Small Unit TACTICS

Leading, Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations

The Lightning Press
Larsen and Wade
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Leading, Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations
Second Edition with Change 1 (Mar 2017)
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Leading, Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations

* Change 1 to SUTS2 (Mar 2017) incorporates minor text edits from ADRP 3-0 (Nov 2016), FM 6-0 (Chg 2, Apr 2016), and Train, Advise, Assist (chap 4). An asterisk marks changed pages.

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About our cover photo: Prepare to breach. Soldiers from Borzoi Company, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division, stack outside the objective compound while Sappers from the 34th Engineer Company prepare to breach the target building during training in South Korea. (Dept of Army photo).

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Leading, Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations

**Tactics** is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions.

Establishing a common frame of reference, **doctrine** provides a menu of practical options based on experience. It provides an authoritative guide for leaders and Soldiers but requires original applications that adapt it to circumstances.

The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook translates and bridges operational-level doctrine into tactical application -- in the form of tactics, techniques and procedures -- and provides the “how to” at the small-unit level, providing a ready reference at the battalion, company, platoon, squad and fire team level.

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**Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs)**

Principles alone do not guide operations. Tactics, techniques, and procedures provide additional levels of detail and more specific guidance, based on evolving knowledge and experience.

- **Tactics.** Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Effective tactics translate combat power into decisive results. Primarily descriptive, tactics vary with terrain and other circumstances; they change frequently as the enemy reacts and friendly forces explore new approaches.

- **Techniques.** Employing a tactic usually requires using and integrating several techniques and procedures. Techniques are non prescriptive ways or methods used to perform missions, functions, or tasks. They are the primary means of conveying the lessons learned that units gain in operations.

- **Procedures.** Procedures are standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks. They normally consist of a series of steps in a set order. Procedures are prescriptive; regardless of circumstances, they are executed in the same manner. Techniques and procedures are the lowest level of doctrine.

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Offense and Defense (Decisive Operations)
Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug ‘12).

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (CJCSM 5120.01). Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander employs combat power in the conduct of engagements and battles. This section addresses the tactical level of war, the art and science of tactics, and hasty versus deliberate operations.

The Tactical Level of War
ADP 3-90 is the primary manual for offensive and defensive tasks at the tactical level. It does not provide doctrine for stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. It is authoritative and provides guidance in the form of combat tested concepts and ideas for the employment of available means to win in combat. These tactics are not prescriptive in nature, and they require judgment in application.

The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are just a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Strategic and operational success is a measure of how one or more battles link to winning a major operation or campaign. In turn, tactical success is a measure of how one or more engagements link to winning a battle.

The Offense
The offense is the decisive form of war. While strategic, operational, or tactical considerations may require defending for a period of time, defeat of the enemy eventually requires shifting to the offense. Army forces strike the enemy using offensive action in times, places, or manners for which the enemy is not prepared to seize, retain, and exploit the operational initiative. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation (ADRP 3-0).

The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt his attack, and to set the conditions for future successful operations.

The Defense
While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. Army forces conduct defensive tasks as part of major operations and joint campaigns, while simultaneously conducting offensive and stability tasks as part of decisive action outside the United States.

Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense include to retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, to attrit or fix the enemy as a prelude to the offense, in response to surprise action by the enemy, or to increase the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.

Tactical Enabling Tasks
Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the conduct of decisive action. Tactical enabling tasks are usually shaping or sustaining. They may be decisive in the conduct of stability tasks. Tactical enabling tasks discussed in ADRP 3-90 include reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement operations, and urban operations. Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable.
Unified Land Operations

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations in order to create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution.

Executed through...

Offensive tasks

- Movement to contact
  - Search and attack
  - Cordon and search
- Attack
  - Ambush
  - Counterattack
  - Demonstration
  - Spooling attack
  - Feint
  - Raid
- Exploitation
- Pursuit

Defensive tasks

- Area defense
- Mobile defense
- Retrograde operations
  - Delay
  - Withdrawal
  - Retirement

Forms of maneuver

- Envelopment
- Flank attack
- Frontal attack
- Infiltration
- Penetration
- Turning movement

Tactical enabling tasks

Tactical mission tasks

Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, fig. 1, p. iv.

Refer to AODS5: The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Army Operations and the Six Warfighting Functions) for discussion of the fundamentals, principles and tenets of Army operations, plus chapters on each of the six warfighting functions: mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection.
The following references were used in part to compile The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook. Additionally listed are related resources useful to the reader. All references are available to the general public and designated as “approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive information restricted from public release.

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**Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs) and Army Doctrinal Reference Publications (ADRPs)**

- ADP/ADRP 1-02 Feb 2015 Operational Terms and Military Symbols
- ADP/ADRP 3-0* Nov 2016 Operations
- ADP/ADRP 3-07 Aug 2012 Stability
- ADP/ADRP 3-90 Aug 2012 Offense and Defense
- ADP/ADRP 5-0 May 2012 The Operations Process
- ADP/ADRP 6-0 May 2012 Mission Command (with Chg 1, Sept 2012)

**Army Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (ATTPs)**

- ATP 5-19 Apr 2014 Risk Management
- ATTP 3-06.11 Jun 2011 Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain
- ATTP 3-97.11 Jan 2011 Cold Region Operations
- FM 3-19.4 Mar 2002 Military Police Leader’s Handbook (change 1)
- FM 3-21.8 Mar 2007 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad
- FM 3-21.10 Jul 2006 The Infantry Rifle Company
- FM 3-24 Dec 2006 Counterinsurgency
- FM 3-90-1* Mar 2013 Offense and Defense, Volume 1
- FM 3-97.6 Nov 2000 Mountain Operations
- FM 6-0* May 2014 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (w/Change 2, Apr 2016)
- FM 7-0* Oct 2016 Train to Win in a Complex World
- FM 6-01.1 Jul 2012 Knowledge Management Operations
- FM 7-85 Jun 1987 Ranger Operations
- FM 7-92 Dec 2001 The Infantry Reconnaissance Platoon and Squad (Airborne, Air Assault, Light Infantry) w/change 1
- FM 7-93 Oct 1995 Long-Range Surveillance Unit Operations
- FM 90-3 Aug 1993 Desert Operations
- FM 90-5 Aug 1993 Jungle Operations

**Joint Publications**

- JP 3-0 Aug 2011 Joint Operations

**Additional Resources and Publications**

- SH 21-76 Jul 2006 The Ranger Handbook
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Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other, the terrain and the enemy to translate potential combat power into victorious battles and engagements. (Dept. of Army photo by Staff Sgt. Russell Bassett).

I. The Tactical Level of War

Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander employs combat power to accomplish assigned missions. The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions.

Tactical operations always require judgment and adaptation to the unique circumstances of a specific situation. Techniques and procedures are established patterns that can be applied repeatedly with little or no judgment in a variety of circumstances. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and staffs with a set of tools to use in developing the solution to a tactical problem.

Individuals, crews, and small units

Individuals, crews, and small units act at the tactical level. At times, their actions may produce strategic or operational effects. However, this does not mean these elements are acting at the strategic or operational level. Actions are not strategic unless they contribute directly to achieving the strategic end state. Similarly, actions are considered operational only if they are directly related to operational movement or the sequencing of battles and engagements. The level at which an action occurs is determined by the perspective of the echelon in terms of planning, preparation, and execution.
Battles, Engagements and Small-Unit Actions

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander uses combat power in battles, engagements, and small-unit actions. A battle consists of a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement. Battles can affect the course of a campaign or major operation. An engagement is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing, lower echelons maneuver forces (JP 1-02). Engagements are typically conducted at brigade level and below. They are usually short, executed in terms of minutes, hours, or days.

II. The Science and Art of Tactics

The tactician must understand and master the science and the art of tactics, two distinctly different yet inseparable concepts. Commanders and leaders at all echelons and supporting commissioned, warrant, and noncommissioned staff officers must be tacticians to lead their soldiers in the conduct of full spectrum operations.

A. The Science

The science of tactics encompasses the understanding of those military aspects of tactics—capabilities, techniques, and procedures—that can be measured and codified. The science of tactics includes the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations and systems, such as determining how long it takes a division to move a certain distance. It also includes techniques and procedures used to accomplish specific tasks, such as the tactical terms and control graphics that comprise the language of tactics. While not easy, the science of tactics is fairly straightforward. Much of what is contained in this manual is the science of tactics—techniques and procedures for employing the various elements of the combined arms team to achieve greater effects.

Mastery of the science of tactics is necessary for the tactician to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which he must work. These constraints include the effects of terrain, time, space, and weather on friendly and enemy forces. However—because combat is an intensely human activity—the solution to tactical problems cannot be reduced to a formula. This realization necessitates the study of the art of tactics.

B. The Art

The art of tactics consists of three interrelated aspects: the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish assigned missions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced with an intelligent enemy, and understanding the human dimension—the effects of combat on soldiers. An art, as opposed to a science, requires exercising intuitive faculties that cannot be learned solely by study. The tactician must temper his study and evolve his skill through a variety of relevant, practical experiences. The more experience the tactician gains from practice under a variety of circumstances, the greater his mastery of the art of tactics.

Military professionals invoke the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within his commander’s intent by choosing from interrelated options, including—

- Types and forms of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks
- Task organization of available forces, to include allocating scarce resources
- Arrangement and choice of control measures
- Tempo of the operation
- Risks the commander is willing to take
Close Combat


Close combat is indispensable and unique to land operations. Only on land do combatants routinely and in large numbers come face-to-face with one another. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them. The outcome of battles and engagements depends on Army forces’ ability to prevail in close combat.

The complexity of urban terrain and density of noncombatants reduce the effectiveness of advanced sensors and long-range and air-delivered weapons. Thus, a weaker enemy often attempts to negate Army advantages by engaging Army forces in urban environments. Operations in large, densely populated areas require special considerations. From a planning perspective, commanders view cities as both topographic features and a dynamic system of varying operational entities containing hostile forces, local populations, and infrastructure.

Regardless of the importance of technological capabilities, success in operations requires Soldiers to accomplish the mission. Today’s operational environment requires professional Soldiers and leaders whose character, commitment, and competence represent the foundation of a values-based, trained, and ready Army. Today’s Soldiers and leaders adapt and learn while training to perform tasks both individually and collectively. Soldiers and leaders develop the ability to exercise judgment and disciplined initiative under stress. Army leaders and their subordinates must remain—

- Honorable servants of the Nation.
- Competent and committed professionals.
- Dedicated to living by and upholding the Army Ethic.
- Able to articulate mission orders to operate within their commander’s intent.
- Committed to developing their subordinates and creating shared understanding while building mutual trust and cohesion.
- Courageous enough to accept prudent risk and exercise disciplined initiative while seeking to exploit opportunities in a dynamic and complex operational environment.
- Trained to operate across the range of military operations.
- Able to operate in combined arms teams within unified action and leverage other capabilities in achieving their objectives.
- Able to apply cultural understanding to make the right decisions and take the right actions.
- Opportunistic and offensively minded.

Effective close combat relies on lethality with a high degree of situational understanding. The capacity for physical destruction is a foundation of all other military capabilities, and it is the most basic building block of military operations. Army leaders organize, equip, train, and employ their formations for unmatched lethality over a wide range of conditions. Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence suffices to accomplish the mission through nonlethal engagements and activities.

An inherent, complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes. Though each situation requires a different mix of violence and constraint, lethal and nonlethal actions used together complement each other and create multiple dilemmas for opponents. Lethal actions are critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive tasks. However, nonlethal actions are also important contributors to combined arms operations, regardless of which element of decisive action dominates.
Readiness Through Training


Effective training is the cornerstone of operational success. As General Mark A. Milley, Chief of Staff of the Army, wrote in his initial message to the Army, “Readiness for ground combat is—and will remain—the U.S. Army’s #1 priority. We will always be ready to fight today, and we will always prepare to fight tomorrow.” Through training and leader development, Soldiers, leaders, and units achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and allows them to conduct successful operations across the continuum of conflict. Achieving this competence requires specific, dedicated training on offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Training continues in deployed units to sustain skills and to adapt to changes in an operational environment.

Army training includes a system of techniques and standards that allow Soldiers and units to determine, acquire, and practice necessary skills. Candid assessments, after action reviews, and applied lessons learned and best practices produce quality Soldiers and versatile units, ready for all aspects of a situation. Through training and experiential practice and learning, the Army prepares Soldiers to win in land combat. Training builds teamwork and cohesion within units. It recognizes that Soldiers ultimately fight for one another and their units. Training instills discipline. It conditions Soldiers to operate within the law of war and rules of engagement.

Army training produces formations that fight and win with overwhelming combat power against any enemy. However, the complexity of integrating all unified action partners’ demands that Army forces maintain a high degree of preparedness at all times, as it is difficult to achieve proficiency quickly. Leaders at all levels seek and require training opportunities between the Regular Army and Reserve Components, and their unified action partners at home station, at combat training centers, and when deployed.

The Army as a whole must be flexible enough to operate successfully across the range of military operations. Units must be agile enough to adapt quickly and be able to shift with little effort from a focus on one portion of the continuum of conflict to focus on another portion. Change and adaptation that once required years to implement must now be recognized, communicated, and enacted far more quickly. Technology, having played an increasingly important role in increasing the lethality of the industrial age battlefield, will assume more importance and require greater and more rapid innovation in tomorrow’s conflicts. No longer can responses to hostile asymmetric approaches be measured in months; solutions must be anticipated and rapidly fielded across the force—and then be adapted frequently and innovatively as the enemy adapts to counter new-found advantages.

U.S. responsibilities are global; therefore, Army forces prepare to operate in any environment. Army training develops confident, competent, and agile leaders and units. Commanders focus their training time and other resources on tasks linked to their mission. Because Army forces face diverse threats and mission requirements, commanders adjust their training priorities based on a likely operational environment. As units prepare for deployment, commanders adapt training priorities to address tasks required by actual or anticipated operations.

