Guide to FM/ADRP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of Combat Power

Sixth Edition (AODS6)
Guide to FM/ADRP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of Combat Power

An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to the joint fight through the conduct of unified land operations.

Unified land operations (ADRP 3-0) describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Unified land operations is the Army's operational concept and the Army's contribution to unified action.

While the U.S. Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, large-scale ground combat against a peer threat represents the most significant readiness requirement. FM 3-0 expands on ADRP 3-0 by providing tactics describing how theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades work together and with unified action partners to successfully prosecute operations short of conflict, prevail in large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains to win.

Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Army forces conduct multi-domain battle, as part of a joint force, to seize, retain, and exploit control over enemy forces. Army forces deter adversaries, restrict enemy freedom of action, and ensure freedom of maneuver and action in multiple domains for the joint force commander.

Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. To an Army commander, Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions.

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Army Operations
An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to the joint fight through the conduct of unified land operations.

Chap 1: Unified Land Operations (ADRP 3-0)
Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations, in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Unified land operations is the Army’s operational concept and the Army’s contribution to unified action.

Chap 2: Large-Scale Combat Operations (FM 3-0)
While the U.S. Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, large-scale ground combat against a peer threat represents the most significant readiness requirement. FM 3-0 expands on ADRP 3-0 by providing tactics describing how theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades work together and with unified action partners to successfully prosecute operations short of conflict, prevail in large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains to win enduring strategic outcomes.

The Elements of Combat Power
To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.

Leadership & Information
Commanders apply leadership through mission command. Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power. Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve definitive results.
The Six Warfighting Functions

Chap 3: Mission Command (ADP/ADRP 6-0)
The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force as they exercise mission command.

Chap 4: Movement and Maneuver (ADP/ADRP 3-90)
The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a position of advantage over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area.

Chap 5: Intelligence (ADP/ADRP 2-0)
The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. This warfighting function includes understanding threats, adversaries, and weather. It synchronizes information collection with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders and is more than just collection. Developing intelligence is a continuous process that involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation.

Chap 6: Fires (ADP/ADRP 3-09)
The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. Army fires systems deliver fires in support of offensive and defensive tasks to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target.

Chap 7: Sustainment (ADP/ADRP 4-0)
The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment.

Chap 8: Protection (ADP/ADRP 3-37)
The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States and multinational military and civilian partners, to include the host nation. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and then counters or mitigates those threats.
The following references were used to compile The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook. All references are available to the general public and designated as “approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive material restricted from public release.

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An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to the joint fight through the conduct of unified land operations. Unified land operations are simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action (ADRP 3-0). ADP 3-0 is the Army’s basic warfighting doctrine and is the Army’s contribution to unified action.

I. An Operational Environment

An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders at all levels have their own operational environments for their particular operations. An operational environment for any specific operation is not just isolated conditions of interacting variables that exist within a specific area of operations. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that impact on conditions and operations there. Thus, each commander’s operational environment is part of a higher commander’s operational environment.

Operational environments include considerations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. At the strategic level, leaders develop an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives, with the focus being on the design, planning, and execution of operations using operational art. Finally, the tactical level of warfare involves the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. The levels of warfare assist commanders in visualizing a logical arrangement of forces, in allocating resources, and in assigning tasks based on conditions within their operational environment.

See pp. 1-21 to 1-32 for a discussion of operational art.

Important trends such as globalization, urbanization, technological advances, and failed or failing states can affect land operations. These trends can drive instability in an operational environment as well as a continuing state of persistent conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors who are willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. In such an operational environment, commanders must seek opportunities for exploiting success. Opportunities may include greater cooperation among the local population of a town or perhaps the ability to advance forces along a previously unsecured route. To exploit opportunities successfully, commanders must thoroughly understand the changing nature of an operational environment. In understanding an evolving operational environment, commanders must identify how previous experience within the current or a similar operational environment has changed or is no longer applicable and can actually detract from mission success.

Enemies are developing the capability to mass effects from multiple domains at a speed that will impact ongoing operations. Operations in the information environment and cyberspace will attempts to influence U.S. decision makers and disrupt any
force deployment activities. Land-based threats will attempt to impede joint force freedom of movement and action across all domains, disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum, hinder the information environment, and challenge human perceptions. Just as the enemy will attempt to present multiple dilemmas to land forces from the other domains, Army commanders must seize opportunities across multiple domains to enable their own land operations, as well as the operations of our unified actions partners in the other domains.

Modern information technology makes the information environment, inclusive of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, indispensable for human interaction, including military operations and political competition. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (JP 3-13) This environment inherently impacts an operational environment, and that environment will be simultaneously congested and contested during operations. All actors—enemy, friendly, or neutral—remain vulnerable to attack by physical, psychological, cyber, or electronic means, or a combination thereof. Additionally, actions in and through cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum can affect other actors.

Refer to JP 3-12 (R) for more information on cyberspace operations and the electromagnetic spectrum.

An operational environment consists of many interrelated variables and subvariables, as well as the relationships and interactions among those variables and subvariables. How the many entities and conditions behave and interact with each other within an operational environment is difficult to discern and always results in differing circumstances. Different actor or audience types do not interpret a single message in the same way. Therefore, no two operational environments are the same.

In addition, an operational environment continually evolves. This evolution results from humans interacting within an operational environment as well as from their ability to learn and adapt. As people take action in an operational environment, they change that environment. Other variables may also change an operational environment. Some changes are anticipated, while others are not. Some changes are immediate and apparent, while other changes evolve over time or are extremely difficult to detect. For example, an enemy force adjusting its geographic position may be easy to detect, whereas changes in a population’s demographics or political views may be more subtle and may take longer to understand.

The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment may make determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and may contribute to the uncertainty of military operations. Commanders must continually assess and reassess their operational environments. They seek a greater understanding of how the changing nature of threats and other variables affect not only their forces but other actors as well. To do this, commanders and their staffs may use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an operational environment in support of the operations process.

A. Operational and Mission Variables

An operational environment for each operation differs and evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational variables to analyze and understand a specific operational environment. They use mission variables to focus on specific elements of an operational environment during mission analysis.

Operational Variables (PMESII-PT)

Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment, but also the population’s influence...
An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to the joint fight through the conduct of unified land operations. Unified land operations are simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains to prevent conflict, shape the operational environment, and win our Nation’s wars as part of unified action (ADRP 3-0). ADP 3-0 is the Army’s basic warfighting doctrine and is the Army’s contribution to unified action.
Threats and Hazards

Ref: ADRP 3-0, Operations (Nov ‘16), pp. 1-3 to 1-4.

Threats are a fundamental part of an overall operational environment for any operation. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Commanders and staffs must understand how current and potential threats organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. They must continually identify, monitor, and assess threats as they adapt and change over time. In general, the various actors in any operational area can qualify as an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend.

Enemy
An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war. Enemies will apply advanced technologies (such as a cyberspace attack) as well as simple and dual-use technologies (such as improvised explosive devices). Enemies avoid U.S. strengths (such as long-range surveillance and precision strike) through traditional countermeasures (such as dispersion, concealment, and intermingling with civilian populations).

Adversary
An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).

Neutral
A neutral is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly, adversary, or enemy forces.

Friendly
Finally, a friendly is an individual or group that is perceived to be supportive of U.S. efforts. Land operations often prove complex because an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another.

Hybrid Threat
The term hybrid threat captures the seemingly increased complexity of operations, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional elements of conflict. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects. Hybrid threats combine traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act with no restrictions on violence or target selection. These may involve nation-state actors, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or nonstate actors such as criminal and terrorist organizations that employ protracted forms of warfare using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with states.

Hazard
Although not strictly viewed as a threat, a hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Hazardous conditions or natural phenomena are able to damage or destroy life, vital resources, and institutions, or prevent mission accomplishment. Understanding hazards and their effects on operations allows the commander to better understand the terrain, weather, and various other factors that best support the mission. Understanding hazards also helps the commander visualize potential impacts on operations. Successful interpretation of the environment aids in correctly opposing threat courses of action within a given geographical region. Hazards include disease, extreme weather phenomena, solar flares, and areas contaminated by toxic materials.
Hostile state actors may attempt to overwhelm defense systems and impose a high cost on the United States to intervene in a contingency or crisis. State and nonstate actors attempt to apply technology to disrupt the U.S. advantages in communications, long-range precision-guided munitions, movement and maneuver, and surveillance. Enemy actions seek to reduce the U.S. ability to achieve dominance in the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Army forces cannot always depend on an advantage in technology, communications, and information collection. They must account for what adversaries and enemies know about friendly capabilities and how Army forces operate. Army forces must anticipate how enemies will adapt their operations and use their capabilities to struggle for superiority in important portions of the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Additionally, to accomplish political objectives, enemy organizations may expand operations to the United States. Enemies and adversaries may operate beyond physical battlegrounds. Enemies often subvert friendly efforts by infiltrating U.S. and partner forces (acting as insider threats) and by using cyberspace attacks, while using propaganda and disinformation through social media to affect public perception.

Enemies and adversaries may pursue anti-access and area-denial capabilities. Such efforts make U.S. power projection increasingly risky and enable near-peer competitors and regional powers to extend their coercive strength well beyond their borders. In the most challenging scenarios, the United States may be unable to employ forces the way it has in the past. For example, the ability of U.S. forces to build up combat power in an area, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conduct operations when and where desired may be significantly challenged. Additionally, enemies may employ cyberspace attack capabilities (such as disruptive and destructive malware), battlefield jammers, and space capabilities (such as anti-satellite weapons) to disrupt U.S. communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; synchronization; and freedom of maneuver. Finally, enemies may attempt to strike at homeland installations to disrupt or delay deployment of forces. These types of threats are not specific to any single theater of operations, and they create problematic consequences for international security. Such an environment can induce instability or erode the credibility of U.S. deterrence, and it may weaken U.S. international alliances, including associated trade, economic, and diplomatic agreements.

Concurrent with state challenges, violent extremist organizations work to undermine transregional security in areas such as the Middle East and North Africa. Such groups are dedicated to radicalizing populations, spreading violence, and leveraging terror to impose their visions of societal organization. They are strongest where governments are weakest, exploiting people trapped in fragile or failed states. In many locations, violent extremist organizations coexist with transnational criminal organizations, and both organizations conduct illicit trade and spread corruption, further undermining security and stability. Also, actions by computer hacking and political extremist groups create havoc, undermine security, and increase challenges to stability.

For Army forces, the dynamic relationships among friendly forces, enemy forces, and populations make land operations dynamic and complicated. Regardless of the location or threat, Army forces must synchronize actions across multiple domains to achieve unity of effort that ensures mission accomplishment. Commanders and staffs must be prepared to adapt and thrive in environments where problems bind actors together rather than formal authorities.

Refer to CTS1: The Counterterrorism, WMD & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook for further discussion. CTS1 topics and chapters include: the terrorist threat (characteristics, goals & objectives, organization, state-sponsored, international, and domestic), hybrid and future threats, forms of terrorism (tactics, techniques, & procedures), counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, protection planning and preparation, countering WMD, and consequence management (all hazards response).
C. Close Combat


Close combat is indispensable and unique to land operations. Only on land do combatants routinely and in large numbers come face-to-face with one another. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them. The outcome of battles and engagements depends on Army forces’ ability to prevail in close combat.

The complexity of urban terrain and density of noncombatants reduce the effectiveness of advanced sensors and long-range and air-delivered weapons. Thus, a weaker enemy often attempts to negate Army advantages by engaging Army forces in urban environments. Operations in large, densely populated areas require special considerations. From a planning perspective, commanders view cities as both topographic features and a dynamic system of varying operational entities containing hostile forces, local populations, and infrastructure.

Regardless of the importance of technological capabilities, success in operations requires Soldiers to accomplish the mission. Today’s operational environment requires professional Soldiers and leaders whose character, commitment, and competence represent the foundation of a values-based, trained, and ready Army. Today’s Soldiers and leaders adapt and learn while training to perform tasks both individually and collectively. Soldiers and leaders develop the ability to exercise judgment and disciplined initiative under stress. Army leaders and their subordinates must remain—

- Honorable servants of the Nation.
- Competent and committed professionals.
- Dedicated to living by and upholding the Army Ethic.
- Able to articulate mission orders to operate within their commander’s intent.
- Committed to developing their subordinates and creating shared understanding while building mutual trust and cohesion.
- Courageous enough to accept prudent risk and exercise disciplined initiative while seeking to exploit opportunities in a dynamic and complex operational environment.
- Trained to operate across the range of military operations.
- Able to operate in combined arms teams within unified action and leverage other capabilities in achieving their objectives.
- Apply cultural understanding to make the right decisions and take the right actions.
- Opportunistic and offensively minded.

Effective close combat relies on lethality with a high degree of situational understanding. The capacity for physical destruction is a foundation of all other military capabilities, and it is the most basic building block of military operations. Army leaders organize, equip, train, and employ their formations for unmatched lethality over a wide range of conditions. Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence suffices to accomplish the mission through nonlethal engagements and activities. An inherent, complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes.

Refer to SUTS2: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. Chapters and topics include tactical mission fundamentals, the offense, the defense, stability and counterinsurgency operations, tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement), special purpose attacks (ambush and raid), urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold region, mountain, and jungle operations), patrols and patrolling.
II. Operational Art

I. The Application of Operational Art

Prior to conducting land operations, Army commanders seek to thoroughly analyze an operational environment and determine the most effective and efficient methods for applying decisive action in various locations across multiple echelons and multiple domains. They use operational art and the principles of joint operations to envision how to establish conditions that accomplish their missions and achieve assigned objectives. Actions and interactions across the levels of warfare influence these conditions.

A. Operational Art

Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. This approach enables commanders and staffs to use skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to overcome the ambiguity and intricacies of a complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environment. Operational art applies to all aspects of operations and integrates ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk. Operational art applies to all levels of warfare, strategic, operational, and tactical. Army commanders focus on planning and executing operations and activities to achieve military objectives in support of the joint force commander’s campaign plan.

B. Principles of Joint Operations

The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations across the levels of warfare. (See table 2-1 on page 2-2.) Rather than a checklist, the principles are considerations. While commanders consider the principles in all operations, they do not apply in the same way to every situation. Nor do all principles apply to all situations. Rather, these principles summarize characteristics of successful operations. Their greatest value lies in educating military professionals. Applied to the study of past operations, these principles are powerful tools that can assist commanders in analyzing pending operations. While considering the principles of joint operations, commanders synchronize efforts and determine if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation. See following page (p. 1-23) for a detailed discussion on the principles of joint operations from JP 3-0.

When applying operational art, commanders and staff must create a shared understanding of purpose. This begins with open, continuous collaboration and dialogue between commanders at various echelons of command. Such collaboration and dialogue enables commanders to share an understanding of the problems and conditions of an operational environment. Effective collaboration facilitates assessment, fosters critical analysis, and anticipates opportunities and risk.

Operational art spans a continuum—from comprehensive strategic direction to tactical actions. Bridging this continuum requires creative vision coupled with broad
experience and knowledge. Through operational art, commanders translate their operational approach into a concept of operations—a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources (JP 5-0)—and ultimately into tactical tasks. Commanders then array forces and maneuver them to achieve a desired end state.

C. Army Design Methodology

Army design methodology assists commanders in developing their operational approach. Applying operational art requires a shared understanding of an operational environment with the problem analyzed through the Army design methodology. This understanding enables commanders to develop an operational approach to guide the force in establishing those conditions to win and accomplish the mission. The operational approach is a description of the broad actions the force must take to transform current conditions into those desired at end state (JP 5-0). Commanders use a common doctrinal language to visualize and describe their operational approach. The operational approach provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations.

Refer to ATP 5-0.1 for more information on Army design methodology.

II. Defeat and Stability Mechanisms

When developing an operational approach, commanders consider how to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms are dominated by offensive and defensive tasks, while stability mechanisms are dominant in stability tasks that establish and maintain security and facilitate consolidating gains in an area of operations.

A. Defeat Mechanism

A defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition. Army forces at all echelons use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Applying focused combinations produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. Used individually, a defeat mechanism achieves results proportional to the effort expended. Used in combination, the effects are likely to be both synergistic and lasting.

When commanders destroy, they apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. The enemy cannot restore a destroyed force to a usable condition without entirely rebuilding it.
Dislocate
Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy’s dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. Commanders often achieve dislocation by placing forces in locations where the enemy does not expect them.

Disintegrate
Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy’s command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s capabilities or will to fight. Commanders often achieve disintegration by specifically targeting the enemy’s command structure and communications systems.

Isolate
Isolate is a tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off—both physically and psychologically—an enemy from sources of support, deny the enemy freedom of movement, and prevent the isolated enemy force from having contact with other enemy forces (FM 3-90-1). When commanders isolate, they deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable an enemy unit to maneuver in time and space at will.

Commanders describe a defeat mechanism as the physical, temporal, or psychological effects it produces. Operational art formulates the most effective, efficient way to defeat enemy aims. Physically defeating the enemy deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims. Temporally defeating the enemy anticipates enemy reactions and counters them before they can become effective. Psychologically defeating the enemy deprives the enemy of the will to continue the conflict.

In addition to defeating an enemy, Army forces often seek to stabilize an area of operations by performing stability tasks. There are six primary stability tasks:

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support governance.
- Support economic and infrastructure development.
- Conduct security cooperation.

The combination of stability tasks conducted during operations depends on the situation. In some operations, the host nation can meet most or all of the population’s requirements. In those cases, Army forces work with and through host-nation authorities. Commanders use civil affairs operations to mitigate how the military presence affects the population and vice versa. Conversely, Army forces operating in a failed state may need to support the well-being of the local population. That situation requires Army forces to work with civilian organizations to restore basic capabilities. Civil affairs operations prove essential in establishing the trust between Army forces and civilian organizations required for effective, working relationships.

B. Stability Mechanism

A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.

The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions,
attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy targets and audiences through messages, presence, and actions. Support is to establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

III. The Elements of Operational Art

In applying operational art, Army commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help them understand an operational environment as well as visualize and describe their approach for conducting an operation. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements of operational art. These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe the integration and synchronization of the elements of combat power as well as their commander’s intent and guidance. Commanders selectively use these tools in any operation. However, the tools’ broadest application applies to long-term operations.

Not all elements of operational art apply at all levels of warfare. For example, a company commander may be concerned about the tempo of an upcoming operation but is probably not concerned with an enemy’s center of gravity. On the other hand, a corps commander may consider all elements of operational art in developing a plan in support of the joint force commander. As such, the elements of operational art are flexible enough to be applicable when pertinent.

As some elements of operational design apply only to joint force commanders, the Army modifies the elements of operational design into elements of operational art, adding Army-specific elements. During the planning and execution of Army operations, Army commanders and staffs consider the elements of operational art as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the operation unfolds, and reframe as necessary.

Ref: ADRP 3-0 (2016), table 2-2. Elements of operational art.

A. End State and Conditions

The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Commanders include the end state in their planning guidance. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort; facilitates integration, synchronization, and disciplined initiative; and helps mitigate risk.

Army operations typically focus on achieving the military end state that may include contributions to establishing nonmilitary conditions. Commanders explicitly describe the end state and its conditions for every operation. Otherwise, missions become vague, and operations lose focus. Successful commanders direct every operation toward a clearly defined, conclusive, and attainable end state (the objective).

