Joint/Interagency SMARTBOOK

Joint strategic & operational PLANNING

Planning for Planners

The Lightning Press
Santacroce
Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1: Joint Strategic & Operational Planning

Planning for Planners

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The dawn of the 21st Century presents a global environment characterized by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism and unconventional threats to United States citizens, interests and territories. If we are to be successful as a nation, we must embrace the realities of this environment and operate with clarity from within. It is this setting that mandates a flexible, adaptive approach to planning and an ever-greater cooperation between all the elements of national power, supported by and coordinated with, that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental and regional security organizations. It is within this chaotic environment that planners will craft their trade.

**Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1: Joint Strategic & Operational Planning (Planning for Planners)** was developed to assist planners at all levels in understanding how to plan within this environment utilizing the Joint Operational Planning Process; an orderly, logical, analytical progression enabling planners to sequentially follow it to a rational conclusion. By utilizing this planning process, which is conceptually easy-to-understand and applicable in all environments, any plan can come to life.

This new revision of Planning for Planners incorporates the latest thinking on Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), Global Force Management (GFM), Campaign Planning and Assessment Fundamentals. Planning for Planners has been utilized since 2007 by war colleges, joint staffs, Services, combatant commands and allies as a step-by-step guide to understanding the complex world of global planning and force management. Paramount to planning is flexibility. The ultimate aspiration of this book is to help develop flexible planners who can cope with the inevitable changes that occur during the planning process.

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Introduction: Planning for Planners

Today’s global environment is characterized by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, and unconventional threats to United States citizens, interests, and territories. If we are to be successful as a nation, we must embrace the reality of this environment and operate from within with clarity. It is this environment that mandates a flexible, adaptive approach to planning and an ever greater cooperation between all the elements of national power supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations. It is for this reason that Planning for Planners was developed.

The criteria for deciding to employ United States military forces exemplify the dynamic link among the people, the government, and the military. The people of the United States do not take the commitment of their armed forces lightly. They charge the government to commit forces only after due consideration of the range of options and likely outcomes. Moreover, the people expect the military to accomplish its missions in compliance with national values. The American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met. They demand timely and accurate information on the conduct of military operations.

“One should know one’s enemies, their alliances, their resources and nature of their country, in order to plan a campaign. One should know what to expect of one’s friends, what resources one has, and foresee the future effects to determine what one has to fear or hope from political maneuvers.”

Frederick the Great
Instructions for His Generals, 1747

The responsibility for the conduct and use of United States military forces is derived from the people and loaned to the government. The Department of Defense commits forces only after appropriate direction from the President and in support of national strategy. The national strategy of the United States dictates where, when, and with what means the armed forces will conduct military campaigns and operations. The necessity to plan and conduct joint and combined operations across the operational continuum dictates a comprehensive understanding of the military strategy of the United States, and proficiency in current Service and joint doctrine.

Never static, always dynamic, doctrine is firmly rooted in the realities of current capabilities. At the same time, it reaches out with a measure of confidence to the future. Doctrine captures the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war, conflict and crisis in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and technological developments that will ensure victory now and in the future.

Doctrine derives from a variety of sources that profoundly affect its development: strategy, history, technology, the nature of the threats the nation and its armed forces face, inter-service relationships, and political decisions that allocate resources and designate roles and missions. Doctrine seeks to meet the challenges facing the armed forces by providing the guidance to deal with the range of threats to which its elements may be exposed. It reflects the strategic context in which armed forces will operate, sets a marker for the incorporation of developing technologies, and optimizes the use of all available resources. It also incorporates the lessons learned from the many missions, operations and campaigns of the United States.
Scenario

You’re new on a Joint Operations staff for a geographic combatant command. It’s 0200 and the phone rings. The Chief of Staff is on the phone and relays the following Warning Order to you:

“A magnitude 7.6 earthquake has struck parts of Pakistan and India. By far the biggest in its magnitude and scale that we’ve seen in current history. Pakistan has an estimated 79,000+ injured, 73,000+ dead with possibly 3 million displaced and homeless. Have an initial mission analysis brief for the Combatant Commander by 0700…….. GO!”

You suddenly feel the full affect of the proverbial “planning fire hose.”

What do you do?
Where do you begin?

#1- Take a breath.
#2- Pick up your well-worn and dove-tailed “Planner’s SMARTbook” and get to work.
#3- Delegate!
Introduction (Cont.)

Doctrinal principles set forth in planning are developed and written as the starting point for any variation or deviation from the planning process. One must understand doctrine prior to digressing from it. As noted by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II at the Strategic Studies Institute in his article *Doctrine that Works*, "doctrine should set forth principles and precious little more." With that thought in mind, *Planning for Planners* was designed to promulgate information from several source documents and utilize best practices to fill in where the principles of Joint doctrine departs.

*Planning for Planners* presents the planning process as described by doctrine, best practices and common sense while focusing on the concepts of operational planning and the often misunderstood world of global force management. It is presented in a logical flow which will enable planners to sequentially follow the process to a logical conclusion.

Baron von Steuben’s 1779 *Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States* was not penned in a setting of well-ordered formations and well-disciplined troops but, at a time of turmoil during a winter at Valley Forge. Baron von Steuben’s doctrine, maybe our first written doctrine, set forth principles and created a discipline that went on to defeat the greatest army on the face of the earth. This doctrine, written over 200 years ago, and followed by others, has led to a highly professional armed force that generations later stands foremost in the world. Doctrine reflects the collective wisdom of our armed forces against the background of history and it reflects the lessons learned from recent experiences and the setting of today’s strategic and technological realities. It considers the nature of today's threats and tomorrow’s challenges.

*Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1* will assist planners at all levels with these challenges. It will furnish the planner with an understanding of doctrine and the intricate world of global planning. The ultimate aspiration being to develop planners who can cope with the inevitable change that occurs during the planning process.

Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides us in developing plans for the employment of forces and capabilities within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. *Planning for Planners* focuses on this joint operation planning and the global force management processes.

The Joint Operation Planning Process is an orderly, analytical planning process consisting of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission, develop and compare potential courses of action, select the best course of action, and produce a plan or order. This planning process underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of contingencies. It applies to all planners and helps them organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the method, purpose and end state and to develop effective plans and executable orders.

Planning provides an awareness and opportunity to study potential future events amongst multiple alternatives in a controlled environment. By planning we can evaluate complex systems and environments allowing us to break these down into small, manageable segments for analysis, assisting directly in the increased probability of success. In this way, deliberately planning for contingencies allows us to manage identified

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2 FM 100-5 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army.
Introduction-5

risks and influence the operational environment in which we have chosen to interact, in a
deliberate way. The plans generated in this process represent actions to be taken if an
identified risk occurs or a trigger event has presented itself.

The variance in any plan is the constant change in the operational environment
(system). Whether a crisis or contingency scenario, we plan in a chaotic environment. In
the time it takes us to plan, the likelihood that the operational environment has changed
is a certain, whether by action or inaction, affecting the plan (i.e., assumptions change or
are not validated, leaders change, the operational environment fluctuates, apportionment
tables are poor assumptions, disputed borders fluctuate, weather changes the rules,
plans change at contact, enemy gets a vote, etc.).

Variables are hard to predict because each environment and situation have their own
unique challenges which can certainly affect an orderly plan. Given the size and scope
of an operational environment a plan can only anticipate, or forecast, for a short duration
without being updated. This is known as the plans horizon. In a fluid crisis situation
the plans horizon may be very short and contain greater risk, causing the planner to
constantly re-evaluate and update the plan. Inversely, for a contingency plan, the plans
horizon may be relatively static with less risk allowing time for greater analysis. The
number of variables within the operational environment and the interactions between
those variables and known components of the operational environment increases
exponentially with the number of variables, thus potentially allowing for many new and
sometimes subtle planning changes to emerge.

As an example of a plans horizon, or stability, lets look at an environment that con-
stantly influences us; the weather:

A forecaster endeavors to anticipate the path of a tropical cyclone and utilizes
historical models and probabilities to predict the tropical cyclones path and warn
residents. When a low pressure area first forms and the storm begins to take
shape along the equator, forecasters are working within a complex environment
with constant and multiple variables (i.e., winds, temperatures, currents, pressures,
etc.) and few facts (i.e., exact location at this moment, jet stream location, etc.).
As variables amplify and the storm begins to move the storm’s horizon shifts yet
again, and the forecaster updates the assessment. Over days of surveillance,
gathering information, updating, and studying the variables, the actual track of
the storm begins to emerge and the storms horizon becomes more durable and
predictable. The forecaster continuously narrows the storm’s estimated track,
eventually forecasting with some certainty the tropical cyclones land fall.

Planners employ the same technique by utilizing current knowledge of the operational
environment to anticipate events, calculate what those may be by means of an in-depth
analysis, update, and plan accordingly. But always remember, plans are orderly; prob-
abilities and variables are not. Just as a tropical storm has a self-organizing phase within
its environment, so must the planner.

So the challenge is how to plan within an environment with continuously changing
and emerging variables. The planner must understand that every plan is unique and
never as perfect as you want it, there are too many variables. But with constant aware-
ness each iteration of the plan will improve the prospect of success as the variables
become known and are planned for.

Simplicity should be the aspiration for every plan. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans
and concise orders to ensure a through understanding. A plan need not be more compli-
cated than the underlying principles which generate it.

Introduction-5
About the Author

Michael A. Santacroce has 35 years of joint and interagency experience working within the Department of Defense as a Joint Staff, Combatant Command and Service Planner. As Faculty and Chair for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Campaign Planning and Operational Art, Mike taught advanced planning to leaders from all branches of the government and our allies. His current SMARTbook, Planning for Planners, walks the prospective or advanced planner through joint strategic and operational planning as well as the complex world of global force management.

During his Marine Corps career Mike served in a multiple of demanding leadership, senior staff, strategic and operational planning positions. As a Marine aviator he flew the AV-8B Harrier Jump Jet and participated in operations globally. He commanded a Marine Harrier Squadron (VMA-214 Blacksheep) and later led a Marine Air Group (Forward) for combat operations in Iraq. A seasoned military professional and teacher, Mike has a unique understanding of operations and planning at all levels. Mike retired with more than 30 years of military service.

“The inspiration of a noble cause involving human interests wide and far, enables men to do things they did not dream themselves capable of before, and which they were not capable of alone.”


Today’s preparation determines tomorrow’s achievements. Dedicated to all planners; may this work assist you in some small way.

Planning for Planners is reviewed continually and updated as required. Point of contact is the author, Col (Ret) Mike Santacroce, USMC, at mike.santacroce@thelightningpress.com
# Table of Contents

## Chap 1 – Strategic Organization

1. Background ...................................................................................... 1-1
2. The Security Environment ................................................................. 1-2
3. National Strategic Direction ............................................................... 1-4
   National Security Council System ...................................................... 1-5
   DOD Role in National Security Council System ................................ 1-7
4. National Strategic Guidance .............................................................. 1-8
5. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) ............................................. 1-11
6. Global Context .................................................................................. 1-12

## Chap 2 – Planning

I. Planning and Plans .............................................................................. 2-1
   1. Planning ......................................................................................... 2-1
   2. Defining Challenges ......................................................................... 2-2
   3. Integrated Planning ........................................................................... 2-2
   4. Operational Art and Planning ............................................................. 2-3
   5. Understand and Develop Solutions to Problems ................................ 2-3
   6. Plans ............................................................................................... 2-4

II. The Contingency Plan and Deliberate Planning ................................ 2-4
   1. Contingency Plans ........................................................................... 2-4
   2. Deliberate Planning .......................................................................... 2-6
   3. Deliberate Planning and the GFM Process ......................................... 2-7

III. Crisis and Crisis Action Planning ....................................................... 2-8
   1. Crisis ............................................................................................... 2-8
   2. Crisis Planning Relationship to Deliberate Planning ........................ 2-8
   3. GFM Process during CAP ................................................................. 2-12
   4. Abbreviated Procedures ................................................................ 2-12

## Chap 3 – Campaign Planning

1. Campaign Plans .................................................................................. 3-1
2. Functional Campaign Planning ............................................................ 3-1
3. Theater Campaign Planning ................................................................. 3-2
4. Key Stakeholders ................................................................................ 3-2
5. Theater Campaign Strategic Guidance .............................................. 3-3
6. Nested Planning .................................................................................. 3-3
7. Strategy ............................................................................................... 3-9
8. Theater Campaign Design .................................................................. 3-10
Chap 4 – Joint Operations Planning Overview ............... 4-1

1. Joint Operation Planning ............................................. 4-1
2. Stability Operations .................................................... 4-1
3. GFM and Force Projection Planning .......................... 4-2
4. Full Range of Joint Operations Activities ............... 4-4
5. Global Demand ......................................................... 4-7
6. Sequencing Actions and Phasing ............................ 4-8
7. Joint Operation Planning Organization and Responsibility .... 4-14
8. In-Progress Review (IPR) ........................................ 4-14
9. Force Planning ....................................................... 4-16

Chap 5 – Planning Functions ........................................... 5-1

I. Planning and Functions ........................................... 5-1
   1. Strategic Guidance ............................................. 5-3
   2. Concept Development ......................................... 5-3
   3. Plan Development ............................................... 5-3
   4. Plan Assessment ................................................ 5-3

II. Joint Operation Planning Process (Overview) ........ 5-4

Chap 6 – Operational Art, Design, & the Joint Operations Cycle ........................................... 6-1

I. Operational Art and the Strategic Context ............... 6-1
   1. Grand Strategy as the Basis for Operational Art .... 6-1

II. Utilizing Operational Art and Design ..................... 6-2
   1. Commanders and Operational Art ......................... 6-2
      - Operational Art and Planning .......................... 6-3
   2. Operational Design ........................................... 6-5
   3. Design Goals .................................................. 6-6
   4. Fundamentals of Design .................................... 6-8
   5. Leading Design ............................................... 6-9
   6. Design Methodology ......................................... 6-10
   7. Considering Operational Approaches .................. 6-12
   8. Reframing ...................................................... 6-13

