



JEODS5

SMARTBOOK



Fifth Edition

Joint Doctrine
Fundamentals

Joint
Operations

Joint
Planning

Joint
Logistics

Joint Task Forces
(JTFs)

Information
Operations

Multinational
Operations

Interorganizational
Cooperation

JOINT FORCES

Operations & Doctrine

Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations



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Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations

The Lightning Press
Norman M Wade



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Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations

JFODS5 is the fifth revised edition of The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, designed for use by ALL SERVICES and JOINT FORCES across the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. JFODS5 incorporates the full scope of new material from the latest editions of JP 3-0 Joint Operations (Jan '17), JP 5-0 Joint Planning (Jun '17), JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Change 1, Jul '17), and JP 3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation (Oct '16). Additional chapters and topics include Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jun '12), JP 4-0 Joint Logistics (Oct '13), JDN 2-13 Commander's Communication Synchronization (Dec '13), JP 3-13 Information Operations (Nov '14), and JP 3-16 Multinational Operations (Jul '13).

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(JFODS5) Notes to Reader

Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations

The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests demand that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated **joint team** across the conflict continuum.

Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not establish joint forces. The potential range of **military activities and operations** extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in times of relative peace up through major operations and campaigns that typically involve large-scale combat.

Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks.

Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments' logistics resources to support the joint force. Sustainment provides the joint force commanders freedom of action, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach.

A **joint task force (JTF)** is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander.

Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs) are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information environment.

Achieving national strategic objectives requires effective **unified action** resulting in unity of effort -- to include interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental and **multinational partners**. This is accomplished by **interorganizational cooperation**, synchronization, and coordination in the use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic **instruments of national power**.

JFODS5 is the fifth revised edition of The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, incorporating the full scope of new material from the latest editions of JP 3-0 Joint Operations (Jan '17), JP 5-0 Joint Planning (Jun '17), JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Change 1, Jul '17), and JP 3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation (Oct '16). Additional chapters and topics include Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jun '12), JP 4-0 Joint Logistics (Oct '13), JDN 2-13 Commander's Communication Synchronization (Dec '13), JP 3-13 Information Operations (Nov '14), and JP 3-16 Multinational Operations (Jul '13).

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Joint Publications (JPs)

JP 1*	Jul 2017	Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (with Change 1)
JP 3-0*	Jan 2017	Joint Operations
JP 3-08*	Oct 2016	Interorganizational Cooperation
JP 3-13	Nov 2014	Information Operations (with Change 1)
JP 3-16	Jul 2013	Multinational Operations
JP 3-33	Jul 2012	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JP 4-0	Oct 2013	Joint Logistics
JP 5-0*	Jun 2017	Joint Planning

Other Publications and Manuals

CJCSM 3122.05	Dec 2011	Operating Procedures for Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (Current as of 18 Nov 2014)
CJCSM 3130.01A	Nov 2014	Campaign Planning Procedures & Responsibilities
CJCSM 3500.03E	Apr 2015	Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States
JDN 2-13	Dec 2013	Commander's Communication Synchronization

* New/updated references in this edition.



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I. Joint Doctrine Theory & Foundations

Ref: JP 1 w/Chg 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the U.S.* (Jul '17), chap. I.

Joint Publication 1 provides overarching guidance and fundamental principles for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is the capstone publication of the US joint doctrine hierarchy and it provides an overview for the development of other joint service doctrine publications. It is a bridge between policy and doctrine and describes authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders use and other operational matters derived from Title 10, United States Code (USC).

I. Fundamentals

The purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of joint forces by providing fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces toward a common objective. With the exception of Joint Publication (JP) 1, joint doctrine will not establish policy. However, the use of joint doctrine standardizes terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes among all US forces to free joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to focus their efforts on solving strategic, operational, and tactical problems. Using historical analysis of the employment of the military instrument of national power in operations and contemporary lessons, these fundamental principles represent what is taught, believed, and advocated as what works best to achieve national objectives.

As a nation, the US wages war employing all instruments of national power— diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives. The Armed Forces of the United States conduct military operations as a joint force. “Joint” connotes activities in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. Joint matters relate to the integrated employment of US military forces in joint operations, including matters relating to:

- National military strategy (NMS)
- Deliberate and crisis action planning
- Command and control (C2) of joint operations
- Unified action with Department of Defense and interagency partners

The capacity of the Armed Forces of the United States to operate as a cohesive joint team is a key advantage in any operational environment. Unity of effort facilitates decisive unified action focused on national objectives and leads to common solutions to national security challenges.

Jointness and the Joint Force

The Armed Forces of the United States have embraced “jointness” as their fundamental organizing construct at all echelons. Jointness implies cross-Service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components). Some shared military activities are less joint than are “common;” in this usage “common” simply means mutual, shared, or overlapping capabilities or activities between two or more Services.

II. War

War can result from failure of states to resolve their disputes by diplomatic means. Some philosophers see it as an extension of human nature. Thomas Hobbes stated that man's nature leads him to fight for personal gain, safety, or reputation.

Thucydides said nearly the same thing in a different order, citing fear, honor, and interest as the common causes for interstate conflict.

Individuals, groups, organizations, cultures, and nations all have interests. Inevitably, some of those interests conflict with the interests of other individuals, groups, organizations, cultures, and nations. Nearly all international and interpersonal relationships are based on power and self-interests manifested through politics. Nations exercise their power through diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means. All forms of statecraft are important, but as the conflicts approach the requirement for the use of force to achieve that nation's interests, military means become predominant and war can result. The emergence of non-state actors has not changed this concept. Non-state actors may not use statecraft as established; however, they do coerce and threaten the diplomatic power of other nations and have used force, terrorism, or support to insurgency to compel a government to act or refrain from acting in a particular situation or manner or to change the government's policies or organization.

See facing page for discussion of forms of warfare.

The Principles of War

War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. War historically involves nine principles -- objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity -- collectively and classically known as the principles of war. The basic nature of war is immutable, although warfare evolves constantly.

The application of these classic "Principles of War" in the conduct of joint operations is amplified and expanded in JP 3-0, Joint Operations. See pp. 2-2 to 2-3.

Strategy in War

The two fundamental strategies in the use of military force are strategy of annihilation and strategy of erosion. The first is to make the enemy helpless to resist us, by physically destroying his military capabilities. This has historically been characterized as annihilation or attrition. It requires the enemy's incapacitation as a viable military force. The second approach is to convince the enemy that accepting our terms will be less painful than continuing to aggress or resist. This can be characterized as erosion, using military force to erode the enemy leadership's or the enemy society's political will. In such an approach, we use military force to raise the costs of resistance higher than the enemy is willing to pay. We use force in this manner in pursuit of limited political goals that we believe the enemy leadership will ultimately be willing to accept.

Particularly at the higher levels, waging war should involve the use of all instruments of national power that one group can bring to bear against another (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). While the military focuses on the use of military force, we must not consider it in isolation from the other instruments of national power.

III. Strategic Security Environment and National Security Challenges

The strategic security environment is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict. This environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing and disappearing. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate the course of regional and global events. In addition to traditional conflicts to include emerging peer competitors, significant and emerging challenges continue to include irregular threats, adversary propaganda, and other information activities directly targeting our civilian leadership and population, catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and other threats to disrupt our ability to project power and maintain its qualitative edge.

The Commanders of Combatant Commands (CCDRs)

Commanders of combatant commands exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and SecDef for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of their commands to perform assigned missions.

See pp. 1-29 to 1-34 for further discussion.


The US Chief of Mission (COM)

In a foreign country, the US chief of mission is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating, and supervising all USG elements in the HN, except those under the command of a CCDR. GCCs are responsible for coordinating with chiefs of mission in their geographic AOR (as necessary) and for negotiating memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with the chiefs of mission in designated countries to support military operations.

See pp. 8-19 to 8-21 for further discussion.

II. Unified Action

The term “unified action” in military usage is a broad term referring to the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. Within this general category of operations, subordinate CDRs of assigned or attached forces conduct either single-Service or joint operations to support the overall operation. Unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates joint, single-Service, and multinational operations with the operations of other USC agencies, NGOs, and IGOs (e.g., UN), and the private sector to achieve unity of effort. Unity of command within the military instrument of national power supports the national strategic direction through close coordination with the other instruments of national power.




Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, fig. II-2, p. II-8.

III. Strategy, Planning, and Resourcing

Ref: JP 1 w/Chg 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the U.S.* (Jul '17), p. II-3 to II-6.

Military planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. Regarding force planning for the future, DOD conducts capabilities-based planning (CBP). The essence of CBP is to identify capabilities that adversaries could employ against the US or a multinational opponent and to defend themselves; identify capabilities, US and multinational, that could be available to the joint or combined force to counter/defeat the adversary; and then identify and evaluate possible outcomes (voids or opportunities), rather than forecasting (allocating) forces against specific threat scenarios. Integral to a capabilities-based approach are joint capability areas (JCAs), DOD's capability management language and framework. (National planning documents, fig. II-1, below.)



See pp. 3-3 to 3-12 for discussion of strategic guidance and direction from JP 5-0.

Combatant Commands (CCMDs)

Ref: JP 1 w/Chg 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the U.S. (Jul '17)*, pp. I-10, I-14, and III-12 to III-15. *Unified Command Plan 2011, Change 1 (dated Sept '11)*.

In accordance with the UCP, combatant commands are established by the President, through the SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the SecDef through the CJCS. JTFs can be established by the SecDef, a CCCR, subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

Geographic Combatant Commanders are assigned a geographic AOR by the President with the advice of the SecDef as specified in the UCP. Functional CCCRs support GCCs, conduct operations in direct support of the President or the SecDef normally in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the operation will be conducted, and may be designated by the SecDef as the supported CCCR for an operation.

See pp. 1-25 to 1-32 for further discussion of joint forces organization, roles and responsibilities, to include unified commands.

Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs)

GCCs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their geographical AORs. GCCs are responsible for a large geographical area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations within that area. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national, alliance, or coalition strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. As military force may not achieve national objectives, it must be coordinated, synchronized, and if appropriate, integrated with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, MNFs, and elements of the private sector.

Six combatant commanders have geographic area responsibilities. These combatant commanders are each assigned an area of responsibility (AOR) by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and are responsible for all operations within their designated areas: U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command.



U.S. Northern Command

www.northcom.mil

USNORTHCOM was established Oct. 1, 2002 to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM defends America's homeland — protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action.

USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the president and secretary of defense.




U.S. Pacific Command

www.pacom.mil

USPACOM encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. The 36 nations that comprise the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than fifty percent of the world's population, three thousand different languages, several of the world's largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties.

USPACOM protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and partners, USPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in

Unified CCMD Organizational Options



Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, fig. IV-2, p. IV-6.

Command Structure

The commander of a unified command normally will adapt the command structure to exercise command authority through the commander of a subunified command, JTF, Service component, or functional component. Alternatively, the commander of a unified command may choose to exercise command authority directly through the commander of a single-Service force (e.g., task force, task group, MAGTF for a NEO) or a specific operational force (e.g., SOF for a direct action) who, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the CCCR. The commander of a unified command normally assigns missions requiring a single-Service force to a Service component commander. These six options do not in any way limit the commander's authority to organize subordinate commands and exercise command authority over assigned forces as they see fit.

The commander of a unified command should not act concurrently as the commander of a subordinate command. For example, the commander of a unified command also should not act as a functional component commander without prior approval of the SecDef.

Primary Responsibilities

CCDRs are responsible for the development and production of joint OPLANs. During peacetime, they act to deter war through military engagement and security cooperation activities and prepare to execute other missions that may be required throughout the range of military operations. During war, they plan and conduct campaigns and major operations to accomplish assigned missions. Unified command responsibilities include the following:

- Planning and conducting military operations in response to crises, to include the security of the command and protection of the United States and its possessions and bases against attack or hostile incursion. The JSCP tasks the CCDRs to prepare joint OPLANs that may be one of four increasing levels of detail: commander's estimate, basic plan, concept plan, or OPLAN.
- Maintaining the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Carrying out assigned missions, tasks, and responsibilities.
- Assigning tasks to, and directing coordination among, the subordinate commands to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the assigned missions.

I. Fundamentals of Joint Operations

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan '17), chap. I and Executive Summary.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document in the joint operations series and is a companion to joint doctrine's capstone JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States. It provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint military operations. It also informs interagency and multinational partners, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and other civilian decision makers of fundamental principles, precepts, and philosophies that guide the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States.

Joint Operations / Joint Force

The primary way the Department of Defense (DOD) employs two or more Services (from at least two Military Departments) in a single operation is through joint operations. **Joint operations** are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not establish joint forces. **A joint force** is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC).

I. Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges

The strategic environment consists of a variety of national, international, and global factors that affect the decisions of senior civilian and military leaders with respect to the employment of US instruments of national power in peace and periods of conflict. The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and can change rapidly, requiring military leaders to maintain persistent military engagement with multinational partners. Although the basic character of war has not changed, the character of conflict has evolved.

Transregional, Multi-domain, and Multi-functional (TMM)

The military environment and the threats it presents are increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) in nature. By TMM we mean that the crises and contingencies joint forces face today cut across multiple combatant commands; cut across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace; and involve conventional, special operations, ballistic missile, strike, cyber, and space capabilities. The strategic environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist. The commander's OE is influenced by the strategic environment.

By acquiring advanced technologies, adversaries are changing the conditions of warfare that the US has become accustomed to in the past half century. Today's potential adversaries can increasingly synchronize, integrate, and direct lethal operations and other non-lethal elements of power with greater sophistication, and are less constrained by geographic, functional, legal, or phasing boundaries. Conflict is now, and will remain, inherently transregional as future potential adversaries' interests, influence, capabilities, and reach extend beyond single areas of operation. Significant and emerging challenges include, but are not limited to, traditional

II. Principles of Joint Operations

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), pp. I-2 to I-3 and app. A.

Joint Warfare is Team Warfare. The Armed Forces of the United States—every military organization at all levels—are a team. The capacity of our Armed Forces to operate as a cohesive joint team is a key advantage in any operational environment (OE). Success depends on well-integrated command headquarters (HQ), supporting organizations, and forces that operate as a team. Integrating Service components' capabilities under a single JFC maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the force. However, a joint operation does not require that all forces participate merely because they are available; the JFC has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces to the mission.

Principles of War

Joint doctrine recognizes the nine principles of war. Experience gained in a variety of IW situations has reinforced the value of three additional principles—restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Together, they comprise the 12 principles of joint operations

Objective

The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal. The purpose of military operations is to achieve the military objectives that support attainment of the overall political goals of the conflict.

Offensive

The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.

Mass

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results. In order to achieve mass, appropriate joint force capabilities are integrated and synchronized where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time.

Maneuver

The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force

Economy of Force

The purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces.

Unity of Command

The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.

Security

The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage.

Surprise

The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

Simplicity

The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

IV. Strategic Direction

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan '17), pp. I-5 to I-8.

National Strategic Direction

National strategic direction is governed by the Constitution, federal law, USG policy, internationally recognized law, and the national interest as represented by national security policy. This direction provides strategic context for the employment of the instruments of national power and defines the strategic purpose that guides employment of the military as part of a global strategy. Strategic direction is typically published in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance, but it may be communicated through any means available. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changes in the global environment, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

See p. 1-7 for further discussion.

National, Functional, and Theater-Strategic and Supporting Objectives

From this broad strategic guidance, more specific national, functional, and theater-strategic and supporting objectives help focus and refine the context and guide the military's joint planning and execution related to these objectives or a specific crisis. Integrated planning, coordination, and guidance among the Joint Staff, CCMD staffs, Service chiefs, and USG departments and agencies translate strategic priorities into clear planning guidance, tailored force packages, operational-level objectives, joint operation plans (OPLANs), and logistical support for the joint force to accomplish its mission.