The end state may evolve as an operation progresses. Commanders continuously monitor operations and evaluate their progress. Commanders use formal and informal assessment methods to assess their progress in achieving the end state and determine if they need to reframe. The end state should anticipate future operations and set conditions for transitions. The end state should help commanders think through the conduct of operations to best facilitate transitions.
Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.

1. Offensive Tasks
An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive tasks impose the commander’s will on the enemy. Against a capable, adaptive enemy, the offense is the most direct and sure means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain physical and psychological advantages and achieve definitive results. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action against an enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation does not destroy the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces disintegrate or retreat to where they no longer pose a threat. Executing offensive tasks compels the enemy to react, creating or revealing additional weaknesses that the attacking force can exploit. See pp. 4-2 to 4-3 and SUTS2: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 2nd Ed (ADRP 3-90)

2. Defensive Tasks
A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks. Normally the defense alone cannot achieve a decisive victory. However, it can set conditions for a counteroffensive or counterattack that enables Army forces to regain the initiative. Defensive tasks are a counter to the enemy offense. They defeat attacks, destroying as much of the attacking enemy as possible. They also preserve and maintain control over land, resources, and populations. The purpose of defensive tasks is to retain key terrain, guard populations, protect lines of communications, and protect critical capabilities against enemy attacks and counterattacks. Commanders can conduct defensive tasks to gain time and economize forces so offensive tasks can be executed elsewhere. See pp. 4-2 to 4-3 and SUTS2: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. (ADRP 3-90)
3. Stability Tasks

Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-07). These tasks support governance, whether it is imposed by a host nation, an interim government, or military government. Stability tasks involve both coercive and constructive actions. They help to establish or maintain a safe and secure environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability tasks assist in building relationships among unified action partners, and promote specific U.S. security interests. Stability tasks can also help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting the transition to legitimate host-nation governance. Stability tasks cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. Stability tasks must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability.

See pp. 4-4 to 4-5 and TAA2: The Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. (ADRP 3-07)

4. Defense Support of Civil Authority Tasks

Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by United States Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events (DODD 3025.18). For Army forces, defense support of civil authorities is a task that takes place only in the homeland and U.S. territories. Defense support of civil authorities is conducted in support of another primary or lead federal agency, or in some cases, local authorities.

See pp. 4-6 to 4-7 and HDS1: Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook. (JP 3-28)
Simultaneity & Transitioning

The mission determines the relative weight of effort among the elements.

Ref: ADRP 3-0 (2016), fig. 3-1. Decisive action.

Army forces increase the depth of their operations in time and space through combined arms, economy of force, continuous reconnaissance, advanced information systems, and joint capabilities. Because Army forces conduct operations across large areas, the enemy faces many potential friendly actions. Executing operations in depth is equally important in security; commanders act to keep threats from operating outside the reach of friendly forces. In defense support of civil authorities and some stability tasks, depth includes conducting operations that reach all citizens in the area of operations, bringing relief as well as hope.

See p. 1-47 for discussion of depth as a tenet of unified land operations.

Transitioning in Decisive Action

Conducting decisive action involves more than simultaneous execution of all its tasks. It requires commanders and staffs to consider their units’ capabilities and capacities relative to each task. Commanders consider their missions; decide which tactics, techniques, and procedures to use; and balance the tasks of decisive action while preparing their commander’s intent and concept of operations. They determine which tasks the force can accomplish simultaneously, if phasing is required, what additional resources it may need, and how to transition from one task to another.
IV. Operations Structure

Ref: ADRP 3-0, Operations (Nov ‘16), chap. 4.

The operations structure—the operations process, warfighting functions, and the operational framework—is the Army’s common construct for unified land operations. It allows Army leaders to rapidly and effectively organize efforts in a manner commonly understood across the Army. The operations process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The warfighting functions provide a common organization for critical functions. The operational framework provides Army leaders with basic conceptual options for arraying forces and visualizing and describing operations.

I. The Operations Process

The operations process consists of the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. The operations process is a commander-led activity, informed by mission command. These activities may be sequential or simultaneous. In fact, they are rarely discrete and often involve a great deal of overlap. Commanders use the operations process to drive the planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their unique operational environments; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

See following page (p. 1-51) for an overview of the operations process from ADP 5-0.

Planning is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning consists of two separate but interrelated components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. Successful planning requires the integration of both these components. Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning: the Army design methodology, the military decisionmaking process, and troop leading procedures. Commanders determine how much of each methodology to use based on the scope of the problem, their familiarity with the methodology, the echelon, and the time available to the staffs.

See p. 1-56 for an overview of the Army planning methodologies.

Preparation consists of activities that units perform to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations, as well as setting conditions for successful execution.

Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and by using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. In execution, commanders, staffs, and subordinate commanders focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. They apply combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage. This is the essence of unified land operations.

Assessment is determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes and then occurs during the other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward achieving the desired end state, attaining objectives, and performing tasks.
II. Elements of Combat Power

To execute operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.

See pp. 1-60 to 1-61 for an overview and discussion of the elements of combat power (and the six warfighting functions).

III. Army Operational Framework

Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. They do this through an operational framework and associated vocabulary. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01).

See following pages (pp. 1-52 to 1-53) for an overview and further discussion.
The Army Operational Framework
Ref: ADRP 3-0, Operations (Nov ‘16), pp. 4-4 to 4-8. See also AODS6 pp. 2-14 to 2-21.

Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. They do this through an operational framework & associated vocabulary. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). An operational framework establishes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the commander and provides a way to visualize how the commander will employ forces against the enemy.

The operational framework has four components. First, commanders are assigned an area of operations for the conduct of operations. Second, a commander can designate a deep, close, and support areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time and space. Third, within this area, commanders conduct decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to articulate the operation in terms of purpose. Finally, commanders designate the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting prioritization of resources.

Area of Operations
An area of operations is an operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations assigned by Army commanders to their subordinate echelons as well. In operations, commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fires and maneuver, and control combat operations. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADRP 6-0). One of the most important control measures is the area of operations. The Army commander or joint force land component commander is the supported commander within an area of operations designated by the joint force commander for land operations. Within their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize combat power. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and timing within their areas of operations.

Area of Influence
Commanders consider a unit’s area of influence when assigning it an area of operations. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control (JP 3-0).

Understanding the area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities outside the area of operations.

Area of Interest
An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). An area of interest for stability or DSCA tasks may be much larger than that area associated with the offense and defense.
Deep, Close and Support Areas

• A deep area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is not assigned to subordinate units. Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. A commander’s deep area generally extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries out to the limits of the commander’s designated area of operations. The purpose of operations in the deep area is frequently tied to other events distant in time, space, or both time and space.

• The close area is the portion of a commander’s area of operations assigned to subordinate maneuver forces. Operations in the close area are operations that are within a subordinate commander’s area of operations. Commanders plan to conduct decisive operations using maneuver and fires in the close area, and they position most of the maneuver force within it. Within the close area, depending on the echelon, one unit may conduct the decisive operation while others conduct shaping operations. A close operation requires speed and mobility to rapidly concentrate overwhelming combat power at the critical time and place and to exploit success.

• In operations, a commander may refer to a support area. The support area is the portion of the commander’s area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations.

Decisive–Shaping–Sustaining Operations

Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations lend themselves to a broad conceptual orientation.

• The decisive operation is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. It determines the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders design an entire operation. Multiple subordinate units may be engaged in the same decisive operation. Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of a commander’s intent. Commanders typically identify a single decisive operation, but more than one subordinate unit may play a role in a decisive operation.

• A shaping operation is an operation that establishes conditions for the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. Information operations, for example, may integrate soldier and leader engagement tasks into the operation to reduce tensions between Army units and different ethnic groups through direct contact between Army leaders and local leaders. In combat, synchronizing the effects of aircraft, artillery fires, and obscurants to delay or disrupt repositioning forces illustrates shaping operations. Shaping operations may occur throughout the area of operations and involve any combination of forces and capabilities. Shaping operations set conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Commanders may designate more than one shaping operation.

• A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power. Sustaining operations differ from decisive and shaping operations in that they focus internally (on friendly forces) rather than externally (on the enemy or environment).

Main and Supporting Efforts

Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to establish clear priorities of support and resources among subordinate units.

• The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources in order to maximize combat power. Commanders may designate a unit conducting a shaping operation as the main effort until the decisive operation commences. However, the unit with primary responsibility for the decisive operation then becomes the main effort upon the execution of the decisive operation.

• A supporting effort is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. Commanders resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Forces often realize success of the main effort through success of supporting efforts.
I. Overview

Threats to U.S. interests throughout the world are countered by the ability of U.S. forces to respond to a wide variety of challenges along a conflict continuum that spans from peace to war as shown in figure 1-1.

**Operations Across the Conflict Continuum**

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct ‘17), fig. 1-1. The conflict continuum and the range of military operations.

**Range of Military Operations**

U.S. forces conduct a range of military operations to respond to these challenges. The conflict continuum does not proceed smoothly from stable peace to general war and back. For example, unstable peace may erupt into an insurgency that quickly sparks additional violence throughout a region, leading to a general war.

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose within a backdrop of the conflict continuum. All operations along this range share a common fundamental purpose—to achieve or contribute to national objectives. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities build networks and relationships with partners, shape regions, keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict, and maintain U.S. global influence. Typically, crisis response and limited contingency operations are focused in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a specific strategic or operational-level objective in an operational area. Large-scale combat operations occur in the form of major operations and campaigns aimed at defeating an enemy’s armed forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives.

See pp. 1-14 to 1-15 for related discussion of joint operations, unified action, and the range of military operations from JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17).

**Large-Scale Combat Operations**

Large-scale combat operations are at the far right of the conflict continuum and associated with war. Historically, battlefields in large-scale combat operations have been more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive than those the Army has experienced.
Multi-Domain Extended Battlefield


The interrelationship of the air, land, maritime, space, and the information environment (including cyberspace) requires a cross-domain understanding of an OE. Commanders and staffs must understand friendly and enemy capabilities that reside in each domain. From this understanding, commanders can better identify windows of opportunity during operations to converge capabilities for best effect. Since many friendly capabilities are not organic to Army forces, commanders and staffs plan, coordinate for, and integrate joint and other unified action partner capabilities in a multi-domain approach to operations.

A multi-domain approach to operations is not new. Army forces have effectively integrated capabilities and synchronized actions in the air, land, and maritime domains for decades. Rapid and continued advances in technology and the military application of new technologies to the space domain, the EMS, and the information environment (particularly cyberspace) require special consideration in planning and converging effects from across all domains.

See p. 1-42 for related discussion from ADRP 3-90.

Space Domain

The space domain is the space environment, space assets, and terrestrial resources required to access and operate in, to, or through the space environment (FM 3-14). Space is a physical domain like land, sea, and air within which military activities are conducted. Proliferation of advanced space technology provides more widespread access to space-enabled technologies than in the past. Adversaries have developed their own systems, while commercially available systems allow almost universal access to some level of space enabled capability with military applications. Army forces must be prepared to operate in a denied, degraded and disrupted space operational environment (D3SOE).

Refer to FM 3-14 for doctrine on Army space operations.

Information Environment

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). The information environment is not separate or distinct from the OE but is inextricably part of it. Any activity that occurs in the information environment simultaneously occurs in and affects one or more of the physical domains. Most threat forces recognize the importance of the information environment and emphasize information warfare as part of their strategic and operational methods.

The information environment is comprised of three dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. The physical dimension includes the connective infrastructure that supports the transmission, reception, and storage of information.

Across the globe, information is increasingly available in near-real time. The ability to access this information, from anywhere, at any time, broadens and accelerates human interaction across multiple levels, including person to person, person to organization, person to government, and government to government. Social media, in particular, enables the swift mobilization of people and resources around ideas and causes, even before they are fully understood. Disinformation and propaganda create malign narratives that can propagate quickly and instill an array of emotions and behaviors from anarchy to focused violence. From a military standpoint, information enables decision making, leadership, and combat power; it is also key to seizing, gaining, and retaining the initiative, and to consolidating gains in an OE. Army commanders conduct information operations to affect the information environment.

Refer to FM 3-13 for doctrine on the information environment and the various information-related capabilities available to commanders.
Cyberspace and the Electromagnetic Spectrum
Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12[R]). Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media, and technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace.

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct '17), fig. 1-2. Cyberspace in the multi-domain extended battlefield. Cyberspace is an extensive and complex global network of wired and wireless links connecting nodes that permeate every domain. Networks cross geographic and political boundaries connecting individuals, organizations, and systems around the world. Cyberspace is socially enabling, allowing interactivity among individuals, groups, organizations, and nation-states.

Refer to CYBER: The Cyberspace Operations SMARTbook (in development). U.S. armed forces operate in an increasingly network-based world. The proliferation of information technologies is changing the way humans interact with each other and their environment, including interactions during military operations. This broad and rapidly changing operational environment requires that today's armed forces must operate in cyberspace and leverage an electromagnetic spectrum that is increasingly competitive, congested, and contested.
III. Peer Threats in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ’17), pp. 1-9 to 1-11.

A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0). Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. In general, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or an adversary:

- An **enemy** is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADRP 3-0). An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war.
- An **adversary** is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).

See p. 1-6 to 1-7 for related discussion of threats and hazards from ADRP 3-0.

While ADRP 3-0 addresses various threats across the range of military operations, FM 3-0 is focused on peer threats in large-scale combat operations. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains world-wide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power in geographical proximity to a conflict area with U.S. forces. A peer threat may also have a cultural affinity to specific regions, providing them relative advantages in terms of time, space, and sanctuary. Peers threats generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges that are an order of magnitude more challenging militarily than those the U.S. Army has faced since the end of the Cold War.

Peer threats employ strategies that capitalize on their capabilities to achieve their objectives. When these objectives are at odds with the interests of the United States and its allies, conflict becomes more likely. Peer threats prefer to achieve their goals without directly engaging U.S. forces in combat. They often employ information warfare in combination with conventional and irregular military capabilities to achieve their goals. During a conflict, peer threats will try to weaken the resolve of the United States and its partners to sustain conflict. They will exploit friendly sensitivity to world opinion and attempt to exploit American domestic opinion and sensitivity to friendly casualties. Peer threats believe they have a comparative advantage because of their willingness to endure greater hardship, casualties, and negative public opinion.

Peer threats employ their resources across multiple domains to attack U.S. vulnerabilities. They use their capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal effects throughout an OE. During combat operations, threats seek to inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short period of time. They seek to delay friendly forces long enough to achieve their goals and end hostilities before friendly forces reach culmination. Peer threats will employ various methods to employ their national elements of power to render U.S. military power irrelevant. Five broad peer threat methods, often used in combination, include—

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<th>Peer Threat Methods</th>
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<td>Information Warfare</td>
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<td>Sanctuary</td>
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<td>Systems Warfare</td>
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IV. The Army in Joint Operations

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), pp. 1-14 to 1-16.

Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specific command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces. Traditionally, campaigns are the most extensive joint operations, in terms of the amount of forces and other capabilities committed and the duration of operations. In the context of large-scale combat operations, a campaign is a series of related major operations achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes, and it is the primary building block of a campaign. Army forces conduct supporting operations as part of a joint campaign.

See pp. 1-14 to 1-15 for further discussion of joint operations, unified action, and the range of military operations from JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17).

The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force in four strategic roles: shape operational environments, prevent conflict, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which the U.S. Army is organized, trained, and equipped.

U.S. Army Strategic Roles


A. Shape Operational Environments

Army operations to shape bring together all the activities intended to promote regional stability and to set conditions for a favorable outcome in the event of a military confrontation. Army operations to shape help dissuade adversary activities designed to achieve regional goals short of military conflict. As part of operations to shape, the Army provides trained and ready forces to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) in support of their theater campaign plan. The theater army and subordinate Army forces assist the GCC in building partner capacity and capability and promoting stability across the AOR. Army operations to shape are continuous throughout a GCC’s AOR and occur before, during, and after a joint operation within a specific operational area.

Shaping activities include security cooperation and forward presence to promote U.S. interests, developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Regionally aligned and engaged Army forces are essential to achieving objectives to strengthen the global network of multinational partners and preventing conflict.

See pp. 2-37 to 2-42 for a description of Army forces, as part of a joint team, shape operational environments.
B. Prevent Conflict
Army operations to prevent include all activities to deter an adversary’s undesirable actions. These operations are an extension of operations to shape designed to prevent adversary opportunities to further exploit positions of relative advantage by raising the potential costs to adversaries of continuing activities that threaten U.S. interests. Prevent activities are generally weighted toward actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and to indicate U.S. intent to execute subsequent phases of a planned operation. As part of a joint force, Army forces may have a significant role in the execution of directed FDOs. Additionally, Army prevent activities may include mobilization, force tailoring, and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater to include echeloning command posts; employment of intelligence collection assets; and development of intelligence, communications, sustainment, and protection infrastructure to support the JFC’s concept of operations.
See pp. 2-43 to 2-60 discussion of prevent conflict.

C. Conduct Large-Scale Ground Combat
During large-scale combat operations, Army forces focus on the defeat and destruction of enemy ground forces as part of the joint team. Army forces close with and destroy enemy forces in any terrain, exploit success, and break their opponent’s will to resist. Army forces attack, defend, conduct stability tasks, and consolidate gains to attain national objectives. Divisions and corps are the formations central to the conduct of large-scale combat operations, organized, trained and equipped to enable subordinate organizations. The ability to prevail in ground combat is a decisive factor in breaking an enemy’s will to continue a conflict.
See pp. 2-61 to 2-68 for discussion of large-scale ground combat.

D. Consolidate Gains
Army operations to consolidate gains include activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable environment, allowing for a transition of control to legitimate civil authorities. Consolidation of gains is an integral and continuous part of armed conflict, and it is necessary for achieving success across the range of military operations. Army forces deliberately plan to consolidate gains during all phases of an operation. Early and effective consolidation activities are a form of exploitation conducted while other operations are ongoing, and they enable the achievement of lasting favorable outcomes in the shortest time span. Army forces conduct these activities with unified action partners. In some instances, Army forces will be in charge of integrating forces and synchronizing activities to consolidate gains. In other situations, Army forces will be in support. Army forces may conduct stability tasks for a sustained period of time over large land areas. While Army forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, consolidating gains becomes the focus of Army forces after large-scale combat operations have concluded.
See pp. 2-101 to 2-110 for discussion of consolidate gains.

Win
Winning is the achievement of the purpose of an operation and the fulfillment of its objectives. The Army wins when it successfully performs its roles as part of the joint force during operations. It wins when it effectively shapes an OE for combatant commanders, and when it responds rapidly with enough combat power to prevent war through deterrence during crisis. When required to fight, the Army’s ability to prevail in ground combat at any scale becomes a decisive factor in breaking the enemy’s will to continue fighting. The Army wins when an enemy is defeated to such a degree that it can no longer effectively resist, and it agrees to cease hostilities on U.S. terms. To ensure that the military results of combat are not temporary, the Army follows through with its unique scope and scale of capabilities to consolidate gains and win enduring outcomes favorable to U.S. interests.
See p. 2-22 for discussion of paths to victory (win).
II. Army Echelons, Capabilities, and Training

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), chap. 2.

