
Foreign Train, Advise & Assist

Second Edition with Change 1 (Sept 2017)

The Lightning Press
Norman M Wade


Copyright © 2016 Norman M. Wade

All Rights Reserved
No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or other means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval systems, without permission in writing by the publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to The Lightning Press.

Notice of Liability
The information in this SMARTbook and quick reference guide is distributed on an “As Is” basis, without warranty. While every precaution has been taken to ensure the reliability and accuracy of all data and contents, neither the author nor The Lightning Press shall have any liability to any person or entity with respect to liability, loss, or damage caused directly or indirectly by the contents of this book. If there is a discrepancy, refer to the source document. This SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive information restricted from public release.

“The views presented in this publication are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Defense or its components.”

SMARTbook is a trademark of The Lightning Press.

Photo Credits. Cover: Marines with 3rd Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company and Japanese soldiers coordinate plans during a combined arms shoot with naval gunfire, attack rotary aircraft and 120mm mortars at San Clemente Island, California, Sept. 1, 2015. ANGLICO Marines and Japanese soldiers conducted the live-fire shoot as part of Exercise Dawn Blitz 2015 (USMC Photo/Released). Other photos courtesy of the Dept of Defense and Dept of Army.

Printed and bound in the United States of America.

View, download FREE samples and purchase online:

www.TheLightningPress.com
Throughout U.S. history, U.S. forces have learned that military force alone cannot secure sustainable peace. U.S. forces can only achieve sustainable peace through a comprehensive approach in which military objectives nest in a larger cooperative effort of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, the private sector, and the host nation.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and stability missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. Use of joint capabilities in these and related activities such as security force assistance and foreign internal defense helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

Stability operations are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Peace Operations are crisis response and limited contingency operations conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.

A counterinsurgency campaign is a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires military forces to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies and to be nation builders as well as warriors.

Civil-military operations are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.

SMARTbooks - DIME is our DOMAIN!
SMARTbooks: Reference Essentials for the Instruments of National Power (D-I-M-E: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic)! Recognized as a "whole of government" doctrinal reference standard by military, national security and government professionals around the world, SMARTbooks comprise a comprehensive professional library designed with all levels of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians in mind.

SMARTbooks can be used as quick reference guides during actual operations, as study guides at education and professional development courses, and as lesson plans and checklists in support of training. Visit www.TheLightningPress.com!
The following references were used to compile TAA2: The Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. All references are considered public domain, available to the general public, and designated as "approved for public release; distribution is unlimited." TAA2: The Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. does not contain classified or sensitive material restricted from public release.

**Joint Publications (JPs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JP 3-0*</th>
<th>Jan 2017</th>
<th>Joint Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-07*</td>
<td>Aug 2016</td>
<td>Stability Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-07.3</td>
<td>Aug 2012</td>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-08*</td>
<td>Oct 2016</td>
<td>Interorganizational Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-16</td>
<td>Jul 2013</td>
<td>Multinational Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-20*</td>
<td>May 2017</td>
<td>Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-22</td>
<td>Jul 2010</td>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-24</td>
<td>Nov 2013</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 3-57</td>
<td>Sept 2013</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP 5-0*</td>
<td>Jun 2017</td>
<td>Joint Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDN 1-13*</td>
<td>Apr 2013</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs) and Army Doctrinal Reference Publications (ADRPs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADRP 3-07</th>
<th>Sept 2012</th>
<th>Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRP 5-0</td>
<td>Mar 2012</td>
<td>The Operations Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Army Techniques Publications (ATPs) and Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ATTPs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ATP 3-07.5</th>
<th>Aug 2012</th>
<th>Stability Techniques</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATP 3-07.31</td>
<td>Nov 2014</td>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP 3-57.70</td>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Field Manuals (FMs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FM 3-07</th>
<th>Jun 2014</th>
<th>Stability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-07.1</td>
<td>May 2009</td>
<td>Security Force Assistance (rescinded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-07.31</td>
<td>Oct 2003</td>
<td>Peace Operations (rescinded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-22</td>
<td>Jan 2013</td>
<td>Army Support to Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM 3-24</td>
<td>May 2014</td>
<td>Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* New/updated since last publication.

---


Find this and other SMARTbooks at [www.TheLightningPress.com](http://www.TheLightningPress.com)
The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

I. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO) .................................................. 1-1*

II. Military Operations and Related Missions, Tasks and Actions .................. 1-2*

I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence ....1-3*

The Conflict Continuum .................................................................................... 1-5*

II. Other Considerations ................................................................................... 1-12*

II. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations ......1-13*

I. Typical Crisis Response Operations .......................................................... 1-14*

II. Unique Considerations .............................................................................. 1-16*

III. Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) ...... 1-18*

III. Large-Scale Combat Operations ......................................................... 1-19*

I. Considerations for Deterrence ................................................................. 1-20*

- Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) and Flexible Response Options (FROs) 1-24*

III. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative ............................................... 1-22*

III. Considerations for Dominance ............................................................... 1-26*

V. Considerations for Stabilization ............................................................... 1-27*

VI. Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority ......................................... 1-27*

Table of Contents-1
Train, Advise & Assist (Overview) ................................. 2-1*
  Security Relationships .................................................. 2-1*
 I. Security Cooperation .................................................. 2-1*
 II. Security Cooperation Activities ................................... 2-1a*
 III. Integrated Security Cooperation Activities .................... 2-2*
 IV. Security Cooperation Purposes ................................... 2-3*

I. Security Force Assistance (SFA) .................................. 2-5*
  I. Security Force Assistance (SFA) Tasks ......................... 2-5*
    A. Organize ................................................................. 2-5*
    B. Train ................................................................. 2-6*
    C. Equip .................................................................. 2-8*
    D. Rebuild and Build .................................................. 2-8*
    E. Advise and Assist ................................................... 2-8*
 II. Security Force Assistance (SFA) Activities ..................... 2-7*
 III. Types of Security Force Assistance (SFA) ....................... 2-9*
    A. Advising ................................................................ 2-9*
    B. Partnering ............................................................. 2-9*
    C. Augmenting .......................................................... 2-9*
 IV. The Advisor ............................................................ 2-10*

II. Foreign Internal Defense (FID/IDAD) ....................... 2-11
  I. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) ................................. 2-11
    - The Foreign Internal Defense Framework ................. 2-12
    - Foreign Internal Defense Coordination ..................... 2-13
  II. Internal Defense & Development (IDAD) ..................... 2-15
  III. Foreign Internal Defense Within the Range of Military Operations ........................................ 2-16
    A. Indirect Support ...................................................... 2-17
    B. Direct Support Not Involving Combat Operations .......... 2-17
    C. Combat Operations .................................................. 2-17
    D. Transition and Redeployment ................................... 2-19
  IV. Planning for Foreign Internal Defense ......................... 2-18
  V. Foreign Internal Defense Training ............................. 2-19
    A. Training and Advising ............................................. 2-19
    B. FID Training Plan .................................................... 2-21
    C. Trainer/Advisor Checklists ........................................ 2-22
    D. Executing the FID Mission ......................................... 2-24
  VI. Embassy and Security Cooperation Working Relationships ........................................ 2-26

III. Understanding Culture ............................................... 2-27
  I. Understanding Culture ............................................. 2-27
    - Culture Influences How People View Their World ........ 2-28
    - Culture is Holistic .................................................. 2-28
    - Culture is Learned and Shared .................................... 2-29
    - Culture is Created by People and Can Change ............... 2-29
  II. Assessing a Cultural Situation .................................... 2-30
    - Cultural Assessments ............................................... 2-31
    - Key Leader Engagements (KLE) ................................. 2-31
  III. Organizing to Understand Culture ........................... 2-33
    A. Green Cell and Cultural Advisors ............................. 2-33
    B. Human Terrain System ............................................ 2-34
### IV. Working with Host-Nation Forces

#### I. Assessing & Developing a Host-Nation Force
- Competence ......................................................... 2-36
- Capability ......................................................... 2-36
- Commitment ...................................................... 2-36
- Confidence ......................................................... 2-36

#### II. Multinational Relationships
- Parallel .............................................................. 2-40
- Lead Nation ....................................................... 2-41
- Partnered .......................................................... 2-41
- Integrated .......................................................... 2-41
- Advising ............................................................. 2-41

### V. Developing Host-Nation Security Forces

#### I. Phases in Development of HN Forces
- Phase I - Planning and Resourcing .................. 2-43
- Phase II - Generating the HN Security Force .... 2-44
- Phase III - Employment of the HN Security Force 2-44
- Phase IV - Transition Responsibility to HN Security Force 2-44
- Phase V - Sustainment ..................................... 2-46

#### II. Security Cooperation Planning ..................... 2-45

#### III. Parallel Planning ......................................... 2-47

#### IV. Host-Nation Contributions ......................... 2-48

### VI. Working Effectively with Foreign Security Forces

#### I. Relationship Building ................................. 2-49

#### II. Rapport ...................................................... 2-49
- Building Rapport ............................................. 2-50
- Understanding ................................................ 2-50
- Respect .......................................................... 2-50
- Trust ............................................................... 2-52

#### III. Types of Skills Needed .............................. 2-52
- Hard Skills ....................................................... 2-52
- Soft Skills ........................................................ 2-52
- Communication .............................................. 2-53

#### IV. Cross-Cultural Negotiation ......................... 2-54

### VII. Conflict Resolution & Meetings

#### I. Negotiations ................................................. 2-56

#### II. Mediation .................................................... 2-57

#### III. Arbitration .................................................. 2-62

#### Setting Up and Conducting Meetings .......... 2-60

### VIII. Linguist Support/Interpreters

#### Linguist Support Categories ......................... 2-63

#### I. Selecting an Interpreter .............................. 2-64

#### II. Employing Linguists .................................. 2-66

#### III. Establishing Rapport ................................ 2-66

#### IV. Training the Interpreter ............................ 2-67

#### V. Communication Techniques ....................... 2-68

#### VI. Preparing & Conducting Presentations .......... 2-70
Stability in Operations (Actions/Tasks/Efforts) .......... 3-1*

I. Stability in Operations .............................................. 3-1*
II. Stability within the Range of Military Operations .......... 3-2*
III. Understanding Stability ............................................. 3-3*
        - End State Conditions for Stability .................. 3-3a*
IV. Understanding the Root Causes and Immediate Drivers of Instability .......... 3-4*
        A. The Fragile States Framework ......................... 3-6*
        B. Elements of Stable States .............................. 3-6*
        C. Understanding the Immediate Drivers of Stability ........ 3-10*
V. Fundamentals of Stabilization .................................. 3-5*
VI. Principles of Joint Operations to Achieve Stability .......... 3-8*
        - Maintaining Legitimacy .................................. 3-9*
VII. The Stabilization Framework .................................. 3-10*
        A. Initial Response Stage .................................... 3-12*
        B. Transformation Stage ..................................... 3-12*
        C. Fostering Sustainability Stage ......................... 3-12*
VIII. Stability Actions in Other Joint Operations ......... 3-13*
IX. An Integrated Approach (Linking Military and Civilian Activities) .......... 3-14*
        - Stabilization and Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix (ETM) .......... 3-14*
X. A Comprehensive Approach ................................... 3-18*
XI. A Whole of Government Approach ......................... 3-20*

I. Primary Army Stability Tasks ................................. 3-21

I. Primary Army Stability Tasks ................................. 3-21
        A. Establish Civil Security .................................. 3-30
        B. Establish Civil Control ................................... 3-31
        C. Restore Essential Services .............................. 3-32
        D. Support to Governance ................................... 3-34
        E. Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development .......... 3-35
II. Stability Operations (Underlying Logic) ................. 3-22
        - The American Experience with Stability ............... 3-22
III. Joint Stability Functions ....................................... 3-24*
        A. Security ..................................................... 3-25*
        B. Humanitarian Assistance .................................. 3-25*
        C. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure .................. 3-25*
        D. Rule of Law .................................................. 3-25*
        E. Governance and Participation ........................... 3-25*
        * Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS) .............. 3-25*
IV. Department of State Stabilization & Reconstruction Essential Tasks .......... 3-26
        A. Security ..................................................... 3-26
        B. Justice and Reconciliation .................................. 3-27
        C. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being .................. 3-27
        D. Governance and Participation ........................... 3-27
        E. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure .................. 3-27
V. Stability Phases .................................................... 3-29

II. Stability Considerations ....................................... 3-37

I. Military Role in Prevention Activities ....................... 3-37
II. Security Cooperation ............................................ 3-38
III. Peace Operations ................................................ 3-40
III. Stabilization Planning ................................................................. 3-53*
  I. Stabilization Planning ............................................................... 3-53*
  II. Understanding the Operational Environment (OE) .................. 3-54*
      The Operational Environment (OE) in Stabilization Efforts ....... 3-55*
      A. Planning, Execution and Assessment .................................. 3-54*
      B. Establish an Evolving Common Operational Picture (COP) .. 3-56*
      C. Joint Intelligence Preparation of Environment (JIPOE) ....... 3-56*
  III. Planning Stabilization Efforts ............................................... 3-57*
      A. Operational Approach ..................................................... 3-57*
      B. Stability and Defeat Mechanisms ...................................... 3-59*
  IV. Phasing Major Operations and Campaigns ............................. 3-60*
  V. Operational Art and Stability in Operations ............................ 3-62*
      A. End State and Conditions .................................................. 3-62*
      B. Decisive Points ............................................................... 3-63*
      C. Lines of Effort .................................................................. 3-64*
      D. Operational Approach ...................................................... 3-65*
      E. Force Organization ............................................................ 3-66*
      F. Assessment ...................................................................... 3-66*
  VI. Planning Transitions and Transferring Authorities ............... 3-68*

IV. Civil-Military Teaming (PRT/JIACG/JCMOTF/JIATF) ........... 3-69*
  I. Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms ..................................... 3-69*
  II. Civil-Military Integration Structures ....................................... 3-70*

V. Transitional Governing Authorities ......................................... 3-71*
  I. Transitional Military Authority (TMA) .................................... 3-73*
      - Establishing Transitional Military Authority ....................... 3-73*
      - Forms of Transitional Military Authority ............................ 3-75*
      A. Existing Laws, Customs, and Boundaries ......................... 3-72*
      B. Local Government Officials and Departments .................... 3-74*
  II. Interim Civil Authority .......................................................... 3-74*
  IV. Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority ....................... 3-76*

VI. Small Unit Tasks & Activities .................................................. 3-79
  A. Patrolling ............................................................................ 3-81
  B. Observing and Reporting ..................................................... 3-82
  C. Movement Control (Roadblocks and Checkpoints) .................. 3-86
  D. Conducting Searches ......................................................... 3-88
  E. Monitor Compliance with an Agreement ............................... 3-90
  F. Verification of Weapons and Forces ...................................... 3-90
  G. Demilitarization ................................................................. 3-91
  H. Convoy Operations ............................................................. 3-92
  I. Curfews .............................................................................. 3-94
  J. Crowd Control ................................................................. 3-95
  K. Civil Disturbances ............................................................. 3-96
  L. Refugees and Displaced Persons .......................................... 3-98
  M. De-mining and Unexploded Ordnance .................................. 3-98
Chap 4

Peace Operations (PO)

Peace Operations (Overview) ................................................................. 4-1
 I. Types of Peace Operations ................................................................. 4-1
 II. Characteristics of Peace Operations .................................................. 4-3
 III. Legal Basis of Peace Operations ..................................................... 4-4
 IV. The Peace Operations Environment ................................................ 4-4
 V. Command and Control Considerations ............................................. 4-5
 VI. The Planning Process .................................................................... 4-5
 VII. Fundamentals of Peace Operations ............................................... 4-6
 VIII. Transition Planning .................................................................... 4-9
 IX. Key Documents in Peace Operations ............................................... 4-10

I. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) ..................................................... 4-11
 I. Fundamentals of Peacekeeping Operations ........................................ 4-11
 II. Peacekeeping Tasks ........................................................................ 4-12
 III. Employment .................................................................................. 4-14
   A. Assignment to a Specific Operational Area ..................................... 4-14
   B. Rotation among Operational Areas ................................................. 4-14
   C. Separation of Parties to the Dispute .............................................. 4-14

II. Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO) ............................................. 4-15
 I. Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement Operations .............................. 4-15
 II. Peace Enforcement Tasks ................................................................. 4-16
 III. Employment .................................................................................. 4-17
   A. Preparation and Deployment ......................................................... 4-17
   B. Establishment of Presence in the Operational Area ....................... 4-17
   C. Expansion of the Operational Area ............................................... 4-17
   D. Enforcement of the Mandate ......................................................... 4-18
   E. Transition and Redeployment ....................................................... 4-18

III. Peace Building (PB) ........................................................------------ 4-19
 I. Fundamentals of Peace Building ...................................................... 4-19
 II. Peace Building Phases .................................................................... 4-20
 III. Peace Building Mission Sectors ...................................................... 4-20
   A. Security Mission ............................................................................ 4-20
     - Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement (DDRRR) 
   B. Justice and Reconciliation Mission Sector ..................................... 4-22
   C. Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being ................................ 4-24
   D. Governance and Participation ....................................................... 4-24
   E. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Mission .......................... 4-24
   F. Public Diplomacy and Information Operations ............................... 4-24

IV. Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) ................................. 4-25
 V. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques & Procedures .............................. 4-27
 I. Creating a Secure Environment ........................................................ 4-27
 II. Protected Areas ............................................................................... 4-28
 III. Site Security .................................................................................. 4-29
 IV. Separation/Neutralization of Forces (Interpositioning) ..................... 4-30
 V. Nonlethal Weapons (NLW) ............................................................... 4-33
 VI. Search Operations ......................................................................... 4-33
 VII. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) ................................ 4-34

6-Table of Contents
Chap 5

Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN)

Counterinsurgency Operations (Overview) ........................................... 5-1
I. Insurgency .......................................................................................... 5-1
II. Approach to Counterinsurgency .......................................................... 5-2
   U.S. Strategy and Policy ........................................................................ 5-3
      A. Political Control ........................................................................... 5-2
      B. COIN Is Population-Centric .......................................................... 5-4
      C. Assessing Relevant Actors .............................................................. 5-4
      D. Understanding the Operational Environment .................................... 5-4
III. Governance and Legitimacy ............................................................... 5-5
      A. Governance ................................................................................. 5-5
      B. Legitimacy .................................................................................. 5-6
      A Whole-of-Government Effort ........................................................... 5-7
IV. Strategic Principles .......................................................................... 5-8

I. Insurgency Prerequisites & Fundamentals ............................................ 5-11
   I. Nature of Insurgency ....................................................................... 5-11
   II. Prerequisites for Insurgency ............................................................ 5-12
      A. Opportunity .................................................................................. 5-12
      B. Motive ......................................................................................... 5-13
      C. Means ......................................................................................... 5-13
   III. Insurgent Objectives ..................................................................... 5-14
   IV. Insurgent Narrative, Strategy, Dynamics and Organization .............. 5-15
      A. Insurgent Narrative ...................................................................... 5-15
      B. Strategy ....................................................................................... 5-15
      C. Dynamics of Insurgency ................................................................. 5-18
      D. Organization ............................................................................... 5-22
         - Political and Military Components ............................................. 5-22
         - Insurgent Elements ................................................................... 5-23
   V. Other Analytical Frameworks ............................................................ 5-26

II. Insurgency Threat Characteristics ....................................................... 5-27
   I. Disposition and Activities ................................................................. 5-27
      A. Political Activities ........................................................................ 5-27
      B. Population Control ....................................................................... 5-28
      C. Military Tactics ............................................................................ 5-28
      D. Support Activities ....................................................................... 5-28
      E. Associated Threats ...................................................................... 5-31

III. COIN Operational Environment (OE) ................................................ 5-33
   I. Understanding the Operational Environment (OE) ........................... 5-33
   II. Operational Environment in COIN ................................................ 5-33
      A. Components ................................................................................ 5-33
      B. Relevant Actors .......................................................................... 5-33
      C. Physical Factors .......................................................................... 5-34
      D. Information Environment ............................................................. 5-34
   III. Tools & Methods for Understanding the OE .................................... 5-34
      A. Traditional Intelligence Approaches ............................................ 5-34
      B. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance ............................ 5-34
      C. Sociocultural Analysis .................................................................. 5-35
      D. Analytical Frameworks ............................................................... 5-35

Table of Contents-7
IV. Planning for Countering Insurgencies ........................................ 5-39
   I. Joint Operation Planning ....................................................... 5-39
   II. Conceptual Planning ........................................................... 5-40
       - Counterinsurgency Paradoxes ........................................... 5-41
   III. Elements of Operational Design ......................................... 5-42
       A. Termination .................................................................... 5-42
       B. Military End State and Objectives ................................... 5-42
       C. Effects ........................................................................... 5-42
       D. Centers of Gravity (COGs) .............................................. 5-42
       E. Decisive Points ................................................................ 5-43
       F. Direct and Indirect Approaches ....................................... 5-43
       G. Lines of Operation (LOOs) and Lines of Effort (LOEs) ...... 5-44
       H. Anticipation ..................................................................... 5-46
       I. Operational Reach ............................................................ 5-46
       J. Culmination ...................................................................... 5-46
       K. Arranging Operations ....................................................... 5-46
       L. Forces and Functions ......................................................... 5-46
   IV. Military Operational Considerations .................................... 5-48
       Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Interaction Scale 5-49
       A. Negotiation and Diplomacy .............................................. 5-48
       B. Security Cooperation (SC) ................................................ 5-48
       C. Unconventional Warfare (UW) ......................................... 5-50
       D. Counterterrorism ............................................................. 5-51
       E. Counterguerrilla Operations ............................................ 5-52
       F. Stability Operations ........................................................ 5-52
       G. Peace Operations (PO) ...................................................... 5-52
       H. Related Operations ........................................................ 5-52
   IV. Additional Operational Options .......................................... 5-52
       A. Generational Engagement ............................................... 5-53
       B. Limited Support/Light Footprint ....................................... 5-53
       C. Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate (ISI2R) 5-53
       D. Attack the Network (AtN) ................................................ 5-54
       E. Partnering ....................................................................... 5-54
       F. Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Transition (SCHBT) ................ 5-54
   V. Direct Approaches ............................................................... 5-55
       I. Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition Framework ................. 5-56
       II. Other Direct Enablers ....................................................... 5-64
           A. Targeted Threat Infrastructure .................................... 5-64
           B. Strike .......................................................................... 5-64
   VI. Indirect Approaches ............................................................ 5-65
       I. Nation Assistance and Security Cooperation ..................... 5-65
       II. Generational Engagement ............................................... 5-66
       III. Negotiation and Diplomacy ............................................ 5-68
       IV. Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate (ISI2R) 5-59
       V. Other Indirect Enablers ..................................................... 5-74
           - Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations ....................... 5-74
Chap 6  Civil-Military Operations