See pp. 3-4 to 3-10 for further discussion.

Commander's Communication Synchronization (CCS)

Commander's communication synchronization (CCS) is a process that helps implement strategic-level guidance by coordinating, synchronizing, and ensuring the integrity and consistency of strategic- to tactical-level narratives, themes, messages, images, and actions throughout a joint operation across all relevant communication activities. JFCs, their component commanders, and staffs coordinate and adjust CCS plans, programs, products, and actions with the other interorganizational participants employed throughout the OA, such as the various chiefs of mission relevant to the joint operation. Effective CCS focuses processes and efforts to understand and communicate with key audiences and create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance USG interests, policies, and objectives.

See p. 3-10 for further discussion.

The CCCR's Strategic Role

Based on guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), GCCs and functional combatant commanders (FCCs) translate national security policy, strategy, and available military forces into theater and functional strategies to achieve national and theater strategic objectives.

CCMD strategies are broad statements of the GCC's long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC's long-term vision for the global employment of functional capabilities guided by and prepared in the context of the SecDef's priorities outlined in the GEF and the CJCS's objectives articulated in the National Military Strategy (NMS). A prerequisite to preparing the theater strategy is development of a strategic estimate. It contains factors and trends that influence the CCMD's strategic environment and inform the ends, ways, means, and risk involved in pursuit of GEF-directed objectives.

See pp. 3-8 to 3-10 and pp. 3-31 to 3-42 for further discussion.

III. Joint Functions

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), chap. III.

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of warfare fall into six basic groups—C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as C2 and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the JFC's mission requires.

Joint Functions

-  **Command and Control**
-  **Intelligence**
-  **Fires**
-  **Movement and Maneuver**
-  **Protection**
-  **Sustainment**

The joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the functions is essential to mission accomplishment. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission. Plans describe how the JFC uses military capabilities (i.e., organizations, people, and systems) to perform tasks associated with each joint function. However, forces and other assets are not characterized by the functions for which the JFC is employing them. Individual Service capabilities can often support multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task. Just as component commanders integrate activities across functions to accomplish tasks and missions, the JFC and staff do likewise for the joint force.

JFCs and staffs integrate, synchronize, employ, and assess a wide variety of information-related capabilities (IRCs) within and across joint functions, in concert with other actions to influence a target audience's decision making while protecting our own. IRCs constitute tools, techniques, or activities employed through the information environment that can be used to create effects, accomplish tasks, or achieve specific objectives at a specific time and place.

I. Command and Control (C2)

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The JFC provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses a number of tasks, including:

- Establish, organize, and operate a joint force HQ
- Command subordinate forces
- Prepare, modify, and publish plans, orders, and guidance
- Establish command authorities among subordinate commanders
- Assign tasks, prescribe task performance standards, and designate OAs
- Prioritize and allocate resources
- Manage risk
- Communicate and maintain the status of information across the staff, joint force, and with the public as appropriate
- Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, and achieving objectives
- Coordinate and control the employment of joint lethal and nonlethal capabilities
- Coordinate, synchronize, and when appropriate, integrate joint operations with the operations and activities of other participants
- Ensure the flow of information and reports to higher authority

Command

Command includes both the authority and responsibility to use resources to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations to accomplish missions. The C2 function supports an efficient decision-making process. Timely intelligence enables commanders to make decisions and execute those decisions more rapidly and effectively than the enemy. This decreases risk and allows the commander more control over the timing and tempo of operations.

Control is Inherent in Command

To control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a commander's command authority. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to support the mission and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Control provides the means for commanders to maintain freedom of action, delegate authority, direct operations from any location, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the OA. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

A. Command Authorities (and Support Relationships)

JFCs exercise various command authorities (i.e., combatant command [command authority] {COCOM}, OPCON, tactical control [TACON], and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned and attached forces.

See pp. 1-33 to 1-42 for a listing and discussion of command and support relationships.

Fires - Key Considerations

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), pp. III-27 to III-33.

Targeting. Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of fires to actions and tasks at the component level. Commanders and their staffs must consider strategic and operational-level objectives, the potential for friendly fire incidents and other undesired fires effects, and operational limitations when making targeting decisions. Impact on all systems in the OE should be considered during this process.

Joint Fire Support. Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, cyberspace, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, cyberspace, EMS, and key waters.

Countering Air and Missile Threats. The JFC counters air and missile threats to ensure friendly freedom of action, provide protection, and deny enemy freedom of action. Counterair integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch.

Interdiction. Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction operations are actions to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces to achieve enemy objectives.

Strategic Attack (SA). A strategic attack is a JFC-directed offensive action against a target—whether military or other—that is selected to achieve national or military strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the enemy's ability or will to engage in conflict or continue an action and as such, could be part of a campaign or major operation, or conducted independently as directed by the President or SecDef.

Global Strike. Global strike is the capability to rapidly plan and deliver extended-range attacks, limited in duration and scope, to create precision effects against enemy assets in support of national and theater commander objectives. Global strike missions employ lethal and non-lethal capabilities against a wide variety of targets.

Limiting Collateral Damage. Collateral damage is unintentional or incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets based on the circumstances existing at the time. Causing collateral damage does not violate the law of war so long as the collateral damage caused is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack. Under the law of war, the balancing of military necessity in relation to collateral damage is known as the principle of proportionality.

Nonlethal Capabilities. Nonlethal capabilities can generate effects that limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and may reduce opportunities for enemy or adversary propaganda. They may also reduce the number of casualties associated with excessive use of force, limit reconstruction costs, and maintain the good will of the local populace. Some capabilities are nonlethal by design, and include, but are not limited to, blunt impact and warning munitions, acoustic and optical warning devices, and vehicle and vessel stopping systems.

Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace attack actions create various direct denial effects in cyberspace (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) and manipulation that leads to denial that is hidden or that manifests in the physical domains.

Electronic Attack (EA). EA involves the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capability.

Military Information Support Operations (MISO). MISO convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, and objective reasoning, and ultimately induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives.

IV. Organizing for Joint Operations

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), chap. IV.

Organizing for joint operations involves many considerations. Most can be associated in three primary groups related to organizing the joint force, organizing the joint force headquarters, and organizing operational areas (OAs) to help control operations.

I. Organizing the Joint Force

How JFCs organize their assigned or attached forces affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The JFC's mission and operational approach, as well as the principle of unity of command and a mission command philosophy, are guiding principles to organize the joint force for operations. Joint forces can be established on a geographic or functional basis. JFCs may centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should not reduce the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs should allow Service and special operations tactical and operational forces, organizations, and capabilities to function generally as they were designed. All Service components contribute distinct capabilities to joint operations that enable joint effectiveness. Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service on another Service's capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both. The degree of interdependence varies with specific circumstances.

Joint Force Options

- **Combatant Commands (CCMD).** A CCMD is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through SecDef, and with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. See pp. 1-19 to 1-24.
- **Subordinate Unified Commands.** When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may establish subordinate unified commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis IAW the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic area or functional basis. See p. 1-32.
- **Joint Task Forces (JTFs).** A JTF is a joint force constituted and designated by SecDef, a CCCR, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing commander, joint task force (CJTF) to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives, and which do not require centralized control of logistics. See chap. 5 for further discussion.

Component Options

CCDRs and subordinate unified commanders conduct either single-Service or joint operations to accomplish a mission.

- **Service Components.** Regardless of the organization and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, personnel support, training, sustainment, and Service intelligence operations. See p. 5-14.
- **Functional Components.** The JFC can establish functional component commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more Services must operate in the same physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. See pp. 5-14 to 5-16.

II. Understanding an Operational Environment (OE)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), pp. IV-1 to IV-4.

Factors that affect joint operations extend far beyond the boundaries of the JFC's assigned JOA. The JFC's OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the EMS; and other factors. Included within these are enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect how the commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations.

Physical Areas and Factors

Physical Areas

The fundamental physical area in the OE is the JFC's assigned Operational Area (OA). This term encompasses more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which joint forces conduct military operations. OAs include, but are not limited to, such descriptors as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA, AOA, joint special operations area (JSOA), and AO.

See following pages (pp. 2-30 to 2-31) for further discussion.

Physical Factors

The JFC and staff must consider many factors associated with operations in the air, land, maritime, and space domains, and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). These factors include terrain (including urban settings), population, weather, topography, hydrology, EMS, and other environmental conditions in the OA; distances associated with the deployment to the OA and employment of joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure; the physical results of combat operations; and both friendly and enemy forces and other capabilities. Combinations of these factors affect operations and sustainment.

Information Environment

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information.

Interrelated Dimensions

The information environment is where humans and systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and exists throughout the JFC's OE. The information environment consists of three interrelated dimensions—physical, informational, and cognitive—within which individuals, organizations, and systems continuously interact. Resources in this environment include the information itself and the materials and systems employed to process, store, display, disseminate, and protect information and produce information-related products.

Cyberspace


Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment. It consists of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace, which reaches across geographic and geopolitical boundaries—much of it residing outside of US control—and is integrated with the operation of critical infrastructures, as well as the conduct of commerce, governance, and national security. Commanders must consider their critical dependencies on information and cyberspace, as well as factors such as degradations to confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information and information systems, when they plan and organize for operations.

III. Organizing Operational Areas (OAs)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), pp. IV-10 to IV-13.

Except for AORs, which are assigned in the UCP, GCCs and other JFCs designate smaller operational areas (e.g., JOA and AO) on a temporary basis. OAs have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, maritime, and space domains. While domains are useful constructs for visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations are conducted (the OA), the use of the term "domain" is not meant to imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of any domain. Specific authorities and responsibilities within an operational area are as specified by the appropriate JFC. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which help commanders and staffs coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands.

Operational Areas Within a Theater



This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR, the combatant commander has designated a theater of war. Within the theater of war are two theaters of operations and a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the combatant commander has established a theater of operations and a JOA, within which a joint task force will operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

Ref: JP 3-0, fig. IV-3. *Operational Areas within a Theater.*

A. Combatant Command-Level Areas

GCCs conduct operations in their assigned AORs. When warranted, the President, SecDef, or GCCs may designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation. GCCs can elect to control operations directly in these OAs, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, while remaining focused on the broader AOR.

Area of Responsibility (AOR)

An AOR is an area established by the UCP that defines geographic responsibilities for a GCC. A GCC has authority to plan for operations within the AOR and conduct those operations approved by the President or SecDef. CCDRs may operate forces wherever required to accomplish approved missions. All cross-AOR operations must be coordinated among the affected GCCs.

Theater of War


A theater of war is a geographical area established by the President, SecDef, or GCC for the conduct of major operations and campaigns involving combat. A theater of war is established primarily when there is a formal declaration of war or it is necessary to

III. The Theater Campaign

Military operations, actions, and activities in a GCC's AOR, from security cooperation through large-scale combat, are conducted in the context of the GCC's ongoing theater campaign.

Theater Campaign Plan (TCP)

The CCDR's theater campaign is the overarching framework that ensures all activities and operations within the theater are synchronized to achieve theater and national strategic objectives. A TCP operationalizes the GCC's strategy and approach to achieve these objectives within two to five years by organizing and aligning available resources. TCPs also support the campaign objectives of other CCDRs responsible for synchronizing collaborative DOD planning. As Figure V-3 shows, TCPs encompass all ongoing and planned operations across the range of military operations, continuously adjusted in response to changes in the OE. The TCP's long-term and persistent and preventative activities are intended to identify and deter, counter, or otherwise mitigate an adversary's actions before escalation to combat. Many of these activities are conducted with DOD in support of the diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts of USG partners and PNs. The CCDR adjusts these activities as required for the occasional execution of a contingency plan or response to a crisis.




Ref: JP 3-0, fig. V-3. *Notional Joint Operations in a Theater Campaign Context*

The TCP also provides context for ongoing crisis response and contingency operations to facilitate execution of contingency plans as branch plans to the TCP. These are plans to respond to potential crises such as natural or man-made disasters and military aggression by foreign powers. Also linked to the GCC's TCP and subordinate campaign plans are designated DOD global campaign plans that address integrated execution of global security priorities.

V. Phasing a Joint Operation

The six general groups of activity provide a convenient basis for thinking about a joint operation in notional phases, as Figure V-7 depicts. A phase is a definitive stage or period during a joint operation in which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose that often is represented by intermediate objectives. Phasing, which can be used in any operation regardless of size, helps the JFC organize large operations by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing helps JFCs and staffs visualize, plan, and execute the entire operation and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. It helps them systematically achieve military objectives that cannot be attained all at once by arranging smaller, focused, related operations in a logical sequence. Phasing also helps commanders mitigate risk in the more dangerous or difficult portions of an operation.

Figure V-7 shows one phasing alternative. Actual phases of an operation will vary (e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according to the nature of the operation and the JFC's decisions. For example, UW operations normally use a seven-phase model. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, and events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. Phases may be conducted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may begin in a previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy and operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions.



Ref: JP 3-0, fig. V-7. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominant Military Activities.

VI. Engagement, Security Cooperation & Deterrence


Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), chap. VI.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support other instruments of national power as represented by interagency partners, as well as cooperate with international organizations (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. This may also involve domestic operations that include supporting civil authorities. These activities generally occur continuously in all GCCs' AORs regardless of other ongoing joint operations. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities separate from but integrated with the efforts of interorganizational participants. These activities are conducted as part of a CCDR's routine theater or functional campaign plan and country plan objectives and may support deterrence.

Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of international waters, international airspace, space, and cyberspace. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence help assure operational access for crisis response and contingency operations despite changing US overseas defense posture and the growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe. The more a GCC can promote favorable access conditions in advance across the AOR and in potential OAs, the better. Relevant activities include KLEs; security cooperation activities, such as bilateral and multinational exercises to improve multinational operations; missions to train, advise, and equip foreign forces to improve their national ability to contribute to access; negotiations to secure basing and transit rights, establish relationships, and formalize support agreements; the use of grants and contracts to improve relationships with and strengthen PNs; and planning conferences to develop multinational plans.

I. Military Engagement

Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities. GCCs seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and tension. This military engagement increases the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions and may preclude conflict; or, if conflict is unavoidable, allow a more informed USG to enter into it with stronger alliances or coalitions.




Refer to TAA2: *Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist)* for further discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0), *Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist)*, *Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07)*, *Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3)*, *Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24)*, *Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57)*, *Multinational Operations (JP 3-16)*, *Interorganizational Cooperation (JP 3-08)*, and more.

The Conflict Continuum

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan '17), pp. VI-1 to VI-3.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities provide the foundation of the CCDR's theater campaign. The goal is to prevent and deter conflict by keeping adversary activities within a desired state of cooperation and competition. The joint operation model described in section V, "Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum," has limited application with respect to phasing these activities for normal cooperative and competitive environments. Figure VI-1 shows a notional depiction of activities in an environment of cooperation and competition. DOD forces, as part of larger whole-of-government efforts, conduct operations with partners to prevent, deter, or turn back escalatory activity by adversaries.

The Conflict Continuum



Ref: JP 3-0, fig. VI-1. The Conflict Continuum.

Global and theater shaping increases DOD's depth of understanding of an environment, a partner's viewpoint of that environment, and where the US and PN have common interests. This understanding allows the US, through the relationships that have been developed, to shape the OE. These initiatives help advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts (or limit their severity), and reduce the risk of employing US military forces in a conflict.

In an environment that is more competitive, tensions increase. A partner's resources can enhance USG understanding of an adversary's capabilities and intent, and expand options against the adversary. In the best case, conflict can be averted or diminished by coordinated USG/PN action.

