Homeland Defense & DSCA

Protecting the Homeland/Defense Support to Civil Authority
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The Lightning Press
Norman M Wade
Homeland Security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US; reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.

Homeland Defense is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President.

Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is support provided in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Disaster management (or emergency management) is the term used to designate the efforts of communities or businesses to plan for and coordinate all the personnel and materials required to either mitigate the effects of, or recover from, natural or man-made disasters, or acts of terrorism.

The Armed Forces of the United States and Department of Defense (DOD) agencies may be called upon for defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) to support a whole-of-government response in support of civil authorities, although not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for the support of civil authorities. The US Armed Forces have a historic precedent and enduring role in supporting civil authorities during times of emergency, and this role is codified in national defense strategy as a primary mission of DOD.

The nature of DSCA in the US presents a unique challenge based on the history of the country and the interaction of the federal, state, local, territorial, and tribal governments and private and nonprofit organizations. These relationships establish the multiple layers and mutually reinforcing structures throughout the state and territorial governments for interaction based on the US Constitution, as well as common law and traditional relationships. US military personnel must understand the domestic environment so they can employ military capabilities efficiently, effectively, and legally.

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**Joint Publications (JPs)**

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**Multiservice Publications**

| ATP 3-28.1 | Feb 2013 | Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For Defense Support Of Civil Authorities and Integrating With National Guard Civil Support |
| MCWP 3-36.2 | | |
| NTTP 3-57.2 | | |
| AFTTP 3-2.67 | | |

**Other Publications**

| GTA 90-01-020 | Jul 2010 | Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit |
| GTA 90-01-021 | Jul 2010 | DSCA Handbook: Liaison Officer Toolkit |
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I. The Homeland

Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution gives Congress the power to provide for the common defense and authorized the organizing, arming, and disciplining of militia in the service of the US. The National Security Act of 1947 codified at Title 50, United States Code (USC), Chapter 15, realigned and reorganized the US Armed Forces, foreign policy, and intelligence community (IC) apparatus in the aftermath of World War II. An amendment to the act in 1949, created what we know of as the Department of Defense (DOD) as an executive department in August 1956. The mission of DOD is to provide the military forces needed to deter war and to protect the security of the US. The US employs all instruments of national power to continuously defeat threats to the homeland. DOD executes the homeland defense (HD) mission by detecting, deterring, preventing, and defeating against threats from actors of concern as far forward from the homeland as possible.

The Homeland

The US homeland is the physical region that includes the continental United States (CONUS), Alaska, Hawaii, US territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace. The homeland is a functioning theater of operations, and the DOD regularly performs a wide range of defense operations within the theater.

Homeland Defense (HD)

HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. An external threat or aggression is an action, incident, or circumstance that originates from outside the boundaries of the homeland. Threats planned, prompted, promoted, caused, or executed by external actors may develop or take place inside the boundaries of the homeland. The reference to external threats does not limit where or how attacks may be planned and executed. DOD is responsible for the HD mission, and leads the response with support from international partners and United States Government (USG) departments and agencies. HD is executed across the active, layered defense construct composed of the forward regions, the approaches, and the homeland.

By law, DOD is responsible for two missions in the homeland: HD and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA). DOD organizes a framework of areas of responsibility (AORs) for planning through implementation of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) approved by the President. The UCP establishes the missions and geographic responsibilities for the combatant commands (CCMDs), which execute geographic or functional defense requirements. Two geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are the supported commanders for HD in their AORs, with virtually all other combatant commanders (CCDRs) supporting them. Commander, United States Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) and Commander, United States Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) are charged with specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA. CDRUSNORTHCOM is responsible for planning, organizing, and, as directed, executing HD operations within the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR in concert with missions performed by the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). CDRUSPACOM is responsible for planning and, as directed,
II. Relationships between HS, HD, and DSCA


Perhaps one of the greatest challenges for a military staff is operating in or near the homeland and being subject to the inherent legal and jurisdictional responsibilities that accompany such operations. This challenge is set against the evolving range of threats to the homeland—to countering transnational organizations and individual actors of concern internal and external to the US. JP 3-27, Appendix A provides additional context and considerations for the JFC and military staffs that plan and execute HD and DSCA missions. Those missions could be conducted in a simultaneous, near-simultaneous, or sequential fashion, across the threat spectrum, within or near the homeland. A full range of threats and hazards confronts the homeland. Many threats may not require a DOD-led response, and may not require a response from more than one civilian department or agency. The characterization of a particular threat, and the designated response agencies and modes, ultimately rests with the President. To prepare for wide-ranging contingencies, the USG has developed specific protocols and response options that address the coordination, integration, and responsibilities of the federal agencies to respond to the full spectrum of threats and hazards. Codification of these strategies, processes, and procedures is found in documents such as the National Strategy for Maritime Security and US Aviation Security Policy, and their respective supporting plans. These types of processes aid both the military and civil authorities to identify which agency or agencies are best suited to achieve the USG’s desired outcome given the unique circumstances of the event.

Homeland Security (HS)
HS is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the US; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur. DOD is a key part of HS, conducting HD and DSCA. DHS will usually be the federal agency with lead responsibility, and will be supported by other USG departments and agencies when requested. DOJ has lead responsibility for criminal investigations of terrorist acts or terrorist threats by individuals or groups inside the United State, or directed at US citizens or institutions abroad, where such acts are within federal criminal jurisdiction of the US, as well as for the related intelligence collection activities within the US, subject to the National Security Act of 1947 and other applicable law. The National Strategy for HS addresses the terrorist threat and provides a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, tribal, and private organizations whose primary functions are often unrelated to national security. HD efforts often complement HS efforts and the reverse is also true.

Homeland Defense (HD) and DSCA
DOD protects the homeland through two distinct but interrelated missions, HD and DSCA. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility for HD, which may be executed by DOD alone (e.g., BMD) or include support from other USG departments and agencies. DOD’s role in the DSCA mission consists of support to US civil authorities (DHS or other department or agency) for domestic emergencies and for designated LE and other activities. While these missions are distinct, some department roles and responsibilities overlap and operations require extensive coordination between lead and supporting agencies. Figure A-1 illustrates a notional relationship between HD, DSCA, and HS lead and supporting relationships and provides examples of the types of operations that can take place for each mission. HD and DSCA operations may occur in parallel and require extensive integration and synchronization. Understanding the roles and responsibilities of AC and RC forces and how they are used and the various duty statuses used to employ NG forces (Title 10 and Title 32, USC, and state active duty), is critical to achieve integration and synchronization.
In addition, operations may also transition from HD to DSCA to HS or vice versa (e.g., maritime security) with the lead depending on the situation and USG’s desired outcome (annotated by the arrow in Figure A-1). While the lead may transition, a single agency will always have the lead at any given time for a particular activity.


However, in the areas of overlapping responsibility, the designation of federal agency with lead responsibility may not be predetermined. In time-critical situations, on-scene leaders are empowered to conduct appropriate operations in response to a particular threat. The MOTR protocols provide guidance for maritime security, which can transition between HD, DSCA, or HS. The NG and the reserves also play a vital role in the defense of the homeland. Figure A-1 depicts NG Title 10, USC, authorities for HD and DSCA under DOD C2 showing that the NG can conduct HD and DSCA under Title 10, USC. It also depicts NG Title 32, USC, authorities for HS, HD activities and DSCA, showing that these may be accomplished under Title 32, USC. Figure A-1 also depicts the fact that in exceptional circumstances NG forces may perform HD activities in state active duty. Title 32, USC, and state active duty fall under state or territory C2. EP remains part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities. It spans HD, DSCA, and HS and includes DOD’s lead, support, and enable functions. Mobile command centers and DOD aviation support to the US Secret Service are just two examples of how DOD prepares for and supports EP operations. See also p. 2-3.
under Title 10, USC, Section 12304 or Title 32, USC, Section 502) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, LE support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. HD and DSCA missions may occur simultaneously and require extensive coordination, integration, and synchronization. Considerations regarding such operations are covered in more detail in Appendix A, “Relationships Between Homeland Security, Homeland Defense, and Defense Support of Civil Authorities.”

Refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, for more information on DSCA.

DOD may also be required to engage in emergency preparedness (EP). EP are measures taken in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and property and to protect a nation’s institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive emergency management program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. EP is considered a part of DOD’s overall preparedness activities. It is not a stand-alone activity, but is an integral part of DOD training, mitigation, and response for both HD and DSCA.

III. Homeland Defense Policy and Legal Considerations

Multiple documents provide guidance for conducting HD operations. Specific planning factors, requirements, and objectives for HD operations are contained in operation plans (OPLANs) and CONPLANs associated with the HD mission.

Special Considerations

Certain functions, such as intelligence activities, military information support operations (MISO), rules of engagement (ROE), and rules for the use of force (RUF), have specific applications and legal implications when conducted domestically.

1. Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)

The PCA prohibits the use of military personnel from performing various functions within the homeland. However, when directed by the President, the use of military operations for HD is a constitutional exception to the PCA. When performing HD operations, Title 10, USC, forces are not subject to the restriction of the PCA.

See pp. 2-10 to 2-11 and 2-31 to 2-38 for further discussion.

2. Intelligence Activities

Intelligence activities refer to all activities that DOD intelligence components are authorized to undertake in accordance with (IAW) Executive Order (EO) 12333, United States Intelligence Activities (as amended), Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities, and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons. Intelligence activities include the collection, retention, and dissemination of intelligence by DOD intelligence components.

Intelligence activities conducted by US intelligence organizations in the US and its territories are strictly controlled. Several regulations and laws specifically govern the use of DOD intelligence assets and organizations in domestic operations. The program that oversees the collection of information on US persons by the intelligence organizations is called the Intelligence Oversight Program. Its goal is to ensure that intelligence personnel do not collect, retain, or disseminate information about US persons unless done IAW specific guidelines. For intelligence purposes, a “US person” is one of the following: a US citizen; a permanent resident alien known by the intelligence agency; an unincorporated association substantially composed of US citizens or permanent resident aliens; or a corporation incorporated in the US, except for those directed and controlled by a foreign government or governments.
IV. Threats


HD should address all external threats and other threats (as directed by the President) to facilitate a broad-based defense in depth. The USG has sought to shape the international environment through the judicious application of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power. Given the persistent nature of both the traditional nation-state and asymmetric threats, a proactive, comprehensive, and disciplined approach to HD is required. Additionally, military operations conducted in the homeland require an in depth understanding of laws, policies, and procedures because of numerous overlapping jurisdictions and legal limitations of the use of military forces in certain situations.

Homeland Defense Strategic Threat Environment

- Increased capability for cyberspace operations against the United States Government, Department of Defense, and nations’ critical infrastructures
- Continued desire of transnational terrorists to attack United States with variety of weapons and means (including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear [CBRN]/weapons of mass destruction [WMD])
- Continued proliferation of CBRN/WMD capabilities
- Ongoing rogue nation threats
- Active transnational criminal organizations
- Ongoing illegal immigration/special interest aliens
- Presence of homegrown violent extremists
- Continued traditional threats from nation-states (including intercontinental ballistic missiles)

The homeland is confronted by a variety of disparate and interrelated threats that demand coordinated procedures and synchronized efforts among interagency partners responsible for LE and national defense, particularly those who have overlapping roles, responsibilities, authorities, and capabilities. Transnational threats have proven to be complex and enduring. A transnational threat is defined in Title 50, USC, Section 402, as “any transnational activity (including international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, the proliferation of WMD and the delivery systems for such weapons, and organized crime) that threatens the national security of the US.” DOD further defines a transnational threat as “any activity, individual, or group not tied to a particular country or region that operates across international boundaries and threatens US national security or interests. These threats also include extremists who enter into convenient relationships that exploit each others’ capabilities and cloud the distinction between crime and terrorism (e.g., violent extremist organizations and opportunists, drug trafficking organizations, transnational criminal organizations [TCOs], and those trafficking in persons). Lawless and subversive organizations can take advantage of failed states, contested spaces, and ungoverned areas by forging alliances with corrupt government officials and some foreign intelligence services, further destabilizing political, financial, and security institutions in fragile states, undermining competition in world strategic markets, using cyberspace technologies and other methods to perpetrate sophisticated frauds, creating the potential for the transfer of WMD to terrorists, and expanding narco-trafficking and human and weapons smuggling networks.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
Adversaries have and continue to seek WMD and the means to deliver them. US military superiority has deterred nation-states with WMD from using them against the homeland or US forces abroad. However, that same military superiority continues to drive some adversaries to seek asymmetric capabilities, including WMD. These capabilities may enable adversaries to gain a strategic advantage, influence public or political will, and possibly coerce the US, its friends, and allies with the threat of large-scale destruction. To compound this threat, the technology associated with WMD has proliferated globally as information has become more accessible. Despite counterproliferation and arms control efforts, the capabilities with which adversaries can employ WMD against the US or its interests have increased. A chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) attack may occur in a variety of forms, from release through conventional means such as a ballistic missile to asymmetric means (e.g., a suitcase radiological device). The risk of terrorist (state and non-state sponsored) and traditional nation-state attacks remain.

Adversaries
The complex, uncertain, and volatile threat environment, coupled with the number of adversaries that threaten the homeland and US interests abroad, presents the US with a resource-intensive challenge. The world appears smaller, due to the advancement in modern weapons and the increased availability of information. A number of regional powers and non-state actors possess the capability to challenge the interests of the US and its allies. Adversaries take advantage of technology and employ it to move money, communicate with cells in their organizations, approve missions, or conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions on potential targets. They are also using advances in technology to wage propaganda campaigns and various forms of cyberspace attacks against the US and its allies. Some terrorist organizations have grown more extreme in their objectives and actions, and have demonstrated willingness and desire to attack innocent civilians and public infrastructure to further their objectives. Some groups have attained a considerable degree of financial independence with little regard as to the consequences associated with an attack on the US enemies will continue to employ a variety of tactics, in particular, asymmetric employment of weapons, platforms, and information that could significantly affect not only the politico-military balance, but potentially more significant, the US economy and global trade.

Influx of Illegal Immigrants, Special Interest Aliens, Drugs, and Contraband
TCOs have established networks to move people, drugs, or other contraband into the homeland. While primarily HS issues, there are HD implications, because such networks can also be used by terrorists who want to conduct violent acts. TCOs are expanding and diversifying their activities, resulting in the convergence of threats that were once distinct and that could have explosive and destabilizing effects. Securing our borders and countering illicit trafficking helps protect against transnational extremist threats and requires the combined efforts of US and international law enforcement agencies (LEAs), intelligence agencies, and support from DOD assets to enhance overall USG efforts.

Refer to JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations

Pandemic Influenza (PI) and Other Infectious Diseases
A pandemic is an outbreak of an infectious disease that may be of natural, accidental, or deliberate origin, occurring over a wide geographic area. It is unique in that it is not a discrete event but a prolonged environment in which military operations, including any CBRN response, may continue. The National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza uses a three-pillar construct for preparation and response that can be extended to other pandemics as well.

Refer to JP 3-41, CBRN Consequence Management.
Guidance and Policy for the Intel Oversight Program

- Executive Order 12333 (as amended by Executive Order 13470), United States Intelligence Activities
- Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 5148.11, DOD Directive 5240.01, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
- DOD Directive 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities

**Acquisition of Open Source Information.** Publicly available open source information can be used to obtain basic situational awareness and regional industrial knowledge on any part of the world; however, intelligence oversight still applies to information gathered on US persons or companies regardless of whether it is publicly available or not. Careful adherence to DODD 5240.01 and DOD 5240.1-R when performing such collections is critical to the success of the effort, and to avoid the appearance or conduct of questionable intelligence activities.

**Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations Not Affiliated with DOD.** Some restrictions on information gathering apply DOD wide, not just to DOD intelligence elements. IAW DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense, DOD policy prohibits collecting, reporting, processing, or storing information on individuals or organizations not affiliated with DOD except in those limited circumstances where such information is essential to the accomplishment of certain DOD missions outlined within the directive. DOD intelligence elements are not governed by this directive and must look to DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities, and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons, for guidance.

Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for details on intelligence support to HD.

3. **Military Information Support Operations (MISO)**

MISO are not conducted against US persons IAW law and DOD policy based on significant legal considerations. However, in addition to HD activities outside of the US homeland, “The Homeland Defense Operational Framework,” military information support forces and equipment may also be used as part of civil authority information support elements (CAISEs) for HD and other domestic emergencies within the boundaries of the US homeland. CAISEs conduct DOD information activities under a designated LFA or civil authority to support dissemination of public or other critical information during domestic emergencies (whether relating to national security or disaster relief operations). CAISEs are not part of any MISO program. The Joint Staff issues specific guidance for military information support forces, as well as the designated command and control (C2) authority for the mission-tailored CAISE component.

Refer to JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations, for a more complete discussion on MISO.
VI. The Homeland Defense Operational Framework

The HD operational framework includes the strategies, plans, and actions taken to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression against the homeland. The purpose of HD is to protect against and mitigate the impact of incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population, and critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) as directed. The following are DOD HD objectives:

- Identify the threat.
- Dissuade adversaries from undertaking programs or conducting actions that could pose a threat to the US homeland.
- Ensure defense of the homeland and deny an adversary’s access to the nation’s sovereign airspace, territory, and territorial seas.
- Ensure access to cyberspace and information (including information systems and security).
- Protect the domestic population and critical infrastructure.
- Deter aggression and coercion by conducting global operations.
- Decisively defeat any attack if deterrence fails.
- Recovery of the military force to restore readiness and capabilities after any attack or incident.

