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Afghanistan

Train, Advise & Assist
in a Culturally Sensitive Manner

The Lightning Press
Hansen and Wade



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(CGS1) Cultural Guide SMARTbook 1: Afghanistan

Train, Advise & Assist in a Culturally Sensitive Manner

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(CGS1: Afghanistan) Notes to Reader

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. These operations usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities as well as the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs in a complementary fashion. Ideally, security cooperation activities remedy the causes of crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention.

The social, economic, and political environments in which security cooperation activities are conducted requires a great degree of cultural understanding. Military support and operations that are intended to support a friendly HN require a firm understanding of the HN's cultural and political realities. History has shown that cultural awareness cannot be sufficiently developed after a crisis emerges, and must be a continuous, proactive element of theater intelligence and engagement strategies.

Cultural awareness has become an increasingly important competency for leaders at all levels. Perceptive leaders learn how cultures affect operations. Effective leaders adapt to new situations, realizing their words and actions may be interpreted differently in different cultures.

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Introduction: Train, Advise & Assist in a Culturally Sensitive Manner



(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Shane Hamann)


The American Experience with Stability

During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only eleven wars considered conventional. From the American Revolution through Operation Enduring Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests. Traditionally, the military prepared for these wars since these wars endangered America's way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most have been operations where the majority of effort consisted of stability tasks.

In the two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Army forces have led or participated in more than fifteen operations, intervening in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These operations revealed a disturbing trend throughout the world—the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty. The global implications of such destabilizing issues are staggering.

In the complex, dynamic operational environments of the 21st century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security exist. Sources of instability that push parties toward violence include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and the desire for power. These factors create belts of state fragility and instability that threaten U.S. national security. While journeying into this uncertain future, leaders increasingly call on operations to reduce drivers of conflict and instability and to support social and institutional resiliencies. Such resiliencies can counter instability by building local institutional capacity to forge sustainable peace, security, and economic growth. This environment requires the military to conduct missions, tasks, and activities across the range of military operations to establish conditions for long-term stability.

Stability Underlying Logic



Ref: ADP 3-07, *Stability*, fig. 1, p. iii.



Refer to *The Stability, Peace and Counterinsurgency SMARTbook (Nontraditional approaches in a Dynamic Security Environment)* for discussion of stability operations. Related topics include peace and counterinsurgency operations; civil-military operations; engagement, security cooperation, and security force assistance, multinational operations and IGO/NGO coordination.



(CGS1: Afghanistan) References

The following references were used in part to compile “(CGS1) Cultural Guide Smartbook 1: Afghanistan.” All military references used to compile SMARTbooks are in the public domain and are available to the general public through official public websites and designated as approved for public release with unlimited distribution. The SMARTbooks do not contain ITAR-controlled technical data, classified, or other sensitive material restricted from public release. SMARTbooks are reference books that address general military principles, fundamentals and concepts rather than technical data or equipment operating procedures.

Joint Publications (JPs)

JP 3-07	Sept 2011	Stability Operations
JP 3-24	Nov 2013	Counterinsurgency
JP 3-22	Jul 2010	Foreign Internal Defense
JP 3-57	Sept 2013	Civil-Military Operations

Army “Doctrine 2015” Publications (ADP/ADRP/ATTP)

ADP 3-07	Aug 2012	Stability
ATP 3-07.5	Aug 2012	Stability Techniques
FM 3-22	Jan 2013	Army Support to Security Cooperation
FM 3-24	May 2014	Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Publications

CALL 10-64	Sept 2010	Afghan Culture
CALL 11-16	Feb 2011	Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction Team
CALL 12-18	Sept 2012	Understanding Afghan Culture

Other Publications

FM 3-07.1	May 2009	Security Force Assistance (rescinded)
FM 3-07.31	Oct 2003	Peace Operations
GTA 21-03-022	Sept 2011	Culture Cards: Afghanistan & Islamic Culture
TRADOC	Jan 2011	Afghanistan Smart Book, 3rd Edition



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I. Understanding Culture

Ref: FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May '14), chap. 3.

Culture forms the basis of how people interpret, understand, and respond to events and people around them. Cultural understanding is critical because who a society considers to be legitimate will often be determined by culture and norms. Additionally, counterinsurgency operations will likely be conducted as part of a multinational effort, and understanding the culture of allies and partners is equally critical.

There are many definitions of culture in use by the United States (U.S.) military. As a starting point, this publication understands culture is a web of meaning shared by members of a particular society or group within a society.



(U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Christine Jones)

I. Understanding Culture

To be successful in interacting with the local population to gain information on the enemy, or to understand their requirements, military members must do more than learn a few basic facts or “do’s and do not’s.” They must understand the way that their actions can change the situation for the local population (both positively and negatively) and the resulting perceptions of the population towards those actions. To be successful, commanders and staffs consider four fundamental aspects of culture when planning and executing military operations:

- Culture influences how people view their world.
- Culture is holistic.
- Culture is learned and shared.
- Culture is created by people and can and does change.

See following pages for additional discussion.

Understanding Culture

Ref: FM 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (May '14), pp. 3-1 to 3-2.

To be successful in interacting with the local population to gain information on the enemy, or to understand their requirements, military members must do more than learn a few basic facts or “do’s and do not’s.” They must understand the way that their actions can change the situation for the local population (both positively and negatively) and the resulting perceptions of the population towards those actions. To be successful, commanders and staffs consider four fundamental aspects of culture when planning and executing military operations:

- Culture influences how people view their world.
- Culture is holistic.
- Culture is learned and shared.
- Culture is created by people and can and does change.

Culture Influences How People View Their World

The way that a culture influences how people view their world is referred to as their worldview. Many people believe they view their world accurately, in a logical, rational, unbiased way. However, people filter what they see and experience according to their beliefs and worldview. Information and experiences that do not match what they believe to be true about the world are frequently rejected or distorted to fit the way they believe the world should work. More than any other factor, culture informs and influences that worldview. In other words, culture influences perceptions, understandings, and interpretations of events. Soldiers and Marines need to know that U.S. interpretations of events are often quite different from the perceptions of these events by other people in an area of operations. If Soldiers and Marines assume that the local population will perceive actions the way that they do, they are likely to misjudge their reactions. The U.S. military refers to this pattern of assuming others see events in the same way the U.S. does as mirror imaging. Mirror imaging is dangerous because it leads Soldiers and Marines into thinking that their assumptions about a problem and its solution are shared by the population and multinational partners, rather than employing perspective taking, and looking at the problem from the population’s perspective.

Culture is Holistic

Holism is based on the principle that all socio-cultural aspects of human life are interconnected. While interacting with people in other cultures, Soldiers and Marines may be tempted to say their problems “are all about [fill in the blank: tribalism, corruption, lack of work ethic, and so on.]” Politics affects economics. Family structure affects job choices. Religion affects politics. Every aspect of culture affects every other aspect in some way, even if indirectly. By acknowledging these interconnections, military members can better assess how the local population might react to their presence and actions. For instance, when Soldiers and Marines are not thinking holistically, they may anticipate that closing down a local market will only have an impact on the local economy. However, after closing the market, it may be that the local reaction seems to be about religion or tribal concerns instead of economics. Even if Soldiers and Marines do not understand why, they should be aware that their actions will have unknown second and third order effects. By understanding that a marketplace is more than a place to exchange goods for money, and that economic conditions may affect tribal power, the status of religious leaders, and other social conditions, Soldiers and Marines can see a culture holistically. A holistic perspective helps military members understand the complex interconnectedness of a culture and avoid being surprised by local reactions to military decisions.



(U.S. Army photo by SPC Harold Fields)

Culture is Learned and Shared

Children learn the appropriate way to act in a culture by observing other people; by being taught accepted values and ways of thinking about the world from their parents, teachers and others; and by practicing (sharing) what they have learned on a daily basis. This process of learning a new culture is called socialization. Culture can be learned at any age. Marines and Soldiers, for example, learn military culture by going through basic training or officer training in their late teens or early twenties. In fact, these initial training schools recognize their important role in socializing young men and women into core Marine and Army values. Understanding that culture is learned and shared can offer an important operational and tactical opportunity. Any Marine or Soldier can learn about the culture of the population simply by interacting with the local people. One of the more successful adaptations of the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan occurred when service members realized they could learn a lot about the local culture quickly by talking to and observing their interpreters. Their enhanced understanding of the cultures of their areas of operations enabled them to better negotiate with leaders, to conduct operations that would be successful, and in a number of cases (such as the al Anbar Awakening), to gain the support and assistance of the population in fighting an insurgency.