Civil-Military Operations (Overview) ......................................................... 6-1
  I. Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs, and Unified Action ........ 6-1
  II. CMO and the Range of Military Operations ............................ 6-2
      - Strategic Aspects of Civil-Military Operations ................... 6-3
  III. Civil-Military Operations and the Levels of War ..................... 6-4
  IV. CMO in Joint Operations ......................................................... 6-6

I. Organizing for Civil-Military Operations ......................................... 6-9
  Comparison of Ops and Coordination Centers ................................. 6-9
  A. J-9 CMO Directorate .................................................................. 6-9
  B. Joint Task Force (JTF) ................................................................. 6-10
  C. Joint CMO Task Force (JCMOTF) .............................................. 6-11
  D. Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) .................................... 6-12
  E. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) ............... 6-13
  F. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) .................................. 6-13
  G. Civil-Military Teams ................................................................. 6-16
  H. NATO CIMIC ............................................................................ 6-17
  I. UN Operations ............................................................................. 6-17
  J. Other Organizational Humanitarian Structures ............................ 6-18

II. Civil Affairs Forces & Operations ...................................................... 6-19
  I. Civil Affairs Responsibilities ...................................................... 6-19
  II. Supporting the Operations Process .......................................... 6-20
  III. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) ............................... 6-22
  IV. CMO Campaign Sequence ...................................................... 6-23
  V. Characteristics of Civil Affairs Operations ................................. 6-24
  VI. Civil Affairs Forces ................................................................. 6-26

Chap 7  Multinational Operations

Multinational Operations (Overview) .................................................... 7-1
  I. Strategic Context ......................................................................... 7-1
  II. Security Cooperation (SC) .......................................................... 7-2
  III. Nature of Multinational Operations .......................................... 7-3
  IV. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) ....... 7-4

I. Multinational Command and Coordination ....................................... 7-5
  I. Command and Control of U.S. Forces in Multinational Operations .... 7-5
  II. Unified Action ............................................................................ 7-5
  III. Multinational Force ................................................................. 7-5
  IV. Command Structures of Forces in Multinational Operations ......... 7-6
      A. Integrated Command Structure ............................................. 7-6
      B. Lead Nation Command Structure ...................................... 7-6
      C. Parallel Command Structure ............................................. 7-6
II. Multinational Planning and Execution.................................................7-7
  I. Diplomatic and Military Considerations............................................7-7
  II. Factors in Multinational Participation..............................................7-8
  III. Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force.........................7-10

Chap 8
Interorganizational Cooperation

Interorganizational Cooperation (Overview)........................................8-1*
  I. Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination............................8-2*
  II. Unity of Effort..............................................................................8-2*
  III. US Government Department and Agency Coordination................8-3*
  IV. Coordinating Efforts......................................................................8-4*
    - Applying the Military Component.................................................8-4*
    - Capitalizing on Organizational Diversity......................................8-4*
    - Gathering the Right Resources.....................................................8-5*
    - Identifying Authorities................................................................8-5*
  V. Whole-of-Government Approach....................................................8-6*
  VI. Working Relationships and Practices.............................................8-6*
  VII. Considerations for Effective Cooperation.....................................8-6*

I. Joint Planning Considerations.........................................................8-7*
  I. Whole-of-Government Approach....................................................8-7*
  II. Joint Planning and Interorganizational Coordination......................8-8*
    - The National Security Council (NSC)..........................................8-9*
    A. Plan Development and Coordination...........................................8-10*
    B. Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF)............................8-10*
    C. Annex V (Interagency Coordination)...........................................8-14*
    D. Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG).........................8-14*
  III. Stakeholders..............................................................................8-11*
    A. International Organizations.........................................................8-11*
    B. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)....................................8-11*
    C. The Private Sector.......................................................................8-11*
  IV. Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in the Interagency Process......................8-12*
    - Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)..........................................8-13*
    - Joint Support Force (JSF)............................................................8-13*

II. Foreign Considerations.................................................................8-15*
  I. USG Structure in Foreign Countries...............................................8-15*
    A. The Diplomatic Mission..............................................................8-15*
    B. Combatant Commands (CCMDs).................................................8-15*
  II. Foreign Operations.................................................................8-18*
    A. The Political-Military Dimension.................................................8-18*
    B. Theater or Regional Focus.........................................................8-18*
    C. CCMD Campaign Plans, Crisis Response, and Limited Contingency Operations
    D. Crisis Action Organization..........................................................8-20*
  III. Stakeholders.............................................................................8-19*
  IV. Joint Task Force (JTF) Considerations..........................................8-22*
  V. Civil-Military Teams (JIATFs/PRCs)............................................8-22*
  VI. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC).....................................8-23*
  VII. Aligning Words with Deeds......................................................8-24*

10-Table of Contents
I. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose. The potential range of military activities and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in times of relative peace up through large-scale combat operations.


Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities develop local and regional situational awareness, build networks and relationships with partners, shape the OE, keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict, and maintain US global influence. Many missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as DSCA and FHA, may not require combat. But others, such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be dangerous and may require combat operations to protect US forces.

The complex nature of the strategic environment may require US forces to conduct different types of joint operations and activities simultaneously across the conflict continuum. Although this publication discusses specific types of operations and activities under the various categories in the range of military operations, each type is not doctrinally fixed and could shift within that range.

- **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.** See pp. 1-3 to 1-12.
- **Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations.** See pp. 1-13 to 1-18.
- **Large-Scale Combat Operations.** See pp. 1-19 to 1-30.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!
II. Military Operations and Related Missions, Tasks, and Actions

In general, a military operation is a set of actions intended to accomplish a task or mission. Although the US military is organized, trained, and equipped for sustained, large-scale combat anywhere in the world, the capabilities to conduct these operations also enable a wide variety of other operations and activities. In particular, opportunities exist prior to large-scale combat to shape the OE in order to prevent, or at least mitigate, the effects of war. Characterizing the employment of military capabilities (people, organizations, and equipment) as one or another type of military operation has several benefits. For example, publications can be developed that describe the nature, tasks, and tactics associated with specific types of diverse operations, such as NEO and COIN. These publications provide the basis for related joint training and joint professional military education that help joint forces conduct military operations as effectively and efficiently as possible even in difficult and dangerous circumstances. Characterizations also help military and civilian leaders explain US military involvement in various situations to the US and international public and news media. Likewise, such characterizations, supplemented by operational experience, can clarify the need for specific capabilities that enhance certain operations. For example, facial recognition software associated with biometric capabilities helps military and law enforcement personnel identify terrorists and piece together their human networks as part of combating terrorism.

Military operations are often categorized by their focus, as shown in Figure V-1. In some cases, the title covers a variety of missions, tasks, and activities. Many activities accomplished by single Services, such as tasks associated with security cooperation, do not constitute a joint operation. Nonetheless, most of these occur under a joint “umbrella,” because they contribute to achievement of CCDRs’ TCP objectives.

Examples of Military Operations and Activities

- Stability activities
- Defense support of civil authorities
- Foreign humanitarian assistance
- Recovery
- Noncombatant evacuation
- Peace operations
- Countering weapons of mass destruction
- Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear response
- Foreign internal defense
- Counterdrug operations
- Combating terrorism
- Counterinsurgency
- Homeland defense
- Mass atrocity response
- Security cooperation
- Military engagement

Ref: JP 3-0, fig. V-1. Examples of Military Operations and Activities.

For further discussion and an overview of these types of military operations and activities, see:

- Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. See pp. 1-3 to 1-12.
- Large-Scale Combat Operations. See pp. 1-19 to 1-30.
I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), chap. VI.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support other instruments of national power as represented by interagency partners, as well as cooperate with international organizations (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. This may also involve domestic operations that include supporting civil authorities. These activities generally occur continuously in all GCCs’ AORs regardless of other ongoing joint operations. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities separate from but integrated with the efforts of interorganizational participants. These activities are conducted as part of a CCDR’s routine theater or functional campaign plan and country plan objectives and may support deterrence.

Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of international waters, international airspace, space, and cyberspace. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence help assure operational access for crisis response and contingency operations despite changing US overseas defense posture and the growth of A2/AD capabilities around the globe. The more a GCC can promote favorable access conditions in advance across the AOR and in potential OAs, the better. Relevant activities include KLEs; security cooperation activities, such as bilateral and multinational exercises to improve multinational operations; missions to train, advise, and equip foreign forces to improve their national ability to contribute to access; negotiations to secure basing and transit rights, establish relationships, and formalize support agreements; the use of grants and contracts to improve relationships with and strengthen PNs; and planning conferences to develop multinational plans.

Military Engagement

Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities. GCCs seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and tension. This military engagement increases the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions and may preclude conflict; or, if conflict is unavoidable, allow a more informed USG to enter into it with stronger alliances or coalitions.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!
Security Cooperation

Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN. The policy on which security cooperation is based resides in Presidential Policy Directive-23, Security Sector Assistance. This directive refers to the policies, programs, and activities the US uses to work with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and, enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.

Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping activities and critical aspect of communication synchronization. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation and stability activities by continually employing military forces to complement and support other instruments of national power that typically provide development assistance or humanitarian assistance to PNs. The GCC’s TCP provides a framework within which CCMDs conduct cooperative security cooperation activities and development with PNs. Ideally, security cooperation activities mitigate the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires US military intervention. Security assistance and security force assistance (SFA) normally provide some of the means for security cooperation activities.

Deterrence

Deterrence prevents adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and belief that the cost of the action outweighs the perceived benefits. The nature of deterrent options varies according to the nature of the adversary (e.g., traditional or irregular, state or non-state), the adversary’s actions, US national objectives, and other factors. Deterrence stems from an adversary’s belief that the opponent’s actions have created or can create an unacceptable risk to the adversary’s achievement of objectives (i.e., the contemplated action cannot succeed or the costs are too high). Thus, a potential aggressor chooses not to act for fear of failure, risk, or consequences. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct decisive operations immediately. However, if available forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive operations, they conduct defensive operations while additional forces deploy. Effective deterrence requires a TCP and a coordinated CCS effort that emphasize security cooperation activities with PNs that support US interests, DOD force posture planning, and contingency plans that prove the willingness of the US to employ forces in defense of its interests. Various joint operations (e.g., show of force and enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when necessary. Other TCP actions that help maintain or set the CCDR’s desired conditions support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation and FHA, thus promoting stability. Joint actions such as antiterrorism, DOD support to CD operations, show of force operations, and arms control are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives.

Sustained presence contributes to deterrence and promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can perform as designed. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence involves periodic rotational deployments and redeployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support, and both military-to-military and military-to-civilian contacts. Given their location and knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the first to respond to a crisis.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities provide the foundation of the CCDR’s theater campaign. The goal is to prevent and deter conflict by keeping adversary activities within a desired state of cooperation and competition. The joint operation model described in section V, “Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum,” has limited application with respect to phasing these activities for normal cooperative and competitive environments. Figure VI-1 shows a notional depiction of activities in an environment of cooperation and competition. DOD forces, as part of larger whole-of-government efforts, conduct operations with partners to prevent, deter, or turn back escalatory activity by adversaries.

Ref: JP 3-0, fig. VI-1 The Conflict Continuum.

Global and theater shaping increases DOD’s depth of understanding of an environment, a partner’s viewpoint of that environment, and where the US and PN have common interests. This understanding allows the US, through the relationships that have been developed, to shape the OE. These initiatives help advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts (or limit their severity), and reduce the risk of employing US military forces in a conflict.

In an environment that is more competitive, tensions increase. A partner’s resources can enhance USG understanding of an adversary’s capabilities and intent, and expand options against the adversary. In the best case, conflict can be averted or diminished by coordinated USG/PN action.

Despite the efforts to prevent or mitigate conflict, an armed conflict may occur. As conditions and objectives become more defined, GCCs may transition to the notional phasing construct for execution of a specific contingency operation. However, time spent “to the left” allows DOD to develop a deeper understanding of the environment to see and act ahead of conflict flashpoints, develop options, and maximize the efficiency of resources.
Sample Security Cooperation & Security Assistance Activities

Combined Exercises
Combined exercises and other exercises involving U.S. and foreign militaries are required by law to have each participant pay for its own costs. In some cases, U.S. O&M funds may legally be used for training HN forces when such training tests and evaluates mutual capabilities. Such exercises have a primary benefit to U.S. readiness and use of such funds is not necessarily prohibited. Such O&M-funded training of HN forces may include safety training, familiarization training, and interoperability training.

Conferences and Seminars
Conferences and seminars provide for discussions, interaction, and sometimes policy proposals for U.S. and HN approval.

Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
DCS involve purchases negotiated directly between a friendly government and a U.S. company. Although it must approve the contract, the U.S. government does not guarantee delivery or satisfaction with DCS. Some purchasers prefer to buy major items through DCS and then receive follow-on logistics support through FMS.

Defense Shows and Exhibitions
Defense shows and exhibitions are key opportunities to display U.S. military hardware for potential buyers. A prohibition on direct U.S. military participation was terminated.

Deployment for Training
Deployment for training is usually funded by O&M funds. Its primary benefit is for the U.S. military personnel or unit to perform deployment to a foreign country, perform one of its mission tasks (such as road-building or medical treatment) and redeploy.

Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
The EDA program provides equipment declared excess by DOD to be sold at prices ranging from 5 percent to 50 percent of original cost, or provided as a grant. While Congress has established ceiling amounts and specific country restrictions, exceptions and exemptions still provide significant transfers. Recipient nations pay for all transportation, repairs, and upgrades.

Exchange Programs
Exchange programs are intended to foster understanding and familiarize each force with the capabilities and differences of the other. Programs include Individual Exchange Program, the Personnel Exchange Program (a 1-3 year PCS move) and Reciprocal Unit Exchanges.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
FMF are grants and loans for the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and related training. With almost no exceptions, all of these funds must be spent in the U.S. Despite the term "financing," FMF monies currently are grant funds.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
FMS are government-to-government contracts for the sale of equipment and training. FMS prices include surcharges for the administrative costs of security assistance and the non-recurring costs of research, development, and production. In 1976, Congress required FMS to be used for major items and some special items, reversing a previous preference for DCS. FMS not only includes major defense items of equipment, but also military training.
Humanitarian Assistance
Examples: Protection or support to agencies or organizations providing relief outside the U.S.; humanitarian demining (although the U.S. military rarely actually does demining, it does provide training for demining schools, publicity in local languages, and selected funding for demining groups)

International Military Education and Training (IMET)
IMET provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. The purpose of IMET is to increase mutual understanding, improve management and heighten human rights awareness. Annually, IMET provides programs, including professional military education, to approximately 5,000 students from about 120 countries. In 1991, the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program was implemented to promote professionalism and civilian oversight of the military by providing training and education to host nation civilian officials from ministries of defense and other defense management and resource allocation organizations. Since FY95, E-IMET also has been available to civilians who are not members of the government but are essentially members of non-governmental organizations.

Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET)
U.S. law generally requires the HN to pay for training that benefits its forces. “SOF exception” training, or training provided by U.S. SOF forces to a HN military, are an exception to that rule because some SOF missions require the SOF capability to train foreign forces. Therefore, although primary benefit must be to SOF, and training must not equate or duplicate training purchased or provided by security assistance.

Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP)
JCTP is the program term for small U.S. military liaison teams who are located in and directly assist designated Ministries of Defense with planning and implementing selected TSC activities. The program began in order to accelerate TSC interaction in former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.

Leased Defense Articles (LDA)
The LDA program provides approved nations with U.S. equipment that DOD does not declare excess but certifies as not required for the period of the lease. Recipients, including the UN, generally pay leasing costs including a rental charge for depreciation, transportation fees and any repairs. “No-cost” leases, such as those offered recently for F-16 aircraft, still include payment for transportation and repairs.

Mobile Training Team (MTT)
Security assistance (generally HN) funds provide training, and follow-on logistics support or repair parts to an FMS customer or weapon system logistic office. The primary beneficiary is the HN military.

Regional Study Centers
Regional study centers are educational facilities that include seminars, conferences, and longer courses to increase, educate, and build relationships between military officers in the region. Examples include USEUCOM’s Marshall Center and USPACOM’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Senior Officer Visits
Senior officer visits are highly visible interaction between senior military and civilian leaders to build and enhance personal relationships and increase understanding. Obviously they are an example of informational power as they are publicized and demonstrate U.S. approval and support. They may sometimes be used to express concerns and to influence HN policies.
I. Typical Operations and Activities

Typical operations include: military engagement; emergency preparedness; arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament; counterterrorism; support to CD operations; sanction enforcement; enforcement of exclusion zones; freedom of navigation and overflight; foreign assistance; security assistance; security force assistance; FID; humanitarian assistance programs; protection of shipping; show of force operations; support to insurgency; and COIN.

A. Military Engagement Activities

Numerous routine missions (e.g., security cooperation) and continuing operations or tasks (e.g., freedom of navigation) occur globally on a continuing basis under the general heading of military engagement. These activities build strong relationships with partners, increase regional awareness and knowledge of a PN's capabilities and capacity, and can be used to influence events in a desirable direction. Military engagement activities can also increase understanding of an adversary's capabilities, capacity, and intentions and can provide forewarning of undesirable events. In some cases, what begins as a military engagement activity (e.g., limited support to COIN through a security assistance program) can expand to a limited contingency operation or even a major operation when the President commits US forces. Military engagement activities are generally governed by various directives and agreements and do not require a joint OPLAN or OPORD for execution.

B. Emergency Preparedness

Emergency preparedness consists of measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. At the strategic level, emergency preparedness encompasses those planning activities, such as continuity of operations and continuity of government, undertaken to ensure DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and SecDef in a designated national security emergency.

- **Continuity of operations** ensures continuous conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission supporting the national strategy. Continuity of operations includes the functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others under the authority and direction of the commander. If the President directs, DOD may be tasked with additional missions relating to emergency preparedness.

- **Continuity of government** involves a coordinated effort within each USG branch (executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the capability to continue minimum essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic emergency.

C. Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament

Arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament are not synonymous. The following are examples of US military personnel involvement in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament activities: verifying an arms control treaty; seizing and securing WMD; escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (e.g., enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; conducting and hosting site inspections; participating in military data exchanges; implementing armament reductions; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons and hazardous material.
II. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Ops

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ’17), chap. VII.

Crisis response and limited contingency operations typically are focused in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational-level objective in an OA. They may be conducted as a stand-alone response to a crisis (e.g., NEO) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex operation. Joint forces conduct crisis response and limited contingency operations to achieve operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives.

CCDRs plan for various situations that require military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or other contingencies and crises as directed by appropriate authority. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Limited contingency operations ensure the safety of US citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving the ability to operate with multinational partners to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities operating in close cooperation with interorganizational participants. APEX integrates crisis action and deliberate planning into one unified construct to facilitate unity of effort and transition from planning to execution.

Initial Response

When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs employ joint forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to train in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (e.g., Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is within US territory (e.g., natural or man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces will conduct DSCA and HD operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective early intervention can also deny an adversary time to set conditions in their favor, achieve destabilizing objectives, or mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made disaster. Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in deterring or blocking aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Achieving successful deterrence involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force is able to conduct decisive operations and the national leadership is willing to employ that force and to deploy more forces if necessary.

Strategic Aspects

Two important aspects about crisis response and foreign limited contingency operations stand out. First, understanding the strategic objective helps avoid actions that may have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not uncommon in some operations, such as peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions that have significant strategic implications. Second, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also in strategic objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious. Therefore, commanders must strive to detect subtle changes, which may eventually lead to disconnects between national objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes in national objectives early may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military operations.
I. Typical Crisis Response Operations

A. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)
NEOs are operations directed by DOS or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with DOD, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from locations within foreign countries to safe havens designated by DOS when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may also include citizens from the HN, as well as citizens from other countries. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of US citizens abroad and for safeguarding their property. This order also directs DOD to advise and assist DOS to prepare and implement plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US ambassador, or chief of the diplomatic mission, prepares the emergency action plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The GCC conducts military operations to assist in the implementation of emergency action plans as directed by SecDef.

B. Peace Operations (PO)
PO are multiagency and multinational operations involving all instruments of national power—including international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and military missions—to contain conflict, restore the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.

For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass PKO, predominantly military PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, PM processes, and conflict prevention. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. PO support national/multinational strategic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements.

- **Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).** PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Such actions are often taken under the authority of Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of the UN Charter.

- **Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO).** PEO are the application of military force or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict.

- **Peace Building (PB).** PB consists of stability actions (predominantly diplomatic, economic, and security related) that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. Military support to PB may include rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or training defense forces.

- **Peacemaking (PM).** This is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute or resolves issues that led to conflict. It can be an ongoing process, supported by military, economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of national power. The purpose is to instill in the parties an understanding that reconciliation is a better alternative
III. Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)


Security and defense of the US homeland is the USG’s top responsibility and is conducted as a continuous, cooperative effort among all federal agencies, as well as state, tribal, and local government. Military operations inside the US and its territories, though limited in many respects, are conducted to accomplish two missions—HD and DSCA.

Commander, US Northern Command, and Commander, US Pacific Command, have specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA. These responsibilities include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the US, its territories, and interests within their assigned AORs, as directed by the President or SecDef. However, DOD support to HD is global in nature and is often conducted by all CCDRs beginning at the source of the threat. In the forward regions outside US territories, the objective is to detect and deter threats to the homeland before they arise and to defeat these threats as early as possible when so directed.

Homeland Defense (HD)

HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by other agencies, to defend against external threats and aggression.

However, against internal threats DOD may be in support of another USG department or agency. When ordered to conduct HD operations within US territory, DOD will coordinate closely with other government agencies. Consistent with laws and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support CCDR requirements against a variety of threats to national security. These include invasion, cyberspace attack, and air and missile attacks.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

DSCA is support provided by US federal military forces; DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, DOD agencies, and National Guard forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. For DSCA operations, DOD supports and does not supplant civil authorities. The majority of DSCA operations are conducted IAW the NRF, which establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. Within a state, that state’s governor is the key decision maker and commands the state’s National Guard forces when they are not in federal Title 10, USC, status. When the governor mobilizes the National Guard, it will most often be under state active duty when supporting civil authorities.

Other DSCA operations can include CD activities, support to national special security events, or other support to civilian law enforcement IAW specific DOD policies and US law. Commanders and staffs must carefully consider the legal and policy limits imposed on intelligence activities in support of LEAs, and on intelligence activities involving US citizens and entities by intelligence oversight regulations, policies, and executive orders.