I. Echelons

As the Nation’s decisive land force, the Army provides a mix of headquarters, units, and capabilities to geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) in support of a theater campaign plan (TCP) and specific joint operations. In order to effectively command these organizations, the Army provides an echeloned array of higher headquarters designed toward a specific function or mission. Winning in large-scale ground combat requires Army forces that can integrate landpower in a multi-domain approach to defeat enemy forces and control terrain. The theater army, corps, and division headquarters give the combatant commander several options necessary for the employment of landpower.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army Echelons</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Theater Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>B Corps</td>
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<td>C Divisions</td>
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<td>D Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs)</td>
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<td>E Multifunctional &amp; Functional Brigades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Although not addressed directly in FM 3-0 (because the focus is on large-scale operations), tactical-level echelons from ADRP 3-90 -- fire teams, crews, squads, sections, platoons, companies, batteries, troops and detachments -- are discussed in AODS6 on pp. 4-11 to 4-16.*

Combat Power

The ability of Army forces to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, defeat enemy forces in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains relates to the quantity of combat power they can continuously generate and apply. Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that are integrated, synchronized, and converged with the commander’s objectives to achieve unity of effort in sustained operations. The purpose of combat power is to accomplish missions. See p. 2-36 for discussion of Army capabilities (in terms of combat power).
**A. Theater Army**

The theater army is the senior Army headquarters in an area of responsibility (AOR), and it consists of the commander, staff, and all Army forces assigned to a combatant command. Each theater army has operational and administrative responsibilities. Its operational responsibilities include command of forces, direction of operations, and control of assigned areas of operations (AOs). Its administrative responsibilities encompass the Service-specific requirements for equipping, sustaining, training, unit readiness, discipline, and personnel matters. As required, the theater army provides Army support to other services and common user logistics.

Refer to ATP 3-93 for more information on the theater army.

**Theater Army Organization**

The size and composition of forces available to a theater Army vary based on the combatant commander’s continuing requirements for Army support. During operations to shape and operations to prevent, the theater army may require more sustainment or civil affairs (CA) units. During the conduct of large-scale combat operations, the theater army may be task organized with an Army Air and Missile Defense Command and Army CBRN units to support theater force protection operations. During operations to consolidate gains, the theater army may require more military police units and a theater aviation brigade.

Prior to the outbreak of large-scale ground combat, theater armies usually have access to five enabling capabilities (sustainment, signal, medical, military intelligence, and CA). Figure 2-1 illustrates an example of forces that may be available to a theater army to provide these capabilities. Not every theater army will have the forces shown. In some cases, a brigade is task organized to an Army command (or direct reporting unit), and aligned to the theater army. In other cases, the theater army has a brigade instead of a full command.

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct ‘17), fig. 2-1. Theater enabler organizations

- **Theater Sustainment Command (TSC).** The TSC has AOR-wide responsibilities and manages distribution in subordinate operational areas as directed. The TSC may maintain oversight of sustainment operations or, more likely, execute this oversight through employment of a subordinate expeditionary sustainment command (ESC).

- **Theater-Level Signal Support.** The joint force depends upon an integrated communications architecture that connects strategic, operational, and tactical commanders across the globe.

- **Medical Command (Deployment Support).** The medical command (deployment support) is the senior medical command within a theater.

- **Military Intelligence Brigade-Theater (MIB-T).** A military intelligence brigade-theater (MIB-T) is assigned to the combatant command and may be attached, OPCON, or TACON to the theater Army by the combatant commander. The MIB-T provides regionally focused collection and analysis in support of theater army daily operations requirements and specific joint operations in the AOR.

- **Civil Affairs Command.** Each theater army receives support from an apportioned Reserve Component civil affairs command (CACOM).
E. Multifunctional and Functional Brigades

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), pp. 2-16 to 2-21.

Theater armies, corps, and divisions may be task-organized with an assortment of multifunctional and functional units to support their operations. These brigades add capabilities such as attack and reconnaissance aviation, fires, contracting support, or sustainment. The theater army may tailor subordinate corps and division headquarters with combinations of multifunctional brigades.

Multifunctional Brigades

Multifunctional brigades provide a variety of functions in support of operations. Normally, they are attached to a corps or division, but they may be under the command of a joint or multinational headquarters. Multifunctional support brigades include the CAB, the expeditionary CAB, the field artillery brigade, and the MEB.

Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB). A CAB is organized and equipped to synchronize the operations of multiple aviation battalions simultaneously to support corps or division operations. The CAB provides a corps or division commander with a maneuver advantage that can overcome the constraints of limiting terrain and extended distances. Attack, reconnaissance, utility, and cargo aircraft may maneuver independently under corps or division control in the echelon deep area or within an assigned AO. (FM 3-04)

Expeditionary Combat Aviation Brigade. The expeditionary CAB is a multifunctional unit that is designed to air assault maneuver forces; position personnel, supplies, and equipment; evacuate casualties; conduct personnel recovery; and provide mission command. When task-organized with an attack reconnaissance battalion or attack reconnaissance squadron, expeditionary CABs also provide accurate and timely information collection; provide reaction time and maneuver space; and destroy, defeat, disrupt, or delay enemy forces.

Field Artillery Brigade. A field artillery brigade’s primary task is conducting corps-level strike operations. It is capable of employing Army fires and incorporating electronic warfare (EW). In addition, a brigade can request joint fires and coordinate with airspace control elements. The field artillery brigade can detect and attack targets using a mix of its organic target acquisition and fires capabilities, a supported division’s information collection capabilities, and access to higher echelon headquarters information collection capabilities provided by the intelligence enterprise. (FM 3-09 and ATP 3-09.24)

Maneuver Enhancement Brigade (MEB). The MEB is a multifunctional headquarters designed to perform support area and maneuver support operations for the echelon it supports. Higher echelon commanders base the MEB’s task-organization on identified mission requirements for the echelon it is supporting. The MEB can perform MP, engineer, and CBRN missions simultaneously in addition to all of the doctrinal responsibilities associated with being assigned an AO. (FM 3-81)

Sustainment Brigade. A sustainment brigade is capable of providing general support to one or more divisions, BCTs, multifunctional and functional brigades, ancillary units, and unified action partners. This is in addition to supporting the corps headquarters and headquarters battalion and other units operating in its assigned area. The sustainment brigade’s attached units will normally be comprised of CSSBs. The Army designed the sustainment brigade to command up to seven functional and multifunctional logistics battalions. The brigade focuses on management and distribution of supplies, field services, human resources support, execution of financial management support, and allocation of field echelon maintenance in an assigned area. (ATP 4-93)
Functional Brigades

A functional brigade is a brigade or group that provides a single function or capability. These brigades can provide support for a theater, corps, or division, depending upon how each is tailored. Functional brigade organization varies extensively. Additional functional brigades not covered here include the field support brigade (ATP 4-91); chemical, biological, and nuclear defense brigade (FM 3-11); contract support brigade (ATP 4-92); medical brigade (FM 4-02); petroleum brigade (ATP 4-43); and aerial brigade (ATP 3-55.3).

Air Defense Artillery (ADA) Brigade. ADA brigades are structured to perform several functions supporting the AAMDCs and designated GCC organizations supporting AMD integration and operations. ADA brigade functions include mission command activities, integration, planning, and liaison with joint, higher echelon units, and subordinate battalions. (FM 3-01)

Civil Affairs (CA) Brigade. The CA brigade provides a CA capability to joint force and land component commanders. The CA brigade mitigates or defeats threats to civil society and conducts actions normally performed by civil governments across the range of military operations. (FM 3-57)

Engineer Brigade. An engineer brigade integrates and synchronizes engineer capabilities across a corps AO and reinforces subordinate corps units in the execution of engineer tasks by allocating mission-tailored engineer forces. (ATP 3-34.23)

Expeditionary-Military Intelligence Brigade (E-MIB). The E-MIB is designed to augment the corps and division capability to process, exploit, and disseminate national and joint force signals intelligence and geospatial intelligence. E-MIBs also provide counterintelligence, human intelligence, and ground-based signals intelligence collection to corps and division hqs. The E-MIB also supports site exploitation operations. (ATP 2-19.3)

Military Police (MP) Brigade. The Army allocates an MP brigade to a division when the magnitude of functional MP requirements exceeds the capability of the MEB to control MP activities. In these instances, MP brigade-level control capability is required to allocate, synchronize, control, and provide technical oversight for MP assets and to provide consistent application of MP capabilities across the division AO. (FM 3-39)

Theater Tactical Signal Brigade (TTSB). A TTSB provides functional signal support for corps and division operations. TTSBs provision communications and information systems support to a theater army headquarters, their subordinate units, and as required, to joint, inter-organizational, and multinational partners throughout the area of responsibility. The TTSB and its subordinate units install, operate, maintain, and defend the Department of Defense information network-Army (DODIN-A). Each TTSB leverages the extension and reachback capabilities to provide joint communications and information systems services to the GCC and subordinate commanders to conduct mission command. (FM 6-02)

Cyberspace Support. There is one cyber protection brigade that provides worldwide defensive cyberspace support, including support for corps and below. The cyber protection brigade is subordinate to Network Enterprise Technology Command. Corps, division, and brigade headquarters have the resources available to execute cyberspace electromagnetic activities. (FM 3-12)

Space Support. The space brigade is the primary Army space force provider. It is a multi-component organization comprised of Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard Soldiers. The space brigade coordinates with combatant commanders, ASCCs, and space support elements to execute space operations; deploy combat ready Army space forces; perform theater space operations; and conduct space control planning, coordination, integration, and execution in support of the combatant commander’s priorities.
II. Training for Large-Scale Combat Operations

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ’17), pp. 2-52 to 2-63.

Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations, and it is the cornerstone of combat readiness. Effective training and unit leader development must be commander driven, rigorous, realistic, and to the standard and under the conditions that units are expected to have to fight in, which includes joint and multinational operations. Realistic training with limited time and resources demands that commanders focus their unit training efforts to maximize repetitions under varying conditions to build proficiency. Units execute effective individual and collective training based on the Army’s principles of training as described in ADRP 7-0.

The Army prepares itself for large-scale combat operations continuously. There is no time to build readiness necessary to win once hostilities commence in the current operational environment. Army forces must demonstrate a credible level of readiness against regional peer threats to effectively deter adversaries and assure partners. Generating credible readiness is the most important shaping task for units as they train at home station and during combat training center (CTC) exercises. Readiness to successfully conduct decisive action tasks in the context of large-scale land warfare against regional peer threats is the primary focus of Army forces.

Current threats demand Army units capable of maneuvering with unified action partners and generating effects, both lethal and nonlethal, across multiple contested domains against enemies whose capabilities may be superior and who enjoy positions of relative advantage. This, in turn, requires that Army units train under realistic conditions that portray real threat capabilities in ways that stress units and leaders for the realities of large-scale combat operations. It is critical for leaders to learn hard lessons and adapt before combat, and that is most effectively accomplished during tough collective training to standard against realistic threats. This training is accomplished at home stations, at CTCs, and while deployed.

All components of the Total Army (including Active, Reserve, National Guard, and Department of the Army [DA] civilians) bear responsibility for achieving the required levels of collective readiness. Each component has resident capabilities that enable the others, and as such must be trained to the same standard against peer threats. Units not training for specific missions focus on training for proficiency in large-scale combat operations. There are numerous implications across the warfighting functions that impact training, education, and priorities of effort, and they apply across all components.

See related discussion of “Readiness Through Training” from ADRP 3-0 on p. 1-20.

Mission-Essential Tasks

Commanders rarely have enough time or resources to train all tasks. Each commander determines what essential supporting collective tasks must be trained to attain the required levels of objective training requirements for mission-essential task list (METL) proficiency. The concept of mission essential tasks provides commanders a process to provide their units a battle focus. Each mission-essential task aligns with collective tasks that support it. All company and higher units have a METL. Units with a table of organization and equipment have an approved and standardized METL based on the type of unit and focused on large-scale combat operations. Standard METLs can be found on the Army Training Network, Digital Training Management System, and Combined Arms Training Strategies websites.
Training Techniques

Using an integrated approach of live, virtual, and constructive training at home station, CTC rotations, and during deployments builds confident and cohesive units able to adapt to their environment and defeat the enemy. Demanding and repetitive training builds Soldiers’ confidence in their weapons and equipment, their ability to fight and overcome challenges, their leaders, and their teams. Teams train under conditions that emphasize change, uncertainty, degraded friendly capabilities, capable enemies, and austere conditions. Soldiers must conduct realistic training that prepares them for combat by including unexpected tasks and moral-ethical challenges that help develop agile, adaptive, and innovative leaders. Training scenarios should require Soldiers to make the right decisions consistent with the moral principles of the Army Ethic, including the Army Values.

The effectiveness of each CTC is directly related to its ability to realistically replicate the conditions friendly units will face in combat against well trained peer threats with advanced capabilities. The CTC’s capabilities should be leveraged to prepare Army forces for activities and operations across the range of military operations. The opposing forces portray capable enemies with modern technology to generate combinations of conventional, irregular, and disruptive threats across each of the domains and the information environment. They challenge training units to the limits of their capabilities, and they provide opportunities for collective training at a scale necessary to exercise combined arms operations in both force-on-force and live-fire conditions.

BCTs with enabling capabilities conduct CTC rotations with a focus on decisive action, force-on-force exercises, and live fire against a regional peer threat. Functional and multifunctional brigades, divisions, corps, and theater armies use mission command training program exercises to train the operations process and mission command. They train on large-scale combat operations with unified action partners under realistic conditions that reflect the challenges of unified action in a multi-domain environment. Given the dynamic and lethal nature of large-scale land warfare, division and corps headquarters require proficiency in the operations process and mission command to orchestrate the high-tempo operations required to create, recognize, and exploit windows of opportunity. Deployment, field craft, continuous reconnaissance in depth, targeting, synchronization of fires and movement, airspace control, combined arms breaching and gap crossing, CP displacement, security, and sustainment are all essential tasks that require continuous, repetitive training for proficiency.

Multiechelon Training

Multiechelon training is a training technique that allows for the simultaneous training of more than one echelon on different or complementary tasks (ADRP 7-0). As each echelon conducts its mission analysis to determine the tasks to train, it provides a logic trail from individual Soldier tasks to brigade-level mission essential tasks. An effective logic trail clearly nests from one echelon to the next and effectively crosswalks the tasks up and down unit echelons. Cross-walking enables leaders to visualize how the top-down training guidance directly supports the bottom-up alignment of individual and collective tasks that support the higher echelon unit.

Refer to TLS5: The Leader’s SMARTbook, 5th Ed. (Military Leadership & Training) for complete discussion of Military Leadership (ADP/ADRP 6-22); Leader Development (FM 6-22); Counsel, Coach, Mentor (ATP 6-22.1); Army Team Building (ATP 6-22.6); Military Training (ADP/ADRP 7-0); Train to Win in a Complex World (FM 7-0); Unit Training Plans, Meetings, Schedules, and Briefs; Conducting Training Events and Exercises; Training Assessments, After Action Reviews (AARs); and more!
III. Army Capabilities (Combat Power)

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), pp. 2-22 to 2-52.

Large-scale combat operations executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability tasks require continuously generating and applying combat power, often for extended periods. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time (ADRP 3-0). Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that are integrated, synchronized, and converged with the commander’s objectives to achieve unity of effort in sustained operations. The purpose of combat power is to accomplish missions.

Commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information:

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct ‘17), fig. 2-6. The elements of combat power.

During operations, every unit, regardless of type, either generates or maintains combat power. All units contribute to operations. Commanders ensure Army forces have enough potential combat power to combine the elements of decisive action in ways appropriate to the situation. Ultimately, Army forces combine elements of combat power to defeat an enemy and prevail during large-scale combat operations.

Combat power is not a numerical value. It can be estimated but not quantified with precision. Combat power is always relative. It has meaning only in relation to conditions and enemy capabilities. It is relevant solely at the point in time and space where it is applied.

The Elements of Combat Power

Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information as shown in figure 2-6.

Combat power is discussed on pp. 1-57 to 1-62. Each of the warfighting functions is covered in a corresponding chapter in AODS6 (chapters 3-8). Army capabilities by warfighting function, from FM 3-0, are addressed in these respective chapters.
Operations to SHAPE

III. Operations to SHAPE

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), chap. 3.

Operations to shape consist of various long-term military engagements, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions intended to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. Operations to shape typically occur in support of the geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) theater campaign plan (TCP) or the theater security cooperation plan. These operations help counter actions by adversaries that challenge the stability of a nation or region contrary to U.S. interests. Operations to shape occur across the joint phasing model. Ultimately, operations to shape focus on four purposes:

- Promoting and protecting U.S. national interests and influence.
- Building partner capacity and partnerships.
- Recognizing/countering adversary attempts to gain positions of relative advantage.
- Setting conditions to win future conflicts.

Shaping Activities

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), fig. 3-1. Shaping activities.

Figure 3-1 depicts shaping and prevent activities in an environment of cooperation and competition. Army forces, as part of a joint team and a larger whole-of-government effort, conduct shaping activities to assure friends, build partners, and prevent, deter, or turn back escalatory activity by adversaries. Army operations to shape align with military engagement and security cooperation activities. Army prevent activities align with deterrence and crisis response and limited contingency operations.

Optimally, shaping activities ensure regions remain stable, a crisis does not occur, and there is no need for an escalation of force. Upon activation of a joint operation order (OPORD) for a crisis or a limited contingency operation Army operations to shape occur simultaneously within a joint operations area (JOA) or designated theater of operations and across the GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR). Shaping activities involving Army forces in support of the GCC to promote favorable access include—

- Key leader engagements.
- Bilateral and multinational exercises to improve multinational interoperability and operations.
- Missions to train, advise, and equip foreign forces.
- Negotiations to secure basing and transit rights, establish relationships, and formalize support agreements.
- The use of grants and contracts to improve relationships with and strengthen partner nations.
- Designing interoperability into acquisition programs.
- Electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) mapping of adversary capabilities.

Operations to shape roughly correlate with theater shaping activities described in JP 3-0. They also include unit home station activities, including maintaining operational readiness, training, and contingency planning. Combined exercises and training, military exchange programs, and foreign military member attendance at Army schools are examples of home station shaping activities.

II. Threats

Threats desire to further their interests and achieve their goals without fighting. If threat actions are successful and are counter to U.S. interests, the United States may consider introducing armed forces to reverse or stabilize the situation. Threat goals prior to this introduction are centered on preventing this, and if that fails, to constrain that introduction in such a way as to prevent the success of a U.S. joint operation. Threats will focus on the following methods:

- Threat information warfare activities will manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and presentation of information in such a way that suits the threat’s preferred decision outcomes.
- Threats will foster instability in key areas and among key groups in such a way that regional security does not match U.S. operational requirements.
- Threats will act upon partnerships to reduce the ability of the United States to operate in its preferred combined, joint, and interagency manner.
- The focus of pre-conflict preclusion activities is through nonlethal means. Threats will undermine relationships, raise political stakes, manipulate public opinion, and attack resolve in order to constrain or deny basing rights, over-flight corridors, logistic support, and concerted allied action.