Culture is Created by People and Can Change

One of the keys to success (and failure) in dealing with a population in a counterinsurgency operation is understanding that cultures are not static; they can and do change, often rapidly. During times of conflict, the usual methods for getting through the day may stop working for the local population, and they may try adopting new ideas or start highlighting traditional ways of doing things. Alternatively, they may switch rapidly among a range of possible behaviors. These changes can occur because of a number of factors were at play, but probably the greatest cause of this during conflict is a rapid decline in security. As security declines, the threat of attack, rape, and murder forces many changes in society. The rapid decline in the status and opportunities for women in these countries, therefore, was not merely due to centuries-old tribal beliefs, but to very real and pragmatic economic and social changes over time. As the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan illustrate, cultural practices and attitudes are frequently influenced by changes in very real physical conditions. Since the arrival of a large military, often accompanied by the destruction of physical property and the erosion of the local economy and security, is undoubtedly an enormous change for the local population, counterinsurgency planners need to recognize and plan for the impact that their operations will have upon the people and cultures in an area of operations.

II. Afghan Cultural Influences

Ref: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 10-64 (Sep '10), Afghan Culture Observations, Insights, and Lessons), chap. 4

"The Afghans are such impressive, devout, generous, and energetic people. They have an acute sense of humor in the face of relentless misery and adversity. They are superb, courageous soldiers and energetic, creative businessmen. They have deep respect for learning and teachers—and a thirst and gratitude for education and knowledge even at the most elemental level. They are intensely focused as students at any age and quick to learn and adapt."

—General Barry R. McCaffrey, U.S. Army (Retired), After Action Report, Visit to Kuwait and Afghanistan, 10-18 November 2009



(DoD photo by Staff Sgt. Brian Ferguson, U.S. Air Force)

Culture defines a society, and even the sub-elements within a society. It is also a means to compare and evaluate societies and sub-societies, to determine how and why they act as they do. Such information can enable reasonably accurate predictions as to how people might react or affect situations over which they may or may not have control or influence. As in all such societies, culture is influenced by many different variables such as language, religion, tribe, geography, economics, gender, government, and education. For this newsletter, the Afghan culture variables are addressed in the following three broad categories:

- Ethnicity
- Economics
- Government

to provide adequately under their standards for their families. They also, as do the female Afghans, believe Inshallah-God willing-when they describe their situation, be it economic, health, or other aspects of their lives or environment. Essentially they accept things as they are and do not expect much beyond what they have.

It is not uncommon to see Afghan men holding hands. While that does not in and of itself identify them as homosexuals, male homosexual activity, to varying degrees by tribe, is a fact of life among Afghans. Most U.S. Soldiers will not see these practices during their deployment. If they do, it is imperative that they are trained on how to handle themselves.

A training scenario available on the CALL website addresses homosexual relationships: "Homosexuality is present and accepted as a norm, but not recognized as an exclusive lifestyle choice. Some males of sexual age engage in sexual activities with each other, but still marry and father children. Physical advances and postures that might be considered affectionate in Western cultures, such as hugging very tightly, holding hands, cuddling, flirting looks, are still considered as such in this culture and are signs of coupling activities. There exist hand and arm signals that advertise and invite homosexual encounters. Music and dancing in male groups almost always leads to coupling and sometimes group sex."

Afghan Women

Afghan women and girls are not free like American women and girls. In Afghanistan, women cannot drive cars, ride bicycles and horses, participate in sports and other social activities, and travel and shop without being accompanied by a male family member. While some Afghan women and girls may work outside their homes, attend school, and have greater freedom of dress and contacts with men other than family members, based on their tribal group's beliefs and/or practices, you will not see them enjoying the freedoms and doing other things American women and girls routinely do.



(US Consulate Herat)

Life for most Afghan women is extremely hard. Their life expectancy is 44.39 years as compared to Afghans males, which is 44.04 years. Their freedom of movement is severely restricted. While some may be seen in public during the day, it is extremely rare to see them in public at night, even with a male family member. In many cases,

III. The Taliban (Know the Insurgents)

Ref: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 10-64 (Sep '10), Afghan Culture Observations, Insights, and Lessons), chap. 4

In Afghanistan, the Taliban are the insurgents and are predominately Pashtun. However, they have a distinct culture that sets them apart from their Pashtun cousins. U.S. Soldiers, whether they engage in lethal or nonlethal counterinsurgency (COIN) operations against the Taliban, should be aware of the Taliban's culture and history as they devise means to defeat them. This is in addition to knowing the culture of the non-Taliban Afghans. Actions to defeat the Taliban that do not take their culture into consideration, and how it relates to the local non-Taliban Afghans, could unintentionally bring those Afghans to support the Taliban. Therefore, U.S. Soldiers in the Afghan COIN environment must know the insurgents.




(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Nicolas Morales)

In 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew its military forces from Afghanistan after its failed attempts to defeat the mujahedin who were opposed to its oppressive efforts to maintain the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. For the next five years, rival Afghan mujahedin warlords battled each other, either individually or in alliances, for regional/ethnic control of additional territory or the Afghan government which remained from the Soviet era. While Soviet attacks had been directed against the mujahedin in the rural areas, with millions of Afghans either killed or driven to exile in Pakistan, Iran, and other countries, the post-Soviet fighting brought the destructive conflict into the urban areas where the pro-Soviet central government remained in control.

Train, Advise & Assist

Ref: ADRP 3-07, *Stability* (Sept '12), chap. 3 and adaptations from FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (May '09, rescinded), chap. 1-3.

A complex relationship exists among security cooperation, security assistance, and the military instrument of foreign internal defense. The left side of the illustration below depicts this relationship, including how aspects of foreign internal defense and security assistance overlap. The right side illustrates how foreign internal defense focuses on internal threats to a host nation and how security assistance focuses on external threats. The column depicts how security (military, intelligence, and civilian), economic, and governance are considerations common to both foreign internal defense and security assistance. Security Force Assistance supports the military instrument of foreign internal defense, much of security assistance efforts, and some security cooperation efforts.



Ref: FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, fig. 1-3, p. 1-7.

I. Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation—usually coordinated by the U.S. military's security cooperation organization in a country—includes all Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense and security establishments. These interactions include all DOD-administered security assistance programs that build defense and security relationships promoting specific U.S.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Ref: JP 3-22, *Foreign Internal Defense* (Jul 2010), chap. 1.

Military engagement, security cooperation (SC), and deterrence encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power supports other instruments of national power to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict.



Figure I-3. Foreign Internal Defense: Integrated Security Cooperation Activities

Nation Assistance (NA)

Within this range of military operations, nation assistance (NA) is civil or military assistance (other than foreign humanitarian assistance [FHA]) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between the United States and that nation.

NA operations support the host nation (HN) by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

NA programs include security assistance (SA), humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), and foreign internal defense (FID).

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

FID is the participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization, to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. Internal threats in the context of this publication means threats manifested within the internationally recognized boundaries of a nation. These threats can come from, but are not limited to, subversion, insurgency (including support to insurgency), and/or criminal activities.

The focus of US FID efforts is to support the HN's internal defense and development (IDAD). IDAD is the full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security. It focuses on building viable institutions that respond to the needs of society. It is important to understand that both FID and IDAD, although defined terms and used throughout this publication, are not terms used universally outside the Department of Defense (DOD). Other terms could be used to encompass what are called FID and IDAD herein.

Military engagement during FID supports the other instruments of national power through a variety of activities across the range of military operations. In some cases, direct military support may be necessary in order to provide the secure environment for IDAD efforts to become effective. However, absent direction from the President or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), US forces engaged in NA are prohibited from engaging in combat operations, except in self-defense.

