


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JP 1
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(JFODS6) The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, 6th Ed.

Guide to Joint Warfighting, Operations & Planning

JFODS6 is the sixth revised edition of The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook. JFODS6 is completely updated for 2023 with new/updated material from the latest editions of JP 3-0 Joint Campaigns and Operations (Jun '22), JP 5-0 Joint Planning (Dec '20), JP 3-33 Joint Force Headquarters (Jun '22), and JP 1 Volumes I and II Joint Warfighting and the Joint Force (Jun '20). Additional topics and references include Joint Air, Land, Maritime and Special Operations (JPs 3-30, 3-31, 3-32 & 3-05).

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(JFODS6) Notes to Reader

The ultimate purpose of the Armed Forces of the United States is to **defend the homeland and win the nation's wars**. The four strategic uses of the **military instrument of national power** - assurance; both forms of coercion, deterrence and compellence; and forcible action - are implemented through campaigns, operations, and activities that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and intensity, and occur across a competition continuum.

The **competition continuum** describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. Competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations; as state and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their interests in pursuit of influence, advantage, and leverage, they continually compete over incompatible aims. **Armed conflict** occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict varies in intensity and ranges from crisis response and limited contingency operations to **large-scale combat operations**.

The capability of the Armed Forces of the United States to operate as a cohesive **joint force** is a key advantage in any operational environment. Integrating Service components' forces under a single joint force commander (JFC) maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the joint force. The joint force **conducts campaigns and operations** in a complex, volatile, security environment characterized by contested norms and persistent disorder. National security threats are transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional.

Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) **in time and space** to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks. Joint planning ties the military instrument of national power to the achievement of national security objectives and transforms national strategic objectives into operational design/approaches, lines of operation, and operational objectives, which in turn are carried out through tactical actions.

A **joint task force (JTF)** is the most common command and control option for conducting joint operations. A JTF may be established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the operation require capabilities of Services from at least two MILDEPs operating under a single JFC. Commanders must integrate the capabilities and synchronize the operations of air, land, maritime, space, special operations, and cyberspace forces to defeat peer enemies.

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JP 1, Vol. 1*	Jun 2020	Joint Warfighting, Reference Copy
JP 1, Vol. 2*	Jun 2020	The Joint Force
JP 3-0*	Jun 2022	Joint Campaigns and Operations
JP 5-0*	Dec 2020	Joint Planning
JP 3-33*	Jun 2022	Joint Force Headquarters
JP 3-02	Jan 2021(v)	Amphibious Operations (validated)
JP 3-05	Jul 2014	Special Operations
JP 3-30	Sept 2021(v)	Joint Air Operations (validated)
JP 3-31*	Nov 2021	Joint Land Operations, with Change 1
JP 3-32*	Sept 2021	Joint Maritime Operations, with Change 1

* New/updated references in this edition.



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I. Foundations of Joint Warfighting

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 1, Joint Warfighting, Reference Copy (Jun '20), chap. II.

I. The Profession of Arms

To realize global integration, the Armed Forces of the United States must remain a values-based organization. The character, professionalism, principles, and teamwork of our military leaders have proven vital for tactical, operational, and strategic success. A professional is a person of both high character and competence who conforms to the ethical standards established by their chosen field. As military professionals charged with the defense of the nation, joint leaders must be experts in the conduct of warfare. They must be ethical individuals of both action and intellect, skilled at producing results, and masters of the military art and science. Strong character and competence represent the essence of the US military and its leaders. Both are the products of lifelong learning and are embedded in joint professional military education curricula and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

II. Joint Force Campaigns & Operations *(See Chap. 2.)*

US national leadership may decide to intervene when a situation threatens national interests. Military intervention could involve the conduct of a major operation or campaign. Campaigns may be global or theater in nature. Major operations and campaigns typically involve large-scale combat. In such cases, the objective is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, establish conditions favorable to the US and its partners, and conclude hostilities. A campaign can include combat, coercive measures, and stabilization activities to achieve strategic objectives. Some specific crisis response or limited contingency operations may not involve large-scale combat, but could be considered a campaign or major operation, depending on scale and duration. Large-scale combat operations and limited contingency operations (in some cases) feature simultaneous balancing of offensive, defensive, and stabilization activities through the course of a joint operation. As large-scale combat abates, stabilization activities increase to assert transitional military authority within the occupied or liberated territory, provide the local populace with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. The long-term objective may be to develop the following: indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institutions, and a robust civil society.

Activities in this continuum are dynamic and complex. A joint force may be simultaneously in armed conflict, competing against adversaries, and cooperating with one or more other actors. While the joint force must always be prepared to win in armed conflict, most joint force activities occur in the context of competition below armed conflict. The need for integrated military and nonmilitary solutions in this context, combined with the transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional character of security challenges, has changed the way the joint force plans and operates. To contend with these security challenges, the joint force executes the following critical tasks:

- Understanding the environment, the adversaries, and ourselves.
- Competing below armed conflict.
- Projecting military power.
- Maintaining freedom of action in all-domains.
- Integrating partners.
- Generating, maintaining, and regenerating the force.

III. Globally Integrated Operations (See pp. 2-23 to 2-28.)

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 1, Joint Warfighting, Reference Copy (Jun '20), pp. 1-7 to 1-10.

Global integration is the arrangement of cohesive military actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional challenges. It is an iterative process that combines top-down guidance and bottom-up refinement to integrate planning, decision making, resource allocation development, and design. Global integration is necessary because today's strategic environment has changed to include increasingly prevalent transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional security challenges. Furthermore, the proliferation of advanced technologies has accelerated the speed and complexity of warfare. These factors have eroded the US competitive military advantage. Simultaneously, global demand for the force continues to exceed capacity. To meet these challenges, the joint force must integrate at the right place, at the right time, with the right amount of force in the context of a global perspective.

The global integration process includes the four overarching activities (planning, decision making, force management and employment, and force development and design) that lead to two primary outcomes:

- Globally aligned operations and resources tied to strategic priorities.
- A lethal, agile force with a consistent competitive advantage over any adversary.

The joint force achieves global integration through shared understanding, strategy, planning, operations, and assessments.

Globally Integrated C2

Globally integrated operations rely on an awareness of the global employment of all forces. Global integration is essential for military operations in response to multiple, simultaneous, and transregional threats. A global perspective enables the rapid transmission of orders based on a comprehensive understanding of the security environment and the relationships between actors and events.

Responsiveness

Responsiveness is the ability to recognize and act to a specific situation quickly and effectively, while using the appropriate force required to achieve strategic objectives. It enables a joint force commander (JFC) to combine elements of a globally postured force from across echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations and seize, retain, and exploit the initiative in response to security challenges. Responsiveness requires:

- **Global agility** is the ability to form, employ, and equip geographically dispersed forces with speed and precision. Shared understanding, integrated planning, mobility, modularity, and interoperability increase global agility.
- **Operational reach** is the distance, duration, and speed at which a force can employ military capabilities. The joint force employs forward-based forces, rapidly deployable forces, pre-positioned stocks, and contingency basing to extend its operational reach. The joint force also employs cyberspace and global strike capabilities for rapid and flexible responses and when constrained by geography.
- **Comprehensive readiness** underpins all aspects of responsiveness. The joint force draws from a complete inventory of joint capabilities to provide tailorable options in response to evolving environments, shifting priorities, and competing requirements.

All-Domain Approach

The foundation of US warfighting capability is the joint force's ability to integrate capabilities across all domains throughout the operational environment to create a military advantage. A commander's operational environment is the composite of the conditions, cir-

cumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the commander's decisions. This environment encompasses the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); and the electromagnetic spectrum. The joint force operates as a globally integrated force, not as individual ones. The joint force conducts operations at all echelons down to small-unit level by using common tactical approaches, shared situational awareness, and interoperable weapons and equipment. Integration occurs when the collective use of the appropriate joint functions produces a combined effect greater than the sum of the components. Globally integrated C2 and responsiveness increase the ability for JFCs to integrate many capabilities at multiple points, improving the effectiveness of military operations.

Integrating Physical Actions and Information

Physical actions, military and nonmilitary, are inseparable from their psychological effect. These effects directly influence the perceptions of relevant actors, including the enemy, and ultimately their behavior. These influences can affect an enemy's will to fight, as well as popular support of one side over another. Pervasive media and social networks create an interconnected, transparent environment that magnifies and multiplies psychological effects. Therefore, commanders integrate information activities throughout joint operations to legitimize US actions while simultaneously delegitimizing adversary and enemy actions by shaping perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. Joint planning nests information activities within operations to achieve objectives ranging from building legitimacy to influencing the action of a specific group. Commanders integrate information into all military actions to create desired effects and to minimize unintended consequences. Lastly, integration underlines the importance of activities in the information environment.

Partner Integration

The US military rarely pursues strategic objectives acting alone. Coordination with DOS to integrate allies and other partners is central to how the joint force operates globally. In the conduct of military activities, the joint force relies on partners to increase capacity, access unique capabilities and authorities, share intelligence, and extend operational reach to achieve objectives. Interorganizational partnerships are the sources of these means. The term "by, with, and through" describes how the joint force achieves its military objectives by allies and partners operating independently, with or without US assistance; with allies and other partners cooperating in the same operational environment; and indirectly, through surrogates operating under the direction and control of the JFC, often in a non-overt manner.

Resilience

Enemy capabilities have increased the need for a resilient joint force. The joint force achieves resiliency through professional military education and development, force protection (FP) measures, depth, exchangeability, interoperability, and dispersal so a single attack cannot incapacitate it. Professional military education and training enable the continued development of leaders and personnel responsible for executing military operations. FP measures include not only physical barriers against attack but also virtual barriers to protect against threats from cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and other disruptions. Depth provides the ability to replace capacity and capability with reserves, as well as using the industrial base (the worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development and to design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements) to produce new assets. Our war reserve serves as the bridge spanning the gap between the exhaustion of our forces' operating stocks and the industrial base ramp up timeline. Exchangeability is the ability of forces to serve multiple roles or functions when required. The employment of multifunctional units and equipment that are both modular and scalable increases exchangeability and operational flexibility. Interoperability is the ability to act together coherently, effectively, and efficiently to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. Dispersal eliminates vulnerability to a single point of failure.

Instruments of National Power (DIME)

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 1, Joint Warfighting, Reference Copy (Jun '20), pp. II-7 to II-9.

The ability of the US to advance its national interests depends on the USG achieving objectives stated within the NSS. Military power aligns with other instruments of national power to achieve a whole-of-government approach to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. Directed by the President and managed by the National Security Council(NSC), this approach confronts all global security situations across the competition continuum. The NSC advises the President on how to best meet national interests and goals. It also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various USG departments and agencies.

Instruments of National Power

D Diplomatic	I Informational	M Military	E Economic
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Embassies/ AmbassadorsRecognitionNegotiationsTreatiesPoliciesInternational forums	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Military informationPublic diplomacyPublic affairsCommunications resourcesInternational forumsSpokespersons, timing, media and venues for announcements	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Military operationsEngagement, Security Coop, DeterrenceShow of forceMilitary technologySize, composition of force	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Trade policiesFiscal and monetary policiesEmbargoesTariffsAssistance

The alignment of the instruments of national power is fundamental to US activities in the strategic security environment. The use of the military instrument of national power increases relative to the other instruments as the need to compel an enemy through force increases. The USG's ability to achieve its national strategic objectives depends on employing the instruments of national power in effective combinations for all possible situations. At the President's direction, through the interagency process, military power is aligned with other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish alignment, the Armed Forces of the United States interact with the other USG departments and agencies to develop a shared understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. They also identify the ways in which military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other. The NSC plays a key role in aligning all instruments of national power facilitating presidential direction, cooperation, and unity of effort (unified action).

D - Diplomatic

Diplomacy is the instrument of national power that uses diplomatic relations activities to engage other states and foreign groups to advance US values, interests, and objectives. This includes organizing coalitions and alliances, as well as eliciting foreign support for US military operations. Diplomacy may include support to sympathetic groups opposing a hostile regime or occupying power, outreach to diaspora populations, the use of international organizations to achieve strategic objectives, or the arbitration or mediation of political disputes. DOS is the USG lead for foreign affairs. DOS has regional bureaus, with which CCDRs coordinate to align military and diplomatic activities in their assigned

AORs. In a foreign nation, the chief of mission, normally the US ambassador, has authority over all USG personnel in country, except for those under the command of a CCDR, a USG multilateral mission, or an international organization. CCDRs coordinate with the chief of mission and the country team on diplomatic-military activities, including the credible threat of force, as this reinforces and, in some cases, enables the diplomatic process.

I - Informational

Information is a significant instrument of national power and a strategic resource critical to national security. Previously considered in the context of traditional nation-states, the construct of information as an instrument of national power now extends to non-state actors such as terrorists and transnational criminal organizations, who are using information to further their causes and undermine those of the USG and our multinational partners.

The information environment comprises and aggregates numerous social, cultural, cognitive, technical, and physical attributes that act upon and are impacted by knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world views, and, ultimately, actions of an individual, group, system, community, or organization.

Information activities deliberately leverage the inherent informational aspects of military activities that affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive desired behaviors of relevant actors to produce enduring strategic results.

DOD operates in an age of interconnected global networks and evolving social media platforms where numerous audiences derive meaning, correctly or otherwise, from every action or activity. DOD supports the USG exercise of the informational instrument of national power by planning and conducting operations that deliberately reinforce and leverage those informational aspects inherent in military activities. It is a focused effort to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to national interests, policies, and objectives. Every DOD action, word (written or spoken), and/or image displayed or released communicates a message to US and foreign audiences that may have strategic implications. In coordination with the interagency (e.g., whole-of-government) effort, DOD should make every effort to synchronize, align, and promote an understanding of how the execution of DOD strategies, plans, and operations will be received or understood by key audiences.

M - Military

The US employs the military instrument of national power in support of national objectives. The ultimate purpose of the Armed Forces of the United States is to defend the homeland and win the nation's wars. Fundamentally, the military instrument of national power functions to coerce or force enemies and adversaries through force or the threat of force and to preclude the coercion of US policy makers by external threats. Military capabilities can also be applied in cooperation and competition to deter adversaries and assure allies and partners. When conflict is inevitable, the military response is measured to change the enemy's behavior through coercion or defeat the enemy completely through compellence. Regardless of when or where employed, the Armed Forces of the United States abide by constitutional principles, standards for the profession of arms, and the law of war.

E - Economic

A strong US economy, with access to global markets and resources, is a fundamental engine of the general welfare—the enabler of a strong national defense. A strong economy enables the USG to employ its economic power to use commerce, trade sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, tariffs, and price manipulation with the other instruments of national power to achieve favorable strategic objectives. In the international arena, the Department of Commerce and Department of the Treasury work with DOS, other USG departments and agencies, foreign governments, and international financial institutions to target the economic interests of adversaries and enemies to coerce changes in their behavior.

VI. Strategic Uses of the Military Force

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 1, Joint Warfighting, Reference Copy (Jun '20), pp. 2-9 to 2-10.

The US leverages all instruments of national power to pursue its national interests. Reinforcing traditional tools of US diplomacy, DOD provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from positions of strength. DOD is in a supporting role when the military instrument of national power is not the predominant instrument for the strategy. When other instruments of national power prove insufficient, the military becomes the nation's primary instrument. In either case, the military contribution is essential as it enables and reinforces the application of the other instruments of national power. Whether primary or supporting, there are four strategic uses of military force - assurance; both forms of coercion, deterrence and compellence; and forcible action.

Assurance. Assurance is using the military instrument to demonstrate commitment and support to US allies and partners. Assurance often takes the form of security cooperation, combined exercises, and forward stationing of US forces. It can also take the form of stabilization to provide security and meet the basic human needs of populations in conflict-affected areas. This includes foreign humanitarian assistance as a demonstration of commitment to the international order and support to those in need.


Deterrence. Deterrence is the prevention of undesired action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or the belief that the costs of action outweigh the perceived benefits. The joint force deters by maintaining joint readiness, demonstrating the ability to project power globally, reinforcing narratives, stationing forces forward, and conducting multinational security cooperation and training.

Compellence. Compellence is the use, or threat of use, of violent military force to change enemy or adversary behavior. It is frequently used in conjunction with diplomacy. Effective compellence requires blending with information and diplomacy. Sometimes successful compellence requires economic measures. Compellence differs from deterrence in that the adversary has already taken an action contrary to US interests. Rather than maintaining the status quo, compellence is the application of force to increase the pressure on an enemy or adversary through escalation or denial. Compellence by escalation seeks to increase costs to force an enemy or adversary to choose to stop pursuing a particular approach. Compellence by denial uses military means to convince an adversary they are unable to achieve their objective at a reasonable cost. Compellence provides flexibility; however, it relies on a deep and accurate empathetic perspective of the adversary and the underlying causes of their behavior. Ultimately, the choice remains with the enemy or adversary to continue the COA if the will is strong enough.

Forcible Action. Forcible action is the violent application of military force used to project our will on the enemy by eliminating their resistance. If an enemy values an objective that threatens our national security above all else, then it is imperative to remove those in power or use military force to destroy that which gives the enemy the will to resist. To force an enemy, there must be the national will to win and the means available to do it decisively. Forcible action requires strong national commitment. The three basic methods to prevail in armed conflict against an enemy are exhaustion, attrition, and annihilation. Rarely employed in isolation from the others, exhaustion is the erosion of the enemy's will, attrition is the process of gradually reducing their strength or effectiveness, and annihilation is the complete destruction of the enemy's means. Against a capable and determined enemy, the joint force should not expect any of these methods to be easy, fast, or inexpensive. Additionally, the joint force should not expect military victory to be a forgone conclusion.

VII. Competition Continuum (See pp. 2-47 to 2-52.)

The four strategic uses of the military instrument of national power—assurance; both forms of coercion, deterrence and compellence; and forcible action—are implemented through campaigns, operations, and activities that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and intensity, and occur across a competition continuum (fig. II-1).



Ref: JP 1 Vol. 1 (Jun '20), fig. II-1. Notional Competition Continuum.

The competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic relationships among the actors in the operational environment—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict/war—to distinguish relationships between actors and clarify options for the use of military force within each context. During campaigns and operations, the joint force will likely cooperate with allies and other partners, compete against adversaries, and fight enemies concurrently in the same operational environment.

See following pages (pp. 1-10 to 1-11) for an overview and further discussion.

VIII. Warfare

Warfare is “the how”—the ways and means—of armed conflict against an enemy. Warfare is reflective of the variable character of war outlined above and is transformed by the instruments of national power and other social, infrastructure, physical and chronological factors.

Understanding the changing character of war frames the context in which wars are fought. In a world where fragile critical infrastructure is widely connected through cyberspace, and in which sabotage and terrorism have profound effects, enemies can easily escalate a conflict, and the dimensions of any particular security challenge may not align with existing boundaries or command structures.

Translating military success into strategic success is the ultimate purpose of warfare. Tactical and operational military successes do not always translate into strategic success. They should establish the conditions necessary to achieve strategic objectives. Therefore, near-term military success must be followed by mid- to long-term military efforts to consolidate military gains, secure and stabilize occupied or liberated territory, prevent or mitigate the emergence of an insurgency or resistance movement, and support the USG and international stabilization activities until relieved by another USG department or agency, or other authority (e.g., international or foreign).

III. Unified Direction of Armed Forces

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 2, *The Joint Force (Jun '20)*, chap. 1.

I. National Strategic Direction

National strategic direction is governed by the Constitution, US law, United States Government (USG) policy regarding internationally recognized law, and the national interest as represented by national security policy. Unified direction is the shared whole-of-government approach to protect the nation and its national interests. This direction leads to unified action that results in unity of effort to achieve national objectives. At the strategic level, unity of effort requires coordination among USG departments and agencies within the executive branch; between the executive and legislative branches; with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations, and the private sector; among nations in alliance or coalition; and during bilateral or multilateral military engagement. National policy and planning documents provide national strategic direction.

Responsibilities for national strategic direction as established by the Constitution and US law are as follows:

President

The President is responsible to the American people for national strategic direction.

When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are often the lead element of a national-level effort that coordinates the instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of USG departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign nations may also be involved. The President establishes guidelines for civil-military integration, disseminates decisions, and monitors execution through the National Security Council (NSC).

Complex operations may require a high order of civil-military integration. Presidential directives guide interagency alignment, coordination, and participation in such operations. Military leaders must work with the members of the national security team to promote unity of effort. Operations of USG departments and agencies representing the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power are not under command of the Armed Forces of the United States or of any specific JFC. In US domestic situations, another department, such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), may assume overall control of interorganizational cooperation, including military elements. Abroad, the Department of State (DOS) chief of mission (COM) (normally the ambassador), supported by the country team, is normally in control.

Secretary of Defense (SecDef)

SecDef is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to DOD and, subject to the direction of the President, exercises authority, direction, and control over DOD, including activities to create, support, and employ military capabilities. SecDef is the link between the President and the CCDRs and provides direction and control of the CCDRs as they conduct military activities and operations. SecDef provides authoritative direction and control over the Services through the Secretaries of the MILDEPs. SecDef exercises control of and authority over those forces not assigned to the combatant commands (CCMDs) and administers this authority

through the Secretaries of the MILDEPs, the Service chiefs, and applicable chains of command. The Secretaries of the MILDEPs organize, train, and equip forces and provide for the administration and support of forces within their department, including those assigned or attached to the CCDRs.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the NSC, and SecDef and functions under the authority, direction, and control of the President and SecDef. The CJCS assists the President and SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States and the global integration of their operations. Communications between the President or SecDef and the CCDRs are normally transmitted through the CJCS.

Commanders of Combatant Commands (CCDRs)

CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces and are responsible to the President and SecDef for the preparedness of their commands and performance of assigned missions. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the missions and responsibilities of CCDRs and provides the framework used to assign forces. Certain CCDRs are designated a geographic area of responsibility (AOR). All CCDRs exercise authorities as provided in the United States Code (USC), detailed in the UCP, and as otherwise directed by SecDef.

Chief, National Guard Bureau

The CNGB is a principal advisor to SecDef through the CJCS on matters involving non-federalized National Guard (NG) forces and on other matters as determined by SecDef pursuant to Title 10, USC, Section 10502.

US Chief of Mission (COM)

In a foreign nation, the COM is the direct representative of the President and is also responsible to the Secretary of State and the respective DOS regional bureaus to direct, coordinate, and supervise all USG elements in the host nation (HN), except those under the command of a CCDR, a USG multilateral mission, or an international organization. CCDRs coordinate with COMs in their AOR (as necessary) and negotiate memoranda of agreement (MOAs) with the COMs in designated countries to support military operations. Force protection (FP) is an example of a military function where an MOA would enhance alignment, coordination, and integration.

II. The Strategic Environment, National Defense Challenges, and Strategic Readiness

A. Strategic Environment

The strategic environment is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent competition and conflict. This environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances and partnerships and increasing transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional threats. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate the course of regional and global events. Those conditions are made even more likely due to advances in information technology that enable individuals and organizations to access, use, and share information across the globe and to use information to affect the behavior of individuals, groups, and automated systems. In addition to traditional conflicts, emergent challenges threaten to significantly disrupt our ability to project power and maintain our qualitative edge. These challenges include weapons of mass destruction (WMD), asymmetric threats, propaganda enabled by social media, and other information activities that directly target our civilian leadership and population. Information can be more easily and inexpensively leveraged to affect the drivers of behavior of civilian leadership and the population to

avoid or offset the physical overmatch of the joint force. Space and cyberspace have steadily increased in importance as a part of military operations. Space, cyberspace, and electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) capabilities figure prominently in the projection of military and national power. Operations in space, cyberspace, and the EMS are both a precursor to and an integral part of armed conflict. Enemies may elect to attack only in cyberspace, where military networks and critical infrastructure are vulnerable to remote access and actions remain difficult to attribute. As science and technology continue to evolve, opportunities to create new threats emerge. Our adversaries pursue strategies that make US power projection increasingly risky and enable near-peer competitors and regional powers to extend their coercive strength well beyond their borders. In the most challenging scenarios, the United States may be unable to employ forces the way it has in the past (i.e., build up combat power in an area, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and conduct operations when and where desired). The joint force must be agile and flexible in the face of complex transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional security challenges. To confront them, the CJCS manages global integration by coordinating with the Joint Chiefs and CCDRs to provide military advice to the President of the United States and SecDef.

B. National Defense Challenges

The strategic environment presents broad national defense challenges likely to require the employment of the joint force. All of these challenges are national problems requiring a strategic approach to match ends, ways, and means to achieve national objectives. To deal with these challenges, the US military, often in conjunction with our interagency partners, as well as our PNS' military, security forces, and law enforcement agencies, undertakes the following actions:

- Protect the homeland, deter and defeat attacks on the United States, and support civil authorities.
- Build security to preserve regional stability, deter and compete against adversaries, assure allies and partners, and cooperate globally to address common security challenges.
- Compete for influence in the operational environment to generate leverage and create advantages if competition leads to armed conflict. This includes a range of military activities directed to achieve national objectives without escalation. The primary focus of these activities is to create conditions in support of other instruments of national power to give our senior leaders freedom of action during times of stability and times of crisis. Competitive military activities can be either defensive or offensive, unilateral or multilateral, employing conventional or special operations forces throughout the operational environment, and involve any combination of military capabilities. Competitive activities preserve and expand friendly military and nonmilitary advantages while limiting or eroding competitor operations, imposing costs, and increasing adversary doubts. Military competition supports, and is normally dependent on, the other instruments of national power.
- Project power to disrupt and degrade our enemies' ability to achieve their objectives, swiftly defeat aggression and threat networks, and assist DOS efforts to provide foreign humanitarian assistance.


C. Comprehensive Joint Readiness

Readiness is the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions. It is the foundation for our responsiveness to provide viable national security options to the President and SecDef in the event of a crisis or contingency. To address future challenges, the joint force must maintain a state of continual readiness. Maintaining a ready, flexible, and agile military is paramount to executing our national strategy. Comprehensive joint readiness is the ability of the joint

III. National Strategic Direction (See pp. 3-19 to 3-26.) **(Strategic Guidance & Responsibilities)**

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 2, *The Joint Force* (Jun '20), fig. I-1.

A number of strategic planning-related documents inform military planning and resourcing and also assign related responsibilities to senior leaders and organizations. Figure I-1 illustrates the various strategic guidance sources, described in the context of national strategic direction.



***NOTES:**

1. Within the national security strategy (NSS), the President of the United States outlines vital national interests and strategic priorities that support them.
2. The national defense strategy refines the strategic direction of the NSS into Department of Defense requirements.
3. Within the national military strategy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff further refines that direction and establishes a framework for joint force prioritization, management, employment, development, and design.
4. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.01, (*U*) *Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)*, establishes planning guidance and objectives for daily joint force operations as well as the flexibility to react to contingencies.

Legend

CCMD	combatant command		direct		President
EXORD	execute order		inform		Secretary of Defense
SVC	Service		advice		Chairman
USSOCOM	United States Special Operations Command		Guidance Assessment		Service chiefs and combatant commanders

The **National Security Strategy (NSS)**, signed by the President, sets out the principles and priorities necessary to provide enduring security for the American people and shape the global environment. It provides a broad strategic context for employing military capa-

bilities in concert with other instruments of national power. In the ends, ways, and means construct, the NSS provides the ends.

The **National Defense Strategy (NDS)** is legislatively mandated by Congress per Title 10, USC, Section 113, to be released every four years in January and is signed by SecDef. The strategy supports the most recent NSS.

The **National Military Strategy (NMS)**, signed by the CJCS, supports the objectives of the NSS and implements the NDS. It describes the Armed Forces' of the United States plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides a vision for designing and developing a force capable of meeting future challenges. This provides the means (from near to long term) of the ends, ways, and means construct.

The **Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)** issues the President's guidance for contingency planning and conveys SecDef's guidance for plans and defense posture. The President approves the CPG. The CPG translates NDS requirements into prioritized contingency and posture planning guidance for DOD.

The **Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)** provides guidance to CCDRs, Service chiefs, the CNGB, CSA directors, applicable DOD agency directors, and DOD field activity directors to accomplish tasks and missions based on near-term military capabilities. The JSCP is signed by the CJCS and implements transregional, campaign, contingency, and posture planning guidance reflected in the CPG and NDS.

The **Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)** lists the assigned and apportioned forces for unified commands and states critical policy guidance for the assignment, apportionment, and allocation of forces to joint commands.

The **National Strategy for Homeland Security**, also signed by the President, provides national direction for securing the homeland through a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, tribal, and private organizations whose primary functions are often interwoven with national security.

The **National Response Framework** developed by DHS establishes a comprehensive, national-level, all-hazards, all-discipline approach to domestic incident management. It covers the full range of complex and constantly changing requirements in anticipation of, or in response to, threats or acts of terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies. DOD develops and revises its plans through United States Northern Command (US-NORTHCOM), United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), and in coordination with the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to align with this framework and effectively and efficiently employ the joint force.

The **Unified Command Plan (UCP)** provides missions and responsibilities to guide the development of theater and functional strategies. The UCP also provides additional guidance for the CCDR to create campaign plans.