III. Joint Operations Cycle and Design ......................... 6-13

Chap 7 – Global Force Management (GFM) ............... 7-1

I. Global Force Management Goals and Processes ........ 7-4
II. Force Sourcing and GFM Planning ......................... 7-19
III. Force Planning and the GFM Process ..................... 7-23
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Deployment Planning</td>
<td>7-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Joint Force Projection</td>
<td>7-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Responsibilities of Supported and Supporting CCDRs</td>
<td>7-38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>Mutually Supporting, Interrelated DOD Processes</td>
<td>7-41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>GFM Summary</td>
<td>7-42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chap 8 – In-Progress Review (IPR) - Overview**

- 1. IPR Venue ................................................................. 8-1
- 2. IPR Objective ............................................................ 8-1
- 3. GEF- and JSCP-Tasked Plan Review Categories and Approval.... 8-2
- 4. IPR with the SECDEF/Designated Representative .................. 8-2
- 5. Plan Socialization and the IPR Process ........................... 8-2
- 6. Joint Planning and Execution Community Review .................. 8-4
- 7. IPR Attendance ............................................................ 8-6

**Chap 9 – Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), and the Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP)**

- I. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Overview ................ 9-1
  - 1. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) .......................... 9-1
- II. Joint Operation Planning Overview .................................... 9-4
  - 1. Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) .......................... 9-4
  - 2. Joint Planning Group .................................................. 9-6
  - 3. Staff Estimates .......................................................... 9-6
    - Types of Estimates ....................................................... 9-8

**Chap 10 – Strategic Guidance/Strategic Direction (Function I)**

- 1. Function I – Strategic Guidance/Strategic Direction ............. 10-1
- 3. GEF, GFMIG, and JSCP .................................................... 10-3
- 4. Strategic Guidance Focus .............................................. 10-4
- 5. Strategic Direction Focus .............................................. 10-4

**Chap 11 – Planning Initiation**

- 1. Step 1 to JOPP – Planning Initiation .................................. 11-1
Chap 12 – Mission Analysis Overview ........................................... 12-1
1. Step 2 to JOPP – Mission Analysis ........................................... 12-1
   13 Key Steps to Mission Analysis ........................................... 12-3
2. Planner Organization ................................................................. 12-4

Chap 13 – Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) & Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPIE) ........................................... 13-1
1. Overview ..................................................................................... 13-1
2. JIPOE and the Intelligence Cycle ................................................. 13-1
3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) ........................................... 13-5
   Step 1 – Define the Operational Environment ................................ 13-8
   Step 2 – Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment .... 13-9
     - Modified Combined Operations Overlay (MCOO) .................... 13-9
   Step 3 – Evaluate the Adversary .................................................. 13-14
   Step 4 – Determine Adversary Courses of Action (COAs) .......... 13-17
4. Intelligence Preparation of the Information Environment (IPIE) ... 13-18
5. JIPOE Support to JOPP ................................................................. 13-20

Chap 14 – Mission Analysis Key Steps ......................................... 14-1
I. Step 2 to JOPP - Mission Analysis: Key Steps ....................... 14-1
   Key-Step – 1: Analysis of Higher CDR’s Mission and Intent .......... 14-1
   Key-Step – 2: Determine Own Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks ........................................... 14-2
   Key-Step – 3: Determine Known Facts, Assumptions, Current Status or Conditions ....................... 14-4
   Key-Step – 4: Determine Operational Limitations: Constraints/Restraints ........................................... 14-6
   Key-Step – 5: Determine Termination Criteria, Own Military Endstates, Objectives, and Initial Effects ........................................... 14-7
   Termination of Joint Operations ........................................... 14-7
   Endstate ........................................................................................ 14-11
   Objectives ..................................................................................... 14-14
   Effects .......................................................................................... 14-19
   Effects vs Objectives .................................................................. 14-20
   Effects in the Planning Process; Bottom Line ......................... 14-22
   Tasks ............................................................................................. 14-23
   Task Assessment ........................................................................... 14-23

4-Table of Contents
Key-Step – 6: Determine Own and Enemy’s Center(s) of Gravity (COG), Critical Factors, and Decisive Points .......... 14-27

Center of Gravity (COG) .................................................................................. 14-27
Critical Factors .................................................................................................. 14-31
Decisive Points ................................................................................................. 14-33
Center of Gravity Determination ...................................................................... 14-36

Key-Step – 7: Conduct Initial Force Structure Analysis (Apportioned Forces) ......................................................... 14-43

Analysis of Available Forces and Assets ......................................................... 14-43
Force Planning ................................................................................................. 14-43
Availability of Forces for Joint Operations ..................................................... 14-44
Force Sourcing and the GFM Process ............................................................. 14-44

Key-Step – 8: Conduct Initial Risk Assessment .............................................. 14-45

Key-Step – 9: Determine CDR’s Critical Information Requirements .................... 14-51

Key-Step – 10: Develop Mission Statement .................................................. 14-58

Key-Step – 11: Develop and Conduct Mission Analysis Brief ....................... 14-60

Key-Step – 12: Prepare Initial Staff Estimates ................................................ 14-61

Key-Step – 13: Approval of Mission Statement, Develop CDR’s Intent, Publish Initial CDR’s Planning Guidance .......... 14-61

II. In-Progress Review Discussion ...................................................................... 14-66

Chap 15 – Concept Development (Function II) ....................................... 15-1

1. Function II – Concept Development .......................................................... 15-1

2. COA Development Preparation Considerations ....................................... 15-2

   Time Available .............................................................................................. 15-2
   Political Considerations ............................................................................... 15-3
   Flexible Deterrent Options .......................................................................... 15-3

3. Lines of Operation (LOO) .......................................................................... 15-5

4. Lines of Effort (LOE) .................................................................................. 15-8

5. Combining LOO and LOE .......................................................................... 15-13

   Operational Design Schematic .................................................................... 15-14

Chap 16 – Course of Action (COA) Development ................................... 16-1

1. Step 3 to JOPP – Course of Action Development .................................... 16-1

2. Tentative COAs .......................................................................................... 16-2

3. Planning Directive Published ..................................................................... 16-10

4. Staff Estimates ............................................................................................ 16-10
Chap 17 – COA Analysis and Wargaming

1. Step 4 to JOPP – COA Analysis and Wargaming
2. Analysis of Opposing COAs
3. The Conduct of Analysis and Wargaming
4. Examining and Testing the COAs
   - Governing Factors/Evaluation Criteria
   - Developing Governing Factors
5. Wargaming Decisions
6. Wargaming
   - Preparing for the Wargame
   - Wargame Process
   - Wargame Products
     - Event Template
     - Decision Support Template
   - Wargame Output
   - Red Team
   - White Team
   - Synchronization Matrix
7. Interpreting the Results of Analysis and Wargaming
8. Flexible Plans

Chap 18 – COA Comparison

1. Step 5 to JOPP – COA Comparison
2. Prepare for COA Comparison
3. Determine Comparison Method and Record
   - Non-Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique
   - Narrative/Bulleted Descriptive Comparison of Strengths & Weaknesses
   - Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison
   - Stop Light Comparison
   - Descriptive Comparison

Chap 19 – COA Selection & Approval

1. Step 6 to JOPP – COA Approval
2. Prepare the COA Decision Briefing
3. Present the COA Decision Briefing
   - COA Decision Briefing Format
4. COA Selection and Modification by the CDR
5. Refine Selected COA
6. Prepare the CDR’s Estimate
7. Concept Discussions IPR

6-Table of Contents
# Chap 20 – Plan Development (Function III) 20-1

1. Function III - Plan/Order Development ........................................ 20-1
2. Step 7 to JOPP – Plan or Order Development ............................. 20-1
3. Format of Military Plans and Orders ........................................... 20-1
4. Plan or Order Development ....................................................... 20-2
5. Application of Forces and Capabilities ....................................... 20-3
6. Plan Development Activities ...................................................... 20-4
   - Force Planning........................................................................ 20-4
   - Support Planning .................................................................... 20-5
   - Nuclear Strike ........................................................................ 20-5
   - Deployment Planning ............................................................ 20-6
   - Shortfall Identification ......................................................... 20-8
   - Feasibility Analysis ............................................................... 20-8
   - Refinement ............................................................................ 20-8
   - Documentation ....................................................................... 20-8
   - Plan Review and Approval .................................................... 20-8
   - Supporting Plan Development ............................................... 20-10
7. Transition .................................................................................. 20-10

# Chap 21 – Plan Assessment (Function IV) 21-1

1. Function IV – Assessment .......................................................... 21-1
2. Plan Assessment - Overview ..................................................... 21-2
3. Plan Assessments - Requirements ............................................. 21-3
4. Contingency Plan Assessments ................................................ 21-5
5. Plan Review Assessment .......................................................... 21-5
6. Interagency Collaboration ......................................................... 21-6

# Chap 22 – Assessment Fundamentals 22-1

1. Assessment Fundamentals .......................................................... 22-1
2. Assessment Process ................................................................... 22-2
   - Assessment Levels and Measures ........................................... 22-3
3. Assessment and the Levels of War .......................................... 22-7
4. Considerations for Effective Assessment .................................. 22-7

# Chap 23 – Execution 23-1

1. Execution .................................................................................. 23-1
2. TPFDD and Execution .............................................................. 23-2
3. Planning During Execution ..................................................... 23-2
4. Plan Adjustment ....................................................................... 23-4
Chap 24 – Summary .................................................................................. 24-1

Appendixes

Appendix A: References ............................................................................. A-1
Appendix B: Planning Timelines and Dates.................................................. B-1
Appendix C: Commander’s Estimate............................................................. C-1
Appendix D: Operational Plan Annexes ...................................................... D-1
Appendix E: Command Relationships.......................................................... E-1
Appendix F: Chain of Command................................................................... F-1
Appendix G: Governing Factors/Evaluation Criteria................................. G-1
Appendix H: Acronyms and Abbreviations................................................... H-1

Index ........................................................................................................... Index-1

Related (Joint/Interagency) SMARTbooks.................................................. Info
1. Background

a. Civilian Control of the Military. Since the founding of the nation, civilian control of the military has been an absolute and unquestioned principle. The Constitution incorporates this principle by giving both the President and Congress the power to ensure civilian supremacy. The Constitution establishes the President as the Commander-in-Chief, but gives the Congress the power “to declare war,” to “raise and support Armies – provide and maintain a Navy – (and) to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces.”

b. Joint Organization before 1900. As established by the Constitution, coordination between the War Department and Navy Department was effected by the President as the Commander in Chief. Army and naval forces functioned autonomously with the President as their only common superior. Despite Service autonomy, early American history reflects the importance of joint operations. Admiral MacDonough’s naval operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor in the ground campaigns of the War of 1812. The joint teamwork displayed by General Grant and Admiral Porter in the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 stands as a fine early example of joint military planning and execution. However, instances of confusion, poor inter-Service cooperation and lack of coordinated, joint military action had a negative impact on operations in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War (1898). By the turn of the century, advances in technology and the growing international involvement of the United States required greater cooperation between the military departments.

c. Joint History through World War I. As a result of the unimpressive joint military operations in the Spanish-American War, in 1903 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy created the Joint Army and Navy Board charged to address “all matters calling for cooperation of the two Services.” The Joint Army and Navy Board was to be a continuing body that could plan for joint operations and resolve problems of common concern to the two Services. Unfortunately, the Joint Board accomplished little, because it could not direct implementation of concepts or enforce decisions, being limited to commenting on problems submitted to it by the secretaries of the two military departments. It was described as “a planning and deliberative body rather than a center of executive authority.” As a result, it had little or no impact on the conduct of joint operations during the First World War. Even as late as World War I, questions of seniority and command relationships between the Chief of Staff of the Army and American Expeditionary Forces in Europe were just being resolved.

“Our Nation’s cause has always been larger than our Nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace - a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.”

President Bush, West Point, New York, June 1, 2002
d. Joint History through World War II. After World War I, the two Service secretaries agreed to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board. Membership was expanded to six: the chiefs of the two Services, their deputies, the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and Director of Plans Division for the Navy. More importantly, a working staff (named the Joint Planning Committee) made up of members of the plans divisions of both Service staffs was authorized. The new Joint Board could initiate recommendations on its own. Unfortunately, the 1919 board was given no more legal authority or responsibility than its 1903 predecessor; and, although its 1935 publication, _Joint Action Board of the Army and Navy_, gave some guidance for the unified operations of World War II, the board itself was not influential in the war. The board was officially disbanded in 1947.

2. The Security Environment

Today's security environment is not unlike those of historic times. The commanders during those eras considered the enemy extremely complex and fluid with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new threats constantly appearing and disappearing. Today, with the national and transnational threats we face, our political and military leaders conduct operations in an ever-more complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment. This increase in the scope of the operational environment may not necessarily result from actions by the confronted adversary alone, but is likely to result from other adversaries exploiting opportunities as a consequence of an overextended or distracted United States (U.S.) or coalition. These adversaries encompass a variety of actors from transnational organizations to states or even ad hoc state coalitions and individuals.

To prepare the United States for today's threats and contingencies we have, over time, established a system of checks and balances to include numerous governmental organizations that are involved in the implementation of United States security policy. However, constitutionally, the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the President.

“As in a building, which, however fair and beautiful, the superstructure is radically marred and imperfect if the foundation be insecure—so, if the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general on the battlefield, the valor of the soldier, the brilliancy of victory, however otherwise decisive, fail of their effect.”

-A.T. Mahan
Joint Operations, Unified Action, & the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)


Services may accomplish tasks and missions in support of Department of Defense (DOD) objectives. However, the DOD primarily employs two or more services in a single operation, particularly in combat, through joint operations. The general term, joint operations, describes military actions conducted by joint forces or by Service forces employed under command relationships. A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments operating under a single joint force commander. Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities through unified action, and joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve a desired military end state.

Unified Action

Whereas the term joint operations focuses on the integrated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States in a unified effort, the term unified action has a broader connotation. JFCs are challenged to achieve and maintain operational coherence given the requirement to operate in conjunction with interorganizational partners. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying joint force actions, since all of the elements and actions that comprise unified action normally are present at the CCDR’s level. However, subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the operations of other military forces and the activities of nonmilitary organizations in the operational area to promote unified action. Unified action is a comprehensive approach that synchronizes, coordinates, and when appropriate, integrates military operations with the activities of other governmental and nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort.

The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

- **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.** These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect US interests at home and abroad.

- **Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Operations.** A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat.

- **Major Operations and Campaigns.** When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign normally involving large-scale combat.