From the US perspective, FID refers to the US activities that support an HN IDAD strategy designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their security, consistent with US national security objectives and policies

Relationship of Foreign Internal Defense to Internal Defense and Development (IDAD)

It is important to frame the US FID effort within the context of the US doctrine it supports and to understand how it fits into the HN IDAD program. NA supports the HN by promoting sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The US goal is to promote long-term regional stability.

US military support to FID should focus on assisting an HN in anticipating, precluding, and countering threats or potential threats and addressing the root causes of instability. Emphasis on internal developmental programs as well as internal defense programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to US FID activities is essential.

US military involvement in FID has traditionally been focused toward counterinsurgency (COIN). Although much of the FID effort remains focused on this important area, US activities may aim at other threats to an HN's internal stability, such as civil disorder, illicit drug trafficking, and terrorism. These threats may, in fact, predominate in the future as traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal drug trafficking continue. Focusing on the internal development portion of IDAD expands the focus beyond COIN.

US military operations supporting FID provide training, materiel, advice, or assistance to local forces executing an IDAD program, rather than US forces conducting IDAD military missions for the HN. Military operations are, at least to some degree, intertwined with foreign assistance provided by non-DOD agencies in the form of development assistance, humanitarian assistance, or SA described in legislation such as the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA).

V. The Advisor

Ref: FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance* (May '09), pp. 7-1 to 7-3.

The military advisor has three roles involving different responsibilities. First and foremost, advisors are members of a U.S. military organization with a well-defined chain of command and familiar responsibilities. Second, advisors embed themselves with their counterparts. Third, advisors are interpreters and communicators between U.S. forces and their foreign counterparts.

As members of military organizations, advisors receive and execute the orders of superiors. These orders may conflict with the orders their counterparts receive. Among other duties, advisors must act unobtrusively, but nonetheless positively, as inspector general—often observing, evaluating, and reporting on the performance of counterparts and their assigned unit.

Secondly, advisors live, eat, and work with the officers and men of their host units. Often, advisors soon regard themselves as one of them. The sharing of common hardships and dangers forges potent emotional ties. The success and good name of their units become matters of prime and personal importance to the advisor.

Finally, advisors are interpreters and communicators between U.S. superiors and foreign counterparts. Advisors must introduce and explain one to the other; they help resolve the myriad of problems, misunderstandings, and suspicions which arise in any human organization, particularly when people of starkly different cultures approach difficult tasks together.

To be effective, advisors obviously must gain their counterparts' trust and confidence. This relationship, however, is only a prelude to the advisor's major objective: inspiring and influencing a counterpart to effective action. In pursuing this goal—constantly, relentlessly, and forcefully, yet patiently, persuasively, and diplomatically—advisors must recognize conditions which can benefit or handicap their cause.

Considerations of the Advisor

An advisor follows ten considerations when serving with FSF:

- **By, with, and through.** All planned operations of a combat advisory mission must be conducted by, with, and through the FSF.
- **Empathy leads to competency.** Empathy can be defined as identification with and understanding of another's situation, feelings, and motives.
- **Success is built on personal relationships.** Mutual respect, trust, and understanding create success. Both parties rely on each other for mission accomplishment and often for survival.
- **Advisors are between U.S. and Foreign Security Forces.** Advisors are often alone, navigating between two military systems and two cultures, never quite fitting in with either one.
- **Advisors will never win, nor should they.** The advisor attaining a tactical objective does not achieve success; success is achieved by the foreign security force achieving the objective.
- **Advisors are not commanders.** Advisors provide advice, training, and access to coalition resources to FSF.
- **Advisors are honest brokers.** They transparently assess capabilities and reveal limitations of foreign units to the FSF's and advisors' higher command.
- **Advisors live with shades of gray.** Caught between two cultures, systems, and narratives, the advisor works within a gray area.
- **Talent is everything, but advisors must understand rank.** Military forces around the world approach rank and prestige in completely different ways.
- **Make do.** Advisors will never have everything they believe they need to succeed.

Chap 2

I. Working with Host-Nation Forces

Ref: FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (May '14), chap. 11, pp. 11-1 to 11-10.

To enable a host-nation security force to conduct counterinsurgency operations, United States (U.S.) or multinational forces conduct various security cooperation activities. Commanders often view host-nation security force development as an essential task and one of their primary lines of effort. The resulting increase in a host nation's ability to secure its own population yields significant benefits because host-nation troops are normally more effective in conducting operations among the local population than U.S. or multinational forces. Transitioning responsibility for operations to the host-nation security force reduces the visible presence of U.S. or multinational troops, further enhancing the legitimacy of the host-nation government.

Train, Advise
& Assist



(U.S. Army photo)

U.S. or multinational efforts to develop the capability and capacity of a host-nation security force must focus on operational and developmental needs of host-nation counterparts. Developing a sound plan to develop a host nation's capability to address the root causes of the insurgency requires a deliberate, comprehensive assessment of that host nation's security force. The set of metrics that the U.S. or multinational forces selects to assess a host-nation security force must be appropriate for the type of security force being assessed. For example, assessment of a host-nation army may require a completely different set of criteria from those used to assess a host-nation police force. Likewise, a host nation's border or customs police, local (city or county) police, and provincial, state, or national police must

II. Developing HN Security Forces

Ref: FM 3-24 (MCWP 3-33.5), *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (May '14), chap. 11, pp. 11-10 to 11-14.

Both foreign internal defense and security force assistance can be used as part of a long term plan to develop and deploy a host-nation force to defeat an insurgency. While the U.S. may intervene in a country that only needs enablers to enhance an already effective military force, a host nation may lack an effective military.

Train, Advise & Assist

I. Phases in Development of HN Forces

If the host nation lacks an effective military, aid in the development of that host-nation military could follow five phases: planning and resourcing host-nation security force, generation of host-nation security force, employment of host-nation security force, transition of responsibility for security to host-nation security force, and sustainment of host-nation security force. These phases are distinct and independent of those in the joint phasing model. U.S. or multinational forces conduct parallel planning with their host-nation security force counterparts to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical objectives in support of the overall counterinsurgency campaign, while at the same time working toward milestones that lead to a successful transition from U.S. or multinational lead to host-nation security force lead for security.




Figure 11-4. Phases of building a host-nation security force

Phase I

Typically, the first phase of building a host-nation security force, planning and re-sourcing, falls to the responsibility of geographic combatant command-level planners in coordination with the country team. Coordination of legal authorities and funding for security force assistance and foreign internal defense activities is an interagency process because it typically involves resources provided under a number of different sections of the United States Code (USC). Moreover, other security cooperation programs, such as foreign military sales, may be essential in equipping another military to perform foreign internal defense operations.

Phase II

Generating the host-nation security force is the second phase in building a host-nation security force. If the U.S. is deploying conventional forces, this will probably be the initial phase in which regiments or brigade combat teams will actually have an active role. These forces can partner with host-nation security forces of varying developmental levels in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. For example, while supporting recent counterinsurgency operations in Colombia and the Philippines, host-nation security force counterparts had already fielded relatively sophisticated, well-developed operational units supported by robust supporting institutions and well established executive-level or ministerial leadership. In other U.S. historical counterinsurgency operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq, the host-nation security force operational units, their supporting institutions, and the most senior-level executive leadership functions were undeveloped or completely non-existent. In situations such as these, U.S. and multinational forces must organize, train, and equip host-nation security force units while assisting in the building or rebuilding of their supporting infrastructure. The organize, train, and equip security force assistance tasks may be assigned to U.S. or multinational regiment- or brigade-sized units while they are simultaneously battling the insurgents. At the same time, unified action must be taken to establish a host-nation security force's own sustainable force generation capabilities and capacity. U.S. or multinational personnel, working with their host-nation security force counterparts, are placed in a difficult predicament in that they must carefully select key host-nation security force leaders to be pulled away from the immediate counterinsurgency fight to assume critical command and staff positions within the host-nation security force's organizations. Counterinsurgents must exercise restraint by not assigning all of the best host-nation security force leaders to operating force units while neglecting to invest in their own force generation capacity.