A **combatant command campaign plan (CCP)** operationalizes planning guidance provided by the CPG and JSCP. A CCP synchronizes national objectives with CCMD plans. Within the context of the current defense strategy, the CCPs focus on setting conditions to protect US national interests, achieve US objectives, and prepare for contingency operations. It describes the command's operations, activities, and investments, which include military engagement, security cooperation, and other activities to prevent or mitigate conflict for the next five years. It should include measurable and achievable objectives that contribute to campaign objectives. Contingency plans for responding to crisis scenarios should be treated as branch plans to the campaign plan. For planning purposes, CCDRs use assigned, apportioned, and allocated forces. The GFMIG provides guidance for the process of force apportionment.

Campaign Support Plans. Supporting CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies routinely conduct security cooperation activities within a CCDR's AOR that include foreign nationals. Services and select DOD agencies must coordinate and provide their security cooperation strategies to the supported CCDR. Campaign support plans balance competing CCMD demands for limited global resources.

IV. Joint Command Organizations

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 2, *The Joint Force* (Jun '20), chap. III.

Joint commands are established at three levels: unified CCMDs, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs. In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10, USC, and as described in the UCP, CCMDs are established by the President, through SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Commanders of unified CCMDs may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by SecDef through the CJCS. SecDef, CCDRs, subordinate unified commanders, or existing JTF commanders can establish JTFs.

See pp. 1-26 to 1-27 for discussion of the UCP, the six geographic combatant commands, and the three functional combatant commands. See chap. 4 for further discussion of joint task forces.

Joint Commands



Unified Combatant Command



Specified Combatant Command

(There are currently no specified CCMDs designated.)



Subordinate Unified Command



Joint Task Force (JTF)

I. Basis for Establishing Joint Forces

Joint commands are established by missions and responsibilities often based on either a geographic AOR or function:

A. Geographic Area


Establishing a joint command on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. Note: CCDRs with an AOR normally assign subordinate commanders an operational area from within their AOR.

- The Unified Command Plan (UCP) establishes the geographic boundaries assigned to CCMDs with an AOR. These AORs do not restrict accomplishment of assigned missions; CCDRs may operate forces wherever required to accomplish their missions. The UCP provides that, unless otherwise directed by SecDef, when significant operations overlap the boundaries of two AORs, a JTF will be formed. Command of the JTF will be determined by SecDef and assigned to the appropriate CCDR. SecDef assigns the JTF commander and

II. Organizing Joint Commands

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 2, *The Joint Force* (Jun '20), pp. III-2 to III-5.

A JFC has the authority to organize assigned or attached forces with specification of OP-CON to best accomplish the assigned mission based on intent, the CONOPS, and consideration of Service organizations (see Figure III-1). The organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of the contemplated operations and any development that may necessitate a change in plan. The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization provides for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, decentralized execution, and comprehensive assessment. Unity of effort is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction are essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. Comprehensive, commander-led assessment is essential for gauging effectiveness of joint action and adaptiveness of continual planning. When organizing joint commands with multinational forces (MNFs), simplicity and clarity are critical.



Ref: JP 1 Vol. 2 (Jun '20), fig. III-1. Possible Components in a Joint Force.

The composition of the JFC's staff reflects the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint commands have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of assigned or attached forces.

Service Component Commands

All joint commands include Service components, and the Service chiefs (on behalf of the MILDEP Secretaries) are responsible for administrative and logistics support of

II. Command and Support Relationships (Overview)

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 2, *The Joint Force (Jun '20)*, pp. IV-2 to IV-12.

A. Command Relationships

The specific command relationship (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) defines the authority a commander has over assigned or attached forces. An overview of command relationships is shown in Figure IV-1. With the exception of COCOM, superior commanders have the discretion to delegate all or some of the authorities inherent in the specified command relationship.

Command Relationships Synopsis

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

(Unique to Combatant Commander)

- Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process input
- Assignment of subordinate commanders
- Relationships with Department of Defense agencies
- Directive authority for logistics

Operational control when delegated

- Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
- Organize and employ commands and forces
- Assign command functions to subordinates
- Establish plans, priorities, and overall requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities
- Suspend subordinate commanders from duty

Tactical control when delegated

Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission

Support relationship when assigned

Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another organization

Ref: JP 1 Vol. 2 (Jun '20), fig. IV-1. *Command Relationships Synopsis*.








- Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders will exercise combatant command (command authority) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), will exercise operational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.

III. Joint Functions

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), chap. III.

A joint function is a grouping of capabilities and activities that enable JFCs to synchronize, integrate, and direct joint operations. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function, and some tasks and systems could apply to more than one function.

Joint Functions

-  **Command and Control**
-  **Information**
-  **Intelligence**
-  **Fires**
-  **Movement and Maneuver**
-  **Protection**
-  **Sustainment**

There are seven joint functions common to joint operations: C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Commanders leverage the capabilities of multiple joint functions during operations. The joint functions apply to all joint operations across the competition continuum and enable both traditional warfare and IW, but to different degrees, conditions, and standards, while employing different tactics, techniques, and procedures. The integration of activities across joint functions to accomplish tasks and missions occurs at all levels of command.

Joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the joint functions is essential to mission accomplishment. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service organizations, people, equipment, and technologies and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission. Plans describe how the JFC uses military capabilities to perform tasks associated with each joint function. Individual Service capabilities can often support multiple joint functions simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task.

I. Command and Control (C2)

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The JFC provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses several tasks, including:

- Establish, organize, and operate a joint force headquarters (HQ).
- Command subordinate forces.
- Prepare, modify, and publish plans, orders, and guidance.
- Establish command authorities among subordinate commanders.
- Assign tasks, prescribe task performance standards, and designate operational areas (OAs).
- Prioritize and allocate resources.
- Manage risk (*see facing page*) and force protection.
- Communicate across the staff and joint force.
- Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, and achieving objectives.
- Coordinate and control the employment of joint forces to create lethal and non-lethal effects (i.e., the use of intermediate force capabilities incorporating both lethal and nonlethal means) across the competition continuum.
- Coordinate, synchronize, and, when appropriate, integrate joint operations with the operations and activities of other participants.
- Ensure the flow of information and reports to and from a higher authority.

Command includes both the authority and responsibility to use resources lawfully to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations to accomplish missions.

Control is inherent in command. To control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a commander's command authority. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs identify and assess requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts.

II. Information

The elevation of information as a joint function impacts all operations and signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within today's complex OE. (*See following pages.*)

The **information function** encompasses the management and application of information to support achievement of objectives; it is the deliberate integration with other joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired relevant actor behaviors; and to support human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the prevalent nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to preserve friendly information and leverage information and the inherent informational aspects of military activities to achieve the commander's objectives. The information joint function provides an intellectual framework to aid commanders in exerting one's influence through the timely generation, preservation, denial, or projection of information.


All military activities have an informational aspect since most military activities are observable in the Information Environment (IE). Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain

Risk Management (See pp. 3-16 to 3-17, 3-137.)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations (Jun '22)*, pp. III-14 to III-15.

Risk management is a function of command and a key planning consideration that focuses on designing, implementing, and monitoring risk decisions. Risk management helps commanders preserve lives and resources; accept, avoid, or mitigate (reduce or transfer) unnecessary risk; identify feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist; and develop valid COAs. Figure III-2 is a generic model that contains the likely elements of a risk management process.

Risk Management Process



Ref: JP 3-0 (Jun '22), Fig. III-2. *Risk Management Process.*

Risk management is the process to identify and assess hazards arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. It assists organizations and individuals in making informed decisions to reduce or offset risk, thereby increasing operational effectiveness and the probability of mission success. The commander determines the level of risk that is acceptable for aspects of operations and should state this determination in the commander's intent. Understanding risk is one of the key outputs of mission analysis and should be a topic at every successive step in JPP. The assessment of risk to mission includes an overall risk to mission analysis (e.g., low, medium, high, or extremely high), along with multiple criteria (e.g., authorities and permissions; policy; forces, basing, and agreements; resources; dependency on commercial support and organic capabilities; PN contributions; other USG support; and critical commercial capabilities). To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their mission or OA.

Commanders at all levels use judgment to manage risk based upon the mission, time, and other resources available. They approach risk management at the appropriate application level, normally using a deliberate approach that is analytically based and uses planning time efficiently. The joint risk analysis methodology described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3105.01, *Joint Risk Analysis*, provides a consistent, standardized way to analyze and manage risk.

Information Use Across the Competition Continuum

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. III-24 to III-26.

COOPERATIVE Use of Information

During day-to-day activities, the joint force integrates information in SC and FHA activities by:

- Assuring and maintaining allies, widening/publicizing combined exercises and other PN cooperation activities, encouraging neutral actors that the joint force is the partner of choice or that they should remain neutral, and reminding partners of benefits to maintain their support.
- Informing enemies and adversaries of benefits to friendly multinational force membership and collective defense, informing enemies and adversaries that the joint force is committed to its allies and security agreements, and concealing investment priorities and costs.

COMPETITIVE Use of Information

During competition, the joint force conducts activities against state or non-state actors with incompatible interests that are below the level of armed conflict. Competition can include military operations such as CO, special operations, demonstrations of force, CTF, and ISR and often depends on the ability to leverage the power of information through OIE. Expect additional time to coordinate and obtain approval from DOD or other USG departments and agencies to use information due to increased risk. Specific information tasks may include:

- Informing allies and partners of malign influence and antagonistic behavior.
- Declassifying and sharing images that reveal or confirm enemy or adversarial behavior, recommending allies and partners communicate to relevant audiences within their areas of influence, and educating the joint force and allies about online disinformation activities to build understanding and resilience against propaganda.
- Influencing adversary's audiences to prevent escalation to armed conflict by demonstrating joint force resolve, strength, and commitment, as well as the costs and expectations of response actions.
- Targeting adversarial information, networks, and systems by temporarily denying communication or Internet access, disrupting jamming of Internet access to its internal population, and partnering with private-sector communication companies to remove inappropriate enemy and adversarial recruiting and fundraising advertisements.

Use of Information in ARMED CONFLICT

In addition to the above tasks, the joint force can use information defensively or offensively. JFCs can employ information as independent activities, integrated with joint force physical actions, or in support of other instruments of national power. Many of these information activities require additional authorities as they present larger strategic risks or risks to the joint force, though capabilities like PA, which has the preponderance of public communication resources and rarely requires additional authorities in armed conflict.

Defensive Purposes. Basic defense activities include protecting data and communications, movements, and locations of critical capabilities and activities. PA can assist in countering adversary propaganda, misinformation, and disinformation. MILDEC can help mask strengths, magnify feints, and distract attention to false locations. DCO can defeat specific threats that attempt to bypass or breach cyberspace security measures. EW can protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly, neutral, or enemy use of the EMS. The management of EM signatures can mask friendly movements and confuse enemy intelligence collectors.

Fires Considerations

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. III-42 to III-47.

Employing fires in conjunction with other activities, such as information activities, to create desired effects is a particularly important factor in maintaining or reestablishing a safe and secure environment. The following are key considerations associated with the above tasks:

Targeting

Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects of joint fires to actions and tasks at the component, subordinate joint force, CCMD, national level. Commanders and their staffs consider strategic-and operational-level objectives, the potential for friendly fire incidents and other undesired fires effects, and operational limitations (e.g., constraints and restraints) when making targeting decisions. Commanders should consider the impact on all systems in the OE during this process. Successful integration of engagement options (e.g., cyberspace, EW, information, nonlethal weapons, DE, and other intermediate force capabilities) to integrate nonlethal effects into the targeting process is often important to mission accomplishment. Commanders assess available engagement options and employ them as appropriate.

JFCs may task their staff to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions or delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize **joint targeting coordination boards (JTCBs)**.

Air Apportionment. In the context of joint fires, air apportionment is part of the targeting process. The JFACC uses air apportionment to ensure the weight of joint force air effort is consistent with the JFC's intent and objectives.

Joint Fire Support

Joint fire support may include aircraft; naval surface fire support; artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles; cyberspace attack; offensive and defensive space operations; EA; and messaging to create lethal and nonlethal effects.

Close air support is a critical element of joint fire support that requires detailed planning, coordination, and training of ground and supporting air forces for safe and effective execution. Integration and synchronization of joint fires and joint fire support with the fire and maneuver of the supported force are essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support. For more information on close air support, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

Countering Air and Missile Threats

The JFC counters air and missile threats to help create friendly freedom of action, provide protection, and deny the enemy freedom of action. Counterair integrates offensive and defensive operations to achieve and maintain the JFC's desired degrees of control in the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. The counterair mission is inherently a joint and interdependent endeavor. Each component of the joint force contributes capabilities necessary for mission success. Also, Service capability and force structure development reflect a purposeful reliance on all components to maximize complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing relative vulnerabilities. Due to the joint and interdependent nature, all components of the joint force normally conduct operations in support of the counterair mission. The JFC normally designates an AADC and a JFACC to enhance the unity of command (or unity of effort), centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution for countering air and missile threats.

- **Offensive Counterair (OCA).** Offensive counterair (OCA) operations are the preferred method of countering air and missile threats. OCA typically seeks to operate in enemy airspace and destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles,

launch platforms, and their supporting structures as close to their sources as possible before and after launch.

- **Control of the Air.** Enemies will contest control of the air. Air superiority is the degree of control of the air by one force that permits the conduct of its operations at a given time and place without prohibitive interference from air and missile threats. Air supremacy is the degree of control of the air wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the OA using air and missile threats. While joint combat focuses on operations within one or more OAs, threats to joint forces can come from well outside assigned JOAs, even outside a CCMD's AOR.
- **Interdiction.** Interdiction operations during armed conflict include actions that divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces or to achieve enemy objectives. Air interdiction is conducted at such a distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.
- **Strategic Attack.** A strategic attack (nuclear or nonnuclear) is a JFC offensive action against a target, whether military or other, selected to achieve a strategic objective. Strategic attacks usually target enemy strategic COGs or other strategic targets. These attacks may be lethal or nonlethal. The purpose is to weaken the enemy's ability or will to engage or continue an undesirable activity. As directed by the President or SecDef, a strategic attack can be an independent action or part of a campaign or major operation. All components of a joint force may have capabilities to conduct strategic attacks.
- **Global Strike.** A global strike is the capability to rapidly plan and execute attacks on any location, limited in duration and scope, to create precise lethal and nonlethal effects against enemy assets. Global strike missions employ capabilities against a wide variety of targets. CDRUSSTRATCOM plans global strike in full partnership with appropriate CCDRs.

Capabilities with Nonlethal Effects

Joint force capabilities can create nonlethal effects. Some capabilities can produce nonlethal effects that limit collateral damage, reduce risk to civilians, and reduce exploitation opportunities for enemy or adversary propaganda:

- **Cyberspace Attack.** Cyberspace attack actions create various direct denial effects in cyberspace (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) or manipulation that leads to denial that appears in the physical domains.
- **Electromagnetic Attack (EA).** EA involves the use of EM energy, DE, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment to degrade, neutralize, or destroy enemy combat capability. EA can be against a computer when the attack occurs through the EMS.
- **Military Information Support Operations (MISO).** MISO actions and messages can generate effects that gain support for JFC objectives; reduce the will of the enemy, adversary, and sympathizer; and decrease the combat effectiveness of enemy forces.

Limiting Collateral Effects

Collateral damage and other collateral effects are unintentional or incidental effects to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets based on the circumstances existing at the time. Causing collateral effects does not violate the law of war so long as the damage or other effect is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the attack. The law of war recognizes that civilian casualties and civilian harm are unfortunate and tragic, but unavoidable consequences of armed conflict. Under the law of war, balancing military necessity with collateral damage is central to the principle of proportionality.

VII. Sustainment

Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services support to maintain operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment gives the JFC the means for freedom of action, endurance, and to extend operational reach. Sustainment enables the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. The sustainment function includes tasks to:

- Coordinate the supply of food, operational energy (fuel and other energy requirements), arms, munitions, and equipment.
- Provide for maintenance of equipment.
- Coordinate and provide base operations support for forces, including field services; personnel services support; health services; mortuary affairs; religious support; postal support; morale, welfare, and recreational support; financial support; and legal services.
- Build and maintain contingency bases.
- Assess, repair, and maintain infrastructure.
- Acquire, manage, and distribute funds.
- Provide common-user logistics support to other USG departments and agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, other nations, and contractors as authorized by their contracts.
- Establish and coordinate movement services.
- Establish large-scale detention compounds and sustain detainee operations.

JFCs should identify sustainment capabilities during planning. Sustainment should be a priority consideration for the timed-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Sustainment provides JFCs with the flexibility to develop branches and sequels and to refocus joint force efforts. Given mission objectives and adversary threats, the ultimate goal is to execute a feasible, supportable, and efficient CONOPS that takes into account the threat and defense of logistical forces. Before developing contingency plans, CCMs develop a theater logistics analysis, theater logistics overview, and distribution plan to provide detailed mobility and distribution analysis to ensure enough capacity or planned enhanced capability is available to support the CCP.

Logistics

Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the theater while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and equipment to support the JFC's CONOPS. The relative combat power that military forces can generate against an enemy is a function of the nation's capability and capacity to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and equipment to the point of application.

Logistics covers the following core functions: supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, joint health services, logistic services, engineering, and operational contract support (OCS).

Personal Services

Personnel services are sustainment functions provided to personnel rather than to systems and equipment. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel during joint operations.

See previous pages (pp. 2-22 to 2-23) for an overview of sustainment considerations.

IV(a). Global Integration

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. IV-4 to IV-14.

Editor's note: For the purposes of organization, JP 3-0 chapter IV "Organizing and Practicing Global Integration" is presented in JFODS6 as two sections: a) Global Integration and b) Organizing for Joint Operations (see pp. 2-29 to 2-46).

I. Global Integration

Global integration enables DOD leadership to provide advice, make timely decisions, and inform operational priorities and institutional investment choices across CCMDs and multiple time horizons. Global integration requires a global perspective organized around and against priority challenges with global campaigns and a posture to execute contingency plans associated with each challenge. Within each GCP, CCDRs use broad mission areas to structure how CCMDs can execute each global campaign. Within each mission area of a global campaign, the joint force executes subordinate operations, activities, and investments to address specific aspects of the priority challenges. The result of integration is effective joint campaigns and operations employing cohesive military actions arranged across time and multiple AORs to achieve strategic objectives and balance strategic risk.

Competition between great powers encompasses the physical domains, the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. This approach is necessary to address the threats that comprise the contemporary strategic environment. Competition manifested by malign influence and antagonistic behaviors has emerged as a central challenge to the joint force. Achieving strategic objectives requires the joint force to execute actions with a global perspective, integrate joint functions across geographic boundaries and all domains, and align the campaigning effort with interagency, multinational, and other interorganizational partners. Campaigning is how the joint force integrates and balances across time and AORs to achieve the objectives of military strategy within acceptable risk. Global campaign planning occurs at the JS and CCMD levels. Global campaigns occur across the competition continuum.

GCPs are identified in the JSCP and based on strategic guidance. The global campaigns address the priority challenges identified in the national strategy. They integrate joint force actions across geographic AOR boundaries and global missions. The CJCS also addresses specific functional and regional challenges that span across geographic boundaries, the physical domains, the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. GCPs address threats and challenges requiring coordination across multiple CCMDs.

The joint force most often operates between peace and war. The competition continuum is a series of overlapping states of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict to distinguish strategic relationships between actors. In practice, commanders spend most of the time executing campaign requirements within the cooperation and competition portions of the competition continuum. Accomplishing global integration requires the joint force to employ a top-down, CJCS-led approach that integrates planning, prioritizes resources, mitigates risk, and assesses joint force progress toward strategic objectives for SecDef.

The joint force can achieve global integration when the following conditions are met:

- Civilian and military leaders make timely decisions at the speed required to outpace adversaries. Decision making requires a common intelligence picture and a shared understanding of global force posture to see operations in real time; identify opportunities to seize the initiative; and identify trade-offs, risk, and opportunity costs. Automation, preplanned responses, and mission command are essential to act at the required speed of relevance.
- Civilian and military leaders coordinate and nest military actions within a whole-of-government approach and include our allies and PNs in global campaigns. In an environment where requirements exceed inventory, force posture must reinforce our strength, agility, and resilience across regions and throughout the OE.

The CJCS provides clear options with acceptable global risk in the form of military advice to SecDef that prioritizes GCPs and CCPs. SecDef gains an understanding of risk through this process as guidance is prepared.

The practice of global integration continuously informs decision making across planning, force management and employment, and force development and design. Achieving global integration requires the combination of the Services and CCMDs to provide precise and timely global military solutions in support of national policy objectives. A comprehensive body of assessments provides a firm analytical foundation for this process.

Adversaries compete with increased efforts short of armed conflict, violating the principle of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and blurring the lines between civil and military goals. The joint force anticipates the adversary's actions and leverages multiple CCMDs' support.

II. Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP)

The JSCP fulfills the CJCS's statutory responsibilities in Title 10, USC, Section 153, to assist the President and SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces of the United States. The JSCP provides the framework for military direction to the joint force, implementing and augmenting the President's and SecDef's guidance found in the NSS, UCP, CPG, and NDS, and in the CJCS's guidance in the NMS. The JSCP provides guidance for CCMDs, Services, the JS, and DOD agencies to prepare campaign and contingency plans and establishes a common set of processes, products, roles, and responsibilities to globally integrate the operations, activities, and investments of the joint force. The CCDRs then operationalize and execute the campaign plan.

There are three types of campaign plans: GCPs, FCPs, and CCPs.

Global Campaign Plan (GCPs) (See p. 3-5.)

GCPs are an integral part of the revised JSPS. The JS develops and maintains the GCPs for SecDef approval. GCPs address threats and challenges that significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all, CCMDs. The JSCP identifies GCPs based on guidance in the NDS and NMS. GCPs are the centerpiece of global integration and form the base of the JSCP. Organizing and Practicing Global Integration

Functional Campaign Plan (FCPs) (See p. 3-5.)

FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are unbound geographically but require coordination across multiple CCMDs. The CJCS directs FCP planning through the JSCP or a planning order to CCMDs.

Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCPs) (See p. 3-5.)

The CCPs are the primary means through which the CCMDs collaboratively develop operations, activities, and investments within their UCP-assigned mission/AOR. CCMDs' execution of CCPs orient on functional/theater objectives in support of objectives directed by GCPs and, as applicable, FCPs.

IV(b). Organizing for Joint Operations

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), chap. IV.

Editor's note: For the purposes of organization, JP 3-0 chapter IV "Organizing and Practicing Global Integration" is presented in JFODS6 as two sections: a) Global Integration (see pp. 2-25 to 2-28) and b) Organizing for Joint Operations.

I. Understanding the Operational Environment (OE) *(See also p. 3-97 to 3-100.)*

The joint force campaigns in a complex, volatile, security environment characterized by contested norms and persistent disorder. National security threats are transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional. Since each threat presents unique challenges, the dilemmas caused by one event impact others, often with no regard for distance and time. As threats gain access to advanced capabilities and contest US advantages, competition and armed conflict are increasingly occurring across multiple AORs and throughout the physical domains (land, maritime, air, and space), the IE (which includes cyberspace), and the EMOE. These realities have eroded the US competitive military advantage while global demand for the joint force continues to exceed resources.

As adversaries enhance their ability to compete at levels below armed conflict, they become more adept at opposing US security goals by using nonmilitary means and manipulating popular perceptions. For example, our adversaries are using commercial capabilities to gain strategic advantage and compete below armed conflict. Adversarial use of these capabilities, such as controlling key physical infrastructure and cyberspace infrastructure, can limit US flexibility, limit freedom of maneuver, and erode US influence. Adversaries can present increasingly complex challenges by operating across regions, domains, and functions in which the United States was once unchallenged. This shift, along with adversaries' increasing willingness to employ coercive measures that remain below the threshold of armed conflict, has resulted in a contested international order, challenges to established norms, and alternative views of reality. This situation underlines the importance of activities in the IE. To remain vigilant, civilian and military leaders must understand political and cultural drivers behind competing for strategic narratives to provide early warnings as well as to gain an overall sense of the competition surrounding US interests.

The joint force exercises multifunctional integration across Service components to protect and enable each other's unique capabilities (involving C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) to maximize outcomes. Commanders integrate the joint functional attributes and expertise from across all the CCMDs to achieve unity of effort.

A. Aspects of the Operational Environment (OE) (Physical, Informational, and Human)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. IV-1 to IV-4.

Physical, informational, and human aspects help describe the interactions that take place in an environment of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict.

Physical

Physical aspects reflect and influence critical elements of group identity and frame how groups and communities form.

Informational

Informational aspects reflect and influence how populations interact and communicate with each other and among themselves.

Human

Human aspects drive behavior and actions in a particular way. Understanding the interplay between the physical, informational, and human aspects provides a unified view of the OE.


A Systems Perspective (PMESII-PT)

The OE is a set of complex, dynamic, and adaptive **political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure** systems, each exerting pressure and influence on the other (see Figure IV-1). The nature and interaction of these systems affect how the commander plans, organizes, and conducts joint operations. The JFC's international partners and other civilian participants regularly focus on systems other than the military, so the JFC and staff should understand these systems and how military operations affect them. Equally important is understanding how elements in other systems can help or hinder the JFC's mission. A shared understanding among stakeholders involved in the operation can influence actions beyond the JFC's directive authority and promote a unified approach to achieve objectives. For example, global corporations maintain global presence, unique capabilities, and influence throughout the OE. DOD must often compete with interagency partners, multinational forces, NGOs, the local populace, civil commerce, and enemy and/or adversaries for commercial capacity. Commercial capabilities are also vulnerable to enemy and/or adversary disruption as well as market factors.

Understanding sociopolitical systems within an OE and how the systems interact and change increases the JFC's knowledge of actions within a system and can explain causal links between actions and effects. Planners develop and leverage the perspective of competitors within these systems that influence the OE. Among other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources of warning intelligence and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex interaction of friendly, adversary, enemy, and neutral systems, while identifying critical nodes and vulnerabilities. A networked approach enables success in confronting problem sets and addressing them comprehensively. Understanding competitors and how they relate to each other helps identify potential levers to influence their behavior.

An understanding of the OE builds through cross-functional participation. The joint force staff collaborates with various intelligence organizations, USG departments and agencies, local partners, and nongovernmental entities. The JFC should consider the best way to manage or support this cross-functional effort, typically led by the J-2 through the JIPOE process. A variety of factors, including planning time available, affect the fidelity of a systems perspective.

Assessment Interaction



A systems perspective facilitates operational design and joint operation planning by providing the joint force commander (JFC) and staff with a common frame of reference for collaboration with interorganizational and multinational partners to determine and coordinate actions that are beyond the JFC's command authority.

Legend

COG center of gravity ● Decisive Point ● COG Node ○ Node — Link

Ref: JP 3-0, (Jun '22), Fig. IV-1. A Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment.

Network analysis and network engagement can build upon a systems perspective by providing additional understanding of relationships among actors, particularly in OEs or when dealing with networked threat environments. Network engagement can provide a framework for understanding the interrelationships and motivations of groups and networks. Network analysis also facilitates identification of significant information that might otherwise go unnoticed. This insight can include uncovering unrecognized positions of power within related groups, accounting for structure and organization, finding individuals or nodes who are critical, and facilitating measuring change over time. It can also help identify primary and secondary impacts across networks and can help synchronize interactions, engagement, and targeting across mission areas to avoid or minimize conflicts. Once the JFC identifies the networks in the OE and understands their interrelationships, functions, motivations, and vulnerabilities, the commander can tailor the force to apply the most effective tools to engage neutral networks and counter the threat.

For further guidance on the use of a systems perspective in operational design and joint planning, refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning. For additional information on network engagement, see JP 3-25, Joint Countering Threat Networks.

III. Organizing Operational Areas (OAs)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. IV-19 to IV-23.

While the UCP assigns AORs, CCDRs and other JFCs designate smaller OAs (e.g., JOA and AO) temporarily. OAs have physical dimensions composed of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains. While domains are useful constructs for visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations unfold (the OA), the use of the term “domain” does not imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of any domain. The appropriate JFC specifies authorities and responsibilities within an OA. JFCs define these areas with geographical boundaries, which help commanders and staffs coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations among joint force components and supporting commands. The size of an OA and types of forces employed depend on the scope and nature of the mission. Every type of OA has an associated area of interest (AOI) and area(s) of influence. Understanding the relationship between the AOI, area of influence, and the assigned OA helps commanders and staffs order their thoughts during both planning and execution.

Area of Interest (AOI)

An AOI includes the area of influence and adjacent areas and extends into hostile territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. An AOI focuses intelligence support for monitoring activities pertinent to the OA that may affect operations. The commander may describe the AOI graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure.

Area of Influence

An area of influence is a geographic area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. The area of influence normally surrounds and includes the assigned OA. The extent of a subordinate command's area of influence is one factor the higher commander considers when defining the subordinate's OA. Understanding the command's area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation that could require the force to employ capabilities outside the assigned OA. The commander can describe the area of influence graphically, but the resulting graphic does not represent a boundary or other control measure for maneuver or fire support.

A. Combatant Command-Level Areas

When warranted, the President, SecDef, or CCDRs may designate a theater of war and/or theater of operations for each operation (see Figure IV-2). CCDRs can elect to control operations directly in these OAs or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose while remaining focused on the broader AOR.

Area of Responsibility (AOR)


An AOR is a geographical area established by the UCP within which a CDR has the authority to plan for and conduct operations. CCDRs may operate forces wherever required to accomplish approved missions. CCDRs must coordinate cross-AOR operations among the affected CCMDs.