Despite the efforts to prevent or mitigate conflict, an armed conflict may occur. As conditions and objectives become more defined, GCCs may transition to the notional phasing construct for execution of a specific contingency operation as Figure VI-1 depicts. However, time spent "to the left" allows DOD to develop a deeper understanding of the environment to see and act ahead of conflict flashpoints, develop options, and maximize the efficiency of resources.

IV. Typical Operations & Activities

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), pp. VI-5 to VI-13.

Typical operations include:

Military Engagement Activities

Numerous routine missions (e.g., security cooperation) and continuing operations or tasks (e.g., freedom of navigation) occur globally on a continuing basis under the general heading of military engagement. These activities build strong relationships with partners, increase regional awareness and knowledge of a PN's capabilities and capacity, and can be used to influence events in a desirable direction. Military engagement activities can also increase understanding of an adversary's capabilities, capacity, and intentions and can provide forewarning of undesirable events. In some cases, what begins as a military engagement activity (e.g., limited support to COIN through a security assistance program) can expand to a limited contingency operation or even a major operation when the President commits US forces. Military engagement activities are generally governed by various directives and agreements and do not require a joint OPLAN or OPORD for execution.

Emergency Preparedness

Emergency preparedness consists of measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. At the strategic level, emergency preparedness encompasses those planning activities, such as continuity of operations and continuity of government, undertaken to ensure DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and SecDef in a designated national security emergency.

Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament

Arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament are not synonymous. The following are examples of US military personnel involvement in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament activities: verifying an arms control treaty; seizing and securing WMD; escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (e.g., enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; conducting and hosting site inspections; participating in military data exchanges; implementing armament reductions; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous material.

Combating Terrorism

Combating terrorism involves actions to oppose terrorism from all threats. It encompasses antiterrorism—defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts—and CT—offensive measures to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Antiterrorism involves defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces and civilians. Counterterrorism (CT) is primarily a special operations core activity and consists of activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.

Support to Counterdrug (CD) Operations

DOD supports federal, state, and local LEAs in their effort to disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal drugs into the US. Specific DOD authorities that pertain to a CD are contained in Title 10, USC, Sections 124 and 371 to 382.

VIII. Large-Scale Combat Operations

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), chap. VIII.

Campaign

Traditionally, campaigns are the most extensive joint operations, in terms of the amount of forces and other capabilities committed and duration of operations. In the context of large-scale combat, a campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

Major Operations

A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes, and is the primary building block of a campaign. Major operations and campaigns typically include multiple phases (e.g., the 1990-1991 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and 2003 OIF). Campaign planning is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.

Campaigns can occur across the continuum of conflict. In campaigns characterized by combat, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible; conclude hostilities; and establish conditions favorable to the HN, the US, and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions may require joint forces to conduct stability activities to restore security, provide essential services and humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction. Some crisis-response or contingency operations may not involve large-scale combat, but could meet the definition of a major operation or campaign based on their scale and duration (e.g., the Tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia or Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in the US, both in 2005).

Campaigns are joint in nature—functional and Service components of the joint force conduct supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Within a campaign, forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and space, conduct operations to achieve strategic or operational objectives in one or more OAs. Forces operate simultaneously or sequentially IAW a common plan, and are controlled by a single Service commander or the JFC.

Combatant Command (CCMD) Planning

The CCMD strategy links national strategic guidance to development of CCMD campaign and contingency plans. A CCMD strategy is a broad statement of the GCC's long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC's long-term vision for the global employment of functional capabilities. CCDRs prepare these strategies in the context of SecDef's priorities outlined in the GEF and the CJCS's objectives articulated in the NMS. However, the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of operations typically magnify the planning challenges. There are three categories of campaigns, which differ generally in scope and focus.

CCDRs document the full scope of their campaigns in the set of plans that includes the theater or functional campaign plan, and all of its GEF- and JSCP-directed plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture or master plans, country plans (for the geographic CCMDs), OPLANs of operations currently in execution, contingency plans, and crisis action plans.

See chap. 3 for further discussion.

I. Considerations for Deterrence

The deter phase is characterized by preparatory actions that indicate resolve to commit resources and respond to the situation. These actions begin when a CCDR or JFC identifies that routine operations may not achieve desired objectives due to an adversary's actions. This requires the commander to have identified CCIRs and assessed whether additional resources, outside those currently allocated and assigned for ongoing operations, are required to defuse the crisis, reassure partners, demonstrate the intent to deny the adversary's goals, and execute subsequent phases of the operation. Deterrence should be based on capability (having the means to influence behavior), credibility (maintaining a level of believability that the proposed actions may actually be employed), and communication (transmitting the intended message to the desired audience) to ensure greater effectiveness (effectiveness of deterrence must be viewed from the perspective of the agent/actor that is to be deterred).

Isolating the Enemy

With Presidential and SecDef approval, guidance, and national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy's potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked by the President and SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions.

The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from both its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be achieved through the use of IRCs and the interdiction of LOCs or resources affecting the enemy's ability to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

Flexible Deterrent Options/ Flexible Response Options (FDOs/FROs)

FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both military and nonmilitary FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FROs, usually used in response to terrorism, can also be employed in response to aggression by a competitor or adversary.

See following pages (pp. 2-64 to 2-65) for further discussion.

Protection

JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action to accomplish their mission. This dictates that JFCs not only provide force protection, but be aware of and participate as appropriate in the protection of interagency and regional multinational capabilities and activities.

Space Operations

JFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space capabilities. During the deter phase, space forces are limited to already fielded and immediately deployable assets and established priorities for service.

GEOINT Support to Operations

Geospatial products or services—including maps, charts, imagery products, web services, and support data—must be fully coordinated with JFC components, as well as with the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the NGA through the JFC's GEOINT cell. Requests for or updates to GEOINT products, including maps or annotated imagery products, should be submitted as early as possible through the JFC's GEOINT cell to the NGA support team at the JFC's HQ.

Preparing the Operational Area (Deterrence)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Jan '17), pp. VIII-7 to VIII-8.

Special Operations (SOF)

SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping the operational area and environment by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, language capabilities, and relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions can provide operational leverage by gathering critical information, undermining an adversary's will or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US, multinational, or indigenous/surrogate forces.

Stability Activities

Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. Considerations include:

- Limit the damage to key infrastructure (water, energy, medical) and services.
- Assist with the restoration and development of power generation facilities.
- Establish the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilized military and paramilitary forces.
- Provide for the availability of cash or other means of financial exchange.
- Determine the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer, medical, multinational).
- Assess availability of HN law enforcement and health and medical resources.
- Secure key infrastructure nodes and facilitate HN law enforcement and first responder services.
- Develop and disseminate information necessary to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority.

Civil Affairs (CA)

CA forces have a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation being planned. CA forces conduct military engagement, humanitarian and civic assistance, and nation assistance to influence HN and foreign nation populations. CA forces assess impacts of the population and culture on military operations, assess impact of military operations on the population and culture, and facilitate interorganizational coordination. Establishing and maintaining civil-military relations may include interaction among US, allied, multinational, and HN forces, as well as other government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs.

Sustainment

Thorough planning for logistic and personnel support is critical. Planning must include active participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational forces, as well as interagency personnel. This planning is done through theater distribution plans (TDPs) in support of the GCCs' TCPs. Setting the conditions enables the JFCs to address global, end-to-end distribution requirements and identify critical capabilities, infrastructure, and relationships required to be resourced and emplaced in a timely manner to sustain and enable global distribution operations.

See chap. 4 for further discussion.

I. Joint Planning

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Jun '17), chap. I.

Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks. Ideally, planning begins with specified national strategic objectives and military end states to provide a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused. The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) conducts joint planning to understand the strategic and operational environment (OE) and determines the best method for employing the Department of Defense's (DOD's) existing capabilities to achieve national objectives. Joint planning identifies military options the President can integrate with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, informational) to achieve those national objectives. In the process, joint planning identifies likely benefits, costs, and risks associated with proposed military options. In the absence of specified national objectives and military end states, combatant commanders (CCDRs) may propose objectives and military end states for the President's and/or the Secretary of Defense's (SecDef's) consideration before beginning detailed planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, may offer military advice on the proposed objectives and military end states as a part of this process.

The Transregional, Multi-Domain, and Multi-Functional (TMM) Environment

The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and changes rapidly. While the nature of war has not changed, the character of warfare has evolved. Military operations will increasingly operate in a transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) environment. TMM operations will cut across multiple combatant commands (CCMDs) and across land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. Effective planning provides leadership with options that offer the highest probability for success at acceptable risk and enables the efficient use of limited resources, including time, to achieve objectives in this global environment. When specific objectives are not identified, planning identifies options with likely outcomes and risks to enable leaders at all levels to make informed decisions, without unnecessary expenditure of resources.

I. Joint Planning Purposes

At the CCMD level, joint planning serves two critical purposes.

At the strategic level, joint planning provides the President and SecDef options, based on best military advice, on use of the military in addressing national interests and achieving the objectives in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and Defense Strategy Review (DSR).

At the operational level, once strategic guidance is given, planning translates this guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving strategic and operational-level objectives and attaining the military end state. This level of planning ties the training, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces to the achievement of military objectives that contribute to the achievement of national security objectives in the service of enduring national interests.

II(a). Strategic Guidance & Coordination

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun '17), chap. II, section a.

The President, SecDef, and CJCS provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military to pursue national interests within legal and constitutional limitations. They generally communicate strategic direction to the military through written documents, but it may be communicated by any means available. Strategic direction is contained in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changing situations, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

I. National & Department of Defense Guidance

The National Security Council (NSC) develops and recommends national security policy options for Presidential approval. The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. NSC decisions may be directed to any of the member departments or agencies. The President chairs the NSC. Its regular attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory) are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, SecDef, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. CJCS is the statutory military advisor to the NSC, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. For DOD, the President's decisions drive SecDef's strategic guidance, which CJCS may refine. To carry out Title 10, United States Code (USC), statutory responsibilities, the CJCS utilizes the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) to provide a formal structure in aligning ends, ways, and means, and to identify opportunities and mitigate risk for the military in shaping the best assessments, advice, and direction of the Armed Forces for the President and SecDef.

A. Strategic Guidance and Direction

The President provides strategic guidance through the NSS, Presidential policy directives (PPDs), executive orders, and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance and refinement from the NSC. The President also signs the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the contingency planning guidance in the SecDef-signed GEF, which are both developed by DOD.

SecDef has authority, direction, and control over DOD. SecDef oversees the development of broad defense policy goals and priorities for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. For planning, SecDef provides guidance to ensure military action supports national objectives. SecDef approves assignment and allocation of forces.

USD(P) assists SecDef with preparing written policy guidance for the preparation of plans, reviewing plans, and assisting SecDef with other duties.

The CJCS provides independent assessments; serves as principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC; and assists the President and SecDef with providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces. In this capacity, the CJCS develops the NMS and the JSCP, which provide military implementation strategies and planning direction.

See pp. 1-7 to 1-10 for discussion on national strategic direction from JP-1.

B. National Security Council (NSC) System

The NSC system is the principal forum for interagency deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. In addition to NSC meetings chaired by the President, the current NSC organization includes the Principals Committee, deputies committee, and interagency policy committees. Specific issue interagency working groups support these higher-level committees.

See p. 8-9 for further discussion of the National Security Council.

C. National Security Strategy (NSS)

The NSS is required annually by Title 50, USC, Section 3043. It is prepared by the Executive Branch of the USG for Congress and outlines the major national security concerns of the US and how the administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power.

D. Department of State (DOS) & the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

The Department of State (DOS) is the lead US foreign affairs agency within the Executive Branch and the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy. The Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor. The Secretary of State implements the President's foreign policies worldwide through DOS and its employees. USAID is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State.

See facing page for further discussion.

E. Department of Defense

Defense Strategy Review (DSR)

The DSR is legislatively mandated by Congress per Title 10, USC, Section 118, and required every four years. The DSR articulates a defense strategy consistent with the most recent NSS by defining force structure, modernization plans, and a budget plan allowing the military to successfully execute the full range of missions within that strategy for the next 20 years.

Unified Command Plan (UCP)

The UCP, signed by the President, establishes CCMD missions and CCDR responsibilities, addresses assignment of forces, delineates geographic AORs for GCCs, and specifies responsibilities for FCCs. The unified command structure identified in the UCP is flexible and changes as required to accommodate evolving US national security needs.

See pp. 1-19 to 1-24 for further discussion of the unified command plan.

Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)

The GEF, signed by SecDef, and its associated Contingency Planning Guidance, signed by the President, convey the President's and the SecDef's guidance for contingency force management, security cooperation, and posture planning. The GEF translates NSS objectives into prioritized and comprehensive planning guidance for the employment of DOD forces.

Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)

The GFMIG provides SecDef's direction for global force management (GFM) to manage forces from a global perspective. It provides the specific direction for force assignment, apportionment, and allocation processes enabling SecDef to make risk-informed decisions regarding the distribution of US Armed Forces among the CCDRs.

See following page (p. 3-6) for further discussion of GFMIG.

publish strategies to provide guidance to subordinates and supporting commands/agencies and improve coordination with other USG departments and agencies and regional partners. A CCDR operationalizes a strategy through a campaign plan (see Figure II-2, below).

Additional Sources of Strategic Guidance

- National Security Strategy
- National Strategy for Combating Terrorism
- National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication
- National Counterintelligence Strategy
- National Intelligence Strategy
- National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel
- National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
- National Strategy for Homeland Security
- National Strategy for Maritime Security
- National Strategy for Information Sharing
- National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza
- National Strategy for Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure
- National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats

List is not all inclusive.

Ref: JP 5-0, Fig. II-2. *Additional Sources of Strategic Guidance.*

C. Commander's Communication Synchronization

Commander's communication synchronization is the process to coordinate and synchronize narratives, themes, messages, images, operations, and actions to ensure their integrity and consistency to the lowest tactical level across all relevant communication activities.

Within the USG, DQS has primary responsibility for communication synchronization oversight. It is led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and is the overall mechanism by which the USG coordinates public diplomacy across the interagency community. A key product of this committee is the US National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication. This document provides USG-level guidance, intent, strategic imperatives, and core messages under which DOD can nest its themes, messages, images, and activities.

The US military plays an important supporting role in communication synchronization, primarily through commander's communication synchronization, public affairs, and defense support to public diplomacy. Communication synchronization considerations should be included in all joint planning for military operations from routine, recurring military activities in peacetime through major operations.

In addition to synchronizing the communication activities within the joint force, an effective communication synchronization effort is developed in concert with other USG departments and agencies, partner nations, and NGOs as appropriate. CCDRs should develop staff procedures for implementing communication synchronization guidance into all joint planning and targeting processes as well as collaborative processes for integrating communication synchronization activities with nonmilitary partners and subject matter experts.

See pp. 2-18 to 2-19 for discussion of CCS as related to the joint functions (JP 3-0), p. 3-10 as related to strategic guidance (JP 5-0), and p. 6-6 as related to information-related capabilities (IRCs) and information operations (IO). Refer to Joint Doctrine Note 2-13, CCS (Dec '13) for more information.

IV. Operational Activities

Operational activities are comprised of a sustained cycle of situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment activities that occur continuously to support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command.

Operational Activities



Situational Awareness



Planning



Execution



Operation Assessment

A. Situational Awareness

Situational awareness addresses procedures for describing the OE, including threats to national security. This occurs during continuous monitoring of the national and international political and military situations so CCDRs, JFCs, and their staffs can determine and analyze emerging crises, notify decision makers, and determine the specific nature of the threat. Persistent or recurring theater military engagement activities contribute to maintaining situational awareness.