Phase III

The third phase of building a host-nation security force is the employment of a host-nation security force to protect the population and defeat the insurgents. During this phase, the primary focus shifts from organizing, training, equipping, and rebuilding host-nation security forces to employing host-nation security forces to perform the security tasks for which they were designed. As one host-nation security force unit enters the employment phase, other units may have just begun the force generation process. Meanwhile, there may be more seasoned host-nation security force units that are ready to transition to the lead for security operations in their assigned area of operations. Additionally, it may be possible to generate host-nation police forces more quickly than army units, since they can be employed individually or in small station-level units, they do not need to conduct large-scale collective training exercises, and they typically have fewer materiel requirements. However, it may take considerably longer for police forces to show their effectiveness during the employment phase due to the length of time it takes for police forces to gain the trust of the local population and build productive, enduring relationships with local or tribal leaders.

Phase IV

The fourth phase of building a host-nation security force in a counterinsurgency is the transition of responsibility for security operations from the U.S. or multinational forces to a host-nation security force. In some instances, such as in Colombia or the Philippines, a host-nation security force may already be mature and highly capable in most or all operational realms (land, air, and maritime). Security force assistance activities and the resulting transition to a host-nation security force lead may refer only to specific functions such as intelligence or an even more discreet set of tactical tasks, such as employment of remote sensors, that supports the host nation's strategic or operational counterinsurgency goals. In these instances, the U.S. may provide operational capabilities to meet the immediate threat, while conducting security force

Setting Up and Conducting Meetings

Ref: FM 3-07.31, *Peace Operations* (Oct '03), app. A.

Meetings are Negotiations

Successful outcomes of meetings are a function of a conceptual framework of negotiations combined with solid preparation and meeting management techniques. Always plan and use preparation time before a meeting, just as the military uses as the axiom of publishing an order so two-thirds of the time available before its execution is available to its subordinate units to prepare for its execution.

Meetings can range from informal one-on-ones to large group gatherings.

- Meetings such as with the various international organizations and military units that are working in the area to harmonize their efforts.
- Local NGO representatives desiring to voice their concerns to the commander regarding the nature of military operations in the area and to resolve conflicting priorities.
- The company or battalion commander meets with the local mayor or faction military leader in a bilateral meeting to discuss topics of mutual concern.
- The mission needs to coordinate with local leaders or facility managers to facilitate access to areas, structures, people, etc., in support of a detailed assessment or survey.
- The ranking military officer in the theater, region, or local area introduces himself to prominent political leaders and discusses issues of significance to all parties.
- A serious incident occurred in which coalition or US forces are implicated and military investigators must work with local authorities to investigate the incident.
- Joint committees are often established in the peace agreement to assist in its implementation.

Meeting Management Techniques

Meeting Worksheets

- For each issue that may be discussed in the meeting, prepare a meeting worksheet. This forces the organizer to explicitly think about the participants' likely positions on the issue as well as the underlying concerns and values that are behind those positions. These concerns and values - called interests - are the raw material to fashion agreements and are a much better guide to reaching agreement than stated positions on what a party wants on a particular issue. Forces may need to link issues to reach good agreements.
- Equally important is the desired outcome of meeting. The desired outcome for example may be achieving a certain agreement or establishing rapport with the other party, to convey specific information, or learn certain information. Clarity on your desired outcome makes for more effective meetings, even if that outcome is not achieved.
- Finally, the worksheet helps the meeting facilitator think explicitly about conveying a certain demeanor on the particular issue (i.e., firmness and leadership, or open and receptive)

Rehearsals

- When significant interests are at stake, conduct a full dress rehearsal, using colleagues and staff to play other parties in a scrimmage of the meeting. Rehearsing the logic and reasoning while others respond, as the real parties will, will sharpen

V. Linguist Support & Interpreters

Ref: FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Dec '06), app. C and FM 3-07.31, Peace Operations (Oct '03), app. C.

U.S. forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in foreign nations require linguist support. Military intelligence units assigned to brigade and higher-level commands have organic interpreters (linguists) to perform human intelligence and signals intelligence functions. However, the need for interpreters usually exceeds organic capabilities, and commanders should obtain external interpreter support early.

Train, Advise & Assist

Linguist Support Categories

When possible, interpreters should be U.S. military personnel or category II or III linguists. Unit intelligence officers should maintain language rosters at home station to track assigned personnel with linguistic capabilities before deployment. When requirements exceed organic capabilities, unit commanders can hire host-nation (HN) personnel to support their operations. Contracted linguists can provide interpreter support and perform intelligence functions. They fall into three categories.

Category I

Category I linguists usually are hired locally and require vetting. They do not have a security clearance. They are the most abundant resource pool; however, their skill level is limited. Category I linguists should be used for basic interpretation for activities such as patrols, base entrance coverage, open-source intelligence collection, and civil-military operations. Commanders should plan for 30 to 40 linguists from category I for an infantry battalion. Brigade headquarters should maintain roughly 15 category I linguists for surge operations.

Category II

Category II linguists are U.S. citizens with a secret clearance. Often they possess good oral and written communication skills. They should be managed carefully due to limited availability. Category II linguists interpret for battalion and higher level commanders or tactical human intelligence teams. Brigade commanders should plan for 10 to 15 linguists from category II. That breaks down to one linguist for the brigade commander, one for each infantry battalion commander, and approximately 10 linguists for the supporting military intelligence company. Of those 10, three translate for each tactical human intelligence team or operations management team, and two translate for each signals intelligence collection platform.

Category III

Category III linguists are U.S. citizens with a top secret clearance. They are a scarce commodity and often retained at division and higher levels of command. They have excellent oral and written communications skills.

Some private companies provide linguist support through contracts. The required statement of work or contract should define the linguist's requirements and the unit's responsibilities. Contracted category II and III linguists should provide their own equipment, such as flak vests, Kevlar, and uniforms. (Category I linguists normally do not.) The unit designates a linguist manager to identify language requirements and manage assets. Site managers for the contractor are located at the division level to manage personnel issues such as leave, vacation, pay, and equipment.

Chap 3

Life in Afghanistan (A Practical View)

Editor's note: The following chapter, Life in Afghanistan, is provided by author Dag Hansen based on his experiences of living in Afghanistan for ten years.

The analogy of getting bigger muscles sets the scene for the difficult task at hand: The difficult job of being effective in a cross cultural setting. It is hard, and we often feel weak both in our understanding and in our attitudes. By “weak” I mean that we could be much more effective and make things happen in ways that are more familiar to the Afghan culture and understanding. This demands insight. Being culturally relevant will help our work be sustainable and the Afghans attain true ownership in our projects. This requires that we are rooted in the Afghan's thinking, values and culture. Of course, we often need to add some western thinking, but only in small amounts.



(U.S. Army photo)

A lot of our work has shown to be lacking cultural adaptation, leading to loss of motivation from the Afghans and ineffective projects. We have lacked an understanding of the underlying cultural causes of the challenges or problems we have faced. This is why some of our policies, plans, interventions and implementations have failed to reach the intended goals.

My hope is that this book will equip and inspire you to rebuild Afghanistan, do business in Afghanistan, train the Afghan police and/or mentor the Afghan army in a culturally, sustainable way. The chapters ahead will assist you in doing this with precision through proverbs, humor and culturally relevant behavior. To be culturally relevant has become increasingly important since we are now handing over equipment worth millions of dollars, selecting leaders to succeed us and investing in long term business or development projects.

About Dag Hansen

Dag Ottar Leithe Hansen is Norwegian and lived in Afghanistan for ten years during the period of 1995-96 and 2001-08. He married a South African, Helen, in 2003, whom he met in Kabul. They lived in Afghanistan, with their two small children. Together they gained valuable insight into Afghan society and family life.

Helen Hansen is an Occupational Therapist and has a Masters in Mental Health. Her experience is in Community Based Rehabilitation programs in Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar and Bamian. She has deep insight in how Afghan women perceive life and how they manage their daily challenges. She has rehabilitated disabled and trained other health-workers to do so. Her humble spirit, genuine servant-hood and professional expertise has gained her much trust which has led to vulnerable people being empowered. Since she is cultural sensitive and fluent in Dari she has managed to gain the respect of both men and women.