Refer to TLS5: The Leader’s SMARTbook, 5th Ed. for complete discussion of Military Leadership (ADP/ADRP 6-22); Leader Development (FM 6-22); Counsel, Coach, Mentor (ATP 6-22.1); Army Team Building (ATP 6-22.6); Military Training (ADP/ADRP 7-0); Train to Win in a Complex World (FM 7-0); Unit Training Plans, Meetings, Schedules, and Briefs; Conducting Training Events and Exercises; Training Assessments, After Action Reviews (AARs); and more!
V. Homeland Defense and Decisive Action

Ref: ADRP 3-0, Operations (Nov ‘16), p. 3-5.

Homeland defense is the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President (JP 3-27). The Department of Defense has lead responsibility for homeland defense. The strategy for homeland defense (and defense support of civil authorities) calls for defending the U.S. territory against attack by state and nonstate actors through an active, layered defense—a global defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protect the homeland. The Army supports this strategy with capabilities in the forward regions of the world, in the geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the U.S. homeland.

Homeland defense operations conducted in the land domain could be the result of extraordinary circumstances and decisions by the President. In homeland defense, Department of Defense and Army forces work closely with federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private agencies. Land domain homeland defense could consist of offensive and defensive tasks as part of decisive action.

Homeland defense is a defense-in-depth that relies on collection, analysis, and sharing of information and intelligence; strategic and regional deterrence; military presence in forward regions; and the ability to rapidly generate and project warfighting capabilities to defend the United States, its allies, and its interests. These means may include support to civil law enforcement; antiterrorism and force protection; counterdrug; air and missile defense; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives; and defensive cyberspace operations; as well as security cooperation with other partners to build an integrated, mutually supportive concept of protection.

Refer to HDS1: The Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook (Protecting the Homeland / Defense Support to Civil Authority) for complete discussion. Topics and references include: homeland defense (JP 3-28), defense support of civil authorities (JP 3-28), Army support of civil authorities (ADRP 3-28), multi-service DSCA TTPs (ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2), DSCA liaison officer toolkit (GTA 90-01-020), key legal and policy documents, and specific hazard and planning guidance.

Refer to CTS1: The Counterterrorism, WMD & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook for further discussion. CTS1 topics and chapters include: the terrorist threat (characteristics, goals & objectives, organization, state-sponsored, international, and domestic), hybrid and future threats, forms of terrorism (tactics, techniques, & procedures), counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, protection planning and preparation, countering WMD, and consequence management (all hazards response).

Refer to CYBER: The Cyberspace & Electronic Warfare SMARTbook (in development). U.S. armed forces operate in an increasingly network-based world. The proliferation of information technologies is changing the way humans interact with each other and their environment, including interactions during military operations. This broad and rapidly changing operational environment requires that today’s armed forces must operate in cyberspace and leverage an electromagnetic spectrum that is increasingly competitive, congested, and contested.

*1-10d (Tactical Mission Fundamentals) II. The Army’s Operational Concept
A tactical mission task is a specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. A tactical mission task may be expressed as either an action by a **friendly force** or effects on an **enemy force**. The tactical mission tasks describe the results or effects the commander wants to achieve. See following pages (pp. 1-12* to 1-13*) for tactical mission tasks.

Not all tactical mission tasks have symbols. Some tactical mission task symbols will include unit symbols, and the tactical mission task “delay until a specified time” will use an amplifier. However, no modifiers are used with tactical mission task symbols. Tactical mission task symbols are used in course of action sketches, synchronization matrices, and maneuver sketches. They do not replace any part of the operation order.

### A. Mission Symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Task</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counterattack (dashed axis)</td>
<td>A form of attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the enemy his goal in attacking (FM 3-0).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cover</td>
<td>A form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delay</td>
<td>A form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy’s momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 1-02, see delaying operation).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard</td>
<td>A form of security operations whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and combat support assets of the main body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penetrate</td>
<td>A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system (FM 3-0).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relief in Place</td>
<td>A tactical enabling operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>A form of retrograde [JP 1-02 uses operation] in which a force out of contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy (JP 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screen</td>
<td>A form of security operations that primarily provides early warning to the protected force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Withdraw</td>
<td>A planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force (JP 1-02) [The Army considers it a form of retrograde.]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Troop leading procedures extend the MDMP to the small-unit level. The MDMP and TLP are similar but not identical. They are both linked by the basic Army problem solving methodology explained. Commanders with a coordinating staff use the MDMP as their primary planning process. Company-level and smaller units lack formal staffs and use TLP to plan and prepare for operations. This places the responsibility for planning primarily on the commander or small-unit leader.

Leaders project their presence and guidance through troop leading procedures. TLP is the process a leader goes through to prepare the unit to accomplish a tactical mission. It begins when the mission is received. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).

Troop leading procedures are a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation (ADP 5-0). These procedures enable leaders to maximize available planning time while developing effective plans and preparing their units for an operation. TLP consist of eight steps. The sequence of the steps of TLP is not rigid. Leaders modify the sequence to meet the mission, situation, and available time. Leaders perform some steps concurrently, while other steps may be performed continuously throughout the operation.

Leaders use TLP when working alone or with a small group to solve tactical problems. For example, a company commander may use the executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to assist during TLP.
I. Performing Troop Leading Procedures

TLP provide small unit leaders a framework for planning and preparing for operations. This section discusses each step of TLP.

Army leaders begin TLP when they receive the initial WARNO or perceive a new mission. As each subsequent order arrives, leaders modify their assessments, update tentative plans, and continue to supervise and assess preparations. In some situations, the higher headquarters may not issue the full sequence of WARNOS; security considerations or tempo may make it impractical. In other cases, Army leaders may initiate TLP before receiving a WARNO based on existing plans and orders (contingency plans or be-prepared missions), and an understanding of the situation.

1. Receive The Mission

Receipt of a mission may occur in several ways. It may begin with the initial WARNO from higher or when a leader receives an OPORD. Frequently, leaders receive a mission in a FRAGO over the radio. Ideally, they receive a series of WARNOS, the OPORD, and a briefing from their commander. Normally after receiving an OPORD, leaders are required to give a confirmation brief to their higher commander to ensure they understand the higher commander’s concept of operations and intent for his unit.

Upon receipt of mission, Army leaders perform an initial assessment of the situation (METT-TC analysis) and allocate the time available for planning and preparation. (Preparation includes rehearsals and movement.) This initial assessment and time allocation form the basis of their initial WARNO. Army leaders issue the initial WARNO quickly to give subordinates as much time as possible to plan and prepare.

Ideally, a battalion headquarters issues at least three WARNOS to subordinates when conducting the MDMP. WARNOS are issued upon receipt of mission, completion of mission analysis, and when the commander approves a COA. WARNOS serve a function in planning similar to that of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) during execution.
3. Make a Tentative Plan

Once they have issued the initial WARNO, Army leaders develop a tentative plan. This step combines MDMP steps 2 through 6: mission analysis, COA development, COA analysis, COA comparison, and COA approval. At levels below battalion, these steps are less structured than for units with staffs. Often, leaders perform them mentally. They may include their principal subordinates—especially during COA development, analysis, and comparison. However, Army leaders, not their subordinates, select the COA on which to base the tentative plan.

A. Mission Analysis

To frame the tentative plan, Army leaders perform mission analysis. This mission analysis follows the METT-TC format, continuing the initial assessment performed in TLP step 1. FM 6-0 discusses the factors of METT-TC.

Note: See facing page (p. 1-31) for discussion and an outline of METT-TC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>METT-TC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M - Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E - Enemy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T - Terrain and Weather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T - Troops and Support Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T - Time Available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C - Civil Considerations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The product of this part of the mission analysis is the restated mission. The restated mission is a simple, concise expression of the essential tasks the unit must accomplish and the purpose to be achieved. The mission statement states who (the unit), what (the task), when (either the critical time or on order), where (location), and why (the purpose of the operation).

B. Course of Action Development

Mission analysis provides information needed to develop COAs. The purpose of COA development is simple: to determine one or more ways to accomplish the mission. At lower echelons, the mission may be a single task. Most missions and tasks can be accomplished in more than one way. However, in a time-constrained environment, Army leaders may develop only one COA. Normally, they develop two or more. Army leaders do not wait for a complete order before beginning COA development. They develop COAs as soon as they have enough information to do so. Usable COAs are suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. To develop them, leaders focus on the actions the unit takes at the objective and conducts a reverse plan to the starting point.

Note: See The Battle Staff SMARTbook for further discussion of COA Development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COA Development</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Analyze relative combat power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Generate options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Array forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Develop the concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Assign responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Prepare COA statement and sketch</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VI. Combat Orders

Combat orders are the means by which the small unit leader receives and transmits information from the earliest notification that an operation will occur through the final steps of execution. WARNOs, OPORDs, and FRAGOs are absolutely critical to mission success. In a tactical situation, the small unit leaders work with combat orders on a daily basis, and they must have precise knowledge of the correct format for each type of order. At the same time, they must ensure that every Soldier in the unit understands how to receive and respond to the various types of orders.

Plans and orders are the means by which commanders express their visualization, commander’s intent, and decisions. They focus on results the commander expects to achieve. Plans and orders form the basis commanders use to synchronize military operations. They encourage initiative by providing the “what” and “why” of a mission, and leave the how to accomplish the mission to subordinates. They give subordinates the operational and tactical freedom to accomplish the mission by providing the minimum restrictions and details necessary for synchronization and coordination.

Refer to BSS5: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 5th Ed. for further discussion. BSS5 covers the operations process (ADRP 5-0); commander’s activities (Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess); the military decisionmaking process and troop leading procedures (FM 6-0: MDMP/TLP); integrating processes and continuing activities (IPB, targeting, risk management); plans and orders (WARNOs/FRAGOs/OPORDs); mission command, command posts, liaison; rehearsals & after action reviews; and operational terms & symbols.
Preparation Activities

Ref: ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (Mar ‘12), pp. 3-1 to 3-5.

Preparation consists of those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation (ADP 5-0). Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations.

**Preparation Activities**

| Continue to coordinate and conduct liaison | Conduct rehearsals |
| Initiate information collection | Conduct plans-to-operations transitions |
| Initiate security operations | Refine the plan |
| Initiate troop movement | Integrate new Soldiers and units |
| Initiate sustainment preparations | Complete task organization |
| Initiate network preparations | Train |
| Manage terrain | Perform pre-operations checks and inspections |
| Prepare terrain | Continue to build partnerships and teams |

Ref: ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process, table 3-1, p. 3-1.

*Preparation activities vary in accordance with the factors of METT-TC. For a listing and discussion of unit preparation activities from ADRP 5-0 (Aug ‘12), refer to The Battle Staff SMARTbook. The following list is adapted from FM 6-0 (Aug ‘03):*

**Reconnaissance Operations**

During preparation, commanders take every opportunity to improve their situational understanding about the enemy and environment. Reconnaissance is often the most important part of this activity, providing data that contribute to answering the CCIR. As such, commanders conduct it with the same care as any other operation. They normally initiate reconnaissance operations before completing the plan.

**Security Operations**

Security operations during preparation prevent surprise and reduce uncertainty through security operations (see FM 3-90), local security, and operations security (OPSEC; see FM 3-13). These are all designed to prevent enemies from discovering the friendly force’s plan and to protect the force from unforeseen enemy actions. Security elements direct their main effort toward preventing the enemy from gathering essential elements of friendly information (EEFI). As with reconnaissance, security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy collection efforts. When successful, security operations provide the force time and maneuver space to react to enemy attacks.

**Force Protection**

Force protection consists of those actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DoD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporates the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy.
II. Rehearsal Types

Each rehearsal type achieves a different result and has a specific place in the preparation timeline.

A. Backbrief
A back brief is a briefing by subordinates to the commander to review how subordinates intend to accomplish their mission. Normally, subordinates perform back briefs throughout preparation. These briefs allow commanders to clarify the commander’s intent early in subordinate planning. Commanders use the back brief to identify any problems in the concept of operations.

The back brief differs from the confirmation brief (a briefing subordinates give their higher commander immediately following receipt of an order) in that subordinate leaders are given time to complete their plan. Back briefs require the fewest resources and are often the only option under time-constrained conditions. Subordinate leaders explain their actions from start to finish of the mission. Back briefs are performed sequentially, with all leaders reviewing their tasks. When time is available, back briefs can be combined with other types of rehearsals. Doing this lets all subordinate leaders coordinate their plans before performing more elaborate drills.

B. Combined Arms Rehearsal
A combined arms rehearsal is a rehearsal in which subordinate units synchronize their plans with each other. A maneuver unit headquarters normally executes a combined arms rehearsal after subordinate units issue their operation order. This rehearsal type helps ensure that subordinate commanders’ plans achieve the higher commander’s intent.

C. Support Rehearsal
The support rehearsal helps synchronize each warfighting function with the overall operation. This rehearsal supports the operation so units can accomplish their missions. Throughout preparation, units conduct support rehearsals within the framework of a single or limited number of warfighting functions. These rehearsals typically involve coordination and procedure drills for aviation, fires, engineer support, or casualty evacuation. Support rehearsals and combined arms rehearsals complement preparations for the operation. Units may conduct rehearsals separately and then combine them into full-dress rehearsals. Although these rehearsals differ slightly by warfighting function, they achieve the same result.

D. Battle Drill or SOP Rehearsal
A battle drill is a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decision making process. A battle drill or SOP rehearsal ensures that all participants understand a technique or a specific set of procedures. Throughout preparation, units and staffs rehearse battle drills and SOPs. These rehearsals do not need a completed order from higher headquarters. Leaders place priority on those drills or actions they anticipate occurring during the operation. For example, a transportation platoon may rehearse a battle drill on reacting to an ambush while waiting to begin movement.

All echelons use these rehearsal types; however, they are most common for platoons, squads, and sections. They are conducted throughout preparation and are not limited to published battle drills. All echelons can rehearse such actions as a command post shift change, an obstacle breach lane-marking SOP, or a refuel-on-the-move site operation.
IX. The After Action Review (AAR)

Ref: FM 6-0 (C2), Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (Apr ‘16), chap. 16 and A Leader’s Guide to After Action Reviews (Aug ‘12).

