SECOND EDITION

Range of Military Operations (ROMO)
Train, Advise & Assist (SFA/FID/HN/FSF)
Stability Operations
Peace Operations (PKO/PEO/PB)
Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN)
Civil-Military Operations (CMO)
Multinational Operations
Intergovernmental Coordination


Foreign Train, Advise & Assist

The Lightning Press
Norman M Wade

Foreign
Train, Advise & Assist

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Throughout U.S. history, U.S. forces have learned that military force alone cannot secure sustainable peace. U.S. forces can only achieve sustainable peace through a comprehensive approach in which military objectives nest in a larger cooperative effort of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, the private sector, and the host nation. Military engagement, security cooperation, and stability missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. Use of joint capabilities in these and related activities such as security force assistance and foreign internal defense helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence. Stability operations are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Peace Operations are crisis response and limited contingency operations conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding the transition to legitimate governance. A counterinsurgency campaign is a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires military forces to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies and to be nation builders as well as warriors. Civil-military operations are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.

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The range of military operations (ROMO) is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

These activities generally occur continuously in all GCCs’ AORs regardless of other ongoing contingencies, major operations, or campaigns. They usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities separate from but integrated with the efforts of inter-organizational partners. Because DOS is frequently the major player in these activities, JFCs should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area. Commanders and their staffs should establish and maintain dialogue with pertinent inter-organizational partners to share information and facilitate future operations.
A. Military Engagement

Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities. Support to military engagement may include specific mission areas such as religious affairs and medical support.

B. Security Cooperation

Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military and security capabilities for internal and external defense, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to the HN. Developmental actions enhance a host government’s willingness and ability to care for its people. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. GCCs shape their AORs through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The GCC’s security cooperation strategy provides a framework within which CCMDs engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention.

C. Deterrence

Deterrence prevents adversary action through the presentation of a credible threat of counteraction. In both peace and war, the Armed Forces of the United States help to deter adversaries from using violence to reach their aims. Deterrence stems from an adversary’s belief that a credible threat of retaliation exists, the contemplated action cannot succeed, or the costs outweigh the perceived benefits of acting. Thus, a potential aggressor chooses not to act for fear of failure, cost, or consequences. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to conduct decisive operations immediately. However, if committed forces lack the combat power to conduct decisive operations, they conduct defensive operations while additional forces deploy. Effective deterrence requires a security cooperation plan that emphasizes the willingness of the US to employ forces in defense of its interests. Various joint operations (such as show of force and enforcement of sanctions) support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and willingness to use force when necessary. Other operations (such as nation assistance and FHA) support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful cooperation, thus promoting stability. Joint actions such as nation assistance, antiterrorism, DOD support to counterdrug (CD) operations, show of force operations, and arms control are applied to meet military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence objectives.

Sustained presence contributes to deterrence and promotes a secure environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational programs designed to reduce the causes of instability can perform as designed. Presence can take the form of forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets. Forward presence activities demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US influence and access. Joint force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating into larger conflicts. The sustained presence of strong, capable forces is the most visible sign of US commitment to allies and adversaries alike. However, if sustained forward presence fails to deter an adversary, committed forces must be agile enough to transition rapidly to combat operations. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence involves periodic rotational deployments and redeployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training, foreign community support, and both military-to-military and military-to-civilian contacts.
Sample Security Cooperation &
Security Assistance Activities

Combined Exercises
Combined exercises and other exercises involving U.S. and foreign militaries are required by law to have each participant pay for its own costs. In some cases, U.S. O&M funds may legally be used for training HN forces when such training tests and evaluates mutual capabilities. Such exercises have a primary benefit to U.S. readiness and use of such funds is not necessarily prohibited. Such O&M-funded training of HN forces may include safety training, familiarization training, and interoperability training.

Conferences and Seminars
Conferences and seminars provide for discussions, interaction, and sometimes policy proposals for U.S. and HN approval.

Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
DCS involve purchases negotiated directly between a friendly government and a U.S. company. Although it must approve the contract, the U.S. government does not guarantee delivery or satisfaction with DCS. Some purchasers prefer to buy major items through DCS and then receive follow-on logistics support through FMS.

Defense Shows and Exhibitions
Defense shows and exhibitions are key opportunities to display U.S. military hardware for potential buyers. A prohibition on direct U.S. military participation was terminated.

Deployment for Training
Deployment for training is usually funded by O&M funds. Its primary benefit is for the U.S. military personnel or unit to perform deployment to a foreign country, perform one of its mission tasks (such as road-building or medical treatment) and redeploy.

Excess Defense Articles (EDA)
The EDA program provides equipment declared excess by DOD to be sold at prices ranging from 5 percent to 50 percent of original cost, or provided as a grant. While Congress has established ceiling amounts and specific country restrictions, exceptions and exemptions still provide significant transfers. Recipient nations pay for all transportation, repairs, and upgrades.

Exchange Programs
Exchange programs are intended to foster understanding and familiarize each force with the capabilities and differences of the other. Programs include Individual Exchange Program, the Personnel Exchange Program (a 1-3 year PCS move) and Reciprocal Unit Exchanges.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
FMF are grants and loans for the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services and related training. With almost no exceptions, all of these funds must be spent in the U.S. Despite the term “financing,” FMF monies currently are grant funds.

Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
FMS are government-to-government contracts for the sale of equipment and training. FMS prices include surcharges for the administrative costs of security assistance and the non-recurring costs of research, development, and production. In 1976, Congress required FMS to be used for major items and some special items, reversing a previous preference for DCS. FMS not only includes major defense items of equipment, but also military training.
Humanitarian Assistance
Examples: Protection or support to agencies or organizations providing relief outside the U.S.; humanitarian demining (although the U.S. military rarely actually does demining, it does provide training for demining schools, publicity in local languages, and selected funding for demining groups)

International Military Education and Training (IMET)
IMET provides military education and training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. The purpose of IMET is to increase mutual understanding, improve management and heighten human rights awareness. Annually, IMET provides programs, including professional military education, to approximately 5,000 students from about 120 countries. In 1991, the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) program was implemented to promote professionalism and civilian oversight of the military by providing training and education to host nation civilian officials from ministries of defense and other defense management and resource allocation organizations. Since FY95, E-IMET also has been available to civilians who are not members of the government but are essentially members of non-governmental organizations.

Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET)
U.S. law generally requires the HN to pay for training that benefits its forces. “SOF exception” training, or training provided by U.S. SOF forces to a HN military, are an exception to that rule because some SOF missions require the SOF capability to train foreign forces. Therefore, although primary benefit must be to SOF, and training must not equate or duplicate training purchased or provided by security assistance.

Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP)
JCTP is the program term for small U.S. military liaison teams who are located in and directly assist designated Ministries of Defense with planning and implementing selected TSC activities. The program began in order to accelerate TSC interaction in former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries.

Leased Defense Articles (LDA)
The LDA program provides approved nations with U.S. equipment that DOD does not declare excess but certifies as not required for the period of the lease. Recipients, including the UN, generally pay leasing costs including a rental charge for depreciation, transportation fees and any repairs. “No-cost” leases, such as those offered recently for F-16 aircraft, still include payment for transportation and repairs.

Mobile Training Team (MTT)
Security assistance (generally HN) funds provide training, and follow-on logistics support or repair parts to an FMS customer or weapon system logistic office. The primary beneficiary is the HN military.

Regional Study Centers
Regional study centers are educational facilities that include seminars, conferences, and longer courses to increase, educate, and build relationships between military officers in the region. Examples include USEUCOM’s Marshall Center and USPACOM’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies.

Senior Officer Visits
Senior officer visits are highly visible interaction between senior military and civilian leaders to build and enhance personal relationships and increase understanding. Obviously they are an example of informational power as they are publicized and demonstrate U.S. approval and support. They may sometimes be used to express concerns and to influence HN policies.
I. Typical Crisis Response Operations


A. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

NEOs are operations directed by the DOS or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with DOD, whereby noncombatants and civilians are evacuated from locations within foreign countries to safe havens when their lives are endangered by, or in anticipation of, war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs also may include citizens from the HN as well as citizens from other countries. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of American citizens abroad and for safeguarding their property. This order also directs DOD to advise and assist DOS in preparing and implementing plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US ambassador, or chief of the diplomatic mission, is responsible for preparation of emergency action plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of emergency action plans is the responsibility of the GCC, as directed by SecDef.

B. Peace Operations (PO)

PO are multi-agency and multinational operations involving all instruments of national power—including international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and military missions—to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass PKO, predominantly military PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, PM processes, and conflict prevention. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. PO support national/multinational strategic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements. See chap. 4.

- Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Such actions are often taken under the authority of Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of the UN Charter.

- Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO). PEO are the application of military force or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict.

- Peace Building (PB). PB consists of stability actions (predominantly diplomatic, economic, and security related) that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. Military support to PB may include rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or training defense forces.

- Peacemaking (PM). This is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute or resolves issues that led to conflict. It can be an ongoing process, supported by military, economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of national power. The purpose is to instill in the parties an understanding that reconciliation is a better alternative.
to fighting. The military can assist in establishing incentives, disincentives, and mechanisms that promote reconciliation. Military activities that support PM include military-to-military exchanges and security assistance.

- **Conflict Prevention.** Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic and other actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an agreement before armed hostilities. These actions are normally conducted under Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of the UN Charter. However, military deployments designed to deter and coerce parties will need to be credible, and this may require a combat posture and an enforcement mandate under the principles of Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, of the UN Charter. Conflict prevention activities include diplomatic initiatives, efforts designed to reform a country’s security sector and make it more accountable to democratic control, and deployment of forces designed to prevent a dispute or contain it from escalating to hostilities. Other conflict prevention activities may include military fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. Military forces used for conflict prevention should be focused on support to political and developmental efforts to ameliorate the causes of tension and unrest. Military activities will be tailored to meet political and development demands.

**C. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)**

FHA operations relieve or reduce the impact of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation in countries or regions outside the United States. These operations are different from nation assistance primarily because they occur on short notice to provide aid in specific crises or similar events rather than as more deliberate programs to promote long-term regional stability. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. DOD provides assistance when the need for relief is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond. See pp. 3-46 to 2-47 for further discussion.

**D. Recovery Operations**

Recovery operations may be conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or human remains (such as JTF—Full Accounting, which had the mission to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans still unaccounted for as a result of the war in Southeast Asia). Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of recovery operation is generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning in order to execute. Recovery operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt depending on whether the operational environment is hostile, uncertain, or permissive.

**E. Strikes andRaids**

- **Strikes** are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. Strikes may be used to punish offending nations or groups, uphold international law, or prevent those nations or groups from launching their own attacks (e.g., Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin). Although often tactical in nature with respect to the ways and means used and duration of the operation, strikes can achieve strategic objectives as did the strike against Libya.

- **Raids** are operations to temporarily seize an area, usually through forcible entry, in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy an objective or capability (e.g., Operation URGENT FURY, Grenada 1983, to protect US citizens and restore the lawful government). Raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.
A complex relationship exists among security cooperation, security assistance, and the military instrument of foreign internal defense. The left side of the illustration below depicts this relationship, including how aspects of foreign internal defense and security assistance overlap. The right side illustrates how foreign internal defense focuses on internal threats to a host nation and how security assistance focuses on external threats. The column depicts how security (military, intelligence, and civilian), economic, and governance are considerations common to both foreign internal defense and security assistance. Security Force Assistance supports the military instrument of foreign internal defense, much of security assistance efforts, and some security cooperation efforts.

**I. Security Cooperation**

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation—usually coordinated by the U.S. military’s security cooperation organization in a country—includes all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense and security establishments. These interactions include all DOD-administered security assistance programs that build defense and security relationships promoting specific U.S.
Military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports other instruments of national power to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict.

**Nation Assistance (NA)**

Within this range of military operations, nation assistance (NA) is civil or military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA]) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation. NA operations support the host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

NA programs include security assistance (SA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), and foreign internal defense (FID).
Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. Internal threats in the context of this publication means threats manifested within the internationally recognized boundaries of a nation. These threats can come from, but are not limited to, subversion, insurgency (including support to insurgency), and/or criminal activities.

The focus of US FID efforts is to support the HN’s internal defense and development (IDAD). IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. It focuses on building viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. It is important to understand that both FID and IDAD, although defined terms and used throughout this publication, are not terms used universally outside the Department of Defense (DOD). Other terms could be used to encompass what are called FID and IDAD herein.

Military engagement during FID supports the other instruments of national power through a variety of activities across the range of military operations. In some cases, direct military support may be necessary in order to provide the secure environment for IDAD efforts to become effective. However, absent direction from the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), US forces engaged in NA are prohibited from engaging in combat operations, except in self-defense.

From the US perspective, FID refers to the US activities that support an HN IDAD strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security, consistent with US national security objectives and policies. See pp. 2-11 to 2-26 for further discussion.

Relationship of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) to Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)

It is important to frame the US FID effort within the context of the US doctrine it supports and to understand how it fits into the HN IDAD program. NA supports the HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The US goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats and addressing the root causes of instability. Emphasis on internal developmental programs as well as internal defense programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to US FID activities is essential.

US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward counterinsurgency (COIN). Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this important area, US activities may aim at other threats to an HN’s internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Focusing on the internal development portion of IDAD expands the focus beyond COIN.

US military operations supporting FID provide training, materiel, advice, or assistance to local forces executing an IDAD program, rather than US forces conducting IDAD military missions for the HN. Military operations are, at least to some degree, intertwined with foreign assistance provided by non-DOD agencies in the form of development assistance, humanitarian assistance, or SA described in legislation such as the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).

See pp. 2-14 to 2-16 for further discussion.
I. Security Force Assistance (SFA) Tasks

SFA aims to establish conditions that support the partner’s end state, which includes legitimate, credible, competent, capable, committed, and confident security forces. This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, and setting conditions in the operational area that enable the success of other actors.

This section addresses the five SFA tasks: organize, train, equip, rebuild and build, and advise and assist. These tasks facilitate SFA planners to assess and allocate resources based on conditions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Force Assistance Tasks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Organize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Train</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Equip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Rebuild and Build</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Advise and Assist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


A. Organize

Organize is a SFA task that encompasses all measures taken to assist FSF in improving its organizational structure, processes, institutions, and infrastructure. U.S. forces must understand the existing security organizations of FSF to better assist them. Subsequently, SFA personnel may help the host nation organize its security forces to meet the needs of its security environment.

Organizing a foreign security force depends on the host nation’s social and economic conditions, cultural and historical factors, and security threats. SFA aims to create an efficient organization with a command, intelligence, logistic, and operations
III. Types of Security Force Assistance

Ref: FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance (May ’09), pp. 2-9 to 2-10.

The U.S. or other actors use three types of SFA—augmenting, partnering, and advising—to develop confident, competent, capable, committed, and credible FSF. These types of SFA define the relationship between outside actors and the foreign security force. They may be employed simultaneously, sequentially, or in combination.

A. Advising

Advising is the primary type of security force assistance. Advising is the use of influence to teach, coach, and advise (see chapter 6) while working by, with, and through FSF. This type of SFA relies on the ability of the advisor to provide relevant and timely advice to FSF. Advising helps FSF conduct independent decisionmaking and operations. Advisors may also provide FSF with direct access to joint and multinational capabilities such as air support, artillery, medical evacuation, and intelligence. However, the advisor and advisor team require proper manning and equipment to perform these secondary support functions while staying focused on advising. Multiple sources will pressure advisors as they perform their missions.

Advisor teams require a clearly defined and structured chain of command under which to operate. This is not only for logistics and support, but also keeps the advisor focused on developing FSF.

B. Partnering

Partnering attaches units at various levels to leverage the strengths of both U.S. and foreign security forces. As a foreign security force’s capabilities mature, the echelon and degree of partnering decrease. As the foreign security force conducts more autonomous operations, U.S. forces still provide quick reaction forces and other assistance as appropriate.

Partner units should establish combined cells for intelligence, operations, planning, and sustainment. While effective coordination is always required and initial efforts may require completely fused efforts, FSF should eventually build the capability and capacity to conduct all efforts autonomously. These combined cells have several functions. They support transparent operations and a comprehensive approach. They also enhance the relationships among U.S. and foreign security forces by demonstrating trust. Finally, they develop the capacity of FSF in key staff areas.

Unit partnerships do not replace advisor roles or functions. If partnering and advising are used in combination, it forms a three-part relationship amongst FSF, advisors, and the partner units. Partner units should look to the advisor to identify, shape, and facilitate operational partnering opportunities and training events. Advisors support U.S., coalition, and partner unit objectives, but, depending on the operational phase, the partner unit may support advisors or advisors may support the partner unit. Therefore, some level of advisor skills training should be included in the partner unit training program if those units will be conducting SFA activities.