Dag with the police in Mazar

Dag experienced first-hand, the drastic changes that occurred in Afghanistan, through the last three major conflicts: The Civil War, The Taliban Reign and the war involving the NATO/US coalition forces. In addition to his engineering studies, Dag has a post-graduate degree in Cross-Cultural Communication, and a Masters in Pedagogical studies, which focuses on Democratic Leadership and Intercultural Competence. During his time in Afghanistan, Dag used his engineering skills by working as a leader for several Food-for-Work Programs. Later he served in other parts of the country in varying capacities: University teacher in Bamian Province, Logistics Officer in Nooristan/ Laghman Province, District Coordinator in Cha 'Ab Province and Educational director in the city of Mazar e-Sharif. He has held contracts with many different international NGOs.

Since 2009 Dag has conducted over 50 seminars on Afghan culture. The theme has been on how to understand the Afghan culture in such a way that you may mentor, assist and help in cultural sustainable ways.

3-4 (Afghan Life) Introduction

Chap 3

II. Afghan Greetings

For Afghans it is vital to always greet each other with a “salam” which means God’s peace. Other versions you might hear is “salamolekum” or “walekoma-salam”. The meaning is the same, just some grammatically differences where you say: God’s peace to you or God’s peace to you too.



(U.S. Army photo)

The greeting “salam” or “salamolekom” is used every time you meet Afghan friends and colleagues. Even if you speak English to them, you can use this Arabic, Islamic greeting. What does God’s peace really mean? It means all things that are good. It does not only consider an absence of war, it includes good health, good relationships, money, food, children, success in your job etc. It is quite a downer to meet a foreigner who just says: Hi!

To greet someone properly means that “I see you”. The person is not invisible or insignificant. “I see you and greet you in a way you understand and appreciate.” That is a considerate, unselfish thing to do. Everybody appreciates this and will be more receptive to the next thing that you have to say.

Remember we are not considered Muslims if we use these greetings, we are just considered normal, polite, decent people. It is a simple, common courtesy.

To say "Salam" is a sign of true religion (or of a godly person).

Afghan proverb. *salAm, salAmati imAn as.*

To greet each other with Gods peace is God's law.

Afghan proverb. *salAm, hekmat e khudA as.*

When Afghans meet, they will not only use salAm but greet each other like this:

"SalAmolekom, chetor asti, khob asti, bakhair asti, qawi asti, tAsa asti, sehat etAn khob as, jAn etAn khob as, fAmil khob as? Zinda bAshen! Khush bAshen!"

Translated it will sound something like this:

"God's peace to you! How are you? Are you doing well? Are you okay? Are you strong? Are you fresh? Is your health good? Is your body good? Is your family okay? May you be filled with life and joy!"

This is an overwhelming and generous greeting that often surprises us. Enjoy it and respond as well as you can. Try to, week by week, to extend your own greeting vocabulary by learning some more of these phrases. In the beginning it is enough to just say: "Salam!"

You do not have to know Dari or speak it well in order to use daily, well-known phrases. These phrases are used to give quick, meaningful responses without using a translator.

(It should be noted that you do not respond to this greeting by answering the questions asked, but simply by repeating the same questions to the one who you are greeting).

Remember this row of greetings is also used when they call each other on the phone. The greeting may sometimes be longer than the actual conversation...

III. Decoding Afghan Culture

Why all these greetings, hugs and kisses? Why can't I just do my job the way I have always done it? Take a look at this overview:

The West	Afghanistan
Nuclear family, Individual, Friends	Extended family, Clan, Tribe, People Group
Organizations	Relationships
Justice	Power
Rules	Negotiations
Direct Communication	Indirect Communication
Right & Wrong	Shame & Honor
Realistic	YES culture

This is a rough categorization or generalization of the differences between The West and Afghanistan. Some may protest, saying that this puts people into cultural-boxes where they do not belong. I understand this, while at the same time this chart has been confirmed at my courses by people from; Bosnia, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Egypt and a number of African countries. They maintain that it has helped them understand the western way of thinking as much as it has helped westerners understand them.

The chart gives an overview of how Afghans personally view themselves and their role in society. Some Afghans might recognize a few points on the right side, while they feel they belong on the left side, for others. This chart introduces us to aspects in culture, which help us to see similarities and differences.

I. Organizations vs. Relationships

Some might say:

"Why is it so important to affirm others when you see them, and appreciate their presence? Why all this Salam?"

Answer: It demonstrates that people and relationships are important.

"Okay, but why are relationships so important? Why is it even more important than getting the job done sometimes?" Because: "Afghans are loyal to people, not organizations", an Afghan told me.

Who do you go to if you are in need of a job, are being hassled, crash your car or become sick? It depends which country you come from, but many of you have a government unemployment office, a trusted police force, an insurance company and health insurance. None of this is available in Afghanistan. Either it is non-existent, or it is not trusted. Instead Afghans stay loyal to their families or continually build relationships which might be of use to them one day.

An Afghan will call an uncle, a cousin or a friend of his dad if he needs a job. He will call upon the favor of a big, strong and influential uncle if he is in trouble. He will get a loan for a new car from a friend when he crashes it. He will make use of his extended relationship network, which is the foundation of his welfare. In short: No organizations can help him - only relationships!

Afghans have a proverb which is also well known in the Middle East. It talks about the importance of maintaining good relationships:

Two mountains will not meet, but two people will.

Afghan proverb. *Ko ba ko na-merasa, hensAn ba hensAn merasa.*

Meaning: Two people might meet in the future. Treat everyone you meet with respect because you never know where or when you might see him again. The person might be in an important position in the future. Today you imagine yourself to be as far away from the other person as the mountains. Ancient wisdom disagrees. Be reconciled today because you might need each other in 3 weeks or 30 years. Who knows?

Use: A reminder for yourself and others on your team. Always treat people with respect. Use it to urge someone to be reconciled. You might think you and your Afghan colleagues have rights and will be shown justice, but soon you will find out that it is more important who you know than what you know. This does not fit into our rational way of thinking. Often we argue rationally forgetting how we recently offended this person.

In spring of 2008 a colleague of mine, in Kabul, called me one afternoon. He had had an accident. He had crashed his small tiny Toyota into a big black Land Cruiser. I cycled across town on my well-used Chinese bicycle to assist him. The other driver involved called a friend who arrived on a motorcycle wearing a handgun around his waist and a Kalashnikov slung across his back. He was a bodyguard for a government official. A powerful man with influence. When the police officer arrived, he was not too keen on figuring out the actual cause of events. I sensed he was evaluating who he wanted to be friends with, or whom he did NOT want to upset. Needless to say, I changed strategy from explaining fault to

are hosting many Afghan guests, let your Afghan colleague do the seating, do not even try to get it right...

V. Titles for Men and Women

Something which is closely connected to hierarchal settings is how Afghans use titles when they talk to or about each other. Commonly, they do not use names alone without a title or say: "Hi you there...yes you with the black beard". This is very rude. Instead Afghans use titles for strangers and titles for people they know well. Let's organize them in a chart and then explain how these titles are used:

Titles for Men	Titles for Women
sahib = Sir (formal, respectable man)	khAia = Aunt (formal)
kAkA = uncle (informal, ordinary man)	khAnum = Mrs (married)
bjAdar = brother (young man)	mAdar = mother (old woman)
bacha = boy, son, child (small boy)	Amshira = sister (unmarried)
sahib = Sir (formal, respectable man)	dokhtar = girl, daughter(little girl)
kAkA = uncle (informal, ordinary man)	khAia = Aunt (formal)
	khAnum = Mrs (married)

A. sahib

The meaning is "Sir". This title is used to address respectful men. It is a formal title. This title I commonly use. I use it when I address an elder or any other leader in an important position. I also use it in any other setting where I meet men that are older than me, be it a shopkeeper, a businessman, a principal, an officer, a policeman or a public servant. There are situations where you clearly know the person's occupation. In that case you might add the job title: Doctor Sahib, Engineer Sahib, Mualem (teacher) Sahib, Mullah Sahib.

You use this title to: Get their attention, acknowledge what they say, ask for someone or during greetings.

Mix the titles into a English sentence: Eg. Sorry, Sahib, could I have your attention. Very good engineer sahib! Where is engineer sahib? How are you doctor sahib? In Dari: Salam sahib. (Hi sir) Tashakor sahib (thank you sir). You will quickly be able to use these phrases without too much effort. It is so much more effective to add the titles to your few words of Dari.