Theater of War

The President, SecDef, or CDR establishes a theater of war, which is a geographic area for campaigns and major operations involving combat. The United States establishes a theater of war when there is a formal declaration of war or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of operations (or a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within a single boundary for C2, sustainment, protection, or mutual support. A

theater of war may not encompass a CDR's entire AOR but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs.

Operational Areas Within a Theater



This example depicts a combatant commander's AOR, also known as a theater. Within the AOR, the combatant commander has designated a theater of war. Within the theater of war are two theaters of operations and a JSOA. To handle a situation outside the theater of war, the combatant commander has established a theater of operations and a JOA, within which a joint task force will operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of war or theaters of operations.

Ref: JP 3-0 (Jun '22), fig. IV-2. *Operational Areas within a Theater.*

Theater of Operations

A theater of operations is an OA defined by the CDR for the conduct or support of specific military operations. A theater of operations is established primarily when the scope and scale of the operation or campaign exceeds what a JOA can normally accommodate. More than one joint force HQ can exist in a theater of operations. A CDR may establish one or more theaters of operations. Different theaters will normally focus on different missions. A theater of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war but is large enough to allow for operations in-depth and over extended periods. Theaters of operations are normally associated with campaigns and major operations and may cross the boundary of two or more AORs.

B. Operational- and Tactical-Level Areas

For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, or for specialized activities, the commander can establish the following OAs.

Joint Operations Area (JOA)

A JOA is an area of land, sea, airspace, and cyberspace defined by a CDR or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a commander, joint task force [CJTF]) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations have a limited scope and geographic area or when operations cross the boundaries of AORs or cover geography between two theaters.

Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA)

A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a JFC to the commander of SOF to conduct special operations activities. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discreet DA mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of UW operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conven-

Continued on next page

Joint
Operations

Continued on next page

tional and special operations. The JFSOCC is the supported commander within the JSOA.

Amphibious Objective Area (AOA)

An AOA is normally established by the JFC or JFMCC for amphibious operations. The AOA is an area specifically for amphibious force operations. This area should be of adequate size to accomplish the amphibious force's mission and must provide enough area for conducting necessary maritime, air, and land operations.


Area of Operations (AO)

AO. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. AOs do not typically encompass their entire OA but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions (to include a designated amount of airspace) and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as coordinated with other component commanders and their representatives to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and achieve unity of effort.

Joint Security Area (JSA)

A JSA is a specific surface area, designated by the JFC as critical, that facilitates protection of joint bases and supports various aspects of joint operations such as LOCs, force projection, movement control, sustainment, C2, airbases/airfields, seaports, and other activities. JSAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JSAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. JSAs may be used in both linear and nonlinear situations. (Editor's note: While mentioned, JSA is not defined in the 2022 version of JP 3-0.)

Typical Operational Areas



Legend

AOA	amphibious objective area	Land AO	area of operations assigned to a land force commander
JOA	joint operations area	Maritime AO	area of operations assigned to a maritime force commander
JSOA	joint special operations area		
JSA	joint security area		



Ref: JP 3-0 (Jun '22), fig. IV-3. Typical Operational Areas

V. The Competition Continuum

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), chap. V.

Competition is a fundamental aspect of international relations. As state and non-state actors seek to protect and advance their interests, they continually compete over incompatible aims. The Cold War was a clear example of the many facets of international competition. Rather than engaging in direct armed conflict with the other, each state fought through and with surrogates as an indirect means to achieve their strategic objectives. Yet, the two superpowers also cooperated, such as when both backed actions in the UN Security Council. Just as competitors can cooperate, friendly states can compete. Within an alliance, individual nations naturally seek to tilt policy in the direction most advantageous for their interests. Diplomats, trade representatives, and other members of the USG who regularly interact with foreign counterparts intuitively recognize that any strategic relationship mixes elements of both competition and cooperation. In general, competition is the interaction among actors in pursuit of the influence, advantage, and leverage necessary to advance and protect their respective interests. Competition is continuous because the conditions that define an acceptable state are constantly changing. Success requires perpetual adaptation in the application of all instruments of national power.

Four Core Elements of Competition



(See p. 2-51.)

There are four core elements of competition. The primary element is a nation's interests and the interrelated aspects are influence, advantage, and leverage through which a nation advances and protects its interests.

A. Interests

Interests are qualities, principles, matters of self-preservation, and concepts that a nation or actor values and seeks to protect or achieve concerning other competitors. Interests are contextual and may include the maintenance of physical security, economic prosperity, continuity of government and culture at home, and value projection in the geopolitical environment, as well as emotional triggers (e.g., fear, honor, glory), and other drivers (e.g., virtual, cognitive) that animate action. Campaigning and interagency actions support a strategy framed by national interests that enables the USG to identify adversaries, threats, and opportunities to promote and protect those

interests. An interest-led orientation, including understanding adversary interests more thoroughly, is the cornerstone of a comprehensive approach to competition.

B. Influence

Influence is the ability to cause an effect in direct, indirect, or intangible ways. An actor can accumulate, spend, or lose influence. JFCs require informed assessments about the degrees of influence over another actor's understanding, locus of power, populations, interest groups, governance, grievances, and other strategic matters.

C. Advantage

Advantage is superiority of position or condition. States may create an advantage by the accumulation of influence toward the desired effect or acceptable condition. Inherently relative, a state realizes advantage through the exercise of the instruments of national power. An advantage may be comprised of physical or virtual aspects (e.g., technology, geographic access, resources, and arsenal inventories) as well as more nebulous, cognitive elements (e.g., initiative, momentum, morale, and skill).

D. Leverage

Leverage is the application of advantage gained to create an effect or exploit an opportunity. From a position of leverage, an actor is more capable of promoting and protecting its interests. Leverage also involves applying deep understanding of other actors and the strategic environment to increase the likelihood and scope of success. Many aspects of strategic competition between the United States and other major powers take form through nonmilitary and noncoercive activities. Competitors are seeking influence and control over developments both within their regions and within peripheries. To do this, they can implement strategies of co-optation and attraction as they are often more effective than coercion. These actions may present or appear to be altruistic but always serve the initiator's interests, even when the recipient benefits. Moreover, some activities provide leverage in both categories—a form of attraction that can become coercive if necessary. The core US strategy in the Cold War reflects this complex mixture of approaches. In its most fundamental aspects, it was attractive. The United States offered access to an economic market, including the leading economies of the world, a powerful source of cultural appeal, democratic values, and other factors that created a gravitational effect for countries pursuing their economic and political self-interest.

A comprehensive approach to competition recognizes the importance of noncoercive strategies in gaining a competitive advantage. Targeting only a rival's coercive activities is not enough. If a peer competitor has success with attractive measures, it will rarely need to apply coercive measures. Successful competition requires clear strategies and tools optimized to oppose the attractive aspects of an adversary's approach as well as counter their coercive measures and intimidation.

Attraction: A Competitive Advantage

A traditional message is that association with the United States and our alliances and trade agreements offer a far more attractive option for a nation's security and prosperity. Attraction can be a powerful message and an effective approach. Currently, the United States faces competitors that are doing their best to create a version of the same attractive strategy. Their core approach to competition is through economic means, using the magnet of their markets and the trading relationships and more targeted benefits of their foreign direct investments and foreign aid. Adversaries can turn these same tools into coercive means through economic sanctions and hostile information campaigns. A preferred approach is one of assurance, persuasion, attraction, and mutual benefit rather than coercion, subversion, or intimidation. - *Various Sources*

The current OE requires a more nuanced consideration than a simple peace and war binary model.

Competition Continuum Overview (See pp. 1-13 to 1-15.)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. V-3 to V-7.

The competition continuum describes a world of enduring competition conducted through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict. These descriptors refer to the relationship between the United States and another strategic actor (state or non-state) concerning a set of specific policy objectives. This description allows for simultaneous interaction with the same strategic actor at different points along the competition continuum. Elements of the competition continuum include:

A. Cooperation (See pp. 2-53 to 2-68.)

Situations in which joint forces take actions with another strategic partner in pursuit of policy objectives. Cooperation does not preclude some element of competition or even armed conflict when their objectives are not in complete alignment. Within cooperation, joint force actions may include SC activities, multinational training and exercises, information sharing, personnel exchange programs, and other military engagement activities. Military cooperation may also occur in the form of multinational operations and activities during armed conflict or competition.

B. Competition (See pp. 2-53 to 2-68.)

Competition is when joint forces or multinational forces take actions outside of armed conflict against a state or non-state adversary in pursuit of policy objectives, but neither seeks armed conflict. These actions are typically nonviolent and conducted under greater legal or policy constraints than in armed conflict but can include lethal and nonlethal actions by the joint force or sponsorship of surrogates or partners. Competition does not preclude some cooperation in other areas. Competition may include diplomatic and economic activities, political subversion, intelligence and CI activities, CO, OIE, special operations, and other nonviolent or intermediate force activities to achieve mutually incompatible objectives while seeking to avoid armed conflict. Joint force actions may include combinations of offense, defense, and stabilization activities; SC activities; MISO; freedom of navigation exercises; and other nonviolent military engagement activities. Competition does not preclude armed conflict or cooperation in other areas. Concurrent with competition, state or non-state forces may engage in forms of armed conflict (e.g., external support of an insurgency, COIN, or resistance movement).


C. Armed Conflict/War (See pp. 2-69 to 2-96.)

Armed conflict/war occurs when military forces take actions against an enemy in hostilities or declared war. International law distinguishes armed conflict from disturbances (e.g., riots, violent protests) by the intensity of the conflict and the organization of the parties.

The competition continuum describes, from the joint force perspective, the environment in which the United States applies the instruments of national power (i.e., diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) to achieve objectives. In practice, all instruments of national power should function together as an interrelated and integrated whole.

Cooperation, competition, and armed conflict can, and often do, occur simultaneously. Cooperation is a feature of nearly every significant military action because the joint force rarely operates unilaterally in any significant operation or campaign. In an interconnected world, there are few circumstances in which a major joint force activity does not have some ramifications for competition with at least one of the US's global or regional rivals. Cooperation and competition are always occurring, and the presence or absence of armed conflict is normally the only variable element. In either case, the joint force will be conducting cooperative activities with partners and competitive activities below armed conflict to counter adversaries who are seeking to turn the competition or conflict to their advantage. The joint force is never solely in cooperation but instead campaigns through a mixture of cooperation, competition, and armed conflict calculated to achieve the desired strategic objectives.

Competition Continuum



Ref. JP 3-0 (Jun '22), fig. I-1. Competition Continuum.

Military Engagement & Security Cooperation (SC)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. VI-3 and VI-7 to VI-8.

Cooperative activities include a broad scope of military engagement and SC activities within the combatant command campaign plan (CCP). Cooperation may also involve FHA and CMO. United States Northern Command and United States Indo-Pacific Command may cooperate with federal, state, and interorganizational authorities while performing DSCA. These activities generally occur continuously in a CCMD's AOR in parallel with other ongoing operations. In many instances, the military cooperates to support efforts of interagency partners and international organizations to achieve broader USG objectives. Military engagement and SC activities usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities aligned with the efforts of interorganizational participants. The joint force executes these activities as part of a CCP and country plan objectives.

Military Engagement

Military engagement is the deliberate contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies. The purpose is to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Military engagement occurs across the competition continuum. DOD engages its interorganizational partners as a component of national engagement efforts among individuals and/or elements of the USG to interact with foreign partners to protect and advance shared or complementary strategic interests. In addition to supporting CCPs, DOD military engagement supports national-level engagement strategies and plans. It also aligns with the engagement plans and programs of DOS, USAID, and other USG departments and agencies.

Military engagement includes SC, CMO, and other interactions with foreign security forces (FSF), institutions, populations, and other relevant foreign actors; interagency partners and US domestic civilian authorities and populations; international organizations and NGOs; and the private sector. Military engagement activities usually involve coordinating, synchronizing, or integrating a combination of military forces and capabilities with the efforts of interorganizational partners.

CCMDs seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and tension. This military engagement increases the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions. If armed conflict is unavoidable, long-term military engagement may enable a more informed USG to face any conflict with stronger alliances or coalitions.

Security Cooperation (SC)

SC encompasses all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments that promote specific US security interests. JFCs use SC to develop allied and PN military and security capabilities for self-defense, facilitate multinational operations, and provide US forces with routine and contingency access to allied and PNs. SC is DOD's contribution to USG security sector assistance (SSA) with allies and partners.

SC is a key element of cooperative activities and communication synchronization at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Throughout the competition continuum, the joint force relies on allies and partners to apply their capabilities, provide access, or promote US interests. DOD brings about these outcomes through SC activities that include military engagements and developmental activities (organize, train, equip, build, and advise), as well as by administering various SC and security assistance (SA) programs that enable these activities

Considerations for the Use of Military Force

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. VI-35 to VI-40.

The impact of the use of military force in these circumstances reinforces and empowers current narratives, expands and leverages existing treaties and partnerships, and provides credibility and teeth to other elements of national and allied power. In almost every case, the joint force provides the backbone and connective tissue to bring to bear other instruments of national power effectively.

When the existing character of relations between two nations regarding a specific contested interest is hostile, nations can call upon armed forces to coerce behavior. Nations use military force in conjunction with the other instruments of national power to present a threat to an adversary to:

- **Deter** the adversary from taking an undesired action or from stopping or preventing a desired action. There may be actors that are currently not complicit in or supportive of the antagonistic behavior but that could make the situation far worse or complicated. The joint force may contribute to actions that ensure those actors remain neutral or not involved.
- **Compel** the adversary to do or to stop doing an action. Armed forces are used to organize around the problem by providing support to a neutral actor(s) or potential ally.
- **Assure or reinforce** other relevant actors so they will continue positive behavior or begin to make positive contributions. Another aspect of assurance is in signaling that compliance by the adversary will not lead to further demands.
- **Induce** a hesitant actor to either initiate positive contributions or refrain from harmful behavior. Policy formulation should consider, and JFCs account for, all the actors involved that can substantially bear on the situation.

Regardless of the circumstance, joint forces can coerce behaviors either directly or indirectly. Direct use of military force occurs when the activities orient on an adversary without intermediaries. Sometimes, JFCs compel behavior indirectly through partners. In these cases, the joint force does not confront the primary adversary with action; only the adversary's allies feel pressure directly

Policy guidance will likely drive the operational objectives. Initially, the level of effort may be minimal. The policy intentions and corresponding military approach may only seek to limit the adversary's actions. Based on the evolving situation, this level of effort and the goals may scale up or down. Of course, the joint force's actions toward coercing a single antagonistic behavior by a single actor occurs within global integration's systematic decision making and recommendation process. Potential policy goals include:

- **Counter.** Proactively challenge and prevent the adversary from achieving incompatible objectives without causing an escalation to armed conflict but seeking to roll back the adversary's gains and coerce the adversary to abandon the behavior and policy.
- **Enhance.** Actively seek to achieve strategic objectives; improve relative strategic or military advantage.
- **Contest.** Maintain relative strategic or military advantage to ensure the adversary achieves no further gains; only seek to improve the US advantage as much as possible with existing resources and in a manner that does not jeopardize interests elsewhere.
- **Limit.** Minimize the adversary's gains. Achieve the best possible strategic objective within given resources or policy constraints, recognizing that this lesser objective entails the risk that the competitor will achieve further gains.

VII(a). Armed Conflict

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (Jun '22), chap. VII, Section I.

I. Introduction

Armed conflict or war is a violent conflict between nations, state-like entities, or armed organizations. A nation with a central government or occupying power opposed by insurgent, separatist, or resistance groups engage in armed conflict. Additionally, armed groups that do not recognize national borders may fight wars in semiautonomous regions. The situation presented by an enemy often drives CCDRs' conduct of joint warfighting to pursue a complex array of overlapping operational objectives across numerous AORs. Along with conventional forces, the enemy may employ coercion, irregular tactics, terrorism, criminal activity, and information warfare to complicate operations. Joint campaigns and operations in armed conflict can be an extensive and comprehensive effort in terms of scale, tempo, and scope of capabilities. Prevailing against the enemy requires senior military and civilian leadership to transition the force's posture optimized for the global campaign to a disposition for joint warfighting. Additionally, commanders integrate capabilities from across the CCMDs to conduct joint warfighting and defeat the enemy's will, strategy, and capabilities. CCDRs synchronize their campaigns' operations and activities with other CCDRs over time and across multiple AORs. Success requires JFCs to adapt continually based on evolving situations and opportunities presented by the enemy. The transition to armed conflict presents a significant challenge for the joint force. The CCDRs prepare for rapid transition from global campaigning to campaigns that include large-scale combat operations. The transition often requires assessment and reallocation of forces across the globe. As the situation evolves, JFCs expand their efforts to prevent aggression alongside allies and partners. This will likely increase as multinational forces begin operating against the common enemy. CCDRs may expand their competitive activities to neutralize irregular threats and coerce other adversaries from supporting the enemy. Joint warfighting often requires multiple supported commands operating together in numerous AORs and across all domains. Against a peer enemy, unity of effort may be more important than unity of command. Warfare against a peer enemy may not be the purview of a single JTF operating in one JOA. Success requires the CCMDs to cooperate through integrated and mutually supporting campaigns executed across multiple AORs and functions based on strategic direction from the President and SecDef. Effective joint warfighting requires joint forces to avoid and survive the enemy's strengths and employ capabilities through cycles of offensives, counteroffensives, and transitions. CCDRs seek to avoid protracted periods of inconclusive warfare or stalemate. At some point, CCDRs conduct counteroffensive operations to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy militarily through attrition, exhaustion, or annihilation. CCDRs either impose or help negotiate a settlement, but the wartime effort will be far from over. Defeating the enemy militarily is necessary, but insufficient to achieve strategic objectives. Influencing the enemy's behaviors and establishing conditions for strategic objectives typically requires CCDRs to continue campaigning long past the cessation of sustained hostilities.

Throughout the aftermath and consequences of armed conflict, JFCs recognize the opportunities to cooperate with new partners and necessity to counter coercion in the new and re-characterized competitions. These competitions can emerge and complicate the United States' vision for the future. JFCs maintain preparedness

to employ force short of war or occasional episodes of violent action to secure and perpetuate the gains after the cessation of hostilities.

A. The Challenges of Armed Conflict

The most demanding scenario is an attack on the United States homeland. Another challenge may begin with the enemy's miscalculation regarding the commitment of the United States to defend another nation. When a significant asymmetry of interest or commitment exists, such as fighting within the enemy's sphere of influence, the enemy will likely endure a great deal of hardship and casualties before modifying their ambition and actions. One daunting challenge the joint force could face would be to absorb an initial enemy offensive on another continent, protect other threatened forces and infrastructure, commit additional forces from across the globe, and simultaneously secure the US homeland. As difficult as this scenario may seem, the joint force would be fighting with only forward and initial response forces. Those forces would have to deny the enemy offensive's initial operational-level objectives and transition to the counteroffensive at the first opportunity. A counteroffensive is an attack made in response to an enemy, typically on a large scale or for a prolonged period. JFCs initiate counteroffensives with forces previously in a defensive or deterrence posture. The JFCs orient on establishing the initiative and disrupting the enemy offensive. Then, JFCs aim on controlling or seizing areas or terrain and creating a cycle of deterioration that can force the enemy to abandon their objectives or even lead to their disintegration.

JFCs of forward forces avoid the enemy's strengths and maneuver to attack vulnerabilities to defeat the enemy. As the counteroffensive progresses, JFCs continually transition and adapt to the situation and the enemy's reactions for as long as required to defeat their capability and will to wage armed conflict. This offensive-counteroffensive-transition cycle is demanding and may repeat itself many times throughout the conflict and before a cessation of hostilities. The joint force has a tradition of persevering through the initial enemy assault, then projecting and sustaining substantial combat forces across the globe to fight the enemy close to their geographic periphery. Adaptation to dynamic change in the OE is essential. Military institutions can fail to anticipate the changing character of warfare because new information and experiences that should prompt reconsideration of methods and organizations are not compelling enough. Cultural ideas about warfighting can serve as barriers to adaptation and remain intact even after costly interactions with the enemy make the requirement to change obvious. The French failure to anticipate and adjust to the German blitzkrieg is a classic example. JFCs expect and anticipate all this as today's joint force would have to overcome significant challenges to prevail in armed conflict against a peer enemy.

Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs) & Flexible Response Options (FROs)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. VII-14 to VII-17.

Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs)

FDOs can be extemporaneous or preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions tailored to help resolve an issue without armed conflict. CCDRs use both military and nonmilitary FDOs to dissuade an adversary before an anticipated crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a contingency. Senior military and civilian leadership develop FDOs from across each instrument of national power, but they are most effective when used in combination. FDOs should provide the ability for both sides to de-escalate while establishing conditions that allow the United States to escalate if required.

Military FDOs. CCDRs can initiate FDOs before or after unambiguous warning of adversarial actions. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response, generally require an economy of force; however, military FDOs should not increase the risk to the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired effect. CCDRs seek to optimize the timing, efficiency, and effectiveness of military FDOs. They can rapidly improve the military balance in the OA, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, MISO, and protection without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Commanders should avoid measures resulting in undesired effects such as eliciting a violent and destabilizing response. An adversary may perceive that friendly military FDOs as preparation for an attack. FDOs should identify the opportunity cost and expected reaction from both allies and partners and the adversary to conduct risk analysis and make informed decisions.

Military FDOs. Nonmilitary FDOs are preplanned, preemptive actions the United States takes to try to dissuade an enemy or adversary from initiating hostilities. Senior military and civilian leadership coordinate and synchronize military and nonmilitary FDOs to present a consistent message. In some situations, commercial support may provide support to a nonmilitary FDO. Alternatively, ad hoc identification of requirements for commercial support, at the point of need, will limit value to tactical forces support, increase cost, and create risks for adversary exploitation. Military leaders may align their efforts with nonmilitary partners to degrade an enemy's alliances, partnerships, and sources of support.

Flexible Response Options (FROs)

Military and civilian leadership use FROs to respond to an enemy's action. The purpose of a FRO is to preempt, respond to, or prepare for additional attacks against US interests and signal US resolve. Military and civilian leaders develop FROs to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of prospective actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects, congruent with national security policy objectives. A FRO can be various military capabilities available to the President and SecDef, with actions appropriate and adaptable to existing circumstances, in reaction to any threat or attack.

Maritime Considerations. Maritime FROs and access to key littoral areas are often critical in the transition to armed conflict. Positioning forces off a belligerent's coast can have a powerful deterrent effect while simultaneously offering the national command authority a variety of FROs. CCDRs can also rapidly scale back maritime operations without high cost as the situation de-escalates. Examples of potential maritime operations include show-of-force actions, airborne ISR operations, multinational exercises, and increased active protection measures.

Land Considerations. FROs conducted with land forces present the greatest resolve and commitment; however, deploying and sustaining an expeditionary land force not only exposes that force to risk but also incurs the greatest cost. These operations generally require access, basing, and sustainment arrangements with HNs and partners, making them contingent on diplomatic agreements. Because of this, these FROs may not always be available or may prove too unresponsive to create the desired effect. Commanders must also consider the unintended consequences of deploying a land force into a volatile region. However, multinational exercises and rehearsals are often necessary.

Air Considerations. Like maritime FROs, air FROs offer rapid and responsive ways to position the force to transition to armed conflict and communicate US intent. Given the joint force's global reach, these FROs may be the only way of demonstrating US resolve and commitment in highly contested or denied areas. However, like other FROs, air operations may be contingent on overflight permissions and support agreements with other nations, making them difficult in some situations. They also offer the greatest risk of misinterpretation and may inadvertently escalate a situation beyond the desired threshold.

Information Considerations. A defining feature of the security environment is how competitors, adversaries, and enemies use information to compete to gain relative advantage over the joint force. JFCs execute a communication strategy that facilitates the transition to armed conflict within the strategic context and supports the USG's policy aims, overarching narrative, and objectives. Key to this transition is the joint force's ability to maneuver in the IE through the integrated employment of informational capabilities in concert with other LOOs and LOEs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and enemies. The joint force looks for opportunities to mass informational effects at decisive times and places. Although targeted at specific audiences, planners should recognize that all joint force activities produce inherent informational aspects that shape the perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of various audiences and relevant actor behavior. Leveraging information expands the JFC's range of options. These options include the ability to operate in environments where the use of lethal force is not appropriate or authorized. Commanders can use information to communicate and reinforce the intent and capabilities of joint force activities, enhance the psychological effects of physical force, and avoid or mitigate any undesired psychological effects of physical force. Commanders at all levels should deconflict messaging. The JFC combats the enemy's narrative by providing a viable alternative narrative that dispels misinformation or rumors and contributes to shaping the OE for continued friendly operations. To the wider audience, OIE should build credibility through transparency, demonstrating consistency in actions and messages.

Cyberspace Considerations. The pace of CO requires significant collaboration during preparation and constant vigilance after initiation for effective coordination and deconfliction throughout the OE. Keys to this synchronization are maintaining cyberspace situational awareness and assessing the potential impacts to the joint force of any planned CO, including the protection posture of the DODIN, changes from normal network configuration, or observed indications of malicious cyberspace activity. The timing of planned CO should be determined based on a realistic assessment of their ability to create effects and support operations throughout the OE.

Space-based Intelligence Considerations. Space-based intelligence collection tasks include warning (to include ballistic missile activity), targeting analysis, threat capability assessment, space domain awareness, BDA, and characterization of the OE. Space assets are capable of collecting diverse information that supports military, diplomatic, and economic intelligence. Space-based collection platforms, delivering globally persistent and legal overflight of any location on Earth, increase the probability of attributing nefarious activities.

E. Joint Warfighting (Integrating Capabilities & Synchronizing Action)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations* (Jun '22), pp. VII-28 to VII-32.

Commanders must integrate the capabilities and synchronize the operations of air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace forces, along with JEMSO, to defeat peer enemies. JFCs should consider intelligence collection, providing joint fire support, maneuvering to close with the enemy, and protecting the force, for example, as separate operations but complementary joint actions executed to create necessary effects against the enemy. Potential enemy responses to integrated and synchronized joint warfighting can create multiple dilemmas. If the enemy attempts to counter the capabilities of intelligence or maneuver, enemy forces may expose themselves to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such losses from joint fires, enemy forces may not be able to evade intelligence or counter the maneuver. All components can conduct intelligence collection, maneuver, and employ fires to close with enemy forces, interdict enemy capability before, and protect the force from enemy attack. The synergy assists commanders in conducting joint operations by integrating and synchronizing all joint functions and unique capabilities from across the force.

The JFC's objectives, intent, and priorities reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements enable subordinates to fully exploit the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force also alleviates such friction. As an example, JOA-wide requirements for cyberspace, space, and airborne JSR support will often exceed the means available, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. The JFACC will have to balance priorities for protection and counter-air with delivering joint fires. Commanders responsible for integrating and synchronizing joint functions within their OAs should prosecute the JFC priorities and work to synchronize and balance operations with commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and JOA-wide functions. JFCs can effectively synchronize efforts across the JOA through the CONOPS and clear statements of intent for JOA-wide operations conducted in concert with joint operations specific to an OA. In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to achieving objectives. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to identify requirements and apply capabilities to meet them. JFCs must exercise command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

Joint Force Component Operations (See chap. 5.)

Within the JOA, all joint force component operations must contribute to the achievement of the JFC's objectives. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish OAs for subordinate commands. Integration and synchronization of intelligence, joint fire support, and maneuver are essential to successful armed conflict. Synchronization and integration of the joint functions are critical within the land or maritime AOs, especially when JFCs task other component commanders to execute JOA-wide functions.

JFCs establish land and maritime AOs to decentralize the execution of land and maritime operations. The JFC bases the size, shape, and positioning of land or maritime AOs on the operational requirements. Within these AOs, the JFC designates the land and maritime commanders as the supported commander for integrating and synchronizing maneuver, fires, and other joint functions and capabilities. Accordingly, land and maritime commanders designate the CONOPS, which includes the target priority, effects, and timing for combat operations within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land and maritime commander, commanders designated as the supported commander for a theater/JOA-wide responsibility have latitude in planning and executing JFC prioritized missions within a land or maritime AO.

Effective coordination of intelligence, maneuver, and joint fires supports defeating critical portions of the enemy A2/AD systems' coverage, maneuver forces, C2 networks, and integrated fires complex. The JFC relies on both airborne ISR and information to identify high-value targets within the JOA and then maneuvers forces to seize key terrain, isolate enemy forces, stimulate the enemy's mid-range or short-range fires systems, or force the enemy to reposition. These operations expose the enemy to additional intelligence, maneuver, and fires efforts. The result of synchronization and effective employment is to increase freedom of movement.

Converging intelligence, maneuver, fires, EW, and deception, the JFC can isolate and defeat enemy forces by massing the fires to create lethal and nonlethal effects. Success is a result of creating the right effect at critical times and locations. The JFCs concentrate effects at enemy LOCs, sustainment, reserves, and enablers to further isolate enemy forces. The result is an enemy force that is isolated and vulnerable to sustained attack by joint forces. The JFC then exploits the freedom of action to defeat the enemy's operational COG or fix and destroy remaining forces.

Sustainment and Operational Reach

Campaigns and major operations in armed conflict place great demands on intertheater and intratheater logistics and sustainment systems. Prolonged combat has the potential to exhaust sustainment reserves within theater, thereby restricting the JFC's freedom of action and operational reach. To avoid this, the JFC and staff must plan for the provision of personnel, logistics, and other support to enable prolonged combat until operations are successful or the CCDR revises the objectives. Unique to armed conflict, the JFC and staff must also plan for reconstitution operations as forces and equipment availability drops. Sustainment plays a pivotal role in both offensive and defensive operations; however, the demands on personnel replacement, Class III (e.g., petroleum, oils, and lubricants), and Class V (e.g., ammunition) will be more severe during offensive operations. As with achieving air and maritime superiority, sustainment provides JFCs with the flexibility and operational reach to develop required branches and sequels as the operation evolves.