C. Augmenting

Augmenting is an arrangement where FSF provide individuals or elements to combine with U.S. units, or U.S. individuals or elements combine with FSF. Augmentation improves the interdependence and interoperability of U.S. and foreign security forces. Augmentation can occur at many levels and in many different forms. For example, a U.S. squad can be augmented with host-nation individuals, a U.S. company can be augmented with a host-nation platoon, or a U.S. battalion can be augmented with a company from a foreign security force. Similarly, augmentation can be of short duration for a specific operation or of a longer duration for an enduring mission. Augmenting immerses FSF in a U.S. environment to provide language and cultural awareness to the U.S. unit. U.S. forces can also augment FSF.
**The Foreign Internal Defense Framework**

Ref: JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Jul ´10), fig. 1-2, p. 3-6.

As shown below, characteristics of FID involve the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) through which sources of US power (such as financial, intelligence, and law enforcement) can be applied to support an HN IDAD program. Although this publication centers on the military instrument’s contribution, it is also important to understand the overlying national strategy that directs FID activities.

### THE FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE FRAMEWORK, INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER, AND SELECTED SOURCES OF POWER

**DIPLOMATIC**

Foreign internal defense (FID) makes extensive use of the diplomatic instrument of national power and is often the first instrument exercised by the United States.

**INFORMATIONAL**

Effective use of public diplomacy, public affairs activities, and psychological operations is essential to FID. Accurate portrayal of United States FID efforts through positive information programs can influence worldwide perceptions of the FID efforts and the host nation’s (HN’s) desire to embrace changes and improvements necessary to correct its problems.

**MILITARY**

The military plays an important supporting role in FID. Military FID activities can generally be categorized into:

- Indirect Support: FID operations that emphasize building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.
- Direct Support (not involving combat operations): FID operations providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with threats beyond its capability to handle.
- Combat Operations.

**ECONOMIC**

Economics influence every aspect of FID support. It is used in a variety of ways, ranging from direct financial assistance and favorable trade arrangements, to the provision of foreign military financing under security assistance.

### Selected Sources of Power Applied Through the Instruments

**FINANCIAL**

This involves United States Government (USG) agencies working with the governments of other nations and international financial institutions to encourage economic growth; raise standards of living; and to the extent possible, predict, prevent, or limit economic and financial crises.

**INTELLIGENCE**

This seeks to provide national leadership with information to help achieve national goals and objectives and to provide military leadership with information to accomplish missions and implement national security strategy. Attention is focused to identify adversary capabilities and centers of gravity; protect friendly course of action; and to assist planning of friendly force employment. Whereas informational power projects information to shape environments, intelligence seeks to gather information to understand environments and to inform decisionmaking.

**LAW ENFORCEMENT**

The USG is accountable to its people and expected to govern effectively through administration and enforcement of the law. This also requires ensuring public safety against foreign and internal threats; preventing and controlling crime; punishing unlawful behavior; and fair and impartial administration of justice. Because the threats to US security and public safety are global, extensive work is required outside US borders to combat and counter these threats.
Integrated Effort

When it is in the interests of national security, the United States may employ all the instruments of national power in order to assist friendly nations in conducting IDAD programs. For FID to be successful in meeting an HN’s needs, the USG must integrate the efforts of multiple government agencies, thus interorganizational coordination and cooperation becomes extremely important as it is the best way to integrate complementary efforts and effectively and efficiently use available resources. Effective integration is difficult and requires a consistent, focused effort that adjusts and evolves as the situation changes and different organizations and groups become involved.


Such integration and coordination are essentially vertical between levels of command and organization, and horizontal between USG agencies and HN military and civilian agencies. In addition, integration and coordination requirements may extend to allied nations and coalition partners participating with the US in multinational FID efforts. As Figure III-1 illustrates, the lines of organization and coordination during FID operations are complex. This factor, combined with the breadth of potential FID operations, makes complete integration and coordination of all national FID efforts a daunting challenge.
C. Trainer/Advisor Checklists

Ref: JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense (Jul ‘10), chap. 5, pp. 5-7 to 5-10.

The predeployment site survey (PDSS) leader—along with any subordinates he may specify—establishes effective initial rapport with the HN unit commander. The PDSS leader:

- Conducts introductions in a businesslike, congenial manner using the HN language
- Briefs the HN commander on the joint force advisors’ PDSS mission and the restrictions and limitations imposed on the unit by the higher US commander. The PDSS leader should use the HN language and, if required, visual aids translated into the HN language.
- Assures the HN commander that all PDSS team members are fully supportive of the HN’s position and that they firmly believe a joint and HN-unit effort will be successful
- Assures the HN commander that his assistance is needed to develop the tentative objectives for advisory assistance to include advisory team agreements with the HN commander on training objectives
- Deduces or solicits the HN commander’s actual estimate of his unit’s capabilities and perceived advisory assistance and material requirements
- Explains the PDSS team’s initial plan for establishing counterpart relationships, obtains approval from the HN commander for the plan, and requests to conduct the counterpart linkup under the mutual supervision of the PDSS leader and the HN commander
- Supervises the linkup between PDSS team members and their HN counterparts to determine if the HN personnel understand the purpose of the counterpart relationship and their responsibilities within it
- Identifies reachback requirements
- The PDSS leader should not make any promises or statements that could be construed as promises to the HN commander regarding commitments to provide the advisory assistance or fulfill material requirements

The PDSS team members analyze the HN unit’s status according to their area of expertise for the purpose of determining the HN requirements for advisory assistance. The PDSS team members:

- Explain the purpose of the analysis to counterparts
- Encourage counterparts to assist in the analysis, the preparation of estimates, and the briefing of the analysis to the advisory team and HN unit commanders
- Collect sufficient information to confirm the validity of current intelligence and tentative advisory assistance COAs selected prior to deployment
- Collect and analyze all information relating to FP
- Prepare written, prioritized estimates for advisory assistance COAs
- Brief, with their counterparts, the estimates to the PDSS team and HN unit commander
- Inspect, with their counterparts, the HN facilities that will be used during the assistance mission
- Identify deficiencies in the facilities that will prevent execution of the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs
• Prepare written or verbal estimates of COAs that will correct the deficiencies or negate their effects on the tentatively selected advisory assistance COAs
• Supervise the preparation of the facilities and inform the JFC of the status of the preparations compared to the plans for them

Once received, the PDSS leader supervises the processing of the survey results. The PDSS leader then:
• Recommends to the HN unit commander the most desirable COAs emphasizing how they satisfy actual conditions and will achieve the desired advisory assistance objectives
• Ensures that his counterpart understands that the desired COAs are still tentative contingent on the tasking US commander’s decision
• Selects the COAs to be recommended to the follow-on joint units, after obtaining input from the HN unit commander
• Ensures the higher in-country US commander is informed of significant findings in the team survey for HN assistance

The PDSS team plans its security in accordance with the anticipated threat. Adjustments are made as required by the situation on the ground. The PDSS team members:
• Fortify their positions (quarters, communications, medical, command) in accordance with the available means and requirements to maintain low visibility
• Maintain a team internal guard system, aware of the locations of all other joint force advisors, and ready to react to an emergency by following the alert plan and starting defensive actions
• Maintain a team internal alert plan that will notify all team members of an emergency. Maintain communications with all subordinate team members deployed outside of the immediate area controlled by the team
• Establish plans for immediate team defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack or a loss of HN rapport with hostile reaction
• Discuss visible team security measures with HN counterparts to ensure their understanding and to maintain effective rapport
• Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to adopt additional security measures that have been identified as necessary during the analysis of the HN unit status and the inspection of its facilities
• Establish mutual plans with the HN unit, through counterparts, for defensive actions in the event of an insurgent or terrorist attack
• Rehearse team alert and defensive plans
• Encourage the HN unit, through counterparts, to conduct mutual, full-force rehearsals of defensive plans

Unit Training
Much of the training necessary to prepare personnel to support FID activities may be conducted within the unit. This training can be individually focused or, in the case of unit-size participation, may involve large-scale collective training. Training resources may be drawn from a variety of sources, but SOF are particularly valuable because of their area orientation and FID focus. When feasible, units should conduct operational rehearsals of the FID mission. These rehearsals allow participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan. Such rehearsals should replicate, as much as possible, the potential situations that a unit may encounter during a FID mission.
III. Understanding Culture

Ref: FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May ‘14), chap. 3.

Culture forms the basis of how people interpret, understand, and respond to events and people around them. Cultural understanding is critical because who a society considers to be legitimate will often be determined by culture and norms. Additionally, counterinsurgency operations will likely be conducted as part of a multinational effort, and understanding the culture of allies and partners is equally critical.

There are many definitions of culture in use by the United States (U.S.) military. As a starting point, this publication understands culture is a web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group within a society.

I. Understanding Culture

To be successful in interacting with the local population to gain information on the enemy, or to understand their requirements, military members must do more than learn a few basic facts or “do’s and don’ts.” They must understand the way that their actions can change the situation for the local population (both positively and negatively) and the resulting perceptions of the population towards those actions. To be successful, commanders and staffs consider four fundamental aspects of culture when planning and executing military operations:

• Culture influences how people view their world.

• Culture is holistic.

• Culture is learned and shared.

• Culture is created by people and can and does change.

See following pages for additional discussion.
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- Culture influences how people view their world.
- Culture is holistic.
- Culture is learned and shared.
- Culture is created by people and can and does change.

Culture Influences How People View Their World

The way that a culture influences how people view their world is referred to as their worldview. Many people believe they view their world accurately, in a logical, rational, unbiased way. However, people filter what they see and experience according to their beliefs and worldview. Information and experiences that do not match what they believe to be true about the world are frequently rejected or distorted to fit the way they believe the world should work. More than any other factor, culture informs and influences that worldview. In other words, culture influences perceptions, understandings, and interpretations of events. Soldiers and Marines need to know that U.S. interpretations of events are often quite different from the perceptions of these events by other people in an area of operations. If Soldiers and Marines assume that the local population will perceive actions the way that they do, they are likely to misjudge their reactions. The U.S. military refers to this pattern of assuming others see events in the same way the U.S. does as mirror imaging. Mirror imaging is dangerous because it leads Soldiers and Marines into thinking that their assumptions about a problem and its solution are shared by the population and multinational partners, rather than employing perspective taking, and looking at the problem from the population’s perspective.

Culture is Holistic

Holism is based on the principle that all socio-cultural aspects of human life are interconnected. While interacting with people in other cultures, Soldiers and Marines may be tempted to say their problems “are all about [fill in the blank: tribalism, corruption, lack of work ethic, and so on.]” Politics affects economics. Family structure affects job choices. Religion affects politics. Every aspect of culture affects every other aspect in some way, even if indirectly. By acknowledging these interconnections, military members can better assess how the local population might react to their presence and actions. For instance, when Soldiers and Marines are not thinking holistically, they may anticipate that closing down a local market will only have an impact on the local economy. However, after closing the market, it may be that the local reaction seems to be about religion or tribal concerns instead of economics. Even if Soldiers and Marines do not understand why, they should be aware that their actions will have unknown second and third order effects. By understanding that a marketplace is more than a place to exchange goods for money, and that economic conditions may affect tribal power, the status of religious leaders, and other social conditions, Soldiers and Marines can see a culture holistically. A holistic perspective helps military members understand the complex interconnectedness of a culture and avoid being surprised by local reactions to military decisions.
To enable a host-nation security force to conduct counterinsurgency operations, United States (U.S.) or multinational forces conduct various security cooperation activities. Commanders often view host-nation security force development as an essential task and one of their primary lines of effort. The resulting increase in a host nation’s ability to secure its own population yields significant benefits because host-nation troops are normally more effective in conducting operations among the local population than U.S. or multinational forces. Transitioning responsibility for operations to the host-nation security force reduces the visible presence of U.S. or multinational troops, further enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government.

U.S. or multinational efforts to develop the capability and capacity of a host-nation security force must focus on operational and developmental needs of host-nation counterparts. Developing a sound plan to develop a host nation’s capability to address the root causes of the insurgency requires a deliberate, comprehensive assessment of that host nation’s security force. The set of metrics that the U.S. or multinational forces selects to assess a host-nation security force must be appropriate for the type of security force being assessed. For example, assessment of a host-nation army may require a completely different set of criteria from those used to assess a host-nation police force. Likewise, a host nation’s border or customs police, local (city or county) police, and provincial, state, or national police must...
all be assessed according to their specific mission requirements, while taking into consideration that host nation’s federal or local laws, political considerations, culture, and tribal affiliations.

The use of security cooperation tools to build governmental capability, including building a host nation’s forces, may be essential. In the eyes of a local population, the credibility of the host-nation government is vital in counterinsurgency efforts to address the threat and conditions of instability. The host nation’s military, police, and paramilitary forces are often the most visible elements of a host nation’s government’s power and authority. Therefore, building the capacity of a host nation’s security forces should work toward improving the security force’s competence, capability, commitment, and confidence.

### Table 11-1. Developing a host-nation security force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Developmental Area</th>
<th>Developmental Indicators</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Competence</strong></td>
<td>Host-nation security forces must possess and demonstrate individual and collective skills in their respective warfighting or law enforcement tasks. They must also support institutional functions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capability</strong></td>
<td>Host-nation security force organizations must be appropriately sized to accomplish their respective missions. A host-nation security force must be adequately manned and equipped at a level that is sustainable, given that host nation’s own resources. A host-nation security forces’ supporting institutions, such as their national level force generation and logistic agencies, must be organized and directed in a manner that adds value to the lower-level, host-nation security forces’ mission requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commitment</strong></td>
<td>A host-nation security force must be committed to the peaceful transition of political power. It must also be committed to the security and survival of the state, the rule of law, the preservation of human rights, civil liberties for the population, and to fighting hard (when necessary) to defeat the active insurgency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Confidence</strong></td>
<td>A host-nation’s population must believe that its host-nation security force actions are always in the best interests of the people. A host-nation government must believe that its host-nation security force supports that government’s legal authority. Also, the international community must see a host nation’s security force as a force for good that respects human rights and the international law of war.</td>
</tr>
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One issue with developing security forces is the issue of the quality versus the quantity of host-nation counterinsurgency forces. In the case of counterinsurgency, quality tends to be more important than quantity. While quantity and quality must be balanced to some degree and “quantity has a quality all its own” to the extent that too small a force will not be able to accomplish its mission, quantity is not a substitute for quality.

### I. Assessing & Developing a Host-Nation Force

Assessment of host-nation army or land forces typically comes more naturally to U.S. or multinational forces than assessing host-nation police forces. It is easier for a Soldier or Marine to assess another Army or Marine Corps unit than it is for a Soldier or Marine to accurately assess a police precinct, fire department, or sanitation department. Developing measures of performance and measures of effectiveness based on their standards and how effective those standards are is important.

*See FM 3-24, chapter 12, for more information on assessments.*

One method to create an assessment framework is to form a working group of subject matter experts. This working group will review any lines of effort and tasks identified by the host nation and recommend additions and subtractions based on...
Both foreign internal defense and security force assistance can be used as part of a long term plan to develop and deploy a host-nation force to defeat an insurgency. While the U.S. may intervene in a country that only needs enablers to enhance an already effective military force, a host nation may lack an effective military.

I. Phases in Development of HN Forces

If the host nation lacks an effective military, aid in the development of that host-nation military could follow five phases: planning and resourcing host-nation security force, generation of host-nation security force, employment of host-nation security force, transition of responsibility for security to host-nation security force, and sustainment of host-nation security force. These phases are distinct and independent of those in the joint phasing model. U.S. or multinational forces conduct parallel planning with their host-nation security force counterparts to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in support of the overall counterinsurgency campaign, while at the same time working toward milestones that lead to a successful transition from U.S. or multinational lead to host-nation security force lead for security.

Phase I - Planning and Resourcing

Typically, the first phase of building a host-nation security force, planning and resourcing, falls to the responsibility of geographic combatant command-level planners in coordination with the country team. Coordination of legal authorities and funding for security force assistance and foreign internal defense activities is an interagency process because it typically involves resources provided under a number of different sections of the United States Code (USC). Moreover, other security cooperation programs, such as foreign military sales, may be essential in equipping another military to perform foreign internal defense operations.

Figure 11-4. Phases of building a host-nation security force

Phase I - Planning and Resourcing

Typically, the first phase of building a host-nation security force, planning and resourcing, falls to the responsibility of geographic combatant command-level planners in coordination with the country team. Coordination of legal authorities and funding for security force assistance and foreign internal defense activities is an interagency process because it typically involves resources provided under a number of different sections of the United States Code (USC). Moreover, other security cooperation programs, such as foreign military sales, may be essential in equipping another military to perform foreign internal defense operations.
Phase II - Generating the HN Security Force
Generating the host-nation security force is the second phase in building a host-nation security force. If the U.S. is deploying conventional forces, this will probably be the initial phase in which regiments or brigade combat teams will actually have an active role. These forces can partner with host-nation security forces of varying developmental levels in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. For example, while supporting recent counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines, host-nation security force counterparts had already fielded relatively sophisticated, well-developed operational units supported by robust supporting institutions and well established executive-level or ministerial leadership. In other U.S. historical counterinsurgency operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the host-nation security force operational units, their supporting institutions, and the most senior-level executive leadership functions were undeveloped or completely non-existent. In situations such as these, U.S. and multinational forces must organize, train, and equip host-nation security force units while assisting in the building or rebuilding of their supporting infrastructure. The organize, train, and equip security force assistance tasks may be assigned to U.S. or multinational regiment- or brigade-sized units while they are simultaneously battling the insurgents. At the same time, unified action must be taken to establish a host-nation security force’s own sustainable force generation capabilities and capacity. U.S. or multinational personnel, working with their host-nation security force counterparts, are placed in a difficult predicament in that they must carefully select key host-nation security force leaders to be pulled away from the immediate counterinsurgency fight to assume critical command and staff positions within the host-nation security force’s organizations. Counterinsurgents must exercise restraint by not assigning all of the best host-nation security force leaders to operating force units while neglecting to invest in their own force generation capacity.