Refer to JFODS4: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations) for complete discussion of joint operations, unified action, and the range of military operations. Additional topics include joint doctrine fundamentals, joint operation planning, joint logistics, joint task forces, information operations, multinational operations, and interorganizational coordination.
3. National Strategic Direction

The common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), Services, and Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) is strategic direction. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide strategic guidance. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), once provided the direction and guidance each prepares strategy and campaign plans in the context of national security and foreign policy goals. These strategic guidance documents are the principle source for DOD global campaign plans, theater strategies, CCMD campaign plans, operation plans, contingency plans, base plans, and commanders estimates.

![National Strategic Direction Diagram](image)

- **National Strategic Direction**
  - Role of the President and Secretary of Defense
    - National Security Strategy
    - National Defense Strategy
    - Quadrennial Defense Review
    - Strategic Guidance Statements
  - Role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    - Joint Strategy Review
    - Unified Command Plan
    - National Military Strategy
    - Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
    - Strategic Guidance Statements
    - Joint Strategic Planning System
  - Role of the Combatant Commander
    - Force Requests
    - Theater Strategy
    - Plans and Orders
    - Strategic Estimate
    - Campaign Plans

  **Figure I-1. National Strategic Direction (JP5-0).**

  a. The President provides strategic guidance through the National Security Strategy (NSS), Presidential Policy Document (PDD), and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance from other members of the National Security Council (NSC)\(^4\) (Figure I-1).

  b. The President and SECDEF, through the CJCS, direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders. The principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential Decisions (PDs) that will directly affect the CCDRs actions is the NSC. Knowledge of the history and relationships between elements of the national security structure is essential to understanding the role of JS organizations.

\(^4\) Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Operations Planning.

1-4 Strategic Organization
c. The National Security Council System (NSC), Department of Defense (DOD) participation in the interagency process is grounded within the Constitution and established by law in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47).

(1) The NSC is a product of NSA 47. NSA 47 codified and refined the interagency process used during World War II, modeled in part on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1919 proposal for a “Joint Plan-Making Body” to deal with the overlapping authorities of the Departments of State, War, and Navy. Because of the diverse interests of individual agencies, previous attempts at interagency coordination failed due to lack of national-level perspectives, a staff for continuity, and adequate appreciation for the need of an institutionalized coordination process. Evolving from the World War II experience (during which the Secretary of State was not invited to War Council meetings), the first State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was formed in 1945.

(a) From the earliest days of this nation, the President has had the primary responsibility for national security stemming from his constitutional powers both as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and his authority to make treaties and appoint cabinet members and ambassadors. The intent of NSA 47 was to assist the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. Most current United States Government (USG) interagency actions flow from these beginnings.

(b) Within the constitutional and statutory system, interagency actions at the national level may be based on both personality and process, consisting of persuasion, negotiation, and consensus building, as well as adherence to bureaucratic procedure.

(2) The NSC is the principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision. The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic (in conjunction with the National Economic Council).

(a) Together with supporting interagency working groups (some permanent and others ad hoc), high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, the National Security Council System (NSCS) provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy. The NSC develops policy options, considers implications, coordinates operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, develops recommendations for the President, and monitors policy implementation. The national security staff is the President’s principal staff for national security issues and also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. NSC documents are established to inform USG departments and agencies of Presidential actions (JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations).


(3) National Security Council Membership. The President chairs the NSC. As prescribed in PDD, the NSC shall have as its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Energy, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Director of Central Intelligence and the CJCS, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall also attend NSC meetings. The Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of NSC meetings, and shall attend any meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate.
(4) **NSC Organization** (Figure I-2). The members of the NSC constitute the President’s personal and principal staff for national security issues. The council tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President, but does not normally implement policy. Rather, it takes a central coordinating or monitoring role in the development of policy and options, depending on the desires of the President and the National Security Advisor. There are three levels of formal interagency committees for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues. The advisory bodies include:

![Diagram](image)

- **Pres**
- **Principals Committee**
- **Deputies Committee**
- **Interagency Policy Committee**

*Figure I-2. National policy-making process is built on consensus.*

(a) The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is the senior Cabinet-level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The Principals Committee meets at the call of and is chaired by the National Security Advisor.

(b) The NSC/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary-level) interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC prescribes and reviews the work of the NSC Interagency Policy Committee (NSC/IPC). The NSC/DC ensures that NSC/IPC issues have been properly analyzed and prepared for decision. The NSC/DC shall focus significant attention on policy implementation. Periodic reviews of the Administration’s major foreign policy initiatives shall be scheduled to ensure that they are being implemented in a timely and effective manner. Such reviews should periodically consider whether existing policy directives should be revamped or rescinded. Finally, the NSC/DC shall be responsible for day-to-day crisis management, reporting to the NSC. Any NSC principal or deputy, as well as the National Security Advisor, may request a meeting of the NSC/DC in its crisis management capacity. The Deputies Committee meets at the call of and is chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor.

(c) NSC/IPCs are the main day-to-day action committees for interagency coordination of national security policy. NSC/IPCs manage the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG, provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSCS, and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The NSC/IPCs shall be established at the direction of the NSC/DC, and be chaired by the NSC (or NEC, as appropriate); at its discretion, the NSC/DC may add co-chairs to any NSC/IPC if desirable. The NSC/IPCs shall convene on a regular basis to review and coordinate the implementation of Presidential decisions in their
I. PLANNING AND PLANS

Plan: (noun)
1. A method or scheme for achieving or doing something. An aim: goal. (Webster’s II)
2. A scheme or method of acting, doing, proceeding, making, etc., developed in advance: battle plans. (Dictionary.com)

1. Planning

Planning is the process of thinking about and organizing the activities required to achieve a desired goal (forethought). It is an anticipatory decision making process that helps in coping with complexities and combines forecasting of developments with the preparation of scenarios and how to react to them. Planning is conducted for different planning horizons, from long-range to short-range. Depending on the echelon and circumstances, units may plan in years, months, or weeks, or in days, hours, and minutes.

The defining challenges to effective planning are uncertainty and time. Uncertainty increases with the length of the planning horizon and the rate of change in an operational environment. A tension exists between the desire to plan far into the future to facilitate preparation and the fact that the farther into the future the commander plans, the less certain the plan will remain relevant. Given the uncertain nature of the operational environment, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to develop a framework for action in the midst of such uncertainty.1

a. Planning provides an informed forecast of how future events may unfold. It entails identifying and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance to include thinking through consequences of certain actions. Planning involves thinking about ways to influence the future as well as how to respond to potential events. Put simply, planning is thinking critically and creatively about what to do and how to do it, while anticipating changes along the way.

b. Planning keeps us oriented on future objectives despite the requirements of current operations. By anticipating events beforehand, planning helps the commander seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. As a result, the force anticipates events and acts purposefully and effectively before the adversary can act or before situations deteriorate. In addition, planning helps anticipate favorable turns of events that could be exploited during shaping operations.

1ADP 5-0, The Operations Process
2. Defining Challenges

a. Planning is also the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out an operational approach to achieve that future. Planning is both a continuous and a cyclical activity of the operations process which translates strategic guidance and direction. Based on this understanding and operational approach, planning continues with the development of a fully synchronized campaign plan, operation plan or order that arranges potential actions in time, space, and purpose to guide the force during execution.\(^2\)

b. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with production of a plan or an order. During preparation and execution, the plan is continuously refined as assessments and situational understanding improves. Supporting commands, subordinates and others provide feedback as to what is working, what is not working, and how the force can do things better.

c. Planning may be based on defined tasks identified in the GEF and the JSCP, or it may be based on the need for a military response to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. The value of following the well-established Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP) has been reinforced through operational and exercise experiences. Key to the process is the detailed analysis necessary to produce the requisite plans and orders that will direct subordinates. In addition to the required analysis, planners must strive to ensure the generated solution does not further exacerbate the problem or limit future options.

3. Integrated Planning

Planning consists of two separate, but closely related, components: a conceptual component and a detailed component (Figure II-1). Conceptual planning involves understanding the operational environment and the problem, determining the operation’s end state, and visualizing an operational approach. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to operational art and is the focus of the commander with staff support. Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with the science of operations including the synchronization of the forces in time, space, and purpose. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or

\(^2\)ADP 5-0, The Operations Process
technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of force as a whole toward a common goal. Effective planning requires the integration of both the conceptual and detailed components of planning.\(^3\)

### 4. Operational Art And Planning

Conceptual planning is directly associated with operational art—the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means.\(^4\) Operational art is a thought process that guides conceptual and detailed planning to produce executable plans and orders.

a. In applying operational art, commanders and their staffs use a set of intellectual tools to help them communicate a common vision of the operational environment as well as visualizing and describing the operational approach. Collectively, this set of tools is known as the elements of operational art (Chapter 6). These tools help commanders understand, visualize, and describe combinations of combat power and help them formulate their intent and guidance. Commanders selectively use these tools in any operation. However, their application is broadest in the context of long-term operations.

b. The elements of operational art support the commander in identifying objectives that link tactical missions to the desired end state. They help refine and focus the operational approach that forms the basis for developing a detailed plan or order. During execution, commanders and staffs consider the elements of operational art as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the operation unfolds.\(^5\)

### 5. Understand and Develop Solutions to Problems

A problem is an issue or obstacle that makes it difficult to achieve a desired goal or objective. In a broad sense, a problem exists when an individual becomes aware of a significant difference between what actually is and what is desired. In the context of operations, an operational problem is the issue or set of issues that impede commanders from achieving their desired end state or objectives.\(^6\)

To understand something is to grasp its nature and significance. Understanding includes establishing context—the set of circumstances that surround a particular event or situation. Throughout the operations process, commanders develop and improve their understanding of their operational environment and the problem. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. Both conceptual and detailed planning assist commanders in developing their initial understanding of the operational environment and the problem. Based on personal observations and inputs from others (to include running estimates), commanders improve their understanding and modify their visualization throughout the conduct of operations.

a. Throughout operations, commanders face various problems, often requiring unique and creative solutions. Planning helps commanders and staffs understand problems and develop solutions. Not all problems require the same level of planning. For simple problems, commanders often identify them and quickly decide on a solution, sometimes on the spot. Planning is critical, however, when a problem is actually a set of interrelated issues, and the solution to each affects the others. For unfamiliar situations, planning offers ways to deal with the complete set of problems as a whole. In general, the more complex a situation is, the more important and involved the planning effort becomes.

\(^3\)ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process  
\(^4\)Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations  
\(^5\)ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process  
\(^6\)Ibid
b. Just as planning is only part of the operations process, planning is only part of problem solving. In addition to planning, problem solving includes implementing the planned solution (execution), learning from implementation of the solution (assessment), and modifying or developing a new solution as required. The object of problem solving is not just to solve near-term problems, but to do so in a way that forms the basis for long-term success.

6. Plans

A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. Commanders issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their understanding of the situation and their visualization of an operation. A plan is a continuous, evolving framework of anticipated actions that maximizes opportunities. It guides subordinates as they progress through each phase of the operation. Any plan is a framework from which to adapt, not a script to be followed to the letter. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events. Good plans and orders foster initiative. Plans and orders come in many forms and vary in scope, complexity, and length of time addressed. Generally, a plan is developed well in advance of execution and is not executed until directed. A plan becomes an order when directed for execution based on a specific time or an event. Some planning results in written orders complete with attachments. Other planning produces brief fragmentary orders issued verbally and followed in writing.a. Plans are developed utilizing the planning steps developed for the JOPP. JOPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical steps to examine a mission, analyze, and compare alternate courses of action (COAs); select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The JOPP process is utilized for “deliberate” planning for a contingency plan or crisis action planning in response to a real world crisis. The greatest difference between deliberate and crisis action planning is the time allotted to conduct each planning step. We will discuss this in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

b. Although the four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, they often run simultaneously in the effort to accelerate the overall planning process. SecDef or the CCDR may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a plan by reentering the planning process at any of the earlier functions. The time spent accomplishing each activity and function depends on the nature of the problem.

(1) In time-sensitive cases, activities and functions may be accomplished simultaneously and compressed so that all decisions are reached in open forum and orders are combined and initially may be issued orally.

(2) A crisis could be so time critical, or a single COA so obvious, that the first written directive might be a DEPORD or an EXORD.

c. Plans encompasses four levels of planning detail, with an associated planning product for each level. See following page for each level.

II. THE CONTINGENCY PLAN AND DELIBERATE PLANNING

1. Contingency Plans

Under the GEF, campaign plans provide the vehicle for linking steady-state shaping activities to current operations and contingencies. Contingency plans under this concept become “branch” plans to the overarching theater campaign plan. A contingency is a situation that likely would involve military forces in response to natural and man-made disasters, terrorists, subversives, military operations by foreign powers, or other situations as directed by the President or SECDEF. Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that
Planning: Levels of Planning Detail

Level 1 Planning Detail — CDR’s Estimate/Concept of Operations/Course of Action (COA)

This level of planning involves the least amount of detail, and focuses on producing a developed COA. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, CDR’s estimate, or a memorandum. The CDR’s estimate provides the SECDEF with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the supported CDR’s analysis of the various COAs available to accomplish an assigned mission and contains a recommended COA.

Level 2 Planning Detail — Base Plan

A base plan describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes or Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD).

Level 3 Planning Detail — Concept Plan (CONPLAN)

A CONPLAN is an operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or operations order (OPORD). It includes a base plan with selected annexes (A, B, C, D, J, K, S, V, Y, and Z) required by the JFC and a supported CDR’s estimate of the plan’s feasibility. It may also produce a transportation feasible TPFDD if applicable.

Level 4 Planning Detail — Operation Plan (OPLAN)

An OPLAN is a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations (CONOPS), all annexes applicable to the plan, and a TPFDD. It identifies the specific forces, functional support, and resources required to execute the plan and provides closure estimates for their flow into the theater. OPLANS can be quickly developed into an OPORD. An OPLAN is normally prepared when:

(a) The contingency is critical to national security and requires detailed prior planning.
(b) The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.
(c) Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.
(d) The feasibility of the plan’s CONOPS cannot be determined without detailed planning.
(e) Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, and sustainment requirements, determine available resources to fill identified requirements, and validate shortfalls.

“In preparing for battle I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable.”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower
The DOS has six Bureaus covering regional priorities.  