Situational awareness encompasses activities such as monitoring the global situation, identifying that an event has occurred, recognizing the event is a problem or a potential problem, reporting the event, and reviewing enduring and emerging warning concerns and the COMD's running intelligence estimate (based on continuous joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment [JIPOE]). An event is a national or international occurrence assessed as unusual and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

B. Planning

Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into campaign plans, contingency plans, and OPORDs. Joint planning may be based on defined tasks identified in the GEF and the JSCP. Alternatively, joint planning may be based on the need for a military response to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis.

Planning for contingencies is normally tasked in the JSCP based on the GEF or other directive. Planners derive assumptions needed to continue planning and reference the force apportionment tables to provide the number of forces expected.

Planning for crises is initiated to respond to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. It is based on planning guidance, typically communicated in orders (e.g., ALERTORD, WARNORD, PLANORD), and actual circumstances. Supported commanders evaluate the availability of assigned and currently allocated forces to respond to the event. They also determine what other force requirements are needed and begin putting together a rough order of magnitude force list.

C. Execution

Execution begins when the President or SecDef authorizes the initiation of a military operation or other activity. An execute order (EXORD), or other authorizing directive, is issued by the CJCS at the direction of the President or SecDef to initiate or conduct the military operations. Depending upon time constraints, an EXORD may be the only order a CCDR or subordinate commander receives. The EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and conveys guidance not provided earlier.

The CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces, makes recommendations to SecDef to resolve shortfalls, and tasks directed actions by SecDef and the President to support the successful execution of military operations. Execution continues until the operation is terminated or the mission is accomplished. In execution, based on continuous assessment activities, the planning process is repeated as circumstances and missions change.

The supported CCDR monitors the deployment, distribution, and employment of forces; measures task performance and progress toward mission accomplishment; and adapts and adjusts operations as required to achieve the objectives and attain the end state. This continual assessment and adjustment of operations creates an organizational environment of learning and adaptation. This adaptation can range from minor operational adjustments to a radical change of approach. When fundamental changes have occurred that challenge existing understanding or indicate a shift in the OE/problem, commanders and staffs may develop a new operational approach that recognizes that the initial problem has changed, thus requiring a different approach to solving the problem. The change to the OE could be so significant that it may require a review of the global strategic, theater strategic, and military end states and discussions with higher authority to determine whether the end states are still viable.

Changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical, intelligence, or environmental considerations; force and non-unit cargo availability; availability of strategic lift assets; and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and adjustment of deployment requirements and schedules and close coordination and monitoring of deployment activities are required.

The CJCS-issued EXORD defines D-day [the unnamed day on which operations commence or are scheduled to commence] and H-hour [the specific time an operation begins] and directs execution of the OPORD. Date-time groups are expressed in universal time. While OPORD operations commence on the specified D-day and H-hour, deployments providing forces, equipment, and sustainment to support such are defined by C-day [an unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins], and L-hour [a specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence]. The CJCS's EXORD is a record communication that authorizes execution of the COA approved by the President or SecDef and detailed in the supported commander's OPORD. It may include further guidance, instructions, or amplifying orders. In a fast-developing crisis, the EXORD may be the first record communication generated by the CJCS. The record communication may be preceded by a voice authorization. The issuance of the EXORD is time sensitive. The format may differ depending on the amount of previous correspondence and the applicability of prior guidance. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), contains the format for the EXORD. Information already communicated in previous orders should not be repeated unless previous orders were not made available to all concerned. The EXORD need only contain the authority to execute the operation and any additional essential guidance, such as D-day and H-hour.

Levels of Detail (Contingency Plans)

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Jun '17), pp. II-23 to II-27.

There are four levels of planning detail for contingency plans, with an associated planning product for each level.

Level 1 Planning Detail—Commander's Estimate

This level of planning involves the least amount of detail and focuses on producing multiple COAs to address a contingency. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander's estimate, or a memorandum with a required force list. The commander's estimate provides SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the commander's analysis of the various COAs available to accomplish an assigned mission and contains a recommended COA.

Level 2 Planning Detail—Base Plan (BPLAN)

A BPLAN describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes. A BPLAN may contain alternatives, including FDOs, to provide flexibility in addressing a contingency as it develops or to aid in developing the situation. D.

Level 3 Planning Detail—Concept Plan (CONPLAN)

A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete and detailed Level 4 OPLAN or an OPORD. It includes a plan summary, a BPLAN, and usually includes the following annexes: A (Task Organization), B (Intelligence), C (Operations), D (Logistics), J (Command Relations), K (Communications), S (Special Technical Operations), V (Interagency Coordination), and Z (Distribution). If the development of a TPFDD is directed for the CONPLAN, the planning level is designated as 3T. A troop list and TPFDD would also require that an Annex E (Personnel) and Annex W (Operational Contract Support) be prepared.

For more information on OPLAN/CONPLAN format, see CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, and Appendix A, "Joint Operation Plan Format."

Level 4 Planning Detail—OPLAN

An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all applicable annexes to the plan including a time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL), and a transportation-feasible notional TPFDD. The notional TPFDD phases unit requirements in the theater of operations at the times and places required to support the CONOPS. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. An OPLAN is normally prepared when:

- The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.
- The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.
- Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.
- Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment requirements; determine available resources to fill identified requirements; and validate shortfalls.

When directed by the President or SecDef through the CJCS, CDDRs convert level 1, 2, and 3 plans into level 4 OPLANs or into fully developed OPORDs for execution.

III. Strategy & Campaign Development

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Jun '17), chap. III.

DOD is tasked to conduct operations on a daily basis to aid in achieving national objectives. In turn, CCDRs are tasked to develop strategies and campaigns to shape the OE in a manner that supports those strategic objectives. They conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement, operations, posture, and other activities that seek to achieve US national objectives and prevent the need to resort to armed conflict while setting conditions to transition to contingency operations when required. The CCMD strategies and campaign plans are nested within the framework of the NSS, DSR, and NMS and are conducted in conjunction with the other instruments of national power. Specific guidance to the commanders is found in the UCP, GEF, and JSCP. Strategy prioritizes resources and actions to achieve future desired conditions. It acknowledges the current conditions as its start point, but must look past the current conditions and envision a future, then plot the road to get there. Plans address detailed execution to implement the strategy. National strategy prioritizes the CCMD's efforts within and across theaters, functional, and global responsibilities; and considers all means and capabilities available in the CCMD's operations, activities, and investments to achieve the national objectives and complement related USG efforts over a specified timeframe (currently five years). In this construct, the CCDRs and their planners develop strategy and plan campaigns to integrate joint operations with national-level resource planning and policy formulation and in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies.

Vision

The CCDR develops a long-range vision that is consistent with the national strategy and US policy and policy objectives. The vision is usually not constrained by time or resources, but is bounded by the national policy.

Strategy

Strategy is a broad statement of the CCDR's long-term vision guided by and prepared in the context of SecDef's priorities and within projected resources. Strategy links national strategic guidance to joint planning.

The CCDR's strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, GFM processes, and strategic guidance/direction. The strategy must address risk and highlight where and what level risk will be accepted and where it will not be accepted. The strategy's objectives are directly linked to the achievement of national objectives.

Strategy includes a description of the factors and trends in the OE key to achieving the CCMD's objectives, the CCDR's approach to applying military power in concert with the other instruments of national power in pursuit of the objectives and the risks inherent in implementation.

Strategy must be flexible to respond to changes in the OE, policy, and resources. Commanders and their staff assess the OE, as well as available ways, means, and risk then update the strategy as needed. It also recognizes when ends need updating either because the original ones have been attained or they are no longer applicable.

A. DOD-Wide Campaign Plans

When a campaign addresses a persistent threat that spans multiple commands, such as terrorism, threats to space and cyberspace assets or capabilities, or distribution operations, the President or SecDef may designate coordinating authority to one CDR to lead the planning effort, with execution accomplished across multiple CCMDs. CCMDs may identify those activities that support the overall plan through the development of a separate subordinate campaign plan or through inclusion in their overall campaign plan.

The CDR with coordinating authority coordinates planning efforts of CDRs, Services, and applicable DOD agencies in support of the designated DOD global campaign plan. The phrase “coordinated planning” pertains specifically to planning efforts only and does not, by itself, convey authority to execute operations or direct execution of operations. Unless directed by SecDef, the CDR responsible for leading the planning effort is responsible for aligning and harmonizing the CCMD campaign plans. Execution of the individual plans remains the responsibility of the GCC or FCC in whose UCP authority it falls.

CCDRs develop subordinate campaign plans to satisfy the planning requirements of DOD global campaign plans. While these plans are designated subordinate plans, this designation does not alter current command relationships. GCCs remain the supported commanders for the execution of their plans unless otherwise directed by SecDef.

See facing page for discussion of lead and supporting responsibilities for DOD-wide campaign plans.

B. Conditions, Objectives, Effects, and Tasks Linkage

For CCMD campaign plans, the CDR develops military objectives to aid in focusing the strategy and campaign plan. CDRs’ strategies establish long-range objectives to provide context for intermediate objectives. Achieving intermediate objectives sets conditions to achieve the command’s objectives. The CDR and planners update the CCMD’s strategy and TCP based on changes to national objectives, achievement of TCP objectives, and changes in the OE.

Conditions

Conditions describe the state of the OE. These are separate from the objective, as an objective may be achieved, but fail to set the desired conditions.

Objectives

Objectives are clearly defined, measurable, and attainable. Intermediate objectives serve as waypoints against which the CCMD can measure success in attaining GEF-directed and national objectives.

Tasks

Tasks direct friendly actions to create desired effect(s). These are the discrete activities directed in the campaign plan used to influence the OE. The execution of a task will result in an effect.

DOD-Wide Campaign Plans (Responsibilities)

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun '17), pp. III-8 to III-9.

If directed to develop or synchronize a DOD-wide campaign plan, the lead CCMD:

- Provides a common plan structure and strategic framework to guide and inform development of CCDR subordinate campaign plans, Services, CSAs, the National Guard Bureau, and other DOD agencies supporting plans and mitigate seams and vulnerabilities from a global perspective.
- Establishes a common process for the development of subordinate and supporting plans.
- Organizes and executes coordination and collaboration conferences in support of the global campaign to enhance development of subordinate and supporting plans consistent with the established strategic framework and to coordinate and conduct synchronization activities.
- Disseminates lessons learned to CCDRs, Services, and applicable DOD agencies.
- Reviews and coordinates all subordinate and supporting plans to align them with the DOD global campaign plan.
- Assesses and provides recommendations to senior military and civilian leadership on the allocation of forces to coordinate the supported and supporting plans from a global perspective.
- Assesses supported and supporting plans and presents integrated force and capability shortfalls with potential sourcing options. These shortfalls and options inform SecDef of the challenges to executing the plan and the decisions that will likely be required should the plan transition to execution.
- Provides advice and recommendations to CCDRs, JS, and OSD to enhance integration and coordination of subordinate and supporting plans with the DOD global campaign plan.
- Accompanies supporting CCDRs as they brief their supporting plans through final approval, as required. To ensure coordination, all plans should be briefed at the same time.
- Develops assessment criteria and timelines. Collects and collates assessments, and provides feedback on plan success (e.g., accomplishment of intermediate objectives, milestones) through IPRs and the AJA process.
- In coordination with the JS, makes recommendations for communication annex.
- The JSCP may provide additional guidance on coordinating authority based on specific planning requirements.

Supporting CCDRs, Services, the National Guard Bureau, and applicable DOD agencies:

- Provide detailed planning support to the lead CCMD to assist in development of the DOD-wide campaign plan.
- Support plan conferences and planning efforts.
- Develop supporting plans consistent with the strategic framework, planning guidance, and process established by the lead planner.
- Provide subordinate or supporting plans to the lead planner prior to IPRs with enough time for the lead CCMD to review and propose modifications prior to the IPR.

The SecDef may also direct the CJCS to support global campaign planning. This designation will not change command relationships, but takes advantage of the CJCS's position to look across the CCMDs and provide a global perspective of opportunities and risk in developing globally integrated plans.


IV. Operational Art & Operational Design

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Jun '17), chap. IV.

The JFC and staff develop plans and orders through the application of operational art and operational design in conjunction with JPP. They combine art and science to develop products that describe how (ways) the joint force will employ its capabilities (means) to achieve military objectives (ends), given an understanding of unacceptable consequences of employing capabilities as intended (risk).

The purpose of operational design and operational art is to produce an operational approach, allowing the commander to continue JPP, translating broad strategic and operational concepts into specific missions and tasks and produce an executable plan.

Developing the Operational Approach



Ref: JP 5-0, fig. IV-1. *Developing the Operational Approach*.

Operational Art

Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is inherent in all aspects of operational design.

Operational Design

Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or operation and its subsequent execution. The framework is built upon an iterative process that creates a shared understanding of the OE; identifies and frames problems within that OE; and develops approaches, through the application of operational art, to resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance and/or policy. The operational approach, a primary product of operational design, allows the commander to continue JPP, translating broad strategic and operational concepts into specific missions and tasks (see Figure IV-1) to produce an executable plan.

Operational design is one of several tools available to help the JFC and staff understand the broad solutions for mission accomplishment and to understand the uncertainty in a complex OE. Additionally, it supports a recursive and ongoing dialogue concerning the nature of the problem and an operational approach to achieve the desired objectives.

The process is continuous and cyclical in that it is conducted prior to, during, and for follow-on joint operations.

Operational Design Methodology

The general methodology in operational design is:

- Understand the strategic direction and guidance.
- Understand the strategic environment (policies, diplomacy, and politics).
- Understand the OE.
- Define the problem.
- Identify assumptions needed to continue planning (strategic and operational assumptions).
- Develop options (the operational approach).
- Identify decisions and decision points (external to the organization).
- Refine the operational approach(es).
- Develop planning guidance.

These steps are not necessarily sequential. Iteration and reexamination of earlier work is essential to identify how later decisions affect earlier assumptions and to fill in gaps identified during the process.

A. Understand the Strategic Direction and Guidance

Planning usually starts with the assignment of a planning task through a directive, order, or cyclical strategic guidance depending on how a situation develops. The commander and staff must analyze all available sources of guidance. These sources include written documents, such as the GEF and JSCP, written directives, oral instructions from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws, policies of other organizations that are interested in the situation, communication synchronization guidance, and higher headquarters' orders or estimates.

Strategic direction from strategic guidance documents can be vague, incomplete, outdated, or conflicting. This is due to the different times at which they may have been produced, changes in personnel that result in differing opinions or policies, and the staffing process where compromises are made to achieve agreement within the documents. During planning, commanders and staff must read the directives and synthesize the contents into a concise statement. Since strategic guidance documents can be problematic, the JFC and staff should obtain clear, updated direction through routine and sustained civilian-military dialogue throughout the planning process. When clarification does not occur, planners and commanders identify those areas as elements of risk.

Additionally, throughout the planning process, senior leaders will provide additional guidance. This can be through formal processes such as SGSSs and IPRs, or through informal processes such as e-mails, conversations, and meetings. All of this needs to be disseminated to ensure the command has a common understanding of higher commander's intent, vision, and expectations.

In particular, commanders maintain dialogue with leadership at all levels to resolve differences of interpretation of higher-level objectives and the ways and means to

accomplish these objectives. Understanding the OE, defining the problem, and devising a sound approach, are rarely achieved the first time. Strategic guidance addressing complex problems can initially be vague, requiring the commander to interpret and filter it for the staff. While CCDRs and national leaders may have a clear strategic perspective of the problem from their vantage point, operational-level commanders and subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of specific circumstances that comprise the operational situation and may have a completely different perspective on the causes and solutions.