An after action review (AAR) is a guided analysis of an organization’s performance, conducted at appropriate times during and at the conclusion of a training event or operation with the objective of improving future performance. It includes a facilitator, event participants, and other observers (ADRP 7-0, Training Units and Developing Leaders, Aug ‘12).

AARs are a key part of the training process, but they are not cure-alls for unit-training problems. Leaders must still make on-the-spot corrections and take responsibility for training soldiers and units. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).

AARs are a professional discussion of an event that enables Soldiers/units to discover for themselves what happened and develop a strategy (e.g., retraining) for improving performance. They provide candid insights into strengths and weaknesses from various perspectives and feedback, and focus directly on the commander’s intent, training objectives and standards. Leaders know and enforce standards for collective and individual tasks.

Refer to BSS5: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 5th Ed. for further discussion. BSS5 covers the operations process (ADRP 5-0); commander’s activities (Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess); the military decisionmaking process and troop leading procedures (FM 6-0: MDMP/TLP); integrating processes and continuing activities (IPB, targeting, risk management); plans and orders (WARNOs/FRAGOs/OPORDs); mission command, command posts, liaison; rehearsals & after action reviews; and operational terms & symbols.
The Offense

Offensive actions are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy. A commander may also conduct offensive actions to deprive the enemy of resources, seize decisive terrain, deceive or divert the enemy, develop intelligence, or hold an enemy in position. This chapter discusses the basics of the offense. The basics discussed in this chapter apply to all offensive tasks.

The commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative when conducting offensive actions. Specific operations may orient on a specific enemy force or terrain feature as a means of affecting the enemy. Even when conducting primarily defensive actions, wresting the initiative from the enemy requires offensive actions.

Effective offensive operations capitalize on accurate intelligence regarding the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Commanders maneuver their forces to advantageous positions before making contact. However, commanders may shape conditions by deliberately making contact to develop the situation and mislead the enemy. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering action against enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation does not destroy the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces disintegrate or retreat to where they are no longer a threat.
I. Primary Offensive Tasks

An offensive task is a task conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). The four primary offensive tasks are movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit.

A. Movement to Contact

Movement to contact is an offensive task designed to develop the situation and to establish or regain contact. The goal is to make initial contact with a small element while retaining enough combat power to develop the situation and mitigate the associated risk. A movement to contact also creates favorable conditions for subsequent tactical actions. The commander conducts a movement to contact when the enemy situation is vague or not specific enough to conduct an attack. Forces executing this task seek to make contact with the smallest friendly force feasible. A movement to contact may result in a meeting engagement. Once contact is made with an enemy force, the commander has five options: attack, defend, bypass, delay, or withdraw.

The Army includes search and attack and cordon and search operations as part of movement to contact operations.

B. Attack

An attack is an offensive task that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. Attacks incorporate coordinated movement supported by fires. They may be either decisive or shaping operations. Attacks may be hasty or deliberate, depending on the time available for assessing the situation, planning, and preparing. However, based on mission variable analysis, the commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires. An attack differs from a movement to contact because, in an attack, the commander knows part of the enemy's disposition. This knowledge enables the commander to better synchronize and employ combat power more effectively in an attack than in a movement to contact.

Subordinate forms of the attack have special purposes and include the ambush, counterattack, demonstration, feint, raid, and spoiling attack. The commander's intent and the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC) determine which of these forms of attack are employed. The commander can conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation.

See pp. 2-13 to 2-18.

C. Exploitation

Exploitation is an offensive task that usually follows the conduct of a successful attack and is designed to disorganize the enemy in depth. Exploitations seek to disintegrate enemy forces to the point where they have no alternative but to surrender or take flight. Exploitations take advantage of tactical opportunities. Division and higher headquarters normally plan exploitations as branches or sequels.

See pp. 2-19 to 2-22.

D. Pursuit

A pursuit is an offensive task designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it. A pursuit normally follows a successful exploitation. However, any offensive task can transition into a pursuit, if enemy resistance has broken down and the enemy is fleeing the battlefield. Pursuits entail rapid movement and decentralized control. Bold action, calculated initiative, and accounting for the associated risk are required in the conduct of a pursuit.

See pp. 2-23 to 2-28.
II. Purposes of Offensive Operations

Ref: Adapted from FM 3-0 Operations (2008) and ADRP 3-90 (Aug ‘12).

The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt the enemy’s attack, and to set up the conditions for future successful operations.

1. Defeat, Destroy, or Neutralize the Enemy force
Well-executed offensive operations dislocate, isolate, disrupt, and destroy enemy forces. If destruction is not feasible, offensive operations compel enemy forces to retreat. Offensive maneuver seeks to place the enemy at a positional disadvantage. This allows friendly forces to mass overwhelming effects while defeating parts of the enemy force in detail before the enemy can escape or be reinforced. When required, friendly forces close with and destroy the enemy in close combat. Ultimately, the enemy surrenders, retreats in disorder, or is eliminated altogether.

2. Seize Decisive Terrain
Offensive maneuver may seize terrain that provides the attacker with a decisive advantage. The enemy either retreats or risks defeat or destruction. If enemy forces retreat or attempt to retake the key terrain, they are exposed to fires and further friendly maneuver.

3. Deprive the Enemy of Resources
At the operational level, offensive operations may seize control of major population centers, seats of government, production facilities, and transportation infrastructure. Losing these resources greatly reduces the enemy’s ability to resist. In some cases, Army forces secure population centers or infrastructure and prevent irregular forces from using them as a base or benefitting from the resources that they generate.

4. To Gain Information
Enemy deception, concealment, and security may prevent friendly forces from gaining necessary intelligence. Some offensive operations are conducted to develop the situation and discover the enemy’s intent, disposition, and capabilities.

5. Disrupt the Enemy’s Attack
Offensive operations distract enemy ISR. They may cause the enemy to shift reserves away from the friendly decisive operation.

6. Set up the Conditions for Future Successful Operations
III. Forms of Maneuver

Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, pp. 3-11 to 3-32.

Forms of maneuver are distinct tactical combinations of fire and movement with a unique set of doctrinal characteristics that differ primarily in the relationship between the maneuvering force and the enemy. The commander generally chooses one form on which he builds a course of action (COA). The higher commander rarely specifies the specific form of offensive maneuver. However, his guidance and intent, along with the mission that includes implied tasks, may impose constraints such as time, security, and direction of attack.

A. Envelopment

The envelopment is a form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to avoid the principal enemy defenses by seizing objectives to the enemy rear to destroy the enemy in his current positions. At the tactical level, envelopments focus on seizing terrain, destroying specific enemy forces, and interdicting enemy withdrawal routes. Envelopments avoid the enemy front, where he is protected and can easily concentrate fires. Single envelopments maneuver against one enemy flank; double envelopments maneuver against both. Either variant can develop into an encirclement.

To envelop the enemy, commanders find or create an assailable flank. Sometimes the enemy exposes a flank by advancing, unaware of friendly locations. In other conditions, such as a fluid battle involving forces in noncontiguous AOs, a combination of air and indirect fires may create an assailable flank by isolating the enemy on unfavorable terrain.

An envelopment may result in an encirclement. Encirclements are operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communications. An offensive encirclement is typically an extension of either a pursuit or envelopment. A direct pressure force maintains contact with the enemy, preventing his disengagement and reconstitution. Meanwhile, an encircling force maneuvers to envelop the enemy, cutting his escape routes and setting inner and outer rings. The outer ring defeats enemy attempts to break through to his encircled force. The inner ring contains the encircled force. All available means, including obstacles, should be used to contain the enemy. Then friendly forces use all available fires to destroy him. Encirclements often occur in nonlinear offensive operations.

B. Turning Movement

A turning movement is a form of maneuver in which the attacking force seeks to avoid the enemy’s principal defensive positions by seizing objectives to the rear and causing the enemy to move out of current positions or divert major forces to meet the threat. A major threat to his rear forces the enemy to attack or withdraw rearward, thus “turning” him out of his defensive positions. Turning movements typically require greater depth than other maneuver forms. Deep fires take on added importance. They protect the enveloping force and attack the enemy.
The Offense

I. Movement to Contact

Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, chap 4; FM 3-21.10 The Infantry Rifle Company, chap 4 and FM 3-21.8 The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 7-18 to 7-24.

Movement to contact is a type of offensive operation designed to develop the situation and establish or regain contact. A commander conducts this type of offensive operation when the tactical situation is not clear or when the enemy has broken contact. A properly executed movement to contact develops the combat situation and maintains the commander’s freedom of action after contact is gained. This flexibility is essential in maintaining the initiative.

Purposeful and aggressive movement, decentralized control, and the hasty deployment of combined arms formations from the march to attack or defend characterize the movement to contact. The fundamentals of a movement to contact are—

- Focus all efforts on finding the enemy
- Make initial contact with the smallest force possible, consistent with protecting the force
- Make initial contact with small, mobile, self-contained forces to avoid decisive engagement of the main body on ground chosen by the enemy. This allows the commander maximum flexibility to develop the situation
- Task-organize the force and use movement formations to deploy and attack rapidly in any direction
- Keep forces within supporting distances to facilitate a flexible response
- Maintain contact regardless of the course of action (COA) adopted once contact is gained

Meeting Engagement

The movement to contact results in a meeting engagement. A meeting engagement is the combat action that occurs when a moving element engages a stationary or moving enemy at an unexpected time and place. Meeting engagements are characterized by—

- Limited knowledge of the enemy
- Minimum time available for the leader to conduct actions on contact
- Rapidly changing situation
- Rapid execution of battle and crew drills

A meeting engagement is a combat action that occurs when a moving force engages an enemy at an unexpected time and place. Conducting an MTC results in a meeting engagement. The enemy force may be either stationary or moving. Such encounters often occur in small-unit operations when reconnaissance has been ineffective. The force that reacts first to the unexpected contact generally gains an advantage over its opponent. However, a meeting engagement may also occur when the opponents are aware of each other and both decide to attack immediately to obtain a tactical advantage or seize key or decisive terrain. A meeting engagement may also occur when one force attempts to deploy into a hasty defense while the other force attacks before its opponent can organize an effective defense. Acquisition systems may discover the enemy before the security force can gain contact. No matter how the force makes contact, seizing the initiative is the overriding imperative.
I. MTC - Organization

A movement to contact is organized with an offensive covering force or an advance guard as a forward security element and a main body as a minimum. Based on the factors of METT-TC, the commander may increase his security forces by having an offensive covering force and an advance guard for each column, as well as flank and rear security (normally a screen or guard).

The MTC may use multiple teams to find the enemy. When a team makes contact, they report the information. The commander decides when to commit the body of the main force.

A movement to contact is conducted using one of two techniques: approach march, or search and attack. The approach march technique is used when the enemy is expected to deploy using relatively fixed offensive or defensive formations, and the situation remains vague. The search and attack technique is used when the enemy is dispersed, when he is expected to avoid contact or quickly disengage and withdraw, or when the higher unit needs to deny him movement in an area of operation.

1. Search and Attack
Search and attack is a technique for conducting a MTC; this technique shares many of the same characteristics of an area security mission. Conducted primarily by Infantry forces and often supported by heavy forces, a commander employs this form of a MTC when the enemy is operating as small, dispersed element, or when the task is to deny the enemy the ability to move within a given area. The battalion is the echelon that normally conducts a search and attack. (Note: See also p.2-12)

2. Approach-March Technique
A unit normally uses this technique when it conducts a MTC as part of a battalion. Depending on its location in the formation and its assigned mission, the company can act as the advance guard, move as part of the battalion main body, or provide flank or rear guards for the battalion. (Note: See also p.2-12)
Tactical tasks are specific activities performed by units as they conduct tactical operations or maneuver. At the platoon level, these tasks are the warfighting actions the platoon may be called on to perform in battle. This section provides discussion and examples of some common actions and tasks the platoon may perform during a movement to contact, a hasty attack, or a deliberate attack. It is extremely important to fully understand the purpose behind a task (what) because the purpose (why) defines what the platoon must achieve as a result of executing its mission. A task can be fully accomplished, but if battlefield conditions change and the platoon is unable to achieve the purpose, the mission is a failure.

Note: The situations used in this section to describe the platoon leader’s role in the conduct of tactical tasks are examples only. They are not applicable in every tactical operation, nor are they intended to prescribe any specific method or technique the platoon must use in achieving the purpose of the operation. Ultimately, it is up to the commander or leader on the ground to apply both the principles discussed here, and his knowledge of the situation. An understanding of his unit’s capabilities, the enemy he is fighting, and the ground on which the battle is taking place are critical when developing a successful tactical solution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seize</td>
<td>Seize is a tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force. An enemy force can no longer place direct fire on an objective that has been seized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppress</td>
<td>Suppress is a tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support by Fire</td>
<td>Support-by-fire is a tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force. The primary objective of the support force is normally to fix and suppress the enemy so he cannot effectively fire on the maneuvering force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear</td>
<td>Clear is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attack by Fire</td>
<td>Attack-by-fire is a tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy without closing with him to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive him.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tactical mission tasks describe the results or effects the commander wants to achieve - the what and why of a mission statement. For a more complete listing of tactical mission tasks, see pp. 1-11 to 1-14.
I. Seize

Seizing involves gaining possession of a designated objective by overwhelming force. Seizing an objective is complex. It involves closure with the enemy, under fire of the enemy’s weapons to the point that the friendly assaulting element gains positional advantage over, destroys, or forces the withdrawal of the enemy.

A platoon may seize prepared or unprepared enemy positions from either an offensive or defensive posture. Examples include the following:

- A platoon seizes the far side of an obstacle as part of a company breach or seizes a building to establish a foothold in an urban environment
- A platoon seizes a portion of an enemy defense as part of a company deliberate attack
- A platoon seizes key terrain to prevent its use by the enemy

There are many inherent dangers in seizing an objective. They include the requirement to execute an assault, prepared enemy fires, a rapidly changing tactical environment, and the possibility of fratricide when friendly elements converge. These factors require the platoon leader and subordinate leaders to understand the following planning considerations.