Adversaries may seek to establish conditions that limit or prevent U.S. access to a region. This includes forward positioning of robust and layered integrated air defenses, early warning surveillance radars, and electronic warfare capabilities (as demonstrated by Russian forces in Syria). Additionally, adversaries may seek to position intermediate range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, fixed-wing aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and naval surface and sub-surface forces to shape an OE in their favor.
D. Project the Force
Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), pp. 4-7 to 4-8 and 4-11 to 4-13.

Projecting the force into an operational area is essential to effective operations to prevent conflict. Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations (JP 3-0). Speed is important—force projection is a race between friendly forces and the enemy or adversary. The side that achieves an operational capability first (a position of relative advantage) can seize the initiative. Speed in force projection is decisive when a combat-ready force deploys to an operational area before an enemy or adversary is ready. Force projection encompasses mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment.

See pp. 4-10 and 7-22 for related discussion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Descriptions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>Mobilization is the process of bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness in response to a contingency. Upon alert for deployment, commanders ensure Army forces are manned, equipped, and meet all Soldier readiness criteria.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deployment</td>
<td>Deployment is the movement of forces to an operational area in response to an order. Sustainment is crucial to the deployment of forces. Joint transportation assets, including air and sealift, provide the movement capabilities for the Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Employment encompasses a wide array of operations. The operations include, but are not limited to, entry operations, offensive operations, defensive operations, security operations and stability operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>Sustainment provides logistics, personnel services, and health-service support to maintain forces until mission completion. It gives Army forces their operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Redeployment</td>
<td>Redeployment is the return of forces and materiel to the home or mobilization station or to another theater. It requires a degrade of logistics, personnel services, and health service support and reuniting unit personnel and equipment at their home station.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct ‘17), table 4-1. Force projection terms.

Deployment
Proper planning establishes what, where, and when forces are needed for successful deployment outcomes. How the GCC intends to employ forces is the foundation of the deployment structure and timing. Corps and division staffs examine all deployment possibilities and conduct parallel planning. The timing and amount of combat power delivered directly influences the GCC’s or other JFC’s courses of action.

There are four principles that apply to the range of activities encompassing deployment. These principles are precision, synchronization, knowledge, and speed. The objective of deployment planning is to synchronize deployment activities to facilitate effective execution in the operational area.

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
RSOI delivers combat power to the JFC in a theater of operations or a JOA. RSOI support, whether provided by theater support contracts, external support contracts (primarily the logistics civil augmentation program), regionally available commercial host-nation support, or military assets, needs to have sufficient capabilities and capacity to provide the support required by arriving units at the various ports of debarkation.

Refer to SMFLS4: Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support). Includes ATP 4-94 Theater Sustainment Command (Jun ‘13), ATP 4-93 Sustainment Brigade (Aug ‘13), ATP 4-90 Brigade Support Battalion (Aug ‘14), Sustainment Planning, JP 4-0 Joint Logistics (Oct ‘13), ATP 3-35 Army Deployment and Redeployment (Mar ‘15), and more than a dozen new/updated Army sustainment references.
I. Large-Scale Combat Operations

A. Joint Large-Scale Combat Operations

As a nation, the United States wages war by employing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives. The nature and scope of some missions may require joint forces to conduct large-scale combat operations to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests. Such combat typically occurs within the framework of a major operation or a campaign.

When large-scale combat operations commence, the joint force commander (JFC) immediately exploits friendly capabilities across multiple domains and the information environment to gain the initiative. The JFC seeks decisive advantage by using all available elements of combat power to exploit the initiative, deny enemy objectives, defeat enemy capabilities to resist, and compel desired behavior. The JFC coordinates with other U.S. governmental departments and agencies to facilitate coherent use of all instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives. Seizing the initiative generally requires force projection. The entry of Army and joint forces into a joint operations area (JOA) or theater of operations may be unopposed or opposed.

JFCs strive to achieve air, maritime, space, and cyberspace superiority early to allow the joint force to conduct land operations without prohibitive enemy interference. Previously deployed forward land forces and land forces projected into the theater during large-scale combat operations can enable joint capabilities in the other domains and provide the joint force freedom of action.

JFCs gain and maintain the initiative by projecting fires, employing forces, and conducting information operations in dynamic combination across multiple domains. Establishing a joint headquarters requires detailed planning, active liaison, and coordination throughout the joint force. Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from an existing headquarters, or it may require augmentation from different sources. One technique is to transfer command in several stages. Another technique is for the JFC to use the capabilities of one of the components until the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs must address all of the command and control (C2) requirements and the timing of the transfer of each requirement.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!
II. Tactical Enabling Tasks

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), pp. 5-9 to 5-20.

Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the performance of all offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Tactical enabling tasks are usually employed by commanders as part of shaping operations or supporting efforts. The tactical enabling tasks are reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement operations, and mobility and countermobility operations.

Reconnaissance

Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance primarily relies on human beings rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. It is performed before, during, and after other operations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process and by commanders in order to formulate, confirm, or modify a course of action. There are five forms of reconnaissance operations. They are route reconnaissance, zone reconnaissance, area reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force, and special reconnaissance. See pp. 4-23 to 4-26.

Security Operations

Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force (ADRP 3-90). The ultimate goal of security operations is to protect the force from surprise and reduce the unknowns in any situation. Security operations may also protect the civilian population, civil institutions, and civilian infrastructure within the unit’s AO. Security operations can be either offensive or defensive. A commander may conduct security operations to the front, flanks, or rear of the friendly force. The main difference between security operations and reconnaissance operations is that security operations orient on the force or facility being protected, while reconnaissance is enemy and terrain oriented. Security operations are shaping operations. As a shaping operation, economy of force is often a consideration when planning tactical security operations. Security operations encompass five tasks—screen, guard, cover, area security, and local security. See p. 2-79.

Troop Movement

The ability of a commander to posture friendly forces for a decisive or shaping operation depends on the commander’s ability to move that force. The essence of battlefield agility is the capability to conduct rapid and orderly movement to concentrate combat power at decisive points and times. Successful movement places troops and equipment at their destination at the proper time, ready for combat. Transition from movement to maneuver occurs when enemy contact is expected. Troop movement is the movement of troops from one place to another by any available means (ADRP 3-90). Troop movements are made by different methods; such as dismounted and mounted marches using organic combat and tactical vehicles; motor transport; and air, rail, and water means in various combinations.

Relief In Place

A relief in place is an operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit and the responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit (JP 3-07.3). (Note. The Army uses AO instead of a zone of operations.)

The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. A commander conducts a relief
in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units. The higher echelon headquarters directs when and where to conduct a relief and establishes the appropriate control measures. Normally, during the conduct of large-scale combat operations, the unit being relieved is defending. However, a relief may set the stage for resuming the offense. A relief may also serve to free the relieved unit for other tasks, such as decontamination, reconstitution, routine rest, resupply, maintenance, specialized training, or redeployment. Sometimes, as part of a larger operation, a commander wants an enemy force to discover the relief, because that discovery might cause an enemy to do something in response that is contrary to its interests, such as move reserves from an area where the friendly commander wants to conduct a penetration. There are three techniques for conducting a relief: sequentially, simultaneously, or staggered.

**Passage Of Lines**

Passage of lines is an operation in which a force moves forward or rearward through another force’s combat positions with the intention of moving into or out of contact with the enemy (JP 3-18). A passage may be designated as a forward or rearward passage of lines. A commander conducts a passage of lines to continue an attack or conduct a counterattack, retrograde, or security operation when one unit cannot bypass another unit’s position. The conduct of a passage of lines potentially involves close combat. It involves transferring the responsibility for an AO between two commanders. That transfer of authority usually occurs when roughly two thirds of the passing force has moved through the passage point. If not directed by higher authority, the two unit commanders determine, by mutual agreement, the time to transfer command. They disseminate this information to the lowest levels of both organizations.

**Encirclement Operations**

Encirclement operations are operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications and reinforcement (ADRP 3-90). A unit can conduct offensive encirclement operations designed to isolate an enemy force or conduct defensive encirclement operations as a result of the unit’s isolation by the actions of an enemy force. Encirclement operations occur because combat operations involving modernized forces are likely to be chaotic, intense, and highly destructive, extending across large areas containing relatively few units as each side maneuvers against the other to obtain positional advantage.

**Mobility and Countermobility Operations**

Freedom to move and maneuver within an operational area is essential to the application of combat power and achieving results across the range of military operations. An OE will present numerous challenges to movement and maneuver. These are typically overcome through the integration of combined arms mobility and countermobility in support of mission requirements. Countermobility operations are those combined arms activities that use or enhance the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to deny enemy freedom of movement and maneuver (ATP 3-90.8). The primary purposes of countermobility operations are to shape enemy movement and maneuver and to prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage.

See pp. 4-27 to 4-36 for further discussion of mobility and countermobility operations from ADRP 3-90.

Refer to SUTS2: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. Chapters and topics include tactical mission fundamentals, the offense, the defense, stability and counterinsurgency operations, tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement), special purpose attacks (ambush and raid), urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold region, mountain, and jungle operations), patrols and patrolling.
III. Forcible Entry Operations

Forcible entry is the seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition or forcing access into a denied area to allow movement and maneuver to accomplish the mission (JP 3-18). A forcible entry operation may be the JFC’s opening move to seize the initiative. For example, a JFC might direct friendly forces to seize and hold an airhead or a beachhead to facilitate the continuous landing of troops and materiel and expand the maneuver space needed to conduct follow-on operations. Forcible entry operations during the dominate phase of an operation or campaign may be used for a coup de main, conducting operational movement and maneuver to attain positional advantage, or as a tactical deception.

Army forces, as part of a joint force, must be capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographic areas controlled by forces hostile to U.S. national interests to be credible both as a deterrent and as a viable military option for policy enforcement. Swift and decisive victory in these cases requires forcible entry and the ability to surge follow-on forces.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!

IV. Transition to Consolidate Gains

Army forces provide the JFC the ability to capitalize on operational success by consolidating gains. Consolidate gains is an integral part of winning armed conflict and achieving success across the range of military operations. It is essential to retaining the initiative over determined enemies and adversaries. Army forces reinforce and integrate the efforts of all unified action partners when they consolidate gains.

Army forces consolidate gains in support of a host nation and its civilian population, or as part of the pacification of a hostile state. These gains may include the establishment of public security temporarily by using the military as a transitional force, the relocation of displaced civilians, reestablishment of law and order, performance of humanitarian assistance, and restoration of key infrastructure.

Upon successful termination of large-scale combat operations, Army forces in the close area transition rapidly to the conduct of consolidation of gains activities. Alternatively, they may be relieved in place by another unit. Consolidation of gains activities may encompass a lengthy period of post conflict operations prior to redeployment. This transition to consolidation of gains may occur even if large-scale combat operations are occurring in other parts of an AO in order to exploit tactical success.

The JFC defines the conditions to which an AO is to be stabilized. The theater army is normally the overseer of the orderly transition of authority to appropriate U.S., international, interagency, or host-nation agencies. The theater army and subordinate commanders emphasize those activities that reduce post-conflict or post-crisis turmoil and help stabilize a situation. Commanders address the decontamination, disposal, and destruction of war materiel. They address the removal and destruction of unexploded ordnance and the responsibility for demining operations. Additionally, the theater army must be prepared to provide Army Health System support, emergency restoration of utilities, support to social needs of the indigenous population, and other humanitarian activities as required.
VI. Large-Scale DEFENSIVE Operations

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), chap. 6.

A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). There are three primary defensive tasks: area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. However, the performance of defensive tasks alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for performing defensive tasks include:

- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to an enemy.
- Conducting defensive covering force operations to protect forces flowing into theater.
- Attriting or fixing an enemy as a prelude to offensive tasks.
- Countering an enemy attack.
- Increasing enemy vulnerabilities to force the enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces.

The defense is what provides time for a commander to build combat power and establish conditions to transition to the offense. The defense is ideally a shield behind which a commander maintains or regains the initiative. Initially, a defending commander is likely to be at relative disadvantage against an attacking enemy, since that enemy can choose when and where to strike. Significant capability gaps in terms of fires, including air and missile defense (AMD), countermobility, protection, and aviation may exist early on in any campaign. Also, joint fires may not be available initially in sufficient quantity, or the enemy may have dominance in one or more of the domains that limits joint capabilities.

The inherent strengths of the defense include the defender’s ability to occupy positions before an attack and use the available time to prepare those defenses. A defending force stops improving its defensive preparations only when it retrogrades or begins to engage an enemy. During combat, a defending force takes the opportunities afforded by lulls in an action to improve its positions and repair combat damage. A defender does not wait passively to be attacked. A defender aggressively seeks ways of attriting and weakening attacking enemy forces before close combat begins. A defender maneuvers to place an enemy in a position of disadvantage and attacks that enemy at every opportunity, using fires, electronic warfare (EW), aviation, information-related capabilities (IRCs), cyberspace operations, and obstacles, as well as joint assets, such as air interdiction, close air support (CAS), and special operations forces (SOF). The static and mobile elements of a defense combine to deprive an enemy of the initiative. A defender contains an enemy while seeking every opportunity to transition to the offense.
Security Operations

Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug ‘12), pp. 5-3 to 5-4.

Security operations are those operations undertaken by a commander to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, to provide the force being protected with time and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, and to develop the situation to allow the commander to effectively use the protected force. There are five forms of security operations:

A. Screen
B. Guard
C. Cover
D. Area Security
E. Local Security

Commanders use security operations to confuse the enemy about the location of the commander’s main battle positions, prevent enemy observation of preparations and positions, and keep the enemy from delivering observed fire on these positions. Commanders also try to force the attacking enemy to deploy prematurely. They can offset the attacker’s inherent advantage of initiative regarding the time, place, plan, direction, strength, and composition of the attack by forcing the enemy to attack blind into prepared defenses. Commanders counter enemy ground reconnaissance activities through both active and passive measures. The commander must not permit enemy reconnaissance and surveillance assets to determine the precise location and strength of defensive positions, obstacles, engagement areas, and reserves. All units conduct aggressive security operations within their area of operations, including the echelon support area, to seek out and repel or kill enemy reconnaissance and other forces. Units implement operations security and other information protection measures to deny the enemy information about friendly dispositions.

Refer to SUTS2: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. Chapters and topics include tactical mission fundamentals, the offense, the defense, stability and counterinsurgency operations, tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement), special purpose attacks (ambush and raid), urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold region, mountain, and jungle operations), patrols and patrolling.
IV. Forms of Maneuver

Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy. The commander generally chooses one form on which he builds a course of action (COA). The higher commander rarely specifies the specific form of offensive maneuver. However, his guidance and intent, along with the mission that includes implied tasks, may impose constraints such as time, security, and direction of attack.

A. Envelopment

The envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions. At the tactical level, envelopments focus on seizing terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. Envelopments avoid the enemy front, where he is protected and can easily concentrate fires. Single envelopments maneuver against one enemy flank; double envelopments maneuver against both. Either variant can develop into an encirclement.

To envelop the enemy, commanders find or create an assailable flank. Sometimes the enemy exposes a flank by advancing, unaware of friendly locations. In other conditions, such as a fluid battle involving forces in noncontiguous AOs, a combination of air and indirect fires may create an assailable flank by isolating the enemy on unfavorable terrain.

B. Turning Movement

A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the rear and causing the enemy to move out of current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat. A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus “turning” him out of his defensive positions. Turning movements typically require greater depth than other maneuver forms. Deep fires take on added importance. They protect the enveloping force and attack the enemy.

An envelopment may result in an encirclement. Encirclements are operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications. An offensive encirclement is typically an extension of either a pursuit or envelopment. A direct pressure force maintains contact with the enemy, preventing his disengagement and reconstitution. Meanwhile, an encircling force maneuvers to envelop the enemy, cutting his escape routes and setting inner and outer rings. The outer ring defeats enemy attempts to break through to his encircled force. The inner ring contains the encircled force. All available means, including obstacles, should be used to contain the enemy. Then friendly forces use all available fires to destroy him.

Encirclements often occur in nonlinear offensive operations.

To envelop the enemy, commanders find or create an assailable flank. Sometimes the enemy exposes a flank by advancing, unaware of friendly locations. In other conditions, such as a fluid battle involving forces in noncontiguous AOs, a combination of air and indirect fires may create an assailable flank by isolating the enemy on unfavorable terrain.

A turning movement attacks the enemy rear to “turn” him out of position and force him to fight to the rear of his flanks.
C. Infiltration
An infiltration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force conducts undetected movement through or into an area occupied by enemy forces to occupy a position of advantage in the enemy rear while exposing only small elements to enemy defensive fires. The need to avoid being detected and engaged may limit the size and strength of infiltrating forces. Infiltration rarely defeats a defense by itself. Cdrs direct infiltrations to attack lightly defended positions or stronger positions from the flank and rear, to secure key terrain to support the decisive operation, or to disrupt enemy sustaining operations.

A penetration has three stages: initial rupture, rolling up the flanks, and continuing the attack to secure a deep objective.

D. Penetration
A penetration is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system. It is used when enemy flanks are not assailable or time does not permit another form of maneuver. Successful penetrations create assailable flanks and provide access to enemy rear areas. Penetrations frequently are directed into the front of the enemy defense, and risk more friendly casualties than envelopments, turning movements and infiltrations.

A frontal attack is frequently the most costly form of maneuver, since it exposes the majority of the attackers to the concentrated fires of the defenders. As the most direct form of maneuver, however, the frontal attack is useful for overwhelming light defenses, covering forces, or disorganized enemy resistance. It is often the best form of maneuver for hasty attacks and meeting engagements, where speed and simplicity are essential to maintain tempo and the initiative. Commanders may direct a frontal attack as a shaping operation and another form of maneuver as the decisive operation. Commanders may also use the frontal attack during an exploitation or pursuit. Commanders of large formations conducting envelopments or penetrations may direct subordinate elements to conduct frontal attacks as either shaping operations or the decisive operation.

E. Frontal Attack
A frontal attack is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to destroy a weaker enemy force or fix a larger enemy force in place over a broad front. At the tactical level, an attacking force can use a frontal attack to rapidly overrun a weaker enemy force. A frontal attack strikes the enemy across a wide front and over the most direct approaches. Commanders normally use it when they possess overwhelming combat power and the enemy is at a clear disadvantage. Commanders mass the effects of direct and indirect fires, shifting indirect and aerial fires just before the assault. Success depends on achieving an advantage in combat power throughout the attack.
Area Security Operations
Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct '17), pp. 8-8 to 8-11.

Search and Attack

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct '17), fig. 8-2.
As part of area security, the consolidation of gains force may have to identify and destroy remaining pockets of enemy forces. Search and attack is a technique for conducting a movement to contact that shares many of the characteristics of an area security mission (FM 3-90-1). Commanders conduct a search and attack for one or more of the following purposes:

- **Destroy the enemy**: render enemy units in the AO combat-ineffective.
- **Deny the area**: prevent the enemy from operating unhindered in a given area (for example, in any area the enemy is using for a base camp or for logistics support).
- **Protect the force**: prevent the enemy from massing to disrupt or destroy friendly military or civilian operations, equipment, property, and key facilities.
- **Collect information**: gain information about the enemy and the terrain to confirm the enemy course of action predicted by IPB

A commander employs the search and attack form of a movement to contact when the enemy is operating as small, dispersed elements whose locations cannot be determined to targetable accuracy by methods other than a physical search, or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move within a given area.