Phase III - Employment of the HN Security Force
The third phase of building a host-nation security force is the employment of a host-nation security force to protect the population and defeat the insurgents. During this phase, the primary focus shifts from organizing, training, equipping, and rebuilding host-nation security forces to employing host-nation security forces to perform the security tasks for which they were designed. As one host-nation security force unit enters the employment phase, other units may have just begun the force generation process. Meanwhile, there may be more seasoned host-nation security force units that are ready to transition to the lead for security operations in their assigned area of operations. Additionally, it may be possible to generate host-nation police forces more quickly than army units, since they can be employed individually or in small station-level units, they do not need to conduct large-scale collective training exercises, and they typically have fewer materiel requirements. However, it may take considerably longer for police forces to show their effectiveness during the employment phase due to the length of time it takes for police forces to gain the trust of the local population and build productive, enduring relationships with local or tribal leaders.

Phase IV - Transition Responsibility to HN Security Force
The fourth phase of building a host-nation security force in a counterinsurgency is the transition of responsibility for security operations from the U.S. or multinational forces to a host-nation security force. In some instances, such as in Colombia or the Philippines, a host-nation security force may already be mature and highly capable in most or all operational realms (land, air, and maritime). Security force assistance activities and the resulting transition to a host-nation security force lead may refer only to specific functions such as intelligence or an even more discreet set of tactical tasks, such as employment of remote sensors, that supports the host nation’s strategic or operational counterinsurgency goals. In these instances, the U.S. may provide operational capabilities to meet the immediate threat, while conducting security force
I. Relationship Building

Building relationships can lead to partnerships, and is central to security cooperation whether conducting military engagement with a foreign partner in Europe and Asia, or conducting Soldier and leader engagements with foreign security forces (Foreign security forces) during operations that may include counterinsurgency. It is essential for the Soldier, particularly the advisor, to place a considerable amount of time and energy in establishing solid relationships among U.S. forces and Foreign security forces. By its very nature, the advisor mission forces its members out of their traditional roles. An advisor must purposefully look to build solid relationships between U.S. and foreign security force commanders, staffs, and the defense establishment, as well as a variety of governmental and nongovernmental entities.

II. Rapport

Since Soldiers conducting security cooperation missions that include security force assistance are in a unique military position, they establish rapport with their foreign counterparts. This position is one in which the leader has no positional authority over the actions of their foreign counterparts. This lack of authority means that the doctrinal view of leadership is modified to emphasize interpersonal relationships and de-emphasize authoritarian roles. Soldiers use their interpersonal skills to build rapport. Soldiers cannot simply order a specific action; instead, they use interpersonal skills to positively affect the actions and decisions of their foreign counterparts and
work toward shared goals. The measure of effective rapport is whether Soldiers can inspire foreign counterparts to take the desired action and guide them to succeed. Soldiers obtain certain knowledge before establishing effective rapport. First, they study Army leadership doctrine (see ADP 6-22 and ADRP 6-22) to enhance their leadership knowledge for understanding human nature and motivation. They then incorporate information specific to the culture and society of their counterparts. To further enable rapport, Soldiers must develop a genuine interest in other people. They must smile often. They must remember and use people’s names, encourage others to talk about themselves, listen to others, discuss what the other person is interested in, and make the other person feel important. Through this type of interaction, Soldiers and Foreign security forces develop mutual or shared interests on which to base their relationships and developmental goals. These mutual or shared interests are the foundation upon which rapport is built. It is important to remember that genuine rapport is developed slowly, but it can be ruined in an instant.

Rapport comprises understanding, respect, and trust. No amount of resources or firepower can compensate for a lack of rapport between advisor and Foreign security forces counterpart. It must be honest, genuine, and heartfelt. Mutual understanding, respect, and trust are the building blocks to success. All the components of rapport are two-way streets: counterparts are more likely to share about their culture, language, and experiences if Soldiers are willing and able to share also. Building this type of rapport may require Soldiers to establish a personal level of understanding, respect, and trust with their counterparts.

**Building Rapport**

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**A. Understanding**

Understanding begins before deployment and may include foreign cultural studies, language training, understanding by observing and asking questions. It is not necessary to accept others’ beliefs or values, but Soldiers need to understand others’ ways of thinking and operating. Knowing their own culture and understanding why they believe and value what they do help Soldiers find a common cause.

**B. Respect**

Respect is a reciprocal commodity. Ideally, the foreign counterpart will grow to respect Soldiers—what they know and how they perform. Soldiers should look for characteristics they respect in their counterparts as soon as they make their acquaintance. Counterparts will possess traits deserving respect, and more will become evident as the relationship matures. Mutual respect grows through shared experiences and shared dangers. Soldiers should live, eat, and if authorized, fight with their counterparts. By sharing their hardships and dangers, coupled with respecting a different culture, Soldiers build respect.
U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in foreign nations require linguist support. Military intelligence units assigned to brigade and higher-level commands have organic interpreters (linguists) to perform human intelligence and signals intelligence functions. However, the need for interpreters usually exceeds organic capabilities, and commanders should obtain external interpreter support early.

**Linguist Support Categories**

When possible, interpreters should be U.S. military personnel or category II or III linguists. Unit intelligence officers should maintain language rosters at home station to track assigned personnel with linguistic capabilities before deployment. When requirements exceed organic capabilities, unit commanders can hire host-nation (HN) personnel to support their operations. Contracted linguists can provide interpreter support and perform intelligence functions. They fall into three categories.

**Category I**

Category I linguists usually are hired locally and require vetting. They do not have a security clearance. They are the most abundant resource pool; however, their skill level is limited. Category I linguists should be used for basic interpretation for activities such as patrols, base entrance coverage, open-source intelligence collection, and civil-military operations. Commanders should plan for 30 to 40 linguists from category I for an infantry battalion. Brigade headquarters should maintain roughly 15 category I linguists for surge operations.

**Category II**

Category II linguists are U.S. citizens with a secret clearance. Often they possess good oral and written communication skills. They should be managed carefully due to limited availability. Category II linguists interpret for battalion and higher level commanders or tactical human intelligence teams. Brigade commanders should plan for 10 to 15 linguists from category II. That breaks down to one linguist for the brigade commander, one for each infantry battalion commander, and approximately 10 linguists for the supporting military intelligence company. Of those 10, three translate for each tactical human intelligence team or operations management team, and two translate for each signals intelligence collection platform.

**Category III**

Category III linguists are U.S. citizens with a top secret clearance. They are a scarce commodity and often retained at division and higher levels of command. They have excellent oral and written communications skills.

Some private companies provide linguist support through contracts. The required statement of work or contract should define the linguist’s requirements and the unit’s responsibilities. Contracted category II and III linguists should provide their own equipment, such as flak vests, Kevlar, and uniforms. (Category I linguists normally do not.) The unit designates a linguist manager to identify language requirements and manage assets. Site managers for the contractor are located at the division level to manage personnel issues such as leave, vacation, pay, and equipment.
I. Selecting an Interpreter


In some operational or training settings abroad, CA personnel will not face the problem of selecting an interpreter; the chain of command or host government will assign one. In other cases, interpreters are chosen from a pool provided by the host government. Finally, in many operational situations, hire interpreters from the general HN population. Whatever the case, the following guidelines are critical to the success of mission accomplishment. This is an opportunity for the peacekeeper to truly influence the outcome of the mission.

The interpreter is a vital link to the target audience
An uncooperative, unsupportive interpreter could jeopardize the mission. Mutual respect and understanding between the peacekeeper and interpreter are essential to effective teamwork. Establish rapport early in the relationship and maintain it throughout the joint effort. Most of the time, the difficulty of establishing rapport stems from the lack of personal contact.

Personality
Interpreters must not inject personality, ideas, or questions into the interview.

Native Speakers
Find interpreters who are native speaker of the socially or geographically determined dialect. The interpreter’s speech, background, and mannerisms should be completely acceptable to the target audience so that attention is given only to what is said.

Social Status
In some situations and cultures, if an interpreter is considered in lower social standing than the audience, that interpreter is ineffective. This may include significant differences in military rank or membership in an ethnic or religious group. Regardless of the peacekeeper’s personal feelings on social status, the job is to accomplish the mission, not to act as an agent for social reform in a faraway land. Accept local prejudices as a fact.

English Fluency
An often-overlooked consideration is how well the interpreter speaks English. As a rule, if the interpreter understands the peacekeeper and the peacekeeper understands the interpreter, then the interpreter’s command of English is satisfactory. Check the interpreter’s “understanding” by asking to paraphrase a statement in English.

Intellectual Intelligence
Find interpreters who are quick, alert, and responsive to changing conditions and situations. An interpreter must be able to grasp complex concepts and discuss them without confusion in a reasonably logical sequence. Although education does not equate to intelligence, the better educated the interpreter, the better the interpreter will be able to perform due to exposure to diverse concepts.

Technical Ability
In certain situations, the peacekeeper may need an interpreter with technical training or experience in special subject areas. The interpreter may need to translate the “meaning” as well as the “words.”
Reliability
Be aware of the candidate interpreter who arrives late for the interview. Throughout the world, the concept of time varies widely. In many less developed countries, time is relatively unimportant. Make sure that the interpreter understands the military’s concern with punctuality.

Loyalty
If the interpreter is a local national, it is safe to assume that the interpreter’s first loyalty is to the HN, or sub-group, not the US military. The security implications are clear. Be very cautious in explaining concepts to give the interpreter “a greater depth of understanding.” Certain tactical situations may require the use of uncleared indigenous personnel as “field expedient” interpreters. Be aware of the increased security risk involved in using such personnel and carefully weigh the risk versus the potential gain. In addition, if uncleared interpreters are used, limit any sensitive information to a minimum.

Gender, Age, and Race
Gender, age, and race have the potential to seriously affect the mission. One example is the status of females in Muslim society. In predominantly Muslim countries, cultural prohibitions may affect the gender of the interpreter used under given circumstance. Another example is the Balkans, where the ethnic divisions may limit the effectiveness of an interpreter from outside the target audience’s group. Since traditions, values, and biases vary from country to country, it is important to check with the in-country assets or area studies for specific taboos or favorable characteristics.

Compatibility
The peacekeeper and interpreter work as a team. The target audience is quick to recognize personality conflicts between the team members that can undermine the effectiveness of the communication effort. If possible, when selecting an interpreter, the peacekeeper needs to look for compatible traits and strive for a harmonious working relationship.

Choose more than one interpreter
If several qualified interpreters are available, select at least two. Interpreting is an exhausting job; four hours is about the maximum active interpreting time for an interpreter’s peak efficiency. Whatever the mission, with two or more interpreters, the peacekeeper can provide quality control and assistance to the active interpreter. Additionally, this technique comes in useful when conducting coordination or negotiation meetings as one interpreter is used in an active role and the other can pay attention to the body language and side conversations of others present. Many times, the peacekeeper will gain important side information that aids negotiations from listening to what others are saying outside of the main discussion.

Inconsistencies
Interpreters should inform the when inconsistencies in language are used by interviewees. Example – an interviewee who claims to be a college professor yet speaks like an uneducated person. During interrogations or interviews this information will be used as part of the assessment of the information obtained from the individual.
1. Nature of Stability Operations

The Department of Defense (DOD) has learned through the difficult experiences of both Iraq and Afghanistan that success is not only defined in military terms; it also involves rebuilding infrastructure, supporting economic development, establishing the rule of law, building accountable governance, establishing essential services, building a capable host nation (HN) military responsible to civilian authority. In short, we must employ multiple instruments of national power to build a foreign nation’s (FN’s) internal capacity in a preventive mode to help them to defend themselves and maintain stability, or to enable the transition of responsibility back to the host country after defeat of an active insurgency. The US also expends resources to bring stability to areas and peoples affected by natural or man-made disasters.

Figure 1-1, above, introduces a simple, idealized model that illustrates the elements of a stable state: human security; economic and infrastructure development; governance and the rule of law. While these elements can be analyzed individually, it is potentially distorting to view them separately. The stability of the state depends upon how well these elements are performed and the manner in which they interact, and the commitment of key members of that society to maintain or promote a standard acceptable to the populace.
Many agencies of the US Government (USG) as well as many intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) distinguish between disaster response/humanitarian assistance activities, development activities, and post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization activities, along with a variety of the individual organizations’ ongoing programs and aid assistance. However, in all cases the purpose of these efforts is to help move a HN or FN from instability (and particularly the violent conflict that often accompanies increased instability) to increased stability (and reduced violent conflict). Significant destabilizing factors challenge sustainable peace and security around the world. Such challenges range from acts of nature (e.g., earthquakes and typhoons) to the direct and indirect consequences of the choices and actions of governments and other entities affecting the populations of the world. Drivers of conflict, including oppression, natural disaster, fanaticism, competition for resources, residual territorial claims, ethnic tension, and the desire for power are exacerbated by terrorism, transnational crime, and ethnic violence. Successful conflict transformation relies on the ability of intervening entities to identify and reduce the primary drivers of ongoing or future violent conflict and instability in a region or individual HN, while building regional and HN capacities to manage them. The comprehensive efforts by the US and its partners to stabilize states in crisis (including both natural disaster response and intervention in violent conflicts) and to build the capacity of fragile states are referred to in this publication as stabilization efforts. The US priorities for stabilization efforts are based on the degree of impact on US strategic interests and the ability to mitigate the impact through intervention. Each individual case is judged by political leaders against these broad determinants.

Stabilization efforts are primarily the responsibility of development and US Foreign Service personnel from across the USG. The Department of State (DOS) is charged with responsibility for leading a whole-of-government approach to stabilization that includes the array of USG departments and agencies, including DOD and component Services and agencies. DOS also coordinates US interagency participation in a comprehensive approach to stabilization efforts that includes not only the US, but also the HN, other nations, IGOs, cooperating NGOs, and other participants. Within this broad approach, the primary military contribution to stabilization is to protect and defend the population, facilitating the personal security of the people and, thus, creating a platform for political, economic, and human security. Beyond protecting the population, however, a combination of factors arising from national strategic objectives, requirements of the operational environment, and the capacity of the joint force may drive the Armed Forces of the United States to directly participate in other stabilization efforts during the conduct of stability operations. Stability operations are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

Joint forces may lead stabilization activities until other USG agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or IGOs assume the role. The conduct of stability operations is a core US military mission that the Armed Forces are prepared to conduct with proficiency equivalent to combat operations. Joint forces support stabilization activities led by other USG departments or agencies, foreign governments and security forces, IGOs, or when otherwise directed.

Force is rarely the defining element that delivers success; instead, it is best used as an enabler of diplomacy. Complex problems of fragile states require comprehensive solutions—a full range of measures to promote HN growth and to protect it from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, and other threats to stability. Ultimately, such a strategy, developed by the HN for itself (sometimes referred to as an internal defense and development [IDAD] strategy), must focus on building viable political, economic, security, and social institutions that respond to the needs of society.
Safe and Secure Environment

Necessary Conditions


Cessation of Large-Scale Violence

- Large-scale armed conflict has come to a halt
- Warring parties are separated and monitored
- A peace agreement or cease-fire has been implemented
- Violent spoilers are managed

Public Order

- Laws are enforced equitably
- The lives, property, freedoms, and rights of individuals are protected
- Criminal and politically motivated violence has been reduced to a minimum
- Criminal elements (from looters and rioters to leaders of organized crime networks) are pursued, arrested, and detained

Legitimate State Monopoly Over the Means of Violence

- Major illegal armed groups have been identified, disarmed, and demobilized
- The defense and police forces have been vetted and retrained
- National security forces operate lawfully under a legitimate governing authority

Physical Security

- Political leaders, ex-combatants, and the general population are free of fear from grave threats to physical safety
- Refugees and internally displaced persons can return home without fear of retributive violence
- Women and children are protected from undue violence
- Key historical or cultural sites and critical infrastructure are protected from attack

Territorial Security

- People and goods can freely move throughout the country and across borders without fear of harm to life and limb
- The country is protected from invasion
- Borders are reasonably well-secured from infiltration by insurgent or terrorist elements and illicit trafficking of arms, narcotics, and humans

A Comprehensive Approach


A comprehensive approach is an approach that integrates the cooperative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG, and to the extent possible, intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and private sector entities to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. A comprehensive approach builds from the cooperative spirit of unity of effort. Successful operations involve actors participating at their own discretion or present in the operational area but not acting as a member of a multinational coalition. Integration and collaboration often elude the diverse array of actors involved, and may vary significantly given the degree of overlap between each actor’s priorities and goals. A comprehensive approach achieves unity of effort through extensive cooperation and coordination to forge a shared understanding of a common goal. A comprehensive approach is difficult to sustain but still critical to achieving success in an operation with a wide representation.