CWMD

JFCs should prepare to conduct activities to curtail the development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD. When planning or executing operations and activities to counter WMD, JFCs coordinate and cooperate with not only other USG departments and agencies but also local, tribal, and state organizations, in addition to multinational partners. With numerous stakeholders in the CWMD mission area, it is critical JFCs understand and consider the capabilities and responsibilities of various interorganizational partners when defining command relationships and coordinating interorganizational activities. Operations to counter WMD may require the formation of a functional JTF for that purpose.

Detainee Operations

During armed conflict, enemy units, separated and disorganized by the shock of intensive combat, may fall capture to US forces. The numbers involved may place a tremendous burden on friendly forces as they divert tactical units to handle detainees. The term detainee includes any person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of DOD personnel.

Detainee operations is a broad term that encompasses the capture, initial detention, screening, transportation, treatment, protection, housing, transfer, and release of the wide range of persons categorized as detainees. Actions at the point of capture, custody, and beyond can directly affect mission success and could have a lasting impact on the pursuit of strategic objectives.

International law requires the safe and humane treatment of detainees. Commanders ensure all detainees are treated humanely and with respect for their dignity, IAW applicable US law, policy, and the law of war. Failure to conduct detainee operations humanely and lawfully can result in significant adverse strategic impacts for the joint force.

VII(c). Limited Contingency

Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (Jun '22), pp. VII-41 to VII-42.

CCDRs tailor and conduct operations within a limited contingency to achieve a specific objective. Limited contingency operations have a unique and typically narrow scope, scale, and focus. Under the authoritative direction of the CCDR, a subordinate command or JFC may execute a limited contingency as a stand-alone operation or reflect the initial effort of an expanding or greater, more complex effort.

Limited Contingency Operations

CCDRs prepare for various responses to situations that require military actions, activities, and operations. Through competition, commanders seek to improve positions of advantage to counter adversary and enemy actions or activities or to impose costs. Additionally, commanders create dilemmas for our adversaries, terrorists, subversives, or other contingencies as directed by an appropriate authority. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Limited contingency operations ensure the safety of US citizens and US interests. Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities operating in close cooperation with interorganizational participants. Commanders seek to integrate and execute within one unified construct to facilitate unity of effort. The timing of the transition from planning and preparation to execution can change rapidly, as necessary.

When contentious situations develop, and the President or SecDef directs action, CCDRs respond. If internal forces within a nation create threats to sovereignty or regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability. Prompt deployment of necessary forces can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective early intervention can also deny an enemy time to set conditions in their favor and achieve their objectives. Deploying a credible force is one step in countering coercion or responding to aggression. However, deployment alone will not guarantee success. Successfully countering coercion involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force can conduct offensive operations. Additionally, the perception that the national leadership is willing to employ that force and deploy more forces if necessary is critical.

Two important aspects of limited contingency operations stand out. CCDRs must provide an initial focus for the effort but remain vigilant of the evolving circumstances. First, understanding the purpose of the use of force and objective helps avoid actions that have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not uncommon in some operations, such as compelling compliance in peace enforcement, for subordinate commanders to make decisions that have significant implications. Second, commanders remain aware of changes in the operational situation and at the strategic level that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious, much less directed. Commanders must strive to detect subtle changes, which may eventually lead to disconnects between evolving strategic objectives and military operations. Failure to recognize changes within implied strategic direction may lead to ineffective or counterproductive military efforts.

Strategic direction and the evolving OE may require JFCs to simultaneously maintain and prepare capabilities for limited contingency operations and support other joint campaigns and operations. JFCs recognize these operations will vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The burden of limited contingency operations may lend itself to using small elements like SOF in coordination, preferably in concert with allies and PNs. Initially, SOF may lead these operations as an economy of force measure to enable continuity of effort.

I. Joint Planning

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), chap. I.

Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how to implement strategic guidance: how (the **ways**) to use military capabilities (the **means**) in time and space to achieve objectives (the **ends**) within an acceptable level of **risk**. Ideally, planning begins with specified national strategic objectives and military end states to provide a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused. Leaders conduct joint planning to understand the strategic and operational environments to determine the best methods for employing the Department of Defense's (DOD's) capabilities to achieve national objectives. Joint planning identifies military ways and means the President can align with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, economic). In the process, joint planning frames the problem; aligns ends, ways, and means; develops operational approaches; accounts for risk; and gives leaders decision space with proposed military options. Combatant commanders (CCDRs) may propose objectives for the President and Secretary of Defense's (SecDef's) consideration before beginning detailed planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, may offer military advice on the proposed objectives and global prioritization.

The Transregional, Multi-Domain, and Multi-Functional (TMM) Environment

The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and dynamic. The joint force will increasingly operate in a transregional (across multiple areas of responsibility [AORs]), all-domain (land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace), and multifunctional (integration of the seven joint functions) environment. Rapid advancements in cyberspace and information capabilities such as artificial intelligence, digital editing, and Internet applications enable rapid sharing of information and narratives, from areas of conflict to national leaders and the global public. This shared information can include digitally manufactured events. An expanding range of adversaries, both state and non-state, can purchase, manufacture, and employ high-tech, homemade weapons that may create problems for nation-states. Although the character of conflict is evolving, the nature of war remains constant—the ability to impose our will on another party to achieve a national objective through the sanctioned use of force.

Joint planning serves two critical purposes at the combatant command (CCMD) and subordinate joint force level:

At the **strategic level**, joint planning provides the President and SecDef with options and advice to achieve the National Security Strategy of the United States of America [short title: National Security Strategy (NSS)] objectives through the employment of the joint force. Planning supports decision making by identifying courses of action (COAs) available along with probable outcomes, costs, and risks.

At the **operational level**, joint planning translates national-level guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives and attaining the military end state as directed in the (U) National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 2018; 2018-2020 Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG); and Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP).

Types of Campaign Plans

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), p. 1-9.

Global Campaign Plans (GCPs)

GCPs address threats and challenges that significantly affect US interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all, CCMDs. GCPs are identified in the JSCP based on guidance in the NDS and NMS and are managed by the CJCS in the role as global integrator on behalf of SecDef. GCPs form the base of the JSCP.

Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs)

Regional planning guidance addresses regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple CCMDs. Generally, issues that require RCPs are not as significant a threat to US interests as GCPs but require attention to ensure they do not devolve into a more significant crisis. If necessary, SecDef, through the CJCS, could direct an RCP with a designated coordinating authority.

Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs)

FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are not geographically constrained and require coordination across multiple CCMDs.

Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs)

CCPs are the centerpiece of the CCMDs' planning construct and operationalize CCMD strategies. CCPs incorporate intermediate objectives and tasks assigned to the CCMD from the GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs within their geographic AOR or functional area. They link support and contingency plans, set priorities, and identify risks in requirements placed on the CCMD. CCPs focus the command's day-to-day activities, which include ongoing operations and military engagement, including security cooperation, exercises, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities. CCPs organize and align operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCMD's objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theater or functional areas. CCDRs identify the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMDs, prioritize objectives, and commit those resources to shape the OE and support the national strategic objectives. CCDRs evaluate the commitment of resources and make recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts associated with executing the command's missions.

B. Contingency Plans

Contingency plans are typically prepared in advance to address an anticipated crisis and must be modified during execution to respond to conditions at the time of execution. If there is an approved contingency plan that closely resembles the emergent scenario, that plan can be refined or adapted as necessary and executed.

Contingency plans are branches of GCPs, FCPs, or RCPs that are planned for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions without a crisis at hand, pursuant to the strategic guidance in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), CPG, and JSCP and guidance given by the CCCR. The UCP, CPG, and JSCP guide the development of contingency plans, which address potential threats that put one or more national interest at risk in ways that warrant military operations. Contingency plans are built to account for the possibility that campaign activities could fail to prevent aggression, preclude large-scale instability in a key state or region, or respond to a natural disaster. An integrated contingency plan coordinates the activities of multiple CCMDs in time and space to respond to a single contingency that spans CCMD geographic boundaries or functional responsibilities. Designated coordinating authorities lead planning and assessments across CCMDs and provide recommendations to the CJCS for specific problem sets or missions.

Global integration frameworks (GIFs) are strategic frameworks for decision making and integrating joint force activities across the competition and conflict continuum. The JS develops GIFs to facilitate CJCS advice to SecDef and the President on global risks, trade-offs, and opportunity costs across and within campaigns during a global crisis or conflict. GIFs are informed by existing campaign and contingency plans, including GCPs and integrated contingency plans. A GIF identifies tasks, priorities, considerations, and decisions associated with the joint force's ability to meet global requirements during a crisis or conflict. GIFs also identify potential President or SecDef decisions required to execute the global response to a priority challenge. These decisions may include risk mitigation options, reallocation and escalation management decisions, or early actions to preserve optionality.

Planners use the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), existing contracts, and task orders to identify forces available for campaign and contingency plans. Planning for contingencies is based on hypothetical situations and therefore relies heavily on assumptions regarding the circumstances that will exist when a crisis arises. Planning for a contingency encompasses the activities associated with the development of plans for the deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of forces and resources in response to potential crises identified in joint strategic planning documents. An existing plan with a similar scenario may be used to initiate planning in an emergent crisis situation. To accomplish this, planners develop a concept of operations (CONOPS) that details the assumptions; adversary forces; operation phases; prioritized missions; and force requirements, deployment, and positioning. Detailed, wargamed planning identifies force requirements and training in preparation for the most likely operational requirements. It also enables rapid comparison of the hypothetical conditions, operation phases, missions, and force requirements of existing contingency plans to the actual requirements of an emergent crisis. Contingency planning allows the JPEC to deepen its understanding of the OE and sharpen its analytical and planning expertise.

The President or SecDef may issue an out-of-cycle directive or other guidance in response to new situations. The CJCS implements the President or SecDef's planning guidance into orders or policy to direct the initiation of planning.

Contingency plans are produced, reviewed, and updated periodically to maintain their relevance. Contingency planning most often addresses situations in which military options focus on combat operations but can address contingencies in which the joint force is in support from the onset. These include defense support of civil authorities, support to stabilization efforts, and foreign humanitarian assistance.

3-6 (Joint Planning) I. Overview

Planning Detail

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Dec '20), pp. I-11 to I-12.

Commanders develop plans to one of the four levels of planning detail or into an operation order (OPORD) (for execution).

Level 1 Planning Detail—Commander's Estimate

This level of planning has the least detail. It produces multiple COAs to address contingencies. The product for this level can be a COA briefing, command directive, commander's estimate, or a memorandum with a proposed force list. The commander's estimate provides SecDef with military COAs to meet a potential contingency. The estimate reflects the commander's analysis of the various COAs and recommends a COA.

Level 2 Planning Detail—BPLAN

A BPLAN describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes. A BPLAN may contain alternatives, including FDOs and FROs, to provide multiple options to address contingencies as they develop or to shape the developing situation.

Level 3 Planning Detail—CONPLAN

A CONPLAN is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format. It may require considerable expansion or alteration to be converted into a complete and detailed level 4 OPLAN or an OPORD. It includes a plan summary; a BPLAN; and usually includes the following annexes: A (Task Organization), B (Intelligence), C (Operations), D (Logistics), J (Command Relationships), K (Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems), S (Special Technical Operations), V (Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination), and Z (Distribution). If the development of time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) is directed for the CONPLAN, the planning level is designated as 3T and requires consideration of intelligence community-assessed contested environment impacts on deployment and distribution operations. A CCMD may request a national intelligence support plan (NISP) be developed for level 3T contingency plans. A troop list and TPFDD also require an annex E (Personnel) and annex W (Operational Contract Support).

Level 4 Planning Detail—OPLAN

An OPLAN is a complete and detailed plan. The OPLAN identifies the force requirements, functional support, and resources to execute the plan. It contains a full description of the CONOPS, all applicable annexes, a time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) and a transportation-feasible notional TPFDD, as well as analysis of the impact of a potentially contested environment on the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE). A TPFDD phases unit requirements into the theater of operations to support the CONOPS and provide closure estimates. A CCMD may request a NISP be developed for level 4 OPLANS. An OPLAN is normally prepared when:

- The contingency threatens national security and requires detailed prior planning.
- The magnitude or timing of the contingency requires detailed planning.
- Detailed planning is required to support multinational planning.
- Detailed planning is necessary to determine force deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment requirements; identify resources to fill requirements; and validate shortfalls.

III. Joint Orders

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. I-16 to I-18.

Upon approval, CCDRs and Services issue orders directing action (see Figure I-2). Formats for orders are in CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance. By the CJCS's direction, the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] develops, coordinates, and prepares orders. The JS J-3 prepares and coordinates the Secretary of Defense Orders Book to present recommendations to SecDef for decision.

	Order Type	Intended Action	Secretary of Defense Approval Required
Warning Order	WARNORD or WARNO	Initiates development and evaluation of COAs by supported commander. Requests commander's estimate be submitted.	No. Required when WARNORD includes deployment or deployment preparation actions.
Planning Order	PLANORD	Begins planning for anticipated President or SecDef-selected COA. Directs preparation of OPORDs or contingency plan.	No. Conveys anticipated COA selection by the President or SecDef.
Alert Order	ALERTORD	Begins execution planning on President or SecDef-selected COA. Directs preparation of OPORD or contingency plan.	Yes. Conveys COA selection by the President or SecDef.
Operation Order	OPORD	Effect coordinated execution of an operation.	Specific to the OPORD.
Prepare To Deploy Order	PTDO	Increase/decrease deployability posture of units.	Yes (if allocates force). Refers to five levels of deployability posture.
Deployment/Redeployment Order	DEPORD	Deploy/redeploy forces. Establish C-day/L-hour. Increase deployability. Establish joint task force.	Yes (if allocates force). Required for movement of unit personnel and equipment into combatant commander's AOR.
Execute Order	EXORD	Implement President or SecDef decision directing execution of a COA or OPORD.	Yes.
Fragmentary Order	FRAGORD or FRAGO	Issued as needed after an OPORD to change or modify the OPORD execution.	No.

Legend

- AOR area of responsibility
- C-day unnamed day on which a deployment operation begins
- COA course of action
- L-hour specific hour on C-day at which deployment operation commences or is to commence
- SecDef Secretary of Defense

Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. I-2, Joint Orders.

Warning Order (WARNORD)

A WARNORD initiates the development and evaluation of military COAs by a supported commander and requests that the supported commander submit a commander's estimate. If the order contains the deployment of forces, SecDef's authorization is required.

Planning Order (PLANORD)

A PLANORD provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development before the directing authority approves a military COA.

Alert Order (ALERTORD)

An ALERTORD provides essential planning guidance and directs the initiation of plan development after the directing authority approves a military COA. An ALERTORD does not authorize execution of the approved COA.

Prepare to Deploy Order (PTDO)

A PTDO orders the force provider (FP) to have a unit ready and available to deploy within a specified response time. Unless otherwise stated, units placed on PTDO by the FP remain under the command and control (C2) of the FP. CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, and the GFMIG discuss the PTDOs in more detail.

Deployment Order (DEPOD)

A DEPOD, a planning directive from SecDef, issued by the CJCS, authorizes the transfer and allocation of forces among CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies. It specifies the authorities the gaining CCDR will exercise over specified forces to be transferred. The GFMAP is a global DEPOD for all allocated forces. FPs deploy or prepare forces to deploy on a time frame as directed in the GFMAP. CJCSM 3130.06, (U) Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures, and the GFMIG discuss the DEPOD in more detail.

Execute Order (EXORD)

An EXORD is a directive to implement an approved CONOPS. Only the President and SecDef have the authority to approve and direct the initiation of military operations. The CJCS, by the authority of and at the direction of the President or SecDef, may subsequently issue an EXORD to initiate military operations. Supported and supporting commanders and subordinate JFCs use an EXORD to implement the approved CONOPS.

Operation Order (OPORD)

An OPOD is a directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders to coordinate execution of an operation. Joint OPODs are prepared under joint procedures in prescribed formats during a crisis.

Fragmentary Order (FRAGORD)

A FRAGORD is a modification to any previously issued order. It is issued to change an existing order or to execute a branch or sequel of an existing OPOD. It provides brief and specific directions that address only those parts of the original order that have changed.

For more information on plan and orders formats, refer to CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, and Appendix A, "Joint Operation Plan Example."

II(a). Strategic Guidance and Coordination

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Dec '20), chap. II.

The President, SecDef, and CJCS provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military to pursue national interests within legal and constitutional limitations. They generally communicate strategic direction to the military through written documents but may communicate by any means available. Strategic direction is contained in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changing situations, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

I. National and Department of Defense Guidance

The President's decisions drive SecDef's strategic guidance, which the CJCS operationalizes.

A. Strategic Guidance and Direction

The President provides strategic guidance through the NSS, executive orders, and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance and refinement from the NSC. The President also signs the UCP and the CPG, which are both developed by DOD.

Secretary of Defense (SecDef)

SecDef executes authority, direction, and control over DOD components. SecDef oversees the development of broad defense policy goals and priorities for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. For planning, SecDef provides guidance to ensure military action supports national objectives. SecDef approves assignment and allocation of forces.

USD(P) assists SecDef with preparing written policy guidance for the preparation of plans, reviewing plans, and other duties, as directed.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

The CJCS serves as principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and other members of the NSC and assists the President and SecDef with providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces of the United States. The CJCS uses the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) as the formal mechanism to fulfill responsibilities under Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 153, to maintain a global perspective, conduct assessments, develop the force, and develop military advice for SecDef and the President. The JSPS also supports the CJCS's interactions with Congress, the Services, and the CCMDs.

Per Title 10, USC, Section 153, the CJCS is responsible for strategic direction for the Armed Forces of the United States, strategic and contingency planning, global military integration, comprehensive joint readiness, joint capability development, and joint force development activities.

Refer to CJCSI 3100.01, *Joint Strategic Planning System*, for additional information.

B. National Security Council (NSC) System

The President uses the NSC system for national security policy development and decision making. In addition to NSC meetings chaired by the President, the NSC system includes the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, policy coordination committees, and a dedicated NSC staff. Along with the NSC staff, issue-specific interagency working groups support these higher-level committees.

The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials, including SecDef and the CJCS. NSC decisions may be directed to any department or agency.

C. National Security Strategy (NSS)

The NSS is required annually by Title 50, USC, Section 3043. It is prepared by the Executive Branch of the USG for Congress and outlines the major national security concerns of the United States and how the administration plans to address them using all instruments of national power. The document is often purposely general in content, and its implementation by DOD relies on elaborating direction provided in supporting documents (e.g., the NDS and NMS).

JFCs and their staffs can derive the broad, overarching policy of the United States from the NSS but must check other DOD and military sources for refined guidance, as the NSS is too broad for detailed planning.

D. Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development

DOS is the lead US foreign affairs agency within the Executive Branch and the lead institution for the conduct of American diplomacy. The Secretary of State is the President's principal foreign policy advisor. The Secretary of State implements the President's foreign policies worldwide through DOS and its employees. USAID is an independent federal agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State. USAID serves as the USG lead for international development and foreign disaster assistance.

See facing page.

E. Department of Defense

National Defense Strategy (NDS)

The NDS, required by Title 10, USC, Section 113(g), is signed by SecDef and outlines DOD's approach to implementing the President's NSS. The NDS supports the NSS by establishing a set of overarching defense objectives that guide DOD's security activities and provide direction for the NMS. The NDS objectives serve as links between military activities and those of other DOD agencies in pursuit of national goals.

Unified Command Plan (UCP)

The UCP, signed by the President, establishes CCMDs and responsibilities and missions of the CCDRs. The unified command structure identified in the UCP is flexible and changes as required to accommodate evolving US national security needs. Title 10, USC, Section 161, tasks the CJCS to conduct a review of the UCP "not less often than every two years" and submit recommended changes to the President through SecDef.

This document provides broad guidance from which CCDRs and planners can derive tasks and missions during CCMD plan development and modification.

Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG)

The CPG, signed by the President, fulfills the statutory requirement in Title 10, USC, Section 113. SecDef, with the approval from the President, and with advice from the CJCS, provides written policy guidance on the preparation and review of campaign and contingency plans.

(Notional) Strategic Estimate Format

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), app. B.

1. Strategic Direction

This section analyzes broad policy, strategic guidance, and authoritative direction to the theater situation and identifies theater strategic requirements in global and regional dimensions.

- a. **US Policy Goals.** *Identify the US national security or military objectives and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.*
- b. **Non-US/Multinational Policy Goals.** *Identify the multinational (alliance or coalition) security or military objectives and strategic tasks that may also be assigned to, or coordinated by the CCMD.*
- c. **Opposition Policy Goals and Desired End State.**
- d. **End State(s).** *Describe the campaign or operation objective(s) or end state(s) and related military objectives to achieve and end states to attain and maintain.*

2. Strategic Environment

- a. **AOR.** *Provide a visualization of the relevant geographic, political, economic, social, demographic, historic, and cultural factors in the AOR assigned to the CCDR.*
- b. **Area of Interest.** *Describe the area of interest to the commander, including the area of influence and adjacent areas and extending into adversary territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.*
- c. **Adversary Forces.** *Identify all states, groups, or organizations expected to be hostile to, or that may threaten US and partner nation interests, and appraise their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of the magnitude of the potential threat, including threats to power projection activities.*
- d. **Friendly Forces.** *Identify all relevant friendly states, forces, and organizations. These include assigned US forces, regional allies, and anticipated multinational partners. Describe the capabilities of the other instruments of power (diplomatic, economic, and informational), US military supporting commands, and other USG departments and agencies that could have a direct and significant influence on the operations in this AOR.*
- e. **Neutral Forces.** *Identify all other relevant states, groups, or organizations in the AOR and determine their general objectives, motivations, and capabilities. Provide the information essential for a clear understanding of their motivations and how they may impact US and friendly multinational operations.*

3. Assessment of Major Strategic and Operational Challenges

- a. This is a continuous appreciation of the major challenges in the AOR with which the CCDR may be tasked to deal.
- b. These may include a wide range of challenges, from direct military confrontation, peace operations, and security cooperation activities (that include security force assistance for building partner capacity and capability), to providing response to atrocities, foreign humanitarian assistance, and stability activities.

4. Potential Opportunities

- a. This is an analysis of known or anticipated circumstances, as well as emerging situations, that the CCMD may use as positive leverage to improve the theater strategic situation and further US or partner nation interests.
- b. Each potential opportunity must be carefully appraised with respect to existing strategic guidance and operational limitations.

5. Assessment of Risks


- a. This assessment matches a list of the potential challenges with anticipated capabilities in the OE
- b. Risks associated with each major challenge should be analyzed separately and categorized according to significance or likelihood (most dangerous or most likely)
- c. The CCMD staff should develop a list of possible mitigation measures to these risks.

II(b). Application of Guidance

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), chap. II.

I. Joint Planning and Execution Community

The headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in joint planning or committed to a joint operation are collectively termed the JPEC. Although not a standing or regularly meeting entity, the JPEC consists of the stakeholders shown in Figure II-2.



Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. II-2. Joint planning and execution community.

Supported CCDR

The supported CCDR has primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the CPG, JSCP, or other joint planning directives. In the context of joint planning, the supported commander can initiate planning at any time based on command authority or in response to direction or orders from the President, SecDef, or CJCS. The designated supporting commanders provide planning assistance, forces, or other resources to a supported commander, as directed.

Supporting Commanders

Supporting commanders provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported commander in accordance with the principles set forth in GFM policies and procedures. Supporting commanders prepare supporting plans as required. A commander may be a supporting commander for one operation while being a supported commander for another.

Coordinating Authority

Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating authority for joint security area operations among the component commanders) and may include USG departments and agencies and partner nations (e.g., as part of security cooperation planning). To fulfill the requirements of global integration, the global integrator may also designate individuals as a coordinating authority. In this context, a coordinating authority is generally a CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility for developing plans in support of a GCP and associated contingencies but who does not receive additional command authority or authority to compel agreement beyond that already assigned in the UCP. Coordinating authorities convene collaborative forums to perform three functions: planning, assessing, and recommending changes to plans.

The President, with the advice and assistance of the NSC and CJCS, issues policy and strategic direction to guide the planning efforts of DOD and other USG departments and agencies that represent all of the instruments of national power. SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS, organizes the JPEC for joint planning by establishing appropriate command relationships among the CCDRs and by establishing appropriate support relationships between the CCDRs and the CSAs for that portion of their missions involving support for operating forces. A supported commander is identified for specific planning tasks, and other JPEC stakeholders are designated as appropriate.

Refer to CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans, for a more complete discussion of the JPEC and coordinating authority. See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, for a more complete discussion of command relationships.

II. Adaptive Planning

Adaptive planning supports decision making and facilitates the transition from planning to execution.

The intent of adaptive planning is to develop plans that contain military options for the President and SecDef as they seek to shape the environment and respond to contingencies. This facilitates responsive plan development that provides up-to-date planning and plans for civilian leaders. The JPP incorporates policies and procedures to facilitate responsive planning and foster a shared understanding through frequent dialogue between civilian and military leaders to provide viable military options to the President and SecDef. Continuous assessment and collaborative technology provide increased opportunities for consultation and updated guidance during the planning and execution processes.

IPRs are an integral part of adaptive planning. Iterative dialogue among civilian and military leaders at the strategic level enable a shared understanding of the situation, inform leadership, and influence planning. Topics such as planning assumptions, interagency and multinational participation guidance, supporting and supported activity requirements, desired objectives, key capability shortfalls, acceptable levels of risk, and SecDef decisions are typically discussed. Further, IPRs expedite planning by ensuring the plan addresses the most current strategic assessments and objectives. IPR participants are based on the requirements of the plan.

Refer to CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review Campaign and Contingency Plans, which discusses integrated planning and IPRs in more detail.

III. Operational Activities

Operational activities comprise a sustained cycle of situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment that occur continuously to support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command.

3-28 (Joint Planning) II(b). Application of Guidance

A. Situational Awareness

Situational awareness addresses procedures for understanding the OE, including threats to national security. This occurs during continuous monitoring of the national and international political and military situations so CCDRs, JFCs, and their staffs can determine and analyze emerging crises, notify decision makers, and determine the specific nature of the threat. Persistent or recurring theater military engagement activities contribute to maintaining situational awareness.

Situational awareness encompasses activities such as monitoring the global situation, identifying that an event has occurred, recognizing the event is a problem or a potential problem, reporting the event, and reviewing enduring and emerging warning concerns and the CCMD's running intelligence estimate (based on continuous joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment [JIPOE]). An event is a national or international occurrence assessed as unusual and viewed as potentially having an adverse impact on US national interests and national security. The recognition of the event as a problem or potential problem follows from the observation.

B. Planning

Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into campaign plans, contingency plans, and OPORDs. Joint planning is usually based on defined tasks identified in the UCP, CPG, and JSCP. Alternatively, joint planning may be based on the need for a military response to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. CCMD planning for contingencies is normally tasked in the JSCP based on the CPG or other directive. Planners derive assumptions needed to continue planning and reference the force apportionment and force assignment tables to provide the number of forces reasonably expected to be available.

Planning for crises is initiated to respond to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. It is based on planning guidance, typically communicated in orders: WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD. Commanders evaluate the availability of assigned and currently allocated forces to respond to the event. They also determine what other force requirements are needed and begin putting together a rough order-of-magnitude force list.

C. Execution

Execution begins when the President or SecDef authorizes the initiation of a military operation or other activity. The CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues an EXORD or other authorizing directive to initiate or conduct military operations. Depending upon time constraints, an EXORD may be the only order a CCDR or subordinate commander receives. The EXORD defines the time to initiate operations and may convey guidance not provided earlier.

The CJCS monitors the deployment and employment of forces, makes recommendations to SecDef to resolve shortfalls, and transmits presidential- and SecDef-directed orders to support the successful execution of military operations. Execution continues until the mission is accomplished and a new order transitions operations. In execution, based on continuous assessment activities, the planning process is repeated as circumstances and missions change.

The CCDR monitors the deployment, distribution, and employment of forces; measures task performance and progress toward mission accomplishment; and adapts and adjusts operations as required to achieve the objectives and attain the military end state. This continual assessment and adjustment of operations creates an organizational environment of learning and adaptation. This adaptation can range from minor operational adjustments to a radical change of approach.

Changes to the original plan may be necessary because of tactical, intelligence, or environmental considerations; force and non-unit cargo availability; availability of strategic transportation; and port capabilities. Therefore, ongoing refinement and

II. Planning Functions

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Dec '20), p. III-5 to III-8.

The four planning functions of strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment are generally sequential, although often run simultaneously to deepen the dialogue between civilian and military leaders and accelerate the overall planning process. SecDef, the CJCS, or CCCR may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a plan by reentering the planning process at any of the earlier functions. The time spent accomplishing each activity and function depends on the circumstances. In time-sensitive cases, planning functions may be compressed and decisions reached in an open forum. Orders may be combined and initially communicated orally.

A. Strategic Guidance (See pp. 3-19 to 3-26.)

Strategic guidance initiates planning, provides the basis for mission analysis, and enables the JPEC to develop a shared understanding of the issues, OE, objectives, and responsibilities.