Strategic guidance is essential to operational art and operational design. As discussed elsewhere, the President, SecDef, and CJCS all promulgate strategic guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives. It should define what constitutes victory or success (ends) and identify available forces, resources, and authorities (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The operational approach (ways) of employing military capabilities to achieve the ends is for the supported JFC to develop and propose, although policy or national positions may limit options available to the commander.

For situations that require the employment of military capabilities (particularly for anticipated large-scale combat), the President and SecDef may establish a set of operational objectives. However, in the absence of coherent guidance or direction, the CCDR/JFC may need to collaborate with policymakers in the development of these objectives.

B. Understand the Strategic Environment

After analyzing the strategic guidance, commanders and planners build an understanding of the strategic environment. This forms boundaries within which the operational approach must fit. Some considerations are:

- What actions or planning assumptions will be acceptable given the current US policies and the diplomatic and political environment?
- What impact will US activities have on third parties (focus on military impacts but identify possible political fallout)?
- What are the current national strategic objectives of the USG? Are the objectives expected to be long lasting or short-term only? Could they result in unintended consequences (e.g., if you provide weapons to a nation, is there sufficient time to develop strong controls so the weapons will not be used for unintended purposes)?

Strategic-Level Considerations

Strategic-level military activities affect national and multinational military objectives, develop CCMD campaign plans to achieve these objectives, sequence military operations, define limits and assess risks for use of the military instrument of national power, and provide military forces and capabilities in accordance with authorizing directives. Within the OE, there are strategic-level considerations that may include global aspects due to global factors such as international law, the capability of adversary/enemy information activities to influence world opinion, adversary and friendly organizations and institutions, and the capability and availability of national and commercial space-based systems and information technology. Strategic-level considerations of the OE are analyzed in terms of geopolitical regions, nations, and climate rather than local geography and weather. Nonmilitary aspects of the OE assume increased importance at the strategic level. For example, the industrial and technological capabilities of a nation or region will influence the type of military force it fields, and factors may influence the ability of a nation or region to endure a protracted conflict without outside assistance. In many situations, nonmilitary considerations may play a greater role than military factors in influencing adversary and relevant actor COAs. The JIPOE process analyzes all relevant aspects of the OE, including the adversary and other actors, and PMESII Systems and Subsystems.

F. Defeat and Stability Mechanisms

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Jun '17), pp. IV-31 to IV-33.

Defeat and stability mechanisms complement COG analysis. While COG analysis helps us understand a problem, defeat and stability mechanisms suggest means to solve it. They provide a useful tool for describing the main effects a commander wants to create along a line of operation (LOO) or line of effort (LOE).

Defeat Mechanisms

Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. Combat aims at defeating armed enemies—regular, irregular, or both, through the organized application of force to kill, destroy, or capture by all means available. There are two basic defeat mechanisms to accomplish this: attrition and disruption. The aim of disruption is to defeat an enemy's ability to fight as a cohesive and coordinated organization. The alternative is to destroy his material capabilities through attrition, which generally is more costly and time-consuming. Although acknowledging that all successful combat involves both mechanisms, joint doctrine conditionally favors disruption because it tends to be a more effective and efficient way of causing an enemy's defeat, and the increasing imperative for restraint in the application of violence may often preclude the alternative. The defeat mechanisms may include:

1. Destroy

To identify the most effective way to eliminate enemy capabilities; it may be attained by sequentially applying combat power over time or with a single, decisive attack.

2. Dislocate

To compel the enemy to expose forces by reacting to a specific action; it requires enemy commanders to either accept neutralization of part of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning.

3. Disintegrate

To exploit the effects of dislocation and destruction to shatter the enemy's coherence; it typically follows destruction and dislocation, coupled with the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding.

4. Isolate

To limit the enemy's ability to conduct operations effectively by marginalizing critical capabilities or limiting the enemy's ability to influence events; it exposes the enemy to continued degradation through the massed effects of other defeat mechanisms.

Stability Mechanisms

A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help to shape the human dimension of the OE more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. Stability mechanisms may include compel, control, influence, and support. Proper application of these stability mechanisms is key in irregular warfare where success is dependent on enabling a local partner to maintain or establish legitimacy and influence over relevant populations.

1. Compel

To maintain the threat—or actual use—of lethal or non-lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements. Legitimacy and compliance are interrelated. While legitimacy is vital to achieving host-nation compliance, compliance depends on how the local populace perceives the force's ability to exercise force to accomplish the mission. The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central component to success in stability operations; it closely ties to legitimacy. Depending on the circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or complement efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates and agreements. The misuse of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of force—can adversely affect the legitimacy of the mission or the military instrument of national power.

2. Control

To establish public order and safety, securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals and physically occupying key terrain and facilities. As a stability mechanism, control closely relates to the primary stability task, establish civil control. However, control is also fundamental to effective, enduring security. When combined with the stability mechanism compel, it is inherent to the activities that comprise disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as broader security sector reform programs. Without effective control, efforts to establish civil order—including efforts to establish both civil security and control over an area and its population—will not succeed. Establishing control requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts across the OA.

3. Influence

To alter the opinions and attitudes of the HN population through IRCs, presence, and conduct. It applies nonlethal capabilities to complement and reinforce the compelling and controlling effects of stability mechanisms. Influence aims to effect behavioral change through nonlethal means. It is more a result of public perception than a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of forces to operate successfully among the people of the HN, interacting with them consistently and positively while accomplishing the mission. Here, consistency of actions, words, and deeds is vital. Influence requires legitimacy. Military forces earn the trust and confidence of the people through the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, not through lethal or coercive means. Positive influence is absolutely necessary to achieve lasting control and compliance. It contributes to success across the LOEs and engenders support among the people. Once attained, influence is best maintained by consistently exhibiting respect for, and operating within, the cultural and societal norms of the local populace.

4. Support

To establish, reinforce, or set the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively, coordinating and cooperating closely with HN civilian agencies and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. Support is vital to a comprehensive approach to stability activities. The military instrument of national power brings unique expeditionary capabilities to stabilization efforts. These capabilities enable the force to quickly address the immediate needs of the HN and local populace. In extreme circumstances, support may require committing considerable resources for a protracted period. However, easing the burden of support on military forces requires enabling civilian agencies and organizations to fulfill their respective roles. This is typically achieved by combining the effects of the stability mechanisms—compel, control, and influence—to reestablish security and control, restoring essential civil services to the local populace, and helping to secure humanitarian access necessary for aid organizations to function effectively.

V(a). Joint Planning Process (JPP)

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Jun '17), chap. V.

The joint planning process (JPP) is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order.

Joint Planning Process (JPP) Steps



I Planning Initiation



II Mission Analysis



III COA Development



IV COA Analysis and Wargaming




V COA Comparison



VI COA Approval



VII Plan or Order Development



(see p. 3-71)

JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission. JPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

JPP is applicable for all planning. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution. It is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive. Based on the nature of the problem, other tools available to the planner, expertise in the planning team, time, and other considerations, the process can be modified as required. Similarly, some JPP steps or tasks may be performed concurrently, truncated, or modified as necessary dependent upon the situation, subject, or time constraints of the planning effort.

In a crisis, the steps of JPP may be conducted simultaneously to speed the process. Supporting commands and organizations often conduct JPP simultaneously and iteratively with the supported CCMD.

Mission Analysis (Overview)

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Jun '17), pp. V-5 to V-6 (fig. V-3 and V-4).

Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process.

Mission Analysis

Key Inputs

Higher headquarters' planning directive

Strategic direction

Commander's planning guidance

- Description of the operational environment
- Definition of the problem
- Commander's operational approach
- Commander's initial intent

Strategic estimate and intelligence products to include JIPOE

Mission Analysis

Key Outputs

Staff estimates

Mission statement

Commander's refined operational approach including:

- JFC's intent statement
- JFC's updated planning guidance

Problem framing, initial force identification, mission success criteria, initial risk assessment, mission analysis briefing, and planning directive (as necessary)

Initial commander's critical information requirements

Course of action evaluation criteria

Joint
Planning

Mission Analysis Activities *(not necessarily sequential)*

- Begin logistics supportability analysis
- Analyze higher headquarters planning activities and strategic guidance
- Review commander's initial planning guidance, including his initial understanding of the operational environment, of the problem, and description of the operational approach
- Determine known facts and develop planning assumptions
- Determine and analyze operational limitations
- Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks
- Develop mission statement
- Conduct initial force allocation review
- Develop risk assessment
- Develop mission success criteria
- Develop commander's critical information requirements
- Prepare staff estimates
- Prepare and deliver mission analysis brief
- Publish commander's updated planning guidance, intent statement, and refined operational approach

C. Determine Known Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions

The staff assembles both facts and assumptions to support the planning process and planning guidance.

Fact

A fact is a statement of information known to be true (such as verified locations of friendly and adversary force dispositions).

Assumption

An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, presumed to be true in the absence of facts. A valid assumption can be developed for both friendly and adversary situations and has three characteristics: logical, realistic, and essential for planning to continue. Commanders and staffs should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume that unrealistic friendly capabilities would be available. Assumptions address gaps in knowledge that are critical for the planning process to continue. Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure validity and challenged if they appear unrealistic. Subordinate commanders must not develop assumptions that contradict valid higher headquarters assumptions.

Commanders and staffs should anticipate changes to the plan if an assumption proves to be incorrect. Because of assumptions' influence on planning, planners must either validate the assumptions (treat as facts) or invalidate the assumptions (alter the plan accordingly) as quickly as possible.

During wargaming or red teaming, planners should review both the positive and negative aspect of all assumptions. They should review the plan from both the perspective that the assumption will prove true and from the perspective that the assumption will prove false. This can aid in preventing biases or tunnel vision during crisis action procedures.

Assumptions made in contingency planning should be addressed in the plan. Activities and operations in the plan can be used to validate, refute, or render unnecessary contingency plan assumptions.

Plans may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a potential crisis develops. As a crisis develops, assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The staff accomplishes this by identifying the information needed to validate assumptions and submitting an information request to an appropriate agency as an information requirement. If the commander needs the information to make a key decision, the information requirement can be designated a CCIR. Although there may be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the OPORD.

Planners should attempt to use as few assumptions as necessary to continue planning. By definition, assumptions introduce possibility for error. If the assumption is not necessary to continue planning, its only effect is to introduce error and add the likelihood of creating a bias in the commander's and planner's perspective. Since most plans require refinement, a simpler plan with fewer assumptions allows the commander and staff to act and react with other elements of the OE (including adversaries, allies, and the physical element). However, assumptions can be useful to identify those issues the commander and planners must validate on execution.

All assumptions should be identified in the plan or decision matrix to ensure they are reviewed and validated prior to execution.

N. Commander's Refined Planning Guidance

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun '17), pp. V-19 to V-20.

After approving the mission statement and issuing the intent, the commander provides the staff (and subordinates in a collaborative environment) with enough additional guidance (including preliminary decisions) to focus the staff and subordinate planning activities during COA development.

At a minimum, this refined planning guidance should include the following elements:

- An approved mission statement
- Key elements of the OE (operational environment)
- A clear statement of the problem
- Key assumptions
- Key operational limitations
- National strategic objectives with a description of how the operation will support them
- Termination criteria (if appropriate, CCMD-level campaign plans will not have termination criteria and many operations will have transitions rather than termination)
- Military objectives or end state and their relation to the national strategic end state
- The JFC's initial thoughts on the conditions necessary to achieve objectives
- Acceptable or unacceptable levels of risk in key areas
- The JFC's visualization of the operational approach to achieve the objectives in broad terms. This operational approach sets the basis for development of COAs. The commander should provide as much detail as appropriate to provide the right level of freedom to the staff in developing COAs. Planning guidance should also address the role of interorganizational and multinational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations as required.

Commanders describe their visualization of the forthcoming campaign or operations to help build a shared understanding among the staff. Enough guidance (preliminary decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action necessary to accomplish the mission consistent with commander's intent. The commander's guidance must focus on the essential tasks and associated objectives that support the accomplishment of the assigned national objectives. It emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how the commander intends to employ military capabilities integrated with other instruments of national power to accomplish the mission within the higher JFC's intent.

The JFC may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or subordinate JFCs or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit individually as the situation and information dictates. The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed. However, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary efforts by the staff or subordinate and supporting commands.

Planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad, allowing the staff and/or subordinate commands wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs. However, no matter its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in a logical sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. Moreover, one must recognize that all the elements of planning guidance are tentative only. The JFC may issue successive planning guidance during the decision-making process; yet the focus of the JFC's staff should remain upon the framework provided in the initial planning guidance. The commander should continue to provide refined planning guidance during the rest of the planning process while understanding of the problem continues to develop.

B. Prepare for the War Game

There are two key decisions to make before COA analysis (wargaming) begins. The first decision is to decide what type of wargame will be used. This decision should be based on commander's guidance, time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability of simulation models. The second decision is to prioritize the enemy COAs or the partner capabilities, partner and US objectives for noncombat operations, and the wargame that it is to be analyzed against. In time-constrained situations, it may not be possible to wargame against all COAs.

The two forms of wargames are computer-assisted and manual. There are many forms of computer-assisted wargames; most require a significant amount of preparation to develop and load scenarios and then to train users. However, the potential to utilize the computer model for multiple scenarios or blended scenarios makes it valuable. For both types, consider how to organize the participants in a logical manner.

For manual wargaming, three distinct methods are available to run the event:

1. Deliberate Timeline Analysis

Consider actions day-by-day or in other discrete blocks of time. This is the most thorough method for detailed analysis when time permits.

2. Phasing

Used as a framework for COA analysis. Identify significant actions and requirements by functional area and/or joint task force (JTF) component.

3. Critical Events/Sequence of Essential Tasks

The sequence of essential tasks, also known as the critical events method, highlights the initial actions necessary to establish the conditions for future actions, such as a sustainment capability and engage enemy units in the deep battle area. At the same time, it enables the planners to adapt if the enemy or other actor in the OE reacts in such a way that necessitates reordering of the essential tasks. This technique also allows wargamers to analyze concurrently the essential tasks required to execute the CONOPS. Focus on specific critical events that encompass the essence of the COA. If necessary, different MOEs should be developed for assessing different types of critical events (e.g., destruction, blockade, air control, neutralization, ensure defense). As with the focus on phasing, the critical events discussion identifies significant actions and requirements by functional area and/or by JTF component and enables a discussion of possible or expected reactions to execution of critical tasks.

C. Conduct the Wargame and Evaluate the Results

The facilitator and the red cell chief get together to agree on the rules of the wargame. The wargame begins with an event designated by the facilitator. It could be an enemy offensive or defensive action, a friendly offensive or defensive action, or some other activity such as a request for support or campaign activity. They decide where (in the OA) and when (H-hour or L-hour) it will begin. They review the initial array of forces and the OE. Of note, they must come to an agreement on the effectiveness of capabilities and previous actions by both sides prior to the wargame. The facilitator must ensure all members of the wargame know what events will be wargamed and what techniques will be used. This coordination within the friendly team and between the friendly and the red team should be done well in advance.

Each COA wargame has a number of turns, each consisting of three total moves: action, reaction, and counteraction. If necessary, each turn of the wargame may be extended beyond the three basic moves. The facilitator, based on JFC guidance, decides how many total turns are made in the wargame.

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun '17), pp. V-49 to V-50.

The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels.

- States the commander's intent
- Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to accomplish the mission
- Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including those of multinational and interagency organizations as appropriate)
- Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required
- Focuses on friendly and adversary COGs and their associated critical vulnerabilities
- Avoids discernible patterns and makes full use of ambiguity and deception
- Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation
- Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved
- Relates the joint force's objectives and desired effects to those of the next higher command and other organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders.