Refer to The Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook (Protecting the Homeland / Defense Support to Civil Authority) for complete discussion. Topics and references include homeland defense (JP 3-28), defense support of civil authorities (JP 3-28), Army support of civil authorities (ADRP 3-28), multi-service DSCA TTPs (ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2), DSCA liaison officer toolkit (GTA 90-01-020), key legal and policy documents, and specific hazard and planning guidance.
Range of Military Ops

III. Large-Scale Combat Operations

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Jan ‘17), chap. VIII.

Campaign
Traditionally, campaigns are the most extensive joint operations, in terms of the amount of forces and other capabilities committed and duration of operations. In the context of large-scale combat, a campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

Major Operations
A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes, and is the primary building block of a campaign. Major operations and campaigns typically include multiple phases (e.g., the 1990-1991 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and 2003 OIF). Campaign planning is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Campaigns can occur across the continuum of conflict. In campaigns characterized by combat, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible; conclude hostilities; and establish conditions favorable to the HN, the US, and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions may require joint forces to conduct stability activities to restore security, provide essential services and humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction. Some crisis-response or contingency operations may not involve large-scale combat, but could meet the definition of a major operation or campaign based on their scale and duration (e.g., the Tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia or Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in the US, both in 2005).

Campaigns are joint in nature—functional and Service components of the joint force conduct supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Within a campaign, forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and space, conduct operations to achieve strategic or operational objectives in one or more OAs. Forces operate simultaneously or sequentially IAW a common plan, and are controlled by a single Service commander or the JFC.

Combatant Command (CCMD) Planning
The CCMD strategy links national strategic guidance to development of CCMD campaign and contingency plans. A CCMD strategy is a broad statement of the GCC’s long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC’s long-term vision for the global employment of functional capabilities. CCDRs prepare these strategies in the context of SecDef’s priorities outlined in the GEF and the CJCS’s objectives articulated in the NMS. However, the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of operations typically magnify the planning challenges. There are three categories of campaigns, which differ generally in scope and focus.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!
Joint Operation Model (Example Activities)


The six general groups of activity provide a convenient basis for thinking about a joint operation in notional phases, as Figure V-7 depicts.

**Phasing an Operation**

Ref: JP 3-0, fig. V-7. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominant Military Activities.

**A. Shape**

In general, shaping activities help set conditions for successful theater operations. Shaping activities include long-term persistent and preventive military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence actions to assure friends, build partner capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. They help identify, deter, counter, and/or mitigate competitor and adversary actions that challenge country and regional stability. A GCC’s TCP provides these and other activities tasked by SecDef/CJCS strategic guidance in pursuit of national objectives. Likewise, CCDRs may direct more focused geographic and functional shaping activities at the potential execution of specific contingency plans for various types of operations. In the best case, shaping activities may avert or diminish conflict. At the least, shaping provides a deeper, and common, understanding of the OE. Preparatory intelligence activities inform operation assessment, planning, and execution to improve the JFC’s understanding of the OE.

**B. Deter**

Successful deterrence prevents an adversary’s undesirable actions, because the adversary perceives an unacceptable risk or cost of acting. Deterrent actions are generally weighted toward protection and security activities that are characterized by preparatory actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and partners, and indicate the intent to execute subsequent phases of the planned operation. A number of FDOs, FROs, and force
enhancements could be implemented during this phase. The nature of these options varies according to the nature of the adversary (e.g., traditional or irregular, state or non-state), the adversary’s actions, US national objectives, and other factors. Once a crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces, and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of intelligence collection assets; and development of mission-tailored C2, intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS. CCDRs continue to conduct military engagement with multinational partners to maintain access to areas, thereby providing the basis for further crisis response. Many deterrent actions build on security cooperation activities. They can also be part of stand-alone operations.

C. Seize Initiative
JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all situations through decisive use of joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves both defensive and offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the enemy to culminate offensively and setting the conditions for decisive operations. Rapid application of joint combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the enemy’s initial aggression and to deny the enemy its initial objectives. Operations to gain access to theater infrastructure and expand friendly freedom of action continue during this phase, while the JFC seeks to degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the crisis at the earliest opportunity.

D. Dominate
These actions focus on breaking the enemy’s will to resist or, in noncombat situations, to control the OE. Successful domination depends on overmatching enemy capabilities at critical times and places. Joint force options include attacking weaknesses at the leading edge of the enemy’s defensive perimeter to roll enemy forces back, and striking in depth to threaten the integrity of the enemy’s A2/AD, offensive weapons and force projection capabilities, and defensive systems. Operations can range from large-scale combat to various stability actions depending on the nature of the enemy. Dominating activities may establish the conditions to achieve strategic objectives early or may set the conditions for transition to a subsequent phase of the operation.

E. Stabilize
These actions and activities are typically characterized by a shift in focus from sustained combat operations to stability activities. These operations help reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. The intent is to help restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability. Civilian officials may lead operations during part or all of this period, but the JFC typically will provide significant supporting capabilities and activities. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance (i.e., military government), and integrate the efforts of other supporting interagency and multinational partners until legitimate local entities are functioning. The JFC continuously assesses the impact of operations on the ability to transfer authority for remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity.

F. Enable Civil Authority
Joint force support to legitimate civil governance typically characterizes these actions and activities. The commander provides this support by agreement with the appropriate civil authority. In some cases, especially for operations within the US, the commander provides this support under direction of the civil authority. The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its ability to govern and administer to the Services and other needs of the population. The military end state typically is reached during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation. CCMD involvement with other nations and other government agencies beyond the termination of the joint operation, such as lower-level stability activities and FHA, may be required to achieve national objectives.
I. Considerations for Deterrence

The deter phase is characterized by preparatory actions that indicate resolve to commit resources and respond to the situation. These actions begin when a CCDR or JFC identifies that routine operations may not achieve desired objectives due to an adversary’s actions. This requires the commander to have identified CCIRs and assessed whether additional resources, outside those currently allocated and assigned for ongoing operations, are required to defuse the crisis, reassure partners, demonstrate the intent to deny the adversary’s goals, and execute subsequent phases of the operation. Deterrence should be based on capability (having the means to influence behavior), credibility (maintaining a level of believability that the proposed actions may actually be employed), and communication (transmitting the intended message to the desired audience) to ensure greater effectiveness (effectiveness of deterrence must be viewed from the perspective of the agent/actor that is to be deterred).

Isolating the Enemy

With Presidential and SecDef approval, guidance, and national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked by the President and SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions. The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from both its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can be achieved through the use of IRCs and the interdiction of LOCs or resources affecting the enemy’s ability to conduct or sustain military operations. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

Flexible Deterrent Options/ Flexible Response Options (FDOs/FROs)

FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both military and nonmilitary FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FROs, usually used in response to terrorism, can also be employed in response to aggression by a competitor or adversary. See following pages (pp. 1-24 to 1-25) for further discussion.

II. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative

As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit friendly advantages and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately. The JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of combat power to seize and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat. Additionally, the JFC coordinates with other USG departments and agencies to facilitate coherent use of all instruments of national power in achieving national strategic objectives.

Stability Activities

Combat in this phase provides an opportunity to begin various stability activities that will help achieve military strategic and operational-level objectives and create the conditions for the later stability and enable civil authority phases. Operations to neu-
Preparing the Operational Area
(Deterrence)


Special Operations (SOF)
SOF play a major role in preparing and shaping the operational area and environment by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate successful follow-on operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights, language capabilities, and relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF contributions can provide operational leverage by gathering critical information, undermining an adversary’s will or capacity to wage war, and enhancing the capabilities of conventional US, multinational, or indigenous/surrogate forces.

Stability Activities
Joint force planning and operations conducted prior to commencement of hostilities should establish a sound foundation for operations in the stabilize and enable civil authority phases. JFCs should anticipate and address how to fill the power vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down. Considerations include:

• Limit the damage to key infrastructure (water, energy, medical) and services.
• Assist with the restoration and development of power generation facilities.
• Establish the intended disposition of captured leadership and demobilized military and paramilitary forces.
• Provide for the availability of cash or other means of financial exchange.
• Determine the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military police, CA, engineer, medical, multinational).
• Assess availability of HN law enforcement and health and medical resources.
• Secure key infrastructure nodes and facilitate HN law enforcement and first responder services.
• Develop and disseminate information necessary to suppress potential new enemies and promote new governmental authority.

Civil Affairs (CA)
CA forces have a variety of specialty skills that may support the joint operation being planned. CA forces conduct military engagement, humanitarian and civic assistance, and nation assistance to influence HN and foreign nation populations. CA forces assess impacts of the population and culture on military operations, assess impact of military operations on the population and culture, and facilitate interorganizational coordination. Establishing and maintaining civil-military relations may include interaction among US, allied, multinational, and HN forces, as well as other government agencies, international organizations, and NGOs.

Sustainment
Thorough planning for logistic and personnel support is critical. Planning must include active participation by all deploying and in-theater US and multinational forces, as well as interagency personnel. This planning is done through theater distribution plans (TDPs) in support of the GCCs’ TCPs. Setting the conditions enables the JFCs to address global, end-to-end distribution requirements and identify critical capabilities, infrastructure, and relationships required to be resourced and emplaced in a timely manner to sustain and enable global distribution operations.
Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs)


Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict. Both military and nonmilitary FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power, but they are most effective when used in combination.

- **Military FDOs** can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning of enemy action. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response, generally require economy of force; however, military FDOs should not increase risk to the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired effect. Military FDOs must be carefully tailored regarding timing, efficiency, and effectiveness. They can rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, MISO, and protection without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Care should be taken to avoid undesired effects such as eliciting an armed response should adversary leadership perceive that friendly military FDOs are being used as preparation for a preemptive attack.

- **Nonmilitary FDOs** are preplanned, preemptive actions taken by other government agencies to dissuade an adversary from initiating hostilities. Nonmilitary FDOs need to be coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with military FDOs to focus all instruments of national power.

**Example Diplomatic FDOs**
- Alert and introduce special teams (e.g., public diplomacy)
- Reduce international diplomatic ties
- Initiate noncombatant evacuation ops
- Restrict activities of diplomatic missions
- Prepare to withdraw or withdraw US embassy personnel
- Take actions to gain international support
- Restrict travel of US citizens
- Gain support through the UN

**Example Military FDOs**
- Upgrade alert status
- Increase ISR activities
- Initiate show-of-force actions
- Increase training & exercise activities
- Take steps to increase U.S. public support
- Increase defense support to public diplomacy
- Deploy forces into or near the potential operational area

**Example Informational FDOs**
- Increase public awareness of the problem and potential for conflict
- Interrupt satellite downlink transmissions
- Publicize violations of international law
- Publicize increased force presence, joint exercises, military capability
- Increase informational efforts
- Implement meaconing, interference, jamming, and intrusion of enemy informational assets
- Maintain dialogue with the news media

**Example Economic FDOs**
- Freeze or seize real property in the United States where possible
- Freeze monetary assets in the U.S.
- Freeze international assets where possible
- Encourage US and international corporations to restrict transactions
- Embargo goods and services
- Enact trade sanctions
- Enact restrictions on technology transfer
A complex relationship exists among security cooperation, security assistance, and the military instrument of foreign internal defense. The left side of the illustration below depicts this relationship, including how aspects of foreign internal defense and security assistance overlap. The right side illustrates how foreign internal defense focuses on internal threats to a host nation and how security assistance focuses on external threats. The column depicts how security (military, intelligence, and civilian), economic, and governance are considerations common to both foreign internal defense and security assistance. Security Force Assistance supports the military instrument of foreign internal defense, much of security assistance efforts, and some security cooperation efforts.

Ref: JP 3-20, Security Cooperations (May ‘17); ADRP 3-07, Stability (Sept ‘12); and adaptations from FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (May ‘09, rescinded).

I. Security Cooperation (SC)

Security cooperation (SC) encompasses all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with US defense objectives. It includes, but is not limited to, military engagements with foreign defense and security establishments (including those governmental organizations that primarily perform disaster or emergency response functions), DOD-administered security assistance (SA) programs, combined exercises, international armaments cooperation, and information sharing and collaboration.
Il. Security Cooperation Activities


Security Cooperation (SC) uses a combination of programs and activities by which DOD, in coordination with DOS, encourages and enables countries and organizations to partner with the US to achieve strategic objectives.

Foreign Assistance
Foreign assistance consists of a number of legally authorized programs that can be grouped into the general categories of development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and SA with the strategic purpose of promoting long-term host nation (HN) and regional stability.

Security Assistance (SA)
SA is a group of programs the USG uses to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to advance national policies and objectives. SA is generally overseen by DOS, and in many cases administered by DOD as SC.

Security Cooperation (SC)
SC is the group of programs or activities employed by DOD in cooperation with PNs to achieve US security objectives, and some SC is foreign assistance, but not all. Security force assistance is the set of DOD SC activities that contribute to unified action by the USG to support the development of the capacity and capabilities of FSF and their supporting institutions, whether of a PN or an international organization (e.g., regional security organization), in support of US objectives.

Security Sector Reform (SSR)
Security sector reform (SSR) is a comprehensive set of programs and activities that an HN government undertakes with USG assistance to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. Defense institution building (DIB) is a primary form of DOD support to SSR.

Defense Institution Building (DIB)
DIB comprises SC typically conducted at the ministerial/department, military staff/service headquarters, and related agency/supporting entity level to develop the strategic and operational aspects of a PN’s defense institutions.

Other SC-related Activities
Other SC-related activities and programs include military engagements; joint combined exchange training; Regional Defense Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program; combined exercises for training, train-and-equip initiatives, and international military education and training (IMET); and international armaments cooperation.

Security Cooperation and Joint Operations
A significant number of SC activities are conducted as a part of the GCCs’ TCPs, but limited contingencies, crises responses, or major operations can also involve some form of SC.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
The foreign internal defense program is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government, or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security.

Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is the comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. COIN is
primarily a political struggle and incorporates a wide range of activities by the HN government of which security is only one, albeit an important one.

**Counterterrorism (CT)**
Counterterrorism are those activities and operations conducted to neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.

**Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)**
Countering weapons of mass destruction, across the three lines of effort (prevent acquisition, contain and reduce threats, and respond to crises), includes activities conducted across the USG to counter efforts to coerce or attack the US, its Armed Forces, allies, partners, and interests with chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons.

**Counterdrug (CD) Operations**
Counterdrug operations are those civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking.

**Stability Activities**
Stability activities include military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with or in support of other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

**Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)**
Foreign humanitarian assistance consists of DOD activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.

**Peace Operations (PO)**
Peace operations normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, reestablish the peace, shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding between two or more factions within the indigenous population, and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.

**Civil-Military Operations (CMO)**
Civil-military operations are the activities of a commander performed by designated civil affairs or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, indigenous populations, and institutions, by directly supporting efforts for stability within an HN or a region.

**Military Information Support Operations (MISO)**
Military information support operations are planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator’s objectives.

**Countering Threat Networks (CTN)**
Countering threat networks is the aggregation of activities across the USG that identify, analyze, neutralize, disrupt, or destroy threat networks.

**Personnel Recovery (PR)**
Personnel recovery is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to affect the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel.
**III. Integrated Security Cooperation Activities**


Military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports other instruments of national power to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict.

![Diagram of Foreign Internal Defense: Integrated Security Cooperation Activities]


**Nation Assistance (NA)**

Within this range of military operations, nation assistance (NA) is civil or military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA]) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. NA operations support the host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

NA programs include security assistance (SA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), and foreign internal defense (FID).
I. Security Force Assistance (SFA)

Security force assistance (SFA) is the set of Department of Defense (DOD) activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and supporting institutions. FSF are all organizations and personnel under host nation (HN) control that have a mission of protecting the HN’s sovereignty from internal as well as external threats. SFA activities are primarily used to assist an HN in defending against internal and transnational threats to stability (i.e., supporting foreign internal defense [FID], counterterrorism, counterinsurgency [COIN], or stability operations).

I. Security Force Assistance (SFA) Tasks

The ultimate goal of SFA activities is to create FSF that are competent, capable, sustainable, committed, and confident, and have a security apparatus tied to regional stability. Regional security may partly be achieved in partnership with an HN by developing its ability to deter and defend against military aggression by its neighbors and to combat lawlessness, subversion, insurgency, and terrorist threats.

Security Force Assistance Tasks

- Organize
- Train
- Equip
- Rebuild and Build
- Advise and Assist


This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, and setting conditions in the operational area that enable the success of other actors.
A. Organize

Organize is a SFA task that encompasses all measures taken to assist FSF in improving its organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. U.S. forces must understand the existing security organizations of FSF to better assist them. Subsequently, SFA personnel may help the host nation organize its security forces to meet the needs of its security environment.

Organizing a foreign security force depends on the host nation’s social and economic conditions, cultural and historical factors, and security threats. SFA aims to create an efficient organization with a command, intelligence, logistic, and operations structure viable for the host nation. Conventional forces with limited special purpose teams (such as explosive ordnance disposal) are preferred. Doctrine or standing operating procedures should apply across the force, as should unit structures. The organization must facilitate the collection, processing, and dissemination of intelligence across and throughout all security forces. As the foreign security force strengthens, U.S. leaders and trainers should expect more independent organizational decisions. The host nation determines the structure of its military forces, to include approving all organizational designs. These may include changing the numbers of forces, types of units, and internal organizational designs.

Organization should address all FSF, from the ministerial level to the patrolling police officer and soldier. Building a competent FSF infrastructure—including civilian information systems—is critical for success.

Organizing a foreign security force requires resolving issues related to: recruiting, promotion screening and selection, pay and benefits, leader recruiting and selection, personnel accountability, and demobilization of security force personnel.

B. Train

Train is a SFA task to assist FSF by developing programs and institutions to train and educate. These efforts must fit the nature and requirements of their security environment.

Establishing Training Standards

Training in SFA involves many of the individual and collective skills performed in conventional military operations. All levels of training for all components should include values training. Metrics for evaluating units should include subjective measures, such as loyalty to the host-nation government, as well as competence in military tasks. Soldiers know how to evaluate military training. However, the acceptance of values, such as ethnic equality or the rejection of corruption, may be a better measure of training effectiveness. Gauging this acceptance is far more difficult than evaluating task performance. While the operational environment varies widely, FSF and trainers can still establish clear measures to evaluate the training of individuals, leaders, and units.

Training Foreign Security Forces

Members of FSF develop through a systematic training program (individual training and education as well as collective training). The program builds basic skills, then teaches them to work as a team, and finally allows them to function as a unit. Basic military, intelligence, or law enforcement training focuses first on basic skills such as legal considerations, first aid, marksmanship, and fire discipline. Leaders have training in tactics, including patrolling, urban operations, and legal evidence collection. Everyone must master rules of engagement and the law of armed conflict. FSF units should train to standard for conducting the major operations they will face.
II. Security Force Assistance Activities

Ref: Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 1-13, Security Force Assistance (Apr ’13), fig. III-2.

SFA activities should be a critical part of strategic and operational planning from the beginning, including the Geographic Combatant Commander’s (GCC’s) theater strategy and theater campaign and contingency planning to support GCC’s strategic objectives. SFA should be integrated into the specific operation or campaign plans in all phases, not just as an afterthought for the stabilize and enable civil authority phases following combat operations.

Methods/Ends, Ways, Means

Successful strategies typically employ all USG instruments of national power. Ends are the desired strategic outcomes or end states. Ways are the methods, tactics, and procedures used to achieve the ends. Means are the resources required to achieve the ends, such as troops, weapons systems, money, will, and time. All strategies are subject to risk, often associated with the means allocated against a particular way. The ends must be reasonable given the means and ways available. Figure III-2 depicts a model for SFA activities.
II. Internal Defense & Development (IDAD)

Ref: JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Jul '10), chap. 2.

An IDAD program focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond to the needs of the HN’s society. Its fundamental goal is to prevent an insurgency or other forms of lawlessness or subversion by forestalling and defeating the threat and by working to correct conditions that prompt violence. The HN government mobilizes its population to participate in IDAD efforts. Thus, the IDAD program is ideally preemptive/Phase 0; however, if an insurgency, illicit drug, terrorist, or other threat develops, the IDAD program evolves to combat that threat. Commanders and their staffs must understand the HN’s IDAD program and its objectives if they are to plan effectively to support it. The objectives of FID will be to assist the HN in formulating an appropriate IDAD program, which often includes fusing several separate strategic plans and programs into one broader strategy.

An IDAD program should integrate security force and civilian actions into a coherent, comprehensive effort. Security force actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development. This development requires change to meet the needs of vulnerable groups of people. This change may in turn promote unrest in the society. The strategy, therefore, includes measures to maintain conditions under which orderly development can take place.

IDAD Functions

An IDAD program blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats. These functions are balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization. Balanced development attempts to achieve national goals through political, social, and economic programs. It allows all individuals and groups in the society to share in the rewards of development, thus alleviating frustration. Balanced development satisfies legitimate grievances that the opposition attempts to exploit. The government must recognize conditions that contribute to the internal threat and instability and take preventive measures. Correcting conditions that make a society vulnerable is the long term solution to the problem.

Security includes all activities implemented in order to protect the populace from violence and to provide a safe environment for national development. Security of the populace and government resources is essential to countering the threat. Protection and control of the populace permit development and deny the adversary access to popular support. The security effort should establish an environment in which the HN can provide for its own security with limited US support. Neutralization is a political concept that:

- makes an insurgent or criminal element irrelevant to the political process
- is the physical and psychological separation of the threatening elements from the population
- includes all lawful activities (except those that degrade the government’s legitimacy) to disrupt, preempt, disorganize, and defeat the insurgent organization
- can involve public exposure and the discrediting of insurgent and criminal leaders during a period of low-level unrest with little political violence
- can involve arrest and prosecution when laws have been broken, or
- can involve combat action when the adversary’s violent activities escalate

All neutralization efforts must be legal. They must scrupulously observe HN laws and policy provisions regarding rights and responsibilities. The need for security forces to act lawfully is essential not only for humanitarian reasons but also because this reinforces government legitimacy while denying the adversary an exploitable issue.
IV. Planning for Foreign Internal Defense


A comprehensive planning process at both the national and theater level is vital in order to provide the means to bolster the internal stability and security of the supported nation. The type of planning necessary is dictated by the type or types of support being provided. Support in anticipating and precluding threats is preventive in nature and is likely to require a mix of indirect support and direct support not involving combat operations. Depending on whether the mission has originated through DOD or DOS, how, where, and at what level the planning, coordination, and resourcing takes place will vary. Some basic imperatives when integrating FID into strategies and plans are:

- **Maintain HN Sovereignty and Build Legitimacy.** Ultimately, FID operations are only as successful as the HN’s IDAD program.