*Refer to FM 3-90-1 for more information.*

Cordon and Search

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct '17), fig. 8-3.
Once threats have been identified within a certain part of the consolidation of gains area, cordon and search is a technique that can be used for neutralizing the threat or confiscating material that could be used against friendly forces. Cordon and search is a technique of conducting a movement to contact that involves isolating a target area and searching suspected locations within that target area to capture or destroy possible enemy forces and contraband (FM 3-90-1).

*FM 3-90.2 discusses encirclement operations. ATP 3-06.20 discusses multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures for cordon and search operations.*
B. Stability Tasks (Consolidation of Gains)


Operations focused on stability seek to stabilize the environment enough so that the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. During consolidation of gains, these operations focus on stability tasks to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate authorities. Initially, this is accomplished by performing the minimum essential stability tasks of providing security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Once conditions allow, these tasks are a legal responsibility of Army forces. However, commanders may not need to have Army forces conduct all of these essential tasks. Other military units or appropriate civilian organizations may be available to adequately perform them. As the operational environment (OE) and time allow, the effort will transition to the more deliberate of execution of stability tasks.

Essential Stability Tasks

Ref: ADRP 3-07, Stability, chap. 2.

Establish Civil Security

Civil security is the provision of security for state entities and the population, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment is crucial to obtaining local support for military operations. The primary task of establishing civil security may include SFA tasks, depending on the tasks assigned. As soon as a host-nation’s security forces can perform this task, Army forces transition civil security responsibilities to them. Within the security sector, transformation tasks focus on developing legitimate, sustainable, and stable security institutions. Civil security sets the conditions for enduring stability and peace.
Establish Civil Control
Civil control fosters the rule of law. The rule of law means that all persons, institutions, and entities—public and private, including the state itself—are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights principles. To strengthen civil control and the rule of law, Army units seek to improve the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of host-nation judicial and corrections systems by providing training and support to law enforcement and judicial personnel. Army units focus on implementing temporary or interim capabilities to lay the foundation for host-nation or inter-organizational development of judicial systems.

Restore Essential Services
Restoring services essential to local expectations of normalcy allows people to return to their daily activities and prevents further destabilization. Ideally, the host-nation’s government and civilian relief agencies should restore and develop essential services. In most cases, local, international, and U.S. agencies have arrived in country long before U.S. forces. However, when partner organizations are not well established or lack capacity, Army units accomplish these tasks until other organizations can.

Support Governance
Governance is the set of activities conducted by a government or community organization to maintain societal order, define and enforce rights and obligations, and fairly allocate goods and services. Effective, legitimate governance ensures these activities are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation. Elections, while often an end state condition in planning, do not ensure these outcomes. In societies divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections may further polarize factions. Generally, representative institutions based on universal suffrage offer the best means of fostering governance acceptable to most citizens. If a host-nation’s government or community organizations cannot provide governance, some degree of military support may be necessary. In extreme cases where civil government or community organizations are dysfunctional or absent, international law requires military forces to provide basic civil administration.

Support Economic and Infrastructure Development
Long-term peace and stability require sustainable host-nation economic and infrastructure development. The end state is the creation of a sustainable economy. In post-conflict and fragile states, host-nation actors, interagency partners, and inter-organizational partners often have the most useful knowledge and skills regarding the restoration and facilitation of economic and infrastructure development. However, if security considerations or other factors restrict their ability to intervene, Army units should assist host-nation entities to foster sustainable economic and infrastructure development.

* Conduct Security Cooperation
Security cooperation, as part of consolidation of gains, enhances military engagement and builds the security capacity of partner states. Security cooperation is comprised of multiple activities, programs, and missions, and it is functionally and conceptually related to security assistance, SFA, internal defense and development, foreign internal defense, and security sector reform.

Mission Command Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (May ‘12) and ADRP 3-0, Operations (Nov ‘16), p. 5-3.

Commanders, assisted by their staffs, conceptualize and apply capabilities in terms of combat power to accomplish the mission. **Combat power** consists of eight elements: leadership, information, and the six warfighting functions—mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. Each warfighting function consists of related tasks and a system, united by a common purpose that commanders use to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

See pp. 1-60 to 1-61 for an overview of the six warfighting functions from ADRP 3-0.

**Integration of Warfighting Functions**

Ref: ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, fig. 3-1, p. 3-1.

The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). It consists of the related tasks and a mission command system that support the exercise of authority and direction by the commander. Through the mission command warfighting function, commanders integrate the other warfighting functions into a coherent whole to mass the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time.

Refer to BSS5: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 5th Ed. for further discussion. BSS5 covers the operations process (ADRP 5-0); commander’s activities (Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess); the military decisionmaking process and troop leading procedures (FM 6-0: MDMP/TLP); integrating processes and continuing activities (IPB, targeting, risk management); plans and orders (WARNOs/FRAGOs/OPORDs); mission command, command posts, liaison; rehearsals & after action reviews; and operational terms & symbols.
I. The Exercise of Mission Command

Ref: ADRP 6-0, Mission Command (May ‘12), pp. 1-2 to 1-5.

To function effectively and have the greatest chance for mission accomplishment, commanders, supported by their staffs, exercise mission command throughout the conduct of operations. In this discussion, the “exercise of mission command” refers to an overarching idea that unifies the mission command philosophy of command and the mission command war fighting function. The exercise of mission command encompasses how Army commanders and staffs apply the foundational mission command philosophy together with the mission command war fighting function, guided by the principles of mission command.

An effective approach to mission command must be comprehensive, without being rigid. Military operations are affected by human interactions and as a whole defy orderly, efficient, and precise control. People are the basis of all military organizations. Commanders understand that some decisions must be made quickly and are better made at the point of action. Mission command concentrates on the objectives of an operation, not how to achieve it. Commanders provide subordinates with their intent, the purpose of the operation, the key tasks, the desired end state, and resources. Subordinates then exercise disciplined initiative to respond to unanticipated problems. Mission command is based on mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose. It demands every Soldier be prepared to assume responsibility, maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the commander’s intent.

Mission Command as a Philosophy

As the Army’s philosophy of command, mission command emphasizes that command is essentially a human endeavor. Successful commanders understand that their leadership directs the development of teams and helps to establish mutual trust and shared understanding throughout the force. Commanders provide a clear intent to their forces that guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates, by understanding the commander’s intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities. They are given the latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that best fits the situation. Subordinates understand that they have an obligation to act and synchronize their actions with the rest of the force. Likewise, commanders influence the situation and provide direction and guidance while synchronizing their own operations. They encourage subordinates to take action, and they accept prudent risks to create opportunity and to seize the initiative. Commanders at all levels need education, rigorous training, and experience to apply these principles effectively. Mission command operates more on self-discipline than imposed discipline.

Mission Command as a Warfighting Function

Mission command—as a warfighting function—assists commanders in balancing the art of command with the science of control, while emphasizing the human aspects of mission command. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions (ADRP 3-0). The mission command warfighting function consists of the mission command war fighting function tasks and the mission command system.

Mission Command System

Commanders need support to exercise mission command effectively. At every echelon of command, each commander establishes a mission command system—the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0).
The Exercise of Mission Command

Unified Land Operations
How the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.

Nature of Operations
Military operations are human endeavors. They are contests of wills characterized by continuous and mutual adaptation by all participants. Army forces conduct operations in complex, ever-changing, and uncertain operational environments.

Mission Command Philosophy
Exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations.

Guided by the principles of:
- Build cohesive teams through mutual trust
- Create shared understanding
- Provide a clear commander’s intent
- Exercise disciplined initiative
- Use mission orders
- Accept prudent risk

The principles of mission command assist commanders and staff in balancing the art of command with the science of control.

Mission Command Warfighting Function
The related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions.

Commander Tasks:
- Drive the operations process through the activities of understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess
- Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with unified action partners
- Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations

Staff Tasks:
- Conduct the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess)
- Conduct knowledge management and information management
- Conduct inform and influence activities
- Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities

Additional Tasks:
- Conduct military deception
- Conduct airspace control
- Conduct civil affairs operations
- Install, operate, and maintain the network

Enabled by a system...

Mission Command System:
- Personnel
- Information systems
- Networks
- Processes and procedures

Together, the mission command philosophy and warfighting function guide, integrate, and synchronize Army forces throughout the conduct of unified land operations.

Ref: ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, fig. 1-1, p. 1-3.
I. Mission Command Warfighting Tasks

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), pp. 2-23 to 2-34.

The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions (ADRP 3-0). The mission command warfighting function integrates the other warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) into a coherent whole. By itself, the mission command warfighting function will not secure an objective, move a friendly force, or restore an essential service to a population. Instead, it provides purpose and direction to the other warfighting functions.

Mission Command Warfighting Function Tasks

While staffs perform essential functions, commanders are ultimately responsible for accomplishing assigned missions. Throughout operations, commanders encourage disciplined initiative through a clear commander’s intent while providing enough direction to integrate and synchronize the force at the decisive place and time. To this end, commanders perform three primary mission command warfighting function tasks. The commander tasks are—

• Drive the operations process through the activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.
• Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with unified action partners.
• Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations.

Staffs support commanders in the exercise of mission command by performing four primary mission command warfighting function tasks. The staff tasks are—

• Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.
• Conduct knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure.
• Conduct information operations.
• Conduct cyberspace electromagnetic activities.

Six additional tasks reside within the mission command warfighting function. These tasks are—

• Conduct CA operations.
• Conduct military deception.
• Install, operate, and maintain the DODIN.
• Conduct airspace control.
• Conduct information protection.
• Plan and conduct space activities.

An overview and discussion of commander, staff and additional functions can be found on pp. 3-8 to 3-12.

See following pages (pp. 3-13 to 3-24) for specific discussion of key mission command warfighting function tasks from FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17).
Information Operations (IO)

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ’17), pp. 2-26 to 2-28.

Commanders and their units must coordinate what they do, say, and portray. The development of themes and messages in support of a military operation is fundamental to that process. A theme is a unifying or dominant idea or image that expresses the purpose for military action. Themes are tied to objectives, lines of effort, and end state conditions. Themes are overarching and apply to the capabilities of public affairs activities, MISO, and Soldier and leader engagements. A message is a verbal, written, or electronic communication that supports a theme focused on a specific actor and in support of a specific action. Commanders approve and employ themes and messages as part of planned activities designed to influence specific foreign audiences for various purposes that support current or planned operations.

Staffs synchronize information operations throughout the operations process. Information operations specialists must effectively synchronize various information-related capabilities to support the concept of operations. The use of messaging is a critical supporting effort during large-scale combat operations. As in previous wars and conflicts, the message legitimizing why U.S. forces are there and why they fight must be communicated and understood across all echelons and audiences. Commanders must communicate and enforce a positive narrative and be aware that an enemy may lead with information effects and only support them with physical effects.

While all unit operations, activities, and actions affect the information environment, information related capabilities requiring synchronization and coordination as part of information operations include—

- Military deception (MILDEC).
- MISO.
- Soldier and leader engagement, including police engagement.
- CA operations.
- Combat camera.
- OPSEC.
- Public affairs.
- Cyberspace Operations.
- EW.
- Space operations.
- Special technical operations.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!
A. Military Deception (MILDEC)

Military deception is actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions or (inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission (JP 3-13.4). MILDEC operations are planned from the top down. Subordinate deception plans must support higher echelon plans.

Tactical deception (TAC-D) is a deception activity planned and executed by, and in support of, tactical-level commanders to cause adversaries to take actions or inactions favorable to the friendly tactical commanders’ objectives. TAC-D is conducted to influence military operations in order to gain a tactical advantage over an adversary, mask vulnerabilities in friendly forces, or to enhance the defensive capabilities of friendly forces. TAC-D is unique to the tactical requirements of the local commander and not necessarily linked or subordinate to a greater joint MILDEC plan. In order to ensure that it does not compromise an existing or future MILDEC, TAC-D must be approved two echelons up, not to exceed the combatant command.

The corps echelon is where properly conceived and employed MILDEC is most likely to succeed and mislead enemy commanders as to the true disposition, capabilities, and intentions of friendly forces. Divisions and lower echelons often lack the density of forces and capabilities to successfully deceive a regional peer enemy. Tactical headquarters employ TAC-D measures assigned by a higher echelon headquarters or develop their own measures to support their own concept of operations. These measures must be nested. The tactical headquarters, higher echelon headquarters must vet and approve all TAC-D operations. TAC-D requires synchronization across multiple domains and echelons. An enemy is not likely to be deceived when friendly actions do not match the available information. Tactical units assigned to conduct MILDEC activities are often not informed of their mission’s true purpose.

It is extremely difficult for BCTs and other types of brigades to employ effective TAC-D because of the lack of resources available at the brigade echelon. Operations security—including effective camouflage, concealment, and the use of decoys—may only delay an enemy from identifying the objective of a BCT operation for short periods. OPSEC may assist in determining the timing for the movement of forces, managing the daily volume of electronic signatures, or the timing of sustainment operations. BCT TAC-D may create only a very short period of time to exploit a position of relative advantage. False insertions, feints, deception fires, smoke screens, decoys, EW and other tactics, techniques, and procedures can create confusion or uncertainty in the mind of an enemy commander which will facilitate friendly maneuver. When possible, TAC-D is used by corps and division support brigades in the close and deep area to add to the dilemmas presented to an opposing enemy commander.

Commanders should assume all ground forces are under continuous observation by enemies and adversaries employing their national space-based capabilities and operate accordingly. Commanders employ camouflage and deception measures to minimize unit exposure and identification for targeting by long-range precision fires or direct action by enemy conventional, special purpose, and irregular forces. The harder it is to identify friendly forces to target, the less likely they will be targeted. Rapidly maneuvering friendly forces also reduces the ability of an enemy to target those friendly forces. The combination of deception, good OPSEC, and enemy limitations are all related. Minimizing the appearance of actual lucrative targets while providing false targets should be a MILDEC goal.
Army Command & Support Relationships

Ref: FM 6-0 (C2), Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (Apr ‘16), app. B.

Army command and support relationships are similar but not identical to joint command authorities and relationships. Differences stem from the way Army forces task-organize internally and the need for a system of support relationships between Army forces. Another important difference is the requirement for Army commanders to handle the administrative support requirements that meet the needs of Soldiers.

A. Command Relationships

Army command relationships define superior and subordinate relationships between unit commanders. By specifying a chain of command, command relationships unify effort and enable commanders to use subordinate forces with maximum flexibility. Army command relationships identify the degree of control of the gaining Army commander. The type of command relationship often relates to the expected longevity of the relationship between the headquarters involved and quickly identifies the degree of support that the gaining and losing Army commanders provide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If relationship is:</th>
<th>Then inherent responsibilities:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Have command relationship with:</td>
<td>May be task-organized by:¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unless modified, ADCON have responsibility through:</td>
<td>Are assigned position or AO by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish/maintain communications with:</td>
<td>Have priorities established by:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship of:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>All organic forces organized with the HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
<td>Organic HQ specified in organizing document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
<td>Organic HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assigned</td>
<td>Combatant command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaining HQ</td>
<td>Gaining Army HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCC or Service-assigned HQ</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPFCON</td>
<td>OPFCON; OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>Gaining unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>Parent unit and gaining unit; gaining unit may pass OPCON to lower HQ²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSR</td>
<td>GSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached</td>
<td>Attached</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
<td>As required by gaining unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>As required by gaining unit and parent unit</td>
<td>As required by OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
<td>OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>TACON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON; GSR; R; DS</td>
<td>GSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>OPCON</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
<td>OPCON; TACON; GS; GSR; R; DS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ¹ In NATO, the gaining unit may not task-organize a multinational force. (See TACON.)
² ADCON administrative control, AO area of operations, ASCC Army Service component command, DS direct support, GS general support, GSR general support–reinforcing, HQ headquarters, N/A not applicable, NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization, OPCON operational control, R reinforcing, TACON tactical control.

Ref: FM 6-0 (C2), Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, table B-2, p. B-5.

B. Support Relationships

Table B-3 on the following page lists Army support relationships. Army support relationships are not a command authority and are more specific than the joint support relationships. Commanders establish support relationships when subordination of one unit to another is inappropriate. Commanders assign a support relationship when—
Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to achieve results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units—as in direct support—to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters—as in general support. Support relationships do not alter administrative control. Commanders specify and change support relationships through task organization.

**Direct support** is a support relationship requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance (ADRP 5-0). A unit assigned a direct support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is positioned by and has priorities of support established by the supported unit.

**Reinforcing** is a support relationship requiring a force to support another supporting unit (ADRP 5-0). Only like units (for example, artillery to artillery) can be given a reinforcing mission. A unit assigned a reinforcing support relationship retains its command relationship with its parent unit, but is positioned by the reinforced unit. A unit that is reinforcing has priorities of support established by the reinforced unit, then the parent unit.

**General support** is that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof (JP 3-09.3). Units assigned a GS relationship are positioned and have priorities established by their parent unit.

**General support-reinforcing** is a support relationship assigned to a unit to support the force as a whole and to reinforce another similar-type unit (ADRP 5-0). A unit assigned a general support-reinforcing (GSR) support relationship is positioned and has priorities established by its parent unit and secondly by the reinforced unit.

---

### If relationship is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relationship Type</th>
<th>Commanding Unit</th>
<th>Supporting Unit</th>
<th>Receiving Unit</th>
<th>Assigning Unit</th>
<th>Sustaining Unit</th>
<th>Liaison Responsibility</th>
<th>Command Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct support</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Supported unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Supported unit</td>
<td>Parent unit; supported unit</td>
<td>Command relationship with:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcing</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Reinforced unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Reinforced unit</td>
<td>Reinforced unit; then parent unit</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General support-reinforcing</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>As required by parent unit</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General support</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>Parent unit</td>
<td>As required by parent unit</td>
<td>Not applicable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Then inherent responsibilities:**

- Have command relationship with:
- May be task-organized by:
- Receive sustainment from:
- Are assigned position or an area of operations by:
- Provide liaison to:
- Establish/ maintain communications with:
- Have priorities established by:
- Can impose on gaining unit further command or support relationship by:

---

Ref: FM 6-0 (C2), Commander and Staff Organization and Operations, table B-3, p. B-6.

Army support relationships allow supporting commanders to employ their units’ capabilities to achieve results required by supported commanders. Support relationships are graduated from an exclusive supported and supporting relationship between two units—as in direct support—to a broad level of support extended to all units under the control of the higher headquarters—as in general support. Support relationships do not alter administrative control. Commanders specify and change support relationships through task organization.
III. Task Organization

Ref: FM 6-0 (C2), Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (Apr ‘16), app. D.

Task-organizing is the act of designing an operating force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission (ADRP 3-0). Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to, training, experience, equipment, sustainability, operational environment, (including enemy threat), and mobility. For Army forces, it includes allocating available assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. Command and support relationships provide the basis for unity of command in operations. The assistant chief of staff, plans (G-5) or assistant chief of staff, operations (G-3 [S-3]) develops Annex A (Task Organization).

Fundamental Considerations

Military units consist of organic components. Organic parts of a unit are those forming an essential part of the unit and are listed in its table of organization and equipment (TOE). Commanders can alter organizations’ organic unit relationships to better allocate assets to subordinate commanders. They also can establish temporary command and support relationships to facilitate exercising mission command.