Achieving unity of effort requires leaders to apply a comprehensive approach that includes coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and deconfliction among all the stakeholders toward an objective. This inclusive approach of working closely with stakeholders often is more appropriate than a focused military approach. Taking an authoritative, military approach often counters effective interorganizational relationships, impedes unified action, and compromises mission accomplishment. Gaining unity of effort is never settled and permanent; it takes constant effort to sustain interorganizational relationships.

Unlike a whole-of-government approach that aims for true interagency integration toward those ends, a comprehensive approach requires a more nuanced, cooperative effort. Leaders forge a comprehensive approach, leveraging the capabilities of the disparate actors, to achieve broad conflict transformation goals and attain a sustainable peace. Leaders support the activities and goals of other actors by sharing resources. In a comprehensive approach, actors are not compelled to work together toward a common goal. Instead, they participate out of a shared understanding and appreciation for what that goal represents. Achieving the end state is in the best interests of the actors participating; the actors recognize that fact forges the bonds that allow them to achieve unity of effort.
Some groups, such as NGOs, must retain independence of action. Reconciling that independence with the mission requirements may pose specific challenges to unity of effort. A comprehensive approach has four underlying tenets: accommodation, fostering understanding, unity of purpose, and cooperation.

- **Accommodation** means including the concerns and contributions of all participants. It determines appropriate priorities for resourcing and sets support relationships as required to deconflict activities.
- **Fostering understanding** requires development of a shared understanding that can be leveraged for cooperation towards common goals.
- **Unity of purpose** focuses cooperative effort toward goal. This tenet to the approach links discreet, yet interrelated, tasks and objectives to conditions that compose the desired end state.
- **Cooperation** reinforces institutional familiarity, trust, and transparency by sharing information. Information sharing enables cooperation.

Nongovernmental humanitarian actors refer to maintaining neutrality as “humanitarian space.” Maintaining neutrality is particularly important in armed conflict. The importance of preserving this space depends somewhat on the context. In armed conflict, it is absolutely essential (thus NGOs often do not want military forces to visit them in their offices). In a natural disaster where armies are not belligerents, nongovernmental humanitarian actors often work with military forces. In this context, military forces do not violate the actors’ humanitarian space but—because of their logistics capacities—can significantly contribute to the humanitarian relief effort. Dialogue between military forces and the humanitarian community define humanitarian space in other, less clear-cut situations such as a natural disaster in a context of armed conflict.

Refer to the Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments for more information on nongovernmental humanitarian actors.

**Terms of Interaction**

Participants often use certain terms of interactions: coordination, consensus, cooperation, collaboration, and compromise.

- **Coordination** is the process of organizing a complex enterprise in which numerous organizations are involved and bring their contributions together to form a coherent or efficient whole. It implies formal structures, relationships, and processes.
- **Consensus** is a general or collective agreement, accord, or position reached by a group as a whole. It implies a serious treatment of every group member’s considered position.
- **Cooperation** is the process of acting together for a common purpose or mutual benefit. It involves working in harmony, side by side and implies an association between organizations. It is the alternative to working separately in competition. Cooperation with other agencies does not mean giving up authority, autonomy, or becoming subordinated to the direction of others.
- **Collaboration** is a process where organizations work together to attain common goals by sharing knowledge, learning, and building consensus. Some organizations attribute a negative meaning to the term collaboration as if referring to those who betray others by willingly assisting an enemy of one’s country, especially an occupying force.
- **Compromise** is a settlement of differences by mutual concessions without violation of core values; an agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing positions, by reciprocal modification of an original position. Compromise should not be regarded in the context of win or lose.
A Whole of Government Approach


A whole-of-government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. This approach enables achieving the balance of resources, capabilities, and activities that reinforce progress made by one of the instruments of national power while enabling success among the others. Success in this approach depends upon the ability of civilians and military forces to plan jointly and respond quickly and effectively through an integrated, interagency approach to a fundamentally dynamic situation. Accomplishing this approach requires a willingness and ability to share information and resources among USG agencies and organizations while working toward a common goal. These resources—financial, military, intelligence, law enforcement, diplomatic, developmental, and strategic communication—are often limited in availability and cannot be restricted to use by a single agency, Service, or entity. It relies on interagency coordination among the agencies of the USG, including the Department of Defense, to ensure that agencies leverage, synchronize, and apply capabilities to address the drivers of conflict and reinforce resiliencies of local institutions to facilitate achieving sustainable peace. Leaders actively consider what information they can provide as well as what resources they can share with unified action partners. Ensuring continued sharing and cooperation requires a balance of activities in time and resources. These activities occur as regular meetings, formal agreements, assignment of coordinators or liaison staff, or even developing common communication or information technology platforms, integrated plans, or joint secretariats. Further, leaders maintain strong working relationships enable collaboration and sharing, based upon mutual trust and shared goals.

All actors involved in unified action integrate with the operation from the onset of planning. Together, they complete detailed analyses of the situation and operational environments, develop integrated courses of action, and continuously assess the situation. These actions ensure that the various capabilities and activities focus on achieving specific conflict transformation goals with host-nation and international partners. A coherent whole-of-government approach requires early and high-level participation of national, civilian, and military participants. This approach necessitates active collaboration and dialogue with nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, the host-nation government, and the private sector, when necessary.

Civilian and military efforts encounter challenges during a whole-of-government approach. Challenges include differing organizational capacities, perspectives, approaches, and decisionmaking processes between civilian agencies and military forces. Each USG agency often arrives in the unstable area with differing unstated assumptions or interpretations of events and solutions. A successful whole of government approach requires that all actors:

• Are represented, integrated, and actively involved in the process
• Share an understanding of the situation and problem to be resolved
• Strive for unity of effort toward achieving a common goal
• Integrate and synchronize capabilities and activities
• Collectively determine the resources, capabilities, and activities necessary to achieve their goal
• Allocate resources to ensure continuation of information sharing, common understanding, and integrated efforts

See previous pages (pp. 3-18 to 3-19) for related discussion of a comprehensive approach. See also p. 8-10.
I. Primary Army Stability Tasks

Five primary Army stability tasks correspond to the five stability sectors adopted by the DOS. Together, they provide a mechanism for interagency tactical integration, linking the execution of discreet tasks among the instruments of national power. The subordinate tasks performed by military forces under the primary stability tasks directly support broader efforts within the stability sectors executed as part of unified action.


### Essential Stability Tasks

- **A** Establish Civil Security
- **B** Establish Civil Control
- **C** Restore Essential Services
- **D** Support to Governance
- **E** Support to Economic & Infrastructure Development

Ref: ADRP 3-07, Stability, chap. 2.

None of these primary tasks is performed in isolation. When integrated within their complementary stability sectors, they represent a cohesive effort to reestablish the institutions that provide for the civil participation, livelihood, and well-being of the citizens and state. At the operational level, the primary stability tasks serve as lines of effort or simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across the stability sectors. Each primary task and stability sector contains a number of related subordinate tasks. In any operation, the primary stability tasks, and the subordinate tasks included within each area, are integrated with offensive and defensive tasks.

The primary stability tasks are fundamental to unified land operations and conducted across the range of military operations, from stable peace to general war. Forces execute the tasks before, during, or after conflict to support a legitimate host-nation government, to assist a fragile state, or in the absence of a functioning civil authority. Each situation is unique. Assessment and analysis support planning and execution to determine the ends, ways, and means appropriate to the conditions of an operational environment.
II. Stability Operations (Underlying Logic)


The American Experience with Stability

During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only eleven wars considered conventional. From the American Revolution through Operation Enduring Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests. Traditionally, the military prepared for these wars since these wars endangered America’s way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most have been operations where the majority of effort consisted of stability tasks.

In the two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Army forces have led or participated in more than fifteen operations, intervening in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These operations revealed a disturbing trend throughout the world—the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty. The global implications of such destabilizing issues are staggering.

In the complex, dynamic operational environments of the 21st century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security exist. Sources of instability that push parties toward violence include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and the desire for power. These factors create belts of state fragility and instability that threaten U.S. national security. While journeying into this uncertain future, leaders increasingly call on operations to reduce drivers of conflict and instability and to support social and institutional resiliencies. Such resiliencies can counter instability by building local institutional capacity to forge sustainable peace, security, and economic growth. This environment requires the military to conduct missions, tasks, and activities across the range of military operations to establish conditions for long-term stability.
E. Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development

Military tasks executed to support the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a state is among the first elements of society to exhibit stress and ultimately fracture as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelm the government. Signs of economic stress include rapid increases in inflation, uncontrolled escalation of public debt, and a general decline in the state’s ability to provide for the well-being of the people. Economic problems inextricably tie to governance and security concerns. As one institution begins to fail, others likely follow.

Infrastructure development complements and reinforces efforts to stabilize the economy. It focuses on the society’s physical aspects that enable the state’s economic viability. These physical aspects of infrastructure include construction services, engineering, and physical infrastructure in the following sectors:

- Transportation, such as roads, railways, airports, ports, and waterways
- Telecommunications
- Energy (such as natural resources, the electrical power sector, and energy production) and distribution
- Municipal and other public services

Accurate, detailed assessment is a key to formulating long-term plans for infrastructure development. Military forces often possess the capability to conduct detailed reconnaissance of the state’s physical infrastructure and can effectively inform planning efforts. Infrastructure reconnaissance gathers technical information on the status of large-scale public systems, services, and facilities necessary for economic activity. This reconnaissance facilitates restoring essential services as well as spurring economic and infrastructure development. Infrastructure reconnaissance is accomplished in two stages: infrastructure assessment—associated with the restoration of essential services—and infrastructure survey—that supports economic and infrastructure development. Infrastructure reconnaissance supports the operations process by providing vital information on the quality of the local infrastructure or problems within it. It also supports how those infrastructure issues impact military operations and the population.

Refer to FM 3-34.170 for more information on infrastructure assessment.

Commanders, when pursuing local economic development projects, consider the host-nation population and government’s ability to sustain the effort. Sustainability involves the local ability to maintain the project and the capacity to utilize it after the operation. Developing new local capacities can be substantially more complex than simply restoring capabilities that existed before the conflict. Existing capabilities, though perhaps not as effective as new capabilities, may be more supportable by local means.

Sound economic policies promote equitable, sustainable growth. Economic policies are the key to remedying underlying tensions in society. These policies allow the state to progress toward recovery and eventually long-term economic development. Therefore, any effort to establish economic stabilization closely links to similar efforts in other stability sectors. Linking these efforts expands the possibilities for changing the underlying social, economic, and political conditions that led to the collapse of the state. Synchronizing reform efforts among the economic, governance, and security sectors decreases the chance of continued or renewed conflict.

Building capacity within the economic sector requires an integrated approach to achieve sustainable growth. Appropriate civilian or host-nation organizations can accomplish much of this effort at the macro level through development mechanisms but may look to the military for security or other types of assistance. Despite this, military forces must maintain an understanding of the economic sector, the impact of their activities on the economy, and the proper method to lay a stabilizing foundation that will support future sustainability and development.
At the local level, military forces significantly support economic stabilization and infrastructure development. The building blocks for broad national recovery and development are set at the local level. At this level, recovery and development focus on generating employment opportunities, infusing monetary resources into the local economy, stimulating market activity, fostering recovery through micro economics, and supporting the restoration of physical infrastructure. However, military forces must avoid causing unintended disruptions to the local markets by suddenly stimulating the economy, particularly by agreeing to pay prices significantly above the market rate. This demand on local markets may cause prices to spike, thus making products cost prohibitive for the people. A price spike may cause resentment and undermine broader efforts, particularly if the military force is only in the area for a short time and a collapse in market activity occurs after its departure. Thus, members of the force understand the economic fundamentals of the area—key markets, revenue producers, and price trends—to gauge the impact of military activities.

At the national or regional level, efforts focus on comprehensive infrastructure improvements or on supporting the efforts of other agencies to strengthen the economy or foster development. Intergovernmental organizations—such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—help set sound economic policies and establish conditions for long-term development and investment.

**Conditions to Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development**

Army units first gain and maintain comprehensive situational awareness. Units work with host-nation officials and others to gather and continuously update the information needed to accurately assess the HN. This assessment includes the status of the host-nation economy, infrastructure, civil society, and local communities. This initial socio-economic and infrastructure assessment forms the basis for developing and implementing economic and infrastructure development strategies that establish the following conditions:

- Employment generation
- Macroeconomic stabilization
- Market economy sustainability
- Control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to peace
- Functioning civil societal infrastructure and local community development

**Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development Subordinate Tasks**

- Support economic generation and enterprise creation
- Support monetary institutions and programs
- Support national treasury operations
- Support public sector investment programs
- Support private sector development
- Protect natural resources and environment
- Support agricultural development programs
- Restore transportation infrastructure
- Restore telecommunications infrastructure
- Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs
II. Unique Stability Considerations

Ref: ADRP 3-07, Stability (Sept ’12), chap. 3.

Operations characterized by stability tasks and all stability tasks—whether conducted before, during, or after conflict—require a unique application of some considerations common to operations. Some operations feature a large component of stability tasks relative to offensive and defensive tasks. However, these operations, as with most decisive action, have elements of offense and defense as well.

Military support to stability efforts during peacetime generally takes the form of presence, peace operations (specifically conflict prevention), and nation assistance (often as security cooperation). During military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities, stability tasks support the objectives of operations conducted with the geographic combatant commanders’ theater campaign plan and the country team’s integrated country strategy (formerly mission strategic resource plan).

JP 3-07.3 discusses conflict prevention. FM 3-05.2 discusses security cooperation.

During crisis response and limited contingency operations, the balance of stability and combat tasks varies widely. Some crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as foreign humanitarian assistance, may not require combat. Others, such as strikes and raids, may not require any stability tasks. Still others, such as other types of peace operations, require a delicate balance of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks throughout the operation.

Major operation and campaign plans appropriately balance offensive, defensive, and stability tasks in all phases. An exclusive focus on offensive and defensive tasks in earlier phases may limit appropriate development of basic and supporting plans for follow-on phases and ultimately strategic success. Even while sustained combat operations continue, units need to establish or restore minimal levels of civil security and provide humanitarian relief. Such relief entails minimum levels of shelter, food, water, and medical care as succeeding areas are occupied, bypassed, or returned to a transitional authority or host-nation control.

During major operations and campaigns, military forces particularly emphasize stability tasks after achieving major combat objectives. In a transition to a post-conflict situation, initial response activities dominate stability tasks. The force first focuses on establishing the minimum-essential levels of civil security to protect both military and civilian populations and simultaneously ensure for providing water, shelter, food, and medical treatment. Forces begin stability tasks purposed for transformation and fostering sustainability as resources allow.

I. Military Role in Prevention Activities

Stability is at the foundation of prevention efforts. Military preventative activities often support United States Government (USG) diplomatic efforts before, during, or after a crisis. Taken before a potential crisis, these activities prevent or limit violence and interfere with U.S. interests. Prevention activities during a conflict prevent the spread or escalation of conflict. Taken after a conflict, they stop a return to violence. Prevention activities include military engagement and security cooperation efforts designed to reform a country’s security sector and deployment of forces designed to prevent a dispute or contain it from escalating to hostilities.
Other potential prevention activities include—

- Military fact-finding missions
- Military-to-military consultations and warnings
- Inspections
- Observation missions
- Monitoring

Army forces performing prevention activities focus on support to political and developmental efforts to lessen the causes of tension and unrest. Military forces tailor these activities to meet political and development demands. In stability tasks, including those where lethal actions are not likely, commanders consider that any accidental harm to civilians—traffic accidents, collateral damage, and so on—will severely impact their mission success. Commanders proactively plan for civilian casualty mitigation.

Military engagement encourages regional stability. Engagement activities are key peacetime military preventative actions that enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing. Military engagement in peacetime comprises all military activities that involve other nations and are intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. It includes programs and exercises that the United States military conducts with other nations to shape the international environment, improve mutual understanding, and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. Military engagement activities support a combatant commander’s objectives within the theater security cooperation plan. These activities may be long term, such as training teams and advisors assisting land forces, or short term, such as multinational exercises. Combat is not envisioned, although terrorist attacks against deployed forces are always possible. Policy, regulations, and security cooperation plans, rather than doctrine, typically govern military engagement activities in peacetime. Units usually conduct bilaterally but can involve multiple nations. Examples of joint operations and activities that fall under military engagement in peacetime include the following:

- Multinational training events and exercises
- Security assistance
- Joint combined exchange training
- Recovery operations
- Arms control
- Counterdrug activities

II. Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation—usually coordinated by the U.S. military’s security cooperation organization in a country—includes all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense and security establishments. These interactions include all DOD-administered security assistance programs that build defense and security relationships promoting specific U.S. security interests. Such interests include all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities to—

- Develop friendly, partner, and allied military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations
- Build partnership capacity and enhance or establish relationships with regional national militaries that promote bilateral and coalition interoperability, strategic access, and regional stability
Security cooperation aims to promote stability, develop alliances, and gain and maintain access through security relationships that build both partner capacities and capabilities. The capacities and capabilities of partners directly correlate to the type of activities undertaken. Goals range from creating a positive relationship that allows freedom of movement to creating global security interoperability with core partners to addressing regional security organizations and alliance organizations. A broad range of interconnected and integrated security cooperation activities accomplishes security cooperation.

