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**Third Edition
(JIA1-3)**

**Planning
Fundamentals**

**Planning
Functions**

**Global Force
Mgmt (GFM)**

**JIPOE &
IPIE**

**Joint Planning
Process (JPP)**

**Plan/Order
Development**

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joint strategic & operational **PLANNING**

Planning for Planners (Third Edition)

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Planning for Planners
(Third Edition)

The Lightning Press
Michael A. Santacroce



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(JIA1-3) Note to Readers

The dawn of the 21st Century presents an increasingly complex global security environment. Within this environment United States national interest, citizens, and territories are threatened by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, unconventional threats and challenges from adversaries in every operating domain. If we are to be successful as a nation, we must embrace the realities of this environment and operate with clarity from within. It is this setting that mandates a flexible, adaptive approach to planning and an ever-greater cooperation between all the elements of national power, supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental and regional security organizations. It is within this chaotic environment that planners will craft their trade.

Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1 - Joint Strategic & Operational Planning (Planning for Planners), 3rd Edition (JIA1-3), was developed to assist planners at all levels in understanding how to plan within this environment utilizing the Joint Planning Process; an orderly, logical, analytical progression enabling planners to sequentially follow it to a rational conclusion. By utilizing this planning process, which is conceptually easy to understand and applicable in all environments, any plan can come to life. Paramount to planning is flexibility. The ultimate aspiration of this book is to help develop flexible planners who can cope with the inevitable changes that occur during the planning process in any environment.

Planning for Planners has been utilized since 2007 by war colleges, joint staffs, Services, combatant commands and allies as a step-by-step guide to understanding the complex world of global planning and force management.

JIA1-3 is the third edition of Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1 - Joint Strategic & Operational Planning (Planning for Planners), completely reorganized and updated with the latest joint publications for 2023. At 420-pgs, JIA1-3 is designed to give the reader a thorough understanding of the Joint Planning and Execution Process, where the Joint Planning Process resides. Topics and chapters include planning fundamentals, planning functions, global force management, JIPOE and IPIE, joint planning process, plan/order development, execution functions, and annexes.

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Introduction: Planning for Planners

The criteria for deciding to employ United States (U.S.) military forces exemplifies the dynamic link among the people, the government, and the military. The responsibility for the conduct and use of U.S. military forces is derived from the people and loaned to the government. The people of the U.S. do not take the commitment of their armed forces lightly. They charge the government to commit forces, our fathers, mothers, sons and daughters, only after due consideration of the range of options and likely outcomes. Moreover, the people expect the military to accomplish its missions in compliance with national values. The American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met. They demand timely and accurate information on the conduct of military operations.

“True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous, and conflicting information.”

Winston Churchill

The Department of Defense (DOD) commits forces only after appropriate direction from the President and in support of national strategy. The national strategy of the U.S. dictates where, when, and with what means the armed forces will conduct military campaigns and operations. The necessity to plan and conduct joint and combined operations across the operational continuum dictates a comprehensive understanding of the military strategy of the U.S., and proficiency in current Service and joint **doctrine**.

“One should know one’s enemies, their alliances, their resources and nature of their country, in order to plan a campaign. One should know what to expect of one’s friends, what resources one has, and foresee the future effects to determine what one has to fear or hope from political maneuvers.”

Frederick the Great

Instructions for His Generals, 1747

Never static, always dynamic, “*doctrine*” is firmly rooted in the realities of current capabilities. At the same time, it reaches out with a measure of confidence to the future. Doctrine captures the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war, conflict and crisis in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and technological developments that will ensure victory now and in the future.

Doctrine derives from a variety of sources that profoundly affect its development: strategy, history, technology, the nature of the threats the nation and its armed forces face, inter-service relationships, and political decisions that allocate resources and designate roles and missions. Doctrine seeks to meet the challenges facing the armed forces by providing the guidance to deal with the range of threats to which its elements may be exposed. It reflects the strategic context in which armed forces will operate, sets a marker for the incorporation of developing technologies, and optimizes the use of all available resources. It also incorporates the lessons learned from the many missions, operations and campaigns of the U.S.

Scenario

It's a holiday weekend and you're new on a Joint Planning staff for a Combatant Command and your boss, the PlansO, is enjoying leave. It's a typical 1800 on a Friday and the Chief of Staff walks in as your headed out the door. The Chief relays with "some urgency" the following Warning Order to you:

[A magnitude 9.1 - 9.3 earthquake with its epicenter off the west coast of northern Sumatra at Coordinates: 3.316°N 95.854°E, occurred at 00:58 UTC. News reports it is the third largest earthquake ever recorded. It's reported that an extensive series of tsunamis up to 100 feet high were created by the earthquake and have flooded communities along the Indian Ocean. At least 15 independent countries to include Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Maldives, Malaysia, Myanmar, Madagascar, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, South Africa, and Yemen are affected. Sources indicate the possibility of over 250,000 casualties with millions displaced and homeless. The President wants to assist and needs options. Have an initial mission analysis brief for the CCDR by 0700. The CCDR will brief the Chairman, Secretary and President following your brief so make it clear, succinct, and have several separate courses of action with differing degrees of assistance. Bring the State Department into your planning. They'll be a tremendous resource of country, state and local populations. They may have people on the ground already. Get your team together and lets get to work!

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What do you do?


Where do you begin?

You suddenly feel the full affect of the proverbial "planning fire hose."

#1- Take a breath.

#2- Pick up your well-worn and dog-eared *Planner's SMARTbook* and get to work.

#3- Delegate!



Introduction (Cont.)

Baron von Steuben's 1779 "Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States" was not penned in a setting of well-ordered formations and well-disciplined troops but, rather, at a time of turmoil during a winter at Valley Forge. Baron von Steuben's doctrine, maybe our first written doctrine, set forth principles and created a discipline that went on to defeat the greatest army on the face of the earth. This doctrine, written over 240 years ago, and followed by others, has led to a highly professional armed force that generations later stands foremost in the world. Doctrine reflects the collective wisdom of our armed forces against the background of history and it reflects the lessons learned from recent experiences and the setting of today's strategic and technological realities. It considers the nature of today's threats and tomorrow's challenges.¹

Doctrinal principles set forth in planning are developed and written as the starting point for any variation or deviation from the planning process. One must understand doctrine prior to digressing from it. Doctrine should set forth principles and precious little more.² With that thought in mind Planning for Planners was designed to promulgate information from source documents, best practices, lessons learned and common sense from where the "principles" of Joint doctrine depart. This book explains and simplifies Joint planning and the often misunderstood and complex world of global force management.

Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1 will assist planners at all levels with these challenges. It will furnish the planner with an understanding of doctrine and the intricate world of global planning. The ultimate aspiration is to develop planners who can cope with the inevitable change that occurs during the planning process.

Joint Planning and Variables

Joint planning is the overarching process that guides us in the development of plans for the employment of forces and capabilities within the context of national strategic objectives and national defense/military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises.

The Joint Planning Process consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission, develop and compare potential courses of action, select the best course of action, and produce a plan or order.

This planning process underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of contingencies. It applies to all planners and helps them organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the method, purpose and end state and to develop effective and executable plans and orders.

Planning provides an awareness and opportunity to study potential future events among multiple alternatives in a controlled environment. By planning we can evaluate complex systems and environments allowing us to break these down into small, manageable segments for analysis, assisting directly in the increased probability of success. In this way, deliberately planning for campaigns and contingencies allows us to manage identified risks and influence the operational environment in which we have chosen to interact, in a deliberate way. The plans generated in this process represent actions to be taken if an identified risk occurs or a trigger event has presented itself.

¹ FM 100-5 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army

² Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II, Strategic Studies Institute, Doctrine That Works, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub724.pdf

The variance in any plan is the constant change in the operational environment (system). Whether a contingency or crisis scenario, we plan in a chaotic environment. In the time it takes us to plan, the likelihood that the operational environment has changed is a certain, whether by action or inaction, affecting the plan (i.e., assumptions change or are not validated, leaders change, the operational environment fluctuates, apportionment tables are poor assumptions, disputed borders fluctuate, weather changes the rules, plans change at contact, enemy gets a vote, etc.).

Variables are hard to predict because each environment and situation has their own unique challenges which can certainly affect an orderly plan. Given the size and scope of an operational environment, a plan can only anticipate, or forecast, for a short duration without being updated. This is known as the plan's horizon. In a fluid crisis situation, the plan's horizon may be very short and contain greater risk, causing the planner to constantly re-evaluate and update the plan. Inversely, for a campaign or contingency plan, the plan's horizon may be relatively static with less risk allowing time for greater analysis. The number of variables within the operational environment and the interactions between those variables and known components of the operational environment increases exponentially with the number of variables, thus potentially allowing for many new and sometimes subtle planning changes to emerge.

As an example of a plan's horizon, or stability, let's look at an environment that constantly influences us, the weather:

A forecaster endeavors to anticipate the path of a tropical cyclone and utilizes historical models and probabilities to predict the tropical cyclone's path and warn residents. When a low-pressure area first forms and the storm begins to take shape along the equator, forecasters are working within a complex environment with constant and multiple variables (i.e., winds, temperatures, currents, pressures, etc.) and few facts (i.e., exact location at this moment, jet stream location, ocean temperatures, surface winds, etc.). As variables amplify and the storm begins to move, the storm's horizon shifts yet again, and the forecaster updates the assessment. Over days of surveillance, gathering information, updating, and studying the variables, the actual track of the storm begins to emerge and the storm's horizon becomes more durable and predictable. The forecaster continuously narrows the storm's estimated track, eventually forecasting with some certainty the tropical cyclone's landfall.

Planners employ the same technique by utilizing current knowledge of the operational environment to anticipate events, calculate what those may be by means of an in-depth analysis, update, and plan accordingly. But always remember, plans are orderly; probabilities and variables are not. Just as a tropical storm has a self-organizing phase within its environment, so must the planner.

So, the challenge is how to plan within an environment with continuously changing and emerging variables. The planner must understand that every plan is unique and never as perfect as you want it. There are too many variables. But with constant awareness each iteration of the plan will improve the prospect of success as the variables become known and are planned for.

Simplicity should be the aspiration for every plan. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure a thorough understanding. A plan need not be more complicated than the underlying principles which generate it.



(JIA1-3) About the Author

Colonel (Ret) Michael A. Santacroce has 35 years of joint and interagency experience working within the Department of Defense as a Joint Staff, Combatant Command and Service Planner. As Faculty and Chair for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Campaign Planning and Operational Art, Mike taught advanced planning to leaders from all branches of the DoD, government agencies and our allies. His current SMARTbook, *Planning for Planners*, walks the prospective or advanced planner through joint strategic and operational planning as well as the complex world of global force management.

During his Marine Corps career Mike served in a multiple of demanding leadership, senior staff, strategic and operational planning positions. As a Marine aviator he flew the AV-8B Harrier Jump Jet and participated in operations globally. Mike served as the Operations Officer of Marine Air Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), commanded a Marine Harrier Squadron (VMA-214 Blacksheep) and later led a Marine Air Group (Forward) for combat operations in Iraq. A seasoned military professional and teacher, Mike has a unique understanding of operations and planning at all levels. Mike retired with more than 30 years of military service.

"The inspiration of a noble cause involving human interests wide and far, enables men to do things they did not dream themselves capable of before, and which they were not capable of alone."

Joshua L. Chamberlain, October 3, 1869. Monument dedication ceremony, Gettysburg, Pa.

Today's preparation determines tomorrow's achievements. Dedicated to all planners; may this work assist you in your planning endeavors'.

Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1: Joint Strategic & Operational Planning (Planning for Planners) is reviewed continually and updated as required. Point of contact is the author, Col (Ret) Mike Santacroce, USMC, at mike.santa@yahoo.com.



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I. Strategic Organization

"In pursuit of that future, we will look at the world with clear eyes and fresh thinking. We will promote a balance of power that favors the United States, our allies, and our partners. We will never lose sight of our values and their capacity to inspire, uplift, and renew. Most of all, we will serve the American people and uphold their right to a government that prioritizes their security, their prosperity, and their interests."

President Donald Trump, 2017 NSS

1. Background

a. Civilian Control of the Military. Since the founding of the nation, civilian control of the military has been an absolute and unquestioned principle. The Constitution incorporates this principle by giving both the President and Congress the power to ensure civilian supremacy. The Constitution establishes the President as the Commander-in-Chief, but gives Congress the power "to declare war," to "raise and support Armies – provide and maintain a Navy – (and) to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and Naval forces."

b. Joint Organization before 1900. As established by the Constitution, coordination between the War Department and Navy Department was effected by the President as the Commander-in-Chief. Army and Naval forces functioned autonomously with the President as their only common superior. Despite Service autonomy, early American history reflects the importance of joint operations. Admiral MacDonough's Naval operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor in the ground campaigns of the War of 1812. The joint teamwork displayed by General Grant and Admiral Porter in the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 stands as a fine early example of joint military planning and execution. However, instances of confusion, poor inter-Service cooperation and lack of coordinated, joint military action had a negative impact on operations in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War (1898). By the turn of the century, advances in technology and the growing international involvement of the United States (U.S.) required greater cooperation between the military departments.

c. Joint History through World War I. As a result of the unimpressive joint military operations in the Spanish-American War, in 1903 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy created the Joint Army and Navy Board charged to address "all matters calling for cooperation of the two Services." The Joint Army and Navy Board was to be a continuing body that could plan for joint operations and resolve problems of common concern to the two Services. Unfortunately, the Joint Board accomplished little, because it could not direct implementation of concepts or enforce decisions, being limited to commenting on problems submitted to it by the secretaries of the two military departments. It was described as "a planning and deliberative body rather than a center of executive authority." As a result, it had little or no impact on the conduct of joint operations during the First World War. Even as late as World War I, questions of seniority and command relationships between the Chief of Staff of the Army and American Expeditionary Forces in Europe were just being resolved.

d. Joint History through World War II. After World War I, the two Service secretaries agreed to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board. Membership was expanded to six: the

chiefs of the two Services, their deputies, the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and Director of Plans Division for the Navy. More importantly, a working staff (named the Joint Planning Committee) made up of members of the Plans Divisions of both Service staffs was authorized. The new Joint Board could initiate recommendations on its own. Unfortunately, the 1919 board was given no more legal authority or responsibility than its 1903 predecessor; and, although its 1935 publication, *Joint Action Board of the Army and Navy*, gave some guidance for the unified operations of World War II, the board itself was not influential in the war. The board was officially disbanded in 1947.

e. Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986. The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986 Pub. L. 99–433, made the most sweeping changes to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) since the department was established in the National Security Act of 1947 by reworking the command structure of the U.S. military.¹ The Goldwater–Nichols Act was an attempt to fix problems caused by inter-service rivalry, which had emerged during the Vietnam War, contributed to the catastrophic failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, and which were still evident in the invasion of Grenada in 1983.² It increased the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and streamlined the military chain of command, which now runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directly to combatant commanders (CCDRs), bypassing the Service Chiefs. The Act further outlined the responsibilities of those CCDRs, giving them total authority to accomplish assigned missions within their geographic areas of responsibility.³ The Service Chiefs were assigned to an advisory role to the President and the SecDef as well as given the responsibility for training and equipping personnel for the unified combatant commands.

Five years after the Goldwater-Nichols Legislation the U.S. military successfully conducted Operation Desert Storm and other associated operations (such as Operation Provide Comfort). The clarification of the operational chain of command, as well as the advances in jointness that were made as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, were viewed by many as instrumental to that success.⁴

f. Strategic Context. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) marked the most integrated joint force and joint campaign American armed forces had ever conducted up to that time. The OIF campaign is marked with a number of firsts. Arguably, it is the first “jointly” coherent campaign since the Korean War. American joint forces executed a large-scale, complex operation while simultaneously continuing active operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and in support of Homeland Defense. In OIF, a combined and joint land component commanders (CDR) directed all ground operations for the first time since the Eighth Army did so in the Korean War. Not since World War II have the armed forces of the U.S. operated in multiple theaters of war while simultaneously conducting security operations and support operations in several other theaters.

¹ *The Perfect Storm, The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Its Effect on Navy Acquisition/ Charles Nemfakos • Irv Blickstein • Aine Seitz McCarthy • Jerry M. Sollinger*

² Cole, Ronald H. (1999). “Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform” (PDF). *Joint Force Quarterly* (20 (Autumn/Winter 1998-99)): 57–74

³ Richard W. Stewart, ed. (2005). “Chapter 12: Rebuilding the Army Vietnam to Desert Storm.” *American Military History, Volume II. United States Army Center of Military History*

⁴ Leighton W. Smith, “A Commander’s Perspective,” as found in, Dennis J. Quinn (ed), *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999) p. 29. See also Clark A. Murdock, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004). http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/bgn_ph1_report.pdf, p. 14

OIF forces also employed emerging new concepts that had just been incorporated into the body of joint doctrine. Noteworthy joint coordination from OIF not imagined a decade earlier includes: the unprecedented degree of air-ground coordination and integration, coalition air forces shaping the fight allowing for rapid dominance on the ground, the establishment of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the “running start,” integration of precision munitions with ground operations, supported by a largely space-based command and control network, effective integration of artillery and attack aviation, and air- and sea-launched precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and cruise missile strikes responding rapidly to targets developed by improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. These all represent the maturation of *joint doctrine* developed since Goldwater-Nichols and tested through joint simulations and training. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 enabled combat operations to occur in 2003 in ways only imagined a short decade earlier.

2. The Strategic and Security Environment

The strategic environment has shifted dramatically. Since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, a number of important historical events have taken place, starting with the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the U.S. performed crisis management and contingency operations globally, in theaters including Iraq, the Balkans, Somalia, and Colombia. After the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, the U.S. undertook major counter-insurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a number of smaller operations as part of its “global war on terror.”

The international security environment was already demanding when the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was enacted, yet most observers agree it has become significantly more complex and unpredictable in recent years.⁵ This is challenging the U.S. to respond to an increasingly diverse set of requirements.⁶ As evidence, observers point to a number of events, including (but not limited to) the rise of the Islamic State, including its military successes in northern Iraq and Syria; the strength of drug cartels in South and Central America; Russian warfare in Ukraine; heightened North Korean aggression; Chinese “island building” in the South China Sea; terror attacks in Europe; the ongoing civil war in Syria and its attendant refugee crisis to name a few.

Today’s security environment is not unlike those of historic times. The CDRs during those eras also considered the enemy extremely complex and fluid with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new threats constantly appearing and disappearing.

With the national and transnational threats we face today our political and military leaders conduct operations in an ever-more complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment (OE). This increase in the scope of the OE may not necessarily result from actions by the confronted adversary alone, but is likely to result from other adversaries exploiting opportunities as a consequence of an overextended or distracted U.S. or coalition. These adversaries encompass a variety of actors from transnational organizations to states or even ad hoc state coalitions and individuals.

⁵ See, for example, CRS Report R43838, *A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O’Rourke ; James Clapper “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Press Briefing by Deputy Secretary Work and Gen. Selva on the FY2017 Defense Department Budget Request in the Pentagon Press Briefing Room, February 9, 2016*, <http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/653524/department-of-defense-press-briefing-by-deputy-secretary-work-and-gen-selva-on>

A central challenge as noted in the Defense Strategy Review (DSR) is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy (NSS) classifies as revisionist powers.⁷ Along with these revisionist powers rogue regimes are destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear weapons or sponsorship of terrorism. Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.

The Joint Force faces two persistent realities. **First**, the security environment is always in flux. Change is relentless and occurs in all aspects of human endeavor. Ideas about how human beings should govern one another emerge, spread, and then fade away. Advances in science and technology progress and proliferate. Countries and political groups simultaneously cooperate and compete based on their relative power, capabilities, interests, and ideals. Change in the security environment occurs at an irregular pace, and over time small changes compound to shatter our assumptions. **Second**, the pursuit of political objectives through organized violence is and will remain a feature of the security environment. Strife, conflict and war are certain to endure into the foreseeable future.⁸

Today, every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. We face an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains, and conducted at increasing speed and reach—from close combat, throughout overseas theaters, and reaching to our homeland. Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion).⁹

To prepare the U.S. for today's threats and contingencies we have, over time, established a system of checks and balances to include numerous governmental organizations that are involved in the implementation of U.S. security policy. However, constitutionally, the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the President.

3. Strategy

The objective of strategy, in the modern sense, is to serve policy—the positions of governments and others cooperating, competing, or waging war in a complex environment. National policy articulates national objectives. National policy is broad guidance statements adopted by national governments in pursuit of national objectives. The ultimate goal of strategy is to achieve policy objectives by maintaining or modifying elements of the strategic environment to serve those interests.

Strategy formulation must consider the strategic environment (e.g., geography, character, and relationship of political entities and their interests, and resources) subject to norms and constants present. These factors present themselves differently in each strategic interaction and exert considerable influence on a particular strategic situation. Additionally, these factors may change during execution, necessitating revision of the strategy.

In its simplest expression, strategy determines what needs to be accomplished, the methods to accomplish it, and the resources required by those methods. A comprehensive and effective strategy answers four basic questions:¹⁰

- What are the desired *ends*?
- What are the *ways* to get there?

⁷Joint Operating Environment

⁸National Defense Strategy

⁹Defense Strategy Review

¹⁰Joint Doctrine Note 2-19, Strategy

Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)




Figure F. JSPS

II. Campaigning & Contingency Plans

I. Integration

1. Introduction

CCDRs can be tasked to address missions that cross geographic CCMD boundaries. They develop campaigns to support the global campaign and shape the OE in a manner that supports strategic objectives by integrating posture, resources, and activities to achieve objectives and tasks identified by the CJCS in the global, functional, and regional campaign plans and complement other government efforts related to a geographic region or functional area. CCDRs conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement, operations, posture, and other activities that seek to achieve U.S. national objectives, protect U.S. national interests, and prevent the need to resort to armed conflict while setting conditions to transition to contingency operations when required.

Campaign plans are developed within the context of existing U.S. national security and foreign policies, and are the primary vehicle for designing, organizing, integrating, and executing security cooperation activities and routine military operations, integrating their posture and contingency plans, and synchronizing these DOD plans and activities with U.S. diplomatic and development efforts. Theater campaign plans also reflect each CCDR's overarching strategy and implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy by identifying those actions the CCMDs will conduct on a daily basis. Campaign plans are intended to focus and direct steady-state activities that can prevent or mitigate conflict and set the conditions necessary for successful execution of contingency plans.¹

2. Integrated Planning

The intent of integrated planning is to produce globally integrated plans to advance U.S. interests and achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Addressed in this chapter are the full range of campaign plans (e.g., Global Campaign Plans (GCPs), CCMD campaign plans (CCPs), Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs) and Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs). These plans provide the SecDef and President the best possible information and options to address the complex and uncertain global environment.