Remember that the title is as important as their name. They are addressed like this by everyone else, even if they are not present. They would say: Mullah Sahib was here yesterday.

smart, because he knew it would be shameful if the staircase broke during such a “jumping test”. His aim was obviously to make the carpenter too afraid to do a bad job. So, he got what he wanted: Strong staircases, but a very bad relationship with the Afghan man:

A relationship based on mistrust and fear and not mutual respect. I am 100% sure that the staircases would have been just as strong if he was able to gain the respect from the Afghan carpenter.

An indirect way to address something illegal could be to use a proverb:

A tilted load will not reach its goal.

Afghan proverb. *bAr-e-kadj ba manzel na-merasa.*

Meaning: You have to plan and do your work well both practically and morally. Dishonest work will not last in the long run.



(Dag Hansen)

IV. Afghan Food

How do you eat a banana in Afghanistan? In western cultures, we often hold the banana in our hand, peel it and take a bite. Then we munch on this delicious fruit. We do the same with an apple. We bite of a piece, chew and enjoy it.

Afghans do it in a much more “civilized” or “proper” way, if you like... They peel the banana slightly; hold it in their left hand, and break of a little piece with their right hand. Then they eat this small piece. As for the apple, they use a knife and cut off small delicate pieces which they enjoy bit by bit, elegantly.

A warm fire is better than a good meal of rice.

Afghan proverb. *alao alao be az palao.*

Meaning: Friendliness and kindness is more important than the food.

Use: When you have not eaten in a long time and you are waiting for the food, which is soon coming, it is a humorous remark when the host is excusing the delay.



The most frequently eaten dis is “Qabuli palao”. (Rice, raisins, carrots. May contain meat and almonds).

When you eat in Afghanistan you either sit or you stand still. You will never see an Afghan walking around the street or in a courtyard whilst nibbling on bread or a banana. Not even an ice cream. Even when they buy mango, oranges, hot potato chips, or other snacks from the street vendors they will not walk. Instead, they will stand and chat with the others who are taking a break and grabbing a bite.

Hot tip! In the winter cold there are many trollies selling hot chicken soup. On your way to your office, stop the car, fill up your thermo mug and get warmed up. Delicious!

Restaurants are often called hotels because villagers who have done their monthly shopping in the city may sleep over after their evening meal, before they travel the long way home again the next day. Unless they rent a room at the second floor, they only pay for the food. The hotel serves several dishes: Grilled beef pieces on a skewer with fresh bread (kebab), cooked cow meat with rice, carrots, raisins, spices and sometimes almonds (qabuli palao), fried chicken, wok fried sheep meat (goshfand qarai...my favorite), meatballs (kofta), meat wrapped in dough sprinkled with yogurt (mantu, my next favorite) and sheep meat with onion (du pjAza).

All these dishes taste delicious and soon you too will know which of them are your favorites. If you are concerned about hygiene or whether the food is contaminated or not - choose kebab, palao or qarai. The kebab is grilled meat on a skewer and the qarai is sheep meat fried in a wok ...all the bacteria are dead!!! The palao is also safe because 90% of the customers chose that, so it is always freshly made. They'll make several pots a day and eat it all up before sundown. The other dishes might have been stored in a lukewarm room for a while. I have never gotten sick from eating any of these dishes. For months at a time I have eaten my daily meal in the bazar. The only times I have gotten ill has been when I have eaten fresh vegetables which obviously have been "cleaned" in contaminated water from the ditch. So, stay away from "fresh looking" salads!

At the entrance of a restaurant there will always be a sink to wash your hands. Wash also your face if you have been traveling and are dusty. At local homes they will instead come around with a bowl for washing your hands. A little boy will carry it. He will also give you soap and a towel. Please, do not do like a friend of mine did. He said: "Wonderful, thank you my boy", and stretched out his legs, thinking his dirty feet would now be cleaned. Very embarrassing...

You must remove your shoes when you enter a carpeted home, hotel or shop. That is local custom. But, they will consider it more important to have a customer into their shop then not getting the carpet dirty. So, if you are wearing boots with laces, you may enter the shop if the shopkeeper insists. Be sensitive and do this only on an invitation. In a home or a hotel where you sit cross-legged on a platform or in a room, always remove your dirty shoes.

II. At the “Table”

Afghans always serve amazingly good food. It is the highlight of the day for most people. Here they catch up, share news and have a good time. It is not expected that you eat up all your food, just that you eat some food. When you are full you say: Thank you, it was delicious! Then you push the plate to the center of the table. Soon the leftovers will either be distributed among the others guests or disappear into the neighboring room where women and children are waiting for their turn. Most often you will get your own plate and a spoon. If you are not accustomed to eat with your hands, you may certainly ask for a spoon. If you are to share a plate with other people, you just keep eating from your side of the plate. In this way you never have to eat food that the others have dropped. This is also what Afghans do. I guess that you already know that they eat with their right hand since the left hand is used in toilet rituals. In these modern times with soap as a very revolutionary invention, I have, however, noticed that they now wash well before meals and then sometimes even their left hand touches the food. They also tear the nAn using their left hand.

Common courtesy at the table, or at the floor over a destarkhan, is simply to stretch your arm towards what you need, for instance the salt, the rice, the bottle of coke, the fruit tray etc. By doing that the Afghan next to you will ‘wake up’ and quickly send you what you want. You should not ask for things to be passed to you, which is common courtesy in western culture. That will seem greedy and demanding. Remember that if you are seated close to things others need, be attentive if you see an Afghan looking at it or indicating that he is about to stretch for it. Stop him by saying you will send him what he needs. Don’t lean back and say ‘No problem, just grab it yourself. Please streeeeetch....’

Fruit, tea and nuts are also served long before everyone is finished eating the main meal. Some also leave the room as soon as they are done. This may seem strange, if you grew up learning that it is impolite to do so. The reason that the customs are different here is that the need for food varies a lot. Some have been sitting in a chair the whole day, while others have been working hard in the fields. It would be embarrassing for a hungry worker to keep everyone waiting while he is hungrily eating his second or third serving. That is why people let him eat and go on with their business eating desserts, discussing important matters or leaving for the office. The worker is then left in peace to enjoy his food and eat until he is full.

Please do not forget this when hosting a big meal. Keep everything coming and let people eat. Afghans do not talk much while eating. Therefore avoid asking too many questions which demand long answers before they are done eating the main meal. Some might talk a little, but mostly they eat and enjoy their food in silence.



(U.S. Air Force photo by Master Sgt. Jim Varhegyi)

If you have bread and onion your forehead is open (your forehead is not wrinkled because of a frown.)

Afghan proverb. *nAn o pyAz peshAni wAz.*

Meaning: Be content with the things you have. You should be happy and not frown.

Use: When a host excuses himself for serving too little food. If someone complains about the food, it is a humorous way of getting people to laugh and not complain anymore. Use it also about other things than food when people are discontent.

Sample

Chap 3

V. Islam in Afghanistan

There are many good books which describe the Muslim faith and give a thorough overview of Islam. This chapter is not a detailed account of the Islamic faith. The intention is rather to give a description of Afghans live out their faith in daily life. I will do this based on the five pillars of their faith. But first, a story about how their faith binds them together:



(Pal Teravagimov / Shutterstock.com)

In the spring of 2002, a jail in Cha Ab, a district in the Takhar province, released all Afghan prisoners who had been captured for treason fighting with the Taliban. Cha Ab was never taken by the Taliban. The Northern Alliance held their ground east of the Qundus Mountains. Not far from Cha Ab is the village Khujabuddin which once served as the Northern Alliance headquarters. It was here their famous leader, Ahmad Shah Masood, was killed in Sep.10 2001.

The prisoners who were Pakistani or from any other countries was kept in jail. Afghans were set free. It was a great moment when about a hundred men, prisoners and local villagers, lined up to pray. Many of them had not been fighters, but had been serving the Taliban as cooks and drivers. Still, they had served the enemy. Now the local population stood shoulder-to-shoulder with them praying. Before they were on their way home to their village, a collection was taken up among the local spectators. Hats served as collection baskets. With some pocket money and a gratefulness of being pardoned, the prisoners were on their way home to their loved ones. Kisses on cheeks, hugs and firm handshakes were also exchanged along with a "KhudA hafiz"= May God keep you.