Security cooperation primarily focuses on interoperability programs with both core partners and the fledging security forces of a failed or failing host nation. Military forces use security cooperation efforts to achieve mid- to long-term objectives with partners. Although forces may require short-term activities, they take extreme care not to put long-term objectives, nationally and regionally, at risk. The size of security cooperation offices vary from country to country based on the size and complexity of the security cooperation program to achieve the joint force commander and country team objectives.

Each security cooperation activity is distinct based on context and changes over time. Security cooperation activities and their purposes adapt as conditions change and as resource availability changes. The nature of the many security cooperation activities, which often span multiple objectives and outcomes, contribute to the geographic combatant commands' theater campaign plans.

The Army supports security cooperation through security assistance, security force assistance, foreign internal defense, and security sector reform. The Army often uses Title 10 authorities—which directs training, manning, and equipping of U.S. forces—to support security cooperation. As such, security cooperation is sustained activities and authorities executed discreetly or in concert with each other across the range of military operations consolidating many requirements, authorities, and force structures.

See pp. 2-1 to 2-4 for further discussion.

Security Assistance
Security assistance is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, or other related statutes. These programs permit the United States to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

See pp. 2-1 to 2-10 for further discussion.

Security Force Assistance
Security force assistance is Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the United States Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). Military forces conduct these activities facilitating host nations to deter and defend against transnational internal threats to stability. The DOD also conducts security force assistance to assist host nations to defend against external threats; contribute to coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another country’s security forces or supporting institutions. The only security force assistance activity conducted under combat conditions is combat advising.

See pp. 2-4 to 2-10 for further discussion.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
Foreign internal defense involves civilian and military agencies of a government participating in action programs taken by another government or other designated organization. This program aims to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. U.S. foreign in-
ternal defense efforts involve all instruments of national power to support host-nation internal defense and development (IDAD) programs.

See pp. 2-2 to 2-3 for further discussion. ADP 3-05 and ADRP 3-05 discuss foreign internal defense in more detail.

**Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)**

Internal defense and development (IDAD) is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). IDAD involves a cyclic interaction of execution, assessment, and adaptation. U.S. forces use IDAD to focus on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Not all countries use IDAD. Ideally, it is a preemptive strategy. However, if an insurgency or other threat develops, it becomes an active strategy to combat that threat. As directed, the Army provides support to other USG departments and agencies focused on IDAD of those foreign security forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as interior, justice, or intelligence services. IDAD blends four interdependent functions to prevent or counter internal threats: balanced development, security, neutralization, and mobilization.

See pp. 2-2 to 2-3 for further discussion.

**Security Sector Reform (SSR)**

Security sector reform (SSR) is an umbrella term that discusses reforming the security of an area. SSR includes integrated activities in support of defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegartion; or reduction of armed violence. In SSR, the Army primarily supports reforming, restructuring, or reestablishing the armed forces and the defense sector across the range of military operations.

See following pages (pp. 3-42 to 3-43) for further discussion.

### III. Peace Operations

Peace operations is a broad term that encompasses multiagency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peacemaking, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts (JP 3-07.3). Peace operations often have a high level of stability tasks compared to offense and defense tasks.

**Types of Peace Operations**

Peace operations aim to keep violence from spreading, contain violence that has occurred, and reduce tension among factions. Accomplishing these objectives creates an environment in which forces use other instruments of national power to reduce the level of violence to stable peace. Peace operations are usually interagency efforts. They require a balance of military and diplomatic resources.

Army forces conduct the following types of peace operations:

- Peacekeeping
- Peace enforcement
- Peacemaking
- Peace building
- Conflict prevention

See chap. 4 for further discussion of peace operations.
VII. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)


Instability may result from man-made or natural disasters. Such disasters often quickly overwhelm a host-nation’s and other organizations’ abilities to provide essential services and security to its citizens. This instability may bring the legitimacy of the host-nation government into question and potentially lead to larger issues, conflict, and regional instability. When such disasters threaten to be of sufficient severity and magnitude, U.S. foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign persons, or intergovernmental organizations may be required.

Foreign humanitarian assistance is the DOD’s contribution to USG efforts to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. This military contribution normally supports the United States Agency for International Development or DOS. Foreign humanitarian assistance provided by Army forces is limited in scope and duration. It supplements or complements the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing such assistance. This short-term aid assists the host nation or other agencies and organizations to provide a more stable environment and may transition to longer-term stability activities, when directed.

FHA activities conducted by US Armed Forces range from steady-state program activities supporting geographic combatant commanders (GCC) security cooperation and related programs to conducting limited contingency operations in support of another United States Government (USG) department or agency. FHA operations can be supported by other activities conducted by US military forces or they may be conducted concurrently with other types of related operations and activities such as dislocated civilian support, security operations, and foreign consequence management. FHA operations (including FDR operations) are normally conducted in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or the Department of State (DOS).

FHA activities typically depend on a whole-of-government approach for success, whether or not DOD is lead federal agent (LFA). FHA operations involve interaction among many local and international agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental. During FHA operations unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount.

The Department of Defense (DOD) has unique assets for effective response and can play a key role in foreign humanitarian crises. For example, the US military possesses exceptional operational reach that can be employed to enhance an initial response. Additionally, the US military augments private sector capability and thus limits threats to regional stability. Furthermore, the US military’s unmatched capabilities in logistics, command and control (C2), communications, and mobility are able to provide rapid and robust response to dynamic and evolving situations among vastly different military, civilian, and government entities.

In joint doctrine, the humanitarian assistance function includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs to ensure the social well-being of the population. Social well-being is characterized by access to and delivery of basic needs and services (water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services), the provision of primary and secondary education, the return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict, and the restoration of a social fabric and community life.

Civilian development agencies generally break humanitarian assistance into three categories: emergency humanitarian and disaster assistance; shorter-term transition initiatives; and longer-term development assistance. These generally parallel the military approach of initial response activities, transformational activities, and activities that foster sustainability; however, in the civilian agencies, each category has distinct operational approaches, staff, and resources.
Refer to the “Foreign Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief SMARTbook” for related discussion (projected 2016). Humanitarian aid is material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to humanitarian crises including natural disaster and man-made disaster. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of Department of Defense (DOD) activities, normally in support of the USAID or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.
IV. Arrangement of Stability Operations


The general arrangement of stability operations within an operation is in the four phases described in Figure II-1. These phases may be subphases of a major operation or campaign (e.g., subphases of a stabilize phase) or they may describe the general flow of operations in a crisis response or limited contingency operation involving stability operations. These phases may not be sequential but may occur simultaneously in various parts of the country depending on local circumstances.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability Operations Employment Phases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shaping</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military participation in security cooperation activities to support fragile states, avert crisis, or prepare for future operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Crisis Action</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military predominance to establish security for the population and protect critical infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stabilization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military maintains civil security and enables shift to civil implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normalization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final handoff to civil control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Shaping

Shaping activities that assist fragile states, preventing them from becoming seriously unstable, or that help build capabilities of partner countries can help create the conditions for the successful conduct of joint operations; or they can prevent the necessity for the conduct of operations in the future. Therefore, allocating adequate resources toward shaping activities focused on stabilization prior to a crisis enables the USG to advance its interests using relatively modest amounts of targeted resources, rather than spending much more substantial, and often massive, amounts of resources to respond to a crisis. Shaping activities also enable joint forces, as well as US civilian agencies and multinational partners, to develop a better understanding of a specific region, which may prove critical for the successful planning and execution of stabilization efforts.
Crisis Action
In the crisis action phase, activities normally accomplished by civilian organizations temporarily exceed the capabilities of those organizations. During this phase, the joint force performs those tasks or cooperates with civilian organizations to ensure that they are accomplished. The joint force should provide immediate relief to save lives and sustain critical infrastructure and provide a secure environment to preempt criminal elements and other adversaries from gaining control over areas of the country. It is important to note that “temporarily” could be months or years in duration.

Stabilization
In the stabilization phase, civil organizations have generated sufficient capability and capacity for the joint force to shift toward facilitating civil implementation.

Normalization
In the normalization phase, the joint force transfers all of the stability tasks, missions, and activities to civilian organizations or the HN and redeploy as required.

Notional Balance of Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Operations
Figure II-2 illustrates a notional balance between offensive, defensive, and stability operations throughout a major operation or campaign.

A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is an interim interagency organization designed to improve stability in a given area by helping build the legitimacy and effectiveness of an HN local or provincial government in providing security to its citizens, delivering essential government services, and encouraging fair, transparent, and responsive governance. PRTs vary in structure, size, and mission. PRTs can temporarily augment the HN capability and capacity and facilitate reconstruction. While the PRTs are primarily concerned with addressing local conditions, they also work on building and improving communication and other linkages among the central, regional, and local government.

The PRT leverages the principles of reconstruction and development to build host-nation capacity while speeding the transition of security, justice, and economic development to the control of the host nation. (USMC photo by Lance Cpl. James Purschwitz)

The development community uses specific principles for reconstruction and development. These enduring principles represent years of practical application and understanding of the cultural and socioeconomic elements of developing nations. Understanding these principles enables development officials to incorporate techniques and procedures effectively to improve economic and social conditions for the local populace. By applying the principles of reconstruction and development, the development community significantly improves the probability of success. Timely emphasis on the principles increases the opportunity for success and provides the flexibility to adapt to the changing conditions. This community assumes risk in projects and programs by failing to adhere to the principles.
IV. Guidelines for Transitional Military Authority

For military forces, the successful accomplishment of the mission is paramount. As long as operations continue, the commander must exercise the necessary control. This may involve actions related to host-nation personnel and the local populace. The policies and practices adopted for transitional military authority should reduce the possibility that civilians interfere with ongoing operations.

To ensure operations continue unimpeded by civilians, transitional military authority focuses on ensuring the safety and security of civilians, restoring and maintaining law and order, building host-nation capability and capacity in key areas of government, and reestablishing living conditions to a normal, customary state. Thoroughly integrating civil affairs capabilities into the operations process helps facilitate unimpeded operations. Civil affairs integration supports maintaining positive interaction between military forces and the local people.

Commanders develop codes of behavior that avoid violation of, or insult to, local customs and practices. Foreign area officers, civil affairs and intelligence staff, and chaplains provide relevant information on the local populace, specific aspects of culture, and general customs and behaviors.

A. Treatment of the Population

Fair treatment of the local populace can help reduce the chance that the local populace will be hostile to U.S. forces and increase the chance for obtaining its cooperation. The proper and just treatment of civilians helps military forces establish and maintain security; prevent lawlessness; promote order; and secure local labor, services, and supplies. Such treatment promotes a positive impression of the military force; the United States; and other government agencies, organizations, and institutions engaged in unified action. Fair treatment strengthens the legitimacy of the operation and the transitional military authority in the eyes of the populace, bordering nations, and other members of the international community.

 Nonetheless, a policy of proper and just treatment does not prevent the imposition of restrictive or punitive measures necessary to achieve objectives of the transitional military authority. Commanders consider imposing restrictive measures on the initial occupation or liberation of a host nation to establish control of the populace. Populace control measures addressing curfews, assembly, looting, reprisals, and so on require planning, and upon implementation, information dissemination to the populace. Furthermore, mission-specific rules of engagement addressing population control measures should be succinct and unambiguous. In particular, areas with active and aggressively hostile actors often need restrictive or punitive measures.

B. Public Health

The transitional military authority establishes a public health policy for security, public safety, and humanitarian reasons. This policy applies to the health of the military forces as well as the local populace. Sustained operations cannot exist without healthy military forces. Without a healthy, viable force, the military cannot provide for the health and well-being of the people adequately. To protect the health of the force, the transitional military authority sometimes takes measures to safeguard, and if necessary, improve, the health of the local populace.

C. Courts and Claims

The ordinary courts in areas under control of the transitional military authority generally continue to function during a military occupation. The transitional military authority may suspend ordinary courts if judges do not fulfill their duties, the courts are corrupt or unfairly constituted, or the administration of the local jurisdiction has collapsed. In such cases, the transitional military authority may establish its own courts.

3-76 (Stability Operations) V. Transitional Military Authority
D. Economic Stabilization and Recovery

Ref: FM 3-07, Stability (Jun ‘14), pp. 2-13 to 2-14.

Transitional military authority generally focuses on security, the restoration and maintenance of law and order, and the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. In certain circumstances, military forces may need to act with regard to economic conditions that promote security and law and order. However, international law generally limits a transitional military authority in this area. Specific sources of international law directed at activities of the transitional military authority, such as UN Security Council resolutions, may provide additional authority. Commanders must routinely consult legal advisors in this complex area.

When international law and the governing mandate permits a transitional military authority to engage in economic stabilization and recovery activities, two immediate goals exist for the economic sector. The first goal is to use all available goods and services as efficiently as possible to meet the essential needs of the local populace. The second is to revive the economy at the local level to reduce dependence on external support. Achieving these goals depends on stimulating production capability and workforce capacity. The transitional military authority should quickly identify local sources of supply and services to support military operations. This infuses critical monetary resources into the local economy to stimulate growth, investment, and development.

Actions taken to stimulate economic recovery at the local level must closely work with efforts to stabilize the national economy. Therefore, the transitional military authority must immediately draw on the expertise and advice of civilian agencies (such as the Department of the Treasury) and organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund) to contend with macroeconomic challenges. Issues such as stabilizing monetary policy, controlling inflation, and reestablishing a national currency generally exceed expertise resident in the transitional military authority. This lack of expertise underscores the necessity of introducing appropriate civilian expertise as soon as practical or puts the success of broader economic recovery programs at risk from the outset of operations.

Stimulating the economy at the microeconomic level facilitates economic recovery, especially in areas suffering from market failure or collapse. The transitional military authority may apply microeconomics principles to influence local prices, supply and demand, or the availability of labor. (DoD photo by Spc. Jennifer Reed)
VI. Small Unit Tasks & Activities

Ref: FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct ‘03), chap. IV and FM 3-21.10 (FM 7-10), The Infantry Rifle Company (Jul ‘06), chap. 6.

This section highlights small unit tasks and activities related to stability, peace and counterinsurgency operations. For discussion of tasks and activities more closely related to peace operations -- protected areas, separation/neutralization of belligerent forces, interpositioning, nonlethal weapons, and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) -- see pp. 4-27 to 4-34.

Stability, peace and counterinsurgency operations encompass various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Stability operations can be conducted in support of a host-nation or interim government or as part of an occupation when no government exists.

Coordination, integration, and synchronization between host-nation elements, other government agencies, and Army forces are enhanced by transparency and credibility. The degree to which the host nation cooperates is fundamental. Commanders publicize their mandate and intentions. Within the limits of operations security, they make the populace aware of the techniques used to provide security and control. Actions on the ground reinforced by a clear and consistent message produce transparency. This transparency reinforces credibility. Credibility reflects the populace’s assessment of whether the force can accomplish the mission.
Stability, peace and counterinsurgency operations are complex and demanding. A small unit in a stability operation -- an Infantry company for example -- must master skills from negotiating to establishing OPs and checkpoints to escorting a convoy.

**Use of Force**

The presence of armed Soldiers operating among the local populace causes tension. Discipline and strict adherence to the rules of engagement are essential but not sufficient to reassure the population. In addressing the populace’s apprehension, commanders balance protecting the force, defeating enemy forces, and taking constructive action throughout the area of operations. They also stress cultural awareness in training and preparing for operations. Cultural awareness makes Soldiers more effective when operating in a foreign population and allows them to leverage local culture to enhance the effectiveness of their operations.

While speed, surprise, and shock are vital considerations in lethal actions; perseverance, legitimacy, and restraint are vital considerations in stability and civil support operations.

*When using force, precision is as important in stability missions as applying massed, overwhelming force is in offensive and defensive operations. Commanders at every level emphasize that in stability operations violence not precisely applied is counterproductive. (Dept. of Army photo).*

In peace operations, commanders emphasize impartiality in the use of force in addition to credibility and transparency. Impartiality is not neutrality. Impartiality does not imply that Army forces treat all sides equally. Force is used against threats in accordance with the rules of engagement. Fair treatment of the local populace improves the prospects for lasting peace, stability, and security.
E. Monitor Compliance with an Agreement

Compliance monitoring involves observing belligerents and working with them to ensure they meet the conditions of one or more applicable agreements. Examples of the process include overseeing the separation of opposing combat elements, the withdrawal of heavy weapons from a sector, or the clearance of a minefield. Planning for compliance monitoring should cover, but is not limited to, the following considerations.