Developing a clear and current picture of the enemy situation is very important. The platoon may seize an objective in a variety of situations, and the platoon leader will often face unique challenges in collecting and disseminating information on the situation. For example, if the platoon is the seizing element during a company deliberate attack, the platoon leader should be able to develop an accurate picture of the enemy situation during the planning and preparation for the operation. He must be prepared to issue modifications to the platoon as new intelligence comes in or as problems are identified in rehearsals.

In another scenario, the platoon leader may have to develop his picture of the enemy situation during execution. He must rely more heavily on reports from units in contact with the enemy and on his own development of the situation. In this type of situation, such as when the platoon is seizing an enemy combat security outpost during a movement to contact, the platoon leader must plan on relaying information as it develops. He uses clear, concise FRAGOs to explain the enemy situation, and gives clear directives to subordinates.

II. Suppress

The platoon maneuvers to a position on the battlefield where it can observe the enemy and engage him with direct and indirect fires. The purpose of suppressing is to prevent the enemy from effectively engaging friendly elements with direct or indirect fires. To accomplish this, the platoon must maintain orientation both on the enemy force and on the friendly maneuver element it is supporting. During planning and preparation, the platoon leader should consider—

- Conducting a line-of-sight analysis during his terrain analysis to identify the most advantageous positions from which to suppress the enemy
- Planning and integrating direct and indirect fires
- Determining control measures (triggers) for lifting, shifting, or ceasing direct fires
- Determining control measures for shifting or ceasing indirect fires
- Planning and rehearsing actions on contact
- Planning for large Class V expenditures. (The company commander and the platoon leader must consider a number of factors in assessing Class V require-
While the offensive element of combat operations is more decisive, the defense is the stronger element. However, the conduct of defensive tasks alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting defensive actions include—

- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy
- Attriting or fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive actions
- Surprise action by the enemy
- Increasing the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing the enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces

While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defender’s ability to occupy his positions before the attack and use the available time to prepare his defenses. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).

A defensive task is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). While the offensive element of combat operations is more decisive, the defense is the stronger element. The inherent strengths of the defense include the defender’s ability to occupy positions before the attack and use the available time to prepare the defenses. The defending force ends its defensive preparations only when it retrogrades or begins to engage the enemy. Even during combat, the defending force takes the opportunities afforded by lulls in the action to improve its positions and repair combat damage. The defender maneuvers to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage and attacks the enemy at every opportunity, using fires, electronic warfare, and joint assets, such as close air support.
The static and mobile elements of the defense combine to deprive the enemy of the initiative. The defender contains the enemy while seeking every opportunity to transition to the offense.

I. Purposes of Defense Operations
Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense include to retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, to attrit or fix the enemy as a prelude to the offense, in response to surprise action by the enemy, or to increase the enemy’s vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.

II. Defensive Tasks
There are three basic defensive tasks—area defense, mobile defense, and retrograde. These apply to both the tactical and operational levels of war, although the mobile defense is more often associated with the operational level. These three tasks have significantly different concepts and pose significantly different problems. Therefore, each defensive task must be dealt with differently when planning and executing the defense. Although the names of these defensive tasks convey the overall aim of a selected defense, each typically contains elements of the other and combines static and mobile elements.

Although on the defense, the commander remains alert for opportunities to attack the enemy whenever resources permit. Within a defensive posture, the defending commander may conduct a spoiling attack or a counterattack, if permitted to do so by the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

A. Area Defense
The area defense is a defensive task that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. The focus of the area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of the defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between these positions. The decisive operation focuses on fires into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a counterattack.

*Note: See pp. 3-14 to 3-18.*

B. Mobile Defense
The mobile defense is a defensive task that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying the enemy by allowing enemy forces to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive counterattack by the striking force.

*Note: See pp. 3-5 to 3-10.*

C. Retrograde
The retrograde is a defensive task that involves organized movement away from the enemy. The enemy may force these operations, or a commander may execute them voluntarily. The higher commander of the force executing the retrograde must approve the retrograde operation before its initiation in either case. The retrograde is a transitional operation; it is not conducted in isolation. It is part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy.

*Note: See pp. 3-19 to 3-22.*
The area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. An area defense capitalizes on the strength inherent in closely integrated defensive organization on the ground.

A commander should conduct an area defense when the following conditions occur:

- When directed to defend or retain specified terrain
- When he cannot resource a striking force
- The forces available have less mobility than the enemy
- The terrain affords natural lines of resistance and limits the enemy to a few well-defined avenues of approach, thereby restricting the enemy’s maneuver
- There is enough time to organize the position
- Terrain constraints and lack of friendly air superiority limit the striking force’s options in a mobile defense to a few probable employment options

The area defense retains dominance over a given geographical location. It does this by employing a fortified defensive line, a screening force, and a reserve force. Particular care is taken in coordinating and synchronizing fire control measures in order to repel any enemy attack.
I. Area Defense - Organization

The platoon will normally defend in accordance with command orders using one of these basic techniques (see pp. 3-23 to 3-28):

- Defend an area
- Defend a battle position
- Defend a strongpoint
- Defend a perimeter
- Defend a reverse slope

The commander conducting an area defense combines static and mobile actions to accomplish his assigned mission. Static actions usually consist of fires from prepared positions. Mobile actions include using the fires provided by units in prepared positions as a base for counterattacks and repositioning units between defensive positions. The commander can use his reserve and uncommitted forces to conduct counterattacks and spoofing attacks to desynchronize the enemy or prevent him from massing.

A well-conducted area defense is anything but static. It's actually quite active in that it continues to advance its own fighting position while it patrols forward to gather intelligence on the enemy. The area defense has great depth and will track and channel the enemy from considerable distances beyond the defense.

Primary Positions

In addition to establishing the platoon’s primary positions, the platoon leader and subordinate leaders normally plan for preparation and occupation of alternate, supplementary, and subsequent positions. This is done IAW the company order. The platoon and/or company reserve need to know the location of these positions. The following are tactical considerations for these positions.

Alternate Positions

The following characteristics and considerations apply to an alternate position:

- Covers the same avenue of approach or sector of fire as the primary position
- Located slightly to the front, flank, or rear of the primary position
- Positioned forward of the primary defensive positions during limited visibility operations
- Normally employed to supplement or support positions with weapons of limited range, such as Infantry squad positions. They are also used as an alternate position to fall back to if the original position is rendered ineffective or as a position for Soldiers to rest or perform maintenance

Supplementary Positions

The following characteristics and considerations apply to a supplementary position:

- Covers an avenue of approach or sector of fire different from those covered by the primary position
- Occupied based on specific enemy actions

Subsequent Positions

The following characteristics and considerations apply to a subsequent position:

- Covers the same avenue of approach and or sector of fire as the primary position
- Located in depth through the defensive area
- Occupied based on specific enemy actions or conducted as part of the higher headquarters’ scheme of maneuver
As part of a larger element, the platoon conducts defensive operations in a sequence of integrated and overlapping phases:

- Reconnaissance, security operations, and enemy preparatory fires
- Occupation
- Approach of the enemy main attack
- Enemy assault
- Counterattack
- Consolidation and reorganization

The defense makes use of obstacles to expose and/or slow the enemy advance in our prepared engagement areas. Troops use of wire obstacles and mines in defilades that cannot be covered by fire. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).

At the small unit level, the area defense typically employs three teams and rotates those teams through the three tasked responsibilities—manning the line, manning the reserve, and patrolling forward. Each team takes its turn in conducting the three tasked responsibilities.

The line includes 2-man fighting positions and crew served weapon positions. It also includes the observation post/listening post (OP/LP) that is positioned just forward of our defensive line. Finally, while the command post (CP) is located behind our line near the reserve force, it is also part of the line force. The command team, however, does not rotate to the other assigned tasks, but rotates a rest plan amongst the command team.

This organization permits:

- About 50 percent of the force on the defensive line at all times
- A reserve force of 25 percent to add depth to our position
- A patrolling force of 25 percent forward to monitor enemy activity

The reserve and screening forces make up half of the total force for the area defense. The line force utilizes the other half of our troops. The troops are typically rotated in 2-hour intervals. That's two hours on the line, two hours patrolling, two hours on the line again, and two hours in reserve (where troops can implement a sleep plan).
II. Planning & Preparation

Platoons establish defensive positions IAW the platoon leader and commander’s plan. They mark engagement areas using marking techniques prescribed by unit SOP. The platoon physically marks obstacles, TRPs, targets, and trigger lines in the engagement area. During limited visibility, the platoon can use infrared light sources to mark TRPs for the rifle squads. When possible, platoons should mark TRPs with both a thermal and an infrared source so the rifle squads can use the TRP.

A. Range Card
A range card is a sketch of a sector that a direct fire weapons system is assigned to cover. Range cards aid in planning and controlling fires. They also assist crews in acquiring targets during limited visibility, and orient replacement personnel, platoons, or squads that are moving into position. During good visibility, the gunner should have no problems maintaining orientation in his sector. During poor visibility, he may not be able to detect lateral limits. If the gunner becomes disoriented and cannot find or locate reference points or sector limit markers, he can use the range card to locate the limits. The gunner should make the range card so he becomes more familiar with the terrain in his sector. He should continually assess the sector and, if necessary, update his range card.

B. Sector Sketch
The sector sketch illustrates how each fighting position is interlocked and how the left and right flanks of the defensive line are secured. The flanks are tied in with adjacent friendly units or with naturally occurring or man-made obstacles to stop the enemy approach. Additionally, the sector sketch identifies engagement areas, final protective fires, locations of our wire and landmine obstacles, the OP/LP, the CP, and assigned alternate fighting positions.

Fire control measures are critical for the success of the area defense. These control measures help the defense to engage the attacking enemy at greater distances, synchronize the final defensive fires of the line, and minimize the possibility of fratricide. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).
IV. Small Unit Defensive Techniques

Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 8-23 to 8-33.

Though the outcome of decisive combat derives from offensive actions, leaders often find it is necessary, even advisable, to defend. The general task and purpose of all defensive operations is to defeat an enemy attack and gain the initiative for offensive operations. It is important to set conditions of the defense so friendly forces can destroy or fix the enemy while preparing to seize the initiative and return to the offense. The platoon may conduct the defense to gain time, retain key terrain, facilitate other operations, preoccupy the enemy in one area while friendly forces attack him in another, or erode enemy forces. A well coordinated defense can also set the conditions for follow-on forces and follow-on operations.

Platoon Defensive Techniques

A platoon will normally defend IAW using one of these basic techniques:

I. Defend an Area
II. Defend a Battle Position
III. Defend a Strongpoint
IV. Defend a Perimeter
V. Defend a Reverse Slope

I. Defend An Area

Defending an area sector allows a unit to maintain flank contact and security while ensuring unity of effort in the scheme of maneuver. Areas afford depth in the platoon defense. They allow the platoon to achieve the platoon leader’s desired end state while facilitating clearance of fires at the appropriate level of responsibility. The company commander normally orders a platoon to defend an area when flexibility is desired, when retention of specific terrain features is not necessary, or when the unit cannot concentrate fires because of any of the following factors:
In the complex, dynamic operational environments of the 21st century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security exist. Sources of instability that push parties toward violence include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and the desire for power. These factors create belts of state fragility and instability that threaten U.S. national security.

Throughout U.S. history, U.S. forces have learned that military force alone cannot secure sustainable peace. U.S. forces can only achieve sustainable peace through a comprehensive approach in which military objectives nest in a larger cooperative effort of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, the private sector, and the host nation.

The recent announcement of “Advisory Brigades” by Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley focuses on the need for specialized units to train and advise foreign forces. Called train, advise and assist brigades, the units would deploy to different combat-ant command areas to help train allies and partners, similar to what units have been doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. “I look at it as if you get a two-for,” Milley said. “You get a day-to-day engagement that the combatant commanders want in order to train, advise and assist. And then in time of national emergency, you have at least four or five brigades with standing chains of command that can marry Soldiers up like the old COHORT units.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Stability

Military engagement, security cooperation, and stability missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support O&GAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. Use of joint capabilities in these and related activities such as Security Force Assistance and Foreign Internal Defense helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

See pp. 4-5 to 4-6 for discussion of military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence. See pp. 4-7 to 4-16 discussion of stability operations.
Security Force Assistance (SFA)

SFA aims to establish conditions that support the partner’s end state, which includes legitimate, credible, competent, capable, committed, and confident security forces. This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, and setting conditions in the operational area that enable the success of other actors.

Security Force Assistance Tasks

- **Organize**
- **Train**
- **Equip**
- **Rebuild and Build**
- **Advise and Assist**


**Organize** is a SFA task that encompasses all measures taken to assist FSF in improving its organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. U.S. forces must understand the existing security organizations of FSF to better assist them. **Train** is a SFA task to assist FSF by developing programs and institutions to train and educate. These efforts must fit the nature and requirements of their security environment. **Equip** is a SFA task encompassing all efforts to assess and assist FSF with the procurement, fielding, and sustainment of equipment. All equipment must fit the nature of the operational environment. The SFA principle of ensuring long-term sustainment is a vital consideration for the equip task. **Rebuild and build** is a SFA task to assess, rebuild, and build the existing capabilities and capacities of FSF and their supporting infrastructure. This task requires an in-depth analysis of the capability, capacity, and structures required to meet the desired end state and operational environment. Some FSF may require assistance in building and rebuilding, while other FSF may only need assistance in building. **Advise and assist** is a SFA task in which U.S. personnel work with FSF to improve their capability and capacity. Advising establishes a personal and a professional relationship where trust and confidence define how well the advisor will be able to influence the foreign security force. Assisting is providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities so FSF can meet objectives and the end state.