Establishing clear command and support relationships is fundamental to organizing any operation. These relationships establish clear responsibilities and authorities between subordinate and supporting units. Some command and support relationships (for example, tactical control) limit the commander’s authority to prescribe additional relationships. Knowing the inherent responsibilities of each command and support relationship allows commanders to effectively organize their forces and helps supporting commanders to understand their unit’s role in the organizational structure.

Commanders designate command and support relationships to weight the decisive operation and support the concept of operations. Task organization also helps subordinate and supporting commanders support the commander’s intent. These relationships carry with them varying responsibilities to the subordinate unit by the parent and gaining units.

Commanders consider two organizational principles when task-organizing forces:

- **When possible, commanders maintain cohesive mission teams.** They organize forces based on standing headquarters, their assigned forces, and habitual associations when possible. When not feasible and ad hoc organizations are created, commanders arrange time for training and establishing functional working relationships and procedures. Once commanders have organized and committed a force, they keep its task organization unless the benefits of a change clearly outweigh the disadvantages. Reorganizations may result in a loss of time, effort, and tempo. Sustainment considerations may also preclude quick reorganization.

- **Commanders carefully avoid exceeding the span of control capabilities of subordinates.** Span of control refers to the number of subordinate units under a single commander. This number is situation dependent and may vary. As a rule, commanders can effectively command two to six subordinate units. Allocating subordinate commanders more units gives them greater flexibility and increases options and combinations. However, increasing the number of subordinate units increases the number of decisions for commanders to make in a timely fashion. This slows down the reaction time among decisionmakers.

Refer to BSS5: The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Leading, Planning & Conducting Military Operations) for complete discussion of task organization to include fundamental considerations, Army command and support relationships, unit listing sequence, and outline format (sample).
III. Command Post Operations

CP personnel, information systems, and equipment must be able to support continuous operations while in communication with their higher echelon, subordinate, supporting, supported, and adjacent units. Commanders arrange personnel and equipment within the CP to facilitate internal planning, coordination, information sharing, and rapid decision making. They ensure staffs are trained on standard operating procedures and that the unit’s battle rhythm effectively integrates and synchronizes the activities of the operations process within the headquarters and with external organizations.

Refer to ATP 6-0.5 for doctrine on CP organization and operations.

Commanders echelon their headquarters into CPs and assign responsibilities to each CP to assist them in controlling operations. While each CP is designed for a particular purpose (for example controlling current operations), activities common in all CPs include, but are not limited to—

- Maintaining running estimates in support of the commander’s decision making.
- Controlling operations.
- Assessing operations.
- Developing and disseminating orders.
- Coordinating with higher, subordinate, and adjacent headquarters.
- Conducting knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure.
- Conducting DODIN operations.
- Maintaining the COP.
- Performing CP administration, including sleep plans, security, and feeding schedules.

CP Organization and Employment Considerations
CPs provide locations from which commanders, assisted by their staffs, exercise mission command. Commanders organize their mission command system into CPs based on mission requirements and the situation. Planning considerations for CP organization and employment can be categorized as—

- Those contributing to effectiveness.
- Those contributing to survivability.

In many cases, these factors work against each other and therefore neither can be optimized. Trade-offs are made to acceptably balance effectiveness and survivability.
The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a position of relative advantage over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver is employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy (JP 3-0). It works through movement and with fires to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy to accomplish the mission and consolidate gains. Commanders use maneuver for massing the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Move.
- Maneuver.
- Employ direct fires.
- Occupy an area.
- Conduct mobility and countermobility.
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Employ battlefield obscuration.

FM 3-90-1 and FM 3-90-2 provide the foundation for movement and maneuver during large-scale combat operations. Corps, division, and BCT commanders normally do not specify the form of maneuver to be adopted by subordinate units. However, the assignment of missions and tasks, AOs, and the allocation of forces may impose such limitations on a subordinate unit that its commander has little choice on the form of maneuver adopted.

The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements. These movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function. Tactical commands normally employ a combination of the six basic forms of maneuver—envelopment, flank attack, frontal attack, infiltration, penetration, and turning movement—in their performance of the four offensive tasks (see pp. 2-85). Forms of the maneuver are discussed on pp. 2-90 to 2-91. Tactical enabling tasks are addressed on pp. 2-66 to 2-67; tactical mission tasks are on pp. 4-17 to 4-22.

Editor’s note: For the purposes of The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, an overview of the following tasks of decisive action (see pp. 1-36 to 1-37) and topics are represented as they relate to the movement and maneuver warfighting function:

I. Offense and Defense, pp. 4-2 to 4-3.
II. Stability Operations, pp. 4-4 to 4-5.
III. Defense Support of Civil Authorities, pp. 4-6 to 4-7.
IV. Special Operations, pp. 4-7 to 3-8.
V. Deployment/Force Projection Operations, p. 4-10.
I. Offense and Defense (Decisive Action)

Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug ‘12).

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (CJCSM 5120.01). Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander employs combat power in the conduct of engagements and battles. This section addresses the tactical level of war, the art and science of tactics, and hasty versus deliberate operations.

The Tactical Level of War

ADP 3-90 is the primary manual for offensive and defensive tasks at the tactical level. It does not provide doctrine for stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. It is authoritative and provides guidance in the form of combat tested concepts and ideas for the employment of available means to win in combat. These tactics are not prescriptive in nature, and they require judgment in application.

The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are just a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Strategic and operational success is a measure of how one or more battles link to winning a major operation or campaign. In turn, tactical success is a measure of how one or more engagements link to winning a battle. See also pp. 3-17 to 3-22.

The Offense

The offense is the decisive form of war. While strategic, operational, or tactical considerations may require defending for a period of time, defeat of the enemy eventually requires shifting to the offense. Army forces strike the enemy using offensive action in times, places, or manners for which the enemy is not prepared to seize, retain, and exploit the operational initiative. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation (ADRP 3-0).

The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt his attack, and to set the conditions for future successful operations.

The Defense

While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. Army forces conduct defensive tasks as part of major operations and joint campaigns, while simultaneously conducting offensive and stability tasks as part of decisive action outside the United States.

Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense include to retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, to attrit or fix the enemy as a prelude to the offense, in response to surprise action by the enemy, or to increase the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.

Tactical Enabling Tasks

Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the conduct of decisive action. Tactical enabling tasks are usually shaping or sustaining. They may be decisive in the conduct of stability tasks. Tactical enabling tasks discussed in ADRP 3-90 include reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement operations, and urban operations. Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable.
The Army echelons its broad array of capabilities to perform diverse functions. These functions vary with the type of unit and, particularly at operational echelons, with the organization of the theater, the nature of the conflict, and the number of friendly forces committed to the effort.

### Tactical Echelons

- **A** Fire Team
- **B** Crew
- **C** Squad
- **D** Section
- **E** Platoon
- **F** Companies, Batteries, Troops and Detachments
- **G** Battalions and Squadrons
- **H** Brigades, Regiments, and Groups
- **I** Division

See pp. 2-23 to 2-35 for discussion of Army echelons associated with large-scale combat operations (from FM 3-0) — theater Army, corps, division, BCTs & brigades.

At each echelon, the commander task organizes available capabilities to accomplish the mission. The commander’s purpose in task organization is to maximize subordinate commanders’ abilities to generate a combined arms effect consistent with the concept of operations. The relationships between units within and supporting an echelon are described in terms of command and support relationships. See pp. 2-27 to 2-34 for discussion of command and support relationships.
A. Fire Team
A fire team is a small military unit. A fire team generally consists of four or fewer soldiers and is usually grouped by two or three teams into a squad or section. The concept of the fire team is based on the need for tactical flexibility. A fire team is capable of autonomous operations as part of its next larger unit, such as a squad or section. It is usually led by a sergeant.

B. Crew
A crew consists of all personnel operating a particular system. This system might be a weapons system, such as a tank or machinegun. The system might also be a vehicle, such as a helicopter, or a sensor system, such as a target acquisition radar. The rank of the senior crew member can vary widely from a junior noncommissioned officer to a commissioned or warrant officer based on the system.

C. Squad
A squad is a small military unit typically containing two or more fire teams. It typically contains a dozen Soldiers or less. In some cases the crew of a system may also be designated as a squad. Squads are usually led by a staff sergeant.

D. Section
A section is an Army unit smaller than a platoon and larger than a squad. A section may consist of the crews of two or more Army systems, such as a tank section, or several fire teams.

E. Platoon
A platoon is a subdivision of a company or troop consisting of two or more squads or sections. A platoon is normally led by a lieutenant. Platoons tend to contain roughly 30 Soldiers, but in some cases they contain significantly more or less than that number.

F. Companies, Batteries, Troops, and Detachments
A company is a unit consisting of two or more platoons, usually of the same type, with a headquarters and a limited capacity for self-support. A troop is a company-size unit in a reconnaissance organization. A battery is a company-size unit in a fires or air defense artillery battalion. A company normally consists of more than 75 soldiers. Some aviation and armor companies are exceptions to this rule. Companies and air defense and artillery batteries are the basic elements of battalions. Companies, batteries, and troops may also be assigned as separate units of brigades and larger organizations. Some companies, such as special forces companies, have subordinate detachments, instead of platoons, which are organized and trained to operate independently for extended periods. A detachment is a tactical element organized on either a temporary or permanent basis for special duties.

Company-size combat units can fight in mass or by subordinate platoons. Reconnaissance troops frequently operate with their platoons in separate areas. In combined arms battalions, companies fight either as integral units or as task-organized teams reinforced with close-combat Platoons of the same or different types. A company team is a combined arms organization formed by attaching one or more nonorganic armor, mechanized infantry, Stryker, or infantry platoons to an armor, mechanized infantry, Stryker, or infantry company, either in exchange for, or in addition to, its organic Platoons. These company teams can include other supporting squads or Platoons, such as engineers. Company teams are task-organized for specific missions. Such teams can match capabilities to missions with greater precision than units using only organic Platoons. However, the attachment of different units at the company level demands thorough training to achieve the maximum complementary effects. Whenever possible, Platoons and detachments should train together before they are committed.
## C. Mission Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterattack</td>
<td>A form of attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the enemy his goal in attacking (FM 3-0).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>A form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 1-02, see delaying operation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>A form of security operations whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and combat support assets of the main body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetrate</td>
<td>A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system (FM 3-0).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>A form of retrograde [JP 1-02 uses operation] in which a force out of contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy (JP 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>A form of security operations that primarily provides early warning to the protected force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw</td>
<td>A planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force (JP 1-02) [The Army considers it a form of retrograde.]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Reconnaissance operations are those operations undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area. Reconnaissance primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is performed before, during, and after other operations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, as well as by the commander in order to formulate, confirm, or modify his course of action (COA).

I. Forms of Reconnaissance

The four forms of reconnaissance are route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force.

Surveillance and reconnaissance missions are a principal means of information collection. A key difference between surveillance missions and reconnaissance is that surveillance is systematic, usually passive in collection of information, and may be continuous; while reconnaissance may be limited in duration of the assigned mission, is active in collection of information, and usually includes human participation. Reconnaissance employs many tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) throughout the course of the mission, one of which may include an extended period of surveillance.

Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance includes reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (JP 3-05).
D. Obstacle Protection
Obstacle protection is protecting the integrity of obstacles. This protection can be achieved through counterreconnaissance, breach asset destruction, obstacle repair, and using phony obstacles. Counterreconnaissance prevents the threat from gathering information on friendly preparation. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan includes obstacle protection. Early breach asset destruction will reduce the threat’s ability to maneuver and ensure maximum effectiveness of the obstacles. Obstacle repair must occur when the threat has attempted to breach tactical obstacles and during lulls in the battle, between echelons.

E. Obstacle C2
Obstacle C2 focuses on obstacle emplacement authority and obstacle control.

- **Obstacle Emplacement Authority.** The authority that a unit commander has to emplace reinforcing obstacles.
- **Obstacle Control.** The commander uses control measures, specific guidance, and orders to maintain obstacle control.

### Obstacle Control Measures
Obstacle control measures are specific control measures that simplify granting obstacle emplacement authority and providing obstacle control (*FM 3-0, Operations, Oct ‘17*).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Obstacle control measure</th>
<th>Emplacement authority</th>
<th>Graphic</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Zone</td>
<td>CORPS</td>
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<td>Unit designation</td>
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<td>DIV</td>
<td>BDE</td>
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<td>Belt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>BDE²</td>
<td>TF²</td>
<td>Unit designation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>TF</td>
<td>CO TRP</td>
<td>Eff symbol is the graphic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstacle restricted area</td>
<td>Any</td>
<td></td>
<td>52ID 120800-182400ZSEP22</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. Rarely done by corps and divisions, but possible.
2. Done only when directed and integrated with corps or division fire plans.

Ref: *FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17)*, fig. 6-8, p. 6-11.
The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operations environment. Specifically, other significant aspects of an operational environment include threats, adversaries, and operational variables, depending on the nature of operations. The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders and is more than just collection. Developing intelligence is a continuous process that involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through the operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise, and information collection. The intelligence warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Provide support to force generation.
- Provide support to situational understanding.
- Conduct information collection.
- Provide intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities.

**Fighting for Intelligence**

Information collection begins immediately following receipt of mission. Units must be prepared to fight for intelligence against a range of threats, enemy formations, and unknowns. These challenges include integrated air defense systems (IADSs) and long range fires, counter reconnaissance, cyberspace and EW operations, deception operations, and camouflage. It may be necessary for commanders to allocate maneuver, fires, and other capabilities to conduct combat operations to enable information collection.

Priority intelligence requirements, information requirements, and targeting requirements inform the integrated information collection plan. All units (maneuver, fires, maneuver support, and sustainment units) are part of the information collection effort. Commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize all activities that provide useful information as a part of the information collection effort, including Soldier and leader engagements, patrols, observation posts and listening posts, convoys, and checkpoints.

During planning, combat information and intelligence is especially useful in determining the viability of potential courses of action. For example, a commander who lacks the intelligence to know where most of the enemy’s units and systems are located cannot conduct a deliberate attack. The unit must collect more information, conduct a reconnaissance in force, a more risky movement to contact, or a hasty attack.

During the execution phase of the operations process, a layered and continuous information collection effort ensures detection of any enemy formations, lethal fires capabilities, or specialized capabilities that provide the enemy advantage. In turn, this allows the commanders and staffs to adjust the scheme of maneuver and fires as the enemy situation develops.
III. Intelligence Warfighting Function Tasks

The intelligence warfighting function facilitates support to the commander and staff through a broad range of supporting Army Universal Tasks List (AUTL) tasks. These tasks are interrelated, require the participation of the commander and staff, and are often conducted simultaneously. The intelligence warfighting function tasks facilitate the commander’s visualization and understanding of the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intelligence tasks ►</th>
<th>Commander’s focus ►</th>
<th>Commander’s decisions ►</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support to force generation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence readiness.</td>
<td>Orient on contingencies.</td>
<td>Should the unit’s level of readiness be increased?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Establish an intelligence architecture.</td>
<td>Plan an operation.</td>
<td>Should the operation plan be implemented?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence overwatch.</td>
<td>Prepare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Generate intelligence knowledge.</td>
<td>Execute.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Tailor the intelligence force.</td>
<td>Assess.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support to situational understanding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perform intelligence preparation of the battlefield.</td>
<td>Secure the force.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Perform situation development.</td>
<td>Determine 2d and 3d effects on operations and the populace.</td>
<td>Which course of action will be implemented?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence support to protection.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Which enemy actions are expected?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide tactical intelligence overwatch.</td>
<td></td>
<td>What mitigation strategies should be developed and implemented to reduce the potential impact of operations on the population?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct police intelligence operations.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence support to civil affairs activities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conduct information collection</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Plan requirements and assess collection.</td>
<td>Plan an operation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Task and direct collection.</td>
<td>Prepare.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Execute collection.</td>
<td>Execute.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assess.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support to targeting and information capabilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence support to targeting.</td>
<td>Like lethal or nonlethal effects against targets.</td>
<td>Are the unit’s lethal and nonlethal effects and maneuver effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence support to inform and influence activities.</td>
<td>Destroy, suppress, disrupt, or neutralize targets.</td>
<td>Which targets should be re-engaged?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence support to cyber electromagnetic activities.</td>
<td>Reposition intelligence or attack assets.</td>
<td>Are the unit’s inform and influence activities effective?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Provide intelligence support to combat assessment.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: ADRP 2-0, Intelligence, table 2-1, p. 2-3.

There are intelligence-related AUTL tasks beyond the four most significant intelligence warfighting tasks shown above. Soldiers, systems, and units from all branches conduct intelligence-related AUTL tasks. Every Soldier, as a part of a small unit, is a potential information collector. Soldiers develop a special awareness simply due to exposure to events occurring in the AO, and have the opportunity to collect and report information based on their observations and interactions with the local population. The increased awareness that Soldiers develop through personal contact and observation is a critical element of the unit’s ability to understand the operational environment more fully.
V. Types of Intelligence Products

The G-2/S-2 staff produces and maintains a broad variety of products tailored to its consumers. These products are developed and maintained in accordance with the commander’s guidance. For all of these products, the primary focus of the G-2/S-2 staff’s analysis is presenting predictive intelligence to support operations. The intelligence products include the—

A. Intelligence Estimate

An intelligence estimate is the appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the threat and the order of probability of their adoption. The G-2/S-2 staff develops and maintains the intelligence estimate. The primary purpose of the intelligence estimate is to—

• Determine the full set of COAs open to the threat and the probable order of their adoption
• Disseminate information and intelligence
• Determine requirements concerning threats and other relevant aspects of the operational environment

B. Intelligence Summary

INTSUMs provide the context for commander’s situational understanding. The INTSUM reflects the G-2’s/S-2’s interpretation and conclusions regarding threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations over a designated period of time. This period will vary with the desires of the commander and the requirements of the situation. The INTSUM provides a summary of the threat situation, threat capabilities, the characteristics of terrain and weather and civil considerations, and COAs. The INTSUM can be presented in written, graphic, or oral format, as directed by the commander.

C. Intelligence Running Estimate

Effective plans and successful execution hinge on accurate and current running estimates. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if the planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Failure to maintain accurate running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions during execution.

Running estimates are principal knowledge management tools used by the commander and staff throughout the operations process. In their running estimates, the commander and each staff section continuously consider the effect of new information and update the following:

• Facts
• Assumptions
• Friendly force status
• Threat activities and capabilities
• Civil considerations
• Recommendations and conclusions

D. Common Operational Picture (COP)

A common operational picture is a single display of relevant information within a commander’s area of interest tailored to the user’s requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (ADRP 6-0). The COP is the primary tool for supporting the commander’s situational understanding. All staff sections provide input from their area of expertise to the COP.
Chap 6
Fires
Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP/ADRP 3-09, Fires (Aug ‘12), chap. 1 and ADRP 3-0, Operations (Nov ‘16), p. 5-5.

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense, and joint fires through the targeting process. Army fires systems deliver fires in support of offensive and defensive tasks to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target. The fires warfighting function includes the following tasks:

• Deliver fires.
• Integrate all forms of Army, joint, and multinational fires.
• Conduct targeting.