- Liaison teams, with suitable communications and transportation assets, are assigned to the headquarters of the opposing sides. Liaison personnel maintain communications with the leaders of their assigned element and talk directly to each other and to their mutual commander.
- The commander positions himself at the point where violations are most likely to occur.
- He positions platoons and squads where they can observe the opposing parties, instructing them to assess compliance and report any violations.
- As directed, the commander keeps higher headquarters informed of all developments, including his assessment of compliance and noncompliance.

F. Verification of Weapons and Forces

This section concerns verification of the location, movement, readiness, and level of weapons and forces as specified by agreements and understandings. Commanders must understand their responsibilities under these agreements and understandings. Often peace agreements or subsequent international accords will establish the parameters for weapons verification and force reductions.

- HN’s and belligerent forces are responsible for compliance with the agreements and their accountability.
- The PO force is responsible for verifying compliance, and, in the case of peace enforcement, compelling compliance.
- The PO force must have total access to all sites and locations. This is a fundamental issue of freedom of movement.

Cantonment and Storage Sites (Four Categories)

- Combat sites, consisting of heavy weapons, air defense, air fields, naval ports, barracks, operational munitions stocks, and combat loads.
- Infrastructure sites, consisting of support activities such as logistics, communications, headquarters, and depots.
- Police sites, consisting of weapons, vehicles, and munitions.
- Ordnance sites, consisting of civilian production plants and factories, production storage, and new weapons holding areas.

Procedures

- Commanders should establish the priority of inspections related to the above four categories of sites. Combat sites and police sites usually will have the highest priority.
- Schedules for inspection should include a combination of pre-inspections, announced inspections, and unannounced inspections.
- IO should support the program of inspections.
- A verification board should coordinate the inspection and develop a collection plan.
- The reporting system, when feasible, should include nonmilitary organization such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the International Police Training Force (IPTF).
G. Demilitarization

Ref: FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct ’03), pp. IV-28 to IV-30. See also p. 2-21.

Demilitarization or arms control may be one of the tasks given to a military force under the terms of its mandate, or they may be local, tactical initiatives attempted to reduce tension in a specific area. In general, the possibility of demilitarization and arms control measures will only arise once a cease-fire or peace agreement is in place. Demilitarization and arms control will normally be a progressive process. Steps, which will require considerable verification and policing by the military force, could include:

1. Withdrawal From Front Lines
   Following a cease-fire agreement, military forces are normally deployed along the old front lines the ADL. The first stage of demilitarization is a withdrawal from these wartime positions, either to barracks or behind a BZ. The aim of this zone is to move the belligerents back, beyond small arms range and ideally outside line of sight.

2. Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons
   Withdrawing heavy weapons a specified distance from the cease-fire line will offer a significant confidence building measure. Heavy weapons should include main battle tanks, towed and self-propelled artillery pieces, mortars, and all types of armored fighting vehicles.

3. Decommissioning of Air Defense (AD) Weapons
   Make military forces aware of the AD capability of former belligerents. Neutralize all active AD systems and then remove them as soon as possible as they pose a high potential threat to all types of aircraft and helicopters.

4. Return to Barracks/Cantonment Sites
   Having separated the former belligerents, the next step is to return the troops to barracks or to new cantonment sites. The aim of this is to move troops into peacetime locations that the PO forces can monitor. Such a move will also assist with the demilitarization of the civilian population as weapons are collected. Establish ad hoc cantonment sites because it is unlikely that there will be sufficient tailor-made military barracks available to accommodate all troops and equipment in the appropriate areas. Base the cantonment sites around large public buildings, factories, or tented camps.

5. Force Levels and Restructuring
   The next stage in demilitarization and arms control is the agreement of force levels and the restructuring of former belligerents into peacetime organizations. Force levels are normally agreed on at the national level, often as part of any cease-fire agreement or peace agreement. The restructuring will generally follow direction from the senior military headquarters and involve suitability assessments, verification, and advice from units at the tactical level.

6. Restructuring
   Restructuring will normally include the following elements:
   - Setting a ceiling on military personnel by unit and/or location
   - The confinement of arms to designated armories
   - The separation of arms and ammunition
   - Military approval for proposed sites with regard to the potential for a future threat
   - The relocation of heavy weapons to authorized sites

7. Verification Will Depend on the Mandate
   If the situation allows, the military force may restrict all military movement and training. In such cases, authorized activities are monitored to ensure compliance. Similarly, the military force may inspect and monitor activities within barracks and cantonment sites.

8. Mandated Restrictions
   Enforcement will also depend on the mandate and may involve restrictions on a faction’s military activity, training, or movement; it may involve punitive inspections or even confiscations of weapons or equipment.
Peace operations (PO) are crisis response and limited contingency operations, and normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment in support of reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. PO may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations (UN), another intergovernmental organization (IGO), within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally.

I. Types of Peace Operations
PO includes the five types of operations. PO include peacekeeping operations (PKO), peace enforcement operations (PEO), conflict prevention, peacemaking processes, and peace building post conflict actions. Conduct PO in conjunction with various diplomatic activities necessary in securing a negotiated truce and resolving the conflict.

Note: The US adopted the term peace operations while others such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted the term peace-support operations.
1. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
PKO consist of military support to diplomatic, informational, and economic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict.
PKO take place following diplomatic negotiation and agreement among the parties to a dispute, the sponsoring organization, and potential force-contributing nations. Before PKO begin, a credible truce or cease fire is in effect, and the parties to the dispute must consent to the operation. A main function of the PKO force is to establish a presence that inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties and bolsters confidence in the peace process. Agreements often specify which nations’ forces are acceptable, as well as the size and type of forces each will contribute.
See pp. 4-11 to 4-14 for further discussion.

2. Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)
Peace enforcement operations (PEO) enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of personnel providing FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties. PEO may be conducted pursuant to a lawful mandate or in accordance with international law and do not require the consent of the HN or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is preferred. Forces conducting PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. Forces conducting PEO generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting.
See pp. 4-15 to 4-18 for further discussion.

3. Peace Building (PB)
PB consists of actions that support political, economic, social, and security aspects of society. Although the major responsibility for PB is with the civil sector, early in PO, when critical and immediate tasks normally carried out by civilian organizations temporarily exceed their capabilities, PO forces should assist and cooperate with the HN civil sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and IGOs, to ensure that those tasks are accomplished.
See pp. 4-19 to 4-24 for further discussion.

4. Peacemaking (PM)
Peacemaking is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves the issues that led to the conflict.
Military support to the peacemaking process includes military-to-military relations, security assistance, or other activities, which influence disputing parties to seek a diplomatic settlement.
An example of military support to peacemaking was the involvement of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and the Joint Staff plans directorate during the development of the Dayton Accords by the presidents of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia outlining a General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

5. Conflict Prevention
Conflict prevention employs complementary diplomatic, civil, and military means to monitor and identify the causes of a conflict, and takes timely action to prevent the occurrence, escalation, or resumption of hostilities. Chapter VI of the United Nations (UN) Charter covers activities aimed at conflict prevention. Conflict prevention includes fact-finding missions, consultations, warnings, inspections, and monitoring. An example of military support to conflict prevention is Operation ABLE SENTRY.

PEO enforce the provisions of a mandate designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties. PEO may be conducted pursuant to a lawful mandate or in accordance with international law and do not require the consent of the HN or the parties to the conflict, although broad based consent is preferred. Forces conducting PEO use force or the threat of force to coerce or compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions. In PEO, force is threatened against or applied to belligerent parties to terminate fighting, restore order, and create an environment conducive to resolving the dispute. Although combat may be required, PEO are not classified as major operations and normally have more restrictive ROE. Forces conducting PEO generally have full combat capabilities, although there may be some restrictions on weapons and targeting.

Conduct of PEO is normally governed by UN Charter Chapter VII (by a regional organization or lead nation designated by the UN), but in rare situations may be conducted under the basis of collective self-defense by a regional organization, a lead nation-led coalition, or unilaterally by the US. PEO do not require the consent of the HN or the parties to the conflict, and to that end they may appear to disregard state sovereignty. The 2004 UNSG’s High-level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, cognizant of this issue, established an international criteria for such intervention.

In a PEO, the use of force is not limited to self-defense and includes the use of force to implement Security Council mandates. Protection of civilians is a common component in recent mandates authorizing the use of force. Mission-specific ROE define the manner in which force should be applied.

PEO contingent forces may have to fight their way into the conflict area and use force to separate the combatants physically. The operational area will normally include civilians and thus pose special considerations such as threat identification, collateral damage, civilian casualties, and other issues associated with DCs.

Participation in PEO with multinational partners involves several unique factors for the PO force commander to consider. Certain multinational partners, for example, may not have a vital national interest at stake in the conflict or may even face certain dilemmas in regard to their involvement.

I. Fundamentals of Peace Enforcement

In addition to the fundamentals already discussed in section I, the following amplifications are made specifically for PEO:

1. Consent

In PEO, consent of the parties to the dispute is not a requirement, although some parties may extend it. At the strategic level, consent should, but may not, translate to the tactical level, where local groups could still disagree violently with their leaders.

2. Impartiality

In PEO this still requires the PO force to act on behalf of the peace process and mandate, and not show preference for any faction or group over another. Because PEO will use coercive force and intervene against the will of some, many people may perceive that the PO force is not impartial. Therefore the PO force must focus IO to counter these perceptions.
II. Peace Enforcement Tasks


PEO tasks may include some of those conducted in PKO as well as enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, operations to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute.

See pp. 4-27 to 4-34 for discussion of related multi-service TTPs.

1. Enforcement of Sanctions and Exclusion Zones
These include a broad range of possible tasks. Commanders must understand that actions to enforce sanctions, while endorsed by the UNSC, have traditionally been considered acts of war and should posture their forces accordingly.

2. Protection
PEO contingent forces may be tasked to provide protection for FHA missions. This could include protection for IGOs, NGOs, OGAs, and other military personnel who are providing FHA. Such protection may include establishing secure base areas, protecting routes or corridors for the transport of relief supplies, and providing security for distribution sites. If belligerent parties oppose the delivery of relief supplies by IGOs, NGOs, or other agencies, PEO forces may deliver the supplies by providing airlift or other forms of logistic support. The CMOC, when established, serves as the focal point for requests for support from US forces.

3. Operations to Restore Order
These are conducted to halt violence and support, reinstate, or establish civil authorities. They are designed to restore stability to the point where indigenous police forces can effectively enforce the law and reinstate civil authority.

4. Forcible Separation of Belligerent Parties
This PEO task can pose a very high risk to the contingent force. Forcible separation may involve reducing the combat capability of one or more of the belligerent parties. The contingent force will normally retain the right of first use of force. Forces conducting forcible separation require extensive offensive combat capability, as well as combat support and combat service support (CSS). The goal is to force the belligerent parties to disengage, withdraw and, subsequently, to establish a BZ or DMZ.

5. Conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) Operations
If PEO require forcible separation of belligerent parties, then there will be a requirement to conduct I/R operations as contingent forces capture or detain parties to the conflict. Depending on the type of conflict that results from forcible separation, I/R operations will need to be conducted for enemy prisoners of war/civilian internees and/or DCs. Forces responsible for conducting I/R operations must ensure that appropriate CSS assets are deployed to support this PO mission. The I/R operations will become critical as forces transition from PEO to PKO.
II. Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) - Approaches


The goal of MARO is to prevent or halt violence and to the extent possible, establish the basis for a stable, secure environment in which civil authorities can work to resolve the underlying causes for the instability. MARO are likely to be a mix of offense, defense, and stability operations. When undertaking MARO, PO forces can use one or more approaches (Figure B-1), which include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Considerations</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach 1</strong>&lt;br&gt;Area Security</td>
<td>• Wide area control&lt;br&gt;• Unit sectors&lt;br&gt;• Mobile patrols&lt;br&gt;• Quick response forces (QRFs)&lt;br&gt;• Outposts&lt;br&gt;• Mobile Operating Base</td>
<td>• Requires adequate forces, extensive logistics, and weak adversary&lt;br&gt;• Suitable when victim population is widely dispersed&lt;br&gt;• Extensive stability operations necessary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach 2</strong>&lt;br&gt;Shape, Clear, Hold, Build</td>
<td>• Clear-hold-build&lt;br&gt;• Focused, systematic advance within capabilities&lt;br&gt;• “Mobile” forces clear; “static” forces maintain security</td>
<td>• Fewer forces required than Area Security Approach&lt;br&gt;• Suitable with strong perpetrators and concentrated victim populations&lt;br&gt;• Cedes territory to perpetrators&lt;br&gt;• Extended commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach 3</strong>&lt;br&gt;Separation</td>
<td>• Controlled buffer zone between perpetrators and victims&lt;br&gt;• Outposts, patrols, and QRFs&lt;br&gt;• Supporting fires, as required&lt;br&gt;• Similar to traditional peacekeeping or demilitarized zone operations</td>
<td>• Limited forces required&lt;br&gt;• Suitable when perpetrators and victims are separated&lt;br&gt;• Cedes territory to perpetrators&lt;br&gt;• Forces may be caught between belligerent groups&lt;br&gt;• Potential long-term division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach 4</strong>&lt;br&gt;Safe Areas</td>
<td>• Protect internally displaced person camps&lt;br&gt;• Secure areas of victim concentration&lt;br&gt;• Defensive posture&lt;br&gt;• Security on migration routes&lt;br&gt;• Expect increased numbers of civilians who seek protection</td>
<td>• Limited forces required&lt;br&gt;• Suitable when victims are concentrated&lt;br&gt;• Cedes territory to perpetrators&lt;br&gt;• Large humanitarian assistance burden&lt;br&gt;• May “reward” perpetrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach 5</strong>&lt;br&gt;Partner Enabling</td>
<td>• Most ground forces from coalition partners or victim groups&lt;br&gt;• US provides security force assistance, equipment, or key enablers (deployment, air, conventional forces, special operations forces [SOF])</td>
<td>• Partners bear most burdens&lt;br&gt;• Minimizes US footprint&lt;br&gt;• Helps build indigenous capability&lt;br&gt;• Partners may be less capable than US forces&lt;br&gt;• US relinquishes control of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach 6</strong>&lt;br&gt;Containment</td>
<td>• Reliance on air, maritime, cyberspace, and SOF&lt;br&gt;• No-fly zones, blockades, and strikes&lt;br&gt;• Integrated with diplomatic and informational efforts</td>
<td>• Capitalizes on US military strengths (air, sea, cyberspace)&lt;br&gt;• Limited in-country presence&lt;br&gt;• Does not provide direct protection to victims&lt;br&gt;• Risk of collateral damage&lt;br&gt;• Precursor to other approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approach 7</strong>&lt;br&gt;Defeat Perpetrators</td>
<td>• Offensive focus against perpetrators&lt;br&gt;• Defeat perpetrator leadership and military capability&lt;br&gt;• Regime change or collapse, if necessary</td>
<td>• Large force required&lt;br&gt;• May be required for long-term resolution&lt;br&gt;• Extensive stabilization effort and reconstruction support required&lt;br&gt;• Potential for high casualties and collateral damage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
V. Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques & Procedures

Ref: ATP 3-07.31 [FM 3-07.31], Peace Operations Multi-Service TTPs (Nov ‘14) and adaptations from FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct ’03).

This section highlights multiservice tactics, techniques and procedures related to peace operations. For related discussion of small unit tasks and activities in support of stability operations -- patrolling, observing and reporting, movement control, searches, demilitarization, convoy operations, curfews, civil disturbances, refugees and displaced persons -- see pp. 3-79 to 3-98.

I. Creating a Secure Environment

The goal of a peace force is to create the conditions for other political, economic, and humanitarian peace building activities to achieve the political objective stated in the mandate and to transition from military to civil control. The peace force must separate and neutralize belligerent forces to ensure public security, establish/maintain freedom of movement, and protect FHA.

A. Principles

- Focus the operation at the tactical level
- Sustain consent for the operation
- Keep the entire operation transparent
- Act as liaison to all key parties and local authorities
- Belligerents must fully participate for success
- The PO force must have full freedom of movement
- Observing, reporting, and monitoring are the essential tools
- IO are key
- Maintain law and order

B. Military Tasks

- Physically occupy key terrain to establish control over urban and rural areas
- Separate belligerent forces
- Disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate
- Control weapons
- Control borders. Commanders must regulate the movement of persons or goods across borders. They may task units to guard ground, maritime, or air (or a combination of all) borders.
- Secure key sites
- Establish control measures that are visible and known to the local population.
- Ensure freedom of movement
- Establish secure base(s)
- Establish and maintain presence in the AO
- Establish protected areas
- Ensure public security
C. Planning Considerations

- Cdrs and staffs must conduct a thorough analysis of the peace agreement
- Commanders should have and use legal advisers during all planning and operations to establish a secure environment
- Urban environments require special considerations
- Joint military commissions provide the cornerstones for settling problems associated with establishing a secure environment

II. Protected Areas

Commanders may elect to require the PO force to establish and maintain a protected area. A protected area is a geographic area, inside of which the military force provides security and facilitates humanitarian aid for people at risk. This area has had several names in the past: security zone, safe area, humanitarian zone, and safe haven.