Figure III-3. Department of State Six Regional Bureaus.  


The DoD has six geographic commands: 

Figure III-4. DOD Geographic Commands (UCP).
broader USG policy. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the US military and the other instruments of national power.

(1) Interagency Planning. To accomplish required coordination, CCMD planners interact with non-DOD agencies and organizations to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and nonmilitary actions as well as the understanding of regional objectives. Formally, CCDRs will work through the DOD/Joint Staff program known as Promote Cooperation (PC). PC is the forum where CCDRs coordinate their plans with other agencies in the national capital region. PC generates collaborative development of DOD plans with civilian agencies and non-DOD entities. PC events provide CCDRs with a means of directly engaging USG departments and agencies to better inform plan development and identify intergovernmental policy issues to advance plan development.

(a) Of note and worth mentioning here are the geographic boundary differences between the DOS Bureaus and the DOD geographic commands (Figures III-3 through III-5). It’s important we recognize these seams and boundary differences to ensure smooth coordination between these two interagency partners.

(b) When overlaid with each other we see the potential coordination challenges that face both the DOS and DOD when working across boundaries. Close coordination is required between DOS Bureaus and DOD geographic CCMD’s to ensure national security issues and priorities are addressed. (Fig III-5)

Figure III-5. U.S. Department of State Regional Bureaus Overlaid on CCDR’s AOR’s

g. Multinational Plans. Theater campaign planning considers the capabilities and activities of allies and partners including regional security organizations and other multinational organizations to complement US efforts to achieve regional objectives. Multinational integration in theater campaign planning is accomplished in national and international channels. Collective security goals, strategies, and combined plans are developed in accordance with individual treaty or alliance procedures. Host nation support and contingency mutual support agreements are usually developed through national planning channels.
(1) Multinational Planning. Joint operation planning is integrated with alliance or coalition planning at the theater and operational level by the commander of US national forces dedicated to the alliance or coalition military organization. Contingency plans identify assumed contributions and requested support, where possible, to comply with strategic guidance to incorporate international coordination into DOD planning. Theater planners also consult allies and partners on tailored regional security architectures.

7. Strategy

Strategy is a broad statement of the GCCs long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC’s long-term vision for the global employment of functional capabilities. Strategy includes a description of the factors of the environment key to the achievement of the CCMD’s GEF-directed objectives, the CCDR’s approach to applying military power in concert with other elements of national power in pursuit of the objectives, the resources needed to affect the approach, and the risks inherent in implementation. Developing strategy requires understanding the complexity of the environment, translating national-level objectives into desired conditions, and building flexible, adaptable approaches that enable military means to work with other elements of national power to achieve those desired objectives. CCDRs publish a theater strategy to serve as the framework for the TCP, which ties ends, ways, means and risk together over time, and provides an action plan for the strategy.

a. Strategic Estimate. The CCDR and staff, with input from subordinate and supporting commands and agencies, prepare a strategic estimate by analyzing and describing the political, military and economic factors, and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or hinder achievement of the objective over the timeframe of the strategy. The CCMD’s input to the Chairman’s Comprehensive Joint assessment (CJA) is produced annually and informs the strategic estimate and its periodic updates.

b. Policy-Strategy Dynamic. Strategy is always subordinate to policy. However, there is a two-way dependent relationship between policy and strategy. CCDRs bridge the inevitable friction that policy and politics create when developing the theater strategy. Military strategy must be clear, achievable, and flexible to react to changing policy. Policy may evolve as the theater strategy is implemented in a dynamic operational environment. Also, policy may change in reaction to unanticipated opportunities or in reaction to unanticipated challenges. The CCDR’s role is to keep national policy makers informed about changes in the theater’s operational environment that effect such policy decisions and provide advice on the potential outcomes of proposed policy changes.

c. Theater Strategy Components. The theater strategy consists of a description of key factors about the environment that provide context for the strategy and affect the achievement of the desired objectives in the theater, a description of the desired strategic objectives (ends), a strategic approach to apply military power in concert with the other elements of national power over time to achieve the desired objectives (ways), a description of resources needed to source the operational approach (means), and a description of the risks in implementing the strategy.

(1) Environment. Planners describe the current environment of the theater, as well as the desired future environment that meets national and regional policy objectives. This provides context for the strategy. While strategy is subordinate to policy, so is it subordi-
nate to the environment – as the environment changes, so must the strategy. The CCDR and staff conduct a theater strategic estimate which describes the broad strategic factors that influence the theater strategic environment. This continually updated estimate helps to determine missions, objectives, and potential activities required in the TCP.

(2) **Ends.** The ends for both the strategy and campaign are the GEF-directed objectives. CCDRs use the Secretary’s prioritization to guide the order in which they employ limited resources, accepting risk on lower priority objectives before accepting risk on higher priority objectives.

(3) **Ways.** The strategic approach describes the ways that the CCDR will employ the command’s total joint force along with other elements of national power to advance toward its objective. Although military operations, activities, and investments may achieve some objectives without the involvement of non-DOD agencies, the commander’s strategic approach should be complementary with partner agencies’ national security and foreign policy efforts.

(4) **Means.** The strategy’s means are the resources and authorities required to conduct the strategic approach. If there is a reasonable expectation that required means will not become available, then the CCMD must develop an alternative approach within the means that are available or can reasonably be expected to become available. The CCDR takes unresolved issues of means to the DODs senior leaders to identify shortfalls.

(5) **Risk.** CCDRs assess how strongly U.S. interests are help within their AOR, how those interests can be threatened, and their ability to execute assigned missions to protect them. This is documented in the CCDR’s strategic estimate and in the annual Chairman’s Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA). CCDRs and DODs senior leaders work together to reach a common understanding of campaign risk, decide what risk is acceptable, and minimize the effects of accepted risk by establishing appropriate risk controls.5

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**Campaign Risk** is the strategic risk assessed by the CCMD at theater level combined with the military risk.

**Military Risk** is the risk to mission assessed by the CCMD combined with the risk to the force assessed by the Services.

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8. Theater Campaign Design

Typically, complex tasks or problems are better understood applying operational art and design techniques to assist understanding and visualization. Operational art and design helps planners bound the theater engagement “problem” in such a way that it can be solved by the CCMD. Three interrelated activities collectively provide understanding and visualization of the theater campaign’s purpose. These activities include framing the operational environment, framing the problem to be solved, and developing an appropriate operational approach to solve the problem. For greater discussion on these design activities see Chapter 6, Operational Art, Design, and the Joint Operations Cycle.

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5CJCSM 3130.01 series

3-10 Campaign Planning
Joint Operation Planning is the problem-solving piece of the “design.” It is procedural, follows the steps of the JOPP and produces the requisite plans and orders to direct action. While not prescriptive, it provides a common framework for joint planning and provides interagency and multinational partners an outline for how the U.S. joint forces plan and where to provide their inputs as stakeholders. Joint Operations Planning consists of the following:

- Joint Operation Planning
- Stability Operations
- GFM and Force Projection Planning
- Operation Phasing
- Joint Operation Planning Organization and Responsibility
- In-Progress Reviews

1. Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides CCDR’s in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. This Planners Smart Book focuses on the planning process and those aspects of GFM which fall into the steps of joint planning.

a. Planning is triggered when directed by strategic guidance or when the continuous monitoring of global events indicates the need to prepare military options. It is a collaborative process that can be iterative and/or parallel to provide actionable direction to CCDRs and their staffs across multiple echelons of command.

b. Joint operation planning includes all activities that must be accomplished to plan for an anticipated operation — the force planning, mobilization, deployment, distribution, employment, sustainment, redeployment and demobilization of forces. Planners recommend and CCDRs define criteria for the termination of joint operations and link these criteria to the transition to stabilization and achievement of the objectives and endstate.

2. Stability Operations

Stability operations are core U.S. military missions that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. Stability operations shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.¹

a. Per DOD Instruction (DODI) 3000.05, Stability Operations, all military plans shall address stability operation requirements throughout all phases of an operation or plan as appropriate. Stability operations dimensions of military plans shall be:

(1) Conduct stability operations activities throughout all phases of conflict and across the range of military operations, including in combat and non-combat environments. The magnitude of stability operations missions may range from small-scale, short-duration to large-scale, long-duration.

¹DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations
(2) Support stability operations activities led by other USG departments or agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “USG agencies”), foreign governments and security forces, international governmental organizations, or when otherwise directed.

(3) Lead stability operations includes activities to establish civil security and civil control, restore essential services, repair and protect critical infrastructure, and deliver humanitarian assistance until such time as it is feasible to transition lead responsibility to other USG agencies, foreign governments and security forces, or international governmental organizations. In such circumstances, the DOD will operate within USG and, as appropriate, international structures for managing civil-military operations, and will seek to enable the deployment and utilization of the appropriate civilian capabilities.

3. GFM and Force Projection Planning

GFM is an integral building block to Joint Planning and is conducted simultaneously. At any given time there could be multiple requirements to employ military forces. Each operation could have a different strategic priority, and could be of a different size and scope. To effectively support multiple requirements, and apply the right level of priority and resources to each, requires effective GFM. The national importance of these missions is reflected in the elevated movement priorities that can be invoked by the President or SECDEF. See Chapter VII, Global Force Management, for greater detail.

a. Background. GFM has transformed the former reactive force management process into a near real-time, proactive process. Historically, and prior to GFM, the DOD conducted strategic force management through a decentralized, ad hoc process that framed decision opportunities for the SECDEF. For Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the SECDEF made crisis force management decisions in response to CCDR’s request for forces (RFF) or capabilities. To support these decisions, the CJCS hosted ad hoc “wargames” to identify forces to support those OEF/OIF requests and determine risk mitigation options. This process was cumbersome and time intensive.

(1) GFM today enables the SECDEF to make proactive, risk-informed force management decisions by integrating and aligning the three processes of force assignment, apportionment, and allocation in support of the NDS, joint force availability requirements, and joint force assessments. This process facilitates alignment of operational forces against known allocation requirements in advance of planning and deployment preparation timelines.

(2) The end result is a timely allocation of forces/capabilities necessary to execute CCMD missions (including Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) tasks), timely alignment of forces against future requirements, and informed SECDEF decisions on the risk associated with allocation decisions while eliminating ad hoc assessments. The Director JS J3 (DJ-3) has been designated the Joint Force Coordinator (JFC) for identifying and recommending sourcing solutions for conventional forces, in coordination with the Military Departments and other CCMDs, and as the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP). U.S. Special Opera-

2CJCSM 3130.06, GFM Policies and Procedures

3Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.

4CJCS, through the Director, J-3 (DJ-3), will serves as the Joint Force Coordinator (JFC) responsible for providing recommended sourcing solutions for all validated force and JIA requirements. In support of the DJ-3 the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Regional Operations and Force Management (J-35) assumes the responsibilities of the JFC. As such the JFC will coordinate with the Joint Staff J-3, Secretaries of the Military Departments, CDRs, JFPs, JFM, and DoD Agencies. The Joint Force Coordinator (JFC) is referred to in current DoD GFM guidance and policy as the JFC. However, for clarity in this document, and distinction between the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and Joint Force Coordinator (JFC), the Joint Force Coordinator will be referred to as the Joint Staff Joint Force Coordinator (JS JFC).
I. Planning and Functions

Contingencies and crisis share the same planning activities and are interrelated. The joint operation planning process (JOPP) can be as detailed as time, resources, experience, and situation permit. The JOPP is detailed, deliberate, sequential, and time consuming. All steps and sub-steps are used when enough planning time and staff support are available. The JOPP is a planning model that establishes procedures for analyzing a mission, developing, analyzing, and comparing COAs against criteria of success and each other, selecting the optimum COA, and producing a plan or order. The JOPP applies across the spectrum of conflict and range of military operations (ROMO). The JOPP helps organize the thought process of commanders and staffs. It helps them apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to reach decisions.

a. Each JOPP step begins with inputs that build on previous steps. The outputs of each step drive subsequent steps. False assumptions and errors committed early affect later steps. While the formal process begins with the receipt of a mission and has as its goal the production of an order, planning continues throughout the operations process.

b. The four subordinate planning functions that embody joint operation planning are: (1) Strategic Guidance, (2) Concept Development, (3) Plan Development, and (4) Plan Assessment (Figure V-1).

c. Although the four planning functions are generally sequential, they often run simultaneously in the effort to accelerate the overall planning process. The Secretary of Defense or the CCDR may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a plan by reentering the planning process at any of the earlier functions. The time spent accomplishing each activity and function depends on the nature of the crisis.

(1) In time-sensitive cases, activities and functions may be accomplished simultaneously and compressed so that all decisions are reached in open forum and orders are combined and initially may be issued orally.

(2) A crisis could be so time critical, or a single COA so obvious, that the first written directive might be a DEPORD or an EXORD.

(a) Commanders can alter the JOPP to fit time-constrained circumstances and produce a satisfactory plan. In time-constrained conditions, commanders assess the situation; update their commander’s visualization, and direct the staff to perform those JOPP activities needed to support the required decisions.

(b) Streamlined processes permit commanders and staffs to shorten the time needed to issue orders when the situation changes. In a time-constrained environment, many steps of the JOPP are conducted concurrently. To an outsider, it may appear that experienced commanders and staffs omit key steps. In reality, they use existing products or perform steps in their heads instead of on paper. They also use many shorthand procedures and implicit communication. Fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs) and warning orders (WARNORDs) are essential in this environment.

(3) Following each of the IPRs the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) will publish a memorandum for record detailing SECDEF’s guidance for continued planning.
Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

Figure V-1. Planning Functions (JP 3-35).
Planning Functions

1. Strategic Guidance - Function I
The President, SECDEF, and the CJCS, with appropriate consultation, formulate suitable and feasible military objectives to counter threats. The CCDR may provide input through one or more CDR’s Assessments. This function is used to develop planning guidance for preparation of COAs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance (e.g., JSCP for contingency plans or a CJCS Warning Order, Planning Order or Alert Order for a crisis). The primary end product is a CDR’s Mission Statement for deliberate planning and a CDR’s Assessment (OPREP-3PCA) or CDRs Estimate in CAP.