The diversity of threats requires that DOD, the military instrument of national power, take a broad role to coordinate all the requirements and objectives of the HD operational framework. HD operations require integration of capabilities and synchronization of activities (i.e., arrangement of activities across time, space, and purpose) through interagency coordination, and when necessary, interorganizational coordination.

DOD conducts activities and operations globally intended to contribute to the defense of the homeland. They are carried out in various operational environments, including the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). The information environment is also considered distinct, but it includes cyberspace and resides within the physical domains. HD operations are conducted IAW laws; treaties and international agreements; national authorities; and DOD, CJCS, Military Department, and Service policy and doctrine. HD operations require active and passive defenses, and DOD may conduct offensive actions (to include preemptive activities) to deter, disrupt, and destroy adversary capabilities before they can be offensively employed.

Outside the US (in the forward regions and approaches), DOD conducts activities to maintain the freedom to operate in the global commons, access information, and conduct operations or campaigns to disrupt and defeat terrorists and other adversaries before they are able to execute attacks against the US homeland. DOD security cooperation activities (e.g., exercises, exchanges, experimentation), and counterproliferation and nonproliferation activities also advance working relationships and interoperability with friends and allies. The NG State Partnership Program (SPP) contributes to these initiatives and is part of the GCC’s security cooperation program.

Within the homeland, military activities are conducted in or adjacent to the land mass, airspace, and territorial waters of the US. These activities require freedom of action and full access and use of capabilities in cyberspace and space. HD includes ballistic missile defense (BMD), cruise missile defense, air interdiction, maritime interdiction, land operations, to include protection of critical infrastructure, and defensive cyberspace operations.

**HD operations require thorough preparation.** DOD EP activities at the strategic level may focus on actions associated with continuity of operations (COOP) and continuity of government (COG). At the operational level, however, DOD emergency preparations to defend the homeland include activities such as joint and interagency interoperability and coordination, joint training exercises and experimentation, and development of information and intelligence architectures.

**Early detection facilitates timely identification, tracking, and engagement decisions for threats before they reach the homeland.** In the forward regions and approaches, intelligence and when possible persistent ISR can provide decision makers with possible indications and warnings, early warning and assessments. The CONUS portion of the air domain is protected in part by NORAD’s integrated tactical warning and attack assessment (ITW/AA) functions. For maritime domain awareness, the National Maritime Intelligence-Integration Office is an interagency organization that works at the national and international level to facilitate the integration of maritime information and intelligence collection and analysis in support of national policy and interagency decision makers at all levels of USG. Additionally, maritime warning utilizes mutual support agreements with other commands and agencies, to enable identification, validation, and response to threats to North America by national commands and agencies responsible for maritime defense and security. Another essential interagency organization is the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) that has the specific and unique mission of acquiring, integrating, analyzing, and disseminating all available USG information about terrorist threats and identities. The US and its multinational partners seek a global awareness of all threats to national security individually and collectively, to increase the ability to deal with a range of threats at home and abroad. Early detection of CBRN threats emanating from any operational environment must be integrated throughout ISR planning and execution from collection to dissemination.
VII. Terrorism & Hybrid Threats

Counterterrorism
Terrorism has evolved as a preferred tactic for ideological extremists around the world, directly or indirectly affecting millions of people. In addition to increasing law enforcement capabilities for counterterrorism (CT), the United States (US), like many nations, developed specialized, but limited, military CT capabilities. In joint doctrine, CT is simply defined as operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. In addition to any diplomatic and law enforcement actions, the US Government (USG) typically viewed CT missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means.

Counterterrorism is one of the core tasks of the US special operations forces (SOF), and their role and additive capability is to conduct offensive measures within Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) overall combating terrorism (CbT) efforts.

Special operations (SO) differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, modes of employment, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. SO are conducted in all environments, but are particularly well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments. SO can be tailored to achieve not only military objectives through application of special operations forces (SOF) capabilities for which there are no broad conventional force requirements, but also to support the application of the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power.

Hybrid Threat
Multiple threats to U.S. interests exist, and rarely are only two sides involved in modern conflicts. The potential for armed conflict between nation-states remains a serious challenge. Additionally, the influence of non-state actors has ever-increasing regional and worldwide implications. Some regional powers aspire to dominate their neighbors and have the conventional force capabilities to do so. Such situations may threaten U.S. vital interests, U.S. allies, or regional stability. Transnational groups conduct a range of activities that threaten U.S. interests and citizens at home and abroad. Such activities include terrorism, illegal drug trading, illicit arms and strategic material trafficking, international organized crime, piracy, and deliberate environmental damage. Extremism, ethnic disputes, and religious rivalries can also further the threat to a region’s stability. Collectively, these transnational threats may adversely affect U.S. interests and possible result in military involvement.

The term “hybrid” has recently been used to capture the seemingly increased complexity of war, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional categories of conflict. While the existence of innovative adversaries is not new, today’s hybrid approaches demand that U.S. forces prepare for a range of conflicts. These may involve nation-state adversaries that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or non-state actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with states.

Refer to The Counterterrorism & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook (Guide to Terrorism in the 21st Century) for further discussion on counterterrorism to include a chapter on countering weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism has evolved as a preferred tactic for ideological extremists around the world, directly or indirectly affecting millions of people. In addition to increasing law enforcement capabilities for counterterrorism (CT), the United States, like many nations, developed specialized, but limited, military CT capabilities.
V. Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)


The National Response Framework outlines the specific ways the federal government will interact with state and local government through 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs). These 15 ESFs are the methods the federal government uses to meet needs of state and local jurisdictions in their efforts to maintain the eight National Essential Functions identified in Federal Continuity Directive 1. ESFs may be selectively activated for both Stafford Act (federal help without asking) and non–Stafford Act (governor asks for help) incidents under circumstances as defined in HSPD-5 (the rules for how to help). They serve the needs of disaster response in preparation, rescue, aftermath mitigation, and recovery to provide the essential aspects of governance: security, essential services, and access to political process (rule of law).

Following a catastrophic event, segments of state, tribal, and local governments as well as NGOs and the private sector may be severely compromised. The federal government should be prepared to fill potential gaps to ensure continuity of government and public- and private-sector operations. The incident may cause significant disruption of the impacted area’s critical infrastructure/key resources, such as energy, transportation, telecommunications, law enforcement, and public health and health care systems.

The USG and many state governments organize much of their resources and capabilities as well as those of certain private-sector and NGOs under the 15 emergency support functions (ESFs). ESFs align categories of resources and provide strategic objectives for their use. ESFs utilize standardized resource management concepts such as typing, inventorying, and tracking to facilitate the dispatch, deployment, and recovery of resources before, during, and after an incident. ESF coordinators and primary agencies are identified on the basis of authorities and resources. Support agencies are assigned based on the availability of resources in a given functional area. ESFs provide the greatest possible access to USG department and agency resources regardless of which organization has those resources.

ESF Notification and Activation

The NRCC, a component of the National Operations Center (NOC), develops and issues operations orders to activate individual ESFs based on the scope and magnitude of the threat or incident. ESF primary agencies are notified of the operations orders and time to report to the NRCC by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Operations Center. At the regional level, ESFs are notified by the RRCC per established protocols.

ESF primary agencies notify and activate support agencies as required for the threat or incident, to include support to specialized teams. Each ESF is required to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) and notification protocols and to maintain current rosters and contact information.

ESF Member Roles and Responsibilities

Each ESF Annex identifies the coordinator and the primary and support agencies pertinent to the ESF. Several ESFs incorporate multiple components, with primary agencies designated for each component to ensure seamless integration of and transition between preparedness, response, and recovery activities. ESFs with multiple primary agencies designate an ESF coordinator for the purposes of preincident planning and coordination of primary and supporting agency efforts throughout the incident. Following is a discussion of the roles and responsibilities of the ESF coordinator and the primary and support agencies.
# Emergency Support Functions (ESFs)

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<tr>
<td>#15 External Affairs</td>
<td>DHS</td>
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Note: DOD is a supporting agency for all ESFs except ESF #3, Public Works and Engineering. Although the Army Corps of Engineers is the Coordinator for #3, it does so based upon its congressionally mandated status and not as a subordinate part of a federal military joint task force.