3. Global Integration

a. Global Integration is the arrangement of cohesive Joint Force actions in time, space, and purpose, executed as a whole to address trans-regional, all domain, and multifunctional challenges. Global integration ensures the Joint Force maintains a shared understanding of the global OE; collaborates to address threats and challenges; provides the information needed to assess and refine strategies and operations, activities, and investments (OAI); and ensures the CJCS is able to make informed decisions and provide military advice.²

b. The key roles within Global Integration are as follows:

(1) Global Integrator. The SecDef designated the CJCS as the Global Integrator with responsibilities defined in 10 U.S.C. 153. The Chairman's responsibilities as Global Integrator with respect to planning include developing strategic frameworks, preparing strategic plans, providing for the preparation and review of contingency plans, and advising the

¹ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

² CJCSM 3141.01 *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans*

SecDef on allocation and transfer of forces among geographic and functional CCMDs to address trans-regional, all domain, and multifunctional threats. Additional roles include assessing risk, priorities, readiness, preparedness, and budgets.

(2) Coordinating Authority (CA). The Chairman, as Global Integrator, may designate CAs to integrate CCMD planning and campaigning. A CA is generally a CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility for a problem set, but does not receive additional command authority beyond that already assigned in the UCP. CAs will perform three key major functions: planning, assessing, and recommending changes to plans. The CA convenes collaborative forums to develop integrated plans among CCMDs, CSAs, Services, other government agencies, allies, and partner nations and is the designated lead for representing a problem set including topics such as planning, risk, prioritization, resourcing, synchronization of activities in plans, and transition to contingencies. CAs determine relative risk and prioritization of objectives and tasks, and identify additional authorities or execute orders, as required.

(3) Priority Challenge Cross-Functional Team (CFT). Priority challenge cross-functional teams (CFTs) consist of Joint Staff members from each functional and regional area and members from CCMDs and other government agencies, as required. CFTs are charged with maintaining a shared understanding of the strategic and operational environment through activities such as the development of strategies (NMS) and plans (GCPs) with respect to one of the Chairman's priority challenges as designated in the NMS. CFTs develop guidance for the Global Integrator and support globally integrated planning.³

(4) Collaborator. A collaborator is a Joint Force organization assigned by the Global Integrator to support integrated planning for a problem set. The collaborator is responsible for working with the CA to develop and assess globally integrated plans. A collaborator is also responsible for providing support plans to the CA when required by the JSCP or other strategic guidance.

4. Global Integrated Plans

a. Global Integration seeks to increase collaboration through intentional JPEC engagement across the whole-of-government to address priority challenges. To accomplish this, the traditional planning framework requires a greater degree of integration. The integrated planning framework, therefore, requires the two traditional plan types—campaigns and contingencies—to closely align in purpose and activities to execute a strategy spanning the spectrum of conflict.

Priority Challenge: An actual or potential adversary with the will and capability to undermine U.S. national interests. CJCS priority challenges are designated in the NMS.

b. Plan Framework

(1) The JSCP is the CJCS's primary document to guide and direct the preparation and integration of joint force campaign plans and associated contingency plans. The three types of campaign plans addressed in the JSCP are: GCPs, FCPs, and CCPs. Although no longer directed in the JSCP, another type of campaign plan is a Regional Campaign Plan (RCP). Regional planning guidance addresses regional threats or challenges that require coordination across multiple CCMDs. Generally, issues that require RCPs are not as significant a threat to U.S. interests as GCPs, but they require attention to ensure they do not evolve into a more significant crisis. If necessary, the SecDef, through the CJCS, could direct a RCP with a designated CA.

GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs are generally problem-focused plans that focus the efforts of multiple organizations on specific problem sets that span organizational and geographic boundaries. GCPs focus on competing with a single priority challenge, while RCPs and FCPs focus on addressing crosscutting challenges, not necessarily one priority challenge.

³ CJCSM 5115.01, *Priority Challenge Cross Functional Teams*

CCPs are generally organization-focused and serve to guide day-to-day campaigning (incorporating requirements from GCPs and FCPs) and operational execution to achieve U.S. strategic objectives short of war.

(2) **Global Integration Frameworks (GIF)**. The JSCP directs contingency planning consistent with the CPG. It expands on the CPG with specific objectives, tasks, and linkages between campaign and contingency plans. The JSCP directs the development of Integrated Contingency Plans (ICPs) and Global Integration Frameworks (GIFs). While GCPs guide day-to-day Joint operations, activities, and investments, GIFs provide strategic frameworks to enable a coordinated Joint Force response to crisis or conflict associated with a **priority challenge**. The Chairman recommends which challenges require GIFs based on the SecDef's priorities in the NDS. GIFs are strategic frameworks that enable the Chairman's advice and the SecDef's decisions on strategic risks and trade-offs across and within campaigns and contingencies during crisis or conflict with a priority challenge. GIFs provide a global look at crisis and conflict with one of the priority challenges beyond the scope of a single CCMD. GIFs are informed by GCPs and existing contingency plans.⁴

(3) **Contingency Plans**. Contingency plans serve as branches or sequels to campaign plans. The Joint Force executes them in a synchronized manner as an ICP or independently for limited purposes. Overlaps between plans represent a convergence of objectives, organizational responsibilities, resources, and readiness. Planners must integrate objectives between campaign plans and contingency plans to employ the campaign plan in a way that seeks to prevent contingencies and posture the Joint Force for successful contingency execution when necessary.

(a) **ICPs are the primary branch plans and war plans associated with a GCP.**

The ICP brings together contingency plans from multiple organizations to achieve increased unity-of-effort and closer linkages between complementary contingency plans for a specific problem set.

(b) **Stand-alone contingency plans** will remain necessary for situations not tied to conflict with priority challenges. Organizations may use support plans written for campaign plans or stand-alone contingencies to support ICPs, provided the plans meet the CA's requirements.

5. Problem-Focused Plans (GCP/FCP/RCP)

a. A problem set is an array of threats or adversary capabilities unified in its actions against U.S. interests. Rather than a theater or AOR-centric view, the JPEC starts with a problem-centric view across AORs and functional boundaries, assigning planning responsibilities to CCMDs, CSAs, and other Defense agencies capable of addressing them. To ensure successful integration of planning, the Global Integrator assigns a single CA to each global, regional, or functional problem set. There may be instances, however, when a problem set is divided between more than one CA (e.g., responsibilities for homeland defense within and outside of the Continental United States (CONUS)).

(1) Problem-focused campaign plans include guidance and direction from the Global Integrator, integrated planning by the CA, and support plans developed by collaborators. For GCPs, the Joint Staff develops and maintains the plan while the CA implements, assesses, and recommends updates to it. For FCPs and RCPs, the CA develops, maintains, and updates the plans. The CA regularly coordinates with collaborators to provide feedback to the Global Integrator. As part of this process, the CA may also draft establishing directives to recommend support relationships for approval by the SecDef.

(2) Problem-focused campaign plans enable aligning operations, forces, footprints, agreements, authorities, permissions, and capabilities necessary to promote and protect national interests using the Joint Force. Problem-focused campaign plans provide a description of the strategic environment and situation, campaign approach and intent, related contingency plans, intermediate military objectives, and high-level tasks.

⁴ CJCSI 3141.01 *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans*

b. **Global Campaign Plans (GCP).** GCPs address threats or challenges that significantly affect U.S. interests across the globe and require coordinated planning across all, or nearly all, CCMDs. GCPs globally integrate the activities of the Joint Force to campaign against the priority challenges. The CJCS manages these plans on behalf of the SecDef. The CJCS approves GCPs after SecDef endorsement.

(1) The Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, is responsible for developing, staffing, reviewing, and preparing GCPs for the CJCS and the SecDef's approval. The GCPs are integrated plans that address the most pressing trans-regional, multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains. The CJCS, as the global integrator, determines which challenges require GCPs.

(2) As problem-focused plans, GCPs look across GCC and FCC seams and simultaneously provide direction to the CCDRs and military advice to the SecDef. GCPs are the focal point for integrated assessment and resource decisions regarding prioritization, posture, capabilities, risk, and risk mitigation measures. The Chairman's military advice, derived from GCP assessments, can take the form of a GCP memorandum focused on a single challenge or be contained within a broader JSPS product. GCPs contain linkages to key contingency plans, identify responsibilities, define objectives, and assign tasks. The CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility for a GCP generally serves as the CA.⁵

c. **Regional Campaign Plans (RCP).** RCPs address regional threats or challenges that require coordinated planning across multiple CCMDs. CAs develop, approve, and manage these plans.

d. **Functional Campaign Plans (FCP).** FCPs address functional threats or challenges that are not geographically constrained and require coordinated planning across multiple CCMDs. CAs develop, approve, and manage these plans. Functional planning guidance addresses security challenges that are often global in nature or affect more than one GCC. Though functional planning guidance often leads to planning by FCCs, GCCs must ensure their CCPs support achievement of strategic end states and objectives.

The JSCP tasks CCDRs to develop FCPs when achieving strategic objectives requires joint operations and activities conducted in multiple area of responsibilities (AORs). FCPs establish the strategic and operational framework within which subordinate campaign plans are developed. The FCP's framework also facilitates coordinating and synchronizing the many interdependent, cross-AOR missions such as security cooperation, intelligence collection, and coalition support.

6. Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs)

a. CCDRs maintain responsibility for developing campaign plans that address their respective area and functional responsibilities. A CCP is a CCDR-approved plan that incorporates intermediate objectives and tasks from GCPs, RCPs, and FCPs. The CCP is, therefore, the principal operational plan for execution of a CCMD's theater and global responsibilities for all priority challenges. The CCP balances the risks and opportunities of the command and simultaneously accounts for all assigned theater and problem-focused tasks to provide a campaign plan that fully integrates OAI spanning the CCMDs' assigned responsibilities.

(1) CCP and FCPs implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy by identifying those actions the CCMDs will conduct on a daily basis. Campaign plans are intended to focus and direct steady-state activities that can prevent or mitigate conflict and set the conditions necessary for successful execution of contingency plans. In linking steady-state objectives with resources and activities, campaign plans enable resource-informed planning and permit prioritization across DOD. The UCP, CPG and JSCP are the core strategic guidance directives for campaign planning. The CPG and the JSCP

⁵ CJCSM 3130.01 Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities

Plans Relationship and Nesting




Figure A. Plans Relationship (CJCSM 3141.01)




Figure B. Nested Plans in Generic CCP Framework (CJCSG 3130)

(2) CCMD campaign planning is inherently intergovernmental. It is informed by the strategic planning of other USG agencies, in particular the DOS and USAID. The intent is for the CCMD campaign design to complement and support the DOS's broader foreign policy objectives and, to the extent possible, not undermine or work at cross purposes to the goal and activities of other USG agencies in the region. CCMD theater campaign planning is also heavily informed by detailed country planning. Country-level plans help quantify and justify aggregate theater military resource requirements. In peacetime, regional military actions occur in a world where the U.S. Ambassadors' objectives have primacy. Therefore, regional U.S. military operations, activities, events, and investments are prioritized, aligned, and/or integrated with U.S. developmental and diplomatic actions at the country level to achieve unity of effort and husband-scarce resources. In the end, CCMD campaign planners seek to synchronize and nest the planned operations, activities, events, and investments across posture planning, country planning, security cooperation planning, contingency planning, shaping phase integration, strategic communication planning, interagency planning, and multi-national planning in CCPs to promote overall regional unity of effort.