Give, give and give as long as you see it doesn't cause more problems or tension among your staff or competitiveness between the staff trying to see who can get the next gift. You want the help and friendship that you receive to be genuine and not motivated by thought of getting expensive gifts. Think about the long-term effects, not momentary popularity. Live a life of giving which is planned and from the heart. Live with a clear consciousness, but think consequences and be critical. Always ask yourself if the giving is more to satisfy your own need to be needed than to satisfy the receiver.

V. Pilgrimage

Muslims do their pilgrimage to Mecca in Saudi Arabia. They sometimes visit several places, but Mecca is the most important one. It is quite visible in Kabul what time of the year it is most common to go on "hajj" (pilgrimage). The Hadjis (a person been on hadj) arrive at the airport, and hundreds, sometimes thousands of relatives want to welcome them. In Kabul the mosque near the stadium is often used as a greeting and welcoming place for the Hadjis.

It is amazing to see people dressed to go to a party and decorated cars all waiting for hours for their Hadji to arrive. Then they drive to their homes and have a big meal where the Hadji gives gifts and tells stories from the Holy City.

Your staff, or Afghan friend, may ask to borrow your car, or the office car to use on this day. They would like to use a nice car. But remember: The plane from Saudi Arabia is often delayed, sometimes for many, many hours. So, do not give your employee of a few hours to get his uncle at the airport. Give him of the whole day.

It is a great privilege for Afghans to go on pilgrimage. But, it is expensive, so few are able. If you meet a Haji, ask about his pilgrimage. What did he see? How were the people there? How were they dressed? Ask about the different rituals. What was it like to walk around the K'aba (holy stone) etc.

Most Afghans are comfortable if you are not a Muslim. They have numerous times quoted this proverb to me when they hear I am a Christian:

Jesus has his religion, Moses has his.

Afghan proverb. *isa ba din-e khud, mosa ba din-e khud.*

Meaning: I have my religion and you have yours. We should accept that. There should be religious freedom.

Use: Afghans use it to express their respect for other religions. You can use it to express the same.

You have maybe heard that you should never say that you do not believe in God. This is because Afghans do have a proverb that states: Fear the man who does not fear God. Still I would recommend that you be honest in an evasive way rather than lying. This question could be asked: Do you believe in God? A way of dealing with this, instead of saying: No, I do not, is to say:

- I come from a country that has its roots in Christianity.
- I come from a country where God is vital in our constitution.
- My father and mother believe.
- I grew up learning how to pray.
- I believe in religious freedom.
- I do not know if there is a God.
- I find it difficult to believe sometimes.

Find an answer that you are comfortable with. Be truthful and honest. Do not feel that you always have to give a straight, direct and accurate answer to things they ask you.

Sample

Chap 3

VI. The Magic Land Beyond the Passes

To sum up the history of this multiethnic and diverse country is a huge task to undertake. Its cities have been conquered, burned and liberated dozens of times through history. Persian kings, Greek rulers, Indian kings, British soldiers and Russian troops have swarmed across these plains, mountains and forests trying in different degree of success to rule this area. There are big volumes of books to read on the subject. I will only mention a few points about history that I have found useful to know in many conversations, in a mentoring and in a relationship building situation.



(U.S. Army photo)

Life in
Afghanistan

I. The Soviet invasion

As you probably know, the Russian invasion lasted for 10 years, from 1979 to 1989. There were many intrigues leading up to this where family members killed each other, betrayal, loyalty and power struggles within and outside the country played vital parts. Also during the invasion, there were power struggles, alliances, immense suffering and victories.

It's a man's honor to forget the past.

Afghan proverb. *gozasht kheslat e mardAn ast.*



(U.S. Army photo)

III. The Taliban

Not long after Taliban took control over Kabul in the autumn of 1996, the Pakistan president Benazir Bhutto visited Kabul and announced her support. Soon, as I was crossing the Afghan-Pakistan border I saw how openly the Taliban received supplies from army vehicles which some people guessed was the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). I crossed the border at the Khyber Pass dozens of times. I was always met by these supply vehicles. I lived in Jalalabad at the time. At first life got better as the Taliban posted its army during the night at many vital road crossings providing security. Prior to the Taliban, robberies were common in the city. My neighbor was robbed my soldiers who stole money, valuables and their daughter. Taliban restored order and people felt safer. They used brutal methods, but people in general referred to them to be more moral and disciplined than the soldiers stationed in the city before them. This later changed. Taliban grew crueler in their efforts in ruling the people.

In this city, Jalalabad, and others too, it is important to be aware that Taliban might have good support, not because the people fear them, but because the people are grateful for their just ruling. If you recognize this, it will display humbleness and insight that will give you respect among some leaders that might be skeptical to you in the first place. In a mentoring situation or a conversation, it is therefore vital not to actively put Taliban down. Rather speak about what is important in your relationship with them (the people). Instead of putting others down, you focus on yourself and then it is up to the people, to choose their alliances.

"Taliban destroyed Kabul. They bombed it to pieces!" a young man told me in animated anger. I leaned forward and said: "Well, I was her in June 1995, long before Taliban tried to capture the city. Most of the city was then already destroyed by the civil war ..." The young man nodded and smiled...he said: "Okay, yes you are right. Taliban did not do it. But, the Taliban was bad...right?" he said smiling. Others would even blame the Taliban to have encouraged the civil

Chap 3

IX. Practical Use of Afghan Proverbs

As you have noticed I have used many proverbs in the text. Proverbs are important cultural indicators. They express deeper insights within the culture, and by using them we show respect for the culture. An Afghan man expressed it like this:

“Our proverbs are our precious jewels. They shine, are priceless and help us to prosper. They set the standard for our living through difficult times when we neglect to live in respect and love. Our proverbs are life wisdom experienced and refined through thousands of years.”



(U.S. Army photo)

Afghans have neglected some of their proverbs. They are familiar with them, since they memorized them as kids, but do not always take them seriously anymore. War and fighting has made them forget their true value. Proverbs are used to guide, lead and influence people in an indirect way, with the authority of the ancestors. It is also valuable truth made easy to remember by metaphor and rhyme. Instead of having to explain something in long sentences, you can memorize some proverbs. It is not necessary to memorize the proverb 100% correctly. I experienced quickly that all I had to do was to start trying to say it. As soon as I say a few words, the Afghans around me finish it. Sometimes I even just said: “Don’t you have a proverb about fingers....?” “Yes, we do”, someone would say, and quickly impress everybody in reciting it perfectly.

It is a well-known saying that a picture is worth a thousand words. Proverbs also do this. It expresses a thousand words. In addition, it has a deeper meaning, which sometimes is hard to articulate using our own words. Saying difficult truths

that might hurt or better captured in a proverb.. Here is a list of the proverbs that I have used in the text. I have gathered them here for ease of access and repetition. The Dari is highlighted making them easier to memorize. I have also added a few:

yak roz didi dost, dega roz didi brAdar.

Translation: The first day we meet, we are friends, the second day we are brothers.

Meaning: When you first meet, you only know each other a little, but we wish to develop a better and closer relationship, like brothers.

Use: When you wish to convey that you would like to be committed in a relationship or that you are serious and to be trusted. Use it also to give a compliment to someone who has helped you in an unselfish and sacrificial way.

del ba del rA dAra.

Translation: There is a way from heart to heart.

Meaning: It is possible to have a good relationship.

Use: When you sense and experiencing a good atmosphere/ openness/ honesty in a setting/ relationship/meeting or conversation. Or use it to indirectly express that you would like to have better openness/ contact with a person.

panj angusht brAdar as, barAbAr nes.

Translation: Five fingers are brothers, but they are not the same.

Meaning: We are brothers despite of ethnicity or nationality.

Use: If someone has a bad attitude against another people group, use this proverb to express your opinion. It can also be used motivationally when you are planning to get many different people together for a project. Brothers are obligated to keep the peace and help each other.

nAn o pyAs peshAni wAz.