Refer to TAA2: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) chap. 2 for further discussion.
The range of military operations (ROMO) is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

These activities generally occur continuously in all GCCs’ AORs regardless of other ongoing contingencies, major operations, or campaigns. They usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities separate from but integrated with the efforts of inter-organizational partners. Because DOS is frequently the major player in these activities, JFCs should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. Commanders and their staffs should establish and maintain dialogue with pertinent inter-organizational partners to share information and facilitate future operations.
A. Military Engagement

Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities. Support to military engagement may include specific mission areas such as religious affairs and medical support.

B. Security Cooperation

Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN. Developmental actions enhance a host government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power.

C. Deterrence

Deterrence prevents adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat of counteraction. In both peace and war, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter adversaries from using violence to reach their aims. Deterrence stems from an adversary’s belief that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh the perceived benefits of acting. Thus, a potential aggressor chooses not to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct decisive operations immediately. However, if committed forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive operations, they conduct defensive operations while additional forces deploy. Effective deterrence requires a security cooperation plan that emphasizes the willingness of the US to employ forces in defense of its interests. Various joint operations (such as show of force and enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when necessary. Other operations (such as nation assistance and FHA) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability. Joint actions such as nation assistance, antiterrorism, DOD support to counterdrug (CD) operations, show of force operations, and arms control are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives. Sustained presence contributes to deterrence and promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can perform as designed. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. Joint force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. The sustained presence of strong, capable forces is the most visible sign of US commitment to allies and adversaries alike. However, if sustained forward presence fails to deter an adversary, committed forces must be agile enough to transition rapidly to combat operations.

II. Fundamentals of Security Ops

Ref: Adapted from FM 3-90 Tactics, pp. 12-2 to 12-3.

1. Provide Early and Accurate Warning
The security force provides early warning by detecting the enemy force quickly and reporting information accurately to the main body commander. The security force operates at varying distances from the main body based on the factors of METT-TC. As a minimum, it should operate far enough from the main body to prevent enemy ground forces from observing or engaging the main body with direct fires. The earlier the security force detects the enemy, the more time the main body has to assess the changing situation and react. The commander positions ground security and aeroscouts to provide long-range observation of expected enemy avenues of approach, and he reinforces and integrates them with available intelligence collection systems to maximize warning time.

2. Provide Reaction Time and Maneuver Space
The security force provides the main body with enough reaction time and maneuver space to effectively respond to likely enemy actions by operating at a distance from the main body and by offering resistance to enemy forces. The commander determines the amount of time and space required to effectively respond from information provided by the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and the main body commander’s guidance regarding time to react to enemy courses of action (COA) based on the factors of METT-TC. The security force that operates farthest from the main body and offers more resistance provides more time and space to the main body. It attempts to hinder the enemy’s advance by acting within its capabilities and mission constraints.

3. Orient on the Force or Facility to Be Secured
The security force focuses all its actions on protecting and providing early warning to the secured force or facility. It operates between the main body and known or suspected enemy units. The security force must move as the main body moves and orient on its movement. The security force commander must know the main body’s scheme of maneuver to maneuver his force to remain between the main body and the enemy. The value of terrain occupied by the security force hinges on the protection it provides to the main body commander.

4. Perform Continuous Reconnaissance
The security force aggressively and continuously seeks the enemy and reconnoiters key terrain. It conducts active area or zone reconnaissance to detect enemy movement or enemy preparations for action and to learn as much as possible about the terrain. The ultimate goal is to determine the enemy’s COA and assist the main body in countering it. Terrain information focuses on its possible use by the enemy or the friendly force, either for offensive or defensive operations. Stationary security forces use combinations of OPs, aviation, patrols, intelligence collection assets, and battle positions (BPs) to perform reconnaissance. Moving security forces perform zone, area, or route reconnaissance along with using OPs and BPs, to accomplish this fundamental.

5. Maintain Enemy Contact
Once the security force makes enemy contact, it does not break contact unless specifically directed by the main force commander. The security asset that first makes contact does not have to maintain that contact if the entire security force maintains contact with the enemy. The security force commander ensures that his subordinate security assets hand off contact with the enemy from one security asset to another in this case. The security force must continuously collect information on the enemy’s activities to assist the main body in determining potential and actual enemy COAs and to prevent the enemy from surprising the main body. This requires continuous visual contact, the ability to use direct and indirect fires, freedom to maneuver, and depth in space and time.
### Screen Movement Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alternate Bounds by OPs</td>
<td>- Main body moves faster</td>
<td>- Very secure method</td>
<td>- Execution takes time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conducted by platoon or company/troop</td>
<td>- Maintains maximum surveillance over the security area</td>
<td>- Disrupts unit integrity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Contact is possible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conducted rear to front</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternate Bounds by Units</td>
<td>- Main body moves faster</td>
<td>- Execution does not take a great deal of time</td>
<td>- May leave temporary gaps in coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conducted by platoon or company/troop</td>
<td>- Maintains good surveillance over the security area</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Contact is possible</td>
<td>- Maintains unit integrity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conducted rear to front</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successive Bounds</td>
<td>- Main body moving slowly</td>
<td>- Most secure method</td>
<td>- Execution takes the most time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conducted by platoon or company/troop</td>
<td>- Maintains maximum surveillance</td>
<td>- Unit is less secure when all elements are moving simultaneously</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Contact is possible</td>
<td>- Maintains unit integrity</td>
<td>- Simultaneous movement may leave temporary gaps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conducted simultaneously or in succession</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Units should maintain an air screen during ground movement</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Marching</td>
<td>- Main body is moving relatively quickly</td>
<td>- OPs displace quickly</td>
<td>- Least secure method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Performed as a route reconnaissance</td>
<td>- Maintains unit integrity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Enemy contact not likely</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Unit should maintain an air screen on the flank</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: FM 3-90, table 12-1, p. 12-6.

### B. Guard

Guard is a form of security operations whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and combat support assets of the main body.

A guard differs from a screen in that a guard force contains sufficient combat power to defeat, cause the withdrawal of, or fix the lead elements of an enemy ground force before it can engage the main body with direct fire. A guard force routinely engages enemy forces with direct and indirect fires. A screening force, however, primarily uses indirect fires or close air support to destroy enemy reconnaissance elements and slow the movement of other enemy forces. A guard force uses all means at its disposal, including decisive engagement, to prevent the enemy from penetrating to a position where it could observe and engage the main body. It operates within the range of the main body’s fire support weapons, deploying over a narrower front than a comparable-size screening force to permit concentrating combat power.

### Types of Guard Operations

1. Advance guard
2. Flank guard
3. Rear guard

Ref: FM 3-90, pp. 12-21 to 12-25.
The three types of guard operations are advance, flank, and rear guard. A commander can assign a guard mission to protect either a stationary or a moving force.

Guard tasks:
- Destroy the enemy advance guard
- Maintain contact with enemy forces and report activity in the AO
- Maintain continuous surveillance of avenues of approach into the AO under all visibility conditions
- Impede and harass the enemy within its capabilities while displacing
- Cause the enemy main body to deploy, and then report its direction of travel
- Allow no enemy ground element to pass through the security area undetected and unreported
- Destroy or cause the withdrawal of all enemy reconnaissance patrols
- Maintain contact with its main body and any other security forces operating on its flanks

C. Cover

Cover is a form of security operations whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.

The covering force’s distance forward of the main body depends on the intentions and instructions of the main body commander, the terrain, the location and strength of the enemy, and the rates of march of both the main body and the covering force. The width of the covering force area is the same as the AO of the main body.

A covering force is a self-contained force capable of operating independently of the main body, unlike a screening or guard force. A covering force, or portions of it, often becomes decisively engaged with enemy forces. Therefore, the covering force must have substantial combat power to engage the enemy and accomplish its mission. A covering force develops the situation earlier than a screen or a guard force. It fights longer and more often and defeats larger enemy forces.

While a covering force provides more security than a screen or guard force, it also requires more resources. Before assigning a cover mission, the main body commander must ensure that he has sufficient combat power to resource a covering force and the decisive operation. When the commander lacks the resources to support both, he must assign his security force a less resource-intensive security mission, either a screen or a guard.

A covering force accomplishes all the tasks of screening and guard forces. A covering force for a stationary force performs a defensive mission, while a covering force for a moving force generally conducts offensive actions. A covering force normally operates forward of the main body in the offense or defense, or to the rear for a retrograde operation. Unusual circumstances could dictate a flank covering force, but this is normally a screen or guard mission.

1. Offensive Cover

An offensive covering force seizes the initiative early for the main body commander, allowing him to attack decisively. Some critical tasks include

- Performing zone reconnaissance along the main body’s axis of advance or within the AO
I. Reconnaissance Fundamentals

At this point the PL should know the specific recon mission and have received and developed the maneuver control measures. Before delving into the execution of each type of reconnaissance, it’s important to delineate the fundamentals of recon patrols. There are seven rules to remember.

1. Ensure continuous recon
Reconnaissance happens before, during, and after an engagement. Before the engagement, the recon team develops the commander’s picture of the battlefield. During the engagement, the recon team lets the commander know if the plan is having its intended effect upon the enemy force. After the engagement, the recon team helps the commander to determine the enemy’s next move.

2. Don’t keep recon assets in reserve
Of course, the recon team should not be run until it is exhausted. However, the recon team acts as the commander’s eyes and ears forward. There is no reason to keep one ear or one eye in reserve! Recon assets must be managed to allow continuous reconnaissance. That includes a rest plan.

3. Orient on the objective
Don’t just throw the recon team forward without a specified objective! Name the type of recon mission and name the objective within the AO. This helps the commander prioritize the recon assets and objectives, plus gives focus to the recon team for the most economical use of time.

4. Report information rapidly and accurately
Over time, information loses value because more often than not, the battlefield is rapidly changing. Recon teams give timely reports on exactly what they see (without exaggeration) and exactly what they do not see. A common mistake in reconnaissance is the failure to report when no enemy force or presence is detected. Failing to report does nothing for the commander. A report of negative activity gives the commander a better understanding of where the enemy isn’t located, at least.

5. Retain freedom of maneuver
As stated earlier, a recon team that becomes engaged in a firefight with the enemy is fixed to a given location. Without the ability to maneuver, that recon team can only report what is to its immediate front. In short, it has become no more useful in developing the battlefield picture than any other line unit.

6. Gain and maintain contact
Recon teams seek to gain contact with the enemy. More often than not, the recon team uses a combination of stealth and surveillance to maintain contact with the enemy. The recon team maintains contact with the enemy until the commander orders them to withdraw. The recon patrol leader may also break contact if the recon team is decisively engaged, but then seeks to regain contact immediately.

7. Develop the situation rapidly
Once contact is gained, the recon team must quickly discern the threat. For an enemy force, that means identifying the approximate size of the enemy force, the activity and direction of movement, and possibly the enemy’s disposition and capabilities. When evaluating an enemy obstacle, the recon team must discern the type of obstacle, the extent of the obstacle, and whether or not it is covered by enemy fire. Often, enemy obstacles tell the commander a fair amount of information regarding the capabilities and even the location of the enemy force.
B. The Zone Reconnaissance

Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. It is appropriate when the enemy situation is vague, existing knowledge of the terrain is limited, or combat operations have altered the terrain. A zone reconnaissance may include several route or area reconnaissance missions assigned to subordinate units.

A zone reconnaissance is normally a deliberate, time-consuming process. It takes more time than any other reconnaissance mission, so the commander must allow adequate time to conduct it. A zone reconnaissance is normally conducted over an extended distance. It requires all ground elements executing the zone reconnaissance to be employed abreast of each other. However, when the reconnaissance objective is the enemy force, a commander may forgo a detailed reconnaissance of the zone and focus his assets on those named areas of interest (NAI) that would reveal enemy dispositions and intentions.

Zone Reconnaissance Tasks

Unless the commander orders otherwise, a unit conducting a zone reconnaissance performs the following tasks within the limits of its capabilities. A commander issues guidance on which tasks the unit must complete or the priority of tasks, which is usually clear from the reconnaissance objective. Tasks include:

• Find and report all enemy forces within the zone
• Clear all enemy forces in the designated AO within the capability of the unit conducting reconnaissance
• Determine the trafficability of all terrain within the zone, including built-up areas
• Locate and determine the extent of all contaminated areas in the zone
• Evaluate and classify all bridges, defiles, overpasses, underpasses, and culverts in the zone
• Locate any fords, crossing sites, or bypasses for existing and reinforcing obstacles (including built-up areas) in the zone
• Locate all obstacles and create lanes as specified in execution orders
• Report the above information to the commander directing the zone reconnaissance, to include providing a sketch map or overlay

Conducting the Zone Reconnaissance - A Small Unit Perspective

A zone recon collects detailed information of the terrain, obstacles, routes, and enemy forces within a specified zone that has been designated by boundaries on a map.

This method of conducting a zone reconnaissance uses a series of rally points to stop and then dispatch the recon teams. The patrol then moves to the next rally point. Zone recon tends to be a time consuming mission. (Ref: FM 7-92, chap 4, fig. 4-6)
1. Upon occupying the ORP, the PL confirms the location of the recon objective. All special equipment is prepared for use and plans are finalized. In this case, the ORP acts more like an assault position in that the patrol will not defend the ORP, nor will they return to the ORP.

The converging route method uses multiple recon teams—and therefore requires larger numbers of troops. Rally points are established and the multiple recon teams move along a designated lane or terrain feature. (Ref: FM 7-92, chap 4, fig. 4-7)

2. Converging Route Method: This method uses multiple recon teams that do NOT meet again until they rendezvous at the far side of the zone! This means that a rally point is clearly established on an easily recognized terrain feature or landmark at the far side of the recon objective. Additionally, a near recognition signal is established to ensure that the fireteams do not mistakenly fire upon each other!

3. At the release point, the PL divides the patrol into the assigned recon teams. The PL must travel with one of these teams. The PL issues each recon team a contingency plan.