- **Understand long-term or strategic implications and sustainability of all US assistance efforts.** Building HN development and defense self-sufficiency may require large investments of time and materiel.

- **Tailor military support to FID for the operational environment and the specific needs of the supported HN.** The tendency to use a US frame of reference can result in equipment, training, and infrastructure not at all suitable for the nation receiving US assistance.

- **Ensure Unity of Effort/Unity of Purpose.** Planning should consider and, where appropriate, integrate all instruments of national power and intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and HN capabilities in order to reduce inefficiencies and enhance strategy in support of FID and HN IDAD efforts.

- **Understand US Foreign Policy.** NSC directives, plans, or policies are the guiding documents; however, US policy may change as a result of developments in the HN or broader political changes in either country. DOD planners should seek guidance from the COM and country team in interpreting foreign policy and guiding US efforts in a particular country.

- **Understand the Information Environment.** In an environment characterized by “instant communications,” proactive PA and PSYOP programs can address regional, trans regional, and even global audiences that may have (or perceive they have) a stake in US FID operations.

- **Sustain the Effort.** Plan for the US sustainment effort as well as the efforts necessary for the HN to sustain its operations after the US or multinational forces depart.

GCCs base strategy and military planning to support FID on the broad guidance and missions provided in the JSPS. The NMS supports the aims of the National Security Strategy (NSS) and implements the national defense strategy. Through the guidance and resources provided in the JSCP, the GCCs develop their operation plan and operation plan in concept format to support FID. The Guidance for Employment of the Force provides the foundation for all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments, and supports the President’s NSS. The GCC, using an integrated priority list, also identifies requirements to support FID efforts and request authorization and resourcing.

Military activities in support of FID requirements are integrated into concepts and plans from the strategic level down to the tactical level. Theater strategy translates national and alliance strategic tasks and direction into long-term, regionally focused operational tasks and direction to accomplish specific missions and objectives. In peacetime, FID is an integral part of the strategy of deterring hostilities and enhancing stability in the theater. The GCC’s theater campaign plan is the primary document that focuses on the command’s steady-state activities, which include operations, SC, and other activities designed to achieve theater strategic end states.
C. Trainer/Advisor Checklists

Ref: JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Jul ‘10), chap. 5, pp. 5-7 to 5-10.

The predeployment site survey (PDSS) leader—along with any subordinates he may specify—establishes effective initial rapport with the HN unit commander. The PDSS leader:

- Conducts introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner using the HN language
- Briefs the HN commander on the joint force advisors’ PDSS mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the unit by the higher US commander. The PDSS leader should use the HN language and, if required, visual aids translated into the HN language.
- Assures the HN commander that all PDSS team members are fully supportive of the HN’s position and that they firmly believe a joint and HN-unit effort will be successful
- Assures the HN commander that his assistance is needed to develop the tentative objectives for advisory assistance to include advisory team agreements with the HN commander on training objectives
- Deduces or solicits the HN commander’s actual estimate of his unit’s capabilities and perceived advisory assistance and material requirements
- Explains the PDSS team’s initial plan for establishing counterpart relationships, obtains approval from the HN commander for the plan, and requests to conduct the counterpart linkup under the mutual supervision of the PDSS leader and the HN commander
- Supervises the linkup between PDSS team members and their HN counterparts to determine if the HN personnel understand the purpose of the counterpart relationship and their responsibilities within it
- Identifies reachback requirements
- The PDSS leader should not make any promises or statements that could be construed as promises to the HN commander regarding commitments to provide the advisory assistance or fulfill material requirements

The PDSS team members analyze the HN unit’s status according to their area of expertise for the purpose of determining the HN requirements for advisory assistance. The PDSS team members:

- Explain the purpose of the analysis to counterparts
- Encourage counterparts to assist in the analysis, the preparation of estimates, and the briefing of the analysis to the advisory team and HN unit commanders
- Collect sufficient information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and tentative advisory assistance COAs selected prior to deployment
- Collect and analyze all information relating to FP
- Prepare written, prioritized estimates for advisory assistance COAs
- Brief, with their counterparts, the estimates to the PDSS team and HN unit commander
- Inspect, with their counterparts, the HN facilities that will be used during the assistance mission
- Identify deficiencies in the facilities that will prevent execution of the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs
• Prepare written or verbal estimates of COAs that will correct the deficiencies or negate their effects on the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs
• Supervise the preparation of the facilities and inform the JFC of the status of the preparations compared to the plans for them

Once received, the PDSS leader supervises the processing of the survey results. The PDSS leader then:
• Recommends to the HN unit commander the most desirable COAs emphasizing how they satisfy actual conditions and will achieve the desired advisory assistance objectives
• Ensures that his counterpart understands that the desired COAs are still tentative contingent on the tasking US commander’s decision
• Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on joint units, after obtaining input from the HN unit commander
• Ensures the higher in-country US commander is informed of significant findings in the team survey for HN assistance

The PDSS team plans its security in accordance with the anticipated threat. Adjustments are made as required by the situation on the ground. The PDSS team members:
• Fortify their positions (quarters, communications, medical, command) in accordance with the available means and requirements to maintain low visibility
• Maintain a team internal guard system, aware of the locations of all other joint force advisors, and ready to react to an emergency by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions
• Maintain a team internal alert plan that will notify all team members of an emergency. Maintain communications with all subordinate team members deployed outside of the immediate area controlled by the team
• Establish plans for immediate team defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack or a loss of HN rapport with hostile reaction
• Discuss visible team security measures with HN counterparts to ensure their understanding and to maintain effective rapport
• Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security measures that have been identified as necessary during the analysis of the HN unit status and the inspection of its facilities
• Establish mutual plans with the HN unit, through counterparts, for defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack
• Rehearse team alert and defensive plans
• Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to conduct mutual, full-force rehearsals of defensive plans

Unit Training
Much of the training necessary to prepare personnel to support FID activities may be conducted within the unit. This training can be individually focused or, in the case of unit-size participation, may involve large-scale collective training. Training resources may be drawn from a variety of sources, but SOF are particularly valuable because of their area orientation and FID focus. When feasible, units should conduct operational rehearsals of the FID mission. These rehearsals allow participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. Such rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the potential situations that a unit may encounter during a FID mission.
To enable a host-nation (HN) security force to conduct counterinsurgency operations, United States (U.S.) or multinational forces conduct various security cooperation activities. Commanders often view host-nation security force development as an essential task and one of their primary lines of effort. The resulting increase in a host nation’s ability to secure its own population yields significant benefits because host-nation troops are normally more effective in conducting operations among the local population than U.S. or multinational forces. Transitioning responsibility for operations to the host-nation security force reduces the visible presence of U.S. or multinational troops, further enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government.

U.S. or multinational efforts to develop the capability and capacity of a host-nation security force must focus on operational and developmental needs of host-nation counterparts. Developing a sound plan to develop a host nation’s capability to address the root causes of the insurgency requires a deliberate, comprehensive assessment of that host nation’s security force. The set of metrics that the U.S. or multinational forces selects to assess a host-nation security force must be appropriate for the type of security force being assessed. For example, assessment of a host-nation army may require a completely different set of criteria from those used to assess a host-nation police force. Likewise, a host nation’s border or customs police, local (city or county) police, and provincial, state, or national police must...
all be assessed according to their specific mission requirements, while taking into consideration that host nation’s federal or local laws, political considerations, culture, and tribal affiliations.

The use of security cooperation tools to build governmental capability, including building a host nation’s forces, may be essential. In the eyes of a local population, the credibility of the host-nation government is vital in counterinsurgency efforts to address the threat and conditions of instability. The host nation’s military, police, and paramilitary forces are often the most visible elements of a host-nation government’s power and authority. Therefore, building the capacity of a host nation’s security forces should work toward improving the security force’s competence, capability, commitment, and confidence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developmental Area</th>
<th>Developmental Indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>Host-nation security forces must possess and demonstrate individual and collective skills in their respective warfighting or law enforcement tasks. They must also support institutional functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability</td>
<td>Host-nation security force organizations must be appropriately sized to accomplish their respective missions. A host-nation security force must be adequately manned and equipped at a level that is sustainable, given that host nation’s own resources. A host-nation security forces’ supporting institutions, such as their national level force generation and logistic agencies, must be organized and directed in a manner that adds value to the lower-level, host-nation security forces’ mission requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>A host-nation security force must be committed to the peaceful transition of political power. It must also be committed to the security and survival of the state, the rule of law, the preservation of human rights, civil liberties for the population, and to fighting hard (when necessary) to defeat the active insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confidence</td>
<td>A host-nation’s population must believe that its host-nation security forces’ actions are always in the best interests of the people. A host-nation government must believe that its host-nation security force supports that government’s legal authority. Also, the international community must see a host nation’s security force as a force for good that respects human rights and the international law of war.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: FM 3-24, table 11-1. Developing a host-nation security force.

One issue with developing security forces is the issue of the quality versus the quantity of host-nation counterinsurgency forces. In the case of counterinsurgency, quality tends to be more important than quantity. While quantity and quality must be balanced to some degree and “quantity has a quality all its own” to the extent that too small a force will not be able to accomplish its mission, quantity is not a substitute for quality.

I. Assessing & Developing a Host-Nation Force

Assessment of host-nation army or land forces typically comes more naturally to U.S. or multinational forces than assessing host-nation police forces. It is easier for a Soldier or Marine to assess another Army or Marine Corps unit than it is for a Soldier or Marine to accurately assess a police precinct, fire department, or sanitation department. Developing measures of performance and measures of effectiveness based on their standards and how effective those standards are is important.

See FM 3-24, chapter 12, for more information on assessments.

One method to create an assessment framework is to form a working group of subject matter experts. This working group will review any lines of effort and tasks identified by the host nation and recommend additions and subtractions based on
IV. Host-Nation Contributions


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Reason for Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Understand an operational environment</td>
<td>An area of operations is a host nation’s home and its culture; a host-nation force knows the language, the different groups, the political situation, educational levels, economic considerations, historical bad actors, and unofficial community leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide human intelligence</td>
<td>Host-nation security forces may be able to better gather information that leads to human intelligence for many reasons, including speaking the same language and understanding the important players in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Put the pieces together</td>
<td>Host-nation forces can often better integrate the different fragments of intelligence into the context of an operational environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine credibility of intelligence assets (sources, walk-ins, call-ins)</td>
<td>Host-nation forces possess a vastly superior sense of cultural intelligence and may be able to assist in assigning credibility to sources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validate and check interpreters</td>
<td>Host-nation forces can assist in confirming the locally hired interpreters’ abilities to interpret.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify and root out infiltrators</td>
<td>Host-nation forces can pick out minute differences between normal and abnormal behaviors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gain information superiority</td>
<td>Host-nation forces can help write messages that may resonate with the local population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vet locally hired personnel for counterintelligence and security purposes</td>
<td>Host-nation forces have access to resources not necessarily available to U.S. personnel.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Tactical-level planners in the U.S. military employ either the military decisionmaking process or the Marine Corps planning process to gain an understanding of an operational environment, identify the tactical problem, develop possible courses of action, and evaluate and select the best course of action to most effectively address the tactical problem. Commanders and staffs first properly frame the problem. When given a set of inputs, such as an order from higher headquarters or some other initiating directive, certain intelligence products, and an initial commander’s visualization, commanders and staffs complete the steps to work toward a specified output, such as a finished operation order. In cases where host-nation security force leaders have been directly involved in combat operations over many years, those leaders who survive often owe their lives to their own ability to improvise. As a result, many host-nation security force leaders apply an intuitive, instead of a process-oriented, method of making decisions. They can immediately size up a tactical situation, almost instantaneously recognize dangers and opportunities, and decide upon a course of action. While this capability can serve in critical situations, it cannot be taught to others, and it is of no use in situations unrelated to the leader’s own experiential learning. Therefore, U.S. or multinational advisors may have to work patiently with their host-nation security force counterparts for them to develop a planning and decision support process instead of allowing them to rely solely on the intuitive approach.

U.S. and multinational planners ensure that they have conducted basic mission analysis prior to parallel planning with host-nation partners. This allows advisors to develop and assess assumptions, identify implied and specified tasks, determine what assets and capabilities are available, and formulate a tentative timeline to coordinate advisory efforts throughout the planning process.
I. Relationship Building

Building relationships can lead to partnerships, and is central to security cooperation whether conducting military engagement with a foreign partner in Europe and Asia, or conducting Soldier and leader engagements with foreign security forces (Foreign security forces) during operations that may include counterinsurgency. It is essential for the Soldier, particularly the advisor, to place a considerable amount of time and energy in establishing solid relationships among U.S. forces and Foreign security forces. By its very nature, the advisor mission forces its members out of their traditional roles. An advisor must purposefully look to build solid relationships between U.S. and foreign security force commanders, staffs, and the defense establishment, as well as a variety of governmental and nongovernmental entities.

II. Rapport

Since Soldiers conducting security cooperation missions that include security force assistance are in a unique military position, they establish rapport with their foreign counterparts. This position is one in which the leader has no positional authority over the actions of their foreign counterparts. This lack of authority means that the doctrinal view of leadership is modified to emphasize interpersonal relationships and de-emphasize authoritarian roles. Soldiers use their interpersonal skills to build rapport. Soldiers cannot simply order a specific action; instead, they use interpersonal skills to positively affect the actions and decisions of their foreign counterparts.
Stability is achieved through the process of stabilization through the balanced application of the instruments of national power in partnership with the host nation (HN) and local communities. Stabilization is the process by which military and nonmilitary actors collectively apply various instruments of national power to address drivers of conflict, foster HN resiliencies, and create conditions that enable sustainable peace and security. Stability can be described as the overarching characterization of the effects created by activities of the United States Government (USG) outside the US using one or more of the instruments of national power to minimize, if not eliminate, economic and political instability and other drivers of violent conflict across one or more of the five USG stability sectors.

I. Stability in Operations

Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. These conditions consist of the level of violence; the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions; and the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.

Sources of instability manifest themselves locally. First, instability stems from decreased support for the government based on what locals actually expect of their government. Second, instability grows from increased support for anti-government elements, which usually occurs when locals see spoilers as helping to solve the priority grievance. Lastly, instability stems from the undermining of the normal functioning of society where the emphasis must be on a return to the established norms.

Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and by building the capacity of local institutions.

Stability Tasks (Army Definition)

Across the range of military operations, Army units use the principles of stability with the principles of joint operations to carry out stability tasks. Effective commanders better understand the joint principles in the context of stability as part of decisive action and in the context of how to use the principles.

Stability tasks are based on principles that lay the foundation for long-term stability. Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-07).

Stability tasks focus on identifying, targeting, and mitigating the root causes of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and by building the capacity of local institutions.

Stability Actions (Joint Definition)

Military contributions to stabilization consist of those various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide...
End State Conditions for Stability

Ref: ADRP 3-07, Stability (Aug ‘12), pp. 1-13 to 1-16

To achieve conditions that ensure a stable and lasting peace, stability tasks in operations capitalize on coordination, cooperation, integration, and synchronization among military and nonmilitary organizations. These complementary civil-military efforts aim to strengthen legitimate governance, restore or maintain rule of law, support economic and infrastructure development, and foster a sense of national unity. These complementary efforts also seek to reform institutions to achieve sustainable peace and security and create the conditions that enable the host-nation government to assume responsibility for civil administration.

Successful efforts require an overarching framework that serves as a guide to develop strategy in pursuit of broader national or international policy goals. The following purpose-based framework—derived from work within the USG and led by the United States Institute of Peace with the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute—is founded on five broad conditions that describe the desired end state of a successful stability operation. In turn, a series of objectives link the execution of tactical tasks to that end state.

This framework provides the underpinnings for strategic, whole-of-government planning, yet also serves as a focal point for integrating operational- and tactical-level tasks. It is flexible and adaptive enough to support activities across the range of military operations but relies on concrete principles and fundamentals in application.

1. Safe and Secure Environment

Security is the most immediate concern of the military force, a concern typically shared by the local populace. A safe and secure environment is one in which these civilians can live their day-to-day lives without fear of being drawn into violent conflict and being victimized by criminals or by the forces there to protect them. Achieving security requires extensive collaboration with civil authorities, the trust and confidence of the people, immediate attention to any reported civilian harm as a result of operations, and strength of perseverance.

In the aftermath of conflict or disaster, conditions often create a significant security vacuum within the state. The government institutions are either unwilling or unable to provide security. In many cases, these institutions do not operate within internationally accepted norms. They are rife with corruption, abusing the power entrusted to them by the state. Sometimes these institutions actually embody the greatest threat to the populace. These conditions only serve to ebb away at the very foundation of the host nation’s stability.

Many challenges threaten a safe and secure environment. Generally, the immediate threat to a safe and secure environment is a return to fighting by former warring parties. However, insurgent forces, criminal elements, and terrorists also significantly threaten the safety and security of the local populace.

2. Established Rule of Law

While military forces aim to establish a safe and secure environment, the rule of law requires much more—security of individuals and accountability for crimes committed against them. These basic elements are critical for a broader culture of rule of law to take hold in a society emerging from conflict. A broad effort integrates activities of many actors, focusing civilian and military law and order capabilities to support host-nation civil institutions in establishing and supporting the rule of law. These activities come from a shared sense of confidence among the population that the justice sector focuses on serving the public rather than pursuing narrow interests. Planning, preparing, and executing the transfer of responsibility from military to host-nation control for rule of law—although critical for building public confidence—often proves the most difficult and complex transition conducted in a stability operation. Failure to ensure continuity of rule of law through this transition threatens the safety and security of the local populace, erodes the legitimacy of the host nation, and impedes long-term development and achieving the desired end state.
3. Social Well-Being
The immediate needs of a host-nation population emerging from conflict or disaster generally consist of food, water, shelter, basic sanitation, and health care. International aid typically responds quickly, often due to their presence in, or proximity to, the affected area. If allowed, and once forces stabilize and secure the situation, local and international aid organizations provide for the immediate humanitarian needs of the people, establish sustainable assistance programs, and assist with displaced civilians.

However, forces also must attend to long-term requirements: developing educational systems, avoiding inadvertent civilian harm, addressing past abuses, and promoting peaceful coexistence among the host-nation people. These requirements most appropriately get supported from civilian actors, including other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and NGOs. Resolving issues of truth and justice are paramount to this process, and systems of amends, compensation, and reconciliation are essential.

4. Stable Governance
Since the end of the Cold War, all international interventions have aimed to establish stable governments with legitimate systems of political representation at the national, regional, and local levels. In a stable government, the host-nation populace regularly elects a representative legislature according to established rules and in a manner generally recognized as free and fair. Legislatures must be designed consistently with a legal framework and legitimate constitution. Officials must be trained, processes created, and rules established.

Typically, early elections in a highly polarized society empower elites, senior military leaders, and organized criminal elements. However, the local populace often seeks early and visible signs of progress. Effective reform processes begin with elections at the provincial or local level to minimize the likelihood of national polarization and reemergence of violent divisions in society. Popular leaders—capable of delivering services and meeting the demands of their constituents—and effective processes can emerge. Since elections can also become flashpoints for violence and instability between groups, U.S. forces consider security measures as part of the election process.

Successful, stable governments also require effective executive institutions. Such capacity building generally requires a long-term commitment of effort from the international community to reestablish effective ministries and a functional civil service at all levels of government. Stable governments also require free and responsible media, multiple political parties, and a robust civil society. Further, in many countries, formal systems of governance exist alongside informal governance systems, such as tribal elders. Such informal systems can play an important stabilization role, acting as an enduring and effective alternative to formal structures, which may have limited reaches within a country.

5. Sustainable Economy
Following conflict or a major disaster, economies tend toward a precarious state. They often suffer from serious structural problems that need immediate attention. However, they also possess significant growth potential. Commerce—legitimate and illicit—previously inhibited by circumstances emerges quickly to fill market voids and entrepreneurial opportunities. International aid and the requirements of intervening military forces often infuse the economy with abundant resources, stimulating rapid growth across the economic sector. However, much of this growth is temporary. It tends to highlight increasing income inequalities, the host-nation government’s lagging capacity to manage and sustain growth, and expanding opportunities for corruption.

Rather than focus efforts toward immediately achieving economic growth, intervening elements aim to build on those aspects of the economic sector that enable the economy to become self-sustaining. These aspects include physical infrastructure, a sound fiscal and economic policy, an effective and predictable regulatory and legal environment, a viable workforce, business development and increased access to capital, and effective management of natural resources.
The Immediate Drivers of Instability


The root causes are critical to understanding why a state is unstable, but additional analysis is required to understand how they have manifested in specific political dynamics that threaten the HN. To develop an effective plan for stabilization, the joint force must analyze the immediate drivers of instability. Opportunity, motive, and means are central to understanding and mapping the drivers of instability as a basis for the design and detailed planning to create stability.

Opportunity

Opportunity may emerge slowly over time due to a decline in HN capacity to control its territory and population. It can also arise when HN security force capacity remains level, but the willingness of the HN population to cooperate with HN forces declines. Conversely, opportunity can also emerge suddenly as the result of a natural, industrial, or humanitarian disaster that overwhelms the capacity of the HN government to maintain control. In these cases, the HN government may face criminal or political opportunists seeking to exploit a sudden vacuum of authority.

Motive

The motives for violence vary between individuals and communities, and between elites, combatants, and supporters. For a joint force conducting stability activities, it is important to distinguish between the root causes that made a society vulnerable to instability, and how those conditions were transformed into drivers of instability by established or aspiring elites. The existence of grievances does not automatically cause instability: poverty, unemployment, economic inequality, inadequate essential services, political marginalization, and repression are unfortunately commonplace, and exist in many places that are reasonably stable. It takes leaders to build a compelling narrative that links grievances to a political agenda. Those leaders use that narrative to mobilize support for some political purpose, including possibly undermining the government’s ability to constrain their freedom of action. The narrative explains who is to blame for the grievances, how the grievances should be addressed and what the population should do. The success of a narrative is based not only on the substance of its promises and threats, but how it is presented to the target audience. Successful narratives typically frame grievances in terms of an ethnic, religious, political, class, or geographic identity, emphasizing its marginalization by the HN government. The identity provides the symbols, myths, and historical references that are woven into the narrative to bolster its credibility and appeal.

