ideological beliefs, objectives are typically political in nature.

Criminal elements exist at every level of society and in every operational environment (OE). Their presence, whatever their level of capabilities, adds to the complexity of any OE.

A host of noncombatants add complexity to any operational environment. Noncombatants are persons not actively participating in combat or actively supporting of any of the forces involved in combat. They can be either armed or unarmed. The irregular OPFOR attempts to manipulate these noncombatants in ways that support its goals and objectives.

Foreign security forces (FSF) are those forces, including, but not limited to military, paramilitary, police, and intelligence forces; border police, coast guard, and customs officials; and prison guards and correctional personnel, that provide security for a host nation and its relevant population or support a regional security organization’s mission. An FSF threat attack is a violent act perpetrated against a U.S. Service member, civilian, or contractor by a FSF member or members who have access to U.S. Service members, civilians, or contractors. The FSF threat is not a new phenomenon; however, during recent limited contingency operations, U.S. forces experienced a sharp increase in the number of attacks perpetrated by FSFs.

Insurgents and guerrillas, as part of the irregular OPFOR, may employ adaptive functional tactics. When planning a tactical action, an irregular OPFOR commander or leader determines what functions must be performed to accomplish the mission. Then he allocates functional responsibilities to his subordinates and synchronizes the effort.