A. Principles

- The commander may use force to compel compliance. The PO force should have the appropriate ROE and capability.
- The local population must perceive the PO force as impartial. This will require a significant IO plan and constant command attention.
- Demilitarized and demobilized the area. Do not let it become a protected area for one of the belligerents.
- PO forces must enforce freedom of movement to and from the area.
- The commander must build consent through all means to eliminate the need for a protected area

B. Military Tasks

- Establish the protected area
- Establish and enforce weapons exclusion zone
- Establish and maintain cantonment areas and weapons holding areas
- Dominate avenues of approach
- Establish CP’s, OPs, and other control access measures
- Establish curfew
- Conduct presence patrols
- Develop and rehearse reinforcement contingency plans

C. Planning Considerations

- The commander must insist on clear and unambiguous guidance. The commander must make clear the objectives of the mission and the criteria for success.
- The selected area must afford at least the minimal military requirements to ensure protection. The selected area will have significant political dimensions driven by a humanitarian crisis. The military commander must provide input as to the military feasibility behind the political decision.
- Commanders should establish quick reaction forces (QRF) and decide the ROE for their employment. The commander must understand and rehearse the use of the QRF.
- Coordinate the extent of humanitarian support with NGOs, international governmental organizations, and HN. If the military must assist, this will influence the force size and force mix.
Insurgency is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency uses a mixture of subversion, sabotage, political, economic, psychological actions, and armed conflict to achieve its political aims. It is a protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, a military occupation government, an interim civil administration, or a peace process while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy—the central issues in an insurgency. Each insurgency has its own unique characteristics but they have the following aspects: a strategy, an ideology, an organization, a support structure, the ability to manage information, and a supportive environment. It is these aspects that set an insurgency apart from other spoilers and present a significant threat. Typically, insurgents will solicit, or be offered, external support from state or non-state actors.

Insurgencies will continue to challenge security and stability around the globe in the 21st century. While the possibility of large scale warfare remains, few nations are likely to engage the US, allies, and partner nations. Globalization, numerous weak nation-state governments, demographics, radical ideologies, environmental concerns, and economic pressures are exacerbated by the ease of interaction among insurgent groups, terrorists, and criminals; and all put both weak and moderately governed states at risk. Today, a state’s failure can quickly become not only a misfortune for its local communities, but a threat to global stability and US national interests.

Long-standing external and internal tensions tend to exacerbate or create core grievances within some countries, which can result in political strife, instability, or, if exploited by some groups to gain political advantage, even insurgency. Moreover, some transnational terrorists with radical political and religious ideologies may intrude in weak or poorly governed states to form a wider, more networked threat.

The United States Government (USG) has supported numerous allies and partner nations to prevent or disrupt threats to their stability and security through foreign assistance and security cooperation (SC) activities as part of geographic combatant commanders’ (GCC’s) theater campaign plans in conjunction with other USG efforts. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) efforts can include counterterrorism (CT) operations and foreign internal defense (FID) programs supported by stability operations tasks. If a friendly nation appears vulnerable to an insurgency, and it is in the best interest of the USG to help the host nation (HN) mitigate that insurgency, the USG would support the affected nation’s internal defense and development (IDAD) strategy and program through a FID program. When an HN government supported by a FID program appears to be overwhelmed by internal threats, and if it is in the national security interests of the USG, then the third category of FID, US combat operations, may be directed by the President. Those US combat operations would be in the form of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, whether in conjunction with the HN forces, or in place of them, until the HN has the necessary capability and capacity to take on combat operations. However, the HN must retain responsibility for dealing with the insurgency even though US forces may temporarily be conducting COIN operations.
COIN is a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes. COIN is primarily a political struggle and incorporates a wide range of activities by the HN government of which security is only one, albeit an important one. Unified action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all HN, US, and multinational partners. The HN government in coordination with the chief of mission (COM) should lead the COIN efforts. When the operational environment (OE) is not conducive to a civilian agency lead for the COIN effort within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of and able to lead the unified action required for effective COIN.

II. Approach to Counterinsurgency

Because a COIN operation is in essence a civil-military operation, it differs in many respects from a traditional military force-on-force operation and requires a special mindset. It is the population-centric nature of COIN that distinguishes it from most traditional military force-on-force operations. In COIN success means that the population assents to be governed by the HN government and the insurgents have either reconciled through a peaceful political process or suffered total military defeat. US participation in COIN operations is typically led by a COM in conjunction with a JFC and requires significant interagency coordination in the application of the instruments of national power. A complete analysis of the populace’s grievances and the interconnected social, economic, informational, physical, and governing structure is required for the full application of military capabilities. COIN operations will take time. It is unlikely that there will be a decisive battle that will determine the outcome of the conflict.

A. Political Control

COIN is an armed struggle for legitimacy of all or part of the HN. COIN requires the integration of elements of security, economic development, and information through a political strategy that establishes and sustains the control that reinforces legitimacy and effectiveness of an HN government while reducing insurgent influence over the indigenous population. The USG’s nonlethal actions in support of the HN are often just as important to the COIN effort as the JFC’s lethal actions. COIN is not nation building, and the JFC and COM strengthen the legitimacy of the HN government through understanding and continuously assessing the nature of the conflict, and then tailoring only those resources and capabilities necessary to enable the HN government to provide a secure, predictable, and tolerable living environment for the population that the HN government seeks to control. Because of sociocultural factors, USG normally should not be concerned with transforming the HN government into a mirror image of a Western-style democracy, although some democratic principles are universal and may be valuable in establishing a base level of HN government legitimacy, and adherence to certain human rights standards is required by US statutes to qualify for US foreign assistance.

Insurgency is a struggle for some form of political power, whether that power is sought through reform, revolution, secession, nullification, or resistance. Political power is nearly always the end, not the method, of the insurgent’s strategy and tactics. Thus, the JFC should not confuse the various methods used by insurgents with the end or goal of their struggle. The methods used by the insurgent to gain political power are a mix of raw intimidation and violence, religious extremism, political ideology, and exploitation of local grievances that occur outside the accepted political process. People support an insurgency because they perceive it is in their best interest. They support an insurgency because the insurgent leadership has spun a compelling narrative (the insurgent narrative) that the HN government and/or a foreign occupier or supporting country are collectively responsible for their woes (e.g., their psychic, physical, or economic insecurity), and the people would be better off actively, or at least passively, supporting the insurgency. Narratives are complex...
the government in the eyes of the population. In many cases this is accompanied by a corresponding attempt to supplant government administration with insurgent “shadow” government in more and more areas. Over time, insurgencies work to force governments to the negotiating table, trigger their collapse to seize control, or grow until their forces can directly confront and defeat the government security forces and physically take over the seat of government.

Insurgencies driven by commercial or criminal objectives (e.g., drug cartels) are an exception, because they typically have little interest in fully displacing the government and assuming the entire responsibility for governing the population. Rather, they focus on dominating the state’s security apparatus through bribery and fear and intimidation by extreme violence, so it will not impinge on their illicit activities, and they often rely on the rest of the government’s administrative capacity to address the population’s expectations for essential services. For powerful criminal enterprises, it is an acceptable cost of doing their business.

II. Prerequisites for Insurgency

Fundamental to COIN is understanding why and how an insurgency begins. Historically, lack of government control, vulnerable populations, and revolutionary leadership available for direction have been identified as the prerequisites for an insurgency to occur. Contemporary analysis suggests a somewhat different approach that more properly identifies the prerequisites to be viewed as opportunity, motive, and means.

Ref: JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, fig II-1, p. II-3.

A. Opportunity

Similar to the historical prerequisite of “lack of government control,” opportunity alludes to the emergence of significant gaps in the ability of the national government or local allies to provide security for its territory and population. Specifically, the government must have the capability and capacity to detect the early stages of insurgency—organization and mobilization—a challenge that typically requires a certain
II. Insurgency Threat Characteristics

Ref: FM 3-24, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May ’14), chap. 5.

Threat characteristics involve the composition, disposition, activities, and tactics of an insurgency. The composition of an insurgency is covered under the eighth dynamic, organizational and operational patterns. Tactics for an insurgency include political activities, criminal actions, and military tactics. Counterinsurgents consider how these threat characteristics create strengths and weaknesses for an insurgency.

I. Disposition and Activities

The disposition is the geographic location of insurgent elements and the way they are deployed, employed, or located. The dispositions of an insurgency are partially determined by an operational environment and the operational variables. For example, if an insurgency has connections to a black market, some of its dispositions will normally be to protect that market. Terrain will also affect the dispositions of an insurgency. Commanders and staffs must understand an operational environment to understand an insurgency’s dispositions.

Insurgent Actions

- **A. Political Activities**
- **B. Population Control**
- **C. Military Tactics (including terrorist activities and conventional tactics)**
- **D. Support Activities**

Insurgents who rely solely on violence to achieve their political goals are probably ineffective. Instead, effective insurgents conduct a wide range of activities to achieve their goals. Many of these activities are not enemy or terrain oriented, but political. Insurgents use a range of activities supporting both military and political actions.

A. Political Activities

Insurgents may use political activities to achieve their goals and enhance their cause’s legitimacy. An insurgency’s actions can come from inside the government’s political system or can be used to communicate a message to the population. Political actions that happen within a government normally happen in a democracy or a semidemocracy. In these systems, an insurgency and related political parties can have some political power through elections. This gives groups the ability to launch official investigations and a platform to question government actions. This was a technique used by the Irish Republican Army and Sinn Fein.
Insurgent political actions within the government are limited to an autocratic regime, unless those actions are secretive. An authoritarian regime can have members that are either sympathetic to or actual members of an insurgency. However, those individuals must remain clandestine if they are to remain inside the government.

The use of political activities to influence a society is another political activity of an insurgency. Demonstrations, propaganda, strikes, and civil disobedience can be effective means to undermine the legitimacy of a government and to disrupt a host nation. These actions show the level of support for the insurgency and transmit the insurgents’ message to the rest of society.

Propaganda is one of the most important political tools an insurgency has. Propaganda provides the means for the insurgency to communicate a message, often political, to the population. It allows the insurgency to create a narrative of why the government’s actions are not legitimate, and how the insurgency can eliminate the root causes of the conflict.

In areas of a country where an insurgency is in control, the insurgency can perform governmental functions. These functions replace the functions of the host-nation government. When an insurgency provides effective governance of a region or community, it can build local legitimacy.

At the national level, an insurgency can promote a shadow government. A shadow government offers a known, tangible alternative to the present government to the population. This can be effective as a propaganda technique, and a shadow government can be useful in creating a successful transition for an insurgency. As propaganda, a shadow government allows an insurgency to identify and inform a population of a known alternative to the current government.

B. Population Control
One of the primary goals of a local insurgency is population control. Once the government is displaced from an area, an insurgency can act as the functioning government. With the use of force to enforce local rules and norms, an insurgency can become a functioning instrument to control the population. In such cases, it has displaced the government, at least locally. This control can be used to gain legitimacy among the population. When an insurgency both controls a local population and is seen as legitimate by the local population, it becomes more difficult to displace. The host nation must not only regain control of the area, but maintain control when the population may not view the host nation as a legitimate authority.

C. Military Tactics
Insurgents use violence to create a wide range of effects. For example, in the early phases of an insurgency, insurgents plan attacks to achieve the greatest political and informational impact while not becoming decisively engaged. During the war of movement, insurgents may try to destroy a host nation’s security forces or its communication channels. Commanders need to understand the wide variety of insurgent tactics. Insurgents may use both terrorist acts and conventional military tactics.

See facing page for further discussion.

D. Support Activities
Although noticeable, violence may be only a small part of overall insurgent activity. Insurgent support activities include training, logistics, and communications. These support activities sustain insurgencies and allow for both military and political actions. They are enabled by an insurgency’s ability to generate popular support. Insurgent support networks may be large, even when violence levels are low. These networks can include support from other nations or from population groups outside the country. The effectiveness of insurgent operations depends heavily on logistics.

In some parts of the world, a lack of access to weapons may forestall insurgencies. However, there is widespread availability of weapons in many areas, with especially
I. Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transition Framework

For a tactical and operational ground commander acting as the primary counter-insurgent commander, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework provides a foundation for detailed planning. Moreover, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is well-suited to those commanders and staffs engaged in training, advising, or integrating capabilities into a host-nation effort. If a host nation is performing operations, whatever the U.S. role in the counterinsurgency, Soldiers and Marines must have a framework for understanding that host nation’s actions. Commanders and staffs cannot evaluate, advise, or train another force unless they have a base of knowledge on the operations being conducted. In many counterinsurgency efforts, a state will try to defeat insurgencies by performing a general operational approach that is similar to the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework at the tactical level. While this is certainly not a uniform rule, having some framework in understanding another counterinsurgent’s actions provides a point of reference for understanding. Commanders and staffs must have an understanding of how to solve a particular problem before they advise or assist another commander solve that problem. Understanding the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is a fundamental framework for understanding what units are trying to accomplish in a counterinsurgency. This framework applies to all units involved in the counterinsurgency, including, for example, an infantry battalion directly performing actions, a member of a special forces team advising a host nation, or a member of a combatant command integrating and evaluating various security cooperation capabilities.

Whether U.S. forces are executing the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework or another state is executing it, it can be very effective in defeating an insurgency. For example, in the Philippines, the government was successful in using the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework, even if it was not called shape-clear-hold-build-transition by the counterinsurgents at the time. Commanders and staffs must understand the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework to understand what a host nation is trying to achieve in its counterinsurgency efforts. This framework is used by U.S. and foreign forces.

The shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework describes an operational approach that moves through each of its phases to destroy insurgent capacity and empower host-nation capacity. The phases of this method are not mutually exclusive, but the phases represent a general progression of operations. The shape phase refers to making changes to the environment, through information operations or other methods, that create the conditions for success of the other phases. The population needs to understand that there will be an increase in security and initially local leaders should be contacted. The clear phase is an effort to remove the open insurgent presence in an area. The hold phase is defined by providing security for the population in an area so an open insurgent presence cannot return. The build phase entails efforts to increase security and governmental capacity so that government and local forces can control the area and prevent the return of insurgents. The transition phase is the transition of security to local and government forces.

The commitment of resources, to include time, troops, money, development programs, and other enablers depends entirely on the capacity of the insurgency, the capacity of the host nation’s institutions, the capacity of the host nation’s security forces, and the capacity of the host nation’s population. The capacity requirement for the external counterinsurgent is that capacity which overcomes the capacity differential between the insurgents and the host nation’s systems. As the framework is predicated on the conditions on the ground, the shape-clear-hold-build-transition framework is based on understanding areas of operation and understanding the comprehensive threat. To transition between the clear, the hold, and the build, a unit must be able to measure the conditions on the ground and how those conditions are
An indirect approach seeks to support existing governments, security forces, and groups through increasing capacity to counter an insurgency and enabling existing capabilities. This approach indirectly counters an insurgency by working through host-nation institutions or with groups in the society. The United States (U.S.) can use nation assistance and security cooperation to aid a host nation in building its institutions.

Beyond nation assistance and security cooperation, there are several methods that are indirect methods for countering an insurgency. Among these are generational engagement, negotiation and diplomacy, and identify, separate, isolate, influence, and reintegrate. Beyond these methods, there are several indirect enablers that are important in any counterinsurgency. This includes integrated monetary shaping operations.

I. Nation Assistance and Security Cooperation

Nation assistance is assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory based on agreements mutually concluded between nations (JP 3-0). This civil or military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance) is rendered to a nation by U.S. forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the U.S. and that nation. Nation assistance operations support the host nation by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

Nation assistance involves other government agencies that provide expertise in building civil institutions. This is an essential element in counterinsurgency because the military lacks the expertise to build civil control over the population, perform economic reforms, or aid in other basic functions that a host nation may need to prevent or prevail against an insurgency. Using a whole-of-government approach is essential in conducting nation assistance to prevent insurgencies from developing freedom of movement by exploiting the root causes of conflict within an operational environment.

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22). This includes-

- Military to military exchanges (for example, seminars and symposia)
- Combined exercises
- Humanitarian assistance
- Security assistance

When these activities are used to defeat an insurgency, they are part of a counterinsurgency operation. While not all security cooperation activities are in support of counterinsurgency, security cooperation can be an effective counterinsurgency tool. See chap. 1 and chap. 2 for further discussion of these activities.
II. Generational Engagement


Generational engagement is a method that can be conducted in conjunction with other approaches that seeks to get the host nation to educate and empower the population to participate in legal methods of political discourse and dissent. This can be done in both high threat situations and situations where an insurgency is at its infancy and combat is less intense. It is best that the host nation undertake this method as soon as possible to affect the next generation. Generational engagement focuses on the population. Generational engagement focuses on building new constituents in the host-nation population to counter insurgent actions. Generational engagement is a method of political mobilization of the people. The purpose of the method is to get population groups to side with the host nation.