Translation: If you have bread and onion your forehead is open (your face does not have wrinkles because of frowning.)

Meaning: Be content with the things you have. You should be happy and not frown

Use: When a host excuses himself for serving too little food. Also, if someone complains about the food. It helps to get people to laugh and stop complaining.. Used also for other things than food when people are discontent.

Afghan National & Provincial Data

Ref: Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) Newsletter 11-16 (Feb '11),
Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team, annex A.

I. Background¹

Ahmad Shah Durrani unified the Pashtun tribes and founded Afghanistan in 1747. The country served as a buffer between the British and Russian Empires until it won independence from notional British control in 1919. A brief experiment in democracy ended in a 1973 coup and a 1978 communist counter-coup. The Soviet Union invaded in 1979 to support the tottering Afghan communist regime, touching off a long and destructive war. The Soviets withdrew in 1989 under relentless pressure by internationally supported anti-communist mujahedeen rebels. A series of subsequent civil wars saw Kabul finally fall in 1996 to the Taliban, a hard-line Pakistani-sponsored movement that emerged in 1994 to end the country's civil war and anarchy. Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC, a U.S., allied, and anti-Taliban Northern Alliance military action toppled the Taliban for sheltering Osama Bin Ladin. The U.N.-sponsored Bonn Conference in 2001 established a process for political reconstruction that included the adoption of a new constitution, a presidential election in 2004, and National Assembly elections in 2005. In December 2004, Hamid Karzai became the first democratically elected president of Afghanistan and the National Assembly was inaugurated the following December. Karzai was re-elected in November 2009 for a second term. Despite gains toward building a stable central government, a resurgent Taliban and continuing provincial instability - particularly in the south and the east - remain serious challenges for the Afghan government.



(U.S. Army photo by Spc. Micah E. Clare)

V. Provincial Information

Information¹⁰ follows on Afghanistan's 34 provinces, which are:

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(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Jason Epperson)

Badakhshan Province

Badakhshan is located in the northeastern region of the country between the Hindu Kush and the Amu Darya. It is part of the Badakhshan region. There was a German-led PRT in the provincial capitol, Feyzabad.

History

Badakhshan's name was given by the Sassanids and derives from the word badaxš (an official Sassanian title). Badakhshan and Panjshir were the only provinces that were not occupied by the Taliban during their drive to control the country. However, during the course of the wars, a non-Taliban Islamic emirate was established in Badakhshan, paralleling the Islamic Revolutionary State of Afghanistan in neighboring Nuristan. The province was about to fall to the Taliban when the American invasion allowed the Northern Alliance to reclaim control of the country with the aid of American military air power and assistance.

Geography

Badakhshan province is bordered by Takhar province in the west and Nuristan province in the south and shares international borders with Tajikistan in the north, China in the west, and Pakistan in the south. The province covers an area of 47,403 square kilometers. Nearly nine-tenths of the province (89.9 percent) is mountainous or semi-mountainous terrain, and 9.7 percent is made up of flat or semi-flat land. The province is divided into 28 districts.



Demography and Population

Badakhshan had a total population in 2008 of approximately 845,900. There are 134,137 households in the province, and households, on average, have six members. Almost all (96 percent) of the population lives in rural districts, while 4 percent live in urban areas. Dari is spoken by 77 percent of the population and 80 percent of the villages. The second most frequent language is Uzbeki, spoken by the majorities in villages representing 12 percent of the population. Other languages such as Pashtu, Turkmeni, and Nuristani are spoken by less than 1 percent of the population each. Badakhshan province also has a population of Kuchis (nomads), whose numbers vary in different seasons. In winter, 9,417 individuals, or 0.4 percent of the overall Kuchi population, stay in Badakhshan living in 34 communities. Nearly two-thirds of these (64 percent)

are short-range, partially migratory, and the other one-third have settled in the province. In the winter, both groups stay mostly in one area and do not move around during the season. In the summer season, nearly 175,000 long-range migratory Kuchis come from Takhar, Kunduz, Baghlan, and Nuristan provinces to the Kistam, Tashkan, Taqab, and Arghanj Khawa districts of Badakhshan province as summer pasture areas. The Kuchi population in the summer is 185,452 individuals.

Infrastructure

On average, only 13 percent of households use safe drinking water; and only 1 percent of households in Badakhshan province have access to electricity, with the majority of these relying on public electricity. There is currently no information on the overall percentage of households having access to safe toilet facilities. The transport infrastructure is not well developed, with only 25.4 percent of roads in the province able to take car traffic in all seasons. In 56.5 percent of the province there are no roads.

Economics

Badakhshan is an agricultural province. The majority of commercial activity is related to trade in agricultural and livestock products. Agriculture is the major source of revenue for 55 percent of households in the province. In addition, 32 percent of households derive their income from trade and services, and 29 percent earn income through non-farm-related labor. Unlike agricultural or animal products, there is not a very large production of industrial crops, with sesame, tobacco, sugar extracts, and cotton being the major products. The sector of small industries specializes in honey, dried sugar, karakul skin, confection and sugar candy, and silk. There is also a considerable amount of production of handicrafts in Badakhshan province, especially in rugs, pottery, and jewelry. Forty-six percent of households in the province have access to irrigated land, and 65 percent have access to rain-fed lands. The most important field crops grown include wheat, barley, maize, rice, flax, melons, and watermelons. The most commonly owned livestock are cattle, donkeys, sheep, and goats.

Education

The overall literacy rate in Badakhshan province is 31 percent; however, while 38 percent of men are literate, this is true for just 22 percent of women. On average, 46 percent of children between six and 13 are enrolled in school. In 2008, a total of 263,360 students attended the 623 primary, secondary, and high schools in the province. Boys accounted for 55 percent of students, and 20 percent of schools were boys' schools. There were 9,540 teachers working in the schools; 28 percent were women. The province has a university and a teacher training institute.

Health


In 2008, Badakhshan province had 48 health centers and two hospitals with 191 beds. Data from 2008 also showed that 75 doctors and 339 other health professionals employed by the Ministry of Health were working in the province. The province also has 120 privately owned pharmacies. The majority of communities do not have a health worker permanently present. Access to health care is difficult for many people in the province; 16 percent travel more than 5 kilometers to reach the nearest health facility.

Badghis Province

Badghis is located in northwestern Afghanistan, between the Murghab and Hari rivers, extending as far northward as the edge of the desert of Sarakhs. The province was carved out of portions of Herat province and Meymaneh province in 1964. The provincial capitol is Qala-i-Now. The PRT in Badghis province was led by Spain.

History

The name "Badghis" is from the Persian word Bādghēzz, meaning "lap of wind" or "home of the winds." The province was one of the last captured by the Taliban in their military offensive before the American invasion in 2001. Even after their official takeover of the province, the largely Tajik population of the province never welcomed the Pashtun



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Related SMARTbooks (Security Cooperation/HN)

Resources related to countries, cultures and nations in the world, with emphasis on training, advising and assisting. Cultural awareness has become an increasingly important competency for leaders at all levels. Perceptive leaders learn how cultures affect operations. Effective leaders adapt to new situations, realizing their words and actions may be interpreted differently in different cultures. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power is tasked to support OGAs and cooperate with IGOs (e.g., UN, NATO) and other countries to protect and enhance national security interests and deter conflict. These operations usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities as well as the efforts of OGAs, IGOs, and NGOs in a complementary fashion. Ideally, security cooperation activities remedy the causes of crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires coercive US military intervention.



(SPCS2) Stability, Peace & Counterinsurgency SMARTbook, 2nd Rev. Ed.

The SPCS SMARTbook is multi-service, single-source reference for stability, peace and counterinsurgency operations for all levels of Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines & Civilians!



Humanitarian Smartbook 1: Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)

FHA consists of DOD activities, normally in support of the USAID or DOS, conducted outside the US and its territories to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.



Humanitarian Smartbook 2: Nation & Security Assistance

Nation assistance is civil or military assistance (other than FHA) rendered to a nation by US forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war.




Humanitarian Smartbook 3: Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

NEOs are conducted to assist the DOS in evacuating US citizens, DOD civilians, and designated HN nationals whose lives are in danger from locations in a foreign nation to a safe haven.

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