8. Elements of a Combatant Command Campaign Plan

a. Campaign Plan. The CCP consists of all plans contained within the established theater or functional responsibilities to include contingency plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture plans, country-specific security cooperation sections/country plans (for geographic commands), and operations in execution.

(1) The campaign plan operationalizes the CCCR's strategy by organizing operations, activities, and investments within the assigned and allocated resources to achieve the CPG- and JSCP-directed objectives, as well as additional CCCR-determined objectives within the timeframe established by the CPG or JSCP.

(2) The campaign plan should show the linkages between operations, activities, investments, and expenditures and the campaign objective and associated end states that available resources will support. The campaign plan should identify the assessment process by which the command ascertains progress toward or regression from the national security objectives.⁷

b. Posture Plan. The posture plan is the CCMD's proposal for forces, footprint, and agreements required and authorized to achieve the command's objectives and set conditions for accomplishing assigned missions. GCCs prepare Posture Plans which outline their posture strategy, link national and theater objectives with the means to achieve them, and identify posture requirements and initiatives to meet CCP objectives. The Posture Plans is the single source document used to advocate for changes to posture and to support resource decisions.


(1) Posture Planning. Posture Plans propose a set of posture initiatives and other posture changes, along with the corresponding cost data necessary to support the DoDs activities as described in the CCP. Posture Plans also must account for the desires of the FCCs, other GCCs, and Services, then balance these possibly-competing desires.

(2) CCMD planners must ensure theater objectives that run counter to global and regional objectives are properly aligned and prioritized to ensure that those objectives with the highest priority are elevated and the risk associated with the theater objectives that are counter are well understood. Also, planners must understand that Posture Plans are integrally linked to the Services ability to resource them both from a fiscal and a force requirements perspective.

c. Theater Logistics and Distribution Plans (TDP) The TDP provides detailed theater mobility and distribution analysis to ensure sufficient capacity or planned enhanced capability throughout the theater and synchronization of distribution planning throughout the global distribution network. The TDP includes a comprehensive list of references, country data,

⁷ CJCSM 3130.01 Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities

Joint Planning: Contingency (Notional Depiction)



Purpose. Contingency plans or campaign plans are the principal outputs of this type of planning. These plans can provide the basis for subsequent order development should the plan transition to execution.

Direction. Contingency planning is usually initiated via planning tasks in the CPG or JSCP. Planning requirements that emerge outside of the strategic guidance update cycle may also be directed via a CJCS PLANORD. Additionally, CDRs at all levels may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority.

Planning Basis. The basis for all planning including joint planning is the planning framework provided by strategic guidance intended to advance U.S. national interests. This framework is further informed by an analysis of the OE based upon the outputs of the JIPOE process, TIA, and DTA where applicable. Contingency planning that is based upon a hypothetical scenario usually requires significant planning assumptions to complete detailed planning.

Forces. The forces available for planning are a key planning assumption. The quantities of forces in the Force Apportionment Tables provide an estimate of the Military Departments/Services' capacity to generate force elements along general timelines. These apportioned quantities may be an initial starting point for planning. From this starting point planning may be refined by preferred force identification to provide higher fidelity force planning assumptions necessary for plan feasibility analysis. For campaign plans, the appropriate FY GFMAP may be considered as a projection of forces available to conduct planned campaign activities.

Deployment Plan. Time-phased force lists during plan development may be documented in a notional TPFDD. The JSCP prescribes which specific contingency plans are required to be developed with a notional TPFDD. The units identified in a notional TPFDD are planning assumptions and are not execution sourced forces. A notional TPFDD developed during planning still requires execution sourcing in order to be executed.

Plan Assessment. Developed plans may be assessed periodically to determine if the plan needs to be refined or adapted, terminated or executed based on changes in the OE. The assessment of contingency plans may include contingency sourcing as part of a JCCA to provide a more detailed assessment of the ability to execute a selected plan under prescribed conditions.

Review. Developed plans allow for sustained informal dialog between planners and senior leadership during planning. Some CPG- or JSCP-directed CCMD planning requirements are prescribed JPCC review and scheduled IPRs with the Secretary or designated representative.

Figure E. Contingency Notional Depiction

Contingency and Crisis Comparison

Planning initiated in response to an emergent event or crisis uses the same construct as all other planning. However, steps may be compressed to enable the time-sensitive development of OPLANs or OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces and capabilities in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. While planning for contingencies is based on hypothetical situations and normally is conducted in anticipation of future events, planning in a crisis is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs.

	Planning for a Contingency	Planning in a Crisis
Time Available to Plan	As defined in authoritative directives (normally 6(+) months)	Situation dependent (hours, days, or up to 12 months)
Environment	Distributed, collaborative planning	Distributed, collaborative planning and execution
JPEC Involvement	Full JPEC participation. Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons.	Full JPEC participation. Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons
APEX Operational Activities	Situational Awareness Planning Assessment	Situational Awareness Planning Execution Assessment
APEX Functions	Strategic Guidance Concept Development Plan Development Plan Assessment	Strategic Guidance Concept Development Plan Development Plan Assessment
Document Assigning Planning Task	CJCS issues (1) JSCP, (2) PLANDIR, or (3) WARNORD for short-suspense planning	CJCS issues WARNORD, PLANORD or SecDef approved ALERTORD
Forces for Planning	Apportioned in JSCP	Allocated in WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD
Planning Guidance	CJCS issues JSCP or WARNORD. CCDR issues planning directive and TPFDD LOI	CJCS issues WARNORD, PLANORD, or ALERTORD. CCDR issues WARNORD, PLANORD or ALERTORD and TPFDD LOI to subordinates, supporting commands and supporting agencies
COA Selection	CCDR prepares COAs and submits to CJCS and SecDef for review. Specific COA may/or may not be selected	CCDR develops Commanders Estimate with recommended COA
CONOPS Approval	SecDef approves planning or directs additional planning or changes	President/SecDef approve COA, disapproves or approves further planning
Final Planning Product	Campaign Plan Level 1-4 Contingency Plan	OPORD
Final Planning Product Approval	CCDR submits final plan to CJCS for review and SecDef for approval	CCDR submits final plat1 to President/SecDef for approval
Execution Document	NA	CJCS issues SecDef-approved EXORD. CCDR issues EXORD
Output	Plan	Execution

Legend

ALERTORD	Alert Order	JSCP	Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
APEX	Adaptive Planning and Execution	LOI	Letter of instruction
CCDR	Combatant Commander	OPORD	Operations Order
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	PLANDIR	Planning Directive
COA	Course of Action	PLANORD	Planning Order
CONOPS	Concept of Operations	SecDef	Secretary of Defense
EXORD	Execute Order	TPFDD	Time-phased Force and Deployment Data
JPEC	Joint Planning and Execution Community	WARNORD	Warning Order

Figure G. Contingency and Crisis Comparison

III. Sequencing Actions

"If I were given one hour to save the planet, I would spend fifty-nine minutes defining the problem and one minute resolving it."

-Albert Einstein

This section gives a broad overview of sequencing actions and phasing.

1. Sequencing Actions and Phasing

Part of the art of planning is determining the sequence of actions that best accomplishes the mission. The concept of operations describes in sequence the start of the operation to the projected status of the force at the operation's end, or endstate. If the situation dictates a significant change in mission, tasks, task organization, or priorities of support during the operation, the CDR may phase the operation.¹ A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity.

a. **Phasing.** A phase is a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. Phasing, which can be used in any operation regardless of size, helps the CDRs organize operations by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing helps CDRs and staffs visualize, design, and plan the entire operation or campaign and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. It helps them systematically achieve military objectives that cannot be attained all at once by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Phasing also helps CDRs mitigate risk in the more dangerous or difficult portions of an operation.

(1) Each phase is designed to nest with the intent for the overall campaign and sequenced to achieve an endstate that will set conditions for commencement of the next phase. The CDR will declare his/her intent for each phase that supports his overall intent for the operation or campaign. Each phase must have a specified set of conditions for both the beginning and intended endstate. Leaders should recognize that lines of operation (LOO) or effort (LOE) (see Chapter 5-3a, *Concept Development*) are likely to run throughout the phases to provide the logical framework for the entire operation or campaign. Each operation or campaign is unique and the phasing must make sense for the campaign. While phases should ideally be flexibly event-oriented, the staff must also consider the time-oriented resourcing requirements for the activities of each phase.

(2) For each phase, the campaign's CONOPS should describe the following elements:

(a) **Intent and schemes of movement and maneuver.** The CDR's intent for the phase must be clear. Describe the purpose, endstate, and the operational risk to the campaign during this phase. The schemes of movement and maneuver may be narratives of the various LOO and LOE as they are executed during this particular phase. The flow of forces and capability into theater are broadly described as are subsequent joint force maneuver schemes to achieve the various operational objectives. In campaigns where LOEs are used (as opposed to LOOs) and/or where positional advantage may not be consistently critical to success, the scheme of maneuver uses the logic of purpose and may describe how and

¹ ADRP 3-0

when certain objectives within each LOE must be achieved, especially in relation to the objectives on the other LOEs of the campaign.

(b) Objectives and effects (desired and undesired). Describe the objectives for each phase, and the major effects that must be achieved to realize those objectives. Describe how the force's objectives are related to those of the next higher organization and to other organizations (especially if the military is a supporting effort).

(c) Tasks to subordinate and supporting commands and agencies. The CDR assigns tasks to subordinate CDRs, along with the capabilities and support necessary to achieve them. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on that specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same domain (air, land, sea, or space) or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Include identification of requests for support to organizations outside of DOD.

(d) Command and control (C2) organization and geometry of the area of operations (AO). Note any changes to C2 structure or to the geometry of the AOR (for CCMDs) or joint operations area (JOA) (for subordinate joint forces) or AOs (for subordinate non-joint forces).

(e) Assessment methodology. Identify the basic methodology for assessing accomplishment of objectives. Include assessments to help gauge if the objectives actually support achievement of the endstate.

(f) Risk mitigation. Identify the areas of risk concern to the CDR and outline how the risk may be mitigated.

(g) Commander Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) and associated decision points.

(h) Transition to the next phase. Describe how the joint force will move to the next phase. Describe the endstate conditions for the phase, which should tie directly to the initiation conditions for the next phase. Include a description of transition of control from the joint force to other parties for aspects of the overall campaign.

(3) While phasing has traditionally been described in a 6-phase model, this model has been problematic in describing operations that are not predominately military. While it works well for operations such as Desert Storm, it breaks down in describing some of the operations, activities and actions associated with long-term campaigns and competition activities that occur below the level of armed conflict (e.g., U.S. actions toward Russia in Ukraine). JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*, models several phasing constructs that may apply. The bottom line is that the phases should be adapted to the environment, the problem, and the operational approach – not vice versa.

Inducement: Increases the benefits of and/or reduces the cost of compliance (increasing overall utility of complying with our demands).

Persuasion: Alters the preferences against which the costs and benefits are evaluated (changing the decision context).

(4) Phasing Model.

(a) Phasing is critical to arranging all tasks of an operation that cannot be conducted simultaneously. It describes how the CDR envisions the overall operation unfolding. It is the logical expression of the CDR's visualization in time. Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase.

(b) Figure A is a notional phasing model and displays six phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize the environment, and enable civil authority. Each phase may be considered during planning and assessment. This construct is meant to provide planners a template while not imparting constraints on the flexibility of CCDRs.

This notional six-phase model is not intended to be a universally prescriptive template for all conceivable joint operations and is expected to be tailored to the character and duration of the operation to which it applies.