2. Concept Development - Function II
During deliberate planning, the supported CCDR develops the CCDR’s CONOPS for SECDEF approval, based on SECDEF, CJCS, and Service Chief planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In CAP, concept development is based on situational awareness guidance, resource allocations from approved contingency plans, and a CJCS Planning Order, or Alert Order. Using the CCDR’s mission statement, CCMD planners develop preliminary COAs and staff estimates. COAs are then compared and the CCDR recommends a COA for SECDEF approval in a CDR’s Estimate. The CCDR also requests SECDEF guidance on interagency coordination. The approved COA becomes the basis of the CONOPS containing conflict termination planning, supportability estimates, and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased database of force requirements, with estimated sustainment.

3. Plan Development - Function III
This function is used in developing an OPLAN, CONPLAN or an OPORD with applicable supporting annexes and in refining preliminary feasibility analysis. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, conflict termination, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities. Detailed planning begins with SECDEF approval for further planning in a non-crisis environment or a CJCS Warning Order, Alert Order or Planning Order in a crisis situation; it ends with a SECDEF-approved Plan or OPORD.

4. Plan Assessment – Function IV
During this function, the CCDR refines the complete plan while supporting and subordinate CCDRs, Services and supporting agencies complete their supporting plans for his/her review and approval. CCDRs continue to develop and analyze branches and sequels as required or directed. The CCDR and the JS continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan revision or refinement.

(a) The JS, Services, CCMDs, and Agencies monitor current readiness and availability status to assess sourcing impacts and refine sourcing COAs should the plan be considered for near-term execution.

(b) The CCDR may conduct as many IPR(s) as are required with the SECDEF during Plan Assessment. These IPR(s) could focus on branches/options and situational or assumption changes requiring major reassessment or significant plan modification/adaptation, but might also include a variety of other pertinent topics (e.g., information operations, special access programs, nuclear escalation mitigation).

1 CJCSM 3122.01
II. Joint Operation Planning Process

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Aug ‘11), pp. IV-1 to IV-3 (fig. IV-2, p. IV-3).

Operational design and JOPP are complementary elements of the overall planning process. Operational design provides an iterative process that allows for the commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends–ways–means–risk questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations. The commander, supported by the staff, gains an understanding of the operational environment, defines the problem, and develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation through the application of operational design during the initiation step of JOPP.

Commanders communicate their operational approach to their staff, subordinates, supporting commands, agencies, and multinational/nongovernmental entities as required in their initial planning guidance so that their approach can be translated into executable plans. As JOPP is executed, commanders learn more about the operational environment and the problem and refine their initial operational approach. Commanders provide their updated approach to the staff to guide detailed planning. This iterative process between the commander’s maturing operational approach and the development of the mission and CONOPS through JOPP facilitates the continuing development of possible COAs and their refinement into eventual CONOPS and executable plans.

This relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and JOPP continues throughout execution of the campaign or operation. By applying the operational design methodology in combination with the procedural rigor of JOPP, the command can help keep its aperture as wide as possible to always question the mission’s continuing relevance and suitability while executing operations in accordance with the current approach and revising plans as needed. By combining the best aspects of both of these approaches, the friendly force can maintain the greatest possible flexibility and do so in a proactive vice reactive manner.
II. Operational Art in the Strategic Context

1. Grand Strategy as the Basis for Operational Art

   a. Military operations do not occur in a vacuum, and the preeminent aspect of any military campaign is the grand strategic context in which it occurs. Military effectiveness depends at least partly on the military’s appreciation of and consistency with that context. Pursuing and maintaining the necessary levels of consistency is the realm of operational art.

   b. Clausewitz’s musing that “war is nothing but the continuation of politics by other means”\(^1\) makes no inference that military campaigns are simple interruptions to grand strategy. To the contrary, war is a dynamic integral component of grand strategy for which standard civil planning systems are often insufficient. And so, it is through the application of operational art that military operations and engagements are objectively linked with the activities of those other elements of national power\(^2\) in compliance with grand strategy. Figure VI-1 depicts this relationship.

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\(^1\) Clausewitz, On War (Paret/Howard Translation), author’s notes of 10 July, 1827.

\(^2\) Or international - in the case of multi-national endeavors.
“I believe that in 2020, we will still be the most powerful military in the world. More than 1 million men and women under arms — present in more than 130 countries and at sea — will still possess capabilities in every domain that overmatches potential adversaries. Enjoying alliances with a majority of the most powerful states, we will be the only nation able to globally project massive military power.” ¹

Quadrennial Defense Review

Section I - Global Force Management Goals and Processes (p. 7-4)
Section II - Force Sourcing and GFM Planning (p. 7-19)
Section III - Force Planning and the GFM Process (p. 7-23)
Section IV - Deployment Planning (p. 7-24)
Section V - Joint Force Projection (p. 7-30)
Section VI - Responsibilities of Supported and Supporting CCDRs (p. 7-38)
Section VII - Mutually Supporting, Interrelated DOD Processes (p. 7-41)
Section VIII - GFM Summary (p. 7-42)

The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied. To protect U.S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the NSS in this environment, the Joint Force will need to continually recalibrate its capabilities and make selective additional investments to succeed in the following missions:²

Counter Terrorism and Irregular Warfare - Deter and Defeat Aggression - Project Power Despite Anti-Access/Area Denial Challenges - Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction - Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space - Maintain a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Deterrent - Defend the Homeland and Provide Support to Civil Authorities - Provide a Stabilizing Presence - Conduct Stability and Counterinsurgency Operations - Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations

Likewise the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) affirms that our Armed Forces “be capable of conducting a broad range of several overlapping operations to prevent and deter conflict and, if necessary, to defend the United States, its allies and partners, selected critical infrastructure, and other national interests.” The experiences with operations such as Operation Urgent Response in Haiti has demonstrated that even while sourcing major combat operations in one part of the world, we may be called upon to react to a crisis in disparate regions of the globe. An earthquake in one AOR can have a rippling impact on force sourcing for current operations and long-term security planning.

The QDR also recognizes "simultaneously defending the homeland: conducting sustained, distributed counterterrorist operations; and in multiple regions, deterring aggression and assuring allies through forward presence and engagement. If deterrence fails at any given time, U.S. forces will be capable of defeating a regional adversary in a large-scale multi-phased campaign, and denying the objectives of, or imposing unacceptable costs on, a second aggressor in another region." 3 To remain dominant within this complex and uncertain security landscape the ability to dynamically align the force pool must improve and keep pace with the complexity of the operational environment. The wicked problem of balancing the force against global and institutional demand requires strict purposeful design to allow for timely and informed decisions and to ultimately satisfy the broadest array of objectives.

1. Purpose

This chapter provides an overview of the GFM process, which starts and ends with the SECDEF. In accordance with Title 10, United States Code (Title 10 USC), the SECDEF assigns forces/capabilities, allocates forces/capabilities, provides planning guidance to CCMDs, and provides overarching strategic guidance to the CJCS. The CJCS, in turn, develops strategic-level guidance including apportioned forces/capabilities to CCMDs for adaptive planning. CCMDs use apportioned forces as an assumption in developing plans and to coordinate execution force/capability requirements with the CJCS based on the SECDEF’s guidance. The GFM processes, distributes forces among the CCDR’s via the assignment of forces, provides a process to adjust the distribution of forces among the CCDR’s to meet dynamic challenges worldwide, and provides the Services’ estimate of the number of forces that can reasonably be made available over a general timeline, should we be faced with executing a major operation. The end result is a risk-informed distribution of forces among the CCDRs and a starting point to begin resource-informed planning.

2. Situation

The strategic environment will continue to be complex, dynamic and uncertain. The United States military will continue to be involved globally in named operations, Overseas Contingency Operations, Support to Campaign Plans, Theater Security Cooperation activities, exercises, and Security Force Assistance operations in support of National Security, National Defense and National Military Strategies. 4 Success in this environment requires a coherent use of the force pool (Figure VII-1) among the competing priorities in both planning and execution. This is achieved by the integrated use of assignment, allocation and apportionment. The goal of these processes are to provide CCDRs the forces to best support U.S. Military objectives (both current and potential future) outlined in the GEF using assigned and allocated forces to accomplish missions while mitigating military risk. To allow feasible plans to be developed, CCDRs are provided force planning assumptions based on analysis of the force pool. The number of forces that are reasonably expected to be available, (globally, not to a specific plan or CCDR) should the plan be executed, are called apportioned forces. As the US Military continues to face fiscal challenges, the wise use of forces to meet the many global demands will become more and more important.

a. CCDRs are directed by the Unified Command Plan (UCP), strategic guidance and various orders, to plan and execute operations and missions. CCDRs are assigned forces that are to be used to accomplish those operations and missions; however, in the dynamic world environment, competing missions may require adjusting the distribution of assigned forces among the CCDRs and Services through allocation. Each allocation decision

3 Secretary Of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, (U.S. Department of Defense, 2014), VI.
4 SECDEF directed GFM procedures are contained in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) and the GEF.

7-2 Global Force Management (GFM)
force availability requirements, and joint force assessments. It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of U.S. military forces/capabilities and provides senior decision makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in forces/capability assignment, apportionment, and allocation.

3. Force Pool

The three processes of assignment, allocation and apportionment are related to each other. Figure VII-1 shows the entire DOD force pool (every military unit, Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine) within the “Service Institutional” and “Operational Forces” box. This force pool is further divided by assigned forces to a CCDR, unassigned forces (Service Institutional), and Service retained forces. Most allocated forces come from operational forces assigned to a CCDR and Service retained, but in some instances, the Service may be directed to provide (allocate) forces from their Service Institutional forces (such as recruiters and schoolhouses).

**Service Retained Forces** – AC and RC operational forces under the administrative control of respective Secretaries of the Military Departments, and not assigned to a CCDR. These forces remain under the administrative control of their respective Services and are commanded by a Service-designated Commander responsible to the Service unless allocated to a CCDR for the execution of operational missions. GFMIG

**Unassigned Forces** – Forces not assigned to a CCDR IAW Title 10 USC, Section 162, and instead remain under Service control in order to carry out functions of the Secretary of a Military Department IAW Title 10 USC sections 3013(b), 5013(b), 8013(b). GFMIG

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Figure VII-1. Force Pool (GFMIG).
ffectively managing the transportation flow. Supporting CCMDs and DOD agencies source requirements not available to the supported CCDR as directed by the SECDEF and are responsible for: verifying supporting unit movement data; regulating the support deployment flow; and coordinating effectively during deployment operations. Based upon the supported CCDR’s guidance, planners must assess the AOR’s environment and determine deployment requirements for supporting the CCDR’s CONOPS. Transportation feasibility must be included in the COA development.

SECTION VII - MUTUALLY SUPPORTING, INTERRELATED DOD PROCESSES

1. The GFM Process

The GFM process aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the NDS and joint force availability requirements. It provides DOD senior leadership with comprehensive insight into the global availability of forces and risk and impact of proposed force changes. The GFMB serves as a guiding body that provides complementary strategic focus and direction for the assignment, apportionment, and allocation process.

a. The mutually supporting, interrelated DOD processes are viewed in Figure VII-7 through a GFM lens. The stakeholders depicted include OSD, JS J3, Services (including theater Service Components), JFPs and the JFM (including their assigned Service Components and subordinate commands), CCDRs (including their assigned Service Components, JTFs, and other subordinate commands).

![Global Force Management Operational View](Sample Image)

* USO/TVM/COM is the J2/2DMC Joint Force Functional Manager
** USO/OCCM has similar J1 responsibilities to the Services

Figure VII-7. GFM Operational View (OV-1).
2. GFM Operational View

a. The GFM alignment (assignment, apportionment, and allocation) processes, tools, and data maintain synchronization across stakeholders and integration with related processes. This enhances the ability to efficiently and effectively align the force structure to respond to the complex, dynamic global environment.

b. Each stakeholder shares data and information to collaboratively determine the best use of the force structure to meet a situation. Impacts and risks of re-aligning the force structure are visible and all stakeholders collaboratively develop mitigation strategies. Planners obtain common force structure data directly from the entities responsible for building and maintaining the data.

c. Formally and rigorously specified force structure data contains unambiguously defined semantics implemented so GFM-related computer programs can readily exploit the data. Stakeholders share a common understanding of the meaning of GFM data. Changes in any of the processes depicted as overlapping and interacting with GFM influence not only GFM directly, but often influence changes in other processes. Seamless iterative interaction and integration between these related processes are necessary for the success of each of these processes as well as success of the missions these processes exist to support.

d. See facing page for discussion of GFM process interactions.

SECTION VIII, GFM SUMMARY

a. The DOD continues to implement the most profound reordering of the U.S. military presence overseas since the start of the Cold War. The future operating environment has the potential to produce more challenges than the United States and its military forces can respond to effectively. Therefore, resource management must enable the SECDEF and other senior civilian and military leadership to balance resources, to include forces, among the strategic priorities of on-going operations, shaping activities, and deliberate plans. Foremost in the resource management effort is the GFM enterprise which aligns forces using the assignment, allocation, and apportionment processes in support of strategic guidance and a common vision and agreed-upon end result. As a cornerstone to the APEX initiative, GFM will provide leaders at all levels with a clear picture of global force readiness, availability, and the risks associated with changing the alignment of the forces via the assignment, allocation and apportionment processes. The GFM enterprise provides the CJCS and SECDEF the decision support structure to make informed decisions on the use of forces. The metrics, information, and data requirements for these decisions can be situation dependent, making the GFM processes highly dynamic.

b. In the past, forces were apportioned for deliberate planning and presumed ready and available. Today’s dynamic and demanding world requires us to challenge that assumption. As Operation Unified Response in Haiti was unfolding, planners recognized, yet again, that we must still be prepared to practice force management when a large percentage of forces may be committed to on-going operations and are unavailable. We must have the mechanisms available to rapidly mitigate the challenges and the risks this creates.

c. Doctrine and policy will continue to be challenged keeping current with the highly dynamic GFM processes. The many “independent” variables involved in GFM make data transmission and information gathering inconsistent and, at times, it is perceived as cumbersome. Compounding these issues is the fact that the number of individuals who fully
GFM Process Interactions

The GFM process aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the NDS and joint force availability requirements. As displayed in Figure VII-5 the process interactions are:

**Force Development**
The Force Development Process takes input from many sources. Global demand for forces is one of those inputs. Likewise, GFM projects alignment of both current and projected force structure, so GFM is influenced by the changes taking place to the force structure through the Force Development Process.