4. The recon teams depart the release point and move along parallel directions of advance through the specified zone. The recon teams stop at each phase line and NAI to conduct recons using the butterfly technique—which makes use of a series of designated, en route rally points. The recon team pays particular attention to signs of enemy activity:
   - Fresh trash and cigarette butts indicate recent enemy activity
   - Boot prints and bent vegetation indicate the direction of enemy travel
   - The number of pressed vegetation spots at rest stops indicate the size of enemy patrols

Ultimately, the recon teams look for enemy movement, the size of their patrols, and established routes of movement. Also of great importance is the type of activity. For example, is the enemy running re-supply routes or ambush patrols? All enemy resources—outposts, water points, and obstacles such as a minefield—are thoroughly investigated.

5. Each time the recon teams reassemble in a rally point, information is disseminated and reported back to the PL, if possible. The PL in turn makes reports back to higher command.

6. The recon teams rendezvous at the far end of the objective and the PL takes charge of all collected information, disseminating the information to the patrol members and issuing another report to higher command.

7. The patrol moves back to the FLOT via an alternative route. It is generally not a good idea to return using the same route as the reconnaissance. To do so would invite the possibility of an enemy ambush, if in fact the enemy observed your movement. Upon arrival, the PL reports directly to the commander.
Special Purpose Attacks

Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, pp. 5-29 to 5-40.

An attack is an offensive operation that destroys or defeats enemy forces, seizes and secures terrain, or both. Movement, supported by fires, characterizes the conduct of an attack. However, based on his analysis of the factors of METT-TC, the commander may decide to conduct an attack using only fires. An attack differs from a MTC because enemy main body dispositions are at least partially known, which allows the commander to achieve greater synchronization. This enables him to mass the effects of the attacking force’s combat power more effectively in an attack than in a MTC.

Special purpose attacks are ambush, spoiling attack, counterattack, raid, feint, and demonstration. The commander’s intent and the factors of METT-TC determine which of these forms of attack are employed. He can conduct each of these forms of attack, except for a raid, as either a hasty or a deliberate operation.

This chapter specifically discusses “special purpose attacks.” Chap. 2 discusses the attack (pp. 2-13 to 2-18) and other forms of the offense.

### I. Ambush

An ambush is a form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. It may include an assault to close with and destroy the engaged enemy force. In an ambush, ground objectives do not have to be seized and held.

*Note: See pp. 6-3 to 6-16 for further discussion on the ambush.*
II. Raid
A raid is a form of attack, usually small scale, involving a swift entry into hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal from the objective area on mission completion. A raid can also be used to support operations designed to rescue and recover individuals and equipment in danger of capture.

*Note: See pp. 6-17 to 6-22 for further discussion on the raid.*

III. Spoiling Attack
A spoiling attack is a form of attack that preempts or seriously impairs an enemy attack while the enemy is in the process of planning or preparing to attack. The objective of a spoiling attack is to disrupt the enemy’s offensive capabilities and timelines while destroying his personnel and equipment, not to secure terrain and other physical objectives. A commander conducts a spoiling attack whenever possible during friendly defensive operations to strike the enemy while he is in assembly areas or attack positions preparing for his own offensive operation or is temporarily stopped. It usually employs heavy, attack helicopter, or fire support elements to attack enemy assembly positions in front of the friendly commander’s main line of resistance or battle positions.

IV. Counterattack
A counterattack is a form of attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the enemy his goal in attacking. The commander directs a counterattack—normally conducted from a defensive posture—to defeat or destroy enemy forces, exploit an enemy weakness, such as an exposed flank, or to regain control of terrain and facilities after an enemy success. A unit conducts a counterattack to seize the initiative from the enemy through offensive action. A counterattacking force maneuvers to isolate and destroy a designated enemy force. It can attack by fire into an engagement area to defeat or destroy an enemy force, restore the original position, or block an enemy penetration. Once launched, the counterattack normally becomes a decisive operation for the commander conducting the counterattack.

V. Demonstration
A demonstration is a form of attack designed to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the decisive operation by a display of force. Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy.

VI. Feint
A feint is a form of attack used to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of the actual decisive operation. Forces conducting a feint seek direct fire contact with the enemy but avoid decisive engagement. A commander uses them in conjunction with other military deception activities. They generally attempt to deceive the enemy and induce him to move reserves and shift his fire support to locations where they cannot immediately impact the friendly decisive operation or take other actions not conducive to the enemy’s best interests during the defense.

The principal difference between these forms of attack is that in a feint the commander assigns the force an objective limited in size, scope, or some other measure. Forces conducting a feint make direct fire contact with the enemy but avoid decisive engagement. Forces conducting a demonstration do not seek contact with the enemy. The planning, preparing, and executing considerations for demonstrations and feints are the same as for the other forms of attack.
Special Purpose Attacks

I. Ambush

Ref: FM 3-90 Tactics, pp. 5-29 to 5-34; FM 7-85 Ranger Unit Operations, chap 6; and FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 7-26 to 7-29.

An ambush is a form of attack by fire or other destructive means from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy. It may take the form of an assault to close with and destroy the enemy, or be an attack by fire only. An ambush does not require ground to be seized or held. Ambushes are generally executed to reduce the enemy force’s overall combat effectiveness. Destruction is the primary reason for conducting an ambush. Other reasons to conduct ambushes are to harass the enemy, capture the enemy, destroy or capture enemy equipment, and gain information about the enemy. Ambushes are classified by category (deliberate or hasty), formation (linear or L-shaped), and type (point, area, or antiarmor).

Area ambushes trap the enemy in a network of attacks from multiple concealed positions. These ambushes are carefully oriented to avoid “friendly fire” and yet maximize combat power against the enemy. (Ref: FM 7-8, chap 3, fig. 3-15).

The execution of an ambush is offensive in nature. However, a unit may be directed to conduct an ambush during offensive or defensive operations. An ambush normally consists of the following actions:

- Tactical movement to the objective rally point (ORP)
- Reconnaissance of the ambush site
- Establishment of the ambush security site
- Preparation of the ambush site
- Execution of the ambush
- Withdrawal
The intent of any ambush is to kill enemy troops and destroy enemy equipment. From a small unit perspective, how that is achieved and to what extent determines the difference in employing either a near ambush or a far ambush.

**Near Ambush**

The near ambush has the expressed purpose of destroying the target. This often requires an assaulting force to literally overrun the target after the initial volley of fire has inflicted tremendous damage. Again, the intent is to destroy everything.

Since the patrol will overwhelm the target, the patrol will get as close as possible to the enemy. This close proximity also means that friendly forces MUST outnumber the enemy target.

**Far Ambush**

The far ambush has only the purpose of injuring and/or delaying the target. This rarely ever calls for an assaulting force—since the patrol doesn’t seek the complete destruction of the enemy force there is no need to risk the loss of friendly troops. The far ambush simply intends to harass.

A far ambush team can engage an enemy patrol of any size or type. It does not matter if the enemy force is larger than the patrol because significant distances are used, as well as natural obstacles of the terrain, and established routes of withdraw that allows the ambush patrol to escape before the enemy has time to organize an effective counterattack.

**I. Organization**

An ambush patrol will be broken into multiple teams, each with a very specific set of responsibilities. The Infantry platoon is normally task-organized into assault, support, and security elements for execution of the ambush.

Each team must be assigned a leader. The ambush will require special equipment for each assigned team. This equipment should be made available for the rehearsal as well, to ensure everything functions according to the execution plan. Each team has a specific set of duties.

**6-4 (Special Purpose Attacks) I. Ambush**
I. Organization

In a very similar manner as the ambush force, the raiding force breaks down into three main elements: the security team, the support team, and the assault team.

1. Security Team
The security team is most commonly deployed to the left, right and sometimes rear of the raiding formation as it is deployed around the objective. They carry rifles, light machineguns, anti-personnel mines and possibly some anti-armor capabilities. Their main purpose is to isolate the target, prevent any enemy reinforcements, and to seal the escape of any enemy running from the objective.

2. Support Team
The support team is commonly deployed center of the raiding formation in such a manner that they have a clear view of the objective. They carry heavier mass-casualty producing weapons, such as machineguns, grenade launchers, or missiles. This team is primarily responsible for the shock effect, as well as inflicting as many casualties upon the enemy as possible to ensure the success of the assaulting team.

3. Assault Team
The assault team is deployed as closely to the objective as stealth and coordinated fire support allow. They are lightly armed with rifles and carbines but may have special equipment. This team is responsible for the destruction, capture, or liberation of the target. Upon assaulting across the objective, they are also the most exposed—and least armed element of the raid.

After the leader’s recon, the patrol leader leaves a 2-man security team overlooking the objective from a concealed position. This position later becomes the release point for the raid. The PL returns to the ORP to finalize plans. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).
Army doctrine addresses five regional environments: desert, cold, temperate, mountain, and jungle. Another area of special consideration involves urban areas.*

### Relative Units of Control, Action & Maneuver

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Unit of Control</th>
<th>Unit of Action</th>
<th>Unit of Maneuver</th>
<th>Relative Command &amp; Control</th>
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<td>BDE</td>
<td>BN/CO</td>
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<td>PLT/SQD</td>
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<td>PLT</td>
<td>SQD/TM</td>
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</table>

*Urban Operations

The continued trend worldwide of urban growth and the shift of populations from rural to urban areas continues to affect Army operations. The urban environment, consisting of complex terrain, dense populations, and integrated infrastructures, is the predominant operational environment in which Army forces currently operate. ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun ‘11), establishes doctrine for combined arms operations in urban terrain for the brigade combat team (BCT) and battalion/squadron commanders and staffs, company/troop commanders, small-unit leaders, and individual Soldiers.

See pp. 7-3 to 7-16. See also pp. 7-17 to 7-22 for related discussion of fortified areas.

### Desert Operations

Arid regions make up about one-third of the earth’s land surface, a higher percentage than that of any other climate. Desert operations demand adaptation to the environment and to the limitations imposed by terrain and climate. Success depends on the appreciation of the effects of the arid conditions on Soldiers, on equipment and facilities, and on combat and support operations. FM 90-3/FMFM 7-27, Desert Operations (Aug ‘93), is the Army and Marine Corps’ manual for desert operations. It is the key reference for commanders and staff regarding how desert affects personnel, equipment, and operations. It will assist them in planning and conducting combat operations in desert environments.

See pp. 7-23 to 7-30.

### Cold Region Operations

When conducting military operations in cold regions, leaders, Soldiers, and Marines must plan to fight two enemies: the cold and the opposing force. Despite the difficulties that cold regions pose, there are armies that have prepared for and can conduct large-scale, sustained operations in cold environments. In contrast, few U.S. Army units or personnel have trained extensively in cold region operations. ATTP 3-97.11/
MCRP 3-35D, Cold Region Operations (Jan ‘11), is the Army’s doctrinal publication for operations in the cold region environment. This manual will enable leaders, Soldiers, and Marines to accurately describe cold region environments, their effects on military equipment, impacts these environments have on personnel, and most importantly, how to employ the elements of combat power in cold region environments. It provides the conceptual framework for conventional forces to conduct cold region operations at operational and tactical levels.

See pp. 7-31 to 7-38.

Mountain Operations

With approximately 38 percent of the world’s landmass classified as mountains, the Army must be prepared to deter conflict, resist coercion, and defeat aggression in mountains as in other areas. Throughout the course of history, armies have been significantly affected by the requirement to fight in mountains. FM 3-97.6 (90-6), Mountain Operations (Nov ‘00), describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the U.S. Army uses to fight in mountainous regions. It provides key information and considerations for commanders and staffs regarding how mountains affect personnel, equipment, and operations. It also assists them in planning, preparing, and executing operations, battles, and engagements in a mountainous environment. Army units do not routinely train for operations in a mountainous environment. The jungle environment includes densely forested areas, grasslands, cultivated areas, and swamps. Jungles are classified as primary or secondary jungles based on the terrain and vegetation.

See pp. 7-39 to 7-46.

Jungle Operations

Jungles, in their various forms, are common in tropical areas of the world—mainly Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The climate in jungles varies with location. Close to the equator, all seasons are nearly alike, with rains throughout the year; farther from the equator, especially in India and Southeast Asia, jungles have distinct wet (monsoon) and dry seasons. Both zones have high temperatures (averaging 78 to 95+ degrees Fahrenheit), heavy rainfall (as much as 1,000 centimeters [400+ inches] annually), and high humidity (90 percent) throughout the year. Severe weather also has an impact on tactical operations in the jungle. FM 90-5, Jungle Operations (Aug ‘93), is the Army’s field manual on jungle operations.

See pp. 7-47 to 7-54.

Mission Command Considerations

Commanders of tactical forces will recognize a general tendency of command and control to vary from centralized to decentralized operations that is specific to any given regional or area environment. Such trends represent an historic norm, however the trends are not etched in stone as formalized doctrine. Still, it may help to consider battle command as it fluctuates from unit reliance on highly centralized control of desert operations, to unit autonomy in highly decentralized control of jungle operations.

In the associated graph (previous page), the “unit of control” is the higher command element tasked to an operational objective. The “unit of action” refers to the unit tasked to decisive engagement to achieve the operational objective. And the “unit of maneuver” includes the units responsible for shaping operational success.
I. Urban Operations

Infantry platoons conduct operations in urban areas using the same principles applicable to other offensive operations. This section explains the general tactics, techniques, and procedures used for a limited attack in an urban area.

I. Find

The compartmentalized nature of urban terrain, limited observation and fields of fire, and the vast amounts of potential cover and concealment mean that defenders can disperse and remain undetected. The origin of enemy gunfire can be difficult to detect, because distance and direction become distorted by structures. The nature of urban conflicts makes it more difficult for leaders to exercise command and control verbally, and for Soldiers to pass and receive information. Situational understanding is normally limited to the platoon’s immediate area.

II. Isolate the Building

The fix function has two aspects: isolating the objective to prevent interference from the outside (while preventing enemy from exiting), and separating forces on the objective from each other (denying mutual support and repositioning). This is accomplished by achieving fire superiority and seizing positions of advantage.
Urban Operations (UO)
Ref: ADRP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug ‘12), pp. 5-8 to 5-9 and ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun ’11), introduction.