Figure A. Notional Phasing Model

(5) A phase can be characterized by the “focus” that is placed on it. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another, but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Each phase should have a set of starting conditions (that define the start of the phase) and ending conditions (that define the end of the phase). The ending conditions of one phase are the starting conditions for the next phase. Phases are necessarily linked and gain significance in the larger context of the campaign.


The nature of operations and activities during a typical joint combat operation will change from its beginning (when the CJCS issues the execute order) to the operation’s end (when the joint force disbands and components return to a pre-operation status). Shaping activities usually precede the operation and may continue during and after the operation. The purpose of shaping activities is to help set the conditions for successful execution of the operation. Figure B on the following page shows that from deter through enable civil authority, the operations and activities in these groups vary in magnitude—time, intensity, forces, etc., — as the operation progresses. At various points in time, each specific group might characterize the main effort of the joint force.

For example, dominate activities would characterize the main effort after the joint force seizes the initiative until the enemy no longer is able to effectively resist. Even so, activities in the other groups would usually occur concurrently at some level of effort. The following illustration and paragraphs provide more information on the nature of these activities.

“It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.”

Mark Twain

A Notional Joint Combat Operation Model



- The model depicts six general groups of military activities that typically comprise a single joint combat operation. The model applies to a large-scale combat operation as well as to a combat operation relatively limited in scope and duration. It shows that emphasis on activity types shifts as an operation progresses.
- Operation shaping activities may begin during plan development to help set conditions for successful execution. They may continue after the operation ends if the command continues to maintain an operation plan.
- Theater and global shaping activities occur continuously to support theater and global requirements. Specific theater and global shaping activities may support a specific joint operation plan during its execution.

Figure B. Notional Joint Combat Operation Model

2. The Six-Phase Construct

a. The six-phase construct is described as follows:

(1) **Shape.** Shaping Operations are focused on partners, potential partners and those that might impede our efforts or provide indirect support to adversaries. Shaping supports deterrence by showing resolve, strengthening partnership and fostering regional security. Insofar as the influencing of potential adversaries is concerned, shaping utilizes inducement and persuasion. Shaping activities set the foundations for operational access as well as develop the relationships and organizational precursors that enable effective partnerships in time of crisis.

(a) Participation in effective regional security frameworks with other instruments of national and multi-national power is critical. Pre-crisis shaping activities by their nature rely heavily on the non-military contributors to unified action; for example, the State Department as the lead agency for U.S. foreign policy leads the individual country teams, funds security assistance and is responsible for the integration of information as an instrument of national power. Also, the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has the mission to lead, coordinate and institutionalize USG civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife.

I. Planning

The primary goal of planning is not the development of elaborate plans that inevitably must be changed; a more enduring goal is the development of planners who can cope with the inevitable change.

1. Planning

Planning is the **process** of thinking about and organizing the activities required to achieve a desired goal (forethought). It is an anticipatory decision-making process that helps in coping with complexities and combines forecasting of developments with the preparation of scenarios and how to react to them. It is conducted for different planning horizons, from long-range to short-range. Depending on the echelon and circumstances, units may plan in years, months, or weeks, or in days, hours, and minutes. The defining challenges to effective planning are uncertainty and time. Uncertainty increases with the length of the planning horizon and the rate of change in an OE. A tension exists between the desire to plan far into the future to facilitate preparation and the fact that the farther into the future the CDR plans, the less certain the plan will remain relevant. Given the uncertain nature of the OE, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to develop a framework for action in the midst of such uncertainty.¹

Planning is the **art and science** of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and determining effective ways to bring that future about. Planning helps leaders understand situations; develop solutions to problems; direct, coordinate, and synchronize actions; prioritize efforts; and anticipate events. In its simplest form, planning helps leaders determine how to move from the current state of affairs to a more desirable future state while identifying potential opportunities and threats along the way. It is a **continuous learning activity**. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with the production of an order. During preparation and execution, the CDR and staff continuously refine the order to account for changes in the situation. Subordinates and others provide assessments about what works, what does not work, and how the force can do things better. In some circumstances, CDRs may determine that the current order (to include associated branches and sequels) no longer applies. In these instances, instead of modifying the current order, CDRs reframe the problem and develop a new plan.

a. **The Functions of Planning.** Imperfect knowledge and assumptions about the future are inherent in all planning. Planning cannot predict with precision how the enemies will react or how civilians will respond during operations. Nonetheless, the understanding and learning that occurs during planning have great value. Even if units do not execute the plan exactly as envisioned—and few ever do—planning results in an improved understanding of the situation that facilitates future decision making.² Planning and plans help leaders—

- Understand situations and develop solutions to problems.
- Task-organize the force and prioritize efforts.
- Direct, coordinate, and synchronize action.
- Anticipate events and adapt to changing circumstances.

¹ ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*

² *Ibid*


b. Planning keeps us oriented on future objectives despite the requirements of current operations. By anticipating events beforehand, planning helps the CDR seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. As a result, the force anticipates events and acts purposefully and effectively before the adversary can act or before situations deteriorate. In addition, planning helps anticipate favorable turns of events that could be exploited during shaping operations.

c. A product of planning is a plan or order—a directive for future action. CDRs issue plans and orders to subordinates to communicate their visualization of the operations and to direct action. Plans and orders synchronize the action of forces in time, space, and purpose to achieve objectives and accomplish the mission. They inform others outside the organization on how to cooperate and provide support. These plans and orders describe a situation, establish a task organization, lay out a concept of operations, assign tasks to subordinate units, and provide essential coordinating instructions. The plan serves as a foundation for which the force can rapidly adjust from based on changing circumstance. The measure of a good plan is not whether execution transpires as planned, but whether the plan facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.

d. Planning provides an informed forecast of how future events may unfold. It entails identifying and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance to include thinking through consequences of certain actions. Planning involves thinking about ways to influence the future as well as how to respond to potential events. **Put simply, planning is thinking critically and creatively about what to do and how to do it, while anticipating changes along the way.**

2. Conceptual and Detailed Planning

Planning consists of two separate, but closely related, components: a conceptual component and a detailed component as shown in the figure below. Conceptual planning involves understanding the OE and the problem, determining the operation's end state, and visualizing an operational approach. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to **operational art** and is the focus of the CDR with staff support. Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with the **science of operations** including the synchronization of the forces in time, space, and purpose. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of force as a whole toward a common goal. Effective planning requires the integration of both the conceptual and detailed components of planning.³



Conceptual and Detailed Planning

³ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*

3. Operational Art and Planning

Operational art and design provide context for decision-making and how the many facets of the problem are likely to interact, enabling CDRs and planners to identify hazards, threats, consequences, opportunities and risks. Planning is both a science and an art.⁴

a. **Cognitive Approach - Art.** Conceptual planning is directly associated with operational art which is the cognitive approach used by CDRs and staffs, supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity and judgement to develop strategies, campaigns and operations to organize and employ military forces by **integrating ends, ways, means and risks**. Operational art is a thought process that guides conceptual and detailed planning to produce executable plans and orders. Operational art relies on the ability of the CDR and planners to identify what tools are required to address the planning problems. Different CDRs and planners will need different tools in their tool box to help them, as each person has inherent strengths and weaknesses. CDRs apply judgment based on their knowledge and experience to select the right time and place to act, assign tasks, prioritize actions, and allocate resources. Similarly, every problem is different and may require different tools to analyze and address them. The choice of COA, combination of forces, threats, choice of tactics, and arrangement of activities etc., will be different for every OE and problem. One size does not fit all. These belong to the art of planning. The art of planning requires understanding the dynamic relationships among friendly forces, the threat, and other aspects of the OE. It includes making decisions based on skilled judgment acquired from experience, training, study, imagination, and critical and creative thinking. The art of planning involves the CDR's willingness to accept risk.

b. **Analytical Framework - Design.** Design is a methodology for **applying critical and creative thinking** to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. Critical thinking captures the reflective and continuous learning essential to design. Creative thinking involves thinking in new, innovative ways while capitalizing on imagination, insight, and novel ideas. Design is a way of organizing the activities of understanding, visualizing, and describing within an organization. Design occurs throughout the operations process before and during detailed planning, through preparation, and during execution and assessment. Operational design is that analytical framework that underpins planning and supports the CDRs and planners in organizing and understanding the OE as a complex interactive system. Many aspects of military operations, such as movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects, are quantifiable. They are part of the science of planning, they can be measured and analyzed and while not easy, the science of planning is fairly straightforward.⁵

c. As CDRs conceptualize the operation, their vision guides the staff through design and into detailed planning. Design is continuous throughout planning and “evolves” with increased understanding throughout the operations process. Design underpins the role of the CDR in the operations process, guiding the iterative and often cyclic application of understanding, visualizing, and describing. As these iterations occur, the design concept—the tangible link to detailed planning—is forged. Design provides an approach for how to generate change from an existing situation to a desired objective or condition. Effective planners are grounded in both the science and the art of planning.

4. Defining Challenges

a. Planning is also the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out an operational approach (a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission) to achieve that future. Planning is both a continuous and a cyclical activity of the operations process

⁴ JP 3-0, *Joint Campaigns and Operations*

⁵ ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*

II. Operational Activities

1. Overview

The Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require, is the function of joint planning and execution. Joint planning and execution incorporates a joint enterprise for the development, maintenance, assessment, and implementation of global campaign plans, CCMD campaign and related contingency plans and orders prepared in response to Presidential, SecDef, or Chairman direction or requirements. Its activities span many organizational levels, including the interaction between the SecDef, CCDRs, coalition, and interagency which ultimately assists the President and SecDef to decide when, where, and how to commit U.S. military forces.

a. Strategic direction shapes joint planning and execution and it is integrated within the national strategic framework. Civilian control of the military is exercised via this strategic direction, including the delegation of authorities and allocation of resources. A sustained civilian-military dialogue provides a common understanding of the operating environment and options for military ends, ways, means, and associated risk. Within the joint planning and execution framework, this civilian-military dialogue informs and is informed by ongoing Joint planning and execution. Substantive changes in the operating environment or strategic ends, ways, and means may also drive more enduring changes to strategic direction. This mutual influence is foundational and is depicted in Figure A.

b. Joint Planning and Execution. Joint Planning and Execution encompasses the full spectrum of military doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P). It is the compilation of joint policies, processes, procedures, tools, training, and education used by the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) to monitor, plan, execute and assess the planning and execution functions associated with joint operations. Joint planning integrates strategic and operational planning with execution activities of the JPEC to meet national security objectives and facilitate seamless transition from planning to execution. Operational activities and functions span many organizations at all levels of command, including interaction between the Secretary, CCDRs, subordinate forces, allied, coalition, and interagency partners. Collaboration and an integrated approach among the supported and supporting commands, Services, and other essential stakeholders is a fundamental component to achieve unified action through an understanding of the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the JPEC stakeholders. Through joint planning and execution, the entire chain of command is informed, including the President and SecDef, facilitating informed decisions on how, when, and where to employ the joint force. Joint planning and execution is a scalable process which can be adapted to support planning and execution with or without time constraints and under changing conditions. The planning and execution functions are depicted sequentially but can be compressed or conducted in parallel in order to meet time constraints.¹

(1) An iterative process. Each activity and function influences and is influenced by activities and functions which are performed and reviewed at multiple echelons of commands in overlapping timeframes. Facilitating communication and understanding of strategic guidance between these echelons of command takes place in several formats: formal strategy and policy documents; the plans review process; and via specific, individual communications with CCMDs. CCDR planning may also influence strategic direction and guidance, either during planning or execution.