**Planning Process**
The Planning Process is both influenced by and influences GFM. As the fidelity of a given plan is refined, the alignment of the force pool necessarily influences the plan. The forces assumed in planning must be aligned to the supported CCDR if/when a plan transitions to execution. This re-alignment, in turn, affects other planning efforts.

**Command and Control**
Command and Control by the Joint Force Commander includes establishing clear lines of command. Orders and direct planning assumptions dealing with the force structure (apportionment) communicate the alignment of forces. The orders and assumptions also direct near steady state Combatant Command authorities of forces (assignment) and re-alignment of forces and deployments to other CCMDs to respond to world events (allocation). GFM alignment processes both influence and are influenced by the Command and Control processes.

**Deployment Process**
The Deployment Process includes the tasks of preparing, deploying, sustaining and redeploying forces. Timelines for each of the tasks performed in the Deployment Processes inform the GFM alignment processes when planning the schedules to implement allocation and apportionment. Likewise, the Deployment Process receives and executes the deployment schedules generated from the GFM processes.

**Distribution Process**
The Distribution Process includes the tasks of moving units and sustainment worldwide. The distribution and transportation capabilities influence the schedules developed in the GFM process. Likewise, the GFM process deployment orders influence both planning and execution within the Distribution Process.

**Interagency Process**
While GFM does not manage the entire collection capabilities in all branches of government, GFM interacts with the Interagency Process by providing a conduit to non-DOD agencies to meet CCDR capability requests, for both planned and executed operations. As other (non-DOD) instruments of national power are committed to support CCDR capability requests, the GFM orders provide a vehicle to inform the JPEC of the directed sourcing solution.

**Current Operations**
Current operations, while formally defined as a subset of CAP, require forces. As the goals and strategies for these operations change, these changes directly impact the alignment of the force structure. Likewise, the capabilities resident in the force structure influence the strategies and plans to prosecute the operations.

**Readiness**
Readiness is a key indicator of availability when planning force deployments and aligning the force. The alignment of the force likewise influences the flow of efforts and resources to prepare forces to deploy.
I. Adaptive Planning And Execution - Overview

1. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)

APEX is defined as “the Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require.” (CJCSG 3130, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Overview and Policy Framework). It incorporates a joint enterprise for the development, maintenance, assessment, and implementation of global campaign plans, theater campaign and related contingency plans and orders prepared in response to Presidential, SECDEF, or Chairman direction or requirements. APEX activities span many organizational levels, including the interaction between the SECDEF, CCO, coalition, and interagency which ultimately assists the President and SECDEF to decide when, where, and how to commit U.S. military forces.

a. Effective military planning and execution requires integration within the national strategic framework. Fundamentally, military planning and execution is shaped by strategic direction. Civilian control of the military is exercised via this strategic direction, including the delegation of authorities and allocation of resources. A sustained civilian-military dialogue provides a common understanding of the operating environment and options for military ends, ways, means, and associated risk. Within the APEX framework, this civilian-military dialogue informs and is informed by ongoing military planning and execution. Substantive changes in the operating environment or strategic ends, ways, and means may also drive more enduring changes to strategic direction. This mutual influence is foundational to APEX and is depicted in Figure IX-1.

b. **APEX Enterprise.** The APEX enterprise encompasses the full spectrum of military DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy). It is the compilation of joint policies, processes, procedures, tools, training, and education used by the JPEC to monitor, plan, assess and execute the many planning activities involved to include; mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. APEX integrates strategic and operational planning with execution activities of the JPEC to
meet national security objectives and facilitate seamless transition from planning to execution. APEX informs the entire chain of command, including the President and Secretary, facilitating informed decisions on how, when, and where to employ the military.

(1) The APEX Enterprise is an iterative process. Each activity and function influences and is influenced by activities and functions which are performed and reviewed at multiple echelons of commands in overlapping timeframes. Facilitating communication and understanding of strategic guidance between these echelons of command takes place in several formats: formal strategy and policy documents; the plans review process; and via specific, individual communications with CCMDs. CCDR planning may also influence strategic direction and guidance, either during planning or execution.

(2) Per CJCSM 3130.02 the military planning and execution process is composed of four operational activities (situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment) that provide an operating framework for one or more planning or execution efforts (Figure IX-2). The operational activities are comprised of a sustained cycle of situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment that occurs continuously to support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command and inform civilian leadership. The planning and execution functions depict the elements, activities, and products that may be ongoing or under development.

(3) APEX leverages CCDR design, military planning and execution and the JOPP framework that forms the basis for planning. The APEX process is abbreviated below, refer to CJCSM 3130 series documents for greater detail.

(4) Operational Activities:

(a) Situational Awareness. Within APEX, situational awareness is the foundation supporting the continuous cycle of planning, execution, and assessment activities. CCDRs must know when strategic and operational facts and conditions change. Situational awareness is both internal (CCDR CCIRs/PIRs) and external (national interest, political environment). Situational awareness comprises the strategic environment including threats to national security while continuously monitoring the national and international political and military situations. Through situational awareness the determination of timely, relevant, and accurate information concerning the status of adversary, friendly forces, and resources is ascertained.

(b) Planning. APEX formally integrates military planning – campaign, contingency, and crisis – into one construct to better facilitate unity of effort and the transition from planning to execution. APEX establishes routine interactions between the SECDEF and CCDRs in the form of in-process reviews (IPRs). IPRs refine strategic direction and guidance, discuss military options, assist in understanding strategic risks and decision points, and address CCDR issues and concerns within potential contingency scenarios. Importantly, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) civilian leadership considers the review process as an iterative dialogue that matures over time (Chapter 8 – IPRs).

(c) Execution.

1. Theater Campaign Plan. The Theater Campaign Plan is always in execution. Consequently, theater campaigning is a continuous cycle of plan implementation – assessment – modification – and continuous implementation as theater operations, activities, events, and investments are applied to achieve regional IMOs.

2. Contingency Plans. For contingencies execution begins with the first activity in support of an approved operation order (OPORD) after the President or SECDEF authorize the Chairman to issue an execute order (EXORD) which directs the supported commander to initiate military operations, defines the time to initiate operations, and conveys guidance not provided earlier. Execution continues until the operation is terminated, forces are re-deployed, or the mission is accomplished or revised. Detailed discussions on the execution process and the roles and responsibilities during execution of the joint community are contained in the CJCSM 3122 and CJCSM 3130 series of documents.

(d) Assessments. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of a joint plan or operation toward mission accomplishment. It encompasses APEX at all levels and is iterative throughout and enables commanders to review and where necessary make the recommendations for additional resources or to recommend reallocating available resources to the highest priorities. Assessment and learning
also enable incremental improvements to the commander’s operational approach and the campaign or contingency plan. Once commanders understand the problem and what needs to be accomplished, they identify the means to assess effectiveness and the related information requirements that support assessment. This feedback becomes the basis for learning, adaptation, and subsequent adjustment. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. In general assessments should answer two basic questions: Are we doing things right? Are we doing the right things? (Chapter 22 has greater details on assessment).

(e) **Staff Estimates.** Staff estimates are absolutely vital to establish and maintain an overall high degree of coordination and cooperation, both internally and with staffs of higher, lower, and adjacent units. The staff estimates continue throughout situational awareness, planning execution and assessment. Accurate and timely staff estimates directly affect the commanders ability to make well informed resource and risk based decisions (Chapter 16 has greater details on staff estimates).

(5) **Planning Functions.** The APEX process consists of core planning functions; Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, and Plan Assessment. During each function CCDRs ensure planning is synchronized with the SECDEF’s intent and consistent with current national objectives and assumptions. This is accomplished by maintaining an on-going dialog with the Joint Staff and OSD, as the guidance and assessments may change during the planning process and over the life of the plan (Chapter 9 has greater details on planning functions and the JOPP).

(6) **Execution Functions.** The APEX process consists of several execution functions. During each function, CCDRs continue to direct, monitor, assess and adjust as the plan moves forward within execution. CCDRs continue to review progress as needed during execution with the SECDEF, Chairman, and OSD. This on-going dialog is maintained to ensure guidance and intent is consistent with current national objectives and assumptions as the order is executed (Chapter 23 has greater details on execution).

(7) **In-Process Reviews.** The APEX system features early planning guidance and frequent iterative dialog in the form of reviews and updates between the OSD staff, the Joint Staff, Service staffs, and military commanders and planners. This dialog, known as socialization, facilitates an understanding of, and agreement on, the mission, planning and policy assumptions, strategic context, operational environment, threat courses of action, risks, and other key factors such as interagency (IA) and allied planning considerations between OSD leadership and the planners. In this sense, the plan is considered a “living” plan in terms of guidance, relevancy, and appropriateness because the CCMD, Joint Staff,
1. Step 2 to JOPP — Mission Analysis

The mission analysis process helps to build a common understanding of the problem to be solved and boundaries within which to solve it by key stakeholders. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand.

**Primary products of mission analysis are a restated mission statement, the initial intent statement, CDR’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), and initial planning guidance (IPG).**

a. The CCDR is responsible for analyzing the mission and restating the mission for subordinate CDRs to begin their own estimate and planning efforts. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the CCDR and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. *There is perhaps no step more critical to the JOPP and a successful plan.*
One product of the mission analysis process is the mission statement. Your initial mission analysis as a staff will result in a “tentative” mission statement. This tentative mission statement is a recommendation for the commander based on mission analysis. This recommendation is presented to the commander for approval normally during the Mission Analysis Brief.

b. A primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the national strategic endstate and that set of national objectives and related guidance that define strategic success from the President’s perspective. The endstate and national objectives will reflect the broadly expressed Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Infrastructure (PMESII) and other circumstances that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. The CCDR also must consider multinational objectives associated with coalition or alliance operations.

c. The supported CCDR typically will specify a theater strategic endstate. While it will mirror many of the objectives of the national strategic endstate, the theater endstate may contain other supporting objectives and conditions. This endstate normally will represent a point in time and/or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic endstate.

d. CCDRs include a discussion of the national strategic endstate and objectives in their initial planning guidance. This ensures that joint forces understand what the President wants the situation to look like at the conclusion of U.S. involvement. The CCDR and subordinate JFCs typically include the military endstate in their CDR’s intent statement.1

e. During mission analysis, it is essential that the tasks (specified and essential task(s)) and their purposes are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations (restraints-can’t do, or constraints–must do) on actions that the CCDR or subordinate forces may take are understood; and the correlation between the CDRs’ mission and intent, and those of higher, and other CDRs is understood.

f. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The CCDR and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical tasks. Of these two, the purpose is preeminent. The CCDR can adjust his task to ensure he accomplishes the purpose. This is a critical aspect of mission type orders and the ability of subordinate CDRs to re-task themselves during rapidly changing circumstances and still fulfill the CDR’s intent.

 g. While all of these tasks will be addressed during the plan development process, it is critical to focus on the mission essential task(s) to ensure unity of effort and maximum use of limited resources. The mission essential task(s) defines success of the assigned mission.

Auftragstaktik (Mission Type Order): Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters, or one that assigns a broad mission (as opposed to a detailed task), without specifying how it is to be accomplished.

1 JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning.
13 Key-Steps to Mission Analysis

Key-Step — 1: Analyze Higher CDR’s Mission and Intent

Key-Step — 2: Task Analysis, Determine Own Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks

Key-Step — 3: Determine Known Facts, Assumptions, Current Status, or Conditions

Key-Step — 4: Determine Operational Limitations
  • Constraints – “Must do”
  • Restraints – “Can’t do”

Key-Step — 5: Determine Own Military Endstate, Termination Criteria, Objectives and Initial Effects

Key-Step — 6: Determine Own and Enemy’s Center(s) of Gravity, Critical Factors and Decisive Points

Key-Step — 7: Conduct Initial Force Structure Analysis (Apportioned Forces)

Key-Step — 8: Conduct Initial Risk Assessment

Key-Step — 9: Determine CDR’s CCIR
  • CFFI
  • PIR

Key-Step — 10: Develop Tentative Mission Statement

Key-Step — 11: Develop Mission Analysis Brief

Key-Step — 12: Prepare Initial Staff Estimates

Key-Step — 13: Publish CDR’s Planning Guidance and Initial Intent

*NOTE: Previous JP 5-0, Joint Operations Planning, have listed numerous Mission Analysis Key-Steps. This document recognizes and addresses all Key-Steps of Joint Doctrine, and condenses them into the following 13 Key-Steps. This is done to allow a logical flow for planners to follow.
h. Although some Key-Steps occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing (spiral development) of information by the CDR and staff, particularly in a crisis situation. A primary example is the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). JIPOE is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential and most dangerous COA(s). This planning process must begin at the earliest stage of campaign or operations planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. This is also true for logistics, medical, transportation, force and deployment planning to name just a few.

2. Planner Organization

Organizing the planning team and setting goals and objectives within a specific timeline can sometimes be as time consuming as the plan itself. If you enter the planning process with the following information/guidelines defined and understood, the actual planning process will go much smoother:

- Define clear organization planning responsibilities.
  - Who leads what efforts (topic, geographic, functions).
- Define the process for planning.
  - Planning organizations.
  - Product production/transition between organizations.
- Information flow.
  - Higher.
  - Lower.
  - Adjacent.
- Integrate other elements.
  - Coalition.
  - Interagency.
  - Host nation.
- Be sustainable in a 24/7/365 cycle.
  - Rapidly integrate augmentees.

A carelessly planned plan will take three times longer to complete than a carefully planned plan.
6. Key-Step — 6: Determine Own and Enemy’s Center(s) of Gravity (COG), Critical Factors and Decisive Points

“The adversary’s COG… would be attacked carefully, with measured means, because its indiscriminate destruction, while useful in defeating military forces, might bring undesirable consequences in rebuilding that same society.”

Creating a New Center of Gravity: A New Model for Campaign Planning, Watson, Bryan C.

a. Clausewitzian concepts such as friction, fog and culminating points, to name a few, abound in our military vernacular. But arguably, none has been discussed, debated nor written on more than the Clausewitzian concept of COG or main point. For the United States military, the origins of the COG concept are rooted in the Cold War. The COG concept matured in the American mindset largely during an era when the United States military was focused heavily (and almost exclusively) on producing doctrine that would win wars decisively against a conventional traditional military force and nation state, “especially in such places as the Fulda Gap.”