Refer to Civil-Military SMARTbook 2 – Incident Command System (ICS) (On-Scene, All-Hazards Incident Management) for further discussion. Topics include incident command system (ICS) purpose, features, and principles; command and staff functions; leadership and management; unified command, area command, and multiagency coordination; planning; ICS briefings and meetings; organizational flexibility; incident/event management; resource management; and demobilization.
The Incident Command System (ICS) is a sub-component of NIMS and provides specific instruction as to the methods of incident response at the regional, state, tribal, and local level. The importance of ICS is that it provides for consistency of method and coordination of effort so that all responders are using the same standardized terminology, interoperable technologies, organizational structure, and management techniques. This allows any responder to have a common understanding and expectation of how agencies and departments will organize when working together to respond to an incident. This commonality of knowledge, structure, and function provides a level of functionality that can expand and interact as the needs of the situation demand.

The need for, and development of, a standardized method of incident response was based upon the lessons learned following a series of catastrophic fires in California in the 1970s. Property damage ran into the millions, and many people died or were injured. The personnel assigned to determine the causes of these disasters studied the available records and discovered that response problems could rarely be attributed to lack of resources or failure of tactics. The failures that caused death and destruction was specifically found in the lack of effective communication and the lack of coordination of effort. The development and application of ICS enabled responders to avoid these weaknesses in all types of incident responses. ICS was so effective it’s now required by law. The use of ICS is mandated by the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

ICS can be used to manage multiple simultaneous situations that require coordination of effort. Understand that ICS is not just about disasters. ICS can provide coordination of effort for any situation that requires agencies and departments to work together towards a common goal. These can include natural hazards, technological hazards, human-caused hazards, and planned events. This means ICS can be practiced every day. By using ICS principles in coordination of planning for events and activities an agency can become very proficient at ICS before ever having to use it in response to a disaster.

**ICS Benefits**

These “best practices” provide some very important advantages. ICS allows for the efficient use of resources which leads to the achievement of response objectives in the shortest time frame and at the lowest cost (in both lives and resources). These efficiencies help to ensure the safety of everyone in the incident area of effect. This has two major impacts; first, it provides the greatest opportunity for minimizing the loss of life, property, and infrastructure. And second, it minimizes the loss or injury of responding personnel, equipment, and materials thus preserving operational capacity.
ICS Essential Functions

ICS is made up of two kinds of tools; essential functions which make up the working parts of the system and management principles which express uniform methodology for how those functions are to be use. These are expressed in the essential functions list of ICS Features. They are called essential because they are common to every ICS response and are a basic requirement for successful ICS implementation. A short introduction is provided here but a review of the detailed components of ICS in Book 2 of this series provide an in depth explanation of these functions and principles. The essential functions are listed here. The management principles are found as components within the essential functions.

Standardization
This includes the use of common terminology for clear communications as well as standards for training, accreditation, and certification of skills.

Command
This provides a method to establish a clear Chain of Command.

Planning/Organization Structure
These methods provide for the standardization of methods for establishing objectives, making an Incident Action Plan (IAP), developing flexibility with modular organization, and promoting manageable command and control as well as span of control.

Facilities and Resources
This standardized the naming and purposes of incident locations and facilities as well as designating a comprehensive resource management program to ensure resources, materials, and equipment are available during and incident response.

Communication/Information Management
This established the development of integrated communications and interoperable technologies. It also addressed methods of information and intelligence management in the scene of managing situational awareness.

Professionalism
This standardized the expectations for, and methods of, accountability at all levels; command, fiscal, and logistics. The standardization of dispatch and deployment ensures more accurate accountability of personnel and equipment.

ICS provides the operational and tactical aspects of incident response. Military personnel will recognize much within the system but should not assume it operates the same as military ground operations. There are significant differences that should be understood before civil-military operations are conducted.
II. State, Local, Territory, and Tribal Roles


Response begins at the local level with public officials and responders at the county, city, municipality, or town affected by the incident. Local leaders and emergency responders prepare their communities to manage incidents locally. The NRF response guidance describes coordinating resources within jurisdictions, among adjacent jurisdictions, and with the private sector and NGOs such as the American Red Cross.

Chief Elected or Appointed Official
A mayor, city manager, or county manager, as a jurisdiction’s chief executive officer, is responsible for ensuring the public safety and welfare of the people of that jurisdiction. Specifically, this official provides strategic guidance and resources during preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. At times, these roles require providing direction and guidance to constituents during an incident, but the officials’ day-to-day activities do not focus on emergency management and response.

Emergency Manager
The local emergency manager has the day-to-day authority and responsibility for overseeing emergency management programs and activities. The emergency manager establishes and/or directs functions of an emergency operations center (EOC). The EOC is the physical location where multi-agency coordination occurs. The emergency manager ensures the EOC is staffed to support the incident command and arranges needed resources. The chief elected or appointed official provides policy direction and supports the incident commander and emergency manager, as needed, to include unified objectives related to incident planning and incident management. This role entails coordinating all aspects of a jurisdiction’s capabilities. The emergency manager coordinates all components of the local emergency management program, to include assessing the availability and readiness of local resources most likely required during an incident and identifying and correcting any shortfalls.

A primary responsibility of state government is to supplement and facilitate local efforts before, during, and after domestic emergencies. The state provides direct and routine assistance to its local jurisdictions through emergency management program development and by routinely coordinating these efforts with federal officials. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) provides the authority for the USG to respond to a presidential declared major disaster or emergency. The act gives the President the authority to establish a program or disaster preparedness and response support, which is delegated to DHS. Under the Stafford Act, states are also responsible for requesting federal emergency assistance for communities within their jurisdiction. In response to an incident, the state helps coordinate and integrate resources and applies them to local needs.

Governor
Public safety and welfare of a state’s citizens are fundamental responsibilities of every governor. For the purposes of the NRF, any reference to a state governor also references the chief executive of a US territory. The governor:

- Coordinates state resources and provides the strategic guidance needed to prevent, mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from incidents of all types.
- IAW state law, may make, amend, or suspend certain orders or regulations associated with response.
- Communicates to the public and helps people, businesses, and organizations cope with the consequences of any type of incident.
- Commands the state military forces (NG personnel not in Title 10, USC, status and state defense forces).
D. Dual Status Cdr (DSC) Appointment


When it is anticipated that a DSC will be necessary and proper, coordination will immediately commence between key military leaders (TAG, CNGB, CCDR, JS, and OSD), on behalf of their principal (governor or SecDef) (see Figure C-1, below).

For requests initiated from the affected state, TAG will notify CNGB and CCDR of the state’s desire to seek appointment of its nominated DSC. CNGB and CCDR will coordinate with the CJCS and ASD(HD&ASA) to verify the qualification and certification of the nominee and provide SecDef a recommendation on the appointment of the DSC. ASD(HD&ASA) will determine whether a signed MOA exists between the state and DOD, or if there is a need to establish one for this specific event or incident and prepare it for signature by the principals. Additionally, ASD(HD&ASA) will ensure the pre-coordinated DOD appointment memorandum is ready for SecDef’s signature, and NGB will ensure the state has the state appointment memorandum ready for the governor’s signature. A conference call will be arranged between the governor and SecDef to discuss the appointment of a DSC and with the governor’s consent and SecDef’s authorization, the MOA will be verbally executed based on oral agreement with signatures of the appointment memorandums to be obtained as soon as possible. Upon SecDef’s authorization, CJCS will communicate the decision, via order or memorandum, to the supported commander and supporting commanders.

For requests initiated from DOD, a similar process will occur, but the request will be initiated by CDRUSNORTHCOM, with SecDef’s consent.

For requests that occur during principal level discussions (governor and President/SecDef), which key military leaders (SecDef, CJCS, CNGB, CDRUSNORTHCOM, TAG) are unaware, it is imperative that the immediate dissemination and coordination occur to inform all parties of the oral agreement and ensure that signatures are obtained as soon as possible. (Governor may request approval via SecDef verbal authority in an emergency situation.)
Although projecting power overseas has been the usual strategy for ensuring national security, the evolution of new threats against the nation has caused DOD to reshape its approach to this important task. In this era of potential natural disasters and domestic terrorism, US military forces may be required to assist civil authorities, which may require the use of force. The participation of the military in such scenarios is fraught with legal and political pitfalls that warrant clear and specific guidance on the use of force. Third parties may seek to exacerbate a situation for their own purposes by provoking an excessive use of force. The purpose of this appendix is to reference fundamental policies and procedures governing the SRUF by DOD forces during DSCA missions. These RUF do not apply to NG forces while in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status. These NG forces operate under the state’s RUF. DODD 5210.56, Carrying of Firearms and the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Engaged in Security, Law and Order, or Counterintelligence Activities, also applies.

I. Guidance

CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement and Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces, establishes fundamental policies and procedures governing the actions to be taken by US commanders and their forces during all DOD DSCA operations and routine military department functions occurring within the US territory or US territorial seas. SRUF also apply to land HD missions occurring within US territory.