The CCCR provides input through sustained civilian-military dialogue that may include IPRs. The CCCR crafts objectives that support national strategic objectives with the guidance and consent of SecDef; if required, the CJCS offers advice to SecDef. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance such as the CPG and JSCP or a CJCS WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD issued in a crisis. This includes mission analysis, threat assessment, and development of assumptions, which are briefed to SecDef during the strategic guidance IPR.

Some of the primary end products of the strategic guidance planning function are assumptions, identification of available/acceptable resources, conclusions about the strategic and operational environment (nature of the problem), strategic and military objectives, and the supported commander's mission.

The CCCR will maintain dialogue with DOD leadership to ensure a common understanding of the above topics and alignment of planning to date. This step can be iterative, as the CCCR consults with the staff to identify concerns with or gaps in the guidance.

B. Concept Development (See pp. 3-82 to 3-83.)

During planning, the commander develops several COAs, each containing an initial CONOPS that should identify threats to the JDDE, major capabilities and authorities required and task organization, major operational tasks to be accomplished by components, a concept for employment and sustainment, and complete OE modeling and simulation that informs the CCCR's assessment of risk. Each COA may contain multiple embedded alternatives to achieve designated objectives as conditions change (e.g., OE, problem, strategic direction). In time-sensitive situations, a WARNORD may not be issued, and a PLANORD, ALERTORD, or EXORD might be the first directive the supported commander receives with which to initiate planning. Using the guidance included in the directive and the CCCR's mission statement, planners solicit input from supporting and subordinate commands to develop COAs based upon the outputs of the strategic guidance planning function.

During concept development, if an IPR is required, the commander outlines the COA(s) and makes a recommendation to higher authority for approval and further development.

The commander recommends a COA that is most appropriate for the situation.

Concept development should consider a range of COAs that integrate robust options to provide greater flexibility and to expedite transition during a crisis. CCRs should be prepared to continue to develop multiple COAs to provide options to national-level leadership should the crisis develop.

For CCPs, CCDRs should address resource requirements, expected changes in the strategic environment and OEs, and how each COA supports achieving national objectives.

The commander also requests SecDef guidance on interorganizational planning and coordination and makes appropriate recommendations, based on the interorganizational requirements identified during assessments, mission analysis, and COA development.

One of the main products from the concept development planning function is approval for continued development of one or more COAs. Detailed planning begins upon COA approval in the concept development function.

C. Plan Development *(See pp. 3-84 to 3-85.)*

This function is used to develop a feasible plan or order that is ready to transition into execution. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, transition, redeployment, and demobilization activities. When the CCDR believes the plan is sufficiently developed to become a plan of record, the CCDR briefs the final plan to SecDef (or a designated representative) for approval.

D. Assessment *(See pp. 3-139 to 3-146.)*

Assessment is a continuous operation activity in both planning and execution functions and informs the commander's decision making. It determines whether current actions and conditions are creating the desired effects and changes in the OE toward the desired objectives and ensures that plans remain appropriate for the changing conditions in the OE and resources.

Operation Assessment

Assessment reveals the progress of the joint force toward mission accomplishment. Assessment involves comparing desired conditions of the OE with actual conditions to determine the overall effectiveness of the campaign or operation. More specifically, assessment helps the JFC measure task performance; determine progress toward or regression from accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state; and issue the necessary guidance for change to guide forward momentum. As follow-on assessments occur, they are compared to the initial (ideally pre-execution) baseline and previous follow-on assessments; historical trends can aid the analysis and provide more definitive and reliable measures and indicators of change.

During execution, assessment helps the command adapt and adjust operations as required to attain the desired end state (or achieve strategic objectives). This analysis and adjustment of operations creates an organizational environment of learning and adaptation. Adaptation can range from minor operational adjustments to a radical change of approach, including termination of the operation. When fundamental changes have occurred that challenge existing understanding or indicate a shift in the OE, commanders and staffs may develop a new operational approach that recognizes that the initial problem has changed, thus requiring a different approach toward the solution. The change to the OE could be so significant that it may require a review of the national strategic, theater strategic, and military objectives and discussions with higher authority to determine whether the military objectives or national strategic end states are still viable.

Operation assessment identifies when changes to the current plan are required.

See following page (p. 3-36) for discussion of plan assessment.

III(b). Joint Planning Process (JPP)

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. III-9 to III-74.

The joint planning process (JPP) is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order.

Joint Planning Process (JPP) Steps



Planning Initiation



Mission Analysis



COA Development



COA Analysis and Wargaming




COA Comparison



COA Approval



Plan or Order Development



(See p. 3-39.)

JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission. JPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

JPP is applicable for all planning. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution. It is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive. Based on the nature of the problem, other tools available to the planner, expertise in the planning team, time, and other considerations, the process can be modified as required. Similarly, some JPP steps or tasks may be performed concurrently, truncated, or modified as necessary dependent upon the situation, subject, or time constraints of the planning effort.

In a crisis, the steps of JPP may be conducted simultaneously to speed the process. Supporting commands and organizations often conduct JPP simultaneously and iteratively with the supported CCMD.

I. Planning Initiation

Joint planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in support of national objectives or in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authority—the President, SecDef, or CJCS—initiates planning by deciding to develop military options. Presidential directives, NSS, UCP, CPG, NDS, NMS, JSCP, and related strategic guidance documents (e.g., SGSs) serve as the primary guidance to begin planning.

CCDRs, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders also initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. Additionally, analyses of the OE or developing or immediate crises may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS directing military planning through a planning directive. CCDRs normally develop military options in combination with other nonmilitary options. Whether or not planning begins as described here, the commander may act within approved authorities and ROE/RUF in an immediate crisis.

The commander and staff will receive and analyze the planning guidance to determine the time available until mission execution; current status of strategic and staff estimates; and intelligence products, to include JIPOE, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The commander will typically provide initial planning guidance based upon current understanding of the OE, the problem, and the initial operational approach for the campaign or operation. It could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, or authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC's authority.

While planning is continuous once execution begins, it is particularly relevant when there is new strategic direction, significant changes to the current mission or planning assumptions, or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations.

Planning for campaign plans is different from contingency plans in that contingency planning focuses on the anticipation of future events, while campaign planning assesses the current state of the OE and identifies how the command can shape the OE to deter crisis on a daily basis and support strategic objectives.

Operational design supports this step in the planning process by building understanding of strategic direction, the strategic environment, and the OE. This helps the commander and staff define the problem as they begin mission analysis.

II. Mission Analysis

The CCDR and staff analyzes the strategic direction and derives the restated mission statement for the commander's approval, which allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates and planning efforts for higher headquarters' concurrence. The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. Analysis begins with the following questions:

- What is the purpose of the mission received? (What problem is the commander being asked to solve or what change to the OE is desired?)
- What tasks must my command do for the mission to be accomplished?
- Will the mission achieve the desired results?
- What limitations have been placed on my own forces' actions?
- What forces/assets are needed to support my operation?
- How will I know when the mission is accomplished successfully?
- How will friendly, neutral, and threat networks affect accomplishment of the mission?


The **primary inputs to mission analysis** are strategic guidance; the higher headquarters' planning directive; and the commander's initial planning guidance, which may include a description of the OE, a definition of the problem, the operational approach, initial intent, and the JIPOE (following page).

Joint Planning Process (JPP) Overview

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. III-9 to III-10 (fig. III-3).

The commander is the central figure in planning due to knowledge, experience, and because the commander's judgment and decisions are required to guide the staff through the process. Generally, the more complex a situation, the more critical the role of the commander early in planning by leveraging their knowledge, experience, judgment, intuition, responsibility, and authority to generate a clearer understanding of the conditions needed to focus effort and achieve success.

Commanders use the knowledge and understanding gained from operational design, along with any additional guidance from higher headquarters, to provide guidance that directs and guides the staff through the JPP.



Legend

COA course of action
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment

Commander actions

Staff actions

JPP steps

Operational design steps

Primary plan flow

Supporting actions flow

The Operational Approach (See pp. 3-102 to 3-104.)

Commanders distinguish the unique features of their current situations to enable development of innovative or adaptive solutions. They understand that each situation requires a solution tailored to the context of the problem. Through the use of operational design and the application of operational art, commanders develop innovative, adaptive alternatives to solve complex challenges. These broad alternatives are the operational approach.

Joint Planning

Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)

Ref: Adapted from JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence* (Jun '07), pp. I-16 to I-17 and Oct '13, fig. I-5, p. I-17.

All planners need a basic familiarity with the JIPOE process in order to become critical consumers of the products produced by the intelligence community. Some steps in the JIPOE are conducted in parallel with the mission analysis and require input from other members of the maritime planning group. Although the specifics of the process vary depending on the situation and force involved, there is general agreement on the four major steps of JIPOE.

For a more detailed discussion of the JIPOE process, refer to JP 2-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace*.

Step One: Define the Operational Environment

This first step is an initial survey of the geographic and non-geographic dimensions of the operational environment. It is used to bound the problem and to identify areas for further analysis. There are generally three tasks that must be accomplished.

- Identify the AO and the area of interest
- Determine the significant characteristics of the operational environment. This sub-step is an initial review of the factors of space, time, and forces and their interaction with one another.
- Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps and priorities. In this sub-step, intelligence personnel review the information found in various automated databases, Intelink sites (the classified version of the Internet), and other intelligence sources, both classified and unclassified. Intelligence requests and requirements may take the form of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), requests for information (RFIs), production requests (PRs), and collection requirements.

Area of Operations: Defined by LAT/LONG or displayed on a map/chart for clarity and reference. The higher headquarters normally assigns this.

Area of Interest: Adjacent geographic area where political, military, economic, or other developments have an effect within a given theater; it might also extend to the areas enemy forces occupy that may endanger the accomplishment of one's mission; in practical terms, the area of interest determines the maximum scope of intelligence-gathering activities for the geographic combatant command; any theater (of war) also encompasses the pertinent parts of the cyberspace.

Step Two: Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment

The purpose of this step is to determine how the operational environment affects both friendly and enemy operations. It begins with an identification and analysis of all militarily significant environmental characteristics of each operational environment dimension.

These factors are then analyzed to determine their effects on the capabilities and broad COAs of both enemy and friendly forces. Sub-steps include:

- Analyze the factor of space of the operational environment
- Analyze the factor of time of the operational environment
- Determine the operational environment effects on enemy and friendly capabilities and broad COAs

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Space: military geography (area, position, distances, land use, environment, topography, vegetation, hydrography, oceanography, climate, and weather), politics, diplomacy, national resources, maritime infrastructure and positioning, economy, agriculture, transportation, telecommunications, culture, ideology, nationalism, sociology, science and technology.

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Time: preparation, duration, warning, decision cycle, planning, mobilization, reaction, deployment, transit, concentration, maneuver, accomplish mission, rate of advance, reinforcements, commit reserves, regenerate combat power, redeployment, reconstruction

Step Three: Evaluate the Adversary & Other Relevant Actors

The third step is to identify and evaluate the adversary's forces and its capabilities; limitations; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures to be employed. In this step, analysts develop models that portray how the enemy normally operates and identifies capabilities in terms of broad ECOAs that the enemy might take. Analysts must take care not to evaluate enemy doctrine and concepts by mirror imaging U.S. doctrine. Sub-steps include:

- Identify adversary force capabilities
- Consider and describe general ECOAs in terms of DRAW-D (Defend, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, or Delay)
- Determine the current enemy situation (situation template)
- Identify broad COAs that would allow the enemy to achieve objectives

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Forces (Enemy): defense system, armed forces, relative combat power of opposing forces (composition, reserves, reinforcements, location and disposition, strengths), logistics, combat efficiency (morale, leadership, doctrine, training, etc.).

Step Four: Determine Adversary & Other Relevant Actor COAs

Accurate identification of the full set of ECOAs requires the commander and his staff to think as the enemy thinks. From that perspective, it is necessary first to postulate possible enemy objectives and then to visualize specific actions within the capabilities of enemy forces that can be directed at these objectives and their impact upon potential friendly operations. From the enemy's perspective, appropriate physical objectives might include own-forces or their elements, own or friendly forces being supported or protected, facilities or lines of communication, and geographic areas or positions of tactical, operational, or strategic importance.

The real COA by the enemy commander cannot be known with any confidence without knowing the enemy's mission and objective, and that information is rarely known. Even if such information were available, the enemy could change or feign the COA. Therefore, considering all the options the enemy could physically carry out is more prudent.

To develop an ECOA, one should ask the following three questions: Can the enemy do it? Will the enemy accomplish his objective? Would it materially affect the accomplishment of my mission? Each identified ECOA is examined to determine whether it meets the tests for suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency with doctrine.

No ECOA should be dismissed or overlooked because it is considered as unlikely or uncommon, only if impossible. Once all ECOAs have been identified, the commander should eliminate any duplication and combine them when appropriate. Each ECOA is evaluated, prioritized, and ranked according to the probability of adoption. This final step in the IPOE process is designed to produce, at a minimum, two ECOAs: the enemy's most likely COA and most dangerous COA, giving the commander a best estimate and a worst-case scenario for planning.



Refer to *Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1 – Joint Strategic & Operational Planning, 3rd Ed.* Topics and chapters include planning fundamentals, planning functions (planning and plans, operational activities, planning functions), global force management, joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE), intelligence preparation of the information environment (IPIE), joint planning process (JPP), plan and order development (process, review, assessment), execution functions, and annexes.

The primary outputs of mission analysis are the identified essential, specified, and implied tasks; friendly and threat centers of gravity (COGs) and their critical vulnerabilities; staff estimates; the mission statement; a refined operational approach; the commander's intent statement; updated planning guidance; and initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).

Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. The JFC and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical activities, such as those shown in Figure V-4 (facing page).

- Although some activities occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial concurrent processing of information by the commander and staff, particularly in a crisis situation.
- During mission analysis, it is essential the tasks (specified and implied) and their purposes are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements, limitations (constraints—must do, or restraints—cannot do) on actions that the commander or subordinate forces may take are understood, and the correlation between the commander's mission and intent and those of higher and other commanders is understood. Resources and authorities must also be evaluated to ensure there is not a mission-resource-authority mismatch and second, to enable the commander to prioritize missions and tasks against limited resources.
- Specific information may need to be captured and tracked in order to improve the end products. This includes requests for information regarding forces, capabilities, and other resources; questions for the commander or special assistant (e.g., legal); and proposed battle rhythm for planning and execution. Recording this information during the mission analysis process will enable a more complete product and smoother mission analysis brief.

A. Analyze Higher Headquarters' Planning Directives and Strategic Guidance

Strategic Guidance

Strategic guidance is essential to joint planning and operational design. The President, SecDef, and CJCS promulgate strategic direction documents that cover a broad range of situations, and CCDRs provide guidance that covers a more narrow range of theater or functional situations. Documents such as the UCP, NMS, CPG, and JSCP provide near-term (0-2 years) strategic direction, and the CCDR's theater or functional strategy provide the mid- to long-term (greater than 3 years) CCMD vision for the AOR or global employment of functional capabilities prepared in the context of SecDef's priorities. CCDR strategy links national strategic direction to joint planning.

Specific Guidance/Planning Directives

For a specific crisis, an order provides guidance, typically including a description of the situation, purpose of military operations, objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, and pertinent limitations. The GFMI assignment and apportionment tables identify forces planners can reasonably expect to be available. Planners must not include future capabilities or posture because plans should be immediately executable. Supported and supporting plans for the same military activity rely on the same resources. Additionally, there are likely to be operations in execution and other activities already ongoing at crisis execution. Planners must remain aware that most plans will not be executed individually and the finite resource pool for all operations and plans is the same.

The CJCS may amplify apportionment guidance if appropriate. This planning can confirm or modify the guidance for an existing contingency plan or order. This might

Mission Analysis (Overview)

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. III-14 to III-15 (fig. III-5 and III-6).

Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process.

Mission Analysis

Key Inputs

Higher headquarters' planning directive

Strategic direction

Commander's planning guidance

- Description of the operational environment
- Definition of the problem
- Commander's operational approach
- Commander's initial intent

Strategic estimate and intelligence products to include JIPOE

Network analysis

Mission Analysis

Key Outputs

Staff estimates

Mission statement

Commander's refined operational approach including:

- JFC's intent statement
- JFC's updated planning guidance

Problem framing, initial force identification, mission success criteria, initial risk assessment, mission analysis briefing, and planning directive (as necessary)

Initial commander's critical information requirements

Course of action evaluation criteria

Identified essential, specified, and implied tasks

Friendly and threat centers of gravity

Mission Analysis Activities *(not necessarily sequential)*

- Begin logistics supportability analysis.
- Analyze higher headquarters planning activities and strategic guidance.
- Review commander's initial planning guidance, including his initial understanding of the operational environment, of the problem, and description of the operational approach.
- Determine known facts and develop planning assumptions.
- Determine and analyze operational limitations.
- Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks.
- Develop mission statement.
- Conduct initial force identification.
- Develop risk assessment.
- Develop course of action evaluation criteria.
- Develop initial military objectives.
- Develop commander's critical information requirements.
- Prepare staff estimates.
- Prepare and deliver mission analysis brief.
- Publish commander's updated planning guidance, intent statement, and refined operational approach.

Sample Staff Estimate Format

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), app. c.

Staff estimates are central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. Staff estimates should start with the strategic estimate and be comprehensive and continuous and visualize the future, while optimizing the limited time available to not become overly time-consuming. Comprehensive estimates consider both the quantifiable and the intangible aspects of military operations. They translate friendly and enemy strengths, weapons systems, training, morale, and leadership into combat capabilities. The estimate process requires the ability to visualize the battle or crisis situations requiring military forces.

The following is a sample format that can be used as a guide when developing an estimate.

The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands and primary staff sections based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. Refer to the CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, for the specific format.

1. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

- (1) Determine the higher command's purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction, as well as appropriate guidance in partner nations' directions, including long- and short-term objectives.
- (2) Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks and their priorities.
- (3) Determine objectives and consider desired and undesired effects.
- (4) Reassess if the strategic direction and guidance support the desired objectives or end state.

b. Mission Statement

- (1) Express in terms of who, what (essential tasks), when, where, and why (purpose).
- (2) Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and purpose—the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.

2. Situation and Courses of Action

a. Situation Analysis

(1) Geostrategic Context

- (a) Domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict, domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources and political, economic, legal, gender, and moral constraints; and international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations. Similar factors must be considered for theater and functional campaigns and noncombat operations.
- (b) A systems perspective of the OE: all relevant PMESII, and other relevant aspects.
- (2) **Analysis of the Adversary/Competitors.** Scrutiny of the situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders normally will have available a formal intelligence estimate), should include the following:
 - (a) National and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).
 - (b) Broad military COAs being taken and available in the future.
 - (c) Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.
 - (d) Possible external military support.
 - (e) COGs (strategic and operational) and decisive points (including geographic places, key events, and critical factors).
 - (f) Specific operational characteristics such as strength, composition, location, and disposition; reinforcements; logistics; time and space factors (including basing utilized and available); and combat/noncombat efficiency and proficiency in joint operations.
 - (g) Reactions of third parties/competitors in theater and functional campaigns.

(3) Friendly Situation. Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the adversary. At the theater level, CCDRs normally will have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and communications estimates. Multinational operations require specific analysis of partner nations' objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. Interagency coordination required should also be considered.

(4) Operational Limitations. Actions either required or prohibited by higher authority, such as constraints or restraints, and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political or economic conditions in affected countries, and HN issues.

(5) Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors upon which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such. Assumptions should only be made when necessary to continue planning.

(6) Deductions. Deductions from the above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

b. Course of Action Development and Analysis. COAs are based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished. Each COA must be suitable, feasible, and acceptable. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. For a CCDR's strategic estimate, each COA typically will constitute an alternative theater strategic or operational concept and should outline the following:

- (1) Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.
- (2) Major forces or capabilities required (to include joint, interagency, and multinational).
- (3) C2 concept.
- (4) Sustainment concept.
- (5) Deployment concept.
- (6) Estimate of time required to achieve the objectives.
- (7) Concept for establishing and maintaining a theater reserve.

3. Analysis of Enemy and Adversary Capabilities and Intentions

Determine the probable effect of possible enemy or adversary capabilities and intentions on the success of each friendly COA from mobilization and projection of forces through achievement of campaign objectives.

b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider:

- (1) The potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.
- (2) Transition issues; think through own action, enemy reaction, and counteraction.
- (3) The potential impact on friendly desired effects and likelihood that the enemy's or adversary's actions will cause specific undesired effects.

c. Conclude with revalidation of friendly COAs. Determine additional requirements, make required modifications, and list advantages and disadvantages of each enemy or adversary capability.

4. Comparison of Own Courses of Action

a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

b. Compare with respect to evaluation criteria.

- (1) Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of joint operations, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational design).
- (2) Other factors (for example, political constraints).
- (3) Mission accomplishment

c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.


d. Identify risk specifically associated with the assumptions (i.e., what happens if each assumption proves false).

5. Recommendation

Provide an assessment of which COAs are supportable, an analysis of the risk for each, and a concise statement of the recommended COA with its requirements.

III. Course of Action Development

A COA is a potential way (solution, method) to accomplish the assigned mission. Staffs develop multiple COAs to provide commanders with options to attain the military end state. A good COA accomplishes the mission within the commander's guidance, provides flexibility to meet unforeseen events during execution, and positions the joint force for future operations. It also gives components the maximum latitude for initiative. All COAs must be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete.



Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. III-13.

COA Elements

Each COA typically has an associated initial CONOPS with a narrative and sketch and includes the following:

- Operational Environment (OE)
- Objectives, essential tasks and purpose
- Forces and capabilities required, to include anticipated interagency roles, actions, and supporting tasks
- Integrated timeline
- Task organization
- Operational concept
- Sustainment concept
- Communication synchronization
- Risk
- Required decisions and decision timeline (e.g., mobilization, DEPOD)
- Deployment concept
- Main and supporting efforts

C. Step-by-Step Approach to Course of Action Development

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Dec '20), p. III-36 (fig. III-14).

There are several planning sequence techniques available to facilitate COA development. One option is the step-by-step approach, which uses the backward-planning technique (also known as reverse planning):

Step 1

Within the limits of available forces, determine how much force will be needed in the theater at the end of the operation or campaign, what those forces will be doing, and how those forces will be postured geographically. Use troop-to-task analysis. Draw a sketch to help visualize the forces and their locations.

Step 2

Looking at the sketch and working backwards, determine the best way to get the forces postured in Step 1 from their ultimate positions at the end of the operation or campaign to a base in friendly territory. This will help formulate the desired basing plan.

Step 3

Using the mission statement as a guide, determine the tasks the force must accomplish in the physical domains, information environment (including cyberspace), and electromagnetic spectrum to achieve the desired military end state. Draw a sketch of the maneuver plan. Make sure the force does everything the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has directed the commander to do (refer to specified tasks from the mission analysis).

Step 4

Determine the basing required to posture the force in friendly territory, and the tasks the force must accomplish to get to those bases. Sketch this as part of the deployment plan.

Step 5

Determine if the planned force is enough to accomplish all the tasks SecDef has given the commander.

Step 6

Given the tasks to be performed, determine in what order the forces should be deployed into theater. Consider the force categories such as combat, protection, sustainment, theater enablers, and theater opening.

Step 7

The information developed should now allow determination of force employment, major tasks and their sequencing, sustainment, and command relationships.


D. The Planning Directive

The planning directive identifies planning responsibilities for developing joint force plans. It provides guidance and requirements to the staff and subordinate commands concerning coordinated planning actions for plan development. The JFC normally communicates initial planning guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure everyone understands the commander's intent and to achieve unity of effort.

Generally, the J-5 coordinates staff action for planning for the CCMD campaign and contingencies, and the J-3 coordinates staff action in a crisis situation. The J-5 staff receives the JFC's initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff estimates. The JFC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan.

IV. Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming

COA analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that enable the commander and staff to tentatively evaluate COA validity and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. The commander and staff analyze each COA separately according to the commander's guidance. COA analysis is a valuable use of time that ensures COAs are valid.



Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. III-16.

Wargaming is a primary means to conduct this analysis. Wargames are representations of conflict or competition in a synthetic environment, in which people make decisions and respond to the consequences of those decisions. COA wargaming is

a conscious attempt to visualize the flow of the operation, given joint force strengths and dispositions, adversary capabilities and possible COAs, the OA, and other aspects of the OE. Each critical event within a proposed COA should be wargamed based upon time available using the action, reaction, and counteraction method of friendly and/or opposing force interaction. The basic COA wargaming method can be modified to fit the specific mission and OE and be applied to combat, noncombat, and CCP activities. Wargaming is most effective when it involves the following elements:

- A well-developed, valid COA
- People making decisions
- A fair, competitive environment (i.e., the game should have no rules or procedures designed to tilt the playing field toward one side or another)
- Adjudication
- Consequences of actions
- Iterative (i.e., new insights will be gained as games are iterated)

COA wargaming involves a detailed evaluation of each COA as it pertains to the enemy and the OE. Each of the selected friendly COAs is then wargamed against selected enemy or OE COAs, as well as other relevant actor actions as applicable (e.g., wargaming CCMD campaign activities can provide insights about how an HN or others might react/respond). The commander selects the COAs for wargaming and provides guidance along with refined evaluation criteria.

Wargaming stimulates thought about the operation so the commander can obtain ideas and insights that otherwise might not have emerged. An objective, comprehensive analysis of COA alternatives is difficult even without time constraints. Based upon time available, the commander should wargame each COA against the most likely and the most dangerous adversary COAs (or most difficult objectives in noncombat and campaign operations) identified through the JIPOE process. Figure III-16 shows the key inputs and outputs associated with COA analysis.

A. Analysis and Wargaming Process

The analysis and wargaming process can be as simple as a detailed narrative effort that describes the action, probable reaction, counteraction, forces, and time used. A more comprehensive version is the "sketch-note" technique, which adds operational sketches and notes to the narrative process to gain a clearer picture. Sophisticated wargames employ more extensive means to depict the range of actions by competitors and the consequences of the synthesis of those actions. The most sophisticated form of wargaming is one where all competitors in a conflict are represented (and emulated to the best degree possible, to include sustainment considerations) and have equal decision space to enable a full exploration of the competition within the OE. Modeling and simulation are distinct and separate analytic tools and not the same as wargames. Modeling and simulation can be complementary and assist wargaming through bookkeeping, visualization, and adjudication for well-understood actions.

Analysis of multiple COAs is vital to the commander's estimate process. The items selected for wargaming and COA comparison will depend on the nature of the mission. For plans or orders involving contested deployment and combat operations, the staff considers opposing COAs based on enemy capabilities, objectives, an estimate of the enemy's intent, and activities of other relevant actors that would not be favorable or that would challenge achievement of the objective. For noncombat operations or CCPs, the staff may analyze COAs based on partner capabilities, partner and US planned activities and objectives, likely actions of other relevant actors, criticality, and risk.

In the analysis and wargaming step, the staff analyzes the probable effect each opposing COA has on the chances of success of each friendly COA. The objective is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of the COAs. Analysis also provides the planning staff with a greatly improved understand-

B. COA Analysis Considerations

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. III-23, III-49 to III-50.

Evaluation criteria and known critical events are two of the many important considerations as COA analysis begins.

Evaluation Criteria

The commander and staff use evaluation criteria during follow-on COA comparison (JPP step 5) for the purpose of selecting the best COA. The commander and staff consider various potential evaluation criteria during wargaming and select those that the staff will use following the wargame during COA comparison to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of one COA relative to others. These evaluation criteria help focus the wargaming effort and provide the framework for data collection by the staff. These criteria are those aspects of the situation (or externally imposed factors) that the commander deems critical to mission accomplishment.

Evaluation criteria change from mission to mission. It will be helpful during future wargaming steps for all participants to be familiar with the criteria so any insights that influence a criterion are recorded for later comparison. The criteria may include anything the commander desires. If they are not received directly, the staff can derive them from the commander's intent statement. Evaluation criteria do not stand alone. Each must be clearly defined. Precisely defining criteria reduces subjectivity and ensures consistent evaluation. The following sources provide a good starting point for developing a list of potential evaluation criteria:

- Commander's guidance and commander's intent
- Mission accomplishment at an acceptable cost, including impacts to other global requirements.
- The principles of joint operations
- Doctrinal fundamentals for the type of operation being conducted
- The level of residual risk in the COA and to other global requirements
- Implicit significant factors relating to the operation (e.g., need for speed, security)
- Factors relating to specific staff functions
- Elements of operational design
- Other factors to consider: diplomatic or political constraints, residual risks, financial costs, flexibility, simplicity, surprise, speed, mass, sustainability, C2, and capability and infrastructure survivability

Critical Events

These are essential tasks, or a series of critical tasks, conducted over a period of time that require detailed analysis (such as the series of component tasks to be performed on D-day).

This may be expanded to review component tasks over a phase(s) of an operation or over a period of time (C-day through D-day). The planning staff may wish at this point to also identify decision points (those decisions in time and space that the commander must make to ensure timely execution and synchronization of resources). These decision points are most likely linked to a critical event (e.g., commitment of the reserve force).