In addition to the characteristics for effective fires in ADRP 3-09, commanders consider:

• The desired effect, available capabilities, and time and resources are required to deliver the appropriate capability.
• Successful integration of information operations into the targeting process is important to mission accomplishment in many operations.

The fires warfighting function includes tasks associated with integrating, and synchronizing the effects of Army indirect fires, AMD, and joint fires with the effects of other warfighting functions. It includes planning for targeting; providing fire support; countering air, ballistic missile, cruise missile, rocket, artillery, mortars, and unmanned aircraft systems threats; and integrating joint and multinational fires. This represents the tasks the fires function must accomplish to complement and reinforce the other warfighting functions.

Fires organizations require deliberate and dynamic targeting to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects against ground and aerial targets. For ground threats, fires leaders use the Army’s targeting methodology to plan, prepare, execute, and assess effects on the ground. For aerial threats, fires leaders use air defense planning to determine air defense priorities and the tailoring of air defense artillery capabilities to defeat aerial threats.

As a warfighting function, fires address requirements associated with offensive and defensive tasks supporting the concept of operations and integrated into the scheme of maneuver.

A. Deliver Fires

Today’s operational environments require the integration of Army indirect fires in support of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Fires combine the use of air and ground artillery with the capabilities of other Army warfighting functions, special operations forces (SOF), joint forces, and unified action partners to enable the supported commander to seize the initiative. Army forces plan for, integrate, coordinate and synchronize the fires capabilities (sensors and weapon systems) of unified action partners into the concept of operations to achieve synergy, develop a common operational picture (COP), and enable joint interdependencies from the tactical to strategic levels. Additionally, complementary and reinforcing joint and multinational capabilities provide redundancy to mitigate environmental and operational restrictions, resource shortfalls, as well as gaps in coverage from a particular asset.

B. Integrate All Forms of Army, Joint and Multinational Fires

Fires must be integrated with the capabilities of other Army warfighting functions, special operation forces, joint forces and multinational forces. Integration of fires creates an optimal environment that mitigates risks, resource shortfalls and covers gaps within the areas of operations (AO). Ground and air fires must be integrated
VII. Employment of Fires

To employ fires is to use available weapons and other systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target (JP 3-0). Planning and assessment contribute to the execution of fire support and AMD in the successful employment of fires to achieve the commander’s intent. This contribution employs principles of planning, coordination, and execution as a guide. In advising the supported commander on the application of fires, the fires planner also reviews fires requirements against several basic fires considerations that guide planning in the development of the fire support plan and AADP. This function encompasses the fires associated with a number of tasks, missions, and processes, including:

A. Air and Missile Defense Employment

Employment Principles. ADA employment principles enable air defense forces to successfully perform combat missions and support overall force objectives. The four principles are:

**Mass**
Mass is the concentration of air defense combat power. Mass may also be interpreted to include the launching of more than one interceptor against a target.

**Mix**
Mix is the employment of a combination of weapon and sensor systems to protect the force and assets from the threat. Mix offsets the limitations of one system with the capabilities of another.

**Mobility**
Mobility is defined as a quality or capability of military forces, which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.

**Integration**
Integration is the combination of the forces, systems, functions, processes and information acquisition and distribution required to efficiently and effectively perform the mission. Integration combines separate systems, capabilities, functions, etc. in such a way that those individual elements can operate independently or in concert without adversely affecting other elements.

AMD Employment Guidelines
Planning during defense design and positioning ADA units involves applying six employment guidelines. Optimum protection of the items on the JFC’s CAL must be the goal. The six guidelines are:

1. **Mutual Support**
   Weapons are positioned so that the fires of one weapon can engage targets within the dead zone of the adjacent weapon systems.

2. **Overlapping Fires**
   Weapons are positioned so that their engagement envelopes overlap. Defense planners must apply mutual supporting and overlapping fires vertically and horizontally.

3. **Balanced Fires**
   Weapons are positioned to deliver an equal volume of fires in all directions.
B. Field Artillery Employment

When planning for the integration, synchronization and coordination of FA employment, commanders and staffs should consider the steps listed below:

Adequate Fire Support for the Committed Units
Organic fire units are most responsive to maneuver elements. The minimum adequate support for committed units is considered to be one organic FA battalion for each committed brigade. In no instance can there be more than one fires unit in direct support of a maneuver unit.

Weight the Main Effort
Support relationships of reinforcing or general support reinforcing (GSR) can be assigned to provide additional responsive fires to an organic FA battalion or a FA battalion with a direct support relationship.

Immediate Responsive Fires
The force commander should place some artillery on call with which they can immediately influence unified land operations.

Facilitate Future Operations
This fundamental is essential to ensure success in the face of unforeseen events and to ensure smooth transition from one phase of an operation to another. The fundamental can be implemented through the assignment of a support relationship, positioning of fires elements, and allocation of ammunition. The assignment of an on-order mission facilitates a future mission. Another way to facilitate future operations is to modify the current command or support relationship in accordance with anticipated requirements.

Maximize Feasible Centralized Control
Fires are most effective when control is centralized at the highest level consistent with the fire support capabilities and requirements of the overall mission. Centralized control of fires permits flexibility in their employment and facilitates effective support to each subordinate element of the command and to the force as a whole. Command and support relationships represent varying degrees of centralized control and responsiveness to committed units. The optimum degree of centralized control varies with each tactical situation. Decisive action will require more careful planning because of the limited resources available to attack targets and the need for carefully coordinated employment of acquisition, attack, and assessment means. A high degree of centralized control is desired in a defensive situation. Since the enemy has the initiative, it is difficult to accurately predict where and when he will strike. A lesser degree of centralized control is required in an offensive situation, because the supported force has the initiative.
VIII. Fires and the Operational Framework


Fires provide a collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, AMD, and joint fires in support of operations no matter how the unit defines and describes the operational framework.

See pp. 1-20 to 1-21 for discussion of the operational framework from ADRP 3-0.

A. Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining Framework

Fires contribute to the overall effect of maneuver in which commanders use them separately in decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to directly influence the mission objectives.

- **Fires in Support of Decisive Operation.** Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of a commander’s purpose (ADP 3-0). Fires supporting decisive operations include preparation fires, close support fires, interdiction, Army support to offensive counterair (OCA)/DCA, AMD, final protective fires, electronic attack, and counterfire. Fires in the decisive operation integrate and synchronize weapon systems and sensors to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects in support of the scheme of maneuver.

- **Fires in Support of Shaping Operations.** Shaping operations create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive operation (ADP 3-0). Fires in support of shaping operations disrupt or destroy the enemy’s attacking echelons and fire support, mission command, and logistic infrastructure. Fires may be used to limit the enemy’s ability to shift forces to meet attacking friendly maneuver forces and to sustain the momentum of the attack. Fires in support of shaping operations employ the same types of fires as during the decisive operation.

- **Fires in Support of Sustaining Operations.** Fires in sustaining operations protect and enable friendly forces to retain freedom of action. Fires must be responsive and positioned to attack and disable enemy forces or any potential threat.

B. Deep-Close-Security Framework

The Deep-Close-Security framework has historically been associated with a terrain orientation but can be applied to temporal and organizational orientations as well.

- **Fires in Support of Deep Operations.** Deep operations involve efforts to disrupt uncommitted enemy forces (ADP 3-0). These types of operations frequently tie to events in time or space. Fires in support of deep operations disrupt enemy movement, command and control, sustainment and fires assets. Fires used in deep operations include interdiction, counterair, and electronic attack.

- **Fires in Support of Close Operations.** Close operations involve efforts to have immediate effects with committed friendly forces-potentially in direct contact with enemy forces-to include enemy reserves available for immediate commitment (ADP 3-0). Fires in support of close operations include counterfire, indirect fire protection capabilities, combined arms for air defense, close air support (CAS), and final protective fires. When employing fires in support of close operations, commanders must mitigate risk of fratricide by selecting the most appropriate fires capability and implementing ACMs and FSCMs.

- **Fires in Support of Security.** Security operations involve efforts to provide early and accurate warning of enemy operations, provide the force with time, and maneuver space within which to react to the enemy, protect the force from surprise, and develop the situation so the commander can effectively use the force (ADP 3-0). Fires in support of security operations include AMD, sensor early warning, indirect fires, and CAS.
The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. The sustainment warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Conduct logistics.
- Provide personnel services.
- Provide health service support.

A. Logistics

Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that—

- Design, develop, acquire, store, move, distribute, maintain, evacuate, and dispose of materiel.
- Acquire or build, maintain, operate, and dispose of facilities.
- Acquire or furnish services.

Although joint doctrine defines logistics as a science, logistics involves both military art and science. Knowing when and how to accept risk, prioritizing a myriad of requirements, and balancing limited resources all require military art. Logistics integrates strategic, operational, and tactical support of deployed forces while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of additional forces and materiel. Logistics includes—

- Maintenance.
- Transportation.
- Supply.
- Field services.
- Distribution.
- Operational contract support.
- General engineering support.

See pp. 7-31 to 7-34 for discussion of logistics.
III. Sustainment Considerations during Large-Scale Combat Operations

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct ‘17), pp. 2-48 to 2-49.

Logistics during Large-Scale Combat Operations

Logisticians support operational tempo by delivering supplies and materiel as far forward as possible. They use throughput distribution and preplanned and preconfigured packages of essential items to do this. Logisticians maintain constant contact with operational units to determine requirements for supporting operations. Operational units also provide logisticians with support estimates for contingencies and requirements for cross-loading of supplies to prevent all of one type of supply from being destroyed by the loss of a single system.

Supplies and material should remain close to the maneuver force to ensure short response times for supplies and services. This includes uploading critical materiel—such as water, petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ammunition—in order to anticipate attempted occupation of a piece of terrain by more than one unit. Commanders must make risk decisions regarding logistics preparations and avoidance of enemy detection, since logistic preparations may give indications of friendly tactical plans.

The availability of supplies and materiel to sustain tactical unit operations becomes critical to extend operational reach as large-scale combat operations progress. Operational reach is reduced when supplies fail to keep up with the demand of tactical units. Slow or limited resupply may require commanders to use controlled supply rates for various classes of supply to reduce unit expenditures. When those controlled supply rates are not sufficient to continue operations, the force culminates.

During large-scale combat operations supply lines of communication are strained, and requirements for repair and replacement of weapon systems increase. Requirements for petroleum, oils, and lubricants increase during the offense. Conversely, requirements for munitions tend to be higher in the defense than in the offense. Sustainment units must be as mobile as the forces they support. One way to provide continuous support is to task organize elements of sustainment units or complete sustainment units with their supported maneuver formations as required by the mission.

The variety and complexity of possible situations arising during an attack requires sustainment operators to establish a flexible and tailorable distribution system in support of tactical commanders. There may be a wide dispersion of forces and lengthening of lines of communication. Required capabilities to support longer lines of communications include movement control, in-transit visibility, terminal operations, and mode operations.

Field maintenance assets move as forward as possible to repair inoperable and damaged equipment to return it to service as quickly as possible. Crews perform preventive maintenance checks and services as modified for the climate and terrain in which they find themselves. Battle damage assessment and repair restores the minimum essential combat capabilities necessary to support a specific combat mission or to enable the equipment to self-recover. Crews and maintenance and recovery teams conduct battle damage assessment and repair to rapidly return disabled equipment to battlefield service using field expedient components and means.

Establishing aerial resupply and forward logistics base camps may be necessary to sustain operations. This is especially true in the offense, if an attack transitions to exploitation and pursuit conducted at great distances from unit sustaining bases. Aerial resupply,
B. Personnel Services

Personnel services are those sustainment functions related to Soldiers’ welfare, readiness, and quality of life. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel. Personnel services include—

- Human resources support.
- Financial management.
- Legal support.
- Religious support.
- Army music support.

See pp. 7-35 to 7-38 for discussion of personnel services.

C. Health Service Support

The Army Health System is a component of the military health system that oversees operational management of the health service support and force health protection missions. The Army Health System includes all mission support services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department to support health service support, and it includes force health protection mission requirements for the Army. Health service support is part of the sustainment warfighting function, while force health protection is a part of the protection warfighting function.

The health service support mission promotes, improves, conserves, or restores the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers and, as directed, other personnel. This mission consists of casualty care, medical evacuation, and medical logistics. Casualty care encompasses the treatment aspects of a number of Army Medical Department functions including—

- Organic and area medical support.
- Hospitalization (including treatment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear patients).
- Dental treatment.
- Behavioral health and neuropsychiatric treatment.
- Clinical laboratory services.
- Medical evacuation (including en route care and medical regulating).
- Medical logistics (including blood and blood products).

Health service support closely relates to force health protection: the measures to promote, improve, or conserve the mental and physical well-being of Soldiers. These measures enable a healthy and fit force, prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health hazards.

In addition to the principles of sustainment in ADRP 4-0, commanders consider the following when performing sustainment warfighting function tasks:

- Commanders need to plan for the early acquisition of locations and facilities for force and logistic bases where temporary occupancy is planned or when the host nation fails to provide, or provides inadequate, locations and facilities.
- Sustainment forces, like all other forces, must be capable of self-defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other military forces.

See pp. 7-39 to 7-43 for discussion of health service support.
A firm doctrinal grasp enables sustainment staffs to use and apply the planning tools of the operations process (see ADP 5-0, 3-0 and 6-0, respectively). In addition to a firm foundation in planning, operational, and sustainment doctrine, planners must understand maneuver doctrine in order to arrange sustainment actions in a manner to effectively support the operation.

**Planning Considerations**
Sustainment staffs create viable plans that are well coordinated and synchronized, facilitate operational tempo and support the commander’s priorities before, during, and after operations. Sustainment planners in an operational headquarters generally do not drive the planning process but must be fully integrated throughout the Army design methodology. Sustainment planners use the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and the military decision making process to develop the sustainment concept of support.

The concept of support is derived from running estimates developed using a variety of planning tools. These running estimates project consumption rates for key classes of supply, casualty figures, maintenance requirements, and other sustainment requirements (see ADRP 5-0 for additional information). Sustainment planners participate in all aspects of the military decision making process to ensure synchronization and unity of effort.

Planning in a sustainment headquarters requires lead planners to take an active role in the planning process. They assist the development of the commander’s understanding of the operational environment, identify the problems, and articulate the sustainment commander’s vision. It requires they have regular access to the commander. Sustainment planners must have the most current products from the organizations they support as well as planning products from their higher headquarters to ensure proper nesting and synchronization. Developing effective plans facilitates well synchronized transitions between operational phases.

A comprehensive analysis of host nation capabilities and plans incorporating these resources, provides sustainment commanders with an array of options. For example, the availability of reliable contractible resources could reduce the burden on military resources and an already strained distribution system. Contracted resources could enable military resources to be focused on high priority operations that are unsuitable for civilian personnel. The use of contractors and host nation support are often directly tied to the level of violence and threat in the operational environment.

**I. Operational Reach**
Operational reach is a necessity in order to conduct decisive action. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). The limit of a unit’s operational reach is its culminating point. See p. 1-32 and 2-12 to 2-13 for related discussion of operational reach.

Sustainment enables operational reach. It provides Army forces with the lift, materiel, supplies, health services, and other support necessary to sustain operations for extended periods of time. Army forces require strategic sustainment capabilities and global distribution systems to deploy, maintain, and conduct operations over great distances. Army forces increase the joint force’s ability to extend operational reach by securing and operating bases in the AOR. In many instances, land operations combine direct deployment with movements from intermediate staging bases located outside the operational area.

Extending operational reach is a paramount concern for commanders. To achieve the desired end state, forces must possess the necessary operational reach to establish and maintain conditions that define success. Commanders and staffs increase operational reach through deliberate, focused operational design, and the appropriate sustainment to facilitate endurance.
A. Theater Opening

Theater opening (TO) is the ability to establish and operate ports of debarkation (air, sea, and rail) to establish a distribution system and sustainment bases, and to facilitate port throughput for the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces within a theater of operations (ADP 4-0). Preparing for TO operations requires unity of effort among the various commands and a seamless strategic-to-tactical interface. It is a complex joint process involving the GCC, strategic and joint partners such as USTRANSCOM, and transportation component commands like AMC, military sealift command, SDDC, USAMC, DLA, Service Component Commands, and Army generating forces.

- **Mobilization** is the process of bringing the armed forces to a state of readiness in response to a contingency. Upon alert for deployment generating force sustainment organizations, ensure Army forces are manned, equipped, and meet all Soldier readiness criteria.

- **Deployment** is the movement of forces to an operational area in response to an order. Sustainment is crucial to the deployment of forces. Joint transportation assets including air and sealift provide the movement capabilities for the Army.

- **Employment** encompasses a wide array of operations—including, but not limited to—entry operations, decisive action, conduct of operations, and post-conflict operations.

- **Sustainment** provides logistics, personnel services, and health service support to maintain forces until mission completion. It gives Army forces its operational reach, freedom of action and endurance.

- **Redeployment** is the return of forces and materiel to the home or mobilization station or to another theater. It requires retrograde of logistics, personnel services, and health service support and reuniting unit personnel and equipment at their home station.

See pp. 2-47 and 4-10 for related discussion of force projection, deployment operations, and RSOI.

B. Theater Closing

Theater closing is the process of redeploying Army forces and equipment from a theater, the drawdown and removal or disposition of Army non-unit equipment and materiel, and the transition of materiel and facilities back to host nation or civil authorities. Theater closing begins with the termination of joint operations.

See pp. 7-26 to 7-27 for further discussion.
Distribution
Ref: ADRP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul ‘12), pp. 3-16 to 3-18.

Distribution is the primary means to prolong endurance. Distribution is the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the geographic combatant commander. Additionally, it is also the process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets (JP 4-0).

The distribution system consists of a complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, manage, and control the flow of military materiel between point of receipt into the military system and point of issue to using activities and units.

The Joint segment of the distribution system is referred to as global distribution. It is defined as the process that synchronizes and integrates the fulfillment of joint requirements with the employment of joint forces (JP 4-09). It provides national resources (personnel and materiel) to support the execution of joint operations.

The Army segment of the distribution system is referred to as theater distribution. Theater distribution is the flow of equipment, personnel, and materiel within theater to meet the CCDR’s mission. The theater segment extends from the ports of debarkation or source of supply (in theater) to the points of need (Soldier). It is enabled by a distribution management system synchronizes and coordinates a complex of networks (physical, communications, information, and resources) and the sustainment war fighting function to achieve responsive support to operational requirements. Distribution management includes the management of transportation and movement control, warehousing, inventory control, order administration, site and location analysis, packaging, data processing, accountability for equipment (materiel management), people, and communications.

Refer to ATTP 4-0.1, Army Theater Distribution for details.

The distribution management of medical materiel is accomplished by a support team from the Medical Logistics Management Center (MLMC). The MLMC support team collocates with the DMC of the TSC/ESC to provide the MEDCOM (DS) with visibility and control of all Class VIII.

In-Transit Visibility
In-transit visibility is the ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; patients and personal property from origin to consignee, or destination across the range of military operations (JP 3-35). This includes force tracking and visibility of convoys, containers/pallets, transportation assets, other cargo, and distribution resources within the activities of a distribution node.