SecDef approves and the CJCS promulgates standing rules of engagement (SROE) and SRUF for US forces. The Joint Staff Operations Directorate, in coordination with OSD, is responsible for the maintenance of the SROE/SRUF. Commanders at all levels are responsible for establishing ROE/RUF for mission accomplishment that comply with the ROE/RUF of senior commanders, the law of war, applicable international and domestic law, and the CJCS SROE/SRUF. It is critical that commanders consult with their command judge advocates when establishing ROE/RUF.

Unless otherwise directed by a unit commander (IAW CJCSI 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement and Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces), military personnel have the right, under law, to use force that is reasonably necessary under the circumstances to defend themselves against violent, dangerous, or life-threatening personal attack. In addition, military personnel are authorized to use force to discharge certain duties. Nothing in this section alters or limits military commanders’ inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense in response to a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Unit self-defense includes the defense of other DOD forces in the vicinity.

Commanders at all levels are responsible for training their personnel to understand and properly utilize the SRUF. In this regard, it is critical that legal advisors be available to assist in this training and to advise commanders at all levels of the applicable rules.

When DOD forces are detailed to other federal agencies, mission-specific RUF will be used. These RUF must be approved by SecDef and the federal agency concerned.

See following pages for further discussion.
II. Authority/Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) in the Homeland

Ref: ADRP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Jun ’13), chap. 2.

Soldiers deployed overseas follow rules of engagement established by the Secretary of Defense and adjusted for theater conditions by the joint force commander. Within the homeland, Soldiers adhere to RUF (sometimes including SRUF). There are many similarities between them, such as the inherent right of self-defense, but they differ in intent. Rules of engagement are by nature permissive measures intended to allow the maximum use of destructive power appropriate for the mission. RUF are restrictive measures intended to allow only the minimum force necessary to accomplish the mission. The underlying principle is a continuum of force—a carefully graduated level of response determined by civilians’ behavior. The application of RUF also differs somewhat between state National Guard forces and federal forces.

### Illustration of Continuum of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>If subject is—</th>
<th>Deadly force</th>
<th>Soldiers employ—</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combative and armed</td>
<td>Deadly force</td>
<td>Nonlethal weapons to disable or incapacitate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combative, but not armed</td>
<td>Nonlethal force to remove, detain, or disperse</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physically resisting</td>
<td></td>
<td>Verbal warnings; physically detain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncooperative or using passive resistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative</td>
<td></td>
<td>Verbal commands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: ADRP 3-28 DSCA, fig. 2-1, p. 2-14.

Both state National Guard and federal Army forces will encounter situations where Soldiers and small unit leaders will have to know and adhere to the RUF. Therefore, leaders at every level review the RUF with their subordinates as part of their pre mission inspections and confirm that the Soldiers know the rules. Commanders should obtain and issue a rules-for-the-use-of-force summary card to each Soldier before deploying from home station, and small unit leaders should inspect to ensure that the Soldiers have it. The potentially confusing situations associated with infrastructure and property protection require particular attention from commanders. The Soldiers securing a facility or an area must understand the RUF as they apply to the specific location. Above all, the unit leader must understand if, when, and how he or she may use lethal force to protect the facility or to save lives.
Army forces support civil authorities by performing defense support of civil authorities tasks. Defense support of civil authorities is defined as support provided by United States Federal military forces, DoD [Department of Defense] civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support (DODD 3025.18).

Military forces provide civil support at federal and state levels. Federal military forces are active Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force; mobilized Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reserve; and National Guard mobilized for federal service under title 10, United States Code (USC). State National Guard forces under state control perform DSCA tasks when serving under title 32, USC.

Readiness
Numerous features of DSCA are distinct from the other tasks of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. DSCA tasks stress the employment of nondestructive means to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property. Domestic operations are operations in the homeland; The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and airspace (JP 3-28). Domestic operations are constrained by various laws to a greater degree, in comparison to the Law of Land Warfare and The Hague and Geneva Conventions. It is accurate to say that most tasks performed in domestic support are common to overseas operations; however, Soldiers conduct them under very different conditions.

Commanders gauge unit readiness for DSCA missions by assessing proficiency in three warfighting functions: mission command, sustainment, and protection. The requirement to deploy into a domestic operational environment—often with little warning—and to operate with joint and interagency partners requires mission command that can adapt systems and procedures for a noncombat, civilian-led structure.

The majority of DSCA missions will stress the sustainment warfighting function. Mission success depends on units’ ability to deliver personnel, medical support, supplies, and equipment, while maintaining their equipment and Soldiers. This is challenging because forces often provide support in areas devastated by a disaster and lacking potable water, electrical power, and sanitation. When needed, a federal installation identified as a base support installation will serve as a base for federal military forces throughout the mission.

The protection warfighting function is the third area for readiness assessment. It is imperative that commanders understand their protection capabilities. They must understand which of those capabilities may be exercised legally in domestic environments so they can be properly integrated into the overall scheme of protection.

Military Capability
Soldiers are trained to exercise initiative in combat and training. They must understand which military capabilities may be exercised during domestic operations,
I. Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(Decisive Operations)

Ref: ADP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Jul ‘12).

In March 2011, The President of the United States signed Presidential Policy Directive 8, to strengthen “the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.” In support of this directive, the Department of Homeland Security, primarily through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), maintains national doctrine for all aspects of incident management, defined as a national comprehensive approach to preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. Incident management includes measures and activities performed at the local, state, and national levels and includes both crisis and consequence management activities (JP 3-28). ADP 3-0 states that Army forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as unified action—the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1).

Army Support of Civil Authorities

Army forces support civil authorities by performing defense support of civil authorities tasks. Defense support of civil authorities is defined as support provided by United States Federal military forces, DoD [Department of Defense] civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also known as civil support (DODD 3025.18).

Military forces provide civil support at federal and state levels. Federal military forces are active Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force; mobilized Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reserve; and National Guard mobilized for federal service under title 10, United States Code (USC). State National Guard forces under state control perform DSCA tasks when serving under title 32, USC.

Primary Purposes of Army Support

While there are many potential missions for Soldiers as part of DSCA, the overarching purposes of all DSCA missions are, in the following order, to—

• Save lives
• Alleviate suffering
• Protect property

Primary Characteristics of Army Support

Army forces operating within the United States encounter very different operational environments than they face outside the Nation’s boundaries. The support provided by Army forces depends on specific circumstances dictated by law. Soldiers and Army civilians need to understand domestic environments so they can employ the Army’s capabilities efficiently, effectively, and legally.

While every domestic support mission is unique, four defining characteristics shape the actions of commanders and leaders in any mission. These characteristics are that—

• State and federal laws define how military forces support civil authorities
• Civil authorities are in charge, and military forces support them
• Military forces depart when civil authorities are able continue w/o military support
• Military forces must document costs of all direct and indirect support provided
The military’s primary contribution is defense support to civil authorities (DSCA).

Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (DODD 3-25.18)

Primary purposes:
- Save lives
- Alleviate suffering
- Protect property

Primary characteristics:
- State and federal laws define how military forces support civil authorities.
- Civil authorities are in charge, and military forces support them.
- Military forces depart when civil authorities are able to continue without military support.
- Military forces must document costs of all direct and indirect support provided.

Army organization:
- State governors command State National Guard forces
  (National Guard in title 32 duty status)
- President commands Federal military forces
  (National Guard in title 10 duty status, Regular Army, and Army Reserve)

Primary Army tasks:
- Provide support for domestic disasters
- Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents
- Provide support for domestic law enforcement agencies
- Provide other designated support

Ref: ADRP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, fig. 1, p. iv.

Refer to The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Doctrine 2015 Guide to Unified Land Operations & the Six Warfighting Functions) for further discussion of DSCA in terms of decisive operations. Additional topics include the fundamentals, principles and tenets of Army operations and organization, plus chapters on each of the six warfighting functions.
including consideration for duty status (title 10, title 32, or state active duty). With this understanding, they will be able to maximize their initiative and efforts. Commanders maintain a balance between the willingness of their subordinates to engage any mission against the capability to accomplish it. Military capability comprises—

- The ability to perform a task effectively and efficiently
- The ability to perform a task safely
- The legal authority to perform a task

II. Range of Response

Soldiers are trained to exercise initiative in combat and training. Leaders and Soldiers must understand which military capabilities may be employed during domestic operations, including consideration for duty status (Title 10, Title 32, or state active duty). With this understanding, they will be able to maximize their initiative and efforts. Commanders maintain a balance between the willingness of their subordinates to engage any mission against the capability to accomplish it. Military capability comprises—

- The ability to perform a task effectively, efficiently, and ethically
- The ability to perform a task safely
- The legal authority to perform a task

The range of response by Army forces includes support provided by the Regular Army, activated Army Reserve, and the National Guard in state or federal service. National Guard forces may conduct DSCA, National Guard civil support, or both. In principle, Army forces may conduct DSCA in conjunction with offensive and defensive tasks within homeland defense. DSCA is a DOD term and does not encompass all types of domestic military support. DSCA describes operations that DOD executes in support of civil authorities and as part of a national homeland security enterprise. Together, DSCA and National Guard civil support comprise support provided by the Components of the Army to civil authorities within the United States and its territories.