¹ CJCSM 3130.01, *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities*

Civilian-Military Dialogue

Planning Functions




Figure A. Civilian-Military Dialogue

(2) Joint planning and execution leverages existing information technology (IT) tools and doctrinal processes. IT tools enable planner collaboration and access to shared authoritative data. Doctrinal processes provide planners a variety of flexible analytical techniques for framing problems and logically developing plans or orders to accomplish missions or objectives. The joint planning and execution enterprise, including joint doctrine, policies/ procedures, and IT capabilities, facilitates the transition from planning to the effective execution of military operations. Strict adherence to policies and procedures is required to achieve unified action.

(3) The joint planning and execution process is composed of four operational activities (**situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment**) that provide an operating framework for one or more planning or execution efforts. The operational activities support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command and civilian leadership. The planning and execution functions depict the elements, activities, and products that may be ongoing or under development. A sustained civilian-military dialog (Figure A) occurs in parallel to these activities and functions to inform decision making at all levels of the chain of command and ensure alignment with current strategic guidance as depicted in Figures A and B.




Figure B. Joint Planning and Execution Process

(4) This process leverages CCDR design, military planning and execution and the JPP framework that forms the basis for planning. The Operational Activities are discussed below. Planning Functions are discussed in Section III of this chapter and within Chapters 5 and 6. Execution Functions are detailed in Chapter 7.

2. Operational Activities

a. **Operational Activities:** Operational activities are persistent and interdependent activities performed continuously by CDRs and staffs at all levels of the chain of command. They provide a framework under which one or more planning or execution efforts are conducted. These are discussed in detail in the following appendices.²

² CJCSM 3130.01, Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities

(1) **Situational Awareness.** Situational awareness supports the cycle of planning, execution, and assessment activities. The outputs of situational awareness inform CDRs at all levels of the chain of command, from the President to the tactical level with a current, relevant understanding of the dynamic operating environment. Situational awareness is a command-wide activity as all elements of the staff and subordinate commands report on their OE. As threats to national security interests are identified, the focus of situational awareness is adapted to the CDR's priorities. Situational awareness information is provided to the CDR through a command's operational cycle in order to inform decision making. Staff activities that inform situational awareness include:

(a) **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE).** JIPOE is the iterative, analytical process used by all-source joint intelligence organizations to produce and manage intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the JFC's decision-making process. It is a continuous process that involves four major steps: (1) define the OE; (2) describe the impact of the OE; (3) evaluate the adversary and other relevant actors; and (4) determine the adversary's most likely COA and the adversary's COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment. The CDR's staff uses the products to produce their respective staff estimates; develop, wargame, and compare COAs; and assist in the decision regarding which COA to adopt. The CCMD Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOC) have continuous JIPOE analysis and production responsibilities in support of CCMD operation planning, execution and assessment. See Chapter 4 for greater detail on JIPOE.^{3,4}

(b) **Strategic Estimates.** The strategic estimate is a prerequisite for the development of the CDR's theater or functional strategy to address global threats. It encompasses all the aspects that influence the CCMD's OE. Strategic estimates provide the CDR's perspective of the strategic and operational levels of the OE, desired changes required to meet specified regional or functional objectives, and the CDR's visualization of how those objectives might be achieved. CCMDs annually develop and regularly update a strategic estimate of their theater or functional area that includes a description and analysis of political, military, and economic factors and trends, and the threats and opportunities that could facilitate or hinder the achievement of strategic-directed objectives. While the strategic estimate is not specific to a planning problem, it is a starting point for conducting more detailed staff estimates and provides the CDR a baseline of understanding of the OE.⁵

(c) **Staff Estimates.** Staff estimates are running functional estimates, updated continuously, that support situational awareness. Staff estimates inform the CDR, staff, and subordinate commands how the functional areas support planning and execution. They should identify critical shortfalls or obstacles that impact mission accomplishment. Staff estimates may be tailored to support the unique requirements of one or more planning effort.⁶

(2) **Planning.** Planning implements strategic direction through the development of military plans and orders focused on military objectives. Planners provide military options and COAs for military actions which inform the civilian-military dialogue and decision-making and enable a shared understanding of ends, ways, means, and risk. Planning is an overarching continuous operational activity that spans the full spectrum of joint operations and may encompass multiple simultaneous planning efforts. Joint planning and execution integrates planning into one unified construct utilized during contingency or crisis situations to facilitate unity of effort and the transition from planning to execution. Planning functions can be performed in series over a period of time or they can be compressed, performed in parallel, or truncated as appropriate.

(a) **Collaborative, Parallel Planning Environment.** Planning at all levels involves a large collection of stakeholders and functional specialists, who require a holistic view while concentrating on specific elements of a plan. The CCMD will establish a collaborative plan-

³ CJCSM 3314.01, *Intelligence Planning*

⁴ JP 2-01.3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*


⁵ CJCSM 3130.01, *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities*

⁶ JP 5-0, *Operations*

III. Planning Functions

Planning Functions Overview

Joint planning and execution encompass four operational activities, four planning functions, seven execution functions, and a number of related products. The four planning functions are: 1) **strategic guidance**, 2) **concept development**, 3) **plan development**, and 4) **plan assessment**.¹



Planning Functions Screen Shot from CJCSM 3130.02

These planning functions facilitate an early understanding of the situation, problems, objectives and measures which will lead to the production of plans or orders that can be rapidly and effectively transitioned to execution and accomplish specified military objectives and to give military options to the President and SecDef as they seek to shape the environment and respond to contingencies. These planning functions are not mechanical. Planners perform JPP steps nested within these planning functions while considering the continuous operational activities that apply to each function. Effective planners also consider design, depicted as integration of the operational activities, while performing each function.

While these functions are depicted and may be performed sequentially, planning is iterative and functions may be re-visited as the planning conditions require to include planning continuing into execution. The SecDef, CJCS, CCDR, or any other Joint CDR may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a joint plan by reentering the planning process at any of the earlier functions. The time spent accomplishing each activity and function depends on the circumstances.

¹ CJCSM 3122.01 Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures

Planning Functions

Planning functions can be performed in series or in parallel as the situation dictates. During a crisis, planning functions are tailored to the time available and may be truncated, compressed, or conducted in parallel with execution functions. Instead of planning assumptions, crisis planning may be based upon the actual conditions of the OE.

Joint plans should be based upon strategic direction, reflect the current operating environment, limitations, developed and documented in standardized products and formats that are required to facilitate plan implementation and transition to execution.

Strategic Guidance - Function I (see Chapter 5-1(a))

The President, SecDef, and the CJCS, with appropriate consultation, formulate suitable and feasible military objectives to counter threats. The CDR may provide input through one or more CDR's Assessments. This function is used to develop planning guidance for preparation of COAs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance (e.g., JSCP for contingency plans or a CJCS WARNORD, PLANORD or ALERTORD for a crisis). The primary end product is a CDR's Mission Statement for contingency planning and a CDR's Assessment (OPREP-3PCA) or CDRs Estimate in a crisis.

Concept Development - Function II (see Chapter 5-III(a))

During contingency planning, the supported CDR develops the CDR's CONOPS for SecDef approval, based on SecDef, CJCS, and Service Chief planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In a crisis, concept development is based on situational awareness guidance, resource allocations from approved contingency plans, and a CJCS PLANORD, or ALERTORD. Using the CDR's mission statement, CCMD planners develop preliminary COAs and staff estimates. COAs are then compared and the CDR recommends a COA for SecDef approval in a CDR's *Estimate*. The CDR also requests SecDef guidance on interagency coordination. The approved COA becomes the basis of the CONOPS containing conflict termination planning, supportability estimates, and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased database of force requirements, with estimated sustainment.

Plan Development - Function III (see Chapter 6-1)

This function is used in developing an OPLAN, CONPLAN or an OPORD with applicable supporting annexes and in refining preliminary feasibility analysis. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, conflict termination, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities. Detailed planning begins with SecDef approval for further planning in a non-crisis environment or a CJCS WARNORD, PLANORD or ALERTORD in a crisis situation; it ends with a SecDef-approved Plan or OPORD.

Plan Assessment – Function IV (see Chapter 6-III)

During this function, the CDR refines the complete plan while supporting and subordinate CCDRs, Services and supporting agencies complete their supporting plans for his/her review and approval. CCDRs continue to develop and analyze branches and sequels as required or directed. The CDR and the JS continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan revision or refinement.

a. The JS, Services, CCMDs, and Agencies monitor current readiness and availability status to assess sourcing impacts and refine sourcing COAs should the plan be considered for near-term execution.

b. The CDR may conduct as many plan reviews as are required with the SecDef during Plan Assessment. These reviews could focus on branches/options and situational or assumption changes requiring major reassessment or significant plan modification/adaptation, but might also include a variety of other pertinent topics (e.g., information operations, special access programs, nuclear escalation mitigation).

Global Force Management (GFM)

The author and publisher would like to acknowledge and thank Mr. Timothy Conway for his subject matter expertise, contributions and thought—leader review to this chapter on global force management.

"Because we cannot be certain when, where, or under what conditions the next fight will occur, the Joint Force must maintain a boxer's stance -with the strength, agility, endurance, resilience, flexibility, and awareness to fight and win against any potential adversary."¹

The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied. To protect U.S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the NSS and NDS in this environment, the finite Joint Force will need to be used wisely.² The methods used to inform leaders of the options, risks and COAs requires a complex process that evaluates the ends, ways, means, and risks of using military forces to pursue strategic and operational objectives. That process is GFM and it determines which forces are employed at acceptable risk to current and future strategic and operational objectives. To build the Joint Force for the future requires a continuous recalibration of its capabilities and making those additional investments allowing us to succeed in all missions. Determining the best Joint Force of the future should be informed by near-term force needs and shortfalls, which is done through GFM assessments.

The DoD's enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. Reinforcing America's traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. The experiences with operations such as Operation Urgent Response in Haiti while continuing to execute combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that even while sourcing major combat operations in one part of the world, we may be called upon to react to a crisis in disparate regions of the globe. However, an earthquake in one AOR while conducting major operations in another can have a rippling impact on force sourcing for current operations and long-term security planning.

Per the NDS, long-term strategic competitions with our adversaries are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats these adversaries pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future. Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes, defeat terrorist threats to the U.S., and consolidate our gains while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.³ To remain dominant within this complex and uncertain security landscape, the ability to **dynamically align the force pool** must improve and keep pace with the complexity of the operational environment. The wicked problem of balancing the force against global and institutional demand requires strict purposeful design to allow for timely and informed decisions and to ultimately satisfy the broadest array of objectives.

¹ 2018 National Military Strategy Framework, Joseph Dunford Jr., 19th Chairman of the JCS

² National Defense Strategy (NDS)

³ Ibid

1. Purpose

This chapter provides an overview of the GFM process, which starts and ends with the SecDef. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §§ 113, 153, 162, and 163, the SecDef directs the Services to provide ready and available forces, assigns and allocates forces/capabilities, provides planning guidance to CCMDs and provides overarching strategic guidance to CCMDs and the Chairman. The Chairman, in turn, recommends integrated solutions to employ the force to achieve the SecDef direction and develops strategic-level planning guidance including apportioned forces/capabilities to CCMDs for joint planning. CCMDs use apportioned forces as an assumption in developing plans and to coordinate force/capability planning requirements with the CJCS based on the SecDef's guidance.