Retrograde of Materiel
Another aspect of distribution is retrograde of materiel. Retrograde of materiel is the return of materiel from the owning/using unit back through the distribution system to the source of supply, directed ship-to location, and/or point of disposal (ATTP 4-0.1). Retrograde includes turn-in/classification, preparation, packing, transporting, and shipping. To ensure these functions are properly executed, commanders must enforce supply accountability and discipline and utilize the proper packing materials. Retrograde of materiel can take place as part of theater distribution operations and as part of redeployment operations. Retrograde of materiel must be continuous and not be allowed to build up at supply points/nodes.

Early retrograde planning is essential and necessary to preclude the loss of materiel assets, minimize environmental impact, and maximize use of transportation capabilities. Planners must consider environmental issues when retrograding hazardous materiel.
Logistics involves both military art and science. Knowing when and how to accept risk, prioritizing a myriad of requirements, and balancing limited resources all require military art while understanding equipment capabilities incorporates military science. Logistics integrates strategic, operational, and tactical support of deployed forces while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of additional forces and materiel. Logistics include; maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering support. Distribution was previously discussed elsewhere.

A. Maintenance

Maintenance is all actions taken to retain materiel in a serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceability. The Army’s two levels of maintenance are field maintenance and sustainment maintenance (see ATTP 4-33). Maintenance is necessary for endurance and performed at the tactical through strategic levels of war.

1. Field Maintenance
Field maintenance is repair and return to user and is generally characterized by on-(or near) system maintenance, often utilizing line replaceable unit, component replacement, battle damage assessment, repair, and recovery (see ATTP 4-33). It is focused on returning a system to an operational status. Field level maintenance is not limited to remove and replace, but also provides adjustment, alignment, and fault/failure diagnoses. Field maintenance also includes battlefield damage and repair tasks performed by either the crew or support personnel to maintain system in an operational state.

2. Sustainment Maintenance
Sustainment maintenance is generally characterized as “off system” and “repair rear” (see ATTP 4-33). The intent is to perform commodity-oriented repairs on all supported items to one standard that provides a consistent and measurable level of reliability. Off-system maintenance consists of overhaul and remanufacturing activities designed to return components, modules, assemblies, and end items to the supply system or to units, resulting in extended or improved operational life expectancies.

B. Transportation Operations

Army transportation units play a key role in facilitating endurance. Transportation units move sustainment from ports to points of need and retrograde materiel as required. Transportation operations encompass the wide range of capabilities needed to allow joint and Army commanders to conduct operations. Important transportation functions are movement control, intermodal operations (terminal and mode), and container management.

1. Movement Control
Movement control is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces. Movement control balances requirements against capabilities and requires continuous synchronization to integrate military, host nation, and commercial movements by all modes of trans-
portation to ensure seamless transitions from the strategic through the tactical level of an operation. It is a means of providing commanders with situational awareness to control movements in their operational area. Movement control responsibilities are imbedded in an infrastructure that relies on coordination for the planning and execution to ensure transportation assets are utilized efficiently while ensuring LOCs are deconflicted to support freedom of access for military operations.

2. Intermodal Operations

Intermodal operations is the process of using multiple modes (air, sea, highway, rail) and conveyances (i.e. truck, barge, containers, pallets) to move troops, supplies and equipment through expeditionary entry points and the network of specialized transportation nodes to sustain land forces. It uses movement control to balance requirements against capabilities against capacities to synchronize terminal and mode operations ensuring an uninterrupted flow through the transportation system. It consists of facilities, transportation assets and material handling equipment required to support the deployment and distribution enterprise.

a. Terminal Operations. Terminal operations consist of the receiving, processing, and staging of passengers; the receipt, transit storage and marshalling of cargo; the loading and unloading of transport conveyances; and the manifesting and forwarding of cargo and passengers to a destination (JP 4-01.5). Terminal operations are a key element in supporting operational reach and endurance. They are essential in supporting deployment, redeployment and sustainment operations. There are three types of terminals: air, water, and land.

b. Mode Operations. Mode operations are the execution of movements using various conveyances (truck, lighterage, railcar, aircraft) to transport cargo. It includes the administrative, maintenance, and security tasks associated with the operation of the conveyances.

3. Container Management

Container management is the process of establishing and maintaining visibility and accountability of all cargo containers moving within the Defense Transportation System. In theater, container management is conducted by commanders at the operational and tactical levels. The TSC distribution management center coordinates intermodal operations with the movement control battalion at transportation, storage, and distribution nodes. The TSC maintains information on the location and status of containers and flat racks in the theater. The movement control battalion provides essential information on container location, use, flow and condition. They assist with control of containers by identifying that they are ready for return to the distribution system. The distribution management center sets priorities for container shipment and diversion.

C. Supply

Supply is essential for enhancing Soldiers’ quality of life. Supply provides the material required to accomplish the mission. Supply includes the following classes. See facing page for a listing and further discussion of the classes of supply.
Ref: ADP 3-37, Protection (Aug ‘12) and ADRP 3-0, Operations (Nov ’16), p. 5-7.

Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power and the freedom of action and to mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection safeguards the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners. Survivability refers to the capacity, fitness, or tendency to remain alive or in existence. For the military, survivability is about much more than mere survival—it is also about remaining effective. Military forces are composed of personnel and physical assets, each having their own inherent survivability qualities or capabilities that permit them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. These inherent qualities or capabilities are affected by various factors (dispersion, redundancy, morale, leadership, discipline, mobility, situational understanding, terrain and weather conditions) and can be enhanced by tasks within the protection warfighting function.

I. The Protection Warfighting Function

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners, including the host nation. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force’s integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and then counters or mitigates those threats. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. Protection activities ensure maintenance of the critical asset list and defended asset list.

The protection warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Conduct survivability operations.
- Provide force health protection.
- Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
- Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
- Coordinate air and missile defense.
- Conduct personnel recovery.
- Conduct detention operations.
- Conduct risk management.
- Implement physical security procedures.
- Apply antiterrorism measures.
- Conduct populace and resource control.

In addition to the principles of protection described in ADRP 3-37, commanders consider the following when performing protection warfighting function tasks:

- Security of forces and means enhances force protection by identifying and reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise.
- Physical security measures, like any defensive measures, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.
II. The Role of Protection

Ref: ADP 3-37, Protection (Aug ‘12), pp. 1 to 2.

Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (Joint Publication [JP] 3-0). Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power and mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection is a continuing activity; it integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners.

Operational environments are uncertain, marked by rapid change and a wide range of threats and hazards. These evolving operational environments will provide significant challenges for commanders and staffs who are integrating protection capabilities. Protection preserves the combat power potential of the force by providing capabilities to identify and prevent threats and hazards and to mitigate their effects. Army units may also be required to provide protection for civilians in order to support mission objectives. This may include protecting civilians from widespread violence (such as mass atrocities), mitigating civilian casualties, and ensuring a secure environment for the population and nonmilitary partners.

Protection can be maximized by integrating the elements of combat power to reinforce protection or to achieve complementary protective effects. The goal of protection integration is to balance protection with the freedom of action throughout the duration of military operations. This is accomplished by integrating reinforcing or complementary protection capabilities into operations until all significant vulnerabilities have been mitigated, have been eliminated, or become assumed risks. The employment of synchronized and integrated reinforcing and complementary protection capabilities preserves combat power and provides flexibility across the range of military operations. The collaboration, integration, and synchronization between the warfighting functions assist in identifying and preventing threats and hazards and in mitigating their effects.

Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their visualization of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. The commander’s inherent responsibility to protect and preserve the force and secure the area of operations is vital in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. Protection must be considered throughout the operations process to—

- Identify threats and hazards
- Implement control measures to prevent or mitigate enemy or adversary actions
- Manage capabilities to mitigate the effects and time to react or maneuver on the adversary to gain superiority and retain the initiative

A shared understanding and purpose of the joint protection function (see JP 3-0) allows Army leaders to integrate actions within the unified action and to synchronize operations. The joint protection function focuses on preserving the joint force fighting potential in four primary ways:

- **Active defensive measures** to protect the joint force, its information, its bases/base camps, critical infrastructure, and lines of communications from an enemy or adversary attack
- **Passive defensive measures** to make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy
- The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide
- **Emergency management and response** to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-37 provides guidance on protection and the protection warfighting function. It also provides the guiding protection principles for commanders and staffs who are responsible for planning and executing protection in support of unified land operations. ADP 3-37 corresponds with the Army operations doctrine introduced in ADP 3-0.
### I. Supporting Tasks

Supporting task of the protection warfighting function include:

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<td>Provide Intelligence Support to Protection</td>
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<td>Apply Antiterrorism Measures</td>
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<td>G</td>
<td>Conduct Law and Order</td>
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<td>H</td>
<td>Conduct Survivability Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Provide Force Health Protection</td>
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<td>J</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>Conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Coordinate Air and Missile Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>Conduct Personnel Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Conduct Internment and Resettlement</td>
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A. Conduct Operational Area Security

The task of conducting operational area security is a form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within an area of operations. Forces engaged in operational area security protect the force, installation, route, area, or asset. Although vital to the success of military operations, operational area security is normally an economy-of-force mission, often designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power.

Operational area security may be the predominant method of protecting support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Operational area security is often an effective method of providing civil security and control during some stability operations. Forces engaged in operational area security can saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy or adversary attack with an active response. This early warning, reconnaissance or surveillance may come from ground- and space-based sensors. Operational area security often focuses on named areas of interest in an effort to answer commander’s critical information requirements, aiding in tactical decisionmaking and confirming or denying threat intentions. Forces engaged in operational area security are typically organized in a manner that emphasizes their mobility, lethality, and communications capabilities. The maneuver enhancement brigade and some military police units are specifically equipped and trained to conduct operational area security and may constitute the only available force during some phases of an operation. However, operational area security takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units, regardless of their location in the area of operations.

All commanders apportion combat power and dedicate assets to protection tasks and systems based on an analysis of the operational environment, the likelihood of threat action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Based on their assessments, joint force commanders may designate the Army to provide a joint security coordinator to be responsible for designated joint security areas. Although all resources have value, the mission variables of METT-TC make some resources, assets, or locations more significant to successful mission accomplishment from enemy or adversary, and friendly perspectives. Commanders rely on the risk management process and other specific assessment methods to facilitate decisionmaking, issue guidance, and allocate resources. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that become the subject of commander guidance and the focus of operational area security.

See facing page for further discussion.

B. Employ Safety Techniques (Including Fratricide Avoidance)

Safety techniques are used to identify and assess hazards to the force and make recommendations on ways to prevent or mitigate the effects of those hazards. Commanders have the inherent responsibility to analyze the risks and implement control measures to mitigate them. All staffs understand and factor into their analysis how their execution recommendations could adversely affect Soldiers. Incorporating protection within the risk management integrating process is key. It ensures a thorough analysis of risks and implements controls to mitigate their effects. All commands develop and implement a command safety program that includes fratricide avoidance, occupational health, risk management, fire prevention and suppression, and accident prevention programs focused on minimizing safety risks.
Operational Area Security

Base/Base Camp Defense
Base defense is the local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces (JP 3-10).

Critical Asset Security
Critical asset security is the protection and security of personnel and physical assets or information that is analyzed and deemed essential to the operation and success of the mission and to resources required for protection.

Node Protection
Command posts and operations centers are often protected through area security techniques that involve the employment of protection and security assets in a layered, integrated, and redundant manner.

High-Risk Personnel Security
High-risk personnel are personnel who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation, are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets (JP 3-07.2).

Response Force Operations
Response force operations expediently reinforce unit organic protection capabilities or complement that protection with maneuver capabilities based on the threat. Response force operations include planning for the defeat of Level I and II threats and the shaping of Level III threats until a designated combined arms tactical combat force arrives for decisive operations. Refer to FM 3-39 for more information.

Lines of Communications Security
The security and protection of lines of communications and supply routes are critical to military operations since most support traffic moves along these routes. The security of lines of communications and supply routes (rail, pipeline, highway, and waterway) presents one of the greatest security challenges in an area of operations. Route security operations are defensive in nature and are terrain-oriented (see FM 3-90).

Checkpoints and Combat Outposts
It is often necessary to control the freedom of movement in an area of operations for a specific period of time or as a long-term operation. This may be accomplished by placing checkpoints and combat outposts along designated avenues and roadways or on key terrain identified through METT-TC. Refer to ATTP 3-90.4 for more information.

Convoy Security
A convoy security operation is a specialized kind of area security operations conducted to protect convoys (FM 3-90). Units conduct convoy security operations anytime there are insufficient friendly forces to continuously secure routes in an area of operations and there is a significant danger of enemy or adversary ground action directed against the convoy. Refer to FM 4-01.45 for more information.

Port Area and Pier Security
Ground forces may typically provide area security for port and pier areas. The joint force commander and subordinate joint force commanders ensure that port security plans and responsibilities are clearly delineated and assigned. Refer to JP 3-10 for more information.

Area Damage Control
Commanders conduct area damage control when the damage and scope of the attack are limited and they can respond and recover with local assets and resources. Optimally, commanders aim to recover immediately.
II. Integrating Processes

The integrating processes of intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting, and risk management are essential in providing assessments or key information to assessments. They are a vital part of integrating protection within the other warfighting functions and throughout the operations process.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)
The intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the mission variables of threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By applying the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operation effectiveness at critical points in time and space.

Targeting
The targeting process integrates commander guidance and priorities to determine which targets to engage and how, when, and where to engage them in order to assign friendly capabilities to achieve the desired effect. The staff then assigns friendly capabilities that are best suited to produce the desired effect on each target. An important part of targeting is identifying possibilities for fratricide and collateral damage. Commanders establish control measures, including the consideration for restraint, that are necessary to minimize the chance of these events. The protection priorities must be integrated within the targeting process to achieve the desired effects while ensuring the preservation of combat power.

Risk Management
Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks that arise from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Threat, hazard, capability, vulnerability, and criticality assessments are utilized to evaluate the risk to the force, determine the critical assets, ascertain available resources, and apply security or defensive measures to achieve protection. Risk management helps commanders preserve lives and resources, avoid or mitigate unnecessary risk, identify and implement feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and develop valid courses of action (COAs). Risk management integration during operations process activities is the primary responsibility of the unit protection officer or operations officer.

See fig. 2-1 on previous page for an overview of the risk management process.
Threats and Hazards


The protection warfighting function preserves the combat power potential and survivability of the force by providing protection from threats and hazards. Threats and hazards have the potential to cause personal injury, illness, or death; equipment or property damage or loss; or mission degradation.

- **Hostile actions.** Threats from hostile actions include any capability that forces or criminal elements have to inflict damage upon personnel, physical assets, or information. These threats may include improvised explosive devices, suicide bombings, network attacks, mortars, asset theft, air attacks, or CBRN weapons.
- **Nonhostile activities.** Nonhostile activities include hazards associated with Soldier duties within their occupational specialty, Soldier activity while off duty, and unintentional actions that cause harm. Examples include on- and off-duty accidents, OPSEC violations, network compromises, equipment malfunctions, or accidental CBRN incidents.
- **Environmental conditions.** Environmental hazards associated with the surrounding environment could potentially degrade readiness or mission accomplishment. Weather, natural disasters, and diseases are common examples. The staff also considers how military operations may affect noncombatants in the area of operations. Such considerations prevent unnecessary collateral damage and regard how civilians will affect the mission. Heavy civilian vehicle or pedestrian traffic adversely affects convoys and other operations.

**Threats**

The various actors in any area of operations can qualify as a threat, enemy, adversary, neutral, or friendly. Land operations often prove complex because actors intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another.

- **A threat** is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0). Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances.
- **An enemy** is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADRP 3-0). An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war.
- **An adversary** is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).
- **A neutral** is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces (ADRP 3-0).
- **A friendly** is a contact positively identified as friendly (JP 3-01).
- **A hybrid threat** is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects (ADRP 3-0).

**Hazards**

A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Hazards are usually predictable and preventable and can be reduced through effective risk management efforts. Commanders differentiate hazards from threats and develop focused schemes of protection and priorities that match protection capabilities with the corresponding threat or hazard, while synchronizing those efforts in space and time. However, hazards can be enabled by the tempo or friction or by the complacency that sometimes develops during extended military operations.
A. Threat and Hazard Assessment


Personnel from all staff sections and warfighting functions help conduct threat and hazard analysis. This analysis comprises a thorough, in-depth compilation and examination of information and intelligence that address potential threats and hazards in the area of operations. The integrating processes (intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting, and risk management) provide an avenue to obtain the threats and hazards that are reviewed and refined. Threat and hazard assessments are continuously reviewed and updated as the operational environment changes.

Considerations for the threat and hazard assessment include—

- Enemy and adversary threats
  - Operational capabilities
  - Intentions
  - Activities
- Foreign intelligence and security service threats
- Crimes
- Civil disturbances
- Medical and safety hazards
- CBRN weapons and toxic industrial material
- Other relevant aspects of the operational environment
- Incident reporting and feedback points of contact

The threat and hazard assessment results in a comprehensive list of threats and hazards and determines the likelihood or probability of occurrence of each threat or hazard. Table 2-1 shows examples of potential threats and hazards in an area of operations. In the context of assessing risk, the higher the probability or likelihood of a threat or hazard occurring, the higher the risk of asset loss.
# Potential Threats and Hazards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Concern</th>
<th>Potential Threats and Hazards</th>
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</table>
| **Area security** | • Assassination of, or attacks on, important personnel  
• Enemy, adversary or terrorist attacks on facilities  
• Ambushes or attacks on convoys  
• Enemy or adversary attacks on convoy routes |
| **Safety** | • Hazards associated with enemy or adversary activity  
• Accident potential  
• Weather or environmental conditions  
• Equipment |
| **Fratricide avoidance** | • Poor or reduced awareness  
• Inexperienced or poorly equipped or disciplined personnel  
• Complex or poorly defined mission against an experienced enemy or adversary |
| **OPSEC** | • Accidental friendly release of essential elements of friendly information  
• Enemy or adversary collection and exploitation of essential elements of friendly information  
• Enemy or adversary capture of unclassified friendly information  
• Physical security violations  
• Enemy or adversary intelligence gathering |
| **AT** | • Improvised explosive devices  
• Suicide bombs  
• Mail bombs  
• Snipers  
• Standoff weapons  
• WMD  
• Active shooters  
• Insider threats |
| **Survivability** | • Environmental conditions  
• Capabilities of threat weapons and sensors |
| **Force health protection** | • Endemic and epidemic diseases  
• Environmental factors  
• Diseases from animal bites, poisonous plants, animals, or insects  
• Risks associated with the health, sanitation, or behavior of the local populace |
| **CBRN** | • CBRN weapons  
• Toxic industrial materials |
| **EOD** | • Explosive ordnance and hazards (friendly and enemy)  
• Adversary attacks on personnel, vehicles, or infrastructure |
| **Air and missile defense** | • Artillery  
• Mortars  
• Rockets  
• Ballistic and cruise missiles  
• Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft  
• Unmanned aerial systems |
| **Personnel recovery** | • Events that separate or isolate individuals or small groups of friendly forces from the main force |

**Legend:**  
AT = antiterrorism  
CBRN = chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear  
EOD = explosive ordnance disposal  
OPSEC = operations security  
WMD = weapons of mass destruction

Ref: ADRP 3-37, Protection, table 2-1, pp. 2-4 to 2-5.
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