For CCMD campaigns, this includes identifying linked events and activities: the staff must identify if campaign activities are sensitive to the sequence in which they are executed and if subsequent activities are dependent on the success of earlier ones. If resources are cut for an activity early in the campaign, the staff must identify to the commander the impact of the loss of that event (or if the results were different from those anticipated), a decision point to continue subsequent events, and alternates if the planned events were dependent on earlier ones.

ing of their COAs and the relationship between them. COA analysis identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission while best positioning the force for future operations. It also helps the commander and staff to:

- Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage in combat or maximize the effect of available resources toward achieving CCMD and national objectives in noncombat operations and campaigns
- Have as near an identical visualization of the operation as possible
- Anticipate adversary, enemy, and other relevant actor actions/events in the OE and potential reaction options
- Determine conditions and resources required for success, while also identifying gaps and seams
- Determine when and where to apply the force's capabilities
- Plan for and coordinate authorities to integrate IRCs early
- Focus intelligence collection requirements
- Determine the most flexible COA
- Identify potential decision points
- Determine task organization options
- Develop data for use in a synchronization matrix or related tool
- Identify potential plan branches and sequels
- Identify high-value targets
- Assess risk
- Determine COA advantages and disadvantages
- Recommend CCIRs
- Validate end states and objectives
- Identify contradictions between friendly COAs and expected enemy end states.

Wargaming is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation. The process considers friendly dispositions, strengths, and weaknesses; adversary, enemy, and other relevant actor capabilities and intent set forth as probable COAs; and characteristics of the political, information, commercial/economic, and physical environment. It relies heavily on joint doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and operational and regional/area experience. It focuses the staff's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence. It is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. Wargaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with operational possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. Wargaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated significant time.

Each retained COA should be wargamed against both the most likely and most dangerous enemy COAs and address contested environments across both the strategic environment and the OE.

During the wargame, the staff takes a COA statement and begins to add more detail to the concept, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA, including the associated deployment and distribution requirements. Wargaming tests a COA and can provide insights that can be used to improve upon a developed COA. The commander and staff (and subordinate commanders and staffs if the wargame is conducted collaboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems.

B. Determine the Comparison Method and Record

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. III-58 and app. F.

Actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching the best recommendation and the commander making the best decision. There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs. COA comparison is subjective and should not be turned into a strictly mathematical process. The key is to inform the commander why one COA is preferred over the others in terms of the evaluation criteria and the risk. If the COAs are developed for significantly different options, a side-by-side comparison for selection may not be appropriate, as they have differing end states.

Decision Matrixes

The most common technique for COA comparison is the weighted numerical comparison, which uses evaluation criteria to determine the preferred COA based upon the wargame. COAs are not compared to each other directly until each COA is considered independently against the evaluation criteria. The CCDR may direct some of these criteria, but most criteria are developed by the JPG. Below are examples of common methods.

1. Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique

The example below provides a numerical aid for differentiating COAs. Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each COA for each criterion selected. Certain criteria have been weighted to reflect greater value.

Determine the weight of each criterion based on its relative importance and the commander's guidance. The commander may give guidance that results in weighting certain criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area scores each COA using those criteria. Multiplying the score by the weight yields the criterion's value. The staff member then totals all values. However, the staff member must be careful not to portray subjective conclusions as the results of quantifiable analysis. Comparing COAs by category is more accurate than comparing total scores.

Evaluation Criterion	Weight	COA 1		COA 2		COA 3	
		Score	Weighted	Score	Weighted	Score	Weighted
Surprise	2	3	6	1.5	3	1.5	3
Risk	2	3	6	1	2	2	4
Flexibility	1	3	3	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Retaliation	1	1.5	1.5	3	3	1.5	1.5
Damage to alliance	1	3	3	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Legal basis	1	2	2	3	3	1	1
External support	1	3	3	2	2	1	1
Force protection	1	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	1	1
OPSEC	1	3	3	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.5
Total			30		20		16

Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. F-2. Example #2 Course of Action Comparison Matrix Format.

- (1) Criteria are those selected through the process described earlier.
- (2) The criteria can be rated (or weighted). The most important criteria are rated with the highest numbers. Lesser criteria are weighted with lower numbers.
- (3) The highest number is best.
- (4) Each staff section does this separately, perhaps using different criteria on which to base the COA comparison. The staff then assembles and arrives at a consensus for the criterion and weights.

2. Non-Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique

The same as the previous method except the criteria are not weighted. Again, the highest number is best for each of the criteria.

3. Narrative or Bulletized Descriptive Comparison of Strengths & Weaknesses (or Advantages & Disadvantages)

Summarize comparison of all COAs by analyzing strengths and weaknesses or advantages and disadvantages for each criterion.

	Criteria 1		Criteria 2		Criteria 3	
COA 1	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •
COA 2	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •
COA 3	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •	Strengths • •	Weaknesses • •

Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. F-3. *Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses Example.*

4. Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison

Base this comparison on the broad degree to which selected criteria support or are reflected in the COA. This is typically organized as a table showing (+) for a positive influence, (0) for a neutral influence, and (-) for a negative influence.

Criteria	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Casualty estimate	+	-	-
Casualty evacuation routes	-	+	+
Suitable medical facilities	0	0	0
Flexibility	+	-	-

Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. F-5. *Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison Example.*

5. Descriptive Comparison

This is simply a description of advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. III-62 to III-63.

The CONOPS clearly and concisely expresses what the JFC intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. It describes how the actions of the joint force components and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and sequels.

- States the commander's intent
- Describes the central approach the JFC intends to take to accomplish the mission
- Provides for the application, sequencing, synchronization, and integration of forces and capabilities in time, space, and purpose (including those of multinational and interagency organizations as appropriate)
- Describes when, where, and under what conditions the supported commander intends to give or refuse battle, if required
- Focuses on friendly, allied, partner, and enemy COGs and their associated critical vulnerabilities.
- Provides for controlling the tempo of the operation
- Visualizes the campaign in terms of the forces and functions involved
- Relates the joint force's objectives and desired effects to those of the next higher command and other organizations as necessary. This enables assignment of tasks to subordinate and supporting commanders.

The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in sufficient detail so subordinate and supporting commanders understand their mission, tasks, and other requirements and can develop their supporting plans. During CONOPS development, the commander determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA, and resources and authorities available. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of activities or forces into the OA, providing the link between the CONOPS and force planning. The link between the CONOPS and force planning is preserved and perpetuated through the sequencing of forces into the OA via a TPFDD. The structure must ensure unit integrity, force mobility, and force visibility as well as the ability to transition to branches or sequels rapidly as operational conditions dictate. Planners ensure the CONOPS, force plan, deployment plans, and supporting plans provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions, and are consistent with the JFC's intent.

If the scope, complexity, and duration of the military action contemplated to accomplish the assigned mission warrants execution via a series of related operations, then the staff outlines the CONOPS as a campaign. They develop the preliminary part of the operational campaign in sufficient detail to impart a clear understanding of the commander's concept of how the assigned mission will be accomplished.

During CONOPS development, the JFC must assimilate many variables under conditions of uncertainty to determine the essential military conditions, sequence of actions, and application of capabilities and associated forces to create effects and achieve objectives. **JFCs and their staffs must be continually aware of the higher-level objectives and associated desired and undesired effects that influence planning at every juncture.** If operational objectives are not linked to strategic objectives, the inherent linkage or "nesting" is broken and eventually tactical considerations can begin to drive the overall strategy at cross-purposes.

III(c). Joint Operation Plan (OPLAN) Format

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), app. A.

Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing a joint OPLAN. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands, based on command-specific requirements and other factors. However, joint OPLANs/CONPLANs will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as paragraph 3, "Execution") and their primary subparagraphs (such as paragraph 3a, "Concept of Operations"). **The JPEC typically refers to a joint contingency plan that encompasses more than one major operation as a campaign plan, but JFCs prepare a plan for a campaign in joint contingency plan format.**

The CJCSM 3130 series describe joint planning interaction among the President, SecDef, CJCS, the supported CCDR, and other JPEC members, and provides models of planning messages and estimates. CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance, provides the formats for joint plans in more detail.

Notional Operation Plan Format

- a. Copy No. _____
- b. Issuing Headquarters
- c. Place of Issue
- d. Effective Date/Time Group
- e. OPERATION PLAN: (Number or Code Name)
- f. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .
- g. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan.)

1. Situation

(This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses [see national intelligence estimate, any multinational sources, and strategic and commanders' estimates].)

a. General. (This section describes the general politico-military variables that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the contingency plans. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict, identify primary antagonists, state US policy objectives and the estimated objectives of other parties, and outline strategic decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy objectives and conduct effective US military operations to achieve US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

(1) Assessment of the Conflict. (Provide a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context [CPG, JSCP, UCP].)

Continued on next page

(2) Policy Goals. (This section relates the strategic guidance, end state, and termination criteria to the theater situation and requirements in its global, regional, and space dimensions, interests, and intentions.)

(a) US/Multinational Policy Goals. (Identify the national security, multinational or military objectives, and strategic tasks assigned to or coordinated by the CCMD.)

(b) End State. (Describe the national strategic end state and relate the military end state to the national strategic end state.)

(3) Non-US National Political Decisions.

(4) Operational Limitations. (List actions that are prohibited or required by higher or multinational authority [e.g., ROE, RUF, law of war, termination criteria].)

b. Area of Concern

(1) OA. (Describe the JFC's operational area. A map may be used as an attachment to graphically depict the area.)

(2) Area of Interest. (Describe the area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.)

c. Deterrent Options. (Delineate FDOs and FROs desired to include those categories specified in the current JSCP. Specific units and resources must be prioritized in terms of latest arrival date relative to C-day. Include possible diplomatic, informational, or economic deterrent options accomplished by non-DOD agencies that would support US mission accomplishment.) *See pp. 2-76 to 2-77 for discussion of FDOs and FROs.*

d. Risk. (Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. List the specific hazards that the joint force may encounter during the mission. List risk mitigation measures.)

e. Enemy Forces. (Identify the opposing forces expected upon execution and appraise their general capabilities. Refer readers to annex B [Intelligence] for details. However, this section should provide the information essential to a clear understanding of the magnitude of the hostile threat. Identify the strategic and operational COGs and critical vulnerabilities as depicted below.)

(1) Enemy COGs.

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(2) Enemy Critical Factors.

(a) Strategic.

(b) Operational.

(3) Enemy COAs (most likely and most dangerous to friendly mission accomplishment).

(a) General.

(b) Enemy End State.

(c) Enemy's Strategic Objectives.

(d) Enemy's Operational Objectives.

(e) Adversary CONOPs.

(4) Enemy Logistics and Sustainment.

(5) Other Enemy Forces/Capabilities.

(6) Enemy Reserve Mobilization.

I. Operational Design Methodology

Operational design requires recurring touch points between the commander and staff in developing an understanding of the strategic environment and OE, higher-level guidance, defining the problem to be solved, and developing an operational approach. The components have characteristics that exist outside of each other and are not necessarily sequential. However, an understanding of the OE and problem must be established prior to developing operational approaches and is critical in conducting mission analysis and in providing planning guidance. As commanders and staffs develop their operational approach, they account for how information impacts the OE and the inherent informational aspects of activities. In doing so, joint force planners consider how information is used by, and affects the behavior of, friendly, neutral, and adversarial audiences across the competition continuum.

Operational Design Methodology Steps

- A** Understand the Strategic Directions and Guidance
- B** Understand the Strategic Environment
- C** Understand the OE
- D** Define the Problem
- E** Identify Assumptions
- F** Develop Operational Approaches
- G** Identify Decisions and Decision Points
- H** Refine the Operational Approach
- I** Prepare Planning Guidance

Operational design is one of several tools available to help the JFC and staff understand the broad solutions for mission accomplishment and to understand the uncertainty in a complex OE. The process is continuous and cyclical in that it is conducted prior to, during, and for follow-on joint operations.

Iteration and reexamination of earlier work is essential to identify how later decisions affect earlier assumptions and to fill in gaps identified during the process.

A. Understand the Strategic Directions and Guidance

Planning usually starts with the assignment of a planning task through a directive, order, or cyclical strategic guidance, depending on how a situation develops. The commander and staff must analyze all available sources of guidance. These sources include written documents such as the CPG and JSCP, written directives, oral instructions from higher headquarters, domestic and international laws, policies of other organizations that are interested in the situation, communication synchronization guidance, and higher headquarters' orders or estimates.

Direction from strategic guidance documents can be vague, incomplete, outdated, or conflicting. This is due to the different times at which they may have been produced, changes in personnel that result in differing opinions or policies, and the staffing process where compromises are made to achieve agreement within the documents. During planning, commanders and staff must read the directives and synthesize the contents into a concise statement. Since strategic guidance documents can be problematic, the JFC and staff should obtain clear, updated direction through routine and sustained civilian-military dialogue throughout the planning process. When clarification does not occur, planners and commanders identify those areas as elements of risk.

Additionally, senior leaders will provide additional guidance throughout the planning process. This can be through formal processes such as IPRs or through informal processes such as e-mails, conversations, and meetings. All of this guidance needs to be disseminated throughout the command to ensure a common understanding of higher commander's intent, vision, and expectations.

In particular, commanders maintain dialogue with leadership at all levels to resolve differences of interpretation of higher-level objectives and the ways and means to achieve these objectives. Understanding the OE, defining the problem, and devising a sound approach are rarely achieved the first time. Strategic guidance addressing complex problems can initially be vague, requiring the commander to interpret and filter it for the staff. While CCDRs and national leaders may have a clear strategic perspective of the problem from their vantage point, operational-level commanders and subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of specific circumstances that comprise the operational situation and may have a completely different perspective on the causes and solutions. Both perspectives are essential to a sound plan. Subordinate commanders should be aggressive in sharing their perspective with their higher headquarters, and both should resolve differences at the earliest opportunity. While policy and strategic guidance clarify planning, it is equally true that planning informs policy formulation. A strategy or plan that cannot be realistically executed at the tactical level can be as detrimental to long-range US interests as tactical actions that accomplish a task but undermine the strategic or operational objectives.

Strategic guidance is essential to operational art and operational design. As discussed in Chapter I, "Joint Planning," the President, SecDef, and CJCS all promulgate strategic guidance. In general, this guidance provides long-term as well as intermediate objectives. It should define what constitutes victory or success (ends) and identify available forces, resources, and authorities (means) to achieve strategic objectives. The operational approach (ways) of employing military capabilities to achieve the objectives (ends) is for the supported JFC to develop and propose, although policy or national positions may limit options available to the commander. Connecting resources and tactical actions to strategic ends is the responsibility of the operational commander—the commander must be able to explain how proposed actions will result in desired effects, as well as the potential risks of such actions. The commander must also articulate what critical capabilities are necessary to accomplish the assigned mission and what the effects or risks are associated with the delay and/or disruption of those critical capabilities.

II. Elements of Operational Design

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. IV-18 to IV-19.

The elements of operational design are considered in four broad categories: overarching, space (OE), time, and forces.

Overarching Elements

Overarching elements of operational design are those that drive the operation. Some, such as the objective or military end state, may be provided in higher-level guidance. Others, such as the COG, effects, and culmination, must be determined from planners' analysis of the OE and other considerations such as available forces and time.

- Objective
- Military end state
- Center of gravity
- Effects
- Culmination

Space (Operational Environment)

The **space of the OE** requires planners to consider the physical characteristics, conditions, and geometry of the environment, to include how the commander should divide the operation for C2 purposes. The OE also accounts for the integration of the information environment including cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum into planning, even though some, but not all, aspects of the OE exist outside the physical terrain. Analysis of the OE must also consider the distances required for deployment and physics of movement through environment.

- Lines of operation and lines of effort
- Decisive points
- Direct and indirect approach
- Operational reach

Time

Time considerations lead planners to identify how long it could take to conduct operations from an initial decision to commit forces through planning, mobilization, deployment, and execution. When considering the factor of time, a commander needs to identify what information is needed and when it is needed to make timely decisions, how operations might be sequenced, or how an operation might be phased to ensure the force achieves its objective without culminating. Time can also drive other factors such as the resources required by a commander to successfully operate throughout the duration of an operation. Unlike space or forces, time cannot be reconstituted or recaptured once passed.

- Arranging operations (phases, branches, sequels, operational pauses)
- Anticipation


Force

Force requires planners to know the science of warfare, the capabilities and limitations of blue force weapon systems and tactics, and the capabilities and limitations of the enemy's weapon systems and tactics. Force also requires planners to understand how to synchronize multiple simultaneous network engagements. Force accounts for the intangible factors of leadership and morale surrounding the planning process, as well as the capabilities of interagency, international, and commercial actors in the OE.

The characterization of elements into categories is not meant to be exclusive. Many factors affect more than one condition. For example, a decisive point could be an enemy force, a key terrain feature, or ensuring sufficient food and medical supplies are delivered on time (for humanitarian assistance).

- Forces and functions
- Force employment mechanisms
 - Defeat mechanisms
 - Stabilization mechanisms
 - Competition mechanisms

Notional Factors of Operational Design



Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. IV-6. Notional Factors of Operational Design.

Integration

Operational design should be used in conjunction with the principles of joint operations and the joint functions (see Figure IV-6). Throughout the planning process, planners should continuously evaluate the plan to ensure joint functions are adequately addressed and the plan does not violate the principles of joint operations.

Combining LOOs and LOEs

Commanders may use both LOOs and LOEs to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. LOEs can also link objectives, decisive points, and COGs. Combining LOOs and LOEs helps commanders include nontraditional military activities and expected contributions from nonmilitary entities in the operational design. This combination helps commanders incorporate stability tasks necessary to attain the end state into their operational approach and allows commanders to consider the less tangible aspects of the OE, where the other instruments of national power or nontraditional military activities may dominate. Nontraditional military activities occur in stability operations and conventional warfare—demonstrated by the military's control of towns in World War II by graduates of the School of Military Government. Commanders can then visualize concurrent and post-conflict stability activities. Making these connections relates the tasks, effects, and objectives identified in the operation or campaign plan.

B. Decisive Points

A decisive point is key terrain, key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, enables a commander to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contributes materially to achieving success (e.g., creating a desired effect, achieving an objective). Decisive points can greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points can be terrain features such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, or a geosynchronous orbit. Decisive points can also be specific things like a weapons of mass destruction material cache or facility, or an air base, but they could also include other elements, such as command posts, a satellite downlink station, or an under-sea cable. In some cases, specific key events may also be decisive points, such as achievement of air, space, or maritime superiority, opening a supply route during humanitarian operations, or gaining the trust of a key leader. In other cases, decisive points may have a larger systemic impact and, when acted on, can substantially affect the threat's information, financial, economic, or social systems. When dealing with an irregular threat, commanders and their staffs should consider how actions against decisive points affect not only the threat but also the relevant population's perception of threat and friendly forces. Collateral effects on the local populace may impact stability in the area or region of interest.

The most important decisive points can be determined from analysis of critical factors. Understanding the relationship between a COG's critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities can illuminate direct and indirect approaches to the COG. It is likely most of these critical factors are decisive points and should be addressed further in the planning process.

There may often be cases where the JFC's combat power and other capabilities are insufficient to affect the enemy's or adversary's COGs rapidly with a single action. In this situation, the supported JFC must selectively focus a series of actions against the enemy's or adversary's critical vulnerabilities until the cumulative effects of these actions lead to mission success. Just as a combined arms approach is often the best way to attack an enemy's field force in the military system, attacking several vulnerable points in other systems may offer an effective method to influence an enemy or adversary COG. The indirect approach may offer the most effective method to exploit enemy and adversary critical vulnerabilities through the identification of decisive points. Although decisive points usually are not COGs, they are the keys to attacking or protecting them.


C. Direct and Indirect Approach

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. IV-33 to IV-34 (fig. IV-12).

The approach is the manner in which a commander contends with a COG. A direct approach attacks the enemy's COG or principal strength by applying combat power directly against it. However, COGs are generally well-protected and not vulnerable to a direct approach. Thus, commanders usually choose an indirect approach. An indirect approach attacks the enemy's COG by applying combat power against critical vulnerabilities that lead to the defeat of the COG while avoiding enemy strength.

Direct attacks against adversary or enemy COGs resulting in their neutralization or destruction provide the most direct path to victory. Since direct attacks against COGs mean attacking an opponent's strength, JFCs must determine if friendly forces possess the power to attack with acceptable risk. Commanders normally attack COGs directly when they have superior forces, a qualitative advantage in leadership, and/or technological superiority over enemy weapon systems. In the event a direct attack is not a reasonable solution, JFCs should consider an indirect approach until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks (see Figure IV-12). Whenever applicable, JFCs should consider developing simultaneous and/or synchronized action with both direct and indirect approaches. In this manner, the enemy or adversary's derived vulnerabilities can offer indirect pathways to gain leverage over its COGs.

At the strategic level, indirect methods of defeating the enemy or adversary's COG could include depriving them of allies or friends, enmeshing sanctions, weakening the national will to fight by undermining the public support, and breaking up cohesion of the threat alliances or coalitions.




At the operational level, the most common indirect method of defeating an enemy's COGs is to conduct a series of attacks against selected aspects of the enemy's combat power. For example, the JFC may sequence combat actions to force an enemy to divide its forces in theater, destroy the enemy's reserves or elements of the enemy's base of operations, or prevent or hinder the deployment of the enemy's major forces or reinforcements into the OA. Indirect methods of attacking the enemy's COGs (through critical vulnerabilities) could entail reducing the enemy's operational reach, isolating the force from its C2, and destroying or suppressing key protection functions such as air defense. Additionally, in irregular warfare, a persistent indirect approach helps enable a legitimate and capable local partner to address the conflict's causes and to provide security, good governance, and economic development.

V. Campaigning

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), chap. V.

DOD is tasked to conduct operations in support of achieving national objectives. To support the national strategy (as identified in the NSS and NDS), the CJCS oversees the development of the NMS, JSCP, GCPs, and GIFs. In turn, CCDRs develop campaigns to support the global campaign and shape the OE in a manner that supports those strategic objectives. They conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement, operations, posture, and other activities that seek to achieve US national objectives, protect US national interests, and prevent the need to resort to armed conflict while setting conditions to transition to contingency operations when required.

The NDS and NMS prioritize actions and resources to achieve future desired objectives. These documents acknowledge current conditions as their starting point, envision a future, then plot the road to get there. National strategy prioritizes the CCMD's efforts within and across theater, functional, and global responsibilities and considers all means and capabilities available in the CCMD's operations, activities, and investments to achieve the national objectives and complement related USG efforts over a specified timeframe (currently five years).



Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. V-1. The Campaign.

Campaign plans address detailed execution to implement the strategy. In this construct, the CCDRs and their planners develop campaign plans to integrate joint operations with national-level resource planning and policy formulation and in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies. Contingency plans are prepared to address known threats and possible crises that could prevent achievement of national objectives (see Figure V-1).

I. Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCPs)

The CCDRs' campaigns operationalize the guidance in the UCP, NSS, NDS, CPG, NMS, and JSCP by organizing and aligning operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCDRs' objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theaters or functional areas.

CCDRs translate the guidance into executable actions to accomplish identifiable and measurable progress toward achieving the CCDRs' objectives, and thus the national objectives. The achievement of these objectives is reportable to DOD leadership through IPRs and operation assessments (such as the CCDRs' input to the AJA).

CCPs consolidate operational requirements identified across all the GCPs, RCPs, FCPs, as they pertain to the CCDR's specific responsibilities identified in the UCP. The CCDR's independent analysis could identify additional requirements the commander decides to include in the campaign.

CCPs integrate posture, resources, requirements, subordinate campaigns, operations, activities, and investments that prepare for, deter, or mitigate identified contingencies into a unified plan of action.

The purpose of CCMD campaigns is to shape the OE, deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of a contingency, and, when necessary, execute combat operations in support of the overarching national strategy.

Shaping the OE seeks to change current conditions within the OE to conditions more favorable to US interests. It can entail both combat and noncombat operations and activities to establish conditions that support future US activities or operations, or validate planning assumptions.

Deterrence activities, as part of a CCMD campaign, are those actions or operations executed specifically to alter adversaries' decision calculus. These actions or operations may demonstrate US commitment to a region, ally, partner, or principle. They may also demonstrate a US capability to deny an adversary the benefit of an undesired action. Theater posture and certain exercises are examples of possible deterrent elements of a campaign. These actions most closely link the campaign to contingency plans directed in the CPG and JSCP as they can demonstrate commitment to a region or demonstrate US ability to defend or reinforce a region in the event of aggression. Additionally, deterrence activities are associated with early phases of a contingency plan, usually directed and executed in response to changes in threat posture.

A campaign can also set conditions that mitigate the impact of a possible contingency. Activities conducted as part of the campaign, such as posture and security cooperation activities (e.g., military engagement with allies and partners or building partner capacity and capability) can set the stage for more rapid, successful execution of a contingency plan if conflict arises, by leveraging the capabilities and capacities of allies and partners. Campaign activities can also validate or invalidate planning assumptions used during contingency planning.

A campaign can support stabilization, and stabilization should be considered in planning as early as possible to shape operational design and strategic decisions. Where US national security objectives depend upon maintaining or reestablishing stability, stabilization is required to translate combat success into lasting strategic gains, achieve the objectives for which the military operation was conducted, and is a necessary complement to joint combat power. Stabilization links the application of joint force combat power and security assistance capabilities with the achievement of strategic and policy objectives. Stabilization efforts focus on the root causes of instability and mitigating the drivers of conflict for an affected HN, thus helping the HN reach a sustainable political settlement that allows societal conflicts to be resolved peacefully.

Differences Between CCPs and Contingency Plans

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Dec '20), pp. V-3 to V-5.

CCPs seek to shape the OE and achieve national objectives. They establish operations, activities, and investments the command undertakes to achieve specific objectives (set conditions) in support of national policy and objectives.

CCMD campaigns are proactive and rarely feature a single measure of military success implying victory in the traditional sense.

The campaign may include operations across the competition continuum, to include ongoing combat operations, such as counterterrorism operations. In the event a contingency operation is executed, that operation is subsumed into the campaign and becomes an element the CCCR considers when identifying the impact of US operations on the OE, the opportunities to favorably affect the OE to achieve national-level and theater-level objectives, and examining MOEs that may impact the campaign's intermediate objectives.

Operations must be continuously assessed to see if they are changing the conditions as desired. As objectives are achieved (or determined to be infeasible), the CCCR and planners update the campaign plan with new objectives and develop associated assessment measures.

Unlike contingency plans, JSCP-directed CCMD campaigns do not end with the achievement of military objectives. Campaign plan objectives neither affirm nor imply military victories but instead focus CCMD operations, activities, and investments to further US national security by supporting US national security objectives. It helps to identify desired OE conditions to focus campaign planning (the purpose of the CCCR's vision), with the understanding that campaign objectives and US interests may change as the OE evolves and policies change.

The increasing global influence of hostile non-state actors challenges the process of identifying enemy and adversary COGs and vulnerabilities. Therefore, a campaign plan identifies mostly nonlethal means to favorably influence the OE to achieve specific intermediate objectives.

Campaign plans seek to capitalize on the cumulative effect of multiple coordinated and synchronized operations, activities, and investments that cannot be accomplished by a single major operation.

Contingency plans identify how the command might respond in the event of a crisis or the inability to achieve objectives. Contingency plans specifically seek to favorably resolve a crisis that either was not or could not be deterred or avoided by directing operations toward achieving specified objectives.

Contingency plans have specified end states that seek to reestablish conditions favorable to the United States. They react to conditions beyond the scope of the CCP.

Contingency plans have identified military objectives and an end state. Upon achieving the military objective(s) or attaining the military end state, operations transition back to campaigning through competition under the new conditions, possibly with new objectives. To deal with the consequences of armed conflict, the joint force will likely have to employ a new approach and possibly execute different military activities to sustain the new security conditions.

Although campaign plan operations, activities, and investments can have deterrent effects, a contingency plan's deter activities specifically refer to actions for which separate and unique resourcing and planning are required. These actions are executed on order of the President or SecDef and generally entail specific orders for their execution and require additional resources allocated through GFM processes.

IV. Elements of a Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCP)

The CCP consists of all plans contained within the established theater or functional responsibilities, to include contingency plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture plans, CSCSs for country plans (for CCMDs with designated AORs), and operations in execution.

Elements of a Combatant Command Plan (CCP)

- A** Campaign Plan
- B** Posture Plan
- C** Theater Logistics and Distribution Plans
- D** Regional and CSCSs Plans
- E** Subordinate, Supporting, and Campaign Support Plans
- F** Contingency Plan

Contingency Planning Guidance
Contingencies directed by the President.

Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
5-year integrated global plan directed by the Chairman. Provides joint force planning requirements. Includes GIFs, GCPs, RCPs, FCPs, and other planning guidance, directions, and requirements. GCPs, RCPs, FCPs, and other planning documents provide overarching and specified campaign objectives to ensure unity of effort within and across UCP boundaries.

Combatant Command (CCMD) Campaign Plans
Designed to orchestrate a series of operations, activities, and investments within UCP boundaries and provide CCMD component commands with detailed planning guidance and prioritizes tasks and use of resources.

Contingency Plans
A branch of a campaign plan that is planned based on hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions.

Unanticipated Contingencies/ Crises

Legend

EXORD	execute order	GIF	global integration framework
FCP	functional campaign plan	RCP	regional campaign plan
GCP	global campaign plan	UCP	Unified Command Plan



A. Campaign Plan

The campaign plan should show the linkages between operations, activities, investments, and expenditures and the campaign objectives and associated strategic objectives that available resources will support. The campaign plan should identify the assessment process by which the command assesses progress toward or regression from the national security objectives.

CCPs are composed of the CCMD-specific requirements established by global, regional, and FCPs; support plans for other CCMDs; posture plans; theater logistics and distributions plans; and other requirements based on the CDR's assessment, such as a country-specific plan in the CSCS (see Figure V-3).