(1) The COG concept has served us for years as a giant lens for focusing strategic and operational efforts to achieve decisive results. However, for the current generation of military professionals, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan have evoked a disquieting epiphany: battlefield victory is useless without an ensuing political victory. The ongoing military efforts in these countries find the U.S. military engaged in prolonged insurgencies and postwar reconstruction operations far removed from decisive battle. Furthermore, the strategic landscape suggests that the future for the United States military will be rife with other such “ambiguous and uncomfortable wars—and their aftermath.” This has evoked a corresponding renaissance in American doctrinal thinking and with it, not surprisingly, a number of proposals to redefine the COG.

(2) As accepted definitions for COG are discussed in this document, planners must also strive to understand today’s ambiguous environment and take the learned elements and acclimate and adjust ahead of an adaptable adversary.

(3) To understand the concept of COG we must begin with a discussion on the COG as a focal point for identifying critical factors; sources of strength as well as weaknesses and systemic vulnerabilities. Joint doctrine defines center of gravity as “the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.” This definition states in modern terms the classic description offered by Clausewitz, “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends,” the point at which all our energies should be directed.”

28 This enduring dictum also comes to us courtesy of Clausewitz: “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and the means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose.” On War, p. 87.
31 JP 1-02,DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Term1, JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.
(4) COG can be categorized as either physical or moral, and they are not limited in scope to military forces. A physical COG, such as a capital city or a military force, is typically easier to identify, target, and assess. Physical COGs can often be influenced solely by military means. However, the U.S. experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan exemplify the notion that active conflict can outlast the neutralization of a perceived COG. Neither the demise of the Taliban nor the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime brought an end to violence in either theater. As with the Lernaean Hydra from Greek mythology, for each head removed, two more grew back. The U.S. finds itself engaged with elements of the former regimes as well as a multitude of other groups with varying interests and motivations. At a minimum, the nature of the COG has changed in each case. This change, or evolution of the COG, may be exploited by understanding the civil dimension or moral COG. The moral centers of gravity are dynamic and inherently related to human factors: civilian populations, a charismatic or key leader, powerful ruling elite or strong-willed populace. Influencing a moral COG is far more difficult and typically cannot be accomplished by military means alone. The intangible and complex nature of moral COG and their related vulnerabilities necessitates the collective, integrated efforts of the instruments of power. As an example, it is a common understanding that access to, and influence over, civilian populations is a source of strength for insurgent movements and arguably terrorist networks. As noted in FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 “the ability to generate and sustain popular support, or at least acquiescence and tolerance, often has the greatest impact on the insurgency’s long-term effectiveness. This ability is usually the insurgency’s center of gravity.” Engaging the civil COG and/or vulnerabilities utilizing a focused interagency approach during the planning process, the commander may ultimately shape, mitigate a threat, or gain awareness over it, degrading the insurgency’s long-term effectiveness.

“\textit{The source of strength, or civil COG, for those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was the civilian population. Planners of the genocide recruited H\text-}tut Burundi refugees and militias from the lower economic classes. A combination of anti-Tutsi propaganda and physical threats fueled their massive participation in the slaughter. According to interviews with survivors of the massacres, most of the 50,000 recruited killers were peasants just like their victims. Any organization tasked to stop the killing would have had to influence the civil COG—the peasant population.}\”

Sele, Richard K., Engaging Civil Centers of Gravity and Vulnerabilities.

(5) At the strategic level, a COG might be an alliance, a political or military leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the operational level a COG often is associated with the adversary’s military capabilities — such as a powerful element of the armed forces — but could include other factors in the operational environment associated with the adversary’s civil, political, economic, social, information, and infrastructure systems.

\textit{During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War the coalition itself was identified as a friendly strategic COG, and the CCDR took measures to protect it, to include deployment of theater missile defense systems.}

(6) There is no certainty that a single COG will emerge at the strategic and operational levels. It is possible that no COG will emerge below the strategic level. At the tactical level, the COG concept has no utility; for us to speak of a tactical COG, the tactical level of war would have to exist independent of the operational and strategic level. It is commonly accepted that the tactical equivalent of the COG is the objective. Modern writings and

\textsuperscript{32} Sele, Richard K., Engaging Civil Centers of Gravity and Vulnerabilities.

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Ibid.}

14-28 Mission Analysis: Key Steps
understanding of the COG has evolved beyond the term’s pre-industrial roots to include the possibility of multiple COGs existing at the strategic and operational levels.

(7) At all levels, COGs are interrelated. Strategic COGs have associated decisive points that may be vulnerable at the operational level, just as operational COGs may be vulnerable to tactical-level actions. Therefore, analysis of friendly and enemy COGs is a continuous and related process that begins during planning and continues throughout a major operation or campaign. Figure XIV-4 shows a number of characteristics that can be associated with a COG.

![COG Analysis Example](Figure XIV-4. Threat and Friendly Physical COG Analysis Example)

(8) The essence of “operational art” lies in being able to produce the right combination of effects in time, space, and purpose relative to a COG to neutralize, weaken, destroy (consistent with desired endstate/commanders intent), or otherwise exploit it in a manner that best helps achieve military objectives and attain the military endstate. *In theory*, this is the most direct path to mission accomplishment. While doing this the commander must also plan for protecting friendly potential COGs, such as agreements with neutral and friendly nations for transit of forces, information and networks, coalition relationships, and U.S. and international public opinion.

(9) COGs *are not vulnerabilities*, however, within every COG lies inherent vulnerabilities that when attacked can render those COGs weaker and even more susceptible to direct attack and eventual destruction. This process cannot be taken lightly, since a faulty conclusion resulting from a poor or hasty analysis can have very serious consequences, such as the inability to achieve strategic and operational objectives at an acceptable cost. Planners must continually analyze and refine COGs.

(10) An additional insight on the COG is provided by Antulio Echevarria in his Strategic Studies Institute paper, *Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity; It’s Not What We Thought*. Echevarria maintains that the COG needs to be redefined as a “focal point,” not as a strength or weakness or a source of strength. A COG is more than a critical capability; it is the point where a certain centripetal force seems to exist, something that holds everything else together. As an example he offers the following:

“…al-Qa’ida cells might operate globally, but they are united by their hatred of apostasy. This hatred, not Osama bin Laden, is their CoG. They apparently perceive the United States and its Western values as the enemy CoG (though they do not use the term) in their war against “apostate” Muslim leaders. Decisively defeating al-Qa’ida will involve neutralizing its CoG, but this will require the use of diplomatic and informational initiatives more than military action. Commanders and their staffs need to identify where the connections—and the gaps—exist in the enemy’s system as a whole before deciding whether a center of gravity exists. The CoG concept does not apply if enemy elements are not connected sufficiently. In other words, successful antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan may not cause al-Qa’ida cells in Europe or Singapore to collapse.”

b. The adversarial context pertinent to COG analysis takes place within the broader operational environment context. A system’s perspective of the operational environment assists in understanding the adversary’s COGs. In combat operations, this involves knowledge of how an adversary organizes, fights, and makes decisions, and of their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. Moreover, the CCDR and staff must understand other operational environment systems and their interaction with the military system (Figure XIV-5). This holistic understanding helps commanders and their staffs identify COGs, critical factors, and DP to formulate LOO37 (LOO discussed in detail in Chapter 15).

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37 JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
This chapter provides the fundamentals of assessment, including its definition, purpose, and process. It discusses how assessment works with the levels of war and offers considerations for effective assessment. This chapter also covers assessment working groups and assessment support with operations research/systems analysis.

1. Assessment Fundamentals

a. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of the joint operation. Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate commanders, continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of the operation. Based on their assessment, commanders direct adjustments thus ensuring the operation remains focused on accomplishing the mission.

b. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. More specifically, assessment helps the commander determine progress toward attaining the desired end state, achieving objectives, and performing tasks. It also involves continuously monitoring and evaluating the operational environment to determine what changes might affect the conduct of operations. Assessment helps commanders determine if they need to reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan.

c. Throughout planning, preparation and execution commanders integrate their own assessments with those of the staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners in the AOR. Primary tools for assessing progress of the operation include the operation order, the common operational picture, personal observations, running estimates, and the assessment plan. The latter includes measures of effectiveness, measures of performance, and reframing criteria. The commander’s visualization forms the basis for the commander’s personal assessment of progress. Running estimates provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from the perspective of each staff section. They help to refine the common operational picture and supplement it with information not readily displayed.

d. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations. Staffs help the commander by monitoring the numerous aspects that can influence the outcome of operations and providing the commander timely information needed for decisions. The CCIR process is linked to the assessment process by the commander’s need for timely information and recommendations to make decisions. The assessment process helps staffs by identifying key aspects of the operation that the commander is interested in closely monitoring and where the commander wants to make decisions. Examples of commander’s critical decisions include when to transition to another phase of a campaign, what the priority of effort should be, or how to adjust command relationships between component commanders.

e. The assessment process begins during mission analysis when the commander and staff consider what to measure and how to measure it to determine progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective. During planning and preparation for an operation, for example, the staff assesses the joint force’s ability to execute the plan based on available resources and changing conditions in the operational environment. However, the discussion in this section focuses on assessment for the purpose of determining the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment.

1 FM 3-0, Operations
f. CDR’s and their staffs determine relevant assessment actions and measures during planning. They consider assessment measures as early as mission analysis and include assessment measures and related guidance in commander and staff estimates. They use assessment considerations to help guide operational design because these considerations can affect the sequence and type of actions along LOOs/lines of effort. During execution, they continually monitor progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating effects, and achieving objectives. Assessment actions and measures help commanders adjust operations and resources as required, determine when to execute branches and sequels, and make other critical decisions to ensure current and future operations remain aligned with the mission and end state.

(1) Normally, the joint force J-3 or J-5, assisted by the J-2, is responsible for coordinating assessment activities. For subordinate commanders’ staffs, this may be accomplished by equivalent elements within joint functional and/or Service components. The chief of staff facilitates the assessment process and determination of CCIRs by incorporating them into the headquarters’ battle rhythm. Various elements of the CDR’s staff use assessment results to adjust both current operations and future planning.

(2) Friendly, adversary, and neutral diplomatic, informational, and economic actions applied in the operational environment can impact military actions and objectives. When relevant to the mission, the commander also must anticipate using assessment to evaluate the results of these actions. This typically requires collaboration with other agencies and multinational partners—preferably within a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified action. For example, failure to coordinate overflight and access agreements with foreign governments in advance or to adhere to international law regarding sovereignty of foreign airspace could result in mission delay, failure to meet US objectives, and/or an international incident. Many of these organizations may be outside the CDR’s authority. Accordingly, the CDR should grant some joint force organizations authority for direct coordination with key outside organizations—such as interagency elements from DOS or the Department of Homeland Security, national intelligence agencies, intelligence sources in other nations, and other CCMDs—to the extent necessary to ensure timely and accurate assessments.

2. Assessment Process

a. Assessment is continuous; it precedes and guides every operations process activity and concludes each operation or phase of an operation. The three activities that make up the assessment process are also continuous; they are logically sequential while constantly executed throughout the operations process. This process applies to assessments of every type and at every echelon. Broadly, assessment consists of the following activities:

- Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
- Recommending or directing action for improvement.

(1) Monitoring.

(a) Monitoring is continuous observation of those conditions relevant to the current operation. Monitoring within the assessment process allows staffs to collect relevant information, specifically that information about the current situation that can be compared to the forecasted situation described in the commander’s intent and concept of operations. Progress cannot be judged, nor effective decisions made, without an accurate understanding of the current situation.

(b) During planning, commanders monitor the situation to develop facts and assumptions that underlie the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs monitor the situation to determine if the facts are still relevant, if their assumptions remain valid, and if new conditions emerged that affect the operations.
Assessment Levels and Measures

Assessment occurs at all levels and across the entire range of military operations. Even in operations that do not include combat, assessment of progress is just as important and can be more complex than traditional combat assessment. As a general rule, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which such activity is assessed. To do this, JFCs and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and measures during planning, preparation, and execution.

Assessment at the Operational and Strategic Levels
Assessment at the operational and strategic levels typically is broader than at the tactical level (e.g., combat assessment) and uses MOEs that support strategic and operational mission accomplishment. Strategic- and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the end state.

Tactical-Level Assessment
Tactical-level assessment typically uses MOPs to evaluate task accomplishment. The results of tactical tasks are often physical in nature, but also can reflect the impact on specific functions and systems. Tactical-level assessment may include assessing progress by phase lines; neutralization of enemy forces; control of key terrain or resources; and security, relief, or reconstruction tasks.

Combat Assessment
Combat assessment is an example of a tactical-level assessment and is a term that can encompass many tactical-level assessment actions. Combat assessment typically focuses on determining the results of weapons engagement (with both lethal and nonlethal capabilities), and thus is an important component of joint fires and the joint targeting process. Combat assessment is composed of three related elements: battle damage assessment (BDA), munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA), and future targeting or reattack recommendations.
1. Purpose
   a. The commander's estimate, submitted by the supported commander in response to a CJCS WARNORD, provides the CJCS with time-sensitive information for consideration by the NCA in meeting a crisis situation. Essentially, it reflects the supported commander's analysis of the various COAs that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission and contains recommendations as to the best COA (recommended COAs submitted for President, SECDEF approval may be contained in current OPLANs or CONPLANs or may be developed to meet situations not addressed by current plans. Regardless of origin, these COAs will be specifically identified when they involve military operations against a potential enemy). Although the estimative process at the supported commander's level may involve a complete, detailed estimate by the supported commander, the estimate submitted to the CJCS will normally be a greatly abbreviated version providing only that information essential to the President, SECDEF and the CJCS for arriving at a decision to meet a crisis.
   b. Supporting commanders normally will not submit a commander's estimate to the CJCS; however, they may be requested to do so by the supported commander. They may also be requested to provide other information that could assist the supported commander in formulating and evaluating the various COAs.