Means

Finally, acquiring the means to mount a violent challenge to the incumbent government authorities is a significant task for armed actors, and the way such groups go about securing those resources can strongly influence their behavior. The leaders of destabilizing actors must assemble and organize personnel, funds, weapons, and systems of secure communications and logistics—often covertly. Leveraging existing social networks, diaspora support, illicit economies, or state sponsorship can all provide armed actors with the means to challenge HN authority, but each comes with drawbacks as well. Relying on existing social networks can provide a resilient, deeply rooted source of people and funds, but that social identity may limit the ability to win broader support. Diaspora politics and priorities can diverge significantly from those in the theater of operations, creating tensions between local factions and their geographically removed backers. Deepening involvement in illicit economies can transform organizations into criminal organizations as profit becomes an end in itself. State sponsors can often prove the strongest support base, but have their own agendas and expect to wield influence or even outright control.
III. Joint Stability Functions


While the assignment of specific tasks and prioritization among them depends on the mission and conditions of the OE, the stability sectors are a tool to help visualize the scope of stabilization efforts within a joint operation. JIPOE, mission analysis, and the CONOPS sequence necessary activities within the LOEs aligned to operational and tactical objectives and develop appropriate priorities for those activities and resource allocation. Individually, the joint stability functions encompass the distinct yet interrelated tasks that constitute stability activities in a stability sector. Collectively, they are the framework through which the USG identifies the possible tasks required in a stabilization effort. Incorporating tasks within each sector into coherent LOEs is required to ensure that efforts are properly aligned to their specific objective and integrated to create cross-cutting effects.

Integrated Approach to Stabilization


Although some tasks are executed sequentially, success necessitates an integrated approach that focuses on synchronized actions, whether concurrent or sequential, throughout the OE. These tasks are inextricably linked; positive results in one area of stabilization depend upon the successful integration and synchronization of activities across the other areas. The JFC should establish LOEs based on the political strategy that integrates the stability functions within each LOE. Preferably, the JFC should use them simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across all sectors of the HN. In hostile environments, joint forces may be tempted to utilize all available capacity on security efforts. However, security is usually conditional on a degree of popular consent and this, in turn, is conditional on the restoration of basic governance functions. Accordingly, the JFC should not presume that others could implement, for example, governance functions once the joint force has managed to reduce the level of violence. Some tasks are interdependent and a minimal level of security, governance, and rule of law will be necessary to facilitate an initial sense of stabilization.

The joint stability functions are security, FHA, economic stabilization and infrastructure, rule of law, and governance and participation. These functions are based upon the sectors developed in the stability ETM as interagency guidance on stability and reconstruction activities across the USG.
A. Security
Security activities seek to protect and control civil populations, territory, and national assets such as infrastructure or natural resources. Such activities may be performed as part of a military occupation during or after combat; as a component of a COIN or peacekeeping operation; or in response to a natural disaster. They seek to reassure rather than compel the civilian population, while communicating a clear, credible threat of force to opportunists or potential adversaries.

B. Humanitarian Assistance
The humanitarian assistance function includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the well-being of the population. Well-being is characterized by access to and delivery of basic needs and services (i.e., water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of a social fabric and community life.

C. Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure
The economic stabilization and infrastructure function includes programs conducted to ensure an economy in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a predictable system of economic governance bound by law. A sustainable economy is characterized by market based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation.

D. Rule of Law
The rule of law function refers to programs conducted to ensure all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law, which is supreme. The rule of law in a country is characterized by just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Rule of law requires laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated, and that are consistent with international human rights principles. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation of powers, participation in decision making, and legal certainty.

E. Governance and Participation
Governance is the state’s ability to serve the citizens through the rules, processes, and behavior by which interests are articulated, resources are managed, and power is exercised in a society. Participation is a process by which authority is conferred on rulers, by which they make rules and by which those rules are enforced and modified, and refers to programs conducted to help the people to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the nation. These rules and processes must be seen as predictable and tolerable in the eyes of the population to be deemed legitimate. They are manifested in three core functions: representation, security, and welfare.

Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS)
Stabilization efforts, depend on the exercise and establishment of legitimacy, credibility, and trust. Fundamental to each of these principles is the alignment of words, images, and deeds. Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) who fail to synchronize their communication into a coherent and unifying narrative, across all Lines of Effort (LOEs) and all units, agencies, and partners supporting these LOEs, risk credibility gaps that provide the threat fodder for its propaganda and jeopardize support for joint and multinational operations and, ultimately, the HN. In other words, it is essential to synchronize themes, messages, images, and actions with operations, and when appropriate, vice versa.

See also pp. 3-50 to 3-51. For further details, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs, and Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 2-13, Commander’s Communication Synchronization.
B. Establish Civil Control

Establishing civil control is a preliminary step toward instituting rule of law and stable, effective governance. Although establishing civil security is the first responsibility of military forces in a stability operation, they can only accomplish it by also restoring civil control. Internal threats often manifest themselves as an insurgency, subversive elements within the population, organized crime, or general lawlessness. Each significantly threatens law and order and therefore the overall effort to establish a secure, stable peace. Civil control centers on justice reform and the rule of law, supported by efforts to rebuild the host-nation judiciary, police, and corrections systems.

Establishing civil control is a preliminary step toward instituting rule of law and stable, effective governance. Although establishing civil security is the first responsibility of military forces in a stability operation, they can only accomplish it by also restoring civil control. Internal threats often manifest themselves as an insurgency, subversive elements within the population, organized crime, or general lawlessness. Each significantly threatens law and order and therefore the overall effort to establish a secure, stable peace. Civil control centers on justice reform and the rule of law, supported by efforts to rebuild the host-nation judiciary, police, and corrections systems. It encompasses the key institutions necessary for a functioning justice system, including police, investigative services, prosecutorial arm, and public defense. Civil control includes helping the state select an appropriate body of laws to enforce; usually this is the host nation’s most recent criminal code, purged of blatantly abusive statutes.

In a fragile state, the justice system often ceases to function altogether with absent judges and legal professionals, looted or destroyed courts and prisons, damaged or destroyed records, and any surviving vestiges of the justice system stripped of essentials. With a transitional military authority, intervening forces may perform both judicial and correctional functions. Promoting the rule of law in these cases requires that military forces abide by the law and are held accountable for any crimes committed.

To provide for the safety and security of the populace successfully, an effective judiciary branch and a functioning corrections system must complement the state’s security institutions. Together with governance and civil security, civil control is a core element of security sector reform. This reform sets the foundation for broader government and economic reform and successful humanitarian relief and social development. Establishing civil control protects the integrity of the security sector reform program. Civil control tasks prevent corruption that threatens security institutions when institutions lack the support of judges to apply the law and prisons to incarcerate the convicted.

Building host-nation capacity for civil control is paramount to establishing the foundation for lasting civil order. Community-oriented police services under civilian control that clearly separate the roles of the police and military are essential to success. As with host-nation security forces, the development of police forces proves integral to providing a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Military forces first need to restore and then maintain civil order until formed police units trained in stability policing skills can perform these functions and begin training host-nation police forces. In some cases, military forces also train, or oversee the training of, host-nation police forces.

Host-nation justice system actors who participated with a corrupt or authoritarian regime and continued their service in such capacities are inconsistent with institutional reform programs. As with other elements of the civil security and governance sectors, an appropriate authority vets the judiciary, police, and corrections staffs and oversees their activities as part of the security sector reform program. Conducted in parallel with other reform processes, near-term efforts focus on building host-nation capacity by restoring the components of the justice system. Long-term development aims to institutionalize a rule of law culture within the government and society. Establishing this culture often relies on the delicate balance between retribution and reconciliation in a state recovering from the effects of collapse. Successful development depends on the ability of the host nation to reconcile with its past—determining whom to punish, whom to forgive, whom to exclude, and whom to accept within the new order of the state.

Civil control regulates selected behavior and activities of individuals and groups. It reduces risk to individuals or groups and promotes security. Within the justice and reconciliation stability sector, initial response tasks aim to develop interim mechanisms for establishing rule of law. Transformation tasks focus on restoring the justice system and processes for reconciliation. Fostering sustainability tasks serve to
establish a legitimate, functioning justice system founded on international norms. These conditions define success within the sector while reflecting the end state necessary to ensure the foundation for enduring stability and peace.

### Conditions to Establish Civil Control

Civil control ensures that citizens live in a safe society in which individuals and groups do not take the law into their own hands. Rather, they respect the decisions of and adhere to the rule of law. Rule of law enables a populace to have equal access to a self-sustaining justice system consistent with international human rights standards and to apply access equally. This is a long-term process conducted by civilian entities. Nevertheless, Army units take initial actions to begin establishing some level of civil control in public order and safety. Initially, Army units are the only authorities capable of implementing some level of civil control and will likely be involved in building host-nation capacity. Army units quickly transfer the lead for these efforts to the U.S. country team.

Civil control includes the following necessary conditions:

- Just legal frameworks
- Public order
- Accountability to the law
- Access to justice
- Culture of lawfulness

### Establish Civil Security Subordinate Tasks

- Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements
- Determine disposition and composition of national armed and intelligence services
- Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
- Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement
- Support identification
- Protect key personnel and facilities
- Clear explosive and other hazards

### C. Restore Essential Services

Efforts to restore essential services ultimately contribute to achieving a stable democracy, a sustainable economy, and the social well-being of the population. In the aftermath of armed conflict and major disasters, military forces support efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until local civil services are restored. Military forces also protect them until transferring responsibility to a transitional civil authority or the host nation. In addition, these efforts typically include providing or supporting humanitarian assistance, providing shelter and relief for displaced civilians, and preventing the spread of epidemic disease. The immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace are always a foremost priority.

However, activities associated with this primary stability task extend beyond simply restoring local civil services and addressing the effects of humanitarian crises. While military forces generally center their efforts on the initial response tasks that provide for the immediate needs of the populace, other civilian agencies and organizations focus on broader humanitarian issues and social well-being. Typically, local and international aid organizations already provide assistance, although the security situation or obstacles to free movement may limit their access to all populations.
I. Stabilization Planning

The development of OPLANs that integrate offense, defense, and stability actions and integrate the military’s stabilization efforts with the activities of interorganizational partners is the responsibility of JFCs and their staffs. JFCs must also ensure that subordinate commanders executing stability actions understand the overall planning of the operation, including, in particular, how various military and civilian stability efforts interrelate and, when possible, integrate with each other and with combat missions, tasks, and activities, if any.

It is the responsibility of CCDRs and their subordinate JFCs to incorporate stability actions into the deliberate and crisis action planning processes when directed by the President or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). In addition to the important role stability actions play in major operations or campaigns and limited contingency operations, stability actions contribute to shaping the operational environment (OE) and supporting the GCCs’ Theater Campaign Plans (TCPs).

Stability Actions

Stability actions can be an integral part of joint operations that focus on achieving both elements essential to strategic success—defeating the adversary and ensuring that in the aftermath that secure and stable conditions are in place that enable reconstruction and development toward a lasting peace. Stabilization efforts are executed continuously throughout joint operations. Executed early enough and in support of broad national interests and policy goals, stabilization efforts provide an effective proactive tool for building partner capacity and reducing the risks associated with natural disasters and violent conflict in partner states. Effective stabilization efforts do this by preparing HNs for crisis and by anticipating and addressing the possible drivers of conflict long before the onset of hostilities or disaster. There is no separate planning process for stability from that used for combat operations. The balance and simultaneity in execution of offense, defense, and stability actions within each phase of a joint operation demands a similar balance and simultaneity in planning efforts.

Establishing Stable Conditions

While defeating an enemy may remove a physical threat to peace and security, establishing stable conditions that will foster peace and security in the mid-term to long-term will remain a significant challenge. Therefore, joint planning must also consider the key elements of conflict transformation—of how joint, interagency, and multinational actions can transform the factors producing violent conflict over time to return stability and attain strategic end states.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!
II. Understanding the Operational Environment (OE)

A holistic understanding of the operational environment enables the design of Understanding the OE. An understanding of the OE in stabilization enables the development of an approach that includes realistic, achievable objectives, and properly aligns ends, ways, and means. Understanding of the OE is accomplished through JIPOE and the collective staff assessment.

Through enhanced understanding of the OE, the JFC can improve the ability to:

• Decipher the true nature of the problem the stabilization efforts is meant to resolve.
• Develop realistic end states and objectives.
• Develop an operational approach that is relevant to the nature of the conflict, appropriate for the operational area, and achievable based on JFC capabilities and available resources.
• Consider relevant aspects of the OE during the planning and execution of activities and operations that produce lethal and nonlethal effects.
• Determine second and third order effects.
• Inform the feedback loop from the JFC to policy makers about the operational feasibility of policy objectives for a given stabilization mission.

The OE is a composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect how the JFC uses available capabilities and makes decisions. The OE typically encompasses the relevant actors and physical areas and factors of physical domains and information environment (which includes cyberspace). Understanding the OE requires a holistic view of operationally relevant aspects of the OE. Decision making and associated behavior of relevant actors are particularly important to understand. Success during stabilization efforts ultimately depends on the ability of the JFC and partners to apply lethal and nonlethal state power in a manner that influences the behavior of people in accordance with US stabilization objectives. Understanding the OE requires an understanding of factors that shape the decision making and associated behavior of relevant actors. A holistic understanding of all relevant components within the OE, helps the JFC to understand how the OE can be shaped, how the OE affects capabilities, and how friendly, adversary, and neutral actors’ actions affect or shape the conflict. Importantly, understanding relevant aspects of the OE enables the JFC to leverage aspects of the OE to achieve its stabilization objectives.

A. Planning, Execution and Assessment

Understanding the OE in stabilization informs planning, execution, and assessment of various aspects of the operation.

Planning

To perform the mission analysis process during planning, a planner needs an understanding of the OE. It helps identify the true nature of the problem, the mission, and the factors within the OE that must be targeted through lethal and nonlethal means to attain the desired end state. Understanding the OE enables planning missions and activities that make sense for the nature of the conflict and that are appropriate in the context of the operational area. It also enables JFC planners to improve planning by better understanding potential second- and third-order effects.

Execution

Once a mission or activity in support of the operation is planned, understanding of relevant factors within the OE enables operators to better execute their missions in a manner that furthers progress toward the objectives of the stabilization efforts.
B. Stability and Defeat Mechanisms
Ref: ADRP 3-07, Stability (Aug ’12), pp. 4-9 to 4-10.

Stability Mechanisms
Commanders use stability mechanisms to visualize how to employ the force to conduct stability tasks in unified land operations. A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace (ADRP 3-0). Some of these mechanisms recover quickly from change in terms of conflict transformation, as they can act as mitigators for drivers of conflict. Combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that help shape the human dimension of operational environments more effectively and efficiently than a single mechanism applied in isolation. The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support.

Compel involves maintaining the threat—or actual use—of lethal force to establish control and dominance, effect behavioral change, or enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, or other arrangements. Compliance and legitimacy interrelate. While legitimacy is vital to achieving host-nation compliance, compliance itself depends on how local populace perceives the force’s ability to exercise force to accomplish the mission. The appropriate and discriminate use of force often forms a central component to success in operations otherwise underscored by stability tasks; it closely ties to legitimacy. Depending on the circumstances, the threat or use of force can reinforce or complement efforts to stabilize a situation, gain consent, and ensure compliance with mandates and agreements. The misuse of force—or even the perceived threat of the misuse of force—can adversely affect the legitimacy of the mission or the military instrument of national power. The effect of civilian casualties—even from unintended incidents such as traffic accidents and collateral damage—can have a lasting and negative impact on the mission. Commanders should have plans in place to mitigate these events including response mechanisms for incidents that do occur. Good will is much harder to rebuild once lost than to build in the first place. Even one ignored civilian casualty incident can put the mission and troops at risk.

Control involves establishing public order and safety; securing borders, routes, sensitive sites, population centers, and individuals; and physically occupying key terrain and facilities. As a stability mechanism, control closely relates to the primary stability task—establish civil control. However, control is also fundamental to effective, enduring security. When combined with the stability mechanism compel, it is inherent to the activities that compose disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, as well as broader security sector reform programs. Without effective control, efforts to establish civil order—including efforts to establish both civil security and control over an area and its population—will not succeed. Establishing control requires time, patience, and coordinated, cooperative efforts.

Influence involves altering the opinions and attitudes of the host-nation population through inform and influence activities, presence, and conduct. It applies nonlethal capabilities to complement and reinforce the compelling and controlling effects of stability mechanisms. Influence aims to affect behavioral change through nonlethal means. It is more a result of public perception than a measure of operational success. It reflects the ability of forces to operate successfully among the people of the host nation, interacting with them consistently and positively while accomplishing the mission. Here, consistency of actions and messages is vital. Influence requires legitimacy. Military forces earn the trust and confidence of the people through the constructive capabilities inherent to combat power, not through lethal or coercive means. Positive influence is absolutely necessary to achieve lasting control and compliance. It contributes to success across the lines of effort and engenders support among the people.
• Support involves establishing, reinforcing, or setting the conditions necessary for the other instruments of national power to function effectively; coordinating and cooperating closely with host-nation civilian agencies; and assisting aid organizations as necessary to secure humanitarian access to vulnerable populations. Support is vital to a comprehensive approach to stability tasks. The military instrument of national power brings unique expeditionary and campaign capabilities to operations emphasizing stability tasks. These capabilities enable the force to address the immediate needs of the host-nation and local populace quickly. In extreme circumstances, support may require committing considerable resources for a protracted period. However, easing the burden of support on military forces requires enabling civilian agencies and organizations to fulfill their respective roles. Typically commanders ease the burden by combining the effects of the stability mechanisms compel, control, and influence to reestablish security and control; restoring essential civil services to the local populace; and helping to secure humanitarian access necessary for aid organizations to function effectively.

Defeat Mechanisms
Defeat mechanisms primarily apply in combat operations against an active enemy force. A defeat mechanism is a method through which friendly forces accomplish their mission against enemy opposition (ADRP 3-0). They are defined in terms of the broad operational and tactical effects they produce—physical or psychological. Commanders translate these effects into tactical tasks, formulating the most effective method to defeat enemy aims. Physical defeat deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims; psychological defeat deprives them of the will to do so. Military forces prove most successful when applying deliberate combinations of defeat mechanisms. As with stability mechanisms, this produces complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism. The four defeat mechanisms are destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate:

• Destroy involves identifying the most effective way to eliminate enemy capabilities. It may be attained by sequentially applying combat power over time or with a single, decisive attack.

• Dislocate involves compelling the enemy to expose forces by reacting to a specific action. It requires enemy commanders to either accept neutralization of part of their force or risk its destruction while repositioning.

• Disintegrate involves exploiting the effects of dislocation and destruction to shatter the enemy’s coherence. It typically follows destruction and dislocation, coupled with the loss of capabilities that enemy commanders use to develop and maintain situational understanding.

• Isolate involves limiting the enemy’s ability to conduct operations effectively by marginalizing critical capabilities or limiting the enemy’s ability to influence events. It exposes the enemy to continued degradation through the massed effects of other defeat mechanisms.

Combining Stability and Defeat Mechanisms
Stability and defeat mechanisms complement planning and the Army design methodology by providing focus in framing complex problems; they offer the conceptual means to solve them. By combining the mechanisms, commanders can effectively address the human dimension of the problem while acting to reduce the security threat. Therefore, one element of the force can focus on reestablishing security and control while another element can address the immediate humanitarian needs of the populace. These focuses are essential in operations conducted among the people where success is often gauged by the effectiveness of long-term reconstruction and development efforts. Thus, early and deliberate combinations of the stability and defeat mechanisms are vital to success, especially in environments where actors may face active opposition.
Stability Assessment Tools

Ref: JP 3-07, Stability (Aug ’16), app. B.

Operation assessment is a process that measures progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. A constant challenge during stabilization efforts is the difficulty to effectively analyze progress using systematic reliable indicators and data collection methods.

Assessment Metrics

The staff should develop metrics to determine if stability actions are properly linked to the JFC’s overall plan and the larger hierarchy of operational and national objectives. Assessment indicators include Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs) and Measures of Performance (MOPs).

Assessment Tools

- **Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF).** The ICAF is a framework that can be used to help people from different USG departments and agencies work together to reach a shared understanding of a country’s conflict dynamics and consensus on potential entry points for additional USG efforts. This assessment will provide for a deeper understanding of the underlying conflict dynamics in a country or region.

- **USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF).** USAID carries out conflict assessments in a country where changes in conditions or circumstances on the ground are needed to enable an environment for sustainable development, the environment requires a blend of immediate relief and stabilization assistance, or where the country context requires contingency or scenario planning due to the likelihood of a rapid change in the environment requiring resources to be redirected in response to a new or renewed crisis.

- **Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE).** The USACE, US Institute for Peace, Office of the Sec of Defense, and US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute developed MPICE as a framework. Fundamentally, the ICAF is an assessment to ascertain the root causes, the drivers of conflict, and the potential resiliency of a HN. Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE) complements the ICAF.

- **USAID Anticorruption Assessment.** This USAID handbook is tailored to conduct anticorruption assessments efficiently and at a level sufficiently detailed to produce targeted and prioritized recommendations.

- **District Stability Framework (DSF).** The USAID District Stability Framework is a methodology designed for use by both military and civilian personnel to identify the underlying causes of instability and conflict in a region, devise programs to diminish the root causes of instability and conflict, and measure the effectiveness of programming.

- **Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool.** CJSART is designed to assist policymakers and program managers prioritize and administer HN criminal justice sectors.

- **USAID Guidelines for Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters.** REA is a tool to identify, define, and prioritize potential environmental impacts in disaster situations and is used to identify and rank environmental issues and follow-up actions during a disaster. REA is designed as a best practice tool for effective disaster assessment and management.

- **Democracy and Governance Assessment.** Conducting a Democracy and Governance Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development provides a framework for constructing donor, in particular USAID, democracy and governance strategies.

- **The Operation Assessment Process.** JFCs measure the effectiveness and performance of stability actions in relation to accomplishing missions and achieving progress toward overall USG stability goals.
Establishing Transitional Military Authority


The JFC is responsible for the detailed planning and operations of the transitional military authority under the general guidelines received from the President and SecDef. The structure and organization of the transitional military authority depend on international law; UN Security Council resolution; the mission of the military force; the organization, capabilities, and capacities of deployed forces; the military and political conditions of the OE, the nature, structure, and organization of the existing or former HN government; and the physical, political, economic, and cultural geography of the HN. The JFC may execute the authorities of civil administration directly, invest the authority in subordinate operational commanders, or establish a separate JCMOTF.