See *CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance*, for additional information on how to develop campaign plans.

B. Posture Plan

The posture plan is the CCMD's proposal for forces, footprint, and agreements required and authorized to achieve the command's objectives and set conditions for accomplishing assigned missions.

For more information, see Appendix G, "Posture Plans."

Ref: *JP 5-0 (Dec '20)*, fig. V-3. *Plan Relationships*.

C. Theater Logistics and Distribution Plans

Theater Distribution Plan (TDP)

The TDP provides detailed theater mobility and distribution analysis to ensure sufficient capacity or planned enhanced capability throughout the theater and synchronization of distribution planning throughout the global distribution network. The TDP includes a comprehensive list of references, country data, and information requirements necessary to plan, assess, and conduct theater distribution and JRSOI operations. As required, the CDRs develop their TDPs using the format in USTRANSCOM's Campaign Plan for Global Deployment and Distribution 9033; CJCSI 3110.01, (U) 2018 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP); and CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). TDPs and posture plans complement each other by posturing forces, footprints, and agreements that will interface with the theater distribution network to provide a continuous flow of material and equipment into the AOR. This synchronization enables a theater distribution pipeline to have sufficient capacity and capability to support development of CCPs, OPLANs, and CONPLANs.

Theater Logistics Overview (TLO)

The TLO codifies the CDR's theater logistics analysis (TLA) within the posture plan. The TLO provides a narrative overview, with supporting matrices of key findings and capabilities from the TLA, which is included in the posture plan as an appendix.

Theater Logistics Analysis (TLA)

The TLA provides detailed country-by-country analysis of key infrastructure by location or installation (e.g., main operating base [MOB], forward operating site [FOS], cooperative security location [CSL]), footprint projections, HN agreements, existing contracts, and task orders required to logistically support CCPs and their embedded contingency operations (e.g., contingency locations).

For more information, refer to *FM 5-0, Appendix H, "Theater Distribution Plans."*

VI. Operation Assessment

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), chap. VI.

I. Operation Assessments

Operation assessments are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation, fulfilling the requirement to identify and analyze changes in the OE and to determine the progress of the operation. Assessments involve the entire staff and other sources such as higher and subordinate headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. They provide perspective, insight, and the opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective. Operation assessment applies to all levels of warfare and during all military operations.

Assessment

Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. A continuous process that measures the overall effectiveness of employing capabilities during military operations.

Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior and subordinate commanders, key leader engagements (KLEs), and battlefield circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander's awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE, identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, identifying and analyzing commander decision points, and formally providing recommendations to improve progress toward mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization's planning (beginning in the plan initiation step) and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander's decision cycle.

The starting point for operation assessment activities coincides with the initiation of joint planning. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the commander ensure the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. This integrated approach optimizes the feedback senior leadership needs to appropriately refine, adapt, or terminate planning to be effective in the OE.

CCMDs, subordinate Service, joint functional components, and JTFs devote significant effort and resources to plan and execute operations. They apply appropriate rigor to determine whether an operation is being effectively planned and executed as needed to achieve specified objectives and attain end states. Assessment complements that rigor by analyzing the OE objectively and comprehensively to estimate the effectiveness of planned tasks and measure the effectiveness of completed tasks with respect to desired conditions in the OE.

Background

CCPs and CSCSs/country plans are continuously in some stage of implementation. Accordingly, CCMD planners should annually extend their planning horizon into the future year. The simultaneity of planning for the future while implementing a plan requires a CCMD to continually assess its implementation to appropriately revise, adapt, or terminate elements of the evolving (future) plan. This synergism makes operation assessment a prerequisite to plan adaptation. Operation assessment is thus fundamental to revising implementation documents ahead of resource allocation processes.

Events can arise external to the CCMD's control that affect both plan execution and future planning. Some of these events can impede achievement of one or more objectives while others may present opportunities to advance the plan more rapidly than anticipated.

External events generally fall into two categories. The first are those that change the strategic or OE in which a CCMD implements a plan (typically a J-2 focus). The second category involves those events that change the resource picture with respect to funding, forces, and time available (typically a force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff [J-8] focus). This document treats these two types of external events as separate considerations because they can influence plan implementation independent of each other.

Throughout campaign planning and execution, the CCDR and staff continually observe the OE and assess the efficacy of the campaign plan. Assessment at the CCMD level is often referred to as theater or global campaign assessment or, generically, as campaign assessment. Because campaigns are conducted in a complex and dynamic environment, commands must be able to detect, analyze, and adapt to changes in the OE during execution. Local relevant actors are typically the best suited to detect and understand changes in a complex OE, and their input can be instrumental for assessment. Planners refine or adapt the plan based on the guidance, their understanding of the OE, their understanding of the impact of actions or changes within the OE, the campaign objectives, and the decisions that underpinned the original operational approach to refine or adapt the plan, or the approach.

In addition to the command's internal assessment efforts, analysis and assessment of the strategic and operational environments by interagency partners is available to the CCMD. OSD and the JS can assist in obtaining these inputs. Promote cooperation events enable interagency partners' insights on environmental changes to be shared with the CCMDs.

The overall purpose of operation assessment is to provide recommendations to make operations more effective. As it relates to campaigns, where strategic objectives frame the CCMD's mission, assessments help CCDRs and supporting organizations refine or adapt the campaign plan and supporting plans to achieve the campaign objectives or, in coordination with SecDef and CJCS, to adapt the CPG-and/or JSCP-directed strategic objectives in response to changes in the OEs.

The assessment process serves as part of the CCMD's feedback mechanism throughout campaign planning and execution. It also feeds external requirements such as the CCDR's inputs to the CJCS AJA. Assessment analysis and products should identify where the CCMD's ways and means are sufficient to attain their ends, where they are not and why not, and support recommendations to adapt or modify the campaign plan or its components. The analyses might provide insight into basic questions such as:

- Are the objectives (strategic and intermediate) achievable given changes in the OE and emerging diplomatic/political issues?
- Is the current plan still suitable to achieve the objectives?
- Do changes in the OE impose additional risks or provide additional opportunities to the command?
- To what degree are the resources employed making a difference in the OE?

Campaign assessment analyses and products should provide the CCDR and staff with sufficient information to make, or recommend, necessary adjustments to plans, policy, resources, and/or authorities in the next cycle of planning to make operations more effective. Assessment can be used to inform OSD and CJCS reporting requirements as mandated by strategic planning documents.

Campaign assessment activities should facilitate the CCDR's input to SecDef specifically, and DOD more broadly, regarding the capabilities and authorities required to


accomplish the missions in the CCMD's contingency plans over the CCDR's strategic planning horizon. The campaign assessment should take into account expected changes in threats and the strategic and operational environments.

II. Campaign Assessments

Campaign assessments determine whether progress toward achieving CCMD campaign objectives is being made by evaluating whether progress toward intermediate objectives is being made. Essentially, intermediate objectives (and associated conditions/effects) are multiple time- or condition-based objectives that are between initiation of the campaign and achievement of campaign objectives. Accordingly, at the strategic assessment level, intermediate objectives are criteria used to observe and measure progress toward campaign desired conditions and evaluate why the current status of progress exists.

The CPG, NMS, JSCP, and other strategic guidance provide CCMDs with strategic objectives. CCMDs translate and refine those long-range objectives into near-term (achievable in 2-5 years) intermediate objectives. Intermediate objectives represent unique military contributions to the achievement of strategic objectives. In some cases, the CCMD's actions alone may not achieve strategic objectives. Consequently, other instruments of national power may be required, with the CCMD operating in a supported or supporting role.

The basic process for campaign assessment is similar to that used for contingency and crisis applications but the scale and scope are generally much larger. While operational-level activities such as, JTF operations, typically focus on a single military end state with multiple desired conditions, the campaign plan must integrate products from a larger range of strategic objectives, each encompassing its own set of intermediate objectives and desired conditions, subordinate operations, and subordinate plans (i.e., regional and country-specific security cooperation plans, contingency plans not in execution, on-going operations, directed missions.) (See Figure VI-1.)



Ref: JP 5-0 (Dec '20), fig. VI-1. Campaign Plan Assessments.

VII. Transition to Execution

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Dec '20), chap. VII.

Plans are rarely executed as written. Regardless of how much time and effort went into the planning process, commanders and their staffs should accept that the plan, as written, will likely need changes on execution. Often, the decision to deploy the military will be in conditions significantly different from the original planning guidance or the conditions planned. Planning provides a significant head start when called to deploy the military. Assessments and reframing the problem, if required, inform the applicability of, or necessary modifications to, the plan in response to changes in the OE.

Effective planning enables transition. Integrated staff effort during planning ensures the plan is a team effort and the knowledge gained across the staff in the planning process is shared and retained. This staff work assists in identifying changes in the OE and guidance, speeding transition to execution.

Detailed planning provides the analysis of the threat and the OE. The knowledge and understanding gained enables a well-trained staff to quickly identify what is different between their plan and current conditions and make recommendations based on their prior work.

Detailed OPLANS (levels 3 or 4) may require more significant changes due to their specificity. Forces identified in the plan may not be available, assumptions may not be validated, and policy and strategic decisions (and the decision timeline) may have changed or not support the original concept. However, the extra time spent on analysis provides a deeper understanding of the OE, threats, and the technical issues with projecting forces.

Less detailed plans (levels 1-2) may be more readily adaptable to execution due to their generality. However, they may require significantly more analysis (e.g., forces, transportation, logistics) to provide the detail required to enable decisions at the strategic level and ensure the plan's executability and suitability for the problem at hand.

The decision to execute will often be presented as an examination of options in response to a developing crisis or action by a competitor state or threat (state or non-state) rather than a specific directive to execute a specific CONPLAN or OPLAN.

If an existing plan is appropriate, the commander and staff should review and update the plan.

If no existing plan meets the guidance, the commander and staff conduct crisis planning (planning in reduced timeline). More often than not, the commander and staff have conducted some previous analysis of the OE that will speed the planning process.

I. Types of Transition

There are three possible conditions for transitioning planning to execution.

A. Contingency Plan Execution

Contingency plans are planned in advance to typically address an anticipated crisis. If there is an approved contingency plan that closely resembles the emergent scenario, that plan can be refined or adapted as necessary and executed. The execution functions are used for all plans.

Members of the planning team may not be the same as those responsible for execution. They may have rotated out or be in the planning sections of the staff rather than the operations. This is the most likely situation where the conditions used in developing the plan will have changed, due to the time lag between plan development and execution. Staff from the planning team need to provide as much background information as possible to the operations team.

The planning team should be a key participant, if not the lead, in updating the plan for the current (given) conditions. This enables the command to make effective use of the understanding gained by the staff during the planning process. The operations team should be the co-lead for the plan update to ensure they understand the decision processes and reasoning used in development of the operational approach and COAs. This will speed plan update, ease transition, and minimize the time required to revisit the issues that arose during the initial plan development.

GIF

If the contingency plan is associated with a GIF, initial planning has been conducted to identify the requirements to reallocate and reassign forces across the globe to meet the crisis or contingency execution requirements, including the impact of executing the crisis or contingency on ongoing GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs. Even with this preparation, all CCDRs and their planners must reassess the risk associated with cessation of ongoing campaign activities and ensure the CJCS is informed of changes in the assessment. The CJCS uses the GIF as a tool to advise the SecDef and the President on global risks, trade-offs, and potential decision points across plans and combatant commands.

B. Crisis Planning to Execution

Crisis planning is conducted when an emergent situation arises. The planning team analyzes approved contingency plans with like scenarios to determine if an existing plan applies. If a contingency plan is appropriate to the situation, it may be executed through an OPORD or FRAGORD. In a crisis, planning usually transitions rapidly to execution, so there is limited deviation between the plan and initial execution. Planners from the command J-5 can assist in the planning process through their planning expertise and knowledge gained of the OE during similar planning efforts.

C. Campaign Plan Execution

Activities within CCPs are in constant execution.

Planning is conducted based upon assumed forces and resources. Upon a decision to execute, these assumptions are replaced by the facts of actual available forces and resources. Disparities between planning assumptions and the actual OE conditions at execution drive refinement or adaption of the plan or order. Resource informed planning during plan development allows planners to make more realistic force and resource planning assumptions. Enabled by the common formats and collaborative systems, tools and processes, resource informed planning is intended to facilitate the transition of a plan or order by reducing the scope of required plan adjustments or refinements upon execution.


During execution, commanders often have to consider updating the operational approach. It could be triggered by significant changes to understanding of the OE and/or problem, validation or invalidation of assumptions made during planning, identifying (through continuous assessment process) that the tactical actions are not resulting in the expected effects, changes in the conditions of the OE, or the end state. The commander may determine one of three ways ahead:

- The current contingency plan is suitable, with either no change or minor change (such as execution of a branch)—the current operational approach remains feasible.

II. Transition Process

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Dec '20), pp. VII-3 to VI-

The transition process to contingency plan execution originates in the planning section with significant support from the intelligence staff. Planners synthesize strategic guidance from intelligence and existing plans. The output of this synthesis is a hand-off briefing to the crisis planning lead for the command Figure VII-1 and Figure VII-2). For crisis planning execution, plan transition follows similar steps but within the staff section responsible for crisis planning. The transition from plan to execution should consider the following points. These are not meant to be exclusive and may be conducted simultaneously.




Ref: JP 5-0, (Dec '20), fig. VII-1. Operation Plan or Concept Plan Hand-off.

Joint Task Forces (JTF)

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters (Jun '22), pp. 1-2 to 1-7.

A joint task force (JTF) is the most common command and control (C2) option for conducting joint operations. A combatant commander (CCDR) is the JTF establishing authority in most situations, but SecDef; a CCDR; a subordinate unified commander; a subordinate JFC; and a commander, joint task force (CJTf), may also establish subordinate JTFs. A JTF headquarters (HQ) provides a CCDR a separate JFHQ focused on a single problem set able to closely integrate capabilities and coordinate with other joint, coalition, and interagency partners. JTFs also allow CCDRs the freedom to engage with national decision makers and partners to better focus on broader theater activities. A JTF may be established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the operation require capabilities of Services from at least two MILDEPs operating under a single JFC. See pp. 1-33 to 1-38 for discussion of considerations for establishing joint forces.



Joint Task Forces (JTFs)

Ref: JP 3-33 (Jun '22), fig. 1-1. Joint Task Force Organizational Options.

Operational JTFs are the most common type of JTF and is established in response to a Secretary of Defense (SecDef)-approved military operation or crisis.

Contingency JTFs are identified and designated to support operation plan execution or specific on-call missions, such as national special security events, on a contingency basis.

A **Standing JTF** is a JTF originally established as an operational JTF, but that has an enduring mission that is projected to continue indefinitely.


A **combined JTF** is an organizational option for US operations with partner nations (PNs) in a non-NATO multinational operation.

An NG JFHQ-State provides C2 of all National Guard (NG) forces in the state or territory for the governor and can act as a joint HQ for national-level response efforts during contingency operations.

III. Typical Joint Task Force Organization

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters (Jun '22), fig. II-6, p. II-22.

Typical Joint Task Force Organization



* This functionality may be assigned to a subordinate commander.

Legend

CJTF	commander, joint task force	J-8	resource management and financial support directorate of a joint staff
DCJTF	deputy commander, joint task force	J-9	civil-military operations directorate/interagency operations directorate of a joint staff
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff		
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff		
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff		
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff		
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff		
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff		
J-7	training and education directorate of a joint staff		

recommended

as required

CJTF determines staff relationships command


Figure II-6 is not meant to be directive or all-inclusive, depicts an example of a JTF HQ's staff alignment of cross-functional organizations. The figure shows the most common proponent (by staff directorate or special staff group) for each cross-functional organization. As a practical matter, the CJTF and staff establish and maintain only those cross-functional organizations that enhance planning and decision making within the HQ. They establish, modify, and dissolve these entities as the needs of the HQ evolve.

Joint Task Forces (JTFs)

IV. HQ Organization Options

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters (Jun '22), II-12 to II-17 (and chaps. V - XIII).

Mission requirements drive organization and manning, since each joint force's mission is different. The JFC provides early guidance that affects how the JFHQ will organize and function.



Ref: JP 3-33 (Jun '22), fig. II-2. Headquarters Organization Options.

The traditional J-code organization continues to be the preferred basic staff structure for a JFHQ.

J-1

Manpower and personnel support requirements must be determined early in the planning process and continue through the execution of operations and redeployment. To ensure optimal JTF personnel support, the JTF J-1 synchronizes and coordinates personnel support efforts with Service components and functional components and establishes and publishes policies, procedures, and standards to accomplish personnel visibility in the JOA.


J-2

The J-2 informs the commander; describes the OE; identifies, defines, and nominates objectives; supports planning and execution of operations; counters adversary deception and surprise; supports friendly deception efforts; and assesses the effectiveness of operations. Both DOD and non-DOD intelligence agencies and organizations provide assistance to the J-2 in support of activities and operations within the AOR/JOA.

II. Subordinate Commands

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters (Jun '22), chap. III.

A joint force is composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more MILDEPs operating under a single JFC. Based on the authorities directed by the establishing authority, JFCs can organize the joint force with Service components, functional components, or a combination based on the nature of the mission and the OE. All joint forces include Service component commands, because those commands provide administrative and logistic support for their forces. Typical joint forces, particularly JTFs, have a combination of Service and functional components. A CJTF can also establish one or more subordinate JTFs if necessary. Figure III-1 shows the possible components and subordinate commands.



Joint Task Forces (JTFs)

Ref: JP 3-33 (Jun '22), fig. III-1. Possible Joint Force Components.

Responsibilities often change according to circumstances. The following are typical general responsibilities common to both Service and functional component commanders:

- Plan and execute operations to accomplish missions or tasks assigned by the higher commander's plans or orders.
- Advise the JFC on employment of the component command's capabilities, progress toward mission accomplishment, and other matters of common concern.
- Assess the progress of operations; integrate, manage, and share information as part of the JFHQ's assessment activity; and provide timely updates to the higher commander relating to the progress or regression of tasks, objectives, and/or effects.

- Coordinate with other component commanders to ensure effective and efficient conduct of operations. In addition, coordinate with supporting agencies, supporting commanders, and friendly forces and governments as authorized and as necessary to fulfill assigned responsibilities.
- Provide liaison personnel to other commands and organizations as appropriate

I. Service Component Commands

A Service component command consists of the Service component commander and all Service forces assigned or attached to the JFHQ. In general, a Service component commander is responsible for all aspects of planning and executing operations as tasked by the JFC.

Service component commanders have responsibilities that derive from their roles in fulfilling the Services' support function. The JFC may conduct operations through the Service component commander or, at lower echelons, other Service force commanders. A JFC can delegate to subordinate commanders no more than the level of authority the establishing authority has given the JFC, with the exception of COCOM, which cannot be delegated. When a Service component commander exercises OPCON of forces, and the JFC delegates that OPCON or TACON over those forces to another component commander or other subordinate JFC, the Service component commander retains the following responsibilities for certain Service-specific functions:

- Advise the JFC on the proper employment, task organization, and command relationship of the Service component's forces.
- Accomplish such operational missions as may be assigned.
- Select and nominate specific units of the parent Service component for attachment to other subordinate commands. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the Service component commanders' control when such subordinate commands are dissolved.
- Conduct joint training, including the training, as directed, of components of other Services in joint operations for which the Service component commander has or may be assigned primary responsibility or for which the Service component's facilities and capabilities are suitable.
- Inform the applicable JFC(s), and other component or supporting commanders, of planning for changes in logistic support that would significantly affect operational capability or sustainability sufficiently early in the planning process for the JFC to evaluate the proposals prior to final decision or implementation.

Service Components of a CCMD. Service component commanders, or other Service force commanders assigned to a CCDR, are additionally responsible through the chain of command, extending to the Service Chiefs, for the following:

- Internal Service administration and discipline (administrative control [ADCON]).
- Training in joint doctrine and their own Service doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures.
- Logistic functions normal to the command, except as otherwise directed by higher authority. The operating details of any Service logistic support system are retained and exercised by the Service component commanders IAW instructions of their MILDEPs, subject to the directive authority of the CCDR.

II. Functional Component Commands

JFCs normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command typically consists of forces of two or more MILDEPs established to perform designated missions.

Functional component commanders exercise command authority (e.g., OPCON, TACON), as delegated, over forces or military capabilities made available to them.

Functional Component Commands

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters (Jun '22), pp. III-4 to III-5.

JFCs normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command typically consists of forces of two or more MILDEPs established to perform designated missions.

Example functional component commands include the following:

A. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

The JFC usually designates a JFACC to establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air operations. A JFC typically assigns JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of forces tasked and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air.

See pp. 5-1 to 5-6 for further discussion.

B. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)

The JFC should designate a JFLCC and establish the commander's authority and responsibilities to exercise C2 over land operations, when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation.

See pp. 5-7 to 5-16 for further discussion.

C. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)

The JFC may designate a JFMCC to C2 joint maritime operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces made available for tasking to perform operational missions. Generally, maritime forces may include navies, marines, SOF, coast guards and similar border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary shipping managed by the government, civil merchant marines, army/ground forces (normally when embarked),

maritime air, and air/missile defense forces operating in the maritime domain.

See pp. 5-17 to 5-26 for further discussion.

D. Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC)

The JFC may designate a JFSOCC, special operations joint task force (SOJTF) commander, or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) commander to accomplish a specific mission or control SOF in the JOA.

The JFSOCC is generally the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2. The commander of the theater special operations command (TSOC) may function as the JFSOCC, SOJTF commander, or JSOTF commander.

Normally, the JFSOCC exercises day-to-day C2 of assigned or attached forces. C2 of SOF is usually executed within the SOF chain of command. The JFSOCC allocates forces as a supported or supporting commander based on guidance from the JFC.

When multiple JTFs are established, the TSOC commander, functioning as a JFSOCC, may establish and employ multiple JSOTFs and/or a joint special operations air component (JSOAC) to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTFs' special operations requirements. The JSOAC is responsible for the centralized planning, direction, and execution of joint special operations aviation activities within a designated theater of operations. The JSOAC commander is normally the commander with the preponderance of aviation assets and greatest ability to plan, coordinate, allocate task, control, and support the assigned/supporting air assets. The JSOAC is a theater-wide organization that can support a joint force special operations component, special operations task force, or a JSOTF.


See pp. 5-27 to 5-30 for further discussion.

II. Joint Planning Group (JPG) (See also p. 5-11.)

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Force Headquarters (Jun '22), pp. IX-5, p. IX-7.

The JPG is a group of staff and command representatives formed by the J-5 and charged with developing plans and orders. The JPG typically forms to plan for crises, but the J-5 can also use it for future operation planning requirements.

Notional JPG Composition



Ref: JP 3-33 (Jun '22), fig. IX-3. Notional Joint Planning Group Composition.


Early designation of a JPG facilitates the planning process even when the entire JFHQ is not fully organized and staffed. The JFC should clearly articulate the JPG's function, tasks, and interaction with the rest of the JFHQ staff to prevent misunderstandings and disputes. The J-5 should ensure a synchronization process is in place so the diverse JPG members.

A core JPG should be expanded for select planning functions. Typically, these additional planners are needed when specific subject matter expertise and staff or component planning input is required. Many of these representatives are LNOs and staff action officers with specific duties and responsibilities to the JFHQ.

Composition of a JPG varies depending on the planning activities being conducted. Normally, all supporting components have permanent representation in the JPG. Often international organizations and NGOs who have extensive experience in the region/OA, to include language and cultural knowledge, have a better understanding of the OE than the JFHQ planners themselves. The JPG should ensure a system is in place that provides international organizations and NGOs input into the planning process, while taking into account OPSEC and the sensitivities of cooperation and coordination with international organizations and NGOs.

Joint Task Forces (JTFs)

Upon completion of the plan or OPORD and based on JFC guidance, designated planning teams focus on execution phase planning. Figure IX-2 represents a notional organizational option to synchronize long- and short-term planning, assessment, and guidance for commanders.



Joint Task Forces (JTFs)

Ref: JP 3-33 (2022), fig. IX-2. Joint Force Headquarters Plans & Operations Synchronization.

The format for an OPORD is provided in CJCSM 3130.03, Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance. Information that can be referenced in the supported OPORD need not be repeated in the supporting OPORD unless directed.

JPG members provide analysis to the planning teams to which they are assigned based on their functional expertise. The JPG members maintain staff estimates that are informed through their participation in WGs and through the continued coordination with their parent staff directorate center or cell. The JPG chief forms planning teams to address specific planning requirements. The JPG chief organizes each planning team with the appropriate functional expertise and administrative support.

For more on planning teams refer to JP 3-33, appendix B, "Battle Rhythm and Cross-Functional Staff Organizations."

I. Joint Air Operations

Ref: JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations (Sep '21).

Air Domain

The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth's surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible. While domains are useful constructs for visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations are conducted (the operational area), the use of the term "domain" is not meant to imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of any domain. Specific authorities and responsibilities within an operational area are as specified by the appropriate JFC.

Control of the Air

Historically, control of the air has been a prerequisite to success for modern operations or campaigns because it prevents enemy air and missile threats from effectively interfering with operations of friendly air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces (SOF), facilitating freedom of action and movement. Dominance of the air cannot be assumed. In the air, the degree of control can range from no control, to a parity (or neutral) situation wherein neither adversary can claim any level of control over the other, to local air superiority in a specific area, to air supremacy over the entire operational area. Control may vary over time. It is important to remember, the degree of control of the air lies within a spectrum that can be enjoyed by any combatant. Likewise, that degree of control can be localized geographically (horizontally and vertically) or defined in the context of an entire theater. The desired degree of control will be at the direction of the JFC and based on the JFC's concept of operations (CONOPS) and will typically be an initial priority objective of joint air operations.

Organization of Forces

A JFC has three basic organizational options for C2 of joint air operations: designate a JFACC, designate a Service component commander, or retain C2 within the JFC's headquarters. In each case, effectively and efficiently organizing the staff, C2 systems, and subordinate forces that will plan, execute, and assess joint air operations is key. Factors impacting selection of each option may include the overall mission, forces available, the ability to C2, and the desired span of control.

When designated, the JFACC is the commander within a combatant command (CCMD), subordinate unified command, or joint task force (JTF) responsible for tasking joint air forces, planning and coordinating joint air operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFACC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander.



Refer to AFOPS2: The Air Force Operations & Planning SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. (Guide to Curtis E. LeMay Center & Joint Air Operations Doctrine). Topics and references of the 376-pg AFOPS2 include airpower fundamentals and principles (Vol 1), command and organizing (Vol 3); command and control (Annex 3-30/3-52), airpower (doctrine annexes), operations and planning (Annex 3-0), planning for joint air operations (JP 3-30/3-60), targeting (Annex 3-60), and combat support (Annex 4-0, 4-02, 3-10, and 3-34).

Joint Air Operations

Joint air operations are performed by forces made available for joint air tasking.

Joint air operations do not include those air operations that a component conducts as an integral and organic part of its own operations. Though missions vary widely within the operational environment and across the range of military operations, the framework and process for the conduct of joint air operations should be consistent.

Joint air operations are normally conducted using centralized control and decentralized execution to achieve effective control and foster initiative, responsiveness, and flexibility. Centralized control is giving one commander the responsibility and authority for planning, directing, and coordinating a military operation or group/category of operations. Because of air power's speed, range, flexibility, and generally limited assets, centralized control best facilitates the integration of forces for the joint air effort and maintains the ability to focus the impact of joint air forces as needed throughout the operational area. Decentralized execution is the delegation of execution authority to subordinate commanders. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the required tempo of operations and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat in air operations.

Factors such as mission requirements, air capabilities, tempo, and scale of operations drive the level of centralized control and decentralized execution required for joint air operations. Close air support (CAS), personnel recovery (PR), and support to special operations missions typically have a high degree of uncertainty and complexity and, therefore, require greater latitude in mission tasking and a higher degree of decentralized execution. Large-scale combat operations will also require greater decentralized execution to meet the wide range of mission tasking. Conversely, highly sensitive strike missions against long-range strategic targets will generally require a higher level of detailed planning and more centralized control. Low-intensity and small-scale operations, which may include very restrictive rules of engagement (ROE), may also require a higher level of centralized control.

I. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)

The JFC normally designates a JFACC to establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air operations. The JFC will normally assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of forces to be tasked and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations. However, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature, and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and the C2 capabilities in selecting a commander.

Authority

The JFC delegates the JFACC the authority necessary to accomplish assigned missions and tasks. The JFACC will normally exercise tactical control (TACON) over forces made available for tasking. Service component commanders will normally retain operational control (OPCON) over their assigned and attached Service forces.

The JFC may designate the JFACC as the supported commander for strategic attack; air interdiction; PR; and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (among other missions). As such, the JFACC is responsible to the JFC for planning, coordinating, executing, and assessing these missions. Other component commanders may support the JFACC in accomplishing these missions, subject to the demands of their own JFC-assigned missions or as explicitly directed by the JFC. Normally, the JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort and the land and maritime forces commanders are supported commanders for interdiction in their designated area of operations (AO) and have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs.

II. Joint Land Operations

Ref: JP 3-31 (Chg 1), *Joint Land Operations* (Nov '21).

In the 20th century, joint and multinational operations encompassed the full diversity of air, land, maritime, and space forces operating throughout the operational area. Advances in capabilities among air, land, maritime, special operations, space, and cyberspace forces and the ability to communicate over great distances have made the application of military power in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate joint land operations with other components' operations as part of full-spectrum superiority and across operational boundaries. Many of these advances have been realized through the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which has enabled the US military and allies to communicate and reach across geographic and geopolitical boundaries. However, these advances have also led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace and the EMS for the US and its allies.

Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, either singly or in combination, performed across the competition continuum with joint land forces (Army, Marine Corps, or special operations) made available by Service components in support of the joint force commander's (JFC's) operation or campaign objectives or in support of other components of the joint force.

Joint land operations include land control operations. These are described as the employment of land forces, supported by maritime, air, and cyberspace forces (as appropriate), to control vital land areas. Such operations are conducted to establish local military superiority in land operational areas. Land control operations may also support countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) to isolate, seize, or secure weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The operational environment (OE) and the threats in it are increasingly transregional, all-domain, and multifunctional in nature. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, establishes the JFC's OE as composed of the air, land, maritime, and space domains, as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace), the EMS, and other factors. Domains are useful constructs to aid in visualizing and characterizing the OE in which operations are conducted. The land domain is the land area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals. The land domain shares the Earth's surface with the maritime domain. Nothing in the definitions of, or the use of the term, domain implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of that domain. The JFC establishes C2 based upon the most effective use of available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

Land operations are conducted within a complex OE. Number of civilians, amount of valuable infrastructure, avenues of approach, freedom of vehicular movement, and communications functionality vary considerably among land environments, creating challenges for the JFLCC. Additionally, urban, mega-city, or emerging subterranean environments require special consideration for the conduct of joint land operations. As a result, joint land operations require an effective and efficient C2 structure to be successful.

In today's complex OE, actions can originate from, within, and outside of the operational area, all with potentially global impacts and influence. To negate these threats, commanders at all levels should consider how space, cyberspace, and EMS capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations.

II. Support to Joint Operation Planning

Ref: JP 3-31 (Chg 1), *Joint Land Operations* (Nov '21), chap. IV.

Planning for the employment of military forces is an inherent responsibility of command. Joint planning integrates military actions with those of other instruments of national power and our multinational partners in time, space, and purpose to attain a specified end state. Joint land force planning links the tactical employment of land forces to operation or campaign objectives through the achievement of operational objectives.

The formation of a joint force land component command with a JFLCC integrates planning beneath the level of the JFC for land operations. In addition, the designation of a JFLCC enhances the integration and synchronization of operational maneuver with fires by making the JFLCC the supported commander within the designated AO.

JFLCC planning tasks are to:

- Prepare and coordinate required land component OPLANs or OPORDs in support of assigned JFC campaigns, operations, or missions.
- Coordinate land component planning efforts with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational headquarters as required.
- Develop land component COAs within the framework of the JFC-assigned objectives or missions, forces available, and the commander's intent.
- Determine land component force requirements and coordinate land force planning in support of the selected COAs.

Joint Planning Process (JPP) *(See pp. 3-37 to 3-86.)*

The joint planning process (JPP) provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. The JPP may be used by a JFLCC's staff during contingency and crisis planning. The focus of the JPP is the interaction for planning between commanders, staffs, and echelons. The JPP is also linked with the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE).

See pp. 3-40 to 3-41 for an overview of joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE).

Commander's Operational Approach *(See pp. 3-102 to 3-104.)*

Joint force land component command planners first frame the strategic and operational problem by developing an understanding of the situation before addressing operational design and ultimately the appropriate level of plan to include OPLANs. Several cognitive models exist to assist JFLCC's and their staffs as they plan and execute joint land operations. The operational approach is the commander's visualization of how the operations should transform current conditions at end state.


Joint Planning Group (JPG)

The JPG is the primary planning element for the JFLCC to support the JFC's planning or to perform component planning. Planners from the JFLCC's core HQ staff element are the nucleus around which the JPG is normally built. It includes personnel from each of the primary coordinating, functional, and special staff elements; LNOs; and, when necessary, planners from the JFLCC's subordinate commands or multinational land forces (see Figure IV-1). The JPG develops and disseminates staff planning guidance and schedules. It confirms the process and products to be developed and delivered to support the JFLCC's planning effort. The JPG is the planning hub and synchronization center for future plans. The JPG develops the CONOPS for each plan. The CONOPS describes how the actions of the joint land force and supporting organizations will be integrated, synchronized, and phased to accomplish the mission, including potential branches and

sequels. Using mission-type orders, the JPG writes (or graphically portrays) it in sufficient detail so that subordinate and supporting commanders understand the commander's intent, purpose, and any specific tasks or requirements and can innovatively develop their supporting plans accordingly. During its development, the JPG determines the best arrangement of simultaneous and sequential actions and activities to create desired effects and accomplish the assigned mission consistent with the approved COA. This arrangement of actions dictates the sequencing of forces into the operational area, providing the link between joint planning and force planning.

See p. 4-22 for related discussion of the JPG from JP 3-33. For a more detailed discussion of CONOPS development from JP 5-0, see pp. 3-83.

JFLCC Joint Planning Group Representation



Legend

AAMDC	Army air and missile defense command	J-9	civil-military operations/interagency directorate of a joint staff
ADA	air defense artillery	J-35	future operations cell
CA	civil affairs	J-39	information operations cell
CBRN	chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear	JPRC	joint personnel recovery center
C-IED	counter-improvised explosive device	LNO	liaison officer
EMS	electromagnetic spectrum	MISO	military information support operations
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff	OPS	operations
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff	PAO	public affairs officer
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff	PMO	provost marshal office
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff	PR	personnel recovery
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff	PRCC	personnel recovery coordination cell
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff	Rep	representative
J-7	engineering directorate of a joint staff	SJA	staff judge advocate
J-8	force structure, resource, and assessment directorate of a joint staff	SO	special operations
		SOSE	special operations staff element

Ref: JP 3-31 w/Chg 1 (Nov '21), fig. IV-1. Notional Joint Force Land Component Command Joint Planning Group Representation.

III. The Army in Joint Operations

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct '22).

The Army's **primary mission** is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic roles for the joint force. Army forces shape operational environments, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.

Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. Multidomain operations are the Army's contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the **competition continuum**.

The Army provides forces capable of transitioning to combat operations, fighting for information, producing intelligence, adapting to unforeseen circumstances, and defeating enemy forces. Army forces employ capabilities from multiple domains in a **combined arms approach** that creates **complementary and reinforcing effects** through **multiple domains**, while preserving **combat power** to maintain options for the joint force commander (JFC). **Creating and exploiting relative advantages** require Army forces to operate with endurance and in depth. Endurance enables the ability to absorb the enemy's attacks and press the fight over the time and space necessary to accomplish the mission. Depth applies combat power throughout the enemy's formations and the operational environment, securing successive operational objectives and consolidating gains for the joint force.

The employment of joint and Army capabilities, integrated across echelons and synchronized in a **combined arms approach**, is essential to defeating threats able to contest the joint force in all domains. Army forces integrate land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities that facilitate maneuver to create physical, information, and human advantages joint force commanders exploit across the competition continuum. Commanders and staffs require the knowledge, skills, and attributes to integrate capabilities rapidly and at the necessary scale appropriate to each echelon.

During **competition**, theater armies strengthen landpower networks, set the theater, and demonstrate readiness for armed conflict through the command and control (C2) of Army forces supporting the CCP. During **crisis**, theater armies provide options to combatant commanders (CCDRs) as they facilitate the flow and organization of land forces moving into theater. During **armed conflict**, theater armies enable and support joint force land component commander (JFLCC) employment of land forces. The JFLCC provides C2 of land forces and allocates joint capabilities to its corps and other subordinate tactical formations. Corps integrate joint and Army capabilities at the right tactical echelons and employ divisions to achieve JFLCC objectives. Divisions, enabled and supported by the corps, defeat enemy forces, control land areas, and consolidate gains for the joint force. Defeating or destroying enemy capabilities that facilitate the enemy's preferred layered stand-off approaches are central to success. Ultimately, operations by Army forces both enable and are enabled by the joint force.



Refer to AODS7: The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Multidomain Operations). Completely updated with the 2022 edition of FM 3-0, AODS7 focuses on Multidomain Operations and features rescoped chapters on generating and applying combat power: command & control (ADP 6-0), movement and maneuver (ADPs 3-90, 3-07, 3-28, 3-05), intelligence (ADP 2-0), fires (ADP 3-19), sustainment (ADP 4-0), & protection (ADP 3-37).

The focus of Army readiness is on **large-scale combat operations**. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives (ADP 3-0). During ground combat, they typically involve operations by multiple corps and divisions, and they typically include substantial forces from the joint and multinational team. Large-scale combat operations often include both conventional and irregular forces on both sides.

Army Operations (FM 3-0) Logic Map

Peer threats contest the joint force in all domains through several methods:
Information warfare Preclusion Isolation Sanctuary Systems warfare


The U.S. joint force addresses these threats through

Unified action:
The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1, Volume 1).

The Army's contribution to unified action is

Multidomain operations:
The combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.

Army forces conduct multidomain operations throughout an operational environment that consists of 5 domains and 3 dimensions



and executed by Army echelons during competition, crisis, and conflict across the range of military operations



respecting the

Principles of war				
Maneuver	Objective	Offensive	Surprise	Economy of force
Mass	Unity of command	Security	Simplicity	

reflecting the

Tenets of operations			
Agility	Convergence	Endurance	Depth

adhering to

Imperatives of operations:

- See yourself, see the enemy, and understand the operational environment
- Account for being under constant observation and all forms of enemy contact
- Create and exploit relative physical, information, and human advantages in pursuit of decision dominance
- Make initial contact with smallest element possible
- Impose multiple dilemmas on the enemy
- Anticipate, plan, and execute transitions
- Designate, weight, and sustain the main effort
- Consolidate gains continuously
- Understand and manage the effects of operations on units and Soldiers

executed through

Offensive operations Defensive operations Stability operations Defense support of civil authorities

to accomplish missions, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains that meet joint and national objectives.

Joint Land Operations

IV. Marine Corps Forces and Expeditionary Operations

Ref: MCDP 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (Aug '11).

The nation requires an expeditionary force-in-readiness capable of responding to a crisis anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps provides self-sustainable, task organized combined arms forces capable of conducting a full spectrum of operations in support of the joint force commander. These missions might include forcible entry operations, peace enforcement, evacuation of American citizens and embassies, humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief, or operations to reinforce or complement the capabilities of other Services to provide balanced military forces to the joint force commander. The unique capabilities of the Marine Corps as a sea service and partner with the U.S. Navy allow the use of the sea as both a maneuver space and a secure base of operations from which to conduct operations in the littoral areas of the world. The ability to remain at sea for long periods of time without the requirement of third nation basing rights makes the Marine Corps the force of choice in emerging crises.

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Concept

Expeditionary maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps capstone operational concept. It applies the doctrine of maneuver warfare to Marine Corps expeditionary operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of conflict. Supporting operational concepts such as Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM), MPF 2010, and Expeditionary Bases and Sites are all elements of expeditionary maneuver warfare.

Operations as Part of the Joint Force

Marine Corps forces normally conduct operations as part of a joint force. Regardless of the level of the joint force or how a joint force commander organizes his force, if Marine Corps forces are assigned, there is always a Marine Corps Service component. There are two levels of Marine Corps components—a Marine Corps component under a unified command and a Marine Corps component under a subordinate unified command or a joint task force.

Forward-deployed naval forces, including Marine Corps forces, are usually the first conventional forces to arrive in an austere theater or AO during expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps component commander's inherent capability to command and control Marine Corps forces—and attached or assigned forces of other Services or nations—allows him to serve as a functional component commander. Such assignments may be for limited contingencies or for some phases of a major operation or campaign, depending upon the size, scope, nature of the mission, and the functional area assigned.

If the Marine Corps component commander has functional component commander responsibilities, he normally executes them with his subordinate MAGTF. A Marine Corps component commander can also act as a functional component commander. This may be for a particular phase of an operation or for its full duration, depending upon the size, scope, and nature of the mission and the functional area assigned. The most common functional components the joint force commander may establish include:

- Joint force maritime component commander
- Joint force land component commander
- Joint force air component commander

In addition to functional component duties, the joint force commander can assign the Marine Corps component commander other joint duties such as the area air defense commander or airspace control authority. Again, these functions are normally accomplished by the assigned MAGTF.

III. Joint Maritime Operations

Ref: JP 3-32 (Chg 1), *Joint Maritime Operations* (Sept '21).

Maritime forces operate on (surface), under (subsurface), or above (air) the sea and/or above and on the land in support of amphibious operations, port security, infrastructure protection, strike, and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) operations and other types of operations across the competition continuum.

- Movement and maneuver of forces within international waters can take place without prior diplomatic agreement.
- Maritime forces are mostly a self-deploying, self-sustaining, sea-based expeditionary force and a combined-arms team. Maritime forces are manned, trained, and equipped to operate with limited reliance on ports or airfields.

Maritime Domain

The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. Nothing in the definition of, or the use of the term domain, implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of that domain. Per JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*, the littoral comprises two segments of the OE. First, "seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore." Second, "landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea."

The maritime domain also has unique economic, diplomatic, military, and legal aspects (see Figure I-1). US naval forces operate in the deep waters of the open ocean and other maritime environments, including coastal areas, rivers, estuaries, and landward portions of the littorals, including associated airspace. In many regions of the world, rivers mark and define international borders and facilitate intracontinental trade. Ensuring access and securing these waterways are often priorities of state governments seeking to maintain stability and sovereignty.

Maritime forces can participate in multiple operations ashore. They can execute, support, or enable missions ashore by conducting forcible entry operations (such as an amphibious assault), seizing/establishing expeditionary advance bases, seabasing of assets, moving land forces into the operational area via sealift, providing fire and air support, and influencing operations through deterrence. Maritime forces may be employed in littoral waters for the conduct of sea control or denial, ballistic missile defense (BMD), and to support joint force or component C2 platforms. Joint forces can support maritime operations with surveillance, logistics, fires, air support, and military engineering.



Refer to *The Naval Operations & Planning SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning & Conducting Maritime Operations)* for complete discussion of essential Navy keystone warfighting doctrine and maritime operations at the JFMCC/CFMCC, Fleet and JTF levels. Topics include maritime forces, organization and capabilities; maritime operations; maritime headquarters (MHQ) and the maritime operations center (MOC); the maritime operations process; naval planning; naval logistics; and naval theater security cooperation.

Joint Maritime Operations

Joint maritime operations are performed with maritime forces, and other forces assigned, attached, or made available, in support of the JFC's operation or campaign objectives or in support of other components of the joint force. The JFC may designate a JFMCC to C2 a joint maritime operation. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces made available for tasking.

The degree of integration and coordination between joint force component commanders varies depending on the situation. For some joint maritime operations, the JFMCC may operate without the support of other Service component forces (e.g., open ocean submarine operations); whereas for others, there may be detailed integration between components (e.g., attack of enemy submarines in port or their supporting critical infrastructures ashore). In other cases, tactical control (TACON) of maritime forces may be delegated to other joint force components (e.g., close air support [CAS] and strategic attack). For sea control operations, TACON of another joint force component's forces may be delegated to the JFMCC (e.g., air operations in maritime surface warfare [SUW]). In certain situations, specification of operational control (OPCON) or TACON of forces may not be practical. In these cases, the JFC should establish a support relationship, as required. All major operations generally necessitate some degree of maritime support to deploy, sustain, withdraw, and redeploy forces.

Joint maritime operations occur in blue water, green water, brown water environments, and in the landward areas in the littorals, each with its own challenges. Operations in blue water (high seas and open oceans) require forces capable of remaining on station for extended periods, largely unrestricted by sea state, and with logistics capability to sustain these forces indefinitely. Operations in green water (coastal waters, ports, and harbors) stretching seaward require ships, amphibious warfare ships and landing craft, and patrol craft with the stability and agility to operate effectively in surf, in shallows, and the near-shore areas of the littorals. Operations in brown water (navigable rivers, lakes, bays, and their estuaries) involve shallows and congested areas that constrain maneuver but do not subject maritime forces to extreme gulf conditions. Operations on land in the littorals may involve landing forces going ashore by embarked aircraft, landing craft, and amphibious vehicles from amphibious warfare ships.

I. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)

JFCs at the combatant command (CCMD), subordinate unified command, and/or joint task force (TF) command levels all organize staffs and forces to accomplish the mission based on their vision and concept of operations (CONOPS). Organizing the maritime force should take into account the nature of today's complex OE; technological advances in communications; intelligence collection systems; improved weapons capabilities; and how multinational forces organize, train, equip, and conduct operations. Equally important in determining how a JFC organizes joint forces are the threat's nature, capabilities, and the OE (e.g., geography, accessibility, climate, and infrastructure).

The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes appropriate command relationships, provides coordinating instructions to optimize the capabilities of each subordinate, and gains synergistic effects for the joint force as a whole. The JFC may designate a JFMCC to facilitate unity of effort, focus, and synchronize efforts while providing subordinate commanders flexibility and opportunity to exercise initiative and maintain the joint forces' operational tempo.

Normally, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional component commands with operational responsibilities. The JFC normally designates the forces and maritime assets that will be made available for tasking by the

II. Operational Employment for Amphibious Ready Groups with Embarked MEUs

Ref: JP 3-32 (Chg 1), *Joint Maritime Operations* (Sept '21), fig. II-3 to II-4 (fig. II-1).

The ARG/MEU is a forward-deployed, flexible, sea-based force that provides the President and the combatant commander (CCDR) with an assigned area of responsibility (AOR) with credible deterrence and decision time across the competition continuum. The ARG and MEU affords the CCDCR a responsive, flexible, and versatile capability to shape the OE, respond to crises, and protect US and allied interests in permissive and select uncertain and hostile environments. ARG and MEU capabilities support initial crisis response, introduce follow-on forces, support designated SOF, and other missions in permissive and select uncertain and hostile environments, which include, but are not limited to: amphibious assaults, amphibious raids, amphibious demonstrations, amphibious withdrawals, and amphibious force support to crisis response and other operations (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, or MSO). The ARG and Navy detachments are organized under the command of a Navy O-6, while the MEU, with its embarked Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), is under the command of a Marine Corps O-6.

Figure II-2 outlines the different organizational constructs applicable to ARG/MEU employment.

Aggregated

The most common form where the amphibious ready group (ARG) with embarked Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) is employed under a single geographic combatant commander (GCC) who maintains operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of the ARG/MEU. "Split" is a subset of aggregated, where the ARG and MEU remains employed within a single GCC's area of responsibility (AOR), but the units are separated by time, distance, or task while operating beyond the reach of tilt-rotor aircraft or landing craft. Aggregated is the preferred employment construct.

Disaggregated

This construct is driven by emergent requirements wherein the ARG and MEU is divided into parts to support multiple GCCs. The ARG and MEU elements operate within the distinct OPCON/TACON chains of the respective GCCs. Disaggregation comes with a corresponding degradation of ARG and MEU operational readiness, training, and maintenance. This is the least preferred employment construct.

Distributed

The ARG and MEU is partitioned for emergent requirements for multiple GCCs. However, the original GCC to whom it was allocated retains OPCON while another exercises TACON of elements that are distributed for a specific mission or duration mission. The ARG and MEU is able to sustain its elements, facilitate planning, and conduct military engagement and joint/combined training across AOR boundaries, and is supported throughout operations. ARG and MEU communication and computers systems are critical for supporting distributed operations. The GCC that has OPCON may request re-aggregation at any time, and the ARG and MEU commanders cannot make changes to capabilities allocated OPCON or TACON without approval. Distributed is the preferred employment construct to support multiple GCCs.

See pp. 5-14 to 5-15 for an overview and related discussion of Marine Corps Forces and Expeditionary Operations.

III. Seapower Essential Functions

Ref: JP 3-32 (Chg 1), *Joint Maritime Operations* (Sept '21), pp. I-3 to I-IV and I-14 to I-15.

The USN employs five functions in a combined-arms approach to provide a unique comparative advantage for the joint force.

Operational Access

Operational access is the ability to project military force in contested areas with sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. In today's security environment, operational access is increasingly contested by state and non-state actors that can hold even our most advanced forces and weapon systems at risk with their own innovative strategies and weapons systems.

Deterrence

Defending national interests requires being able to prevail in conflict and taking preventive measures to deter potential adversaries who could threaten the vital interests of the United States or its partners. These threats could range from direct aggression to belligerent actions that nonetheless threaten vital national interests. Deterrence influences potential adversaries not to take threatening actions. It is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. Deterrence requires convincing those adversaries that a contemplated action will not achieve the desired result by fear of the consequences.

Sea Control Operations

Sea control operations are those operations designed to secure use of the maritime domain by one's own forces and to prevent its use by the enemy. Sea control is the essence of seapower and is a necessary ingredient in the successful accomplishment of all naval missions. Sea control and power projection complement one another. Sea control allows naval forces to close within striking distance to remove landward threats that threaten access, which in turn enhances freedom of action at sea. Freedom of action at sea enables the projection of forces ashore. Sea control operations are the employment of naval forces, supported by land, air, space, cyberspace, or special operations forces, to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Establishing sea control may require projecting power ashore to neutralize threats or control terrain in the landward portion of the littorals. Sea control operations include the destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local air and maritime superiority in areas of naval operations. The vastness of the world's oceans makes it impossible for even a preeminent naval power to achieve global maritime superiority. Thus, achieving local or regional maritime superiority or maritime supremacy may be desired by the JFC for a limited duration to accomplish specific objectives. Sea control requires maritime, air, space, and cyberspace capabilities.

Power Projection

The United States possesses the ability to project significant power from the sea. Power projection in and from the maritime area of operations (AO) in which we have local sea control includes a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy, suppress, or neutralize enemy forces and their logistic support, or prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons range of friendly forces to achieve objectives at sea or from the sea. Credible power projection supports deterrence objectives and activities.

Maritime Security


The safety and economic security of the United States depends in substantial part upon the secure use of the world's oceans. Maritime security operations (MSO) are conducted to establish the conditions for security and protection of sovereignty in the maritime

IV. Operational-Level Maritime Operations

Ref: JP 3-32 (Chg 1), Joint Maritime Operations (Sept '21), chap. IV.

The USN's traditional and doctrinal warfighting configuration is the fleet, commanded by a numbered fleet commander. Typically, the fleet commander task-organizes assigned and attached forces using the Navy's administrative organization as its foundation.

Notional Maritime Task Organization



Ref: JP 3-32 (Sept '21), fig. IV-1. Notional Maritime Task Organization.

The JFMCC may create subordinate TFs, who may in turn create further subordinate organizations. In each case, the establishing authority must designate the command authorities for each subordinate organization, to include support relationships as required. Although the CTF is normally the CWC, the CTF can designate a subordinate commander to be the CWC. CTFs will typically assign forces under TACON to subordinate commanders. A CTF who has OPCON can designate a support command authority between two or more subordinate force commanders.

Surface Warfare (SUW)

SUW encompasses operations conducted to destroy or neutralize enemy naval surface forces and merchant vessels. These operations typically include the planning and directing of surveillance of the maritime domain, interdiction, and strikes by aircraft and missiles. To facilitate management and promote common understanding, standard terminology and definitions are used to describe important areas in the maritime AO.

Air and Missile Defense

For joint maritime operations, countering air and missile threats consists of a combination of theater counterair and IAMD. Counterair is the foundational framework at the theater level. IAMD synchronizes aspects of counterair with global missile defense, homeland defense (HD), and global strike.

Joint Maritime Operations

IV. Special Operations

Ref: JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (Jul '14).

Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk. Special operations provide JFCs and chiefs of mission (COMs) with discrete, precise, and scalable options that can be synchronized with activities of other interagency partners to achieve United States Government (USG) objectives. These operations are designed in a culturally attuned manner to create both immediate and enduring effects to help prevent and deter conflict or prevail in war. They assess and shape foreign political and military environments unilaterally, or with host nations (HNs), multinational partners, and indigenous populations. Although special operations can be conducted independently, most are coordinated with conventional forces (CF), interagency partners, and multinational partners, and may include work with indigenous, insurgent, or irregular forces. Special operations may differ from conventional operations in degree of strategic, physical, and political and/or diplomatic risk; operational techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets.

Special operations can be a single engagement, such as direct action (DA) against a critical target; as a protracted operation or series of activities such as support to insurgent forces through unconventional warfare (UW); or support to a HN force through foreign internal defense (FID) or security force assistance (SFA). Military information support operations (MISO) can be used during special operations to influence selected target audiences' behavior and actions. Civil affairs operations (CAO) also provide essential support to a JFC or country team. Special operations, synchronized with MISO and CAO, can create effects disproportionate to the size of the units involved.

I. Designated Special Operations Forces

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified combatant command (CCMD). It is unique among the CCMDs in that it performs Service-like functions and has Military Department-like responsibilities and authorities. A theater special operations command (TSOC) is a subordinate unified command of USSOCOM. TSOCs perform broad, continuous missions uniquely suited to special operations forces (SOF) capabilities. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has assigned operational control (OPCON) of the TSOCs and attached SOF tactical units to their respective geographic combatant commander (GCC) via the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.

United States Army Special Operations Command is the designated Army component command for USSOCOM and provides manned, trained, and equipped Army special operations forces. Naval Special Warfare Command is designated the Navy component command of USSOCOM and mans, trains, equips, and provides SEALs. US Air Force Special Operations Command is designated the Air Force component of USSOCOM and organizes, trains, equips, and provides trained Air Force special operations forces. US Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command is designated the Marine Corps component of USSOCOM and trains, equips, and provides Marine Corps special operations forces.

II. Special Operations Core Activities

Ref: JP 3-05, *Special Operations* (Jul '14), chap. II.

USSOCOM organizes, trains, and equips SOF for special operations core activities, and other such activities as may be specified by the President and/or SecDef. Special operations missions may include more than one core activity. The special operations core activities are: direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense, security force assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information support operations, and civil affairs operations.

Special operations are inherently joint because of the integration and interdependency that is established among ARSOF, NAVSOF, AFSOF, and MARSOF to accomplish their missions. SOF conduct joint and combined training both within the SOF community, with CF, and with interagency and multinational partners. When employed, SOF deploy with its C2 structure intact, which facilitates integration into the joint force, retains SOF cohesion, and provides a supported JFC with the control mechanism to address specific special operations concerns and coordinates its activities with other components and supporting commands.

Direct Action *(See p. 2-94.)*

Direct action entails short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted with specialized military capabilities to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover, or damage designated targets in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments.

Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance entails reconnaissance and surveillance actions normally conducted in a clandestine or covert manner to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (CF).

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

SOF support USG efforts to curtail the development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of weapons of mass destruction, related expertise, materials, technologies, and means of delivery by state and non-state actors

Counterterrorism

UW consists of operations and activities that are conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area.

Unconventional Warfare

Foreign internal defense refers to US activities that support a host nation's (HN's) internal defense and development strategy and program designed to protect against subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to their internal security, and stability.

Foreign Internal Defense

USG security sector reform (SSR) focuses on the way a HN provides safety, security, and justice with civilian government oversight. The Department of Defense's (DOD's)

primary role in SSR is to support the reform, restructure, or reestablishment of the HN armed forces and the defense aspect of the security sector, which is accomplished through security force assistance.

Security Force Assistance

Hostage rescue and recovery operations are sensitive crisis response missions in response to terrorist threats and incidents. Offensive operations in support of hostage rescue and recovery can include the recapture of US facilities, installations, and sensitive material overseas.

Hostage Rescue and Recovery

Hostage rescue and recovery operations are sensitive crisis response missions in response to terrorist threats and incidents. Offensive operations in support of hostage rescue and recovery can include the recapture of US facilities, installations, and sensitive material overseas.

Counterinsurgency (See pp. 2-95 to 2-96.)

Counterinsurgency is a comprehensive civilian and military effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)

Foreign humanitarian assistance is a range of DOD humanitarian activities conducted outside the US and its territories to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.

Military Information Operations (MISO)

Military information support operations (MISO) are planned to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals in a manner favorable to the originator's objectives.

Civil Affairs Operations

Civil affairs operations are actions planned, executed, and assessed by civil affairs that enhance the operational environment; identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within civil society; or involve the application of functional specialty skills normally the responsibility of civil government.

Refer to these SMARTbooks for related material:



Refer to TAA2: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16), Interorganizational Cooperation (JP 3-08), and more.



Refer to CTS1: The Counterterrorism, WMD & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook for further discussion. CTS1 topics and chapters include: the terrorist threat (characteristics, goals & objectives, organization, state-sponsored, international, and domestic), hybrid and future threats, forms of terrorism (tactics, techniques, & procedures), counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, protection planning and preparation, countering WMD, and consequence management (all hazards response).



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
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The JOINT FORCES Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, 6th Ed.

Guide to Joint Warfighting, Operations & Planning



The ultimate purpose of the Armed Forces of the United States is to defend the homeland and win the nation's wars. The four strategic uses of the **military instrument of national power** - assurance, deterrence, and forcible action - are implemented through campaigns, operations, and activities that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and intensity, and occur across a competition continuum.



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JFODS6 is the sixth revised edition of The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook. JFODS6 is completely updated for 2023 with new/updated material from the latest editions of JP 3-0 Joint Campaigns and Operations (Jun '22), JP 5-0 Joint Planning (Dec '20), JP 3-33 Joint Force Headquarters (Jun '22), and JP 1 Volumes I and II Joint Warfighting and the Joint Force (Jun '20). Additional topics and references include Joint Air, Land, Maritime and Special Operations (JPs 3-30, 3-31, 3-32 & 3-05).

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