Ref: ADRP 3-28 DSCA, fig. 1-7, p. 1-22.
Disaster Declarations
Ref: FEMA.GOV (https://www.fema.gov/disasters/grid/year)

Every year, citizens of the United States, in all regions of the Nation, are threatened with loss of life and property as the result of natural disasters. In the past decade alone, between 2004 and 2014, natural disasters of considerable severity resulted in 699 Presidential Disaster Declarations, an average of nearly six per month.

Disaster Declarations (by Year since 2004)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Major Disaster Declarations</th>
<th>Emergency Declarations</th>
<th>Fire Management Assistance Declarations</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Major Disasters
A Major Disaster can be a result of hurricanes, earthquakes, flood, tornados or major fires; the President then determines warrants supplemental federal aid. The event must be clearly more than state or local governments can handle alone. If declared, funding comes from the President's Disaster Relief Fund, managed by FEMA and disaster aid programs of other participating federal agencies.

Presidential Major Disaster Declaration
A Presidential Major Disaster Declaration puts into motion long-term federal recovery programs, some of which are matched by state programs and designed to help disaster victims, businesses and public entities.

Emergency Declaration
An Emergency Declaration is more limited in scope and without the long-term federal recovery programs of a Major Disaster Declaration. Generally, federal assistance and funding are provided to meet a specific emergency need or to help prevent a major disaster from occurring.
C. Federal Acts and Reimbursement for DSCA

Ref: GTA 90-01-020, Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit (Jul 2010), table 1-1.

The Stafford Act
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-28 provides for reimbursement of the incremental costs of providing support (approval authority and reporting requirements vary, depending upon the duration and type of support requested), but the President may direct DOD (or any other USG department or agency) to undertake missions and tasks on either a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis under the Stafford Act.

See p. 4-12 for further discussion.

The Economy Act
Title 31, USC, Section 1535, the Economy Act, permits federal agencies to provide resources and services to other federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. The Economy Act is also the basis for the general rule that DOD will not compete with commercial businesses.

## Reimbursement for DSCA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stafford Act</th>
<th>Economy Act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provides the authority for federal funding when approved by the President at the request of a state governor.</td>
<td>Used as authority to provide support between federal agencies for routine and emergency incidents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding reimburses INCREMENTAL costs to military forces in a Title 10 or Title 32 status that have provided support at the federal, state, or local level.</td>
<td>Does NOT require a Presidential declaration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has “pre-declaration essential DoD support” provision whereby a state governor may request essential DoD support from the President for up to ten days.</td>
<td>Funding reimburses the TOTAL cost of support, including pay and allowances, to military forces in a Title 10 or Title 32 status that have provided support to other federal agencies (e.g., National Park Service, United States Forest Service).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DOD Guidelines
DOD 7000.14-R, Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation; USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3501, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA); and USNORTHCOM CONPLAN 3502, Civil Disturbance Operations, require operating agencies and supported CCDRs to recover all costs for civil disturbance operations. The operating agency and supported CCDR are responsible for collecting costs for civil disturbance operations of all Service components and DOD agencies, preparing cost reports for the executive agency, consolidating billings, forwarding bills to DOJ, and distributing reimbursements to Service components and DOD agencies.
III. DSCA Operational Planning & Execution

Ref: ATP 3-28.1 (MCWP 3-36.2, NTTP 3-57.2, AFTTP 3-2.67), Multi-Service TTP for DSCA and Integrating With National Guard Civil Support (Feb ’13), chap. 3.

I. Planning Considerations in the DSCA Environment

The joint operation planning process (JOPP) supports planning at all levels for missions across the full range of military operations.

Sample JOPP Inputs and Outputs (DSCA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input</th>
<th>JOPP Process Step</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission received from higher HQ</td>
<td>Receipt of Mission</td>
<td>Commander’s Guidance, Warning Order #1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher HQ DEPORD/Mission, Assignment/Plan or Order, Staff Estimates, Facts &amp; Assumptions, Input from Media</td>
<td>Mission Analysis</td>
<td>Initial IAA Products, Restated Mission, Commander’s Intent and Guidance, Warning Order #2, Preliminary Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restated Mission, Commander’s Guidance, Commander’s Intent, Staff Estimates &amp; Products, Hazards – Known or Predicted Impacts</td>
<td>COA Development</td>
<td>COA Statement &amp; Sketches/ Diagrams of AOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated Event Timeline and Other Possible Impacts, Staff Table Top Exercise (TTX)</td>
<td>COA Analysis</td>
<td>Table Top Exercise (TTX) Results, Task Organization, Mission to Subordinate Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff TTX Products, Establish COA, Evaluation Criteria, Staff Estimates and Products</td>
<td>COA Comparison</td>
<td>Decision Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Matrix</td>
<td>COA Approval</td>
<td>Approved COA, Redefined Commander’s Intent, Priorities of Mission Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approved COA</td>
<td>Orders Production</td>
<td>DEPORD/OPORD, Mission Order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: GTA 90-01-020, Tactical Level Commander and Staff Toolkit (Jul 2010), fig. 4-1.

II. Mission Analysis


The key inputs to mission analysis are the higher headquarters planning directive, strategic guidance, information about the incident and the affected operational environment, and initial staff estimates. The primary products of mission analysis are a restated mission statement and commander’s initial intent statement, commander’s critical information requirement (CCIR), and planning guidance. In preparation for the mission analysis process, staff officers should develop a generic list of requirements within their functional areas for particular types of missions. In the DSCA environment missions are linked to mission assignments via the RFA process. Mission analysis of these mission assignments will result in fragmentary orders (FRAGORDs), passed down from higher headquarters (via the JTF).

Within these FRAGORDs, the JTF and task force commanders must clearly translate civil authority requirements (most likely what would be found in an ICS Incident Action Plan or outlined in an ICS 204) into an order understood by supporting tactical commanders tasked with execution.

Federal agency support operations should be fully coordinated and integrated with state and local government agencies. On-going military operations and HD requirements have priority over civil support (CS) operations unless otherwise directed. The duration and scope of DOD involvement will be related to the severity and magnitude of the event, and the requirements for DOD CS operations.
Sample Survey for a Military-Assisted Evacuation

Ref: ATP 3-28.1 (MCWP 3-36.2, NTTP 3-57.2, AFTTP 3-2.67) Multi-Service TTP for DSCA and Integrating With National Guard Civil Support (Feb ‘13), table 8, p. 36.

1. Name and title of the official in charge of the evacuation:
2. Where and at how many stations will the military conduct screening of evacuees?
3. Who will assist the military?
4. Is the environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile?
5. Perimeter security needs:
6. Policy for unauthorized persons forcibly attempting to join the evacuation?
7. Assembly areas and embarkation points:
8. Are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available if required?
9. Will food be required? Total Meals:
10. Is potable water available? Quantity of bottled water required:
11. Portable radios available to assist in assembly, movement, and control of evacuees:
12. How many sets, frequencies, additional needs?
14. Other factors affecting evacuation:
   a. Travel restrictions:
   b. Curfews:
   c. Roadblocks:
15. Public affairs considerations.
16. Give number of evacuees who are:
   a. Wounded, injured, or ill (litter):
   b. Wounded, injured, or ill (ambulatory):
   c. Pregnant:
17. What medical assistance (to include special equipment) will be required?
18. Breakdown of evacuees by age and sex:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0-7 years</th>
<th>8-16 years</th>
<th>17-20 years</th>
<th>21+ years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>_________</td>
<td>_________</td>
<td>_________</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>_________</td>
<td>_________</td>
<td>_________</td>
<td>_________</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. DSCA Liaison Officer (LNO)

This section of the Liaison Officer (LNO) Toolkit provides information on LNO duties and responsibilities. It also provides LNOs and commanders with basic tools for success in a Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) environment. It is not intended to describe the duties of the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs).

**liaison n.**
Contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action (The DoD Dictionary of Military Terms).

*LNOs are different from Emergency Support Liaison Officers (EPLOs). EPLOs are Service and other DoD personnel who coordinate military assistance to other federal agencies and state governments. LNOs represent their command.*

A Liaison Officer acts as the commander’s representative at another unit or agency and effects coordination and cooperation between organizations. The LNO is the command’s representative to other governmental agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and/or the private sector and provides input on the unit’s policies, resource capabilities, and other matters.

Title 10 unit commanders should not deploy, assign, or detail unit LNOs to the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) or National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) without prior approval of the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO)/Joint Force Commander (JFC) (federal forces) or JFHQ (state forces).