A transitional military authority restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Transitional military authority is not limited to the occupation of enemy territory. During operations outside the United States and its territories, necessity may also require establishing transitional military authority in various situations, including:

- An allied or neutral territory liberated from enemy forces
- A technically neutral or allied territory proven to be hostile
- Ungoverned areas

The time during which a transitional military authority exercises authority varies based on the requirements of both the military operation and international law. To establish transitional military authority, commanders may require from the host-nation population a level of obedience commensurate with military necessity. Such obedience provides security of military forces, maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of the operational area. Commanders can reward civil obedience by reducing infringement on the individual liberties of the local populace.

The degree of control exercised by a transitional military authority varies greatly due to several factors, including:

- The legal authorities of the military commander under international law
- The relationship that previously existed between the U.S. Government and the host-nation government
- Existing attitudes and the level of cooperation among the host nation’s national, regional, and local leaders and the local populace
- Ongoing and projected military operations
- The presence of hostile or enemy forces
- The level of civil obedience

As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control exercised by a military authority can decrease. Authority and control can transfer either to the legitimate sovereign or to another civil authority.

Command Responsibility for Transitional Military Authority

The exercise of transitional military authority is a command responsibility, exercised in accordance with international law. To ensure that situational understanding and cultural awareness inform planning and the conduct of transitional military authority, commanders at all levels maintain open, continuous dialogue. They also collaborate among the echelons of command and various agencies, organizations, and institutions that share in efforts to restore legitimate governance to the host nation.

The authority to implement transitional military authority resides with the President, exercised through the Secretary of Defense and the joint force commander.
VI. Small Unit Stability Tasks & Activities

Ref: FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct ’03), chap. IV and FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10), The Infantry Rifle Company (Jul ’06), chap. 6.

This section highlights small unit tasks and activities related to stability, peace and counterinsurgency operations. For discussion of tasks and activities more closely related to peace operations -- protected areas, separation/neutralization of belligerent forces, interpositioning, nonlethal weapons, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) -- see pp. 4-27 to 4-34.

Stability, peace and counterinsurgency operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists.

Coordination, integration, and synchronization between host-nation elements, other government agencies, and Army forces are enhanced by transparency and credibility. The degree to which the host nation cooperates is fundamental. Commanders publicize their mandate and intentions. Within the limits of operations security, they make the populace aware of the techniques used to provide security and control. Actions on the ground reinforced by a clear and consistent message produce transparency. This transparency reinforces credibility. Credibility reflects the populace’s assessment of whether the force can accomplish the mission.
A. Patrolling


Patrolling is also a high-frequency task during stability operations. The primary advantage of the dismounted patrol is that they provide a strong presence and enable regular interface with the local population. This procedure greatly helps in gathering vital information as well as in developing the base of knowledge of the unit’s AO. Planning and execution of an area security patrol and presence patrol are similar to procedures for other tactical patrols except that the patrol usually occurs in urban areas and patrol leaders must consider political implications and ROE.

Patrolling is the basis of operations in a hostile area. It is aimed at acquiring information, identifying and apprehending persons, and neutralizing hostile groups. The kind of patrol depends on the mission and can be either mounted or dismounted.

Types of patrols can include the following:

1. Presence Patrols
PO forces use presence patrols when the situation in the area is stabilized and there is no direct danger for the forces. The patrol is recognized as a unit of the PO force. The intention is to show the local people that forces are in the area and alert. The patrol is armed, but is acting in a friendly and frank way. The patrols are conducted during daylight hours.

2. Combat Patrols
Conducted in areas where forces may encounter armed, organized groups may be encountered, it may be necessary to conduct combat patrols. In such circumstances, imposing a curfew will ensure that the combat patrol is not placed at a disadvantage it will usually be sensible to impose a curfew so as not to place the combat patrol at a disadvantage.

3. Ambush Patrols
Ambushes are sometimes useful in rural operations. If conducted under cover of a curfew and the necessary precautions are taken to ensure that innocent people do not get involved, it is possible to set a conventional style ambush designed to capture hostile persons.

4. Reconnaissance Patrols
Reconnaissance patrols play a major role in PO for several reasons. They will need to visit all outlying communities in order to both acquire information and provide the reassurance of a security force presence. These patrols may have to search areas and they may need to set up hasty roadblocks.

5. Air and Space Assets
Use air and space assets to cover large areas and gain certain types of information quickly. For example, the use of thermal imaging cameras can gain timely information, both day and night, for monitoring movement and activity. The threat of applying lethal air power can limit movement of hostile forces.

6. Naval Patrolling
Naval assets provide operational support, including anything from patrolling inland waterways to major ocean coastlines. Other missions commonly performed can include search and rescue (SAR) operations, observation and reporting on pollution damage to the marine environment, and combined training missions with ground elements of the PO force. Examples of training missions include insertion and extraction of personnel at coastal remote sites, re-supply, SAR exercises, small arms live fire exercises, and familiarization rides to encourage mutual understanding and cohesion among contingents.
L. Refugees and Displaced Persons

Military forces do not have primary responsibility for the international response that assists refugees and DP’s. However, they may support the activities of their civilian partners. Refugees and DP’s operations are a subset of DC operations under populace and resources control (PRC).

IDP’s are frequently confused with refugees or other DP’s. The distinction between the two categories is essentially a matter of location. A refugee gains that status crossing an international border. An internally DP, on the other hand, remains within the boundary of the country of origin.

A fundamental point of population movement is that it does not occur without reason. Usually, indicators exist that individual rights are, or soon will be, in jeopardy. They may request that the military provide intelligence support to assist in determining the direction and magnitude of these movements.

Technical and Legal Considerations

The distinction between refugees and IDP’s has less to do with reasons for movement and more to do with technical and legal considerations associated with the individual’s ultimate destination. Both the refugee and IDP may be fleeing the same threat, and both may experience the same requirements to alleviate the threat. Virtually every humanitarian agency has the flexibility to respond to the needs of both refugees and IDP’s. The UNHCR, whose mandate specifically charges the organization to respond to the needs of refugees, can serve the interests of IDP’s on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs must work to ensure the UN system protects and assists persons who are not covered by other UN mandates. This office, as the title implies, coordinates the humanitarian response to emergencies, and advocates the interests of the internally displaced community.

Stages

The five stages of movement are preflight and flight, arrival, asylum, repatriation, and reintegration.

- Preflight and flight. Call on military forces to provide intelligence support to determine the timing, magnitude, and direction of the population movement.
- Arrival. Depending on timing and the security at the arrival location, call on the military to assist international organizations, NGOs, and the HN during the initial arrival of the refugees.
- Asylum. Army forces may secure refugee camps and settlements in the host country while at the same time assisting with stabilization of the refugees’ country of origin.
- Repatriation. When conditions in the operational area improve, and the displaced community returns to its native country, they may need military support to secure repatriation crossing points, screening points, transit sites, and returnee movement to local communities.
- Reintegration. Reintegration is the final phase. During this phase, commanders may require military forces to assist with the security of returnees as they are absorbed into their local communities. This support would be especially critical in the absence of a capable host-nation public safety establishment or active resistance to resettlement. International civilian police normally assume the primary responsibility for community law and order.

M. De-mining and Unexploded Ordnance

Every year, landmines kill 15,000 to 20,000 people and severely maim countless more.
Peace operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another intergovernmental organization (IGO), within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally.

I. Types of Peace Operations

PO includes the five types of operations. PO include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace enforcement operations (PEO), conflict prevention, peacemaking processes, and peace building post conflict actions. Conduct PO in conjunction with various diplomatic activities necessary in securing a negotiated truce and resolving the conflict.

Note: The US adopted the term peace operations while others such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted the term peace-support operations.
1. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
PKO consist of military support to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.

PKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations. Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire is in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. A main function of the PKO force is to establish a presence that inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. Agreements often specify which nations’ forces are acceptable, as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute.

See pp. 4-11 to 4-14 for further discussion.

2. Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)
Peace enforcement operations (PEO) enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel providing FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties. PEO may be conducted pursuant to a lawful mandate or in accordance with international law and do not require the consent of the HN or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is preferred. Forces conducting PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. Forces conducting PEO generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting.

See pp. 4-15 to 4-18 for further discussion.

3. Peace Building (PB)
PB consists of actions that support political, economic, social, and security aspects of society. Although the major responsibility for PB is with the civil sector, early in PO, when critical and immediate tasks normally carried out by civilian organizations temporarily exceed their capabilities, PO forces should assist and cooperate with the HN civil sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IGOs, to ensure that those tasks are accomplished.

See pp. 4-19 to 4-24 for further discussion.

4. Peacemaking (PM)
Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issues that led to the conflict.

Military support to the peacemaking process includes military-to-military relations, security assistance, or other activities, which influence disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.

An example of military support to peacemaking was the involvement of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Joint Staff plans directorate during the development of the Dayton Accords by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia outlining a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention employs complementary diplomatic, civil, and military means to monitor and identify the causes of a conflict, and takes timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Chapter VI of the United Nations (UN) Charter covers activities aimed at conflict prevention. Conflict prevention includes fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. An example of military support to conflict prevention is Operation ABLE SENTRY.
II. Characteristics of Peace Operations

Ref: ATP 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Nov ‘14), pp. 1 to 3.

The United States (US) participates in a broad range of military operations (ROMO), including counterinsurgency, crisis response, and contingency operations, necessitating interaction with indigenous populations and institutions. Peace operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, including international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment in support of reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitating the transition to legitimate governance.

The typical PO operational area is characterized by complex and ambiguous situations and may possess the following:

- Asymmetrical threats
- Failed states
- Absence of rule of law
- Gross violations of human rights
- Collapse of civil infrastructure
- Presence of dislocated civilians (DCs)

Political mandates or constraints affect tactical operations and operations at the tactical level can have strategic implications.

Risk management is a key consideration. PO are dangerous and leaders at every level must continuously assess the risk to their forces and take appropriate risk mitigation actions.

PO involve multiple agencies within the US Government (USG) including the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of State (DOS), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Department of Justice (DOJ). Civil-military operations (CMO) are a central focus of PO with military in a supporting role.

Most PO are multinational in character. This creates challenges because each nation contributes its individual perspectives and unique capabilities.

US national policy determines US participation in PO. The US may participate with regional organizations (e.g., NATO) under the auspices of the UN, in cooperation with other countries or unilaterally.

There is no standard mission for PO. Each PO is unique, with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics.
II. Peace Enforcement Tasks


PEO tasks may include some of those conducted in PKO as well as enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. See pp. 4-27 to 4-34 for discussion of related multi-service TTPs.

1. Enforcement of Sanctions and Exclusion Zones
These include a broad range of possible tasks. Commanders must understand that actions to enforce sanctions, while endorsed by the UNSC, have traditionally been considered acts of war and should posture their forces accordingly.

2. Protection
PEO contingent forces may be tasked to provide protection for FHA missions. This could include protection for IGOs, NGOs, OGAs, and other military personnel who are providing FHA. Such protection may include establishing secure base areas, protecting routes or corridors for the transport of relief supplies, and providing security for distribution sites. If belligerent parties oppose the delivery of relief supplies by IGOs, NGOs, or other agencies, PEO forces may deliver the supplies by providing airlift or other forms of logistic support. The CMOC, when established, serves as the focal point for requests for support from US forces.

3. Operations to Restore Order
These are conducted to halt violence and support, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. They are designed to restore stability to the point where indigenous police forces can effectively enforce the law and reinstate civil authority.

4. Forcible Separation of Belligerent Parties
This PEO task can pose a very high risk to the contingent force. Forcible separation may involve reducing the combat capability of one or more of the belligerent parties. The contingent force will normally retain the right of first use of force. Forces conducting forcible separation require extensive offensive combat capability, as well as combat support and combat service support (CSS). The goal is to force the belligerent parties to disengage, withdraw and, subsequently, to establish a BZ or DMZ.

5. Conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Operations
If PEO require forcible separation of belligerent parties, then there will be a requirement to conduct I/R operations as contingent forces capture or detain parties to the conflict. Depending on the type of conflict that results from forcible separation, I/R operations will need to be conducted for enemy prisoners of war/civilian internees and/or DCs. Forces responsible for conducting I/R operations must ensure that appropriate CSS assets are deployed to support this PO mission. The I/R operations will become critical as forces transition from PEO to PKO.
V. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques & Procedures

Ref: ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31], Peace Operations Multi-Service TTPs (Nov ’14) and adaptations from FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct ’03).

This section highlights multiservice tactics, techniques and procedures related to peace operations. For related discussion of small unit tasks and activities in support of stability operations -- patrolling, observing and reporting, movement control, searches, demilitarization, convoy operations, curfews, civil disturbances, refugees and displaced persons -- see pp. 3-79 to 3-98.

I. Creating a Secure Environment

The goal of a peace force is to create the conditions for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities to achieve the political objective stated in the mandate and to transition from military to civil control. The peace force must separate and neutralize belligerent forces to ensure public security, establish/maintain freedom of movement, and protect FHA.

A. Principles

- Focus the operation at the tactical level
- Sustain consent for the operation
- Keep the entire operation transparent
- Act as liaison to all key parties and local authorities
- Belligerents must fully participate for success
- The PO force must have full freedom of movement
- Observing, reporting, and monitoring are the essential tools
- IO are key
- Maintain law and order

B. Military Tasks

- Physically occupy key terrain to establish control over urban and rural areas
- Separate belligerent forces
- Disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate
- Control weapons
- Control borders. Commanders must regulate the movement of persons or goods across borders. They may task units to guard ground, maritime, or air (or a combination of all) borders.
- Secure key sites
- Establish control measures that are visible and known to the local population.
- Ensure freedom of movement
- Establish secure base(s)
- Establish and maintain presence in the AO
- Establish protected areas
- Ensure public security
I. Insurgency

Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency uses a mixture of subversion, sabotage, political, economic, psychological actions, and armed conflict to achieve its political aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, a military occupation government, an interim civil administration, or a peace process while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy—the central issues in an insurgency. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics but they have the following aspects: a strategy, an ideology, an organization, a support structure, the ability to manage information, and a supportive environment. It is these aspects that set an insurgency apart from other spoilers and present a significant threat. Typically, insurgents will solicit, or be offered, external support from state or non-state actors.

Insurgencies will continue to challenge security and stability around the globe in the 21st century. While the possibility of large scale warfare remains, few nations are likely to engage the US, allies, and partner nations. Globalization, numerous weak nation-state governments, demographics, radical ideologies, environmental concerns, and economic pressures are exacerbated by the ease of interaction among insurgent groups, terrorists, and criminals; and all put both weak and moderately governed states at risk. Today, a state’s failure can quickly become not only a misfortune for its local communities, but a threat to global stability and US national interests.

Long-standing external and internal tensions tend to exacerbate or create core grievances within some countries, which can result in political strife, instability, or, if exploited by some groups to gain political advantage, even insurgency. Moreover, some transnational terrorists with radical political and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked threat.

The United States Government (USG) has supported numerous allies and partner nations to prevent or disrupt threats to their stability and security through foreign assistance and security cooperation (SC) activities as part of geographic combatant commanders’ (GCC’s) theater campaign plans in conjunction with other USG efforts. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) efforts can include counterterrorism (CT) operations and foreign internal defense (FID) programs supported by stability operations tasks. If a friendly nation appears vulnerable to an insurgency, and it is in the best interest of the USG to help the host nation (HN) mitigate that insurgency, the USG would support the affected nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy and program through a FID program. When an HN government supported by a FID program appears to be overwhelmed by internal threats, and if it is in the national security interests of the USG, then the third category of FID, US combat operations, may be directed by the President. Those US combat operations would be in the form of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, whether in conjunction with the HN forces, or in place of them, until the HN has the necessary capability and capacity to take on combat operations. However, the HN must retain responsibility for dealing with the insurgency even though US forces may temporarily be conducting COIN operations.
IV. Strategic Principles


Whatever type of strategy and operational approach that a counterinsurgency takes, several strategic principles are normally relevant. Whether the U.S. is enabling a host nation with certain capabilities or directly using its land forces, the principles listed in below are relevant to most counterinsurgency operations. However, these principles are not meant to be exclusive rules for every conflict. They are provided for the practitioner and planner as a foundation for how they think about planning and executing counterinsurgency operations.

1. Legitimacy is the Main Objective
   Fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government that can provide security and acts in the best interests of its people may be essential to countering an insurgency. Legitimacy can be seen as the willing acceptance of a government by its population. Counterinsurgency forces may achieve this objective by the balanced application of both military and nonmilitary means. Governments rule through a combination of consent and coercion. Governments that are “legitimate” normally rule with the consent of the governed; those described as “illegitimate” tend to rely mainly or entirely on coercion. Citizens of the latter tend to obey the state for fear of the consequences of doing otherwise, rather than because they voluntarily accept its rule. Legitimacy is a perceived condition by the population that can only be achieved by host-nation government actions that lead to an acceptance of its primacy by the people.

2. COIN Forces Must Understand the Environment
   Successful conduct of counterinsurgency operations depends on thoroughly understanding the society and culture within which they are being conducted. In most counterinsurgency operations in which foreign forces participate, insurgents hold a distinct advantage in their level of local knowledge. They speak the language, move easily within the society, and are more likely to understand the population’s interests. Thus, for foreign forces participating in counterinsurgency operations, they require a greater emphasis on certain skills, such as language and cultural understanding. Understanding the operational environment allows the counterinsurgent to identify the conditions which impact the prerequisites for the insurgency and the root causes that are driving the population to accept the insurgency. Only through understanding the operational environment can the counterinsurgent plan and execute successful operations to counter the conditions that allow the insurgency to exist in the first place. Nevertheless, U.S. forces must never assume they will be welcomed by a local population. They may even be viewed as occupiers.

3. Intelligence Drives Operations
   Effective counterinsurgency operations are shaped by timely, relevant, tailored, predictive, accurate, and reliable intelligence, gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force. Without accurate and predictive intelligence, it is often better to not act rather than to act. Gaining situational understanding before action is often essential in avoiding long term damage to mission objectives. In environments where commanders do not have situational understanding, the first action they should take is to use forces to gain that understanding while not creating unintended and lasting harm to the mission.

   Because of the dispersed nature of counterinsurgency operations, the actions of counterinsurgency forces are key generators of intelligence. In counterinsurgency operations, a cycle often develops where intelligence drives operations, which produces additional intelligence that facilitates subsequent operations. Reporting by tactical units and civilian agencies is often of greater importance than reporting by specialized national intelligence assets. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable tempo (rate of military operations) drive the requirement to produce and disseminate intelligence at the lowest practical level. Commanders are responsible for driving the intelligence process.
4. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential
Whenever possible, security forces should be provided by the host nation. To establish legitimacy, the affected government must strive to transition security activities from military authorities to host-nation law enforcement authorities as quickly as feasible. When insurgents are seen as criminals, they lose public support. Prior to any transition to full host-nation responsibility, however, the violence level must be reduced enough for the host-nation counterinsurgency forces to maintain order; otherwise, the host-nation counterinsurgency forces will be unable to secure the population and the host nation may lose the legitimacy gained by the transition. U.S. counterinsurgent forces must also understand how the military and police are viewed by the population and not assume they are always seen as protectors. The goal of a change to a host-nation security force is an accountable, self-sustaining, capable, and credible force able to meet the security challenges faced by the host nation and seen as legitimate by the population.

5. COIN Forces Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment
Counterinsurgency operations can be protracted. Though most insurgencies are quickly defeated by the host nation and its military forces, U.S. involvement normally comes in insurgencies that are not quickly defeated. Insurgents can become extremely difficult to identify, track, and interdict if they are effective in acting clandestinely. Insurgencies may persist for many years after the main threat has been broken. Thus, counterinsurgency operations may demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. The population must have confidence in the staying power of both the affected government and any counterinsurgency forces supporting it. The population may prefer the affected government to the insurgents; however, people do not actively support a government unless they are convinced that the government has the means, ability, stamina, and will to win. Stabilizing the security situation and transforming a failed, failing, or ineffectual government into a functional one is an extremely difficult task that may take an extended period to complete.

6. Manage Information and Expectations
Information and expectations are related; skillful counterinsurgency forces manage both. To limit discontent and build support, the affected government and any counterinsurgency forces assisting it create and maintain a realistic set of expectations among the population, friendly military forces, and the international community. The key tools to accomplish this are information operations through the effective coordination and synchronization of information related capabilities. Effective counterinsurgency commanders tell the truth; they refuse to give projections; and they do not promise more than can be provided. Achieving steady progress toward a set of reasonable expectations can increase the population’s tolerance for the inevitable inconveniences of ongoing counterinsurgency operations. Where a large foreign force is present to help establish a regime, this progress can extend the period until foreign forces are perceived by the population as an army of occupation.

Effective counterinsurgency forces must ensure that their deeds match their words and both are consistent with the broader narrative. They should also understand that any action has an information reaction. Counterinsurgency forces should carefully consider that information reaction’s impact on the many audiences involved in the conflict and on the sidelines. They should work actively to shape responses that further their ends. In particular, messages to different audiences must be consistent. In the global information environment, people in the area of operations can access the internet and satellite television to determine the messages counterinsurgency forces are sending to the international community. Any perceived inconsistency reduces credibility and undermines counterinsurgency efforts.
Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Interaction Scale


The US will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) conducted by conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) can assist the HN in reducing these contributing factors to insurgency and terrorism. FID operations can be indirect support or direct support (noncombat or combat).

Indirect Support. These are FID operations that emphasize the principle of HN self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.

Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations). These operations involve the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. They differ from SA in that they are joint or Service funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually, but may, include training local military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle. DOD support could include activities such as providing intelligence, mobility support, or logistics support.

US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces into FID operations requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace. If combat is authorized, normally this will include major operations.
VI. Indirect Approaches

An indirect approach seeks to support existing governments, security forces, and groups through increasing capacity to counter an insurgency and enabling existing capabilities. This approach indirectly counters an insurgency by working through host-nation institutions or with groups in the society. The United States (U.S.) can use nation assistance and security cooperation to aid a host nation in building its institutions.

Beyond nation assistance and security cooperation, there are several methods that are indirect methods for countering an insurgency. Among these are generational engagement, negotiation and diplomacy, and identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate. Beyond these methods, there are several indirect enablers that are important in any counterinsurgency. This includes integrated monetary shaping operations.

I. Nation Assistance and Security Cooperation

Nation assistance is assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 3-0). This civil or military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance) is rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S. and that nation. Nation assistance operations support the host nation by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

Nation assistance involves other government agencies that provide expertise in building civil institutions. This is an essential element in counterinsurgency because the military lacks the expertise to build civil control over the population, perform economic reforms, or aid in other basic functions that a host nation may need to prevent or prevail against an insurgency. Using a whole-of-government approach is essential in conducting nation assistance to prevent insurgencies from developing freedom of movement by exploiting the root causes of conflict within an operational environment.