Figure 10-1 below provides a general framework for generational engagement.

First, counterinsurgents identify the population that they wish to engage. This relevant population may politically engage and this will encourage the host nation to redress any grievances. This may lead to a reduction of violence. This is all built on a foundation of education, empowerment, and participation.

Five principles are fundamental to generational engagement:

- Groups with whom counterinsurgents partner (such as nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]) must be seen as indigenous, not as foreign constructs.
- Independence of funding and resources are important. Support groups can lose credibility the more they are perceived as solely reliant on foreign funding, possibly due to a shift in priorities by a sole and influential benefactor. Organizations and their partners should identify alternative sources of support, including local sponsors, funding from the relevant ministries, or collecting dues from members.
- In selecting partners, counterinsurgents should not limit themselves to the vocal intellectual elite. If the insurgency is based on the root causes of a rural population, intellectual elites might not have legitimacy among the rural poor. Therefore, counterinsurgents should balance support between the central leadership and local branches in the provinces or townships (where youth engagement is usually most important).
I. Civil-Military Operations, Civil Affairs, and Unified Action

In carrying out their CMO responsibilities, commanders use CAO. The relationship between CMO and CAO is best considered within the broad context of unified action that involves the synchronization, coordination, or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. JFCs seek this synergy by several means, one of the more prominent being through the conduct of CMO that bring together the activities of joint forces and MNFs and nonmilitary organizations to achieve common objectives.

Unified Action

- The synchronization, coordination, and integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort
- Takes place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces under the direction of these commanders

Civil-Military Operations

- The responsibility of a commander
- Normally planned by civil affairs personnel, but implemented by all elements of the joint force

Civil Affairs

- Conducted by civil affairs forces
- Provides specialized support of civil-military operations
- Applies functional skills normally provided by civil government

There are six CA functional specialty areas: rule of law, economic stability, governance, public health and welfare, infrastructure, and public education and information. All six functional specialties are interrelated, and specialists must often work together.

CA functional specialists advise and assist the commander and can assist or direct subordinate civilian counterparts. These functional specialists should be employed to provide analysis in their specialty area that supports planning of interagency efforts or HN efforts, and in a general support role to joint force components requiring such capabilities.

GCCs can establish civil-military operations directorate of a joint staff (J-9) to plan, coordinate, conduct, and assess CMO. While CA forces are organized, trained, and equipped specifically to support CMO, other joint forces supporting CMO include
SOF, military information support (MIS), legal support, public affairs (PA), engineer, transportation, health support personnel, MP, security forces, and maneuver units. CAO are planned, executed, and assessed by CA forces due to the complexities and demands for specialized capabilities associated with activities normally the responsibility of indigenous civil governments or authorities. While all CAO support CMO, they remain a distinct CMO element.

CMO typically coordinate the efforts of joint, interagency, and multinational organizations. CMO’s coordinating and civil information management (CIM) functions build unity of effort and enable unified action.

At all levels, CMO use negotiation, mediation, collaboration, consensus, and relationship building to create conditions for success.

JFCs integrate civil affairs (CA) forces with other military forces (e.g., maneuver, health service, military police [MP], engineer, transportation, and special operations forces [SOF]), to work alongside HN agencies, military, and security forces (e.g., national, border, and local police) as well as the indigenous populations and institutions (IPI). Through interorganizational coordination, the JFC may enable unified action that includes other USG departments and agencies, IGOs, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), HNs, foreign nations (FNs), and the private sector.

II. CMO and the Range of Military Operations

CMO are the activities of a commander performed by designated CA or other military forces that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and IPI, by directly supporting the attainment of objectives relating to the reestablishment or maintenance of stability within a region or HN. CMO may include military forces conducting activities and functions of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA forces, other military forces, or a combination of CA and other forces, and are conducted across the range of military operations.

Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict continuum in a wide variety of operations that are commonly characterized in three groups as this figure depicts.


CMO contribute to missions within many operational areas by synchronizing and building synergy between multiple players and entities contributing to the stabilization of the HN. CMO help disseminate relevant messages and themes to local leaders and the HN population. CMO also provide feedback to information operations (IO) as the assessments reveal sentiments of targeted HN populations or organizations.
D. Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC)

The HOC is a senior level international and interagency coordinating body designed to achieve unity of effort in a large FHA operation. HOCs are horizontally structured with no C2 authority. All members are responsible to their own organizations or countries. The HOC normally is established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly the USAID Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) during a US unilateral operation. Because the HOC operates at the national level, it should consist of senior representatives from the affected country, the US embassy, joint force, OFDA, NGOs, IGOs, and other major organizations in the operation.

*CMOC is shown for illustrative purposes. The joint force commander determines the staff relationship.

Legend

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSEL</td>
<td>command senior enlisted leader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMJCMOTF</td>
<td>commander, joint civil-military operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCJCMOTF</td>
<td>deputy commander, joint civil-military operations task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-1</td>
<td>manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-5</td>
<td>plans directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-6</td>
<td>communications system directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCMOTF</td>
<td>joint civil-military operations task force</td>
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Ref: JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, fig. 2-6, p. 2-18.
IV. CMO Campaign Sequence

Ref: ATP 3-57.70, Civil-Military Operations Center (May ‘14), fig. 3-2, p. 3-5.

See related discussion of CMO in joint operations (phases) on pp. 6-6 to 6-7.
V. Characteristics of Civil Affairs Operations


CAO are actions to coordinate with HN military and civilian agencies, other government departments and agencies, NGOs, or IGOs, to support US policy or the commander’s assigned mission.

CA core tasks include:

Support to Civil Administration (SCA)

CA supports continuity of government in an HN. CA tasks are to:

- Identify, validate, or evaluate HN essential service infrastructure and capabilities
- Assess the needs of the IPI in terms of the CA functional areas of expertise
- Liaison between military and civilian agencies
- Coordinate and synchronize collaborative interagency or multinational SCA operations
- Coordinate transition of SCA operations from military to indigenous government or international transitional government control
- Conduct CIM to assess MOEs

Populace and Resources Control (PRC)

PRC helps the JFC, HN governments, or de facto authorities manage population centers to enhance joint force freedom of action. PRC identifies, reduces, relocates, or accesses the population and resources that may impede or otherwise threaten joint operations. CA tasks in support of PRC:

- Identify or evaluate existing HN PRC measures and capabilities
- Advise and plan PRC measures to support the commander’s objectives
- Publicize control measures among IPI
- Identify and assess MOEs and MOPs
- Execute of selected PRC operations
- Assist in the arbitration of problems arising from the implementation of PRC measures
- Conduct targeted CIM in support of PRC

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)

CA forces administer aspects of FHA in coordination with interagency partners. CA tasks:

- Prepare and review contingency plans to assist USG departments and agencies, IGOs, HN agencies, and NGOs to support FHA.
- Monitor all FHA operations for compliance with law, agreements, and treaties.
- Review guidance from DOD and the GCC regarding FHA operations in TCPs, FHA and disaster relief plans, and foreign consequence management (FCM) plans.
- Assess the environments in which US forces will conduct FHA:
  - Political situation
  - Physical boundaries of the area
  - Potential threat to forces and IPI
  - Global visibility of the situation
  - Media interest climate for FHA operations
  - Assess social and cultural factors that may influence FHA delivery and effectiveness
IV. Command Structures of Forces in Multinational Operations


No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. Organizational structures include the following:

A. Integrated Command Structure
Multinational commands organized under an integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example of this command structure is found in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup.

B. Lead Nation Command Structure
A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure is Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan wherein a US-led headquarters provides the overall military C2 over the two main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces and the other predominately Afghan forces.

C. Parallel Command Structures
Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible.

See pp. 8-4 to 8-5 for discussion and listing of US organizational structures in foreign countries: Ambassadors, Chiefs of Mission, Country Team, Defense Attaches, etc.
I. Diplomatic and Military Considerations

Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational response, from man-made actions (such as interstate aggression) to natural disasters (like an earthquake). In responding to such situations, nations weigh their national interests and then determine if, when, and where they will expend their nation’s resources. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The composition of an MNF may change as partners enter and leave when their respective national objectives change or force contributions reach the limits of their nation’s ability to sustain them.


Factors Affecting Military Capabilities of Nations

National Interests  
Domestic Politics  
Objectives  
Arms Control Limitations  
Doctrine  
Organization  
Training  
Leader Development  
Equipment  
History  
Defense Budget  
Domestic Law  
Treaties


Some nations may even be asked to integrate their forces with those of another, so that a contribution may, for example, consist of an infantry company containing platoons from different countries. The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated diplomatic decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance. The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the MNTF’s command structure. In a parallel command structure, national forces essentially operate under their own doctrine and procedures within the guidelines determined by the strategic national guidance and are not significantly impacted by multinational influences. Under the integrated and LN command structures, more multinational involvement and interaction occurs.

As shown in Figure III-1 above, numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations. The operational-level commander must be aware of the specific constraints and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. MNTF commanders (similar to JTF commanders) at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, HN officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats should not be underestimated.
II. Factors in Multinational Participation

Ref: JP 3-0, pp. II-4 to II-8.

Editor’s Note: The following overview of factors in multinational participation is from JP 3-0, Joint Operations (Aug ‘11). Refer to JP 3-16, Multinational Operations (Jul ‘13) for expanded discussion of general and operational considerations.

Joint forces should be prepared for combat and noncombat operations with forces from other nations within the framework of an alliance or coalition under US or other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations — often as important as leading.

1. National Goals
No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is trust and agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Consequently, perceptions of progress may vary among the participants. JFCs should strive to understand each nation’s goals and how those goals can affect conflict termination and the national strategic end state. Maintaining cohesion and unity of effort requires understanding and adjusting to the perceptions and needs of member nations.

2. Cultural and Language Differences
Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religion, and economic and social outlooks. Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Information lost during translation can be substantial, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects. To assist with cultural and language challenges, JFCs should employ linguists and area experts, often available within or through the Service components or from other US agencies. Linguists must be capable of translating warfighting-unique language to military forces of diverse cultures.

3. Command and Control
By law, the President retains command authority over US forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning employment, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, and protecting military forces for the achievement of assigned missions. JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership. In all multinational operations, even when operating under the operational control (OPCON) of a foreign commander, US commanders will maintain the capability to report separately to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. Further, the President may deem it prudent or advantageous (for reasons such as maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unified action) to place appropriate US forces under the control of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this determination, the President carefully considers such factors as the mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and ROE. Coordinated policy, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and theater intelligence, is required.

4. C2 Structures
Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures. Allied forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the allied force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands often are led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, close military cooperation, and robust diplomatic relations characterize alliances. Coalitions may adopt a parallel or lead nation C2 structure or a combination of the two.

See pp. 7-5 to 7-6 for discussion of multinational command and coordination.
I. Fundamentals

JP 3-08 sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

I. Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational coordination across a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interests and structures. This is especially pronounced for domestic and foreign operations, which are governed by different authorities and have considerably different US Government (USG) governing structures and stakeholders. Interorganizational coordination aids in this by enabling participants to do one or more of the following:

- **Facilitate Unity of Effort.** Achieving national strategic objectives requires the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by interorganizational coordination.

- **Achieve Common Objectives.** Successful interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives.

- **Provide Common Understanding.** Interorganizational coordination is critical to understanding the roles and relationships of participating military commands and relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and insight into the challenges faced.

II. The Need for Unity of Effort

Meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort of all instruments of US national power plus foreign governmental agencies and military forces and civilian organizations. Within the USG alone, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by organizational “stovepiping,” crisis-driven planning, and divergent organizational processes and cultures. These differences have certain benefits, but are not well-suited for addressing the range of conventional and
COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES

ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES

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<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Tactical/ Field-Level</th>
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<tr>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Department Secretaries</td>
<td>Army Corps, Divisions</td>
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<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>Ambassador/Embassy (3)</td>
<td>Navy Carrier Strike Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combatant Commander (1)</td>
<td>Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group</td>
<td>Air Force Wings</td>
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EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

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<td>Ambassador/Embassy United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission Director Liaisons (4)</td>
<td>CJTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Secretaries</td>
<td>Federal Coordinating Officer</td>
<td>Army Corps, Divisions</td>
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<td>Ambassador/Embassy</td>
<td>Regional Office Integration Planning Cell</td>
<td>Navy Carrier Strike Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group</td>
<td>FEMA Regional Response Coordination Center</td>
<td>Air Force Wings</td>
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<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) National Response Coordination Center</td>
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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

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<td>State Adjutant General</td>
<td>County, City (e.g., Police Department)</td>
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<td>Office of Emergency Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Department/Agency</td>
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NOTES

1. The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and the private sector toward theater strategic objectives.

2. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, IGOs, and the private sector toward theater operational objectives.

3. The ambassador and embassy (which includes the country team) function at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, and may support joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF, or may lead an integrated planning team.

4. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any other US agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordination Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander’s staff.

5. USAID’s OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters.

Ref: JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations, fig. I-1, p. I-14.

A government-wide approach that implements a more robust SC capability. This is primarily accomplished through public affairs (PA), defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD), and information operations (IO). In this case, the individual brings the skill sets of a parent agency, but reports through the military chain of command. USG agencies may deploy relatively junior personnel compared to their military counterparts to fill key positions. This difference should not be allowed to cause unnecessary friction. Carefully crafted memorandum of agreement (MOAs) can specify detailers’ rating and reviewing chains, tasking authority, and other clauses that are explicitly designed to overcome this potential source of friction. See chap. 7 for related discussion of information operations.
V. Interagency, IGOs and NGOs

Ref: JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (Jun ‘11), II-15 to II-17, IV-7 to IV-15 and app. A - C.

JP 3-08 describes key US Government departments and agencies, IGOs and NGOs — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.

A. Interagency

Interagency is defined as of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. JP 3-08, appendix A provides descriptions of United States Government (USG) agencies with which the Department of Defense (DOD) has frequent interaction or that a deployed joint task force may encounter during the course of contingency operations.

B. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. There are over 30 IGOs throughout the globe. These organizations represent a variety of global and regional issues and concerns. Unlike NGOs, IGOs represent political entities (e.g., the European Union, African Union); however both can have a significant impact on multinational military-related operations. US military participation in multinational efforts directed or supported by IGOs is primarily an Executive Branch decision subject to numerous constraints and restrictions.

JP 3-08, appendix C provides a summary of selected IGOs.

The United Nations

The UN is a unique international organization of 192 sovereign states, representing virtually every country in the world. It was founded towards the end of the Second World War. The member states are bound together by the principles of the UN Charter, an international treaty that spells out their rights and duties as members of the world community.

Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS, through the US ambassador to the UN, officially titled the Permanent Representative. The ambassador has the status of cabinet rank and is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). USG coordination with UN PO missions or agencies in-theater is through the US country team.

- The UN normally conducts PO under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. FHA is conducted under standing authority from the General Assembly and does not require a resolution to authorize each response.
- As part of a broader UN strategy, the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) provides guidelines for a comprehensive and inclusive UN system approach to the planning of integrated PO (hereafter “integrated missions”).
- United States Military Support. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes) authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with the Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. It provides a forum in which countries from North America and Europe can consult together on security issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them. The Alliance is committed to defending its member states against aggression or the threat of aggression and to the principle that an attack against one or several members would be considered as an attack against all. NATO remains an IGO in which each member country retains its sovereignty. All NATO decisions are taken jointly by the member countries on the basis of consensus. NATO’s most important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which brings together representatives of all the Allies at the level of ambassadors, ministers, or heads of state and government. NATO has no operational forces of its own other than those assigned to it by member countries or contributed by partner countries for the purpose of carrying out a specific mission. It has a number of mechanisms available to it for this purpose – the defense planning and resource planning processes that form the basis of cooperation within the Alliance, the implementation of political commitments to improved capabilities, and a military structure that combines the functions of a MNF planning organization with an Alliance-wide system of C2 of the military forces assigned to it.


C. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights; and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Working alone, alongside the US military, with other US agencies, or with multinational partners, NGOs are assisting in many of the world’s trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, development programs, human rights, and conflict resolution. The sheer number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency and international communities.

NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in both the domestic and international arenas. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military. They may have a long-term established presence in the crisis area. NGOs frequently work in areas where military forces conduct military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused organizations that range from primary relief and development providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations.

JP 3-08, appendix C provides a summary of selected NGOs.
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Military engagement, security cooperation, and stability missions, tasks, and actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests, deter conflict, and set conditions for future contingency operations. Use of joint capabilities in these and related activities such as security force assistance and foreign internal defense helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

**Stability operations** are various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the US in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

**Peace operations** are crisis response and limited contingency operations conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.

A **counterinsurgency campaign** is a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires military forces to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies and to be nation builders as well as warriors.

**Civil-military operations** are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.