2. When Submitted
   a. The Commander's Estimate will be submitted as soon as possible after receipt of the CJCS WARNORD, but no later than the deadline established by the CJCS in the WARNORD. Although submission time is normally 72 hours, extremely time-sensitive situations may require that the supported commander respond in 4 to 8 hours.
   b. Follow-on information or revisions to the Commander's Estimate should be submitted as necessary to complete, update, or refine information included in the initial estimate.
   c. The supported commander may submit a Commander's Estimate at the commander's own discretion, without a CJCS WARNORD, to advise the SECDEF and CJCS of the commander's evaluation of a potential crisis situation within the AOR. This situation may be handled by a SITREP instead of a Commander's Estimate.

3. How Submitted
   The Commander's Estimate is submitted by record communication, normally with a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. GCCS Newsgroup should be used initially to pass the commander's estimate but must be followed by immediate record communication to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees
   The message is sent to the CJCS with information copies to the Services, components, supporting commands and combat support agencies, USTRANSCOM, and other appropriate commands and agencies.

5. Contents
   a. The Commander's Estimate will follow the major headings of a commander's estimate of the situation as outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure J but will normally be substantially abbreviated in content. As with the WARNORD, the precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, time available to respond, and the applicability of
prior planning. In a rapidly developing situation, a formal Commander's Estimate may be initially impractical, and the entire estimative process may be reduced to a commander's conference, with corresponding brevity reflected in the estimate when submitted by record communications to the CJCS. Also, the existence of an applicable OPLAN may already reflect most of the necessary analysis.

b. The essential requirement of the Commander's Estimate submitted to the CJCS is to provide the SECDEF in a timely manner, with viable military COAs to meet a crisis. Normally, these will center on military capabilities in terms of forces available, response time, and significant logistic considerations. In the estimate, one COA will be recommended. If the supported commander desires to submit alternative COAs, an order of priority will be established. All COAs in the WARNORD will be addressed.

c. The estimate of the supported commander will include specific information to the extent applicable. The following estimate format is desirable but not mandatory and may be abbreviated where appropriate.

(1) Mission. State the assigned or deduced mission and purpose. List any intermediate tasks, prescribed or deduced, that the supported commander considers necessary to accomplish the mission.

(2) Situation and COA. This paragraph is the foundation of the estimate and may encompass considerable detail. Because the CJCS is concerned primarily with the results of the estimate rather than the analysis, for purposes of the estimate submitted, include only the minimum information necessary to support the recommendation.

(a) Considerations Affecting the Possible COA. Include only a brief summary, if applicable, of the major factors pertaining to the characteristics of the area and relative combat power that have a significant impact on the alternative COAs.

(b) Enemy Capability. Highlight, if applicable, the enemy capabilities and psychological vulnerabilities that can seriously affect the accomplishment of the mission, giving information that would be useful to the President, SECDEF, and the CJCS in evaluating various COAs.

(c) Terrorist Threat. Describe potential terrorist threat capabilities to include force protection requirements (prior, during, and post mission) that can affect the accomplishment of the mission.

(d) Own COA. List COAs that offer suitable, feasible, and acceptable means of accomplishing the mission. If specific COAs were prescribed in the WARNORD, they must be included. For each COA, the following specific information should be addressed:

1. Combat forces required; e.g., 2 FS, 1 airborne brigade. List actual units if known.
2. FP.
3. Destination.
4. Required delivery dates.
5. Coordinated deployment estimate.
7. Strategic lift requirements, if appropriate.

(3) Analysis of Opposing COA. Highlight enemy capabilities that may have significant impact on U.S. COAs.

(4) Comparison of Own COA. For the submission to the CJCS, include only the final statement of conclusions and provide a brief rationale for the favored COA. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative COAs, if significant, in assisting the President, SECDEF, and the CJCS in arriving at a decision.
(5) **Recommended COA.** State the supported commander’s recommended COA (recommended COA should include any recommended changes to the ROE in effect at that time) (CJCSM 3122.01)).

**SAMPLE COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE**

**IMMEDIATE (OR FLASH AS APPROPRIATE)**

**FROM:** COMUSCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
**TO:** CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
**INFO:** CSA WASHINGTON DC  
CNO WASHINGTON DC  
CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
CMC WASHINGTON DC  
COMUSELEMNORAD PETERSON AFB CO  
COMUSEUCOM VAHINGEN GE  
HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC//

COMUSPACOM HONOLULU HI  
COMUSNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO  
COMUSSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL  
DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD

**DISTR:** COMBATANT COMMANDER/DCOM/CCJ1/CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ4/7/CCJ5/CCJ6  
**DRAFTER:** LTC CHUCK SWANSON, USA CCJ7, EXT 53046  
COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE  
COMUSSTRATCOM OFFUTT AFB NE  
COMUSSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
COMUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL  
DISA WASHINGTON DC  
DIA WASHINGTON DC  
DLA FT BELVOIR VA  
DIRECTOR DTRA FAIRFAX VA  
CIA WASHINGTON DC  
NGA HQ BETHESDA MD  
COMSDDC FALLS CHURCH VA  
COMSC WASHINGTON DC  
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Index

A
Abbreviated Procedures, 2-12
Abbreviations, H-1
Acronyms and Abbreviations, H-1
Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), 9-1
Analysis and Wargaming, 17-2
Analysis of Available Forces and Assets, 14-43
Analysis of Opposing COAs, 17-2
Annexes (Operational Plan), D-1
Application of Forces and Capabilities, 20-3
Apportioned Forces, 14-43
Assessment,
  Fundamentals, 22-1
  Levels and Measures, 22-3
  Levels of War, 22-7
  Plan Assessment (Function IV), 21-1
  Process, 22-2
Assumptions, 14-4
Availability of Forces for Joint Operations, 14-44
Commander’s Intent, 14-61
Commander’s Planning Guidance, 14-61
Commanders and Operational Art, 6-2
Comparison Method and Recording, 18-3
Concept Development (Function II), 15-1
Concept Development, 5-3
Concept Discussions IPR, 19-6
Constraints/Restraints, 14-6
Contingency Plan Assessments, 21-5
Contingency Plans, 2-4
Course of Action (COA)
  COA Analysis and Wargaming, 17-1
  COA Comparison, 18-1
  COA Development, 16-1
  COA Selection & Approval, 19-1
    - COA Decision Briefing, 19-1
    - COA Decision Briefing Format, 19-3
Crisis Action Planning (CAP), 2-8
Crisis Planning Relationship to Deliberate Planning, 2-8
Crisis, 2-8
Critical Factors, 14-27, 14-31
Current Status or Conditions, 14-4

B
Branches and Sequels, 17-20

C
Campaign Planning, 3-1
Campaign Plans, 3-1
Center(s) of Gravity (COG), 14-27
COG Determination, 14-36
Chain of Command F-1
Challenges, 2-2
Combining LOO and LOE, 15-13
Command Relationships, E-1
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), 14-51
Commander’s Estimate, 19-4, C-1

D
Dates, B-1
Decision Support Template, 17-19
Decisive Points, 14-27, 14-33
Deliberate Planning, 2-4, 2-6
  and the GFM Process, 2-7
Deployment Planning, 20-6, 7-24
Descriptive Comparison, 18-6
Design, 6-5
Design Goals, 6-6
Design Methodology, 6-10
Determine Adversary Courses of Action (COAs), 13-17
Determine Comparison Method and Record, 18-3
Developing Governing Factors, 17-3
Documentation, 20-8
DOD Role in National Security Council System, 1-7

E
Effects in the Planning Process, 14-22
Effects vs Objectives, 14-20
Effects, 14-19
Ends – Ways – Means, 10-2
Endstate, 14-11
Essential Tasks, 14-2
Estimates, 9-8
Evaluate the Adversary, 13-14
Evaluation Criteria, 17-3, G-1
Event Template, 17-18
Execution, 23-1

F
Feasibility Analysis, 20-8
Flexible Deterrent Options, 15-3
Flexible Plans, 17-20
Force Planning, 4-16, 7-23, 14-43, 20-4
Force Sourcing, 7-19
and the GFM Process, 14-44
Force Structure Analysis (Apportioned Forces), 14-43
Forces and Capabilities, 20-3
Format of Military Plans and Orders, 20-1
Full Range of Joint Operations Activities, 4-4
Function I – Strategic Guidance/Strategic Direction, 10-1
Function II – Concept Development, 15-1
Function III - Plan/Order Development, 20-1
Function IV – Assessment, 21-1
Functional Campaign Planning, 3-1
Functions, 5-1

G
GEF- and JSCP-Tasked Plan Review Categories and Approval, 8-2
GEF, GFMIG, and JSCP, 10-3
GFMI, 10-3
Global Context, 1-12
Global Demand, 4-7
Global Force Management (GFM), 7-1
GFM and Force Projection Planning, 4-2
GFM Process during CAP, 2-12
GFM Goals and Processes, 7-4
Governing Factors/Evaluation Criteria, 17-3, G-1
Grand Strategy as the Basis for Operational Art, 6-1

H
Higher CDR’s Mission and Intent, 14-1

I
Impact of the Operational Environment, 13-9
Implied Tasks, 14-2
Initial Effects, 14-7
In-Progress Review (IPR), 4-14, 8-1
IPR Attendance, 8-6
IPR Objective, 8-1
IPR Review Discussion, 14-66
IPR Venue, 8-1
Integrated Planning, 2-2
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPIE), 13-1, 13-18
Interagency Collaboration, 21-6
Interpreting the Results of Analysis and Wargaming, 17-20
Interrelated DOD Processes, 7-41

J
Joint Force Projection, 7-30
Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE), 13-1, 13-5
JIPOE and the Intelligence Cycle, 13-1
JIPOE Support to JOPP, 13-20
Joint Operation Planning, 4-1
Organization and Responsibility, 4-14
Operation Planning Overview, 9-1, 9-4
Joint Operation Planning Process (JOPP), 5-4, 9-4
Step 1 to JOPP – Planning Initiation, 11-1
Step 2 to JOPP – Mission Analysis, 12-1
Step 2 to JOPP - Mission Analysis: Key Steps, 14-1
Step 3 to JOPP – Course of Action Development, 16-1
Step 4 to JOPP – COA Analysis and Wargaming, 17-1
Step 5 to JOPP – COA Comparison, 18-1
Step 6 to JOPP – COA Approval, 19-1
Step 7 to JOPP – Plan or Order Development, 20-1
Joint Operations Cycle, 6-1
Joint Planning and Execution Community Review, 8-4
Joint Planning Group, 9-6
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 10-3
JSCP Tasked Plan Review Categories and Approval, 8-2
Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), 1-11

K
Key Stakeholders, 3-2
Known Facts, Assumptions, Current Status or Conditions, 14-4

L
Leading Design, 6-9
Lines of Effort (LOE), 15-8
Lines of Operation (LOO), 15-5

M
Military Endstates, 14-7
Military Plans and Orders, 20-1
Mission Analysis, 12-1, 12-3
Key-Step – 1: Analysis of Higher CDR’s Mission and Intent, 14-1
Key-Step – 10: Develop Mission Statement, 14-58
Key-Step – 11: Develop and Conduct Mission Analysis Brief, 14-60
Key-Step – 12: Prepare Initial Staff Estimates, 14-61
Key-Step – 13: Approval of Mission Statement, Develop CDR’s Intent, Publish Initial CDR’s Planning Guidance, 14-61
Key-Step – 2: Determine Own Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks, 14-2

N
Narrative/Bulleted Descriptive Comparison of Strengths & Weaknesses, 18-5
National Security Council System, 1-5
National Strategic Direction, 1-4
National Strategic Guidance, 1-8
Nested Planning, 3-3
Non-Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique, 18-5
Nuclear Strike, 20-5

O
Objectives, 14-7, 14-14
Operational Approaches, 6-12
Operational Art and Design, 6-1, 6-2
Operational Art and Planning, 2-3, 6-3
Operational Design, 6-5
Operational Design Schematic, 15-14
Operational Environment, 13-8
Operational Limitations: Constraints/Restraints, 14-6
Operational Plan Annexes, D-1
Orders, 20-1

P
Phasing, 4-8  
Plans, 2-1, 2-4  
Plan Adjustment, 23-4  
Plan Assessment (Function IV), 5-3, 21-1, 21-2  
Plan Development (Function III), 5-3, 20-1, 20-4  
Plan Review and Approval, 20-8  
Plan Review Assessment, 21-5  
Plan Socialization and the IPR Process, 8-2  
Planning, 2-1  
Planner Organization, 12-4  
Planning Directive Published, 16-10  
Planning During Execution, 23-2  
Planning Functions, 5-1  
Planning Initiation, 11-1  
Planning Timelines and Dates, B-1  
Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison, 18-6  
Political Considerations, 15-3  
Prepare the CDR’s Estimate, 19-4  
Preparing for the Wargame, 17-8  
Present the COA Decision Briefing, 19-2  
Problems, 2-3

R
Recording, 18-3  
Red Team, 17-11  
References, A-1  
Refine Selected COA, 19-4  
Refinement, 20-8  
Reframing, 6-13  
Restraints, 14-6  
Risk Assessment, 14-45

S
Security Environment, 1-2  
Sequencing Actions and Phasing, 4-8  
Shortfall Identification, 20-8  
Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks, 14-2  
Stability Operations, 4-1  
Staff Estimates, 14-61, 16-10  
Staff Estimates, 9-6  
Stakeholders, 3-2  
Stop Light Comparison, 18-6  
Strategic Context, 6-1  
Strategic Guidance/Strategic Direction (Function I), 5-3, 10-1, 10-4  
Strategic Organization, 1-1  
Strategy, 3-9  
Strengths & Weaknesses, 18-5  
Support Planning, 20-5  
Supported and Supporting CCDRs, 7-38  
Supporting Plan Development, 20-10  
Synchronization Matrix, 17-13

T
Task Assessment, 14-23  
Tasks, 14-23  
Tentative COAs, 16-2  
Termination Criteria, 14-7  
Termination of Joint Operations, 14-7  
Theater Campaign Design, 3-10  
Theater Campaign Planning, 3-2  
Theater Campaign Strategic Guidance, 3-3  
Time Available, 15-2  
TPFDD and Execution, 23-2  
Transition, 20-10

U
Understand and Develop Solutions to Problems, 2-3  
Utilizing Operational Art and Design, 6-2

W
Wargaming, 17-1, 17-5  
Decisions, 17-5  
Output, 17-11  
Process, 17-9  
Products, 17-10  
White Team, 17-12
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