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22). This includes-

- Military to military exchanges (for example, seminars and symposia)
- Combined exercises
- Humanitarian assistance
- Security assistance

When these activities are used to defeat an insurgency, they are part of a counterinsurgency operation. While not all security cooperation activities are in support of counterinsurgency, security cooperation can be an effective counterinsurgency tool. See chap. 1 and chap. 2 for further discussion of these activities.
II. Generational Engagement


Generational engagement is a method that can be conducted in conjunction with other approaches that seeks to get the host nation to educate and empower the population to participate in legal methods of political discourse and dissent. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where an insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. It is best that the host nation undertake this method as soon as possible to affect the next generation. Generational engagement focuses on the population. Generational engagement focuses on building new constituents in the host-nation population to counter insurgent actions. Generational engagement is a method of political mobilization of the people. The purpose of the method is to get population groups to side with the host nation.

Figure 10-1 below provides a general framework for generational engagement.

First, counterinsurgents identify the population that they wish to engage. This relevant population may politically engage and this will encourage the host nation to redress any grievances. This may lead to a reduction of violence. This is all built on a foundation of education, empowerment, and participation.

Five principles are fundamental to generational engagement:

- Groups with whom counterinsurgents partner (such as nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) must be seen as indigenous, not as foreign constructs.
- Independence of funding and resources are important. Support groups can lose credibility the more they are perceived as solely reliant on foreign funding, possibly due to a shift in priorities by a sole and influential benefactor. Organizations and their partners should identify alternative sources of support, including local sponsors, funding from the relevant ministries, or collecting dues from members.
- In selecting partners, counterinsurgents should not limit themselves to the vocal intellectual elite. If the insurgency is based on the root causes of a rural population, intellectual elites might not have legitimacy among the rural poor. Therefore, counterinsurgents should balance support between the central leadership and local branches in the provinces or townships (where youth engagement is usually most important).
I. Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs

In carrying out their civil-military operations (CMO) responsibilities, commanders use civil affairs operations (CAO). The relationship between CMO and CAO is best considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. JFCs seek this synergy by several means, one of the more prominent being through the conduct of CMO that bring together the activities of joint forces and multinational forces (MNFs) and nonmilitary organizations to achieve common objectives.

Civil-Military Operations

**Unified Action**

- The synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort
- Takes place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces under the direction of these commanders

**Civil-Military Operations**

- The responsibility of a commander
- Normally planned by civil affairs personnel, but implemented by all elements of the joint force

**Civil Affairs**

- Conducted by civil affairs forces
- Provides specialized support of civil-military operations
- Applies functional skills normally provided by civil government


There are six civil affairs (CA) functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. CA functional specialists advise and assist the commander and can assist or direct subordinate civilian counterparts. These specialists should be employed to provide analysis in their specialty area that supports planning of interagency efforts or HN efforts, and in a general support role to joint force components requiring such capabilities. GCCs can establish civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9) to plan, coordinate, conduct, and assess CMO. While CA forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to support CMO, other joint forces supporting CMO include...
IV. CMO in Joint Operations  

CMO may occur in any phase of military operations. CMO can be broadly separated into population-centric actions and support to civil actions, though at times these operations can become mixed depending upon the OE.

CMO planners should forecast and continuously reevaluate CMO requirements by analyzing the mission to determine specific tasks. This includes establishing guidance for the specific CMO tasks and developing estimates of the situation to include area studies. In denied areas, CMO planners use intelligence products to access, gather, and validate information for area or functional oriented studies. Planners should consider their knowledge of CMO, geographic areas of specialization, language qualifications, civil sector functional technical expertise, and contacts with IPI. This will allow for timely and critical information on the civilian capabilities and resources in the operational area. Civilian contacts may provide more extensive insight than information collected through intelligence channels, but CMO planners should validate all critical information and assumptions through intelligence capabilities. CA area studies and area assessments provide operational analysis of the civil component of the OE.

CMO tasks vary throughout operation phases. Although JFCs determine the number and actual phases used during a campaign or operation, use of the phases provides a flexible model to arrange CMO. These activities may be performed by CA personnel, other military forces, or combination.

Phase 0—Shape
During the implementation of the CCDR’s security cooperation planning objectives CMO can mitigate the need for other military operations in response to a crisis. CA support FID and contribute to contingency and crisis action planning. In a crisis, CA forces working with HNs, regional partners, and IPI can shape the environment. Shaping operations can include regional conferences to bring together multiple factions with competing concerns and goals, economic agreements designed to build interdependency, or regional aid packages to enhance stability.

Phase I—Deter
CMO should be integrated with flexible deterrent options to generate maximum strategic or operational effect. CMO in the deter phase builds on activities from the shape phase. CA forces support NA, SA, FID, and PO. CA can also conduct area studies and update area assessments to identify potential civil sector and civilian COGs.

Phase II—Seize the Initiative
During this phase, CMO are conducted to gain access to theater infrastructure and to expand friendly freedom of action in support of JFC operations. CMO are designed to minimize civil-military friction and support friendly political-military objectives.

Phase III—Dominate
CMO also help minimize HN civilian interface with joint operations so that collateral damage to IPI from offensive, defensive, or stability operations is limited. Limiting collateral damage may reduce the duration and intensity of combat and stability operations. Stability operations are conducted as needed to ensure a smooth transition to the next phase, relieve suffering, and set conditions for civil-military transition.

Phase IV—Stabilize
The stabilize phase is required when there is no fully functional, legitimate civil governing authority. The joint force may be required to perform limited local governance, integrate the efforts of other supporting or contributing multinational, IGO, NGO, or...
USG department and agency participants until legitimate local entities are functioning. This phase can be marked by transition from sustained combat operations to stability operations. As this occurs, CMO facilitate humanitarian relief, civil order, and restoration of public services as fighting subsides. Throughout this segment, the JFC continuously assesses whether current operations enable transfer of overall regional authority to a legitimate civil entity, which marks the end of the phase.

**Phase V—Enable Civil Authority**

This phase is predominantly characterized by joint force support to legitimate civil governance in the operational area. This includes coordination of CMO with interagency, multinational, IPI, IGO, and NGO participants; establishing and assessing measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs); and favorably influencing the attitude of the HN population regarding both the US and the local civil authority’s objectives.

### Measures of Performance and Effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures of Performance</th>
<th>Measures of Effectiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shape</strong>: foreign humanitarian assistance supplied, quick impact projects.</td>
<td><strong>Shape</strong>: perception by host nation government and host nation populace, reduction of turmoil, return to pre-event levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Deter</strong>: levels of violent/disruptive events.</td>
<td><strong>Deter</strong>: restoration of pre-event civil activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seize the Initiative</strong>: integration with host nation civil-military authorities, host nation government, integration with local populace.</td>
<td><strong>Seize the Initiative</strong>: perception that host nation government and civil-military authorities are legitimate/credible and that United States Government (USG) intervention is welcome.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dominate</strong>: decrease in hostilities, decrease in collateral damage/deaths, injuries.</td>
<td><strong>Dominate</strong>: host nation government lead and legitimacy, USG supporting role is unhindered and unchallenged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stabilize</strong>: humanitarian assistance relief, restoration of services, repair/rebuilding projects.</td>
<td><strong>Stabilize</strong>: self-sufficiency/stability at pre-event levels or better.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Enable Civil Authority</strong>: train/equip law enforcement and military, political elections, mentoring of government officials.</td>
<td><strong>Enable Civil Authority</strong>: self-sufficient/legitimate military and law enforcement, legitimate/unquestioned political elections, legitimate government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Dislocated Civilian (DC) operations are designed to minimize civil-military friction, reduce civilian casualties, alleviate human suffering, and control DC movements. CMO coordinates with civilian agencies to implement measures to locate and identify population centers. CMO also coordinate with civilian agencies to create, restore, and maintain public order. CMO coordinate resources (e.g., labor, supplies, and facilities). CMO coordinate immediate life sustaining services to civilians in the operational area(s) and assist with planning for disease control measures to protect joint forces.

CMO assets may designate routes and facilities for DCs to minimize their contact with forces engaged in combat.

CMO may help contribute to logistics operations. CMO planners can help logistic planners identify available goods and services by using their contacts within the civilian sector.
Authority to Conduct CMO

Authority to conduct CMO can be derived from joint operations, an international cooperative agreement, or an agreement between the USG or appropriate military commander and the government of the area or country in which US forces may be employed. A commander’s authority to undertake CMO derives from Presidential or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) decisions. US strategic objectives, US policy, and relations between the HN government and the USG also influence the authority to conduct CMO.

The law of war requires occupying powers to restore public order and safety while respecting, to the extent possible, the laws of the occupied country; and to establish a civil administration and to control or conduct governmental matters during and after hostilities. International law determines when a territory or a region is actually under the authority of an occupying force, which generally follows the cessation of hostilities. Occupation is a question of fact based on the ability of the occupying force to render the occupied government incapable of exercising public authority or, in the absence of a local government, an ungoverned area. However, mere presence of foreign forces in a nation does not confer occupation rights or responsibilities on that force. Foreign forces present in a sovereign state by consent exercise rights and responsibilities arising from established accords or international agreements.

Liaison

Effective CMO require extensive liaison and coordination among US, multinational, and indigenous security forces and other engaged government departments and agencies as well as NGOs, IGOs, IPI, or the private sector. Liaison officers are commonly employed to establish close, continuous, and physical communications between organizations resulting in enhanced interoperability and increased mission success.

Unified Action

One of the major challenges facing the JFC in CMO is successfully coordinating the activities of the joint force with those of the multinational forces (MNFs) and multiple civilian organizations within the joint operations area (JOA), with each potentially having their own purpose and goals. The joint force operates under a single responsible commander, but unified action requires interagency coordination among all USG participants and interorganizational coordination among all participants. CMO should be closely coordinated with interagency partners such as the US embassy country team. The JFC should coordinate CMO amongst components, supporting forces, the country team, and HN. This is particularly important for lethal operations involving tactical air support or indirect fires. CMO operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels should be nested to ensure unity of effort. Effective planning and coordination for unified action should result in unity of effort during execution.

Civilian-Military Relations

Civilian-military relations are normally the responsibility of the JFC. CMO have proven essential for those relations and typically facilitate accomplishment of the commander’s overall mission. Adversaries may use irregular warfare (IW) to avoid direct confrontation with the US. They may target civilian populations instead of military forces. This erodes distinction between civilian and military institutions, infrastructures, and systems; military and civilian “dual use” infrastructures are becoming more prevalent. Cities and social and cultural hubs are often centers of gravity (COGs) or decisive points rather than military forces or geographic locations. As more people and the influence of their greater numbers migrate to densely populated urban areas, the joint force is more likely to be operating in urban areas than in remote locations. Consequently, CMO should be considered in the planning and execution of military operations.
E. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)

During FHA operations, CCDRs may organize a HACC to assist with interagency partners, IGO, and NGO coordination and planning. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates in early planning and coordination stages. Once a CMOC or HOC is established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through normal CCDR’s staff and crisis action organization.

Joint Task Force-Haiti Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center

The joint task force (JTF)-Haiti commander organized boards, centers, cells, and working groups to facilitate collaboration and align JTF operations with the United Nations (UN) Stabilization Mission in Haiti and other partners. JTF-Haiti stood up a 30-person humanitarian assistance coordination cell (HACC) as a civil-military operations center like mechanism to integrate with the UN cluster system. The JTF Commander designated Brigadier General Matern, a Canadian exchange officer assigned to the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters, the responsibility to lead the HACC efforts. Primarily staffed by members of the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion, the HACC began the task of integrating US military support to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the UN cluster system, and the Government of Haiti by coordinating, planning, and assisting the establishment of medical clinics and food and water distribution points. The JTF also provided key support to the staffs and working groups of USAID and the UN. Possibly the most important assistance provided was in the area of planning and planners. A UN strategic plans officer recently commented about Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE. The military’s planning capability is not the most expensive part, but it is probably the most valuable. The international coordination structure would not have stood up as quickly if they were not tapped into the JTF planning capacity.

Various Sources

F. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

CMOCs are tailored to the mission and augmented by engineer, medical, and transportation assets to the supported commander. The CMOC is the primary coordination interface for US forces and IPI, humanitarian organizations, IGOs, NGOs, MNFs, HN government agencies, and other USG departments and agencies. The CMOC facilitates coordination among the key participants.

A CMOC is formed to:

- Execute JFC CMO guidance.
- Lead JFC CIM.
- Liaise with other departments, agencies, and organizations.
- Provide a joint force forum for organizations which want to maintain their neutrality. Many of these organizations consider the CMOC as a venue for stakeholder discussions, but not a stakeholder decision-making forum.
- Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for support from NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector. The CMOC then forwards these requests to the joint force for action.

See following pages (pp. 6-14 to 6-15) for an overview and further discussion. See also p. 6-22.
Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

CMOC-type organizations should be convenient for interorganizational partners and use joint force communications, transportation, and staff planning capacity to develop unity of effort. JFC should build the CMOC from organic assets and CA personnel, logistic, legal, and communications elements. United States Army (USA) CA units are organized to provide the JFC the manpower and equipment to form the nucleus of the CMOC. CMOCs generally have representatives from:

- Liaisons from Service and functional components
- USAID representatives
- Embassy country team and other USG representatives
- Military liaison personnel from participating countries
- Host country or local government agency representatives
- Representatives of NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector (as appropriate)

Notional Composition of a CMO Center

It is not the intent of this figure to emphasize the CMOC as the center of coordination for all activities, but rather to illustrate organizations that a JFC may cooperate with and hold discussions with concerning an ongoing operation.

Political representatives in the CMOC may provide avenues to coordinate military and political actions. The CMOC may provide NGOs and IGOs a single point of coordination with US forces and help promote unified action.

It is incumbent on the military not to attempt to dictate what will happen but to coordinate a unified approach to problem resolution.
Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Two primary forms of multinational partnership that the joint force commander (JFC) will encounter are an alliance or a coalition.

**Alliance**
An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

**Coalition**
A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are typically ad hoc, formed by different nations, often with different objectives, usually for a single event or for a longer period while addressing a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.

### I. Strategic Context
Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns as they seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) and disaster relief operations, and engage in peace operations (PO). Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence multinational operations and participation. However, a nation’s decision to employ military capabilities is always a political decision.

US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). These operations could span the range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of US Government (USG) departments and agencies, foreign military forces, local authorities, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The move to a more comprehensive approach toward problem solving, particularly in regard to counterinsurgency or stability operations, increases the need for coordination and synchronization among military and nonmilitary entities.

Refer to JFODS5: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for further discussion. Topics and chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0), joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), information operations (JP 3-13), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), plus more!
IV. Command Structures of Forces in Multinational Operations


No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. Organizational structures include the following:

A. Integrated Command Structure
Multinational commands organized under an integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example of this command structure is found in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup.

B. Lead Nation Command Structure
A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure is Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan wherein a US-led headquarters provides the overall military C2 over the two main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces and the other predominately Afghan forces.

C. Parallel Command Structures
Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible.

See pp. 8-16 to 8-17 for discussion and listing of US organizational structures in foreign countries: Ambassadors, Chiefs of Mission, Country Team, Defense Attaches, etc.
II. Multinational Planning & Execution


I. Diplomatic and Military Considerations

Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational response, from man-made actions (such as interstate aggression) to natural disasters (like an earthquake). In responding to such situations, nations weigh their national interests and then determine if, when, and where they will expend their nation’s resources. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The composition of an MNF may change as partners enter and leave when their respective national objectives change or force contributions reach the limits of their nation’s ability to sustain them.

Factors Affecting Military Capabilities of Nations

National Interests
Domestic Politics
Objectives
Arms Control Limitations
Doctrine
Organization
Training
Leader Development
Equipment
History
Defense Budget
Domestic Law
Treaties


Some nations may even be asked to integrate their forces with those of another, so that a contribution may, for example, consist of an infantry company containing platoons from different countries. The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated diplomatic decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance. The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the MNTF’s command structure. In a parallel command structure, national forces essentially operate under their own doctrine and procedures within the guidelines determined by the strategic national guidance and are not significantly impacted by multinational influences. Under the integrated and LN command structures, more multinational involvement and interaction occurs.

As shown in Figure III-1 above, numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations. The operational-level commander must be aware of the specific constraints and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. MNTF commanders (similar to JTF commanders) at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, HN officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats should not be underestimated.
JP 3-08 describes the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) coordination with various external organizations that may be involved with, or operate simultaneously with, joint operations. This coordination includes the Armed Forces of the United States; United States Government (USG) departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector. Interagency coordination describes the interaction between USG departments and agencies and is a subset of interorganizational cooperation.

NOTE:
The organizations listed under each category are included for example purposes only.

Ref: JP 3-08, fig. I-1, Interorganizational Cooperation Relationships.

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational cooperation across a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interest, structures, and authorities. The terms “interagency” and “interorganizational” do not define structures or organizations, but rather describe processes occurring among various separate entities.
Key Coordination Terms

The following terms are a range of interactions that occur among stakeholders. The following descriptions provide a baseline for common understanding.

- **Collaboration** is a process where organizations work together to attain common goals by sharing knowledge, learning, and building consensus.

- **Compromise** is a settlement of differences by mutual concessions without violation of core values; an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing positions, by reciprocal modification of an original position. Compromise should not be regarded in the context of win/lose.

- **Consensus** is a general or collective agreement, accord, or position reached by a group as a whole. It implies a serious consideration of every group member’s position and results in a mutually acceptable outcome even if there are differences among parties.

- **Cooperation** is the process of acting together for a common purpose or mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between organizations. It is the alternative to working separately in competition. Cooperation with other departments and agencies does not require giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.

- **Coordination** is the process of organizing a complex enterprise in which numerous organizations are involved, and bringing their contributions together to form a coherent or efficient whole.

- **Synchronization** is the process of planning when and how—across time and space—stakeholders will apply their resources in a sequenced fashion.

Key Considerations

Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission analysis. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), structures are established at the CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), task force, and Service component levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. The crux of interorganizational cooperation is understanding the civil-military relationship as collaborative rather than competitive.

Organizational Environments

Sharing information among department and agency participants is critical to ensure no participant is handicapped by a lack of situational awareness, uncertainties are reduced as much as possible, and interagency decision making is empowered by a common operational picture. Common unifying goals should be clarified with a discussion on the way to achieve them based upon the roles and responsibilities of each organization with their assigned resources.

Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS)

The USG uses strategic guidance and direction to coordinate use of the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. Commander’s communication guidance is a fundamental component of national security direction.

See pp. 3-50 to 3-51 for further discussion.

Cyberspace Considerations

Access to the Internet provides adversaries the capability to compromise the integrity of US critical infrastructures/key resources in direct and indirect ways. Threats to all interorganizational networks present a significant risk to national security and global military missions.
USG organizations working to achieve national security objectives require increased and improved communications and coordination. This section provides a frame of reference that reflects all levels of interorganizational involvement.

**Joint Planning**
Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission analysis. Where direct participation is not feasible, joint planners should consider the activities and interests of external stakeholders that affect the command’s mission. The CCDR, through the campaign plan, works with civilian organizations to build annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the joint plan. Emphasis should be placed on operationalizing the theater TCP or functional campaign plan (FCP) to facilitate cooperation among all partners, awareness of non-partners, and collective problem framing and synchronization of the CCDR’s campaign plan with other interagency planning products. Subordinate JFCs leverage the planning efforts of the CCMD while also building civilian organization participation into their plan and participate in integrated planning with the embassies. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), structures are established at the CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), task force, and Service component levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This section identifies tools for the commander to facilitate interorganizational cooperation in domestic or foreign operations.

**I. Whole-of-Government Approach**
A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of USG departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of USG capabilities and resources that could be directed toward the strategic objectives in support of US regional goals as they align with global security priorities. Commanders integrate the expertise and capabilities of participating USG departments and agencies, within the context of their authorities, to accomplish their missions.

Whole-of-government planning refers to NSC-sponsored processes by which multiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address challenges to national interests. Whole-of-government planning is distinct from the contributions of USG departments and agencies to DOD planning, which remains a DOD responsibility.

Planning and consulting with stakeholders optimizes the instruments of national power to achieve operational objectives and attain strategic end states in support of US regional goals in support of global security priorities. USG civilian departments and agencies have different cultures and capacities, and understand planning differently. Many organizations do not conduct operational planning. To compensate for these differences, commanders should ensure joint force organization initiatives and broader interagency processes help sustain civilian presence in military planning.
Hallmarks of successful whole-of-government planning and operations include:

- A designated lead or primary agency.
- All USG instruments of national power are integrated into the process.
- Agency core missions are related to mission goals.
- Participants forge a common understanding of the operational environment and the problem USG activities are intended to solve.
- Active lines of communications and pre-established relationships to allow for the ease of information sharing.
- A shared USG goal and clearly stated objectives to achieve results through comprehensive integration and synchronization of activities at the implementation level.
- A common determination of what resources and capabilities are to be aligned to achieve the planning objectives.
- A defined strategic objective.

Guidelines to operationalize a whole-of-government approach require that:

- Commanders and civilian decision makers consider all USG capabilities to achieve objectives.
- Planning groups include personnel from all sectors and organizations.
- Ongoing or existing policies and programs are reassessed, modified where necessary, and integrated into the objectives and desired outcomes defined for the mission and strategic end state.
- Planners consider and incorporate interagency capabilities, resources, activities, and comparative advantages in the application of the instruments of national power.

II. Joint Planning and Interorganizational Cooperation

CCMD campaign plans, also known as TCPs and FCPs, implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy as identified in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) or other issuances, and implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy. Designated CCMD campaign plans direct the activities the command will do to shape the operational environment and deter crises on a daily basis. The commander identifies the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMD, prioritizes objectives (to include the contingencies the command is directed to prepare for), and commits those resources to shape the operational environment and support the national strategic objectives. The commander assesses the commitment of resources and makes recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts in the region. CCMD campaign plans direct military activities (including ongoing operations, security cooperation activities, intelligence collection, exercises, and other shaping or preventive activities) that shape the operational environment to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies.

Strategic Guidance

CCDRs develop objectives based on strategic guidance provided by the President, SecDef, and CJCS. CCDRs coordinate planning for operations, actions, and activities at the theater, strategic, and operational levels to achieve strategic objectives.