Commanders conducting major urban operations use their ability to visualize how doctrine and military capabilities are applied within the context of the urban environment. An operational framework is the basic foundation for this visualization. In turn, this visualization forms the basis of operational design and decisionmaking. To accurately visualize, describe, and direct the conduct of operations in an urban environment, commanders and their staffs must understand the basic fundamentals applicable to most urban operations.

Fundamentals of Urban Operations
The impact of the urban operations environment often differs from one operation to the next. However, some fundamentals apply to urban operations regardless of the mission, geographical location, or level of command. Some of these fundamentals are not exclusive to urban environments. Yet, they are particularly relevant to an environment dominated by man-made structures and a dense noncombatant population. Vitally, these fundamentals help to ensure that every action taken by a commander operating in an urban environment contributes to the desired end-state of the major operation.

- Maintain close combat capability
- Avoid the attrition approach
- Control the essential
- Minimize collateral damage
- Preserve critical infrastructure
- Separate noncombatants from combatants
- Restore essential services
- Understand the human dimension
- Create a collaborative information environment
- Transition control

Urban Operational Construct
The five essential components of the urban operational construct are described below.

Understand
Understanding requires the continuous assessment of the current situation and operational progress. Commanders use visualization, staffs use running estimates, and both use the IPB process to assess and understand the urban environment. Commanders and staffs observe and continually learn about the urban environment (terrain, society, and infrastructure) and other mission variables. They use reconnaissance and security forces; information systems; and reports from other headquarters, services, organizations, and agencies. They orient themselves and achieve situational understanding based on a common operational picture and continuously updated CCIR. The commander’s ability to rapidly and accurately achieve an understanding of the urban environment contributes to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative during UO.

Shape
Reconnaissance, security, and inform and influence activities are essential to successful UO. These shaping operations set the conditions for decisive operations at the tactical level in the urban area. Isolation, decisive action, minimum friendly casualties, and acceptable collateral damage distinguish success when the AO is properly shaped. Failure to adequately shape the urban AO creates unacceptable risk. Urban shaping operations may include actions taken to achieve or prevent isolation, understand the environment, maintain freedom of action, protect the force, and develop cooperative relationships with...
B. Clearing Rooms
Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 7-40 to 7-42.

Although rooms come in all shapes and sizes, there are some general principles that apply to most room clearing tasks. For clearing large open buildings such as hangars or warehouses, it may be necessary to use subordinate units using a line formation while employing traveling or bounding overwatch. These methods can effectively clear the entire structure while ensuring security.

Room clearing techniques differ based on METT-TC, ROE, and probability of non-combatants inside the building. If there are known or suspected enemy forces, but no noncombatants inside the building, the platoon may conduct high intensity room clearings. If there are known or suspected noncombatants within the building, the platoon may conduct precision room clearings. High intensity room clearing may consist of fragmentation grenade employment and an immediate and high volume of small arms fire placed into the room, precision room clearing will not.

• **#1 Man.** The #1 man enters the room and eliminates any immediate threat. He can move left or right, moving along the path of least resistance to a point of domination—one of the two corners and continues down the room to gain depth.

• **#2 Man.** The #2 man enters almost simultaneously with the first and moves in the opposite direction, following the wall. The #2 man must clear the entry point, clear the immediate threat area, and move to his point of domination.

• **#3 Man.** The #3 man simply moves in the opposite direction of the #2 man inside the room, moves at least 1 meter from the entry point, and takes a position that dominates his sector.

• **#4 Man.** The #4 man moves in the opposite direction of the #3 man, clears the doorway by at least 1 meter, and moves to a position that dominates his sector.

Once the room is cleared, the team leader may order some team members to move deeper into the room overwatched by the other team members. The team leader must control this action. In addition to dominating the room, all team members are responsible for identifying possible loopholes and mouseholes. Cleared rooms should be marked IAW unit SOP.
C. Moving in the Building

Ref: FM 3-21.8 (FM 7-8) The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, pp. 7-42 to 7-46. See also pp. 2-32 to 2-33 for discussion of clearing as a tactical mission task.

Movement techniques used inside a building are employed by teams to negotiate hallways and other avenues of approach.

**Diamond Formation (Serpentine Technique)**
The serpentine technique is a variation of a diamond formation that is used in a narrow hallway. The #1 man provides security to the front. His sector of fire includes any enemy Soldiers who appear at the far end or along the hallway. The #2 and #3 men cover the left and right sides of the #1 man. Their sectors of fire include any enemy combatants who appear suddenly from either side of the hall. The #4 man (normally carrying the M249) provides rear protection.

**Vee Formation (Rolling-T Technique)**
The rolling-T technique is a variation of the Vee formation and is used in wide hallways. The #1 and #2 men move abreast, covering the opposite side of the hallway from the one they are walking on. The #3 man covers the far end of the hallway from a position behind the #1 and #2 men, firing between them. The #4 man provides rear security.

To clear a hallway—

- The team configures into a modified 2-by-2 (box) formation with the #1 and #3 men abreast and toward the right side of the hall. The #2 man moves to the left side of the hall and orients to the front, and the #4 man shifts to the right side (his left) and maintains rear security. (When clearing a right-hand corner, use the left-handed firing method to minimize exposure [Figure 7-13 B]).
- The #1 and #3 men move to the edge of the corner. The #3 man assumes a low crouch or kneeling position. On signal, the #3 man, keeping low, turns right around the corner and the #1 man, staying high, steps forward while turning to the right. (Sectors of fire interlock and the low/high positions prevent Soldiers from firing at one another [Figure 7-13 C]).
I. Desert Environments

By definition, a desert region receives less than 10 inches (25cm) of rainfall annually. There are 22 deserts covering 30 percent of the earth's landmass. The largest non-polar desert is the Sahara that covers the northern half of the African continent, an area larger than the entire contiguous 48 states of America. The word desert comes from Latin desertum meaning “an abandoned place.” Though admittedly sparse, both large and small cities are distributed across the deserts of the world. Human population in the desert centers on fresh water sources, oil reserves, and seaports.

Successful desert operations require adaptation to the environment and to the limitations its terrain and climate impose. Equipment and tactics must be modified and adapted to a dusty and rugged landscape where temperatures vary from extreme highs down to freezing and where visibility may change from 30 miles to 30 feet in a matter of minutes. Deserts are arid, barren regions of the earth incapable of supporting normal life due to lack of water. (Dept. of Defense photo by Chance Haworth).

A. Weather in the Desert

Storms in the desert are commonly refer to dust storms. Dust storms are a meteorological formation that may produce hurricane force wind delivering walls of thick dust several hundred feet (100m) high. Dust storms may last as long as several days and can produce dangerous levels of static electricity. Visibility closes to just 30 feet (10m) and travel by land-borne or airborne vehicle is extremely dangerous.

Typically, deserts also have a rainy season in which nearly all of the little precipitation falls. Rains commonly follow heavy dust storms. Flash flooding is a threat during rains because the desert floor has modest absorption properties.
IV. Cold Region Operations

Ref: ATTP 3-97.11/MCRP 3-35D, Cold Region Operations (Jan ‘11).

I. Cold Regions

Cold regions are unique environments that together make up about a quarter of the earth’s landmass at the northernmost and southernmost locales, and are found seasonally in high altitude mountains. In cold regions the annual snowfall exceeds two feet (0.6 meters); the average temperature of the year is below freezing; large ice formations remain for half the year or longer; and a permanent sheet of ice called permafrost lies just beneath the topsoil. In addition to characteristic weather, cold regions have distinctive flora and fauna.

![Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV) pulling troops cross-country on skis.](Dept. of Army photo)

In addition to hauling equipment, the Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV) can pull troops cross-country on skis, referred to as skijoring.

The arctic is a cold region of low coastal and interior plains. Grasslands void of trees, with little snowfall and even less evaporation denote the arctic. The arctic gets so little precipitation that it is classified as a desert, yet in the warmest season the surface ice may melt forming a humid, muddy marsh due to water trapped in the topsoil above the permafrost layer. The arctic has very few human settlements. Military operations tend to focus on maintaining seaports and roads.

The subarctic is a cold region below the Arctic Circle that includes low costal and interior plains, high interior plains, and mountain ranges. Vast boreal forests of coniferous pine trees and the most extreme temperature changes on earth denote the subarctic. There are more significant human settlements, road infrastructure, and natural resources in the subarctic that render military operations all the more likely, but similarly as daunting as the arctic.
C. Geologic & Vegetation Characteristics

Ref: FM 3-97.6 (90-6), Mountain Operations (Nov ‘00), chap. 1.

Mountain environments contain a variety of geological characteristics that impact tactical considerations of OCOKA for each mission. Major and minor terrain features and even micro terrain are easily anticipated. However, less commonly known characteristics include:

- **Talus** – large boulder rock formations
- **Scree** – small loose rocks

The size of talus renders slopes covered with these boulders relatively easy in the ascent, but require considerable effort to navigate in the descent. On the other hand, talus offers excellent cover from enemy fire and acceptable concealment from enemy observation.

As opposed to talus, the loose rock nature of a slope covered in scree make the ascent challenging as scree is known to give away under foot and cause rock slides. Whereas such slides make the descent a relatively easy proposition, though with some injury risk due to falling rock. Scree does not usually offer any value in regard to either cover or concealment from enemy fires and observation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS</th>
<th>TERRAIN</th>
<th>MOBILITY</th>
<th>SKILL LEVEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Gentle Slopes &amp; Trails</td>
<td>Walking</td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Steep Rugged Terrain</td>
<td>Walking &amp; Use of Hands</td>
<td>Basic Mountaineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Low Grade Climbing</td>
<td>Walking, Use of Hands &amp; Fixed Rope</td>
<td>Basic Mountaineer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Steep Grade Climbing</td>
<td>Fixed Rope</td>
<td>Assisted by Assault Climbers</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Vertical Grade Climbing</td>
<td>Alpine Rock Climbing</td>
<td>Only Assault Climbers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to geological characteristics, mountains have unique flora and fauna that must be considered during OCOKA:

- **Tundra** – high altitude short grasses
- **Tussocks** – lower altitude long, clumps of grass
- **Deciduous Forests** – trees with thick trunks and seasonal broad leaves
- **Coniferous Forests** – trees with thin trunks and year-round evergreen

The short characteristic of tundra grasses offers little in the way of concealment. However when clumps of tussocks are plentiful, concealment from enemy observation can easily be achieved.

Coniferous forests offer trees with dense evergreen pine and thinner trunks. There are exceptions to this rule, of course, such as the Ponderosa pine trees unique to mountain forests in the American southwest. However, as a general rule of thumb coniferous forests are more difficult to navigate due to dense evergreen vegetation that grows low to the ground.

Pine trees offer little in the way of cover from enemy fires. In a mountain coniferous forest the micro terrain offers more practical solutions for cover. Yet pine trees offer excellent concealment from enemy observation all year around because unlike the seasonal leaves of deciduous trees, pine trees do not shed their pines.

Mountains may be covered in either deciduous or coniferous forests, mixed forests, or none at all in the most arid conditions. Furthermore, trees do not generally grow above altitudes of 10,000 feet (3,050 meters).

Deciduous forests offer trees with thick trunks that are more sparsely populated. This means that navigation tends to be easier with better visibility. It also means that older, thicker deciduous tree trunks offer better protection from enemy small arm fire.
B. Terrain & Vegetation Characteristics

Tactical considerations of OCOKA present unique challenges in the dense jungle canopy and tropical grasslands. Visibility in the jungle is greatly diminished making concealment all but guaranteed for both friend and foe alike.

Swamps fall into two general categories:

- **Mangrove swamps** – coastal region swamps often with brackish water and dense shrub trees that grow only 3-15 feet (1-5m) high, as are common in the Everglades of Florida.
- **Palm swamps** – freshwater inland swamps set in mature forests trees that grow 65 feet (20m) or taller with dense upper canopies, as is common in the Bayous of Louisiana.

Hilly and mountainous terrain is commonly void of human development in jungle regions, leaving pristine jungle forests covering the high ground.

Vegetation

The jungle climate is covered with dense vegetation. This includes rainforests and deciduous forest, but also includes grasslands called savannahs.

- **Rainforests** – mature forests with trees growing as tall 200 feet (60m) and multiple canopy layers that leave a dark rotten floor with no undergrowth. The canopy ceiling can be 25 feet (8m) above the ground.
- **Deciduous Forests** – new growth or mature forests with trees commonly reaching 65 feet (20m) high. These forests typically have just one upper canopy that allows sunlight to the forest floor that may in spots produce a thick underbrush canopy.
- **Savannahs** – treeless grassland with broadleaf grasses that grow 3-15 feet (1-5m) high. These grasslands can appear as small meadows in the jungle, or grow as vast open prairies across flats and mountain foothills.

The more canopies present in the jungle, the less sunlight can break through to the forest floor. Yet the lack of undergrowth in dark jungle forests makes for easier movement when conducting dismounted patrols.
Patrols & Patrolling


The two categories of patrols are combat and reconnaissance. Regardless of the type of patrol being sent out, the commander must provide a clear task and purpose to the patrol leader. Any time a patrol leaves the main body of the unit there is a possibility that it may become engaged in close combat.

Combat Patrols
Patrols that depart the main body with the clear intent to make direct contact with the enemy are called combat patrols. The three types of combat patrols are raid patrols, ambush patrols (both of which are sent out to conduct special purpose attacks), and security patrols.

Reconnaissance Patrols
Patrols that depart the main body with the intention of avoiding direct combat with the enemy while seeing out information or confirming the accuracy of previously-gathered information are called reconnaissance patrols. The most common types reconnaissance patrols are area, route, zone, and point. Leaders also dispatch reconnaissance patrols to track the enemy, and to establish contact with other friendly forces. Contact patrols make physical contact with adjacent units and report their location, status, and intentions. Tracking patrols follow the trail and movements of a specific enemy unit. Presence patrols conduct a special form of reconnaissance, normally during stability or civil support operations.