The GFM processes directs the Services to provide sufficient ready and available forces to execute the NDS via the Directed Readiness Tables (DRT) (see para.3), distributes forces among the CCMD's via the assignment of forces, provides a process to temporarily adjust the distribution of forces among the CCMD's to meet dynamic challenges worldwide via the allocation process, provides apportioned forces, which is the Services' estimate of the number of forces that can reasonably be made available over a general timeline, should we be faced with executing a major operation and constantly assesses the results. The end result is a sufficient capacity of forces to execute the NDS, a risk-informed distribution of forces among the CCMDs and a starting point to begin resource-informed planning. To ensure the Joint Force remains relevant in meeting both current and future challenges, the GFM assessment processes compare supply with demands.

2. Scope

Strategic objectives are specified in strategic guidance documents, such as the NDS, DPG, and the JSCP. The Secretary also communicates strategic direction through the Chairman in the form of orders or other written or verbal communications. These strategic objectives specify the desired ends that plans and operations articulate the ways to achieve. The NDS provides a comprehensive framework to prioritize strategic objectives to shape the planning and execution of military actions to pursue the objectives and address the fundamental need to focus and apply finite resources. The resources employed in military planning and execution include interagency contract, coalition, DoD Expeditionary Civilian (DoD-EC), but are predominately military forces.

The force development processes identify, prioritize, and build the size and type of future forces necessary to pursue a strategy with acceptable risk. The Secretary through directed readiness specifies the force that must be ready and available to be employed quickly and used in creative ways.

Contingency and other plans and orders to achieve these objectives propose and direct a way to achieve the specified ends. Since campaign and contingency plans often rely on the same force pool, forces need to be prepared to execute any potential operations related to the desired objectives (ends) while also executing current operations and conducting military activities in pursuit of near-term objectives. The GFM assignment and allocation processes are the command and control (C2) mechanisms the Secretary uses to posture and distribute forces (means) which enable CCDRs to conduct operations and military activities to achieve strategic and operational objectives (ways) at acceptable risk.

The strategic environment will continue to be complex, dynamic and uncertain. The U.S. military will continue to be involved globally in executing GCPs, CCPs, other campaign and contingency plans, and ongoing operations, while being prepared to respond to domestic and overseas crises in support of NSS, NDS and NMS.⁴ Success in this environment requires a coherent use of the force pool among the competing priorities in both planning and execution. This is achieved by the integrated use of the GFM processes of directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment and assessment (DR4A). The goal of these processes is to provide CCDRs the forces to best support U.S. Military objectives (both

⁴SecDef directed GFM procedures are contained in the GFMIG, NDS, NMS, CPG, and CJCSM 3130.06

3-2 Global Force Management (GFM)

current and potential future) using assigned and allocated forces to accomplish missions while mitigating military risk. Directed readiness directs the Services to provide enough ready and available forces to execute the NDS. To allow feasible plans to be developed, CCMDs are provided force planning assumptions based on analysis of the force pool. The number of forces that are reasonably expected to be available, (globally, not to a specific plan or CCMD) over a general timeframe should the plan be executed, are called apportioned forces. The U.S. Military is tasked to execute the NDS objectives, which focus on major power competition. To restore readiness and build a credible deterrent force requires either building more forces or using the Services' capacity to field forces at less than the Services' maximum capacity. As the U.S. Military continues to face unpredictable fiscal challenges, the wise use of forces to meet the many global demands will become more and more important.

a. CCDRs are directed by strategic guidance and direction, and various orders, to plan and execute operations and missions. CCDRs are assigned forces that are to be used to accomplish those operations and missions; however, in the dynamic world environment, competing missions may require adjusting the distribution of assigned forces among the CCMDs and Services through allocation. Each allocation decision involves tasking a CCMD, Secretary of a Military Department, or director of DOD Agency to provide a force or individual to another CCMD. This involves risk to not only the providing Service and/or CCMD, but also to other ongoing operations, campaign and contingency plans across the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).⁵

b. Integrated Deterrence.⁶ The NDS sets priorities to compete, deter, dissuade and, if necessary, defeat priority threats while continuing to conduct global foreign anti-violent extremist organization operations. It focuses attention on the strategic priorities. To counter and compete with multiple adversaries while continuing to resource forces globally for continued operations requires the force to be utilized more dynamically and in a more integrated deterrent manner.

The Secretary assigns and allocates forces to CCMDs. For the CCMDs to employ those forces those forces need to be ready and available. The GFM process begins with direction to the Services to build enough ready and available forces to execute the NDS and keep our military advantage into the future. This direction is contained in the GFMIG and the DRT. To comply with the DRT, the Services adjust their force development and force generation processes. Previously, the assignment and allocation processes began with the CCMDs submitting force requirements to execute their UCP assigned missions, tasked operations, and other military activities in their campaign plans.

The allocation process now begins with developing Top-Down Guidance that the Joint Staff, ICW the Services, develop a plan to align the forces against the NDS-specified strategic priorities, the GCPs, and the CCPs while maintaining a credible deterrent of ready and available forces. When the Chairman approves the Top-Down Guidance, the CCDRs develop and submit their requirements. The Joint Force Coordinator (JS JFC)** and JFPs consider the CCDRs submission as bottom-up refinement to the plan. The significant change postures the force against the strategic priorities first. Changes to the strategic posture in the Top-Down Guidance to pursue operational objectives are considered in light of

⁵ *Joint Planning and Execution Community. See JP 5-0, Joint Planning.*

⁶ *Global Force Management Implementation Guidance*

** NOTE: CJCS, through the Director, J-3 (DJ-3), will serve as the Joint Force Coordinator (JFC) responsible for providing recommended sourcing solutions for all validated force and JIA requirements. In support of the DJ-3, the Joint Staff Deputy Director for Regional Operations and Force Management (J-35) assumes the responsibilities of the JFC. As such the JFC will coordinate with the Joint Staff J-3, Secretaries of the Military Departments, CCDRs, JFPs, and DoD Agencies. The Joint Force Coordinator (JFC) is referred to in current DoD GFM guidance and policy as the JFC. For clarity in this text the Joint Force Commander will be annotated by the acronym (JFC) and Joint Force Coordinator will be referred to with the acronym (JS JFC) to denote the Joint Staff Joint Force Coordinator.

Force Pool



Service-Retained Forces – AC and RC operational forces under the administrative control of respective Secretaries of the Military Departments, and not assigned to a CCMD. These forces remain under the administrative control of their respective Services and are commanded by a Service-designated CDR responsible to the Service unless allocated to a CDR for the execution of operational missions. (GFMIG)

Unassigned Forces – Forces not assigned to a CCMD IAW 10 U.S.C. § 162, and instead remain under Service control in order to carry out functions of the Secretary of a Military Department IAW 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b). (GFMIG)

Figure B. Force Pool (GFMIG).

3. GFM Principles

a. Force Management Framework. Figure C illustrates the conceptual force-planning construct that frames the conversation about balancing risk to strategy with risk to force inside a given fiscal year. It depicts the entire force pool and how it is being employed. It depicts the strategy-based demand signal for a ready and available credible deterrent force generated by the Secretary. The framework also captures assigned and allocated forces being employed to execute GCPs and CCDR operational missions as well as the forces undergoing reset in the Services force generation process. Finally, it depicts the institutional forces that perform Military Department statutory responsibilities. Examples of institutional forces include recruiting, training, and material commands as well as the Service HQs. The Incident Response Force (IRF) and Contingency Response Force (CRF) represent the different levels of directed readiness.




Figure C. Force Management Framework

b. Global Demand. In order to distribute a limited number of forces among the competing CCMD demands and preserve the ability of the force to respond to future potential contingencies, SecDef, OSD, CJCS, JCS, CCMDs, Services, Joint Staff, JS JFC, JFPs and FPs must understand the entire global demand on the force pool. By understanding the global demand, the risks of allocating or not allocating forces for a given operation can be better understood. Global demand consists of operational force (including assigned forces), Service institutional, Joint Individual Augmentee (JIA), exercise demand and future challenges IAW the GFMIG. FPs include Secretaries of the Military Departments, CCMDs with assigned forces, Commandant U.S. Coast Guard, Directors of DOD agencies, and OSD organizations that provide force-sourcing solutions to CCDR force requirements.

Global Force Management

III. Force Planning

1. Force Planning and the GFM Process

a. GFM Process during Planning. The Apportionment Tables provide the number of forces reasonably expected to be available for planning. These tables should be used as a beginning assumption in planning. As the plan is refined, there may be forces identified that are required above and beyond those apportioned. Those forces should be requested, as required, to be augmented above the number apportioned for planning, or “augmentation forces.” The CJCS may approve planning to continue with the revised assumption of using the identified augmentation forces. These augmentation forces are then allotted for planning. However, should the plan be executed, planners should be prepared for the risk associated with the potential of those “augmentation forces” not being available.

(1) Planners continually refine and assess the plan throughout Concept and Plan Development. To enable assessments, planners must *assume* that units are allotted to the identified plan force requirements and to enable plan *assessments*, planners identify preferred forces. As the plan is refined, the level of analysis used to identify preferred forces usually increases. Since contingency plans rely on a foundation of assumptions, if an event occurs that necessitates execution of a contingency plan, the planning assumptions have to be re-validated. The planners will usually verify planning assumptions against the unfolding event and re-perform planning functions from Strategic Guidance to Plan Assessment, as required to adapt it to the realities surrounding the event rather than transitioning directly to execution. These planning functions may be performed very deliberately or in a time-constrained environment, as time allows.

(2) As a contingency plan is either approved or nearing approval, the CJCS or, if delegated, the DJS may direct the JS JFC/JFPs to contingency source a plan to support CJCS and/or SecDef's strategic risk assessments or IPRs. CCDRs may request contingency sourcing of specific plans. These requests are evaluated by the JS J5 and a contingency sourcing schedule is presented to the GFMB. The GFMB endorses the schedule and the CJCS orders the JS JFC/ JFPs to contingency source specific plans per the schedule (see contingency sourcing).

b. GFM Process during a Crisis. The same planning steps that are used to develop contingency plans are used during a crisis, but the time to conduct the planning is constrained to the time available. For planning during a crisis, preferred force identification is used the same as it was during contingency planning. Contingency sourcing is rarely used for a crisis due to the time constraints involved, but if time allows, the option exists for the CJCS to direct JS JFC/JFPs to contingency source a plan.

(1) In planning, the difference in force planning is the level of detail done with the force requirements for the plan. With contingency plans the number of planning assumptions prevents generating the detailed force requirements needed by the JS JFC/JFPs to begin execution sourcing. During crisis planning, a known event has occurred and there are fewer assumptions. *The focus of crisis planning is usually on transitioning to execution quickly.* The detailed information requirements specified to support the execution sourcing process, either emergent or annual, preclude completion until most assumptions are validated.

(2) CCDRs usually have a good understanding of the availability of their assigned forces. Availability entails the readiness of the unit, as well as the unit's time in the deployment cycle and whether it meets SecDef deployment-to-dwell (D2D) ratio requirements, and

whether the unit is already allocated to another mission. The supported CCDR generally reviews the force requirements for the contingency plan and conducts a review of assigned and previously allocated forces to determine if the mission can be done without requesting additional forces. If forces are already assigned and/or allocated that can perform the mission, the CCDR may direct those forces to perform the mission, within the constraints of the allocation authorities in the GFM. If additional forces are required, the CCDR will forward an RFF with all the details necessary, both electronically and by message RFF. The emergent force allocation process is the process to identify force requirements in support of planning during a crisis.