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)

Once approval has been provided within the proper chains of command, the CCDRs coordinate with affected USG entities throughout the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise to align the instruments of national power. The CCDR is guid-
The National Security Council (NSC)

Ref: JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation (Oct ’16), pp. II-1 to II-2.

The NSC is the President’s principal forum to consider and decide national security policy. The NSC is the President’s principal arm to coordinate these policies among various USG departments and agencies.

DOD Role in the National Security Council System (NSCS)

Key DOD players in the NSCS come from the OSD and JS. SecDef is a regular member of the NSC and the National Security Council/Principals Committee (NSC/PC). The Deputy Secretary of Defense is a member of the National Security Council/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC). If appointed, an Under Secretary of Defense may chair a National Security Council/interagency policy committee (NSC/IPC).

A primary statutory responsibility assigned to the CJCS in Title 10, USC, is to act as the principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC. The CJCS does this through the NSCS. CJCS regularly attends NSC meetings and provides advice and views in this capacity. The other members of the JCS may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice provided by the CJCS.

The Military Departments implement, but do not participate directly in, national security policy-making activities of the interagency process. They are represented by the CJCS.

Joint Staff Role in the NSCS

The CJCS acts as spokesperson for CCDRs operational requirements and represents CCMD interests in the NSCS through direct communication with the CCDRs and their staffs.

The JS provides operational input and staff support through the CJCS (or designee) for policy decisions made by the OSD. It coordinates with the CCMDs, Services, and other USG departments and agencies, and prepares directives (e.g., warning, alert, and execute orders) for SecDef approval. These orders include definitions of command and interagency relationships.

Within the JS, the offices of the CJCS, Secretary of the JS, Joint Staff J-2 [Intelligence Directorate], Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate], Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics Directorate], Joint Staff J-5 [Plans Directorate], and Joint Staff J-7 [Joint Force Development Directorate] are focal points for NSC-related actions. The JS J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the JS J-4 assesses logistic implications of contemplated operations, and the JS J-5 often focuses on a particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes. Each JS directorate solicits Service input through the Military Departments. SecDef may also designate one of the Service Chiefs or functional CCDRs as the executive agent for direction and coordination of DOD activities for specific mission areas.

For more information on the NSC and its membership, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 5715.01, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.

Combatant Commander (CCDRs’) Role in the NSCS

Although the CJCS presents the views of the CCDRs at the NSC, the CJCS may request and leverage CCMD participation at key NSC forums, including IPCs, NSC/DCs, NSC/PCs, and other events (e.g., Cabinet-level exercises). Execution of CCMD campaign plans by CCDRs is enhanced by robust interaction with interagency partners based on standing authorities. JS and OSD will coordinate authorizations through the NSCS.
The Diplomatic Mission

The US has bilateral diplomatic relations with 190 of the world’s other 193 independent states. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a signatory. DOS provides the core staff of a diplomatic mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG agencies in the country. A diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times the chargé d’affaires (the chargé), when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM. For countries with which the US has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of another country represents US interest and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees. In countries where an IGO is headquartered, the US may have a multilateral mission to the IGO in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country.

- **The Ambassador.** The President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoints the ambassador. The ambassador is the personal representative of the President to the government of the foreign country or to the IGO to which accredited and, as such, is the COM, responsible for recommending and implementing national policy regarding the foreign country or IGO and for overseeing the activities of USG employees in the mission. While the majority of ambassadors are career members of the Foreign Service, many are appointed from outside the Foreign Service. The ambassador has extraordinary decision-making authority as the senior USG official on the ground during crises.

- **Chief of Mission (COM).** The bilateral COM has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those assigned to a combatant command, a USG multilateral mission, or an IGO. The COM may be accredited to more than one country. The COM interacts daily with DOS’s strategic-level planners and decision makers. The COM provides recommendations and considerations for CAP directly to the GCC and commander of a JTF. While forces in the field under a GCC are exempt from the COM’s statutory authority, the COM confers with the GCC regularly to coordinate US military activities with the foreign policy direction being taken by the USG toward the HN. The COM’s political role is important to the success of military operations involving the Armed Forces of the United States. Generally, each COM has a formal agreement with the GCC as to which DOD personnel fall under the security responsibility of each.

- **Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM).** The DCM is chosen from the ranks of career foreign service officers through a rigorous selection process to be the principal deputy to the ambassador. Although not appointed by the President, the DCM wields considerable power, especially when acting as the COM while in chargé. The DCM is usually responsible for the day-to-day activities of the embassy.

- **The Embassy.** The HQ of the mission is the embassy, located in the political capital city of the HN. Although the various USG agencies that make up the mission may have individual HQ elsewhere in the country, the embassy is the focal point for interagency coordination. The main building of the embassy is termed the chancery; the ambassador’s house is known as the residence.

- **Consulates.** The size or principal location of commercial activity in some countries necessitates the establishment of one or more consulates—branch offices of the mission located in key cities, often at a distance from the embassy. A consulate is headed by a principal officer.
IV. Joint Task Force (JTF) Considerations

JFCs are responsible to conduct civil-military operations (CMO). They may establish a JCMOTF when the scope of CMO requires coordination and activities beyond the organic CMO capability. The US Army CA command and brigade, or the United States Marine Corps (USMC) CA group, are staffed to provide the operational core of a JCMOTF. NGOs in the operational area may not have a similarly defined structure. Operations by USG departments and agencies, the equivalent agencies of other national governments, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities, in concert with or supplementing those of HN entities, may be in progress when US forces arrive in a JOA.

Regional Strategy
In further analyzing the mission, consider how the theater or functional strategy will affect joint force planning and operations in the projected JOA. The NSC, DOS, COM, and the supported CCDR will provide the regional strategy and an appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations. This may affect COA development, themes and messages, and planning and execution activities. A well-defined regional strategy will delineate the military mission and assist in determining force requirements and defining the theater objectives.

JTF Assessment Team
A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment team is to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if present, multinational members, UN representatives, and IGO and NGO representatives. USAID, because of the extensive contacts it develops in carrying out development work at the community level, can provide key situational awareness for JTF assessments. The JTF assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST and, if provided early warning of pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment in association with the HAST.

Organizational Tools for the JTF
The CJTF should establish structures to coordinate all activities in the JOA. In addition to military operations, these structures should include political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements, as well as international organizations, NGOs, private sector entities, and the media. The CJTF should consider how joint force actions and those of other organizations contribute to the desired objectives. This consideration requires liaison and routine contact with all parties, as well as reliable communications. An assessment team can develop recommendations for the CJTF concerning formation of an executive steering group (ESG), CMOC, and liaison teams.

V. Civil-Military Teams (JIATFs/PRCs)

A civil-military team combines diplomatic, informational, military, and economic capabilities to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the HN government. A civil-military team can combine military and civil efforts to diminish the means and motivations of conflict, while developing provincial, district, state, or local institutions so they can lead in governance, provide basic services and economic development, and enforce the rule of law. Civil-military teams of interagency experts can be formed to conduct specific missions (e.g., agricultural, economic, and CT). Examples of civil-military teams include JIATFs, and provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan.

See pp. 6-16 to 6-18 and 3-69 to 3-70 for further discussion of civil-military teams.
### Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advise and Assist, 2-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advising, 2-9, 2-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advisor, 2-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aligning Words with Deeds, 8-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>American Experience with Stability, 3-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Analytical Frameworks, 5-26, 5-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annex V (Interagency Coordination), 8-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Anticipation, 5-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Applying the Military Component, 8-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arbitration, 2-62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament, 1-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army Stability Tasks, 3-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Arranging Operations, 5-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessing &amp; Developing a Host-Nation Force, 2-36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessing Relevant Actors, 5-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assessment of Stability Activities, 3-66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Associated Threats, 5-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attack the Network (AtN), 5-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Augmenting, 2-9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>C</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Campaigns, 1-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Centers of Gravity (COGs), 5-42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Affairs Forces and Operations, 6-19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Affairs, 6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Considerations (ASCOPE), 5-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil Disturbances, 3-96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil-Military Integration Mechanisms, 3-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil-Military Integration Structures, 3-70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations (CMO), 6-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC), 6-13, 6-22, 8-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil-Military Teaming (PRT/JIACG/JCMOTF/JIATF), 3-69, 6-16, 8-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Combating Terrorism, 1-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command and Control of U.S. Forces in Multinational Operations, 7-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS), 3-25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Common Operational Picture (COP), 3-56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication, 2-53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach, 3-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducting Searches, 3-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Continuum, 1-1, 1-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict Resolution &amp; Meetings, 2-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Convoy Operations, 3-92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coordinating Efforts, 8-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterguerrilla Operations, 5-52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Countering Insurgencies, 5-39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Interaction Scale, 5-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency (COIN), 1-12, 3-48, 5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Approach, 5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Operational Environment (OE), 5-33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Operations, 5-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Paradoxes, 5-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Counterterrorism, 5-51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criminal Justice Sector Assessment Rating Tool, 3-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis Action Organization, 8-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations, 1-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cross-Cultural Negotiation, 2-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crowd Control, 3-95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Culmination, 5-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cultural Assessments, 2-31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Curfews, 3-94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>D</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decisive Points, 3-63, 5-43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Demilitarization, 3-91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De-mining, 3-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Democracy and Governance Assessment, 3-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Department of State Stabilization &amp; Reconstruction Essential Tasks, 3-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deterrence, 1-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deterrence, 1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomatic Mission, 8-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direct Approaches, 5-43, 5-55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), 3-44, 4-21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Displaced Persons, 3-98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>District Stability Framework (DSF), 3-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dominance, 1-26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dynamics of Insurgency, 5-18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure Mission, 3-25, 3-27, 4-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effective Cooperation, 8-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Index-1
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Index</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effects, 5-42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of Operational Design, 5-42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of Stable States, 3-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy and Security Cooperation Working Relationships, 2-26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Preparedness, 1-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enabling Civil Authority, 1-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End State Conditions for Stability, 3-3a, 3-62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcement of the Mandate, 4-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enforcing Exclusion Zones, 1-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equip, 2-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish Civil Control, 3-31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish Civil Security, 3-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishing Rapport, 2-66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existing Laws, Customs, and Boundaries, 3-72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs), 1-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible Response Options (FROs), 1-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Organization, 3-66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces and Functions, 5-46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Assistance, 1-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Considerations, 8-15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA), 1-15, 3-46</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense (FID), 1-11, 2-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense Framework, 2-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Internal Defense Training, 2-19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Operations, 8-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Security Forces (FSF), 2-49</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fostering Sustainability Stage, 3-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragile States Framework, 3-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, 1-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentals of Stabilization, 3-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gathering the Right Resources, 8-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generational Engagement, 5-53, 5-66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance, 5-5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Participation, 3-25, 3-27, 4-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Cell and Cultural Advisors, 2-33</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), 8-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority, 3-76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard Skills, 2-52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), 1-18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-Nation Forces, 2-25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-Nation Security Forces, 2-43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Terrain System, 2-34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance, 1-11, 3-25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being, 3-27, 4-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC), 6-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), 6-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify, Separate, Isolate, Influence, and Reintegrate (ISI2R), 5-53, 5-59</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity Intelligence (I2), 5-38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Drivers of Stability, 3-10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Approach, 5-43, 5-65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inform and Influence Activities in Stability, 3-50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Environment, 5-34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Management and Information Technology, 5-38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial Response Stage, 3-12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency, 5-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency Prerequisites &amp; Fundamentals, 5-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency Threat Characteristics, 5-27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Elements, 5-23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Narrative, 5-15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgent Objectives, 5-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Approach (Linking Military and Civilian Activities), 3-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Command Structure, 7-6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Monetary Shaping Operations, 5-74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, 3-52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, 5-34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), 3-67</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interim Civil Authority, 3-74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Defense &amp; Development (IDAD), 2-15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Organizations, 8-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interorganizational Cooperation, 8-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpositioning, 4-30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpreters, 2-63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-9 CMO Directorate, 6-9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint CMO Task Force (JCMOTF), 6-11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Intelligence Preparation of Environment (JIPOE), 3-56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Interagency Coordinating Group (JIACG), 8-14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF), 8-13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operation Model (Phasing), 1-20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Planning and Interorganizational Cooperation, 8-8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Stability Functions, 3-24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Joint Support Force (JSF), 8-13
Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in the Interagency Process, 8-12
Justice and Reconciliation Mission, 3-27, 4-22

K
Key Documents in Peace Operations, 4-10
Key Leader Engagements (KLE), 2-31

L
Large-Scale Combat Operations, 1-19
Lead Nation Command Structure, 2-41, 7-6
Legal Basis of Peace Operations, 4-4
Legitimacy, 5-6
Lethal and Non-Lethal Actions, 3-52
Limited Contingency Operations, 1-13
Lines of Effort (LOEs), 3-64, 5-44
Lines of Operation (LOOs), 5-44
Linguist Support/Interpreters, 2-63
Linguist Support Categories, 2-63
Local Government Officials and Departments, 3-74

M
Maintaining Legitimacy, 3-9
Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO), 4-25
Means, 5-13
Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments (MPICE), 3-67
Mediation, 2-57
Meetings, 2-60
Military End State and Objectives, 5-42
Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, & Deterrence, 1-3
Military Engagement Activities, 1-8
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), 3-50
Military Operational Considerations, 5-48
Military Operations and Related Missions, Tasks and Actions, 1-2
Military Tactics, 5-28
Mission Variables (METT-TC), 5-36
Monitor Compliance with an Agreement, 3-90
Motive, 5-13
Movement Control (Roadblocks and Checkpoints), 3-86
Multinational, 7-1
Multinational Command and Coordination, 7-5
Multinational Force, 7-5
Multinational Operations, 7-1
Multinational Planning and Execution, 7-7
Multinational Relationships, 2-40

N
Nation Assistance, 5-65
National Security Council (NSC), 8-9
NATO CIMIC, 6-17
Nature of Insurgency, 5-11
Negotiation and Diplomacy, 5-48, 5-68
Negotiations, 2-56
Network Analysis, 5-35
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), 1-14, 4-34
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), 8-11
Nonlethal Weapons (NLW), 5-33

O
Observing and Reporting, 3-82
Operational Approach, 3-57, 3-65
Operational Art and Stability in Operations, 3-62
Operational Environment (OE), 3-54, 3-55, 5-4, 3-33
Operational Reach, 5-46
Operational Variables (PMESII-PT), 5-36
Opportunity, 5-12
Organizational Diversity, 8-4
Organize, 2-5

P
Parallel Command Structure, 2-40, 7-6
Partnered, 2-41
Partnering, 2-9, 5-54
Patrolling, 3-81
Peace Building (PB), 4-19
Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO), 4-15
Peace Enforcement Tasks, 4-16
Peace Operations (PO), 1-14, 4-1
Peace Operations (PO), 3-40, 5-52
Peace Operations Environment, 4-4
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), 4-11
Peacekeeping Tasks, 4-12
Phasing Major Operations and Campaigns, 3-60
Physical Factors, 5-34
Planning, Execution and Assessment (Stability), 3-54
Planning Stabilization Efforts, 3-57
Planning Transitions and Transferring Authorities, 3-68
Political Activities, 5-27
Political-Military Dimension, 8-18
Population Control, 5-28
Prerequisites for Insurgency, 5-12
Private Sector, 8-11
Protected Areas, 4-28
Protection of Civilians, 3-48
Protection of Shipping, 1-11
Public Diplomacy and Information Operations, 4-24

R
Range of Military Operations (ROMO), 1-1
Rapport, 2-49
Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI), 7-4
Rebuild and Build, 2-8
Recovery Operations, 1-15
Refugees, 3-98
Relationship Building, 2-49
Relevant Actors, 5-4, 5-33
Respect, 2-50
Restore Essential Services, 3-32
Rule of Law, 3-25

S
Sanction Enforcement, 1-9
Search Operations, 4-33
Secure Environment, 4-27
Security, 3-25, 3-26
Security Assistance (SA), 1-10
Security Cooperation (SC), 1-3, 2-1, 3-38, 5-46, 5-66, 7-2
Security Cooperation Activities, 2-1a, 2-2
Security Cooperation Planning, 2-45
Security Force Assistance (SFA), 1-10, 2-5, 2-7, 2-9
Security Mission, 4-20
Security Relationships, 2-1
Security Sector Reform (SSR), 3-42
Seizing the Initiative, 1-22
Selecting an Interpreter, 2-64
Separation of Parties to the Dispute, 4-14
Separation/Neutralization of Forces (Interpositioning), 4-30
Shape, Clear, Hold, Build, Transition (SCHBT), 5-54, 5-56
Show of Force Operations, 1-11
Site Security, 4-29
Small Unit Tasks & Activities, 3-79
Social Science, 5-38
Sociocultural Analysis, 5-35
Soft Skills, 2-52
Stability, 3-1
Stability Actions (Joint Definition), 3-1, 3-13
Stability and Defeat Mechanisms, 3-59
Stability Considerations, 3-37
Stability in Operations (Actions/Tasks/Efforts), 3-1
Stability Operations, 5-52
Stability Operations (Underlying Logic), 3-22
Stability Phases, 3-20
Stability Tasks (Army Definition), 3-1, 3-21
Stabilization, 1-27, 3-5
Stabilization and Reconstruction Essential Tasks Matrix (ETM), 3-14
Stabilization Framework, 3-10
Stabilization Planning, 3-53
Stable States, 3-6
Stakeholders, 8-11, 8-19
Strategic Principles, 5-8
Strike, 1-15, 5-64
Support Activities, 5-28
Support to Counterdrug (CD) Operations, 1-9
Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development, 3-35
Support to Governance, 3-34
Support to Insurgency, 1-12
Training, 2-6
Train, Advise & Assist (TAA), 2-1
Trainer/Advisor Checklists, 2-22
Training and Advising, 2-19
Training the Interpreter, 2-67
Transition Planning, 4-9
Transitional Governing Authorities, 3-71
Transitional Military Authority (TMA), 3-73
Transitions, 3-41
Trust, 2-52

U
Unconventional Warfare (UW), 5-50
Understanding Culture, 2-27
Understanding the Operational Environment (OE), 3-54, 5-4, 5-33
Understanding the Root Causes and Immediate Drivers of Instability, 3-4
Unexploded Ordnance, 3-98
Unified Action, 7-5
Unity of Effort, 8-2
US Government Dept and Agency Coordination, 8-3
USAID Anticorruption Assessment, 3-67
USAID Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF), 3-67
USAID Guidelines for Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment in Disasters, 3-67
USG Structure in Foreign Countries, 8-15

V
Verification of Weapons and Forces, 3-90

W
Whole-of-Government, 3-20, 5-7, 8-6, 8-7
Working with Host-Nation Forces, 2-35
Recognized as a “whole of government” doctrinal reference standard by military, national security and government professionals around the world, SMARTbooks comprise a comprehensive professional library designed with all levels of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines and Civilians in mind.

The SMARTbook reference series is used by military, national security, and government professionals around the world at the organizational/institutional level; operational units and agencies across the full range of operations and activities; military/government education and professional development courses; combatant command and joint force headquarters; and allied, coalition and multinational partner support and training.

View, download FREE samples and purchase online:

www.TheLightningPress.com

The Lightning Press is a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business, DOD-approved vendor and federally registered — to include the SAM, WAWF, FBO, and FEDPAY.
Disaster can strike anytime, anywhere. It takes many forms—a hurricane, an earthquake, a tornado, a flood, a fire, a hazardous spill, or an act of terrorism.

MILITARY REFERENCE: JOINT & SERVICE-LEVEL

Recognized as a “whole of government” doctrinal reference standard by military professionals around the world, SMARTbooks comprise a comprehensive professional library.

MILITARY REFERENCE: MULTI-SERVICE & SPECIALTY

SMARTbooks can be used as quick reference guides during operations, as study guides at professional development courses, and as checklists in support of training.

HOMELAND DEFENSE, DSCA, & DISASTER RESPONSE

Disaster can strike anytime, anywhere. It takes many forms—a hurricane, an earthquake, a tornado, a flood, a fire, a hazardous spill, or an act of terrorism.

The Lightning Press is a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business, DOD-approved vendor and federally registered — to include the SAM, WAWF, FBO, and FEDPAY.
The 21st century presents a global environment characterized by regional instability, failed states, weapons proliferation, global terrorism and unconventional threats.

In today’s complicated and uncertain world, the military must be ready to meet the challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats.

Our eBooks are a true “A–B” solution! Solution A is that our digital SMARTbooks are available and authorized to a user’s Adobe ID and can be transferred to up to six computers and devices via Adobe Digital Editions, with free software available for 85+ devices and platforms—including PC and MAC, iPad, Android Tablets and Phones, and more. Solution B is that you can also use our digital SMARTbooks through our dedicated SMARTbooks iPad App!
SMARTsavings on SMARTbooks! Save big when you order our titles together in a SMARTset bundle. It’s the most popular & least expensive way to buy, and a great way to build your professional library. If you need a quote or have special requests, please contact us by one of the methods below!

View, download FREE samples and purchase online:
www.TheLightningPress.com

Order SECURE Online
Web: www.TheLightningPress.com
Email: SMARTbooks@TheLightningPress.com

Phone Orders, Customer Service & Quotes
Live customer service and phone orders available
Mon - Fri 0900-1800 EST at (863) 409-8084

24-hour Voicemail/Fax/Order
Record or fax your order (or request a call back) by voicemail at 1-800-997-8827

Mail, Check & Money Order
2227 Arrowhead Blvd., Lakeland, FL 33813

Government/Unit/Bulk Sales
The Lightning Press is a service-disabled, veteran-owned small business, DOD-approved vendor and federally registered—to include the SAM, WAWF, FBO, and FEDPAY.
We accept and process both Government Purchase Cards (GCPC/GPC) and Purchase Orders (PO/PR&Cs).

The Lightning Press offers design, composition, printing and production services for units, schools and organizations wishing their own tactical SOP, handbooks, and other doctrinal support materials. We can start a project from scratch, or our SMARTbooks can be edited, custom-tailored and reproduced with unit-specific material for any unit, school or organization.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and stability missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. Use of joint capabilities in these and related activities such as security force assistance and foreign internal defense helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

**Stability operations** are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

**Peace operations** are crisis response and limited contingency operations conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.

A **counterinsurgency campaign** is a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires military forces to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies and to be nation builders as well as warriors.

**Civil-military operations** are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.

**DIME is our DOMAIN!**

SMARTbooks: Reference Essentials for the Instruments of National Power

Part of our “Military Reference” Series

www.TheLightningPress.com