I. Levels of LNOs

**State**
Represents the Title 10 and/or Title 32 forces at state Office of Emergency Management (OEM) Emergency Operations Center (EOC); should be senior officers or NCOs knowledgeable of state military/Department of Defense (DoD) resources and capabilities.

**County**
Advises state interagency partners and County Emergency Managers on Title 10 and Title 32 assets

**Field or Incident**
Represents military unit at field/incident site or Major Subordinate Command (MSC)

**Major Subordinate Command**
Assigned from MSC to EOC and provides coordination of mission requirements from EOC to parent MSC

LNOs must exercise caution to ensure that they do not obligate or volunteer their agency for taskings.
Use of Vehicles and Transportation

Ref: GTA 90-01-020, Tactical Level Commander & Staff Toolkit (Jul 2010), pp. 6-8 to 6-9.

Personnel are to drive defensively and remain alert to potential hazards. Operators of vehicles should:

- Pair experienced drivers with inexperienced drivers for supervision and hands-on training
- Use experienced drivers in difficult terrain
- Remind drivers to slow down in limited visibility, on rough terrain, and during inclement weather
- Secure vehicle antennas to prevent contact with power lines and other objects
- Take into account the maximum fording depth for each vehicle type, and ensure proper fording equipment and accessories are installed before entering water areas
- Use ground guides during periods of limited visibility
- Ensure operators are licensed on their vehicle; operators designated to transport Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) and ammunition are licensed to load, transport and off-load said material

All operators of vehicles should perform:

- Preventive maintenance checks and services, especially under adverse or unusual conditions
- Special requirements covered in the “Operating Under Unusual Conditions” section of their respective operator’s manual

Leaders should conduct convoy briefings before movement. Leaders should ensure all vehicle operators know how to:

- Conduct a physical reconnaissance of the route to avoid hazards; mark unavoidable hazards on a strip map and include them in the convoy briefing
- Reconnoiter the route for bridges or underpasses that might be too low for large vehicles
- Access roads, bridges, and overpasses that may not be posted with weight or height restrictions
- Reconnoiter routes for hazards below the water line before operations begin
- Check water height before driving on submerged surfaces; a good rule of thumb is not to drive into running water deeper than the vehicle axle

Convoys require a safety briefing containing, at a minimum, the following:

- Mishap duties and responsibilities
- Speed limits
- Interval distances
- Mechanical breakdown procedures
- Passenger safety measures
- Visual signals for convoy halt, caution, slow, etc.
- Preplanned rest halts
- Hospital, armory, and operational mission support locations identified on a provided strip map as applicable.

Drivers will not operate a vehicle for longer than two hours without a rest stop or four hours without relief.
This chapter defines the role of the military in support of civil authority in all hazards. Military units tasked to support civil authority during domestic disasters provide effective disaster response capabilities to limit loss of life, mitigate suffering, and curtail further significant property damage. This section will address the commonality of planning deployment, execution and redeployment of forces in support of wildland fires, wind storms, earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, earthquakes, tornados, winter storms, CBRN incidents and national special security events (NSSEs).

Editor's note: The hazard guidance and planning factors presented in this chapter are designed to complement and augment the hazard planning guidance presented in Civil-Military SMARTbook 3 - Disaster Preparedness (chapters 10 & 11), which provides extensive discussion of natural and man-made disasters to include: hurricanes, earthquakes, wildfires, floods, volcanoes, tsunamis, tornadoes, drought & famine, blizzards & ice storms, outbreaks, epidemics & pandemics, nuclear events, civil disturbances, explosions & chemical spills.

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The “BIG 8”: Disaster Qualifiers

When people talk about disasters, they talk about causes and effects. The terms we use to describe a disaster and the methods we use to measure its effects become the definition of the disaster. For example, F5 tornado, Category 3 hurricane, and 8.0 earthquake. But these are generalized descriptions that do not give us enough information to protect ourselves.

There are eight questions to consider when thinking about any disaster: where can it happen, what will happen when, how big will it be, how long will it last, how much reaction time will I have, what will be left, who can help me, and what comes next? Although you may not be able to answer all eight questions for any given situation, it is very rare that you will not be able to answer, or make a good guess on, five or more of them. By gathering information on as many of these questions as you can answer, you make an informed plan and decision on just about any situation, man-made or natural.

We can take these eight questions and express them in quantifiable, or measurable, terms: Areas of Known Occurrence, Events and Measurements, Area of Effect, Duration of Effect, Quick or Slow Onset, Destruction of Infrastructure, Disruptions of Services, and Aftermath. Although history will record each of these aspects in full after a disaster, by looking at each question, we can discern the potential for some of the answers before the event.

1. Where can it happen — Areas of Known Occurrence
2. What will happen when — Scales and Measurements
3. How big will it be — Area of Effect
4. How long will it last — Duration of Effect
5. How much reaction time will I have — Quick or Slow Onset
6. What will be left — Destruction of Infrastructure
7. Who can help me — Disruptions of Services
8. What comes next — Aftermath

The point here is to build your ability to look at a situation and analyze the information you have, to think about what is happening and be able to make an informed decision based on your specific situation and the general knowledge of how the events usually progress.

Refer to Civil-Military SMARTbook 3 - Disaster Preparedness (Surviving Disasters on Your Own Terms) for further discussion of the “big 8” disaster qualifiers. Topics include understanding disasters, response capabilities, federal disaster response, personal preparation, how to make a good plan, mental resiliency in disaster situations, my choices worksheets, safety in numbers (be part of the team), survival kit basics, natural disasters and man-made disasters.
I. Wildland Fires

A wildland fire is an uncontrolled fire occurring in an area with little development except for roads, railroads, power lines, and transportation facilities; structures, if any, are widely scattered.

* Refer to Civil-Military SMARTbook 3 - Disaster Preparedness, pp. 10-19 to 10-24, for more extensive discussion of wildland fires.

I. Wildland Firefighting Response Authorities

There are several types of authorities governing wildland fire responses. These include IRA, mutual aid agreements, Presidential directive or SecDef mission assignment, and state or federal response.

State Response

The state will use all its assets and execute MOUs with other states before requesting any federal military assistance.

Federal Response

FEMA. FEMA is not responsible for fire suppression. However, during a major fire event, FEMA may request DOD support for non-fire disaster-related issues.

NIFC. The NIFC, located in Boise, Idaho, is the nation’s support center for wildland firefighting. An interagency agreement among DOD, USDA, and Department of the Interior (2005) provides guidelines, terms, and conditions for this support.

Support and equipment. DOD, when requested, provides military resources to support ground and aerial fire suppression efforts. The USAF and ANG operate C-130 aircraft equipped with aerial suppression systems, owned by the US Forest Service (USFS), called modular airborne fire fighting system (MAFFS).

Note: Fire zones are temporary restricted airspaces established by civil authorities in coordination with the FAA to control the flow of aircraft traffic into and out of wildland firefighting operating areas.

Ground Suppression Units

NIFC may request DOD personnel to act as ground firefighting hand crews when a wildland fire exceeds local, state, and regional capabilities.

Incident Management Team (IMT)

For ground operations, the DCO will facilitate integration of assigned personnel into the incident using the IMT concept. The IMT is a temporary organization established to coordinate set-up of facilities and orientation training of the military TOC staff to enable oversight of wildland fire operations.
II. Planning Considerations (Wildland Fires)

Ref: ATP 3-28.1 (MCWP 3-36.2, NTTP 3-57.2, AFTTP 3-2.67) (Feb ’13), pp. 83 to 84.

Military personnel deployed under USNORTHCOM should take time to read the NIFC Military Use Handbook which can be found at: http://www.nifc.gov/nicc/predictive/intelligence/military/Military_Use_Handbook_2006_2.pdf.

1. Assessment and Preparation Phase
   • Become familiar with the ICS organizational structure and understand dual C2 organizations.
   • There will be a military and an ICS (civilian) dual C2 organizational structure. The IC directs military crews following the military chain of command. The IMT provides specific work assignments and on-the-line guidance.
   • Review the incident action plan. The incident action plan is a tactical plan and each IMT member has specific implementation responsibilities.
   • Obtain and issue copies of the Fireline Handbook. This handbook may be obtained at: www.nwcg.gov/pms/pubs/410-1/410-1.pdf.
   • Plan for fire pre-deployment training.
   • Coordinate with assigned BNML to provide training facilities and equipment.
   • Work with the BNML on crew requirements.
   • Coordinate with the BNML for postal address of incident location.
   • Coordinate with the BNML for POCs for weather, road conditions, and other local information sources important to the command.
   • Coordinate with the BNML to acquire relevant maps and/or satellite imagery.
   • Prior to deployment, determine needed logistical support items and coordinate with the BNML.
   • Work with the BNML to establish issue records concerning civilian equipment issued by NIFC or the state requiring support.
   • Determine locations of nearest civilian or federal hospitals and evacuation procedures used by the IC if DOD personnel are injured and need to be evacuated.
   • Maintain contact with the IC LNO.
   • Expect coordination with the IC staff, at the earliest opportunity, regarding sustainment requirements.
   • Determine boot sizes for battalion personnel and forward a list to DCO with an alpha roster of deploying personnel.