The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their supporting plans. During CONOPS development, the commander determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA, and resources and authorities available. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of activities or forces into the OA, providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the sequencing of forces into the OA via a TPFDD. The structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility as well as the ability to transition to branches or sequels rapidly as operational conditions dictate. Planners ensure the CONOPS, force plan, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, and are consistent with the JFC's intent.

If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action contemplated to accomplish the assigned mission warrants execution via a series of related operations, then the staff outlines the CONOPS as a campaign. They develop the preliminary part of the operational campaign in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the commander's concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished.

During CONOPS development, the JFC must assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. JFCs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated desired and undesired effects that influence planning at every juncture. If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or "nesting" is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross-purposes.

V(b). Joint Operation Plan (OPLAN) Format

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Aug '11), app. A.

Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing a joint OPLAN. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. However, joint OPLANs/CONPLANs will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as paragraph 3, "Execution") and their primary subparagraphs (such as paragraph 3a, "Concept of Operations"). The JPEC typically refers to a joint contingency plans that encompasses more than one major operation as a campaign plan, but JFCs prepare a plan for a campaign in joint contingency plan format.

The CJCSM 3130 series volumes describe joint planning interaction among the President, SecDef, CJCS, the supported joint commander, and other JPEC members, and provides models of planning messages and estimates. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, provides the formats for joint plans.

Notional Operation Plan Format

- a. Copy No. _____
- b. Issuing Headquarters
- c. Place of Issue
- d. Effective Date/Time Group
- e. OPERATION PLAN: (Number or Code Name)
- f. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .
- g. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan.)

1. Situation

(This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses [see national intelligence estimate, any multinational sources, and strategic and commanders' estimates].)

a. General. (This section describes the general politico-military variables that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the contingency plans. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict, identify primary antagonists, state US policy objectives and the estimated objectives of other parties, and outline strategic decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy objectives and conduct effective US military operations to achieve US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

(1) Assessment of the Conflict. (Provide a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context [JSCP, UCP].)

Continued on next page

VI. Operation Assessment

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Jun '17), chap. VI.

Operation assessments are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation, fulfilling the requirement to identify and analyze changes in the OE and to determine the progress of the operation. Assessments involve the entire staff and other sources such as higher and subordinate headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. They provide perspective, insight, and the opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective. Operation assessment applies to all levels of warfare and during all military operations.

Assessment

A continuous activity that supports decision making by ascertaining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state for the purpose of developing, adapting, and refining plans and for making campaigns and operations more effective.

Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior and subordinate commanders, key leader engagements (KLEs), and battlefield circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander's awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE, identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, and formally providing recommendations to improve progress towards mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization's planning (beginning in the plan initiation step) and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander's decision cycle.

The starting point for operation assessment activities coincides with the initiation of joint planning. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the commander ensure the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. This integrated approach optimizes the feedback senior leadership needs to appropriately refine, adapt, or terminate planning and execution to be effective in the OE.

CCMDs, subordinate Service, joint functional components, and JTFs devote significant effort and resources to plan and execute operations. They apply appropriate rigor to determine whether an operation is being effectively planned and executed as needed to accomplish specified objectives and end states. Assessment complements that rigor by analyzing the OE objectively and comprehensively to estimate the effectiveness of planned tasks and measure the effectiveness of completed tasks with respect to desired conditions in the OE.

Background


TCPs and country-specific security cooperation sections/country plans are continuously in some stage of implementation. Accordingly, during implementation CCMD planners should annually extend their planning horizon into the future year. The simultaneity of planning for the future while implementing a plan requires a CCMD to continually assess its implementation in order to appropriately revise, adapt, or terminate elements of the evolving (future) plan. This synergism makes operation assessment a prerequisite to plan adaptation. Operation assessment is thus fundamental to revising implementation documents ahead of resource allocation processes.

Campaign Assessment Process

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun '17), pp. VI-3 to VI-7.

The basic process for campaign assessment is similar to that used for contingency and crisis applications but the scale and scope are generally much larger. While operational level activities such as a JTF typically focus on a single end state with multiple desired conditions, the campaign plan must integrate products from a larger range of strategic objectives, each encompassing its own set of intermediate objectives and desired conditions, subordinate operations, and subordinate plans (i.e., country-specific security cooperation sections/country plans, contingency plans not in execution, on-going operations, directed missions).

Campaign Plan Assessments



Ref: JP 5-0, fig. VI-1. Campaign Plan Assessments.

One common method to establish more manageable campaign plans is for CCMDs to establish LOEs with associated intermediate objectives for each campaign objective. This method allows the CCMD to simultaneously assess each LOE and then assess the overall effort using products from the LOE assessments. The following discussion uses several boards, cells, and working groups. The names merely provide context for the process and are not intended to be a requirement for organizations to follow.

The assessment needs to nest with and support the campaign and national objectives and cannot rely on accomplishment of specific tasks. Commanders and staffs should make certain the established intermediate objectives will change the OE in the manner desired.

See fig. VI-2 and facing page for further discussion.

IV. Selecting Indicators

The two types of indicators commonly used by the joint forces are MOPs and MOEs.

Measures of Performance (MOPs)

MOPs are indicators used to assess friendly (i.e., multinational) actions tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs commonly reside in task execution matrices and confirm or deny proper task performance. MOPs help answer the question, "Are we doing things right?" or "Was the action taken?" or "Was the task completed to standard?"

Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs)

MOEs are indicators used to help measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time to gauge the achievement of objectives and attainment of end states. MOEs help answer the question, "Are we doing the right things to create the effects or changes in the conditions of the OE that we desire?"

Choose Distinct Indicators

Using indicators that are too similar to each other can result in the repetitious evaluation of change in a particular condition. In this way, similar indicators skew analyses by overestimating, or 'double-counting,' change in one item in the OE.

Include indicators from different causal chains. When indicators have a cause and effect relationship with each other, either directly or indirectly, it decreases their value in measuring a particular condition. Measuring progress toward a desired condition by multiple means adds rigor to the analyses.

Use the same indicator for more than one end state, objective, effect, task, condition, or mission when appropriate. This sort of duplication in organizing OE information does not introduce significant bias unless carried to an extreme.

Avoid or minimize additional reporting requirements for subordinate units. In many cases, commanders may use information generated by other staff elements as indicators in the assessment plan. Units collect many assessment indicators as part of routine operational and intelligence reporting. With careful consideration, commanders and staffs can often find viable alternative indicators without creating new reporting requirements. Excessive reporting requirements can render an otherwise valid assessment plan untenable.

Maximize Clarity

An indicator describes the sought-after information, including specifics on time, information, geography, or unit, as necessary. Any staff member should be able to read the indicator and precisely understand the information it describes.

V. Information Categories and Data Types

Information Categories

The specific type of information that is expressed in indicators can typically be categorized as quantitative or qualitative, and subjective or objective.

Information Types

Assessment information is used to calculate, analyze, and recommend. Whenever possible, information should be empirical—originating in or based on observation or experience. Generally, there are four information types: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio. Knowing the type is essential to understand the type of analysis that can be performed, and whether the information can be interpreted to draw conclusions, such as the quantity and speed of change in an OE condition over time.

Joint Logistics

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), chap. I.

Sustainment

Sustainment is one of the six joint functions (command and control [C2], intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. Sustainment provides the joint force commanders (JFCs) freedom of action, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported combatant commander (CCDR) and subordinate Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies (CSAs), and supporting commands. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Joint logistics supports sustained readiness for joint forces.

Logistics

Logistics concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to support the JFC's concept of operations (CONOPS). The relative combat power that military forces can generate against an adversary is constrained by a nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to required points of application.

I. Joint Logistics

Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments' logistics resources to support the joint force. The joint logistics enterprise (JLEnt) projects and sustains a logistically ready joint force by leveraging Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, nongovernmental agencies, multinational, and industrial resources. The identification of established coordination frameworks, agreements, and other connections creates an efficient and effective logistic network to support the mission.

A. Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt)

The JLEnt is a multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers cooperatively structured to achieve a common purpose. It may be bound by an assortment of collaborative agreements, contracts, policy, legislation, or treaties designed to make it function in the best interest of the JFC or other supported organization. The JLEnt includes organizations and partnerships from the Services, combatant commands (CCMDs), joint task forces (JTFs), CSAs, other US Government departments and



Refer to SMFLS4: Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Warfighter's Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support) -- updated with the latest doctrinal references (ADRP 4-0 Sustainment, ATP 4-93 Sustainment Brigade, JP 4-0 Joint Logistics, and more than 20 other joint and service publications) -- for complete discussion of strategic, operational, and tactical logistics, force projection, deployment and redeployment, and RSO&I operations.

IV. Principles of Logistics

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), pp. 1-7 to 1-8.

1. Responsiveness

Responsiveness is providing the right support when and where it is needed. Responsiveness is characterized by the reliability of support and the speed of response to the needs of the joint force. Clearly understood processes and well-developed decision support tools are key elements enabling responsiveness to emerging requirements. By monitoring the battle rhythm, the joint logistician can anticipate logistic issues.

2. Simplicity

Simplicity fosters efficiency in planning and execution, and allows for more effective control over logistic operations. Clarity of tasks, standardized and interoperable procedures, and clearly defined command relationships contribute to simplicity. Simplicity is a way to reduce the "fog of war" or the friction caused by combat. Clear objectives, relevant processes, and documented procedures assist unity of effort.

3. Flexibility

Flexibility is the ability to improvise and adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and operational requirements. Flexibility is how well logistics responds in a dynamic environment. Where responsiveness is a commander's view of logistic support, flexibility is a logistician's view of being responsive. The logistician's ability to anticipate requirements in an operational environment allows for the development of viable options able to support operational needs.

4. Economy

Economy is the minimum amount of resources required to bring about or create a specific outcome. Economy is achieved when support is provided using the fewest resources within acceptable levels of risk. At the tactical and operational levels, economy is reflected in the number of personnel, units and equipment required to deliver support. Among the key elements of the logistic principle of economy is the identification and elimination of redundancy.

5. Attainability

Attainability is the assurance that the essential supplies and services available to execute operations will achieve mission success. Attainability is the point at which the CCDR or subordinate JFC judges that sufficient supplies, support, distribution capabilities, and LOC capacity exist to initiate operations at an acceptable level of risk. Some examples of minimal requirements are inventory on hand (days of supply), critical support and Service capabilities, theater distribution assets (surge capability), combat service support (CSS) sufficiency, and force reception throughput capabilities.

6. Sustainability

Sustainability is the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of logistics support to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military action. Sustainability is focused on the long-term objectives and requirements of the supported forces. Sustainability provides the JFC with the means to enable freedom of action and extend operational reach.

7. Survivability

Survivability is the capacity of an organization to prevail in spite of adverse impacts or potential threats. To provide continuity of support, critical logistic infrastructure must be identified and plans developed for its protection. Survivability is directly affected by dispersion, design of operational logistic processes, and the allocation of forces to protect critical logistic infrastructure. Examples of critical logistic infrastructure include industrial centers, airfields, seaports, railheads, supply points, depots, LOCs, bridges, intersections, logistic centers, and military installations.

II. Coordinating/Synchronizing Joint Logistics

Ref: JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics* (Oct '13), chap. III.

This section describes the authorities, organizations, and control mechanisms that enable the synchronization of logistics in support of the JFC. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, identifies C2 as a joint function. Command includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and the art of motivating and directing people and organizations to accomplish missions. Control is inherent in command. However, the logistic assets will rarely fall under one command, which makes control, coordination, synchronization, and management of joint logistics more challenging. To control joint logistics, commanders direct forces and functions consistent with a commander's command authority. It involves organizing the joint staff, operational level logistic elements, CSAs, and their capabilities to assist in planning and executing joint logistics. Designating lead Service, assigning agency responsibilities, and developing procedures to execute the CCDR's directive authority for logistics (DAFL) will assist in planning, integrating, synchronizing, and executing joint logistics support operations. While logistics remains a Service responsibility, there are other logistics organizations, processes, and tasks that must be considered when developing a concept of support in order to optimize joint logistics outcome.

Logistics Authorities



Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL)



Executive Agent (EA)



Lead Service

I. Logistics Authorities

Title 10, USC, and DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, describe the statutory requirements for each Military Department to provide logistical support to assigned forces. Title 10, USC, also describes the basic authority to perform the functions of command that include organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and "giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command." This authority includes all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.

A Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL)

CCDRs exercise authoritative direction over logistics, in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 164. DAFL cannot be delegated or transferred. However, the CCDR may delegate the responsibility for the planning, execution, and/or management of common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC or Service component commander to accomplish the subordinate JFC's or Service component commander's mission. For some commodities or support services common to two or more Services, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate one provider as the EA (see Appendix D, "Logistic-Related Executive Agents"). Other control measures to assist in developing common user logistics are joint tasks or inter-Service support agreements. However, the CCDR must formally delineate this delegated authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. The exercise of DAFL by a CCDR includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary for the execution of military operations in support of the following: execution of approved OPLANs; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

See facing page for an overview and further discussion.

B. Executive Agent (EA)

A DOD EA is the head of a DOD component to whom SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational missions, or administrative or other designated activities that involve two or more of the DOD components. The DOD EA may delegate to a subordinate designee within that official's component, the authority to act on that official's behalf for any or all of those DOD EA responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned by SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The nature and scope of the DOD EA responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall be prescribed at the time of assignment and remain in effect until SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense revokes or supersedes them. Only SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate a DOD EA and assign associated responsibilities, functions, and authorities within DOD.

Refer to DODD 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent, and Appendix D, "Logistics-Related Executive Agents," for details.

C. Lead Service

The CCDR may choose to assign specific common user logistics functions, to include both planning and execution to a lead Service. These assignments can be for single or multiple common logistics functions, and may also be based on phases or locations within the AOR. In circumstances where one Service is the predominant provider of forces or the owner of the preponderance of logistics capability, it may be prudent to designate that Service as the joint logistics lead. Rarely does one Service's logistics organization have all the capabilities required to support an operation, so the CCDR may augment the lead Service logistics organization with capabilities from another component's logistics organizations as appropriate.

* Base Operating Support-Integrator (BOS-I)

When multiple Service components share a common base of operations, the JFC may choose to designate a single Service component or JTF as the BOS-I for the location. The BOS-I facilitates unity of effort by coordinating sustainment operations at the location. This includes but is not limited to master planning, collecting and prioritizing construction requirements, seeking funding support, and force protection. When the base has a joint use airfield, the JFC also designates a senior airfield authority (SAA) responsible for airfield operations. When BOS-I and SAA are designated to different Services, close coordination of base support activities and airfield operations is essential.

III. Planning Joint Logistics

Ref: JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics* (Oct '13), chap. IV.

Joint logistics planning provides the process and the means to integrate, synchronize, and prioritize joint logistics capabilities toward achieving the supported commander's operational objectives and desired outcome during all phases of plan development. This chapter is applicable for global or theater campaign plans, subordinate campaign plans, campaign support plans, and deliberate plans tasked in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) series, or as directed by the CCDR. This chapter also addresses planning considerations, input and output products used by joint logisticians to create OPLANs/operation orders (OPORDs) that enable transition from peacetime activities to execution of orders. Focus is on JOPP in development of the theater logistics overview (TLO) as a segment of the theater campaign plan (TCP).

Joint logistics planning is conducted under the construct of joint operation planning and the associated JOPP addressed in JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*. Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations by CCDRs and their subordinate commanders in response to contingencies and crises. It transforms national strategic objectives into activities by development of operational products that include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. Joint operation planning occurs at multiple strategic national and operation levels using process, procedures, tactics, techniques and facilitating information technology tools/applications/systems aligned to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and its transition to the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) system.

See chap. 3, *Joint Planning*, for further details.