Note: See also p. 4-12 for discussion of patrols in support of stability operations.
A patrol is organized to perform specific tasks. It must be prepared to secure itself, navigate accurately, identify and cross danger areas, and reconnoiter the patrol objective. If it is a combat patrol, it must be prepared to breach obstacles, assault the objective, and support those assaults by fire. Additionally, a patrol must be able to conduct detailed searches as well as deal with casualties and prisoners or detainees.

The leader identifies those tasks the patrol must perform and decides which elements will implement them. Where possible, he should maintain squad and fire team integrity.

I. Organization of Patrols

A patrol is sent out by a larger unit to conduct a specific combat, reconnaissance, or security mission. A patrol’s organization is temporary and specifically matched to the immediate task. Because a patrol is an organization, not a mission, it is not correct to speak of giving a unit a mission to “Patrol.”

The terms “patrolling” or “conducting a patrol” are used to refer to the semi-independent operation conducted to accomplish the patrol’s mission. Patrols require a specific task and purpose.

A commander sends a patrol out from the main body to conduct a specific tactical task with an associated purpose. Upon completion of that task, the patrol leader returns to the main body, reports to the commander and describes the events that took place, the status of the patrol’s members and equipment, and any observations.

If a patrol is made up of an organic unit, such as a rifle squad, the squad leader is responsible. If a patrol is made up of mixed elements from several units, an officer or NCO is designated as the patrol leader. This temporary title defines his role and responsibilities for that mission. The patrol leader may designate an assistant, normally the next senior man in the patrol, and any subordinate element leaders he requires.
A patrol can consist of a unit as small as a fire team. Squad- and platoon-size patrols are normal. Sometimes, for combat tasks such as a raid, the patrol can consist of most of the combat elements of a rifle company. Unlike operations in which the Infantry platoon or squad is integrated into a larger organization, the patrol is semi-independent and relies on itself for security.

Every patrol is assigned specific tasks. Some tasks are assigned to the entire patrol, others are assigned to subordinate teams, and finally some are assigned to each individual. An individual will have multiple tasks and subtasks to consider and carry out.

1. **Pointman, Dragman, and Security Team**

Security is everyone’s responsibility. Having noted that, every patrol has a troop walking in front. This troop is called the pointman. He is responsible for making sure the patrol does not walk into enemy ambushes, minefields, or similar. The pointman has forward security. Sometimes a patrol will send the pointman with another patrol member to walk a short distance forward of the patrol. Also, every patrol has someone who is last in the formation. This troop is called the dragman. He is responsible for making sure that no patrol members are left behind. He also makes sure that the enemy doesn’t surprise the patrol from the rear unnoticed. The security team is responsible for specifically pulling security to the left and right of the patrol. This is a critical task when crossing danger areas, so a specific team is identified to conduct this task.

2. **Clearing Team**

The clearing team crosses the danger area once the security team is in place. The clearing team has the specified responsibility of visually clearing and physically securing the far side of a danger area. It’s important so another team is designated to conduct this task.

3. **Compass & Pace Team**

Obviously someone needs to make sure the patrol is headed in the right direction and that we don’t travel too far. This is the job of the compassman and paceman. Typically the compass and pace team is positioned immediately behind the pointman. Additionally, a secondary compass and pace team is usually located in the back half of the patrol.

4. **Command Team**

The PL and a radio operator (RTO) make up the command team for most patrols. Doctrinally speaking, the APL is also part of this team but the APL is normally positioned near the very rear of the formation to help the dragman and ensure no patrol member is left behind.

5. **Aid & Litter Team**

Someone has to help pull wounded buddies out of harms way. There are usually two members of each fire team designated as aid and litter teams. These teams are spread throughout the patrol and have the responsibility of carrying and employing extra medical aid gear.

6. **Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Search Team**

EPW teams are responsible for controlling enemy prisoners IAW the five S’s and the leader’s guidance. These teams may also be responsible for accounting for and controlling detainees or recovered personnel.

7. **Tracking Team**

There are many different specialty teams that might be assigned to a patrol. Trackers are just one such resource. Explosive ordinance details (EOD) are another. Trackers are unique, however, because they are generally positioned just ahead of the pointman on the patrol.

8. **Support Team**

The support team is outfitted with heavy, crew-served weapons on the patrol. Of course, reconnaissance patrols usually do not make use of a support team. But when a support team is required, it will be positioned to the center of the patrol.

9. **Assault & Breach Team**

Reconnaissance rarely ever needs an assault team. The assault team may be dispersed throughout the patrol, but ideally is situated toward the rear. This is because the assault team is typically placed on the objective last.
I. Attack Formations - The Line

The line formation places excellent firepower forward, employing virtually 100 percent of the unit's weapon systems to the front. Additionally, C2 is easily achieved along a line formation, making the line an excellent choice for frontal assaults against the enemy.

To execute the squad line, the squad leader designates one of the teams as the base team. The other team cues its movement off of the base team. This applies when the squad is in close combat as well. From this formation, the squad leader can employ any of the three movement techniques or conduct fire and movement.

The disadvantages include a lack of maneuverability, difficulty in changing direction, and an almost complete inability to protect the flank. Regardless of the interval distance between each troop in the line formation, they are literally lined up in a side-by-side fashion. This means that only the last troop on either flank can engage an enemy force to the sides of this formation.

Troops stand abreast of each other to form the line—with key leaders situated in the middle or just behind the formation. This formation is effective when we expect to gain fire superiority to the immediate front. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).

1. All troops are formed into a rank, side-by-side. Each troop faces forward and has essentially a 90º sector of fire. Subordinate leaders maintain control over the formation, careful not to allow any portion of the line formation to get ahead of the others. This could risk fratricide or at the very least, mask the fires of friendly troops.

2. Hand and arm signals are the preferred method of communication. Communication is passed left and right along the formation. This means that every sixth step of the left foot, each troop should look left and right to see if any information is being passed along the line formation.

3. When any one member of the formation stops, every member halts. Each member takes a knee upon the formation's halt facing forward. The troop on the far left and right face out accordingly. After five minutes, each patrol member drops their rucksack and assumes a prone position until the signal to move out is given.
I. Patch-to-the-Road Method

Using this method, a nine-man squad should be able to cross the danger area in ten seconds or less. *Speed is a form of security.* This method also allows the column formation to be maintained, which means greater control and communication for the PL.

1. The point man brings the patrol to a halt and signals that he has come upon a danger area. The PL comes forward to view the danger area, assesses the situation, and selects a method of negotiating the danger area.

2. If the patch-to-the-road method is selected, the PL communicates this to the team with the appropriate hand and arm signal. The entire patrol closes the intervals between members shoulder-to-shoulder. The patrol members must actually touch each other. This is done even during daylight hours. This will allow a very fast pace when crossing and prevent a break in contact.

3. The two-man security team moves from the rear of the formation up to the front. At the PL's signal, the first security troop steps up to the danger area only as far as he needs to look left and right. If the road is clear of enemy presence, the troop takes a position so he can view down the road to his right. In this position, his unit patch (on the upper part of his left arm sleeve) will be facing toward the middle of the road. Thus, the method is called "patch-to-the-road."

This method uses speed as the primary form of security. A left and right security overwatch is provided locally. At the patrol leader's signal, the rest of the patrol move in file across the danger area. (Photo by Jeong, Hae-jung).
4. As soon as the security troop on the near side of the danger area levels his weapon down the road, the second member of the security team immediately rushes across the danger area and takes up a position to view down the opposite direction of the road. At this point, both team members have their unit arm patches facing toward the middle of the road and they are pointing in the opposite direction.

5. As soon as the security troop is on far side if the danger area levels his weapon down the road, this signals the PL to stand the remaining patrol members and RUN across the danger area. This is done literally by holding onto the gear of the troop to the front.

6. As the last troop passes the near side security troop, he firmly says, “Last man.” An acceptable alternative is to tap the security troop on the shoulder. In either case, this indicates to the security troop to stand up and run across the danger area behind the patrol.

7. The security troop will say firmly, “Last man”, to the far side security troop or tap him on the shoulder. This lets that troop know to follow behind.

8. Now the entire patrol is back in its original marching order on the far side of the objective.

It is important that as the pointman initially crosses the danger area, that he makes a quick dash into the tree line to visually inspect the space the patrol will occupy. The only reason to stop the patrol in the danger area is if the pointman determines the far side tree line is booby-trapped. Even if the enemy has set up a near ambush, the patrol must assault through. No one stays in the danger area.

The potential danger here is that the security team troops become distracted from the mundane task of overwatching their sector. This is especially true if some snag holds up the process and the security team is forced to stand overwatch down the road for more that the allotted ten seconds.

It takes considerable discipline and lots of rehearsals to keep troops facing down a linear danger area, partially exposing themselves and generally feeling vulnerable when there is a hold-up such as another member tripping while running across the road, or getting caught on a fence wire, or dropping an unsecured piece of equipment and then doubling back to retrieve it. What generally happens at that point is that one or both of the security team members become agitated and turns to look to see what’s going on in middle of the road instead of maintaining a vigilant overwatch of their sector.

**Contingency Plan**

Ideally, if the enemy does show up when the patrol is crossing a danger area, the security team will fire first. Or if there is on-coming traffic, the security team will shout a warning to the other patrol to momentarily halt and hide. This signal means no one else should attempt to cross the danger area. So it is imperative that the security team realizes they are to keep a vigilant overwatch of the danger area until:

- The patrol successfully traverses the danger area
- They are directed to hide from on-coming traffic
- Or the patrol becomes engaged in a firefight

If there is a break in contact due to traffic or contact with the enemy, each patrol must establish a method of link-up. Typically, if the patrol becomes separated, the patrol will rendezvous at the last designated en-route rally point (ERP).
Establishing a Hide Position

I. Back-to-Back Method

This method is more practical for wooded and heavily vegetated terrain. When seated, the security team can observe of the likely avenues of approach or escape. This could not be achieved if the security team were laying in the prone in heavy vegetation. And frankly, if the patrol is exhausted enough that it has to use the hide position, placing the watch team on their bellies is just asking for trouble. An exhausted troop is much more likely to fall asleep lying down than sitting up—no matter how disciplined.

1. The patrol members come shoulder to shoulder, take a knee and face left and right in an alternating pattern. All patrol members drop their rucksacks.

2. Half of the patrol members are designated to ready their sleeping bags and mats while the other half pull security. Once the first members have readied their sleeping positions as comfortably as possible, they sit on their equipment and pull security while the other members ready their sleeping bags and mats. No tents are pitched, no early warning devices are implemented, and no fighting positions are prepared.

3. The PL determines how many members of the patrol will pull security and what the duration and schedule of the guard shifts will be. Typically, hide positions require at least two troops to pull security at a time.

4. Since no anti-personnel mines or trip flares are used, CS canisters or fragmentation grenades are given to the first guard shift and then passed to subsequent guards. If the enemy does walk near the patrol, great discipline must be enforced to allow the enemy to pass by. In the unlikely case that the enemy walks up on the hide position, grenades are used while the patrol makes a quick escape. Direct fire should be avoided at night since
Priorities of Work - Patrol Base

Once the PL is briefed by the R&S teams and determines the area is suitable for a patrol base, the leader establishes or modifies defensive work priorities in order to establish the defense for the patrol base. Priorities of work are not a laundry list of tasks to be completed; to be effective, priorities of work must consist of a task, a given time, and a measurable performance standard. For each priority of work, a clear standard must be issued to guide the element in the successful accomplishment of each task. It must also be designated whether the work will be controlled in a centralized or decentralized manner. Priorities of work are determined IAW METT-TC. Priorities of work may include, but are not limited to the following tasks:

1. **Security is always the first priority.** The patrol base is maintained at a level of security appropriate to the situation. As a rule of thumb, the patrol base does not fall below 33 percent security. That means one out of three troops are diligently watching their sectors of fire.

2. **An alternate defensive position is designated.** Typically, the PL informs the subordinate leaders that the ORP will serve as a fallback position in the event the patrol base is over-run. This information is disseminated to all of the patrol members.

3. **An ambush team covers the trail into the patrol base.** A small force backtracks approximately 100 meters from the 6 o’clock position and then steps off of the trail. This ambush team observes the trail for a half hour or so to be certain no enemy force has followed the patrol into the patrol base. This must be done immediately after the patrol base has been secured.

4. **Communication is established between all key positions.** Field phones or radios are positioned with the CP and each apex at the 2, 6, and 10 o’clock positions.

5. **An R&S team conducts a recon of the immediate area.** After communication is established, the PL dispatches a recon & security (R&S) team to skirt the area just outside the visible sectors of fire for the patrol base. Everyone must be informed. Otherwise, patrol members may fire upon the R&S team.

6. **Mines and flares are implemented.** After the R&S team confirms that the area immediately around the patrol base is secure, those positions designated to employ mines or flares carefully place them at the far end of their visible sectors of fire—no more than 35 meters out. These anti-personnel mines and early warning devices must be kept within viewable distance of the patrol base.

7. **Hasty fighting positions are constructed.** Barricades are the preferred method as digging and cutting can be too loud and may disclose the position. Fighting positions make use of available micro-terrain. If a hasty fighting position is necessary, care is taken to camouflage the exposed earth.

8. **Plans are finalized or altered.** The patrol’s missions may be altered slightly or significantly in time. The PL makes these adjustments and every member of the patrol base is informed. If at all possible, shoulder-to-shoulder rehearsals are carried out in the center of the patrol base, prior to conducting missions.

9. **Weapons are cleaned.** This is particularly true if the patrol made contact during a mission or if the movement to the patrol base took involved moving through a particularly filthy environment—such as fording a river or being inserted onto a sandy beach. Still, no less than 33 percent of the patrol members maintain security.

10. **Sleep and eating plans are initiated.** If the situation dictates, the patrol base implements an eating and sleeping schedule, while maintaining security.
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