2. Deployment Phase
   • Each activated battalion should deploy with a public affairs detachment.

3. Support of Civil Authorities Phase
   • Carry plenty of water. This is critical because units cannot rely on local water supplies. Personnel should use established potable water supplies not at a wash or shower facility.
   • Be prepared for reassignment within or to other geographic areas.
   • Advise subordinates that camp conditions may be very austere.
   • Coordinate with BNML on camp security issues and rules for the camp.
• Develop an IPE/PPE and tools issuing and exchange policy with IC staff.
• Establish a communication plan. Communications requirements for all military C2 will be handled by the military.
• All public affairs activities will be in accordance with fire management agency and DOD directives, unless specifically stated otherwise.
• The NIFC Office of External Affairs staff, through the National Fire Information Center at NIFC, will coordinate and disseminate national interagency fire and incident information.

4. Redeployment/Demobilization Phase

• Deactivation procedures will be accomplished through normal channels. The National Interagency Coordination Center, located at NIFC, will give the battalion a lead time of 72 hours prior to the release of military firefighters.
• All tools, IPE/PPE, and other issued firefighting equipment, except boots, must be collected at the incident site prior to deactivation.
• All receipts and vouchers must be turned in to the DCO/JFHQ upon return to home station. This is a time-sensitive issue and critical for reimbursement to DOD.

Standard Ground Support Request

DOD resources for ground firefighting are normally requested to form 25 crews of 20 people, plus their C2 elements, for a total of approximately 550 personnel. Unlike other DSCA operations, deployed personnel in wildland firefighting missions are authorized to take direction from the IC. As always, such tasking cannot conflict with DOD policies and priorities.
IV. CBRN Consequence Management (CM)

Ref: JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management (Jun ‘12).

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear consequence management (CBRN CM) can be described as the overarching United States Government (USG) capability and the strategic national direction, to prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) incident at home or abroad, and whether or not it is attributed to an attack using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). When required, the USG will coordinate its response to a CBRN incident in one of three ways based on the geopolitical situation. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the USG lead agency for incident management that would include a domestic CBRN incident. Overseas, excluding homeland areas, the Department of State (DOS) is the USG lead for what is termed foreign consequence management (FCM).

Domestic, Foreign, and Military Situations
The geographic scope of the domestic CBRN response is associated with the US homeland. Generally, when tasked, Department of Defense (DOD) is a supporting agency, coordinating agency, or cooperating agency in support of DHS within the National Response Framework (NRF) and National Incident Management System (NIMS). A response could take place in a permissive or uncertain foreign operational environment. Requests for FCM originate from an affected nation through DOS. The military situation is when CBRN incidents occur requiring DOD to lead the USG response effort due to the lack of DOS and/or sufficient affected nation ‘federal’ presence as a result of military operations or for a CBRN incident on a DOD installation.

Emergency Preparedness for CBRN CM
CBRN CM provides the operational framework for those authorized measures DOD takes in preparation for anticipated CBRN incidents to mitigate the loss of life and property and to assist with the response and short-term recovery that may be required. This includes having plans, policies, procedures, training, and equipment necessary to effectively respond to CBRN incidents.

CBRN Response
Domestic CBRN response (with DOD and/or National Guard [NG] in Title 10 or Title 32, United States Code (USC), status or state active duty) is a form of civil support (CS)/defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) (with DHS as the lead for coordinating the USG response). FCM encompasses the overall USG effort to prepare for and respond to a CBRN incident on foreign territory in which an impacted nation has primary responsibility, and DOS is the lead USG agency responsible for coordinating the USG response. DOD-led CBRN CM would typically occur during military operations (e.g., WMD offensive operations), or in other situations in which DOS lacks sufficient local authority or presence to lead the USG effort.

Refer to The Counterterrorism & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook (Guide to Terrorism in the 21st Century) for further discussion on counterterrorism to include a chapter on countering weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism has evolved as a preferred tactic for ideological extremists around the world, directly or indirectly affecting millions of people. In addition to increasing law enforcement capabilities for counterterrorism (CT), the United States, like many nations, developed specialized, but limited, military CT capabilities.
The Constitution
Under the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, each state/territory of the United States has the primary responsibility to prepare for and respond to disasters and emergencies occurring within its borders.

The Stafford Act
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, Public Law 93-28 and Public Law 100-707 (the Stafford Act, as amended) authorizes the President to issue major emergency or disaster declarations in response to catastrophes that overwhelm state governments; and provide DOD and other Federal assets once the declaration is made.
See p. 4-14 for further discussion.

The Economy Act
The Economy Act permits federal agencies to provide resources and services to other federal agencies on a reimbursable basis. The Economy Act is also the basis for the general rule that DOD will not compete with commercial businesses.
See p. 4-14 for further discussion.

The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA)
The PCA prohibits Title 10, U.S.C., forces from engaging in any direct civil law-enforcement activities unless a Constitutional or Act of Congress exception applies (such as the Insurrection Act). Because the PCA is often misunderstood, it is important military commanders operating in a DSCA environment are familiar with it. PCA does not apply to NG in SAD or Title 32, U.S.C. status; however, it does apply to NG in Title 10, U.S.C. status. Posse Comitatus does not apply to the Coast Guard, as Title 14, U.S.C., personnel are authorized to conduct law enforcement activities as part of the Coast Guard mission.
See pp. 2-10 to 2-11, 2-31 to 2-38 and 4-15 to 4-19 for further discussion.

Intelligence Oversight (IO)
DOD and NG intelligence personnel performing intelligence duties must adhere to federal and DOD IO rules including, but not limited to, Executive Order 12333, DODD 5240.01, and DOD 5240.1-R. In addition, each Service has its own regulation and policy guidance. IO rules ensure the protection of US persons’ constitutional rights and privacy, the collection of essential authorized information by the least intrusive means, and the dissemination of information limited to lawful government purposes.
See pp. 2-44 to 2-45 and 3-18 to 3-19 for further discussion.
DSCA Legal and Policy Considerations

Legal Considerations
The legal authorities governing the employment of US military forces in DSCA operations include federal and affected state laws and several directives, making a comprehensive legal review of DSCA plans essential.

Commanders should allow for the application of military capabilities and resources within the constraints of the law. Accordingly, commanders should seek legal advice regarding DSCA plans, policies, and operations from their staff judge advocates to ensure compliance with legal requirements.

The NG, due to local presence, will likely be the first military responder during a domestic emergency. The early employment of NG will usually be in either a state active duty status or Title 32, USC, status; both are at the direction of the governor and the command of the adjutant general (TAG).

There are advantages associated with employment of the NG in either state active duty or Title 32, USC, status. Most notable is the ability to assist law enforcement as the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) does not apply to Title 32, USC, or state active duty forces.

To support operational continuity, most, if not all, NG forces supporting a response will remain in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status, throughout an event. The military response to events that require DSCA will be a coordinated effort between the NG in state active duty or Title 32, USC, status, and Titles 10 and 14, USC, USCG forces.

Policy Considerations
Military commanders should use DOD resources judiciously while conducting DSCA operations by adhering to the validation criteria of legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness as discussed in DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA). Some supporting principles include:

- DOD resources are provided only when response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of local, state, and federal civil authorities, and when they are requested by a federal agency with lead responsibility and approved by SecDef. An exception to this is in the case of immediate response authority. When requested by civil authorities, commanders can respond to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage under imminently serious conditions within the US. Refer to DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), for a full explanation of the requirements and constraints of immediate response authority.

- DOD components do not perform any function of civil government unless authorized. Refer to DOD Instruction (DODI) 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies, for DOD policy on providing military support, including personnel and equipment, to law enforcement agencies (LEAs).

Intelligence Support to Law Enforcement Agencies and Intelligence Oversight
Commanders and staffs must carefully consider the legal and policy limits imposed on intelligence activities in support of LEAs, and on intelligence activities involving US citizens and entities by intelligence oversight regulations, policies, and executive orders (EOs). This oversight includes incident awareness and assessment (IAA) products. No intelligence activities should take place while conducting DSCA unless authorized by appropriate authorities in accordance with (IAW) EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, DODD 5240.01, Defense Intelligence Activities, and DOD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons.
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Homeland Defense is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) is support provided in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Disaster management (or emergency management) is the term used to designate the efforts of communities or businesses to plan for and coordinate all the personnel and materials required to either mitigate the effects of, or recover from, natural or man-made disasters, or acts of terrorism.

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