I. Planning Functions

Joint operation planning encompasses a number of elements, including four planning functions: strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment. Depending upon the type of planning and time available, these functions can be sequential or concurrent. Joint operation planning features detailed planning guidance and frequent dialogue between senior leaders and commanders to promote a common understanding of planning assumptions, considerations, risks, COA, implementing actions, and other key factors. Plans may be rapidly modified throughout their development and execution. This process involves expeditious plan reviews and feedback, which can occur at any time, from SecDef and CJCS. The intent is to give SecDef and the CCDR a mechanism for adapting plans rapidly as the situation dictates.


See chap. 3, *Joint Planning*, for further details.

Key joint operation planning activities across the planning process are the in-progress reviews (IPRs). IPRs are a disciplined dialogue among strategic leaders discussing the shaping of the plan during development. Logistics core functions and their use, availability and readiness will be addressed in the IPR process as appropriate.

Logistics Planning Integration (Strategic Guidance, Plans, & Operations)

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), fig. IV-2, p. IV-4.

Using the JOPP framework for deliberate and crisis action planning, Figure IV-2 reflects the cascading relationship from strategic guidance and tasking to planning and developing OPORDs with a focus on TCP and associated key logistics area products. These key logistics area products, TLO, logistics estimate, and concept of logistic support (COLS), support the TCP and provide the basis for deliberate, functional plans, and OPORD development.




Joint Logistics Planning Considerations

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), pp. IV-3 to IV-6.

Figures IV-3 and IV-4 reflect the joint logistics planning process combined with elements of the joint operation planning activities, functions, and products. A means of anticipating future requirements is through the theater logistics analysis (TLA) process supporting TLO development and codification, logistics estimate, and logistics planning process.

Steps I - III (Joint Logistics Planning)

Strategic Guidance/Concept Development/Plan Development



Legend


AOR	area of responsibility	IPR F	plan approval
COA	course of action	J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff
COLS	concept of logistic support	J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency	J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency	J-6	communications systems directorate of a joint staff
DPG	Defense Planning Guidance	J-7	operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint staff
GEF	Guidance for Employment of the Force	JOA	joint operations area
GFMIG	Global Force Management Implementation Guidance	JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
IPR	in-progress review	TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
IPR A	strategic guidance	USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
IPR C	concept development		

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), fig. IV-3, p. IV-5.

Joint Task Forces (JTF)

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jul '12), chap. 1.

A joint task force (JTF) is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single JFC. The JTF establishing authority designates the CJTF, assigns the mission, designates forces, delegates command authorities and relationships, and provides other command and control (C2) guidance necessary for the CJTF to form the joint force and begin operations. The appropriate authority may establish a JTF on a geographic or functional basis or a combination of the two. In either case, the establishing authority typically assigns a joint operations area (JOA) to the JTF. There may also be situations in which a CJTF has a logistics-focused mission. See pp. 1-25 to 1-32 for discussion of considerations for establishing joint forces.



Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, fig. 1-2, p. 1-3.

JTFs can be organized, staffed, and equipped for operations across the full range of military operations. The size, composition, capabilities, and other attributes will vary significantly among JTFs based on the mission and various factors of the operational environment, such as the adversary, the geography of the JOA, the nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to accomplish the mission. CJTFs typically function at the operational level and employ their capabilities in all physical dimensions of their JOA and in the information environment.

The CJTF and staff have a fundamental role in unified action—the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. The JTF may often operate in conjunction with multinational military forces. Even as a US unilateral force a JTF usually will operate with a variety of nonmilitary interorganizational partners.

Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities

Ref: JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* (Jul '12), fig. I-1, pp. I-1 to I-2.

A CJTF has authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and require coordination among subordinate commanders. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Generally, a CJTF should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function as they were designed. The intent is to meet the CJTF's mission requirements while maintaining the functional integrity of Service components. A CJTF may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.

- Appoint the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assign the mission and forces, and exercise command and control of the joint task force (JTF)
 - In coordination with the CJTF, determine the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission
 - Allocate or request forces required
- Provide the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for the directed military operations
- Define the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified)
 - Provide or coordinate communications, personnel recovery, and security for forces moving into or positioned outside the JOA thus facilitating the commander's freedom of action.
- Develop, modify as required, and promulgate to all concerned rules of engagement and rules for the use of force tailored to the situation.
- Monitor the operational situation and keep superiors informed through periodic reports
- Provide guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execute orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements)
- Promulgate changes in plans and modify mission and forces as necessary
- Provide or coordinate administrative and sustainment support
- Recommend to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF
- Establish or assist in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation
- Determine supporting force requirements
 - Prepare a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).
- Approve CJTF plans
- Delegate directive authority for common support capabilities (if required)


V. Centers, Groups, Bureaus, Cells, Offices, Elements, Boards, WGs & Planning Teams

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jul '12), pp. II-10 to II-14.

Cross-Functional Approach to Staff Organization

Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. The most common technique for promoting this cross-functional collaboration is the formation of centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams and other enduring or temporary organizations that manage specific processes and accomplish tasks in support of mission accomplishment. These centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams facilitate planning by the staff, decision-making by the commander, and execution by the HQ. Although cross-functional in their membership, most centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates.

Cross-Functional Staff



Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, fig. II-2, p. II-11.

As a practical matter, the JTF HQ establishes and maintains only those centers, groups, bureaus, cells, offices, elements, boards, WGs, and planning teams that enhance planning and decision-making within the HQ. The HQ establishes, modifies, and dissolves these functional entities as the needs of the HQ evolve.

Center

A center is an enduring functional organization, with supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within JFC's HQ. Often, these organizations have designated locations or facilities. Examples of centers include the JOC and the CMOC.

Group

A group is an enduring functional organization, which is formed to support a broad HQ function within a JFC's HQ. Normally, groups within a JTF HQ consist of one or more planning groups. The planning group manages JTF HQ planning. Functions include:

- Managing designated planning efforts
- Resourcing planning teams
- Coordinating planning activities with other staff directorates
- Managing the subordinate planning teams' conduct of the operational planning process

Functional Component Commands

Ref: JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters* (Jul '12), pp. III-4 to III-5.

CJTFs may normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command typically consists of forces of two or more Military Departments established to perform designated missions.

Example functional component commands include the following:

A. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

The CJTF usually designates a JFACC to establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air operations. A CJTF typically will assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air; however, the JFC always will consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander.

B. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)

When required, the CJTF designates a JFLCC and establishes the commander's authority and responsibilities to exercise C2 over land operations. The designation of a JFLCC typically occurs when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation, and the CJTF determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.

C. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)

The CJTF may designate a JFMCC to C2 joint maritime operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces or assets made available for tasking to perform operational missions. Generally, maritime assets may include navies, marines, expeditionary security

forces, SOF, coast guards and similar border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary shipping managed by the government, civil merchant marines, army/ground forces (normally when embarked), and air and air defense forces operating in the maritime environment.

For further details concerning the JFACC, JFLCC, and JFMCC, refer to JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations; JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations; and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations.


D. Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC)

The CJTF may designate a JFSOCC or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander to accomplish a specific mission or control SOF in the JOA. The JFSOCC generally will be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2. The commander of the theater special operations (SO) command may function as the JSOTF commander or JFSOCC. In certain situations, the JSOTF commander may be appointed by Commander, US Special Operations Command. Normally, the JFSOCC exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached forces. C2 of SOF usually is executed within the SOF chain of command. The JFSOCC allocates forces as a supported or supporting commander based on guidance from the CJTF. When multiple JTFs are established, the theater SO command commander functioning as a JFSOCC may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs and/or a joint SO air component to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTFs SO requirements. The GCC, as the common superior, normally will establish supporting or TACON command relationships between JSOTF commanders and CJTFs.

Joint Planning Group (JPG) Composition

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jul '12), fig. IX-5, p. IX-11.

The JPG is a planning group charged with writing deliberate plans and orders for the JTF as well as for the execution of CAP and writing and developing future plans. To execute either mission, the JPG follows JOPP.



The primary purposes for forming a JPG are to conduct CAP, assist in OPLAN and OPORD development, and perform future planning. As a JPG works through the CAP process towards development of an OPORD, it is important that the head of a JPG devise a system that analyzes COAs. There has to be a synchronization process to ensure that "all parts" of the JTF will work in unison from planning through operations. Early designation of a JTF will facilitate the forming of the JPG and commencement of the planning process.

Information Operations (IO)

Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, *Information Operations* (Nov '14), chap. I & exec. summary.

The instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) provide leaders in the US with the means and ways of dealing with crises around the world. Employing these means in the information environment requires the ability to securely transmit, receive, store, and process information in near real time. The nation's state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of this new technology, and will use **information-related capabilities (IRCs)** to gain advantages in the information environment, just as they would use more traditional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environments. As the strategic environment continues to change, so does **information operations (IO)**.

Based on these changes, the Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO as the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

The Information and Influence Relational Framework and the Application of Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)

IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information environment. The joint force (means) employs IRCs (ways) to affect the information provided to or disseminated from the target audience (TA) in the physical and informational dimensions of the information environment to affect decision making.

The change in the TA conditions, capabilities, situational awareness, and in some cases, the inability to make and share timely and informed decisions, contributes to the desired end state. Actions or inactions in the physical dimension can be assessed for future operations. The employment of IRCs is complemented by a set of capabilities such as operations security (OPSEC), information assurance (IA), counterdeception, physical security, electronic warfare (EW) support, and electronic protection. These capabilities are critical to enabling and protecting the JFC's C2 of forces.

The relational framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization of IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of TAs to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective.

See following pages for further discussion of the relational framework and the IRCs.

Information Operations (IO)

Joint force commanders (JFCs) may establish an IO staff to provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates and supporting organizations on all aspects of IO. Most combatant commands (CCMDs) include an IO staff to serve as the focal point for IO. Faced with an ongoing or emerging crisis within a geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) area of responsibility, a JFC can establish an IO cell to provide additional expertise and coordination across the staff and interagency.

IO is not about ownership of individual capabilities but rather the use of those capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect. There are many military capabilities that contribute to IO and should be taken into consideration during the planning process. These include: strategic communication, joint interagency coordination group, public affairs, civil-military operations, cyberspace operations (CO), information assurance, space operations, military information support operations (MISO), intelligence, military deception, operations security, special technical operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, and key leader engagement.

I. The Information and Influence Relational Framework and the IRCs

Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, *Information Operations* (Nov '14), pp. I-8 to I-10.

Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)

IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information environment. They affect the ability of the target audience (TA) to collect, process, or disseminate information before and after decisions are made. The TA is the individual or group selected for influence. The joint force (means) employs IRCs (ways) to affect the information provided to or disseminated from the TA in the physical and informational dimensions of the information environment to affect decision making.

The change in the target audience (TA) conditions, capabilities, situational awareness, and in some cases, the inability to make and share timely and informed decisions, contributes to the desired end state. Actions or inactions in the physical dimension can be assessed for future operations. The employment of IRCs is complemented by a set of capabilities such as operations security (OPSEC), information assurance (IA), counterdeception, physical security, electronic warfare (EW) support, and electronic protection. These capabilities are critical to enabling and protecting the JFC's C2 of forces. Key components in this process are:

- **Information.** Data in context to inform or provide meaning for action.
- **Data.** Interpreted signals that can reduce uncertainty or equivocality.
- **Knowledge.** Information in context to enable direct action. Knowledge can be further broken down into the following:
 - **Explicit Knowledge.** Knowledge that has been articulated through words, diagrams, formulas, computer programs, and like means.
 - **Tacit Knowledge.** Knowledge that cannot be or has not been articulated through words, diagrams, formulas, computer programs, and like means.
- **Influence.** The act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a TA.
- **Means.** The resources available to a national government, non-nation actor, or adversary in pursuit of its end(s). These resources include, but are not limited to, public- and private-sector enterprise assets or entities.
- **Ways.** How means can be applied, in order to achieve a desired end(s). They can be characterized as persuasive or coercive.
- **Information-Related Capabilities.** Tools, techniques, or activities using data, information, or knowledge to create effects and operationally desirable conditions within the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment.
- **Target Audience.** An individual or group selected for influence.
- **Ends.** A consequence of the way of applying IRCs.
- Using the framework, the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment provide access points for influencing TAs.

The first step in achieving an end(s) through use of the information-influence relational framework is to identify the TA. Once the TA has been identified, it will be necessary to develop an understanding of how that TA perceives its environment, to include analysis of TA rules, norms, and beliefs. Once this analysis is complete, the application of means available to achieve the desired end(s) must be evaluated. Such means may include (but are not limited to) diplomatic, informational, military, or economic actions, as well as academic, commercial, religious, or ethnic pronouncements. When the specific means or combinations of means are determined, the next step is to identify the specific ways to create a desired effect.


I. Integrating / Coordinating Functions of IO

Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, Information Operations (Nov '14), chap. II.

This section addresses how the integrating and coordinating functions of IO help achieve a JFC's objectives. Through the integrated application of IRCs, the relationships that exist between IO and the various IRCs should be understood in order to achieve an objective.

I. Information Operations and the Information-Influence Relational Framework

Influence is at the heart of diplomacy and military operations, with integration of IRCs providing a powerful means for influence. The relational framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization of IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of TAs to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective. Using this description, the following example illustrates how IRCs can be employed to create a specific effect against an adversary or potential adversary.



Ref: JP 3-13 (with change 1), Information Operations, fig. II-3, p. II-6.

II. The IO Assessment Process

Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, Information Operations (Nov '14), fig. IV-1, p. IV-3.

Integrating the employment of IRCs with other lines of operation is a unique requirement for joint staffs and is a discipline that is comparatively new. The variety of IRCs is broad, with specific capabilities having unique purposes and focus. For example, an EW asset may be able to focus on disrupting a very specific piece of adversary hardware while a team from the Army's military information support groups may sit down with the former president of a country to convince him to communicate a radio message to the people. The broad range of information-related activities occurring across the three dimensions of the information environment (physical, informational, and cognitive) demand a specific, validated, and formal assessment process to determine whether these actions are contributing towards the fulfillment of an objective. With the additional factor that some actions result in immediate effect (e.g., jamming a radio frequency or entire band [frequency modulation]) and others may take years or generations to fully create (e.g., eliminating police extortion of tourists), the assessment process must be able to report incremental effects in each dimension. In particular, when assessing the effect of an action or series of actions on behavior, the effects may need to be measured in terms such as cognitive, affective, and action or behavioral. Put another way, we may need to assess how a group thinks, feels, and acts, and whether those behaviors are a result of our deliberate actions intended to produce that effect, an unintended consequence of our actions, a result of another's action or activity, or a combination of all of these. A solution to these assessment requirements is the eight-step assessment process identified in Figure VI-1, below.

IO Assessment Framework

Step 1	Analyze the information environment
Step 2	Integrate information operations assessment into plans and develop the assessment plan
Step 3	Develop information operations assessment information requirements and collection plans
Step 4	Build/modify information operations assessment baseline
Step 5	Coordinate and Execute Information Operations and Coordinate Intelligence Collection Activities
Step 6	Monitor and collect focused information environment data for information operations assessment
Step 7	Analyze information operations assessment data
Step 8	Report assessment results and make recommendations

Ref: JP 3-13 (with change 1), Information Operations, fig. VI-1, p. VI-3.

Multinational Operations

Ref: JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Jul '13), chap. I and executive summary.

Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Two primary forms of multinational partnership that the joint force commander (JFC) will encounter are an alliance or a coalition.

Alliance

An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

Coalition

A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action.

Coalitions are typically ad hoc, formed by different nations, often with different objectives, usually for a single event or for a longer period while addressing a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.

I. Strategic Context

Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns as they seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and disaster relief operations, and engage in peace operations (PO). Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence multinational operations and participation. However, a nation's decision to employ military capabilities is always a political decision.

US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). These operations could span the range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of US Government (USG) departments and agencies, foreign military forces, local authorities, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The move to a more comprehensive approach toward problem solving, particularly in regard to counterinsurgency or stability operations, increases the need for coordination and synchronization among military and nonmilitary entities.



Refer to TAA2: *Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook* (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16), Interorganizational Cooperation (JP 3-08), and more.

I. Multinational Command & Coordination

Ref: JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Jul '13), chap. II.

I. Command and Control of U.S. Forces in Multinational Operations

Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command.

National Command

As Commander in Chief, the President always retains and cannot relinquish national command authority over US forces. National command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment of, and protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time.

Multinational Command

Command authority for an MNFC is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. In making a decision regarding an appropriate command relationship for a multinational military operation, national leaders should carefully consider such factors as mission, nature of the OE, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE). US commanders will maintain the capability to report to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. For matters that are potentially outside the mandate of the mission to which the President has agreed or illegal under US or international law, US commanders will normally first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign commander. If issues remain unresolved, the US commanders refer the matters to higher US authorities.

II. Unified Action

Unified action during multinational operations involves the synergistic application of all instruments of national and multinational power; it includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. This concept is applicable at all levels of command. In a multinational environment, unified action synchronizes, coordinates, and/or integrates multinational operations with the operations of other HN and national government agencies, IGOs (e.g., UN), NGOs, and the private sector in an attempt to achieve unity of effort in the operational area (OA). When working with NATO forces, it can also be referred to as a comprehensive approach. Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations. This is one of the major characteristics of operating in the multinational environment.

III. Multinational Force (MNF)


Multinational Force Commander (MNFC) is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the MNFC's command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements. This authority can vary widely and may be limited by national caveats of those nations participating in the operation. The MNFC's primary duty is to unify the efforts of the MNF toward common objectives. An operation could have numerous MNFCs.

Interorganizational Cooperation

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Oct '16), chap. I.

JP 3-08 describes the joint force commander's (JFC's) coordination with various external organizations that may be involved with, or operate simultaneously with, joint operations. This coordination includes the Armed Forces of the United States; United States Government (USG) departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector. Interagency coordination describes the interaction between USG departments and agencies and is a subset of interorganizational cooperation.

Interorganizational Cooperation Relationships



Ref: JP 3-08, fig. I-1, *Interorganizational Cooperation Relationships*.

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational cooperation across a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interest, structures, and authorities. The terms "interagency" and "interorganizational" do not define structures or organizations, but rather describe processes occurring among various separate entities.

III. US Government Department and Agency Coordination

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Oct '16), pp. 1-12 to 1-14.

One difficulty of coordinating operations among USG departments and agencies is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among them when habitual relationships are not established. Organizational differences exist between the US military and USG departments' and agencies' hierarchies, particularly at the operational level. In defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), military forces may not be familiar with existing structures for disaster response. In foreign operations, existing structures may be limited or not exist at all. Further, overall lead authority in a crisis response and limited contingency operation is likely to be exercised not by the GCC, but by a US ambassador, COM (usually, but not always, the ambassador), or other senior civilian who will provide policy and goals for all USG departments and agencies. When a disaster is declared, the DOS geographic bureau of the affected area becomes the key participating bureau.

Relative Organizational Structures (Levels)

Levels of Decision Making	United States Executive Departments and Agencies
National Strategic	National Security Council Secretary of Defense Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretaries of State, Homeland Security, etc. United States Agency for International Development administrator
Theater Strategic	Combatant Commander Ambassador Chief of Mission Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administrator
Operational	Joint Task Force Defense Coordinating Officer Embassy Country Team staffs FEMA region directors Federal coordinating officers
Tactical	Task Force or Service Component Commander Agency Field Representatives (e.g., Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance disaster assistance response team) Domestic response teams

Ref: JP 3-08, fig. 1-2. *Relevant United States Agency Organizational Structures Levels.*

Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent organizations. Physical or virtual interagency teaming initiatives, such as joint interagency task forces (JIATFs), joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs), or routine interagency video teleconferences, improve reachback and expedite decision making. Figure 1-2 depicts comparative organizational structures in the context of four levels of decision making.

Key Coordination Terms

The following terms are a range of interactions that occur among stakeholders. The following descriptions provide a baseline for common understanding.

- **Collaboration** is a process where organizations work together to attain common goals by sharing knowledge, learning, and building consensus.
- **Compromise** is a settlement of differences by mutual concessions without violation of core values; an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing positions, by reciprocal modification of an original position. Compromise should not be regarded in the context of win/lose.
- **Consensus** is a general or collective agreement, accord, or position reached by a group as a whole. It implies a serious consideration of every group member's position and results in a mutually acceptable outcome even if there are differences among parties.
- **Cooperation** is the process of acting together for a common purpose or mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between organizations. It is the alternative to working separately in competition. Cooperation with other departments and agencies does **not** require giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.
- **Coordination** is the process of organizing a complex enterprise in which numerous organizations are involved, and bringing their contributions together to form a coherent or efficient whole.
- **Synchronization** is the process of planning when and how—across time and space—stakeholders will apply their resources in a sequenced fashion.

Key Considerations

Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission analysis. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), structures are established at the CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), task force, and Service component levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. The crux of interorganizational cooperation is understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive.

Organizational Environments

Sharing information among department and agency participants is critical to ensure no participant is handicapped by a lack of situational awareness, uncertainties are reduced as much as possible, and interagency decision making is empowered by a common operational picture. Common unifying goals should be clarified with a discussion on the way to achieve them based upon the roles and responsibilities of each organization with their assigned resources.

Commander's Communication Synchronization (CCS)

The USG uses strategic guidance and direction to coordinate use of the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. Commander's communication guidance is a fundamental component of national security direction.

See pp. 3-50 to 3-51 for further discussion.

Cyberspace Considerations

Access to the Internet provides adversaries the capability to compromise the integrity of US critical infrastructures/key resources in direct and indirect ways. Threats to all interorganizational networks present a significant risk to national security and global military missions.

I. Joint Planning Considerations

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Oct '16), chap. II.

USG organizations working to achieve national security objectives require increased and improved communications and coordination. This section provides a frame of reference that reflects all levels of interorganizational involvement.

Joint Planning

Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission analysis. Where direct participation is not feasible, joint planners should consider the activities and interests of external stakeholders that affect the command's mission. The CDR, through the campaign plan, works with civilian organizations to build annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the joint plan. Emphasis should be placed on operationalizing the theater TCP or functional campaign plan (FCP) to facilitate cooperation among all partners, awareness of non-partners, and collective problem framing and synchronization of the CDR's campaign plan with other interagency planning products. Subordinate JFCs leverage the planning efforts of the CCMD while also building civilian organization participation into their plan and participate in integrated planning with the embassies. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), structures are established at the CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), task force, and Service component levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This section identifies tools for the commander to facilitate interorganizational cooperation in domestic or foreign operations.

I. Whole-of-Government Approach

A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of USG departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of USG capabilities and resources that could be directed toward the strategic objectives in support of US regional goals as they align with global security priorities. Commanders integrate the expertise and capabilities of participating USG departments and agencies, within the context of their authorities, to accomplish their missions.

Whole-of-government planning refers to NSC-sponsored processes by which multiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address challenges to national interests. Whole-of-government planning is distinct from the contributions of USG departments and agencies to DOD planning, which remains a DOD responsibility.

Planning and consulting with stakeholders optimizes the instruments of national power to achieve operational objectives and attain strategic end states in support of US regional goals in support of global security priorities.

USG civilian departments and agencies have different cultures and capacities, and understand planning differently. Many organizations do not conduct operational planning. To compensate for these differences, commanders should ensure joint force organization initiatives and broader interagency processes help sustain civilian presence in military planning.

II. Domestic Considerations

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Oct '16), chap. III.

I. Key Government Stakeholders

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our borders, enforcing and administering immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters. Within DOD, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has overall authority and is the President's principal advisor on military matters concerning use of federal forces in homeland defense (HD) and defense support to civil authority (DSCA). CNGB is SecDef's principal advisor, through the CJCS, for non-federalized NG forces. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security) (ASD[HD&GS]) serves as the principal staff assistant delegated the authority to manage and coordinate HD and DSCA functions at the SecDef level.

The two CCMDs with major HD and DSCA missions are United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), as their AORs include the US and its territories. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM HD missions include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the US, its territories, and interests within the assigned AOR; and, as directed by the President or SecDef, provide DSCA.

These geographic CCMDs may also have senior DHS representatives and a NG representative assigned as advisors. The senior DHS representative advises the commander and staff on HS and DSCA issues and requirements, and facilitates information sharing, coordination, and collaboration between the command and the operational agencies of DHS (e.g., FEMA, US Customs and Border Protection [CBP], and United States Coast Guard [USCG]).

II. State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Considerations

When a disaster threatens or occurs, a governor may request federal assistance. If DOD support is required and approved as part of that federal assistance, then DOD may execute mission assignments in support of the primary federal agency that often result in a wide range of assistance to local, tribal, territorial, and state authorities. Incidents can have a mix of public health, economic, social, environmental, criminal, and political implications with potentially serious long-term effects. Significant incidents require a coordinated response across organizations and jurisdictions, political boundaries, sectors of society, and multiple organizations.

Federal law, as codified in Title 10 and Title 32, USC, creates distinct mechanisms for local and state authorities to request NG forces or resources. Local and state authorities may also request federal forces (active and reserve) under Title 10, USC, authority for a contingency response. The NG of the US is administered by the NGB, which is a joint activity under DOD and provides communication for NG to DOD to support unified action. The NG active, reserve framework is built on mechanisms that coordinate among federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats and natural disasters. NG forces operate under state active duty, Title 32, USC, or federal active duty, Title 10, USC, depending on activation status.

to be the lead for the federal response; however, this would only happen in extraordinary situations and would involve other DOD core mission areas. US federal and NG forces may also support state, territorial, local, or tribal activities. Commanders and staffs at all levels must understand the relationships, both statutory and operational, among all USG departments and agencies involved in the operation. It is equally important to understand DOD's role in supporting other USG departments and agencies. DOD can provide assistance to the primary agency as authorized by SecDef or the President.

Military commanders are authorized to take action under immediate response authority in certain circumstances. In response to a RFA from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority, DOD officials (i.e., military commanders, heads of DOD components, and responsible DOD civilian officials) may provide an immediate response by temporarily employing the resources under their control—subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher HQ—to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the US.

Military forces may also help DOJ or other federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies (LEAs) when requirements are met. This includes military assistance in response to civil disturbances. In addition to emergency or disaster assistance, other USG departments and agencies may request DOD assistance as part of HS. Military commanders should review, with legal counsel, each request for domestic aid for statutory compliance, especially for law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. SecDef must personally approve any request to assist LEAs in preplanned national events. Requests for DOD assets in support of law enforcement require careful review during planning to ensure DOD support conforms to law and policy and does not degrade the mission capability of CDRs. The US Constitution, federal laws, and USG policies and regulations restrict domestic military operations. Requests for DOD assistance should be coordinated with the supporting organization's legal counsel or SJA.

CBRN Response

Supporting CBRN missions requires a number of specialized capabilities. These capabilities may be required to support civil authorities as part of efforts ranging from the prevention of an attack to technical nuclear forensics to support attribution. For example, the 2011 Interagency Domestic Radiological/Nuclear Search Plan specifies that DOD maintains an operational radiological/nuclear search capability. Additionally, managing the consequences of a CBRN incident is a USG effort.

*Refer to our series of related **Homeland Defense & DSCA, Counterterrorism, and Disaster Response SMARTbooks** for further discussion. The US Armed Forces have a historic precedent and enduring role in supporting civil authorities during times of emergency, and this role is codified in national defense strategy as a primary mission of DOD. In the past decade alone, natural disasters of considerable severity resulted in 699 Presidential Disaster Declarations, an average of nearly six per month. Disaster management (or emergency management) is the term used to designate the efforts of communities or businesses to plan for and coordinate all the personnel and materials required to mitigate or recover from **natural or man-made disasters, or acts of terrorism.***



III. Foreign Considerations

Ref: JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation (Oct '16), chap. IV.

Within the executive branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external political-military relationships with overall US foreign policy. US-AID is the lead agency for overseas development and disaster response and carries out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance.

I. USG Structure in Foreign Countries

A. The Diplomatic Mission

The United States Government (USG) has bilateral diplomatic relations with almost all of the world's independent states. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established IAW the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a party.

Missions are organized under DOS regional and functional bureaus. The boundaries for the DOS regions roughly approximate those of the CCMDs and therefore geographic and functional seams must be addressed and managed. DOS provides the core staff of a diplomatic mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG departments and agencies in the country. A diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times another person designated by the President, or the chargé d'affaires (the chargé) when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM.

For countries with which the US has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of another country represents US interests and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees. In countries where an international organization is headquartered, the US may have a multilateral mission to the international organization in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country.

See following pages (pp. 8-20 to 8-21) for an overview and further discussion

B. Combatant Commands (CCMDs)

USG departments and agencies augment CCMDs to help integrate the instruments of national power in plans. GCCs, functional CCDRs, and, increasingly, JTF commanders are assigned a POLAD by DOS. POLADs are senior DOS officers (often flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to senior US military leaders and commanders, and they provide policy analysis and insight regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders' duties. The POLAD is directly responsible to the CCDR or CJTF. They do not serve as DOS representatives.

See following pages (pp. 8-20 to 8-21) for an overview and further discussion.

Crisis Action Organization

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Cooperation* (Oct '16), pp. IV-15 to IV-19.

The combatant command crisis action organization is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the CCDR. Activation of other crisis action cells to administer the specific requirements of task force operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional requirements of the JTF such as logistics, but also coordination of military and nonmilitary activities and the establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination. Liaison and coordinating mechanisms that the CCDR may elect to establish to facilitate the synchronization of military and nonmilitary activities include:

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST)

Early in crisis response planning, an assessment can help identify resources to immediately mitigate a humanitarian crisis. The supported CCDR may organize and deploy a HAST to acquire information for planning. This assessment should analyze existing conditions and recommend FHA force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should review the current threat assessment; current intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and embassy, DOS, and USAID POCs. The disaster assistance response team (DART) and USAID mission can provide some of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST can assess the HN government's capabilities, identify primary POCs, determine the threat, survey facilities that may be used for FP purposes, and coordinate support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. If dislocated civilians are an element of the crisis, the DOS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), International Organization for Migration (IOM), or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) can also be resources. The HAST works closely with the DART to prevent duplication of effort. Unlike the DART, which assesses overall humanitarian conditions and requirements in the affected country, the HAST focuses its efforts to assess the opportunities and conditions to provide specific military support to civilian agencies.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

USAID, through its OFDA DART, is the lead agency for foreign disaster response. USAID/OFDA may deploy a DART into the crisis area to coordinate the FHA effort and activate an on-call, Washington, DC-based response management team. The DART links the geographic CCMD and USG departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs that participate in FHA operations. The DART team leader represents the USG response and may be supported by DOD. In addition to personnel from OFDA and other parts of USAID, the DART may include liaisons from DOS, parts of DOD (e.g., US Army Corps of Engineers), or other USG departments and agencies (e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC]), depending on the nature of the response. DARTs provide specialists in a variety of DR skills to help US embassies and USAID missions manage the USG response to foreign disasters. DARTs assess the disaster situation and recommend follow-up actions.

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)

The supported GCC may establish a HACC to plan and coordinate with interagency partners. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or civilian HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions transition to one or both of these organizations. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, a USAID/OFDA advisor or liaison, a PA officer, an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (e.g., preventive medicine physician, veterinarian).



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


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