(3) Crisis planning transitions to execution when the order is given to execute a mission or operation, although planning continues throughout execution. During crisis planning, the CCDR considers using assigned and already allocated forces to respond to the situation. If the CCDR identifies additional forces that are required, a force request is submitted. Once this request is approved by the CCDR, that force request is considered a CCDR requirement. The force request is sent from the CCDR to the SecDef via the JS J3. The vehicle for the force request is a message called an RFF to the SecDef and JS J3 info the JS JFC/JFPs, FPs, OSD, and all other CCMDs as specified in CJCSM 3130.06, *GFM Allocation Policies and Procedures*. Each individual force requested is serialized with an FTN. An RFF message may contain one or more FTNs. To request JIAs for a JTF Headquarters, the message is called an Emergent JIA Request. The initial force or JIA request to perform a mission is an emergent JIA request.

(4) For operations that are longer in duration, the SecDef mandates that CCMD's validate their forces annually to determine the forces that require rotation. The process used to source annual forces is fundamentally the same as an emergent force request, but the annual process is necessarily modified to handle the large number of forces necessary to fulfill all CCMD requests for an entire FY. The annual submission is effectively the first RFF for a FY and should include all the forces for all the operations the CCMD anticipates executing.

2. GFM in Exercise Planning


Requests for forces to participate in exercises do not follow the same sourcing process as operational requests. Per reference *CJCS/3500.01, Joint Training Policy and Guidance for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JS JFC/JFPs receive exercise force requests directly from the supported CCDRs. Supportability by JS JFC, the JFPs (and their Service-retained conventional forces) is determined and the resulting sourcing solution is provided back directly to the supported CCDR. The SecDef is not required to allocate forces for exercises, including exercises with other countries. Subsequent deployment of these exercise sourcing solutions is effected and tracked by the JS JFC/JFPs in concert with the supported CCDR. Under most circumstances, the GFMIG authorizes JS JFC/JFPs to transfer TACON of forces to support CCDR exercises and does not require a GFM mod to be approved by the SecDef.

IV. Mutually Supporting, Interrelated DoD Processes

1. The GFM Process

GFM DR4A processes support strategic guidance and joint force availability requirements. It provides DOD senior leadership with comprehensive insight into the global availability of forces and risk and impact of proposed force changes. The GFMB serves as a guiding body that provides complementary strategic focus and direction for the DR4A process.

a. In the following figure the mutually supporting, interrelated DOD processes are viewed through a GFM lens. The stakeholders depicted include OSD, JS J3, Services (including theater Service Components), JFPs (including their assigned Service Components and subordinate commands), CCMDs (including their assigned Service Components, JTFs, and other subordinate commands).



GFM Operational View (OV-1).

b. The GFM alignment (DR4A) processes, tools, and data maintain synchronization across stakeholders and integration with related processes. This enhances the ability to efficiently and effectively align the force structure to respond to the complex, dynamic global environment. The GFM DR4A processes are among the many sub-processes within Joint Planning and Execution. Each of those sub-processes considers a specific aspect of a plan or operation and are influenced by GFM. Likewise, the other sub-processes all influence and are influenced by the others. This dependency on the multitude of variables makes planning a recursive and iterative process.

c. Each stakeholder shares data and information to collaboratively determine the best use of the force structure to meet a situation. Impacts and risks of re-aligning the force structure are visible and all stakeholders collaboratively develop mitigation strategies. Planners obtain common force structure data directly from the entities responsible for building and maintaining the data.

d. Formally and rigorously specified force structure data contains unambiguously defined semantics implemented so GFM-related computer programs can readily exploit the data. Stakeholders share a common understanding of the meaning of GFM data. Changes in any of the processes depicted as overlapping and interacting with GFM influence not only GFM directly, but often influence changes in other processes. Seamless iterative interaction and integration between these related processes are necessary for the success of each of these processes as well as success of the missions these processes exist to support.

"Get there firstest with the mostest"
General Nathan Bedford Forrest

I. (JIPOE) Joint Intel Prep of the Op Environment

MISSION ANALYSIS and JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION of the OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (JIPOE)

"Nothing is more worthy of the attention of a good general than the endeavor to penetrate the designs of the enemy."

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, 1517

1. JIPOE Overview

a. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the CDR's decision-making process. It is a continuous process that involves four major steps: (1) defining the total OE (OE); (2) describing the impact of the OE; (3) evaluating the adversary; and (4) determining and describing adversary potential courses of action (COAs), particularly the adversary's most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment.

b. The process is used to analyze the physical domains (air, land, maritime and space); the information environment (which includes cyberspace), political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems; and all other relevant aspects of the OE, and to determine an adversary's capabilities to operate within that environment. JIPOE products are used by joint force, component, and supporting command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly COAs.¹


2. JIPOE and the Intelligence Cycle

a. JIPOE is a dynamic process that both supports, and is supported by, each of the categories of intelligence operations that comprise the intelligence process.

(1) JIPOE and Intelligence Planning and Direction. The JIPOE process provides the basic data and assumptions regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the OE that help the CDR and staff identify intelligence requirements, information requirements, and collection requirements. By identifying known adversary capabilities, and applying those against the impact of the OE, JIPOE provides the conceptual basis for the CDR to visualize and understand how the adversary might threaten the command or interfere with mission accomplishment. This analysis forms the basis for developing the CDR's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), which seek to answer those questions the CDR considers vital to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Additionally, by identifying specific adversary COAs and COGs, JIPOE provides the basis for wargaming in which the staff "fights" each friendly and adversary COA. This wargaming process identifies decisions the CDR must make during execution and allows the J-2 to develop specific intelligence requirements to facilitate those decisions. JIPOE also identifies other critical information gaps regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the OE, which form the basis

¹ JP 2-01-3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*

of a collection strategy that synchronizes and prioritizes collection needs and utilization of resources within the phases of the operation.² (see figure below)



JIPOE and the Intelligence Cycle (JP 2-01.3).

(2) JIPOE and Intelligence Collection. JIPOE provides the foundation for the development of an optimal intelligence collection strategy by enabling analysts to identify the time, location, and type of anticipated adversary activity corresponding to each potential adversary COA. JIPOE products include several tools that facilitate the refinement of information requirements into specific collection requirements. JIPOE templates facilitate the analysis of all identified adversary COAs and identify named areas of interest (NAIs) where specified adversary activity, associated with each COA, may occur. JIPOE matrices are also produced that describe the indicators associated with each specified adversary activity. In addition to specifying the anticipated locations and type of adversary activity, JIPOE templates and matrices also forecast the times when such activity may occur, and can therefore facilitate the sequencing of intelligence collection requirements and the identification of the most effective methods of intelligence collection.

(3) JIPOE and Processing and Exploitation. The JIPOE process provides a disciplined yet dynamic time-phased methodology for optimizing the processing and exploiting of large amounts of data. The process enables JIPOE analysts to remain focused on the most critical aspects of the OE, especially the adversary. Incoming information and reports can be rapidly incorporated into existing JIPOE graphics, templates, and matrices. In this way, JIPOE products not only serve as excellent processing tools, but also provide a convenient medium for displaying the most up-to-date information, identifying critical information gaps, and supporting operational and campaign assessments.

(4) JIPOE and Analysis and Production. JIPOE products provide the foundation for the J-2's intelligence estimate. In fact, the JIPOE process parallels the paragraph sequence of the intelligence estimate format.³

(5) JIPOE and Dissemination and Integration. The J-2's intelligence estimate provides vital information that is required by the joint force staff to complete their estimates, and for

² See JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, for a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between intelligence requirements and information requirements. See JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, for detailed guidance on the request for information (RFI) process

³ See JP 2-01.3, *JIPOE for greater details*

4-2 (JIPOE & IPIE) I. Joint Intel Prep of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)

subordinate commanders to continue concurrent planning activities. Timely dissemination of the intelligence estimate is therefore paramount to good operation planning. If time does not permit the preparation and dissemination of a written intelligence estimate, JIPOE templates, matrices, graphics, and other data sources can and should be disseminated to other joint force staff sections, and component and supporting commands, in order to facilitate their effective integration into operation planning. JIPOE geospatial perspectives should also be provided to systems supporting the common operational picture.

(6) JIPOE and Evaluation and Feedback. Consistent with the intelligence process, the J-2 staff continuously evaluates JIPOE products to ensure that they achieve and maintain the highest possible standards of intelligence excellence as discussed in JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*. These standards require that intelligence products anticipate the needs of the CDR and are timely, accurate, usable, complete, objective, and relevant. If JIPOE products fail to meet these standards, the J-2 should take immediate remedial action. The failure of the J-2 staff to achieve and maintain intelligence product excellence may contribute to the joint force's failing to accomplish its mission.

b. Roles and Responsibilities. Some critical billets of the JIPOE process are:


(1) CCDR. The CCDR is responsible for ensuring the standardization of JIPOE products within the command and subordinate joint forces, and for establishing theater procedures for collection management and the production and dissemination of intelligence products.

(2) J-2. The J-2 has the primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, and conducting the overall JIPOE analysis and production effort at the joint force level. Through the JIPOE process, the J-2 enhances the JFC's and other staff elements' ability to visualize all relevant aspects of the OE. The J-2 uses the JIPOE process to formulate and recommend PIRs for the CDR's approval, and develops information requirements that focus the intelligence effort (collection, processing, production, and dissemination) on questions crucial to joint force planning.

(3) CCDR Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC). The JIOC is the focal point for the overall JIPOE analysis and production effort within the CCMD. It is responsible for managing collection requirements related to JIPOE and Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) efforts, and for producing intelligence products for the CCDR and subordinate commanders that support joint operation planning and ongoing operations. The JIOC ensures that the JIPOE production effort is accomplished in conjunction with all appropriate CCMD staff elements, particularly the Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC), and Information Operations (IO) staff officers. The JIOC also ensures that its JIPOE analysis is fully integrated with all IPB and JIPOE products produced by subordinate commands and other organizations. With the assistance of all appropriate joint force staff elements, the JIOC identifies information gaps in existing intelligence databases and formulates collection requirements and requests for information (RFIs) to address these shortfalls. Additionally, the CCMD JIOC may be requested to support another CCDR's federated intelligence requirements, to include JIPOE requirements. As a federated partner, the JIOC must be prepared to integrate into the overall federated intelligence architecture identified by the supported CCDR. All CCMD JIOCs are eligible to participate in federated intelligence support operations.

(4) Subordinate JFC/CDR. The subordinate CDRs clearly state their objectives, CONOPS, and operation planning guidance to their staffs and ensure that the staff fully understands their intent. Based on wargaming and the joint force staff's recommendation, the CDR selects a friendly COA and issues implementing orders. The CDR also approves the list of intelligence requirements associated with that COA. The CDR then identifies those intelligence requirements most critical to the completion of the joint force's mission as PIRs.


(5) JTF Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) or JIOC. The intelligence organization at the JTF level is normally a JISE. However, the limited resources of a JISE will usually preclude a full JIPOE effort at the JTF level without substantial augmentation, reliance on reach-back capability, and national-level assistance. To overcome this limitation, the CCDR may authorize the establishment of a JTF-level JIOC based on the scope, duration, and mission of the unit or JTF. A JTF JIOC is normally larger than a JISE and is responsible



(1) The joint force J-2 staff evaluates the available intelligence databases to determine if the necessary information is available to conduct the remainder of the JIPOE process. In nearly every situation, there will be gaps in the existing data bases. The gaps must be identified early in order for the joint force staff to initiate the appropriate intelligence collection requirements. The joint force J-2 will use the CDR's stated intent and initial PIR to establish priorities for intelligence collection, processing, production, and dissemination. The joint force J-2 staff initiates collection operations and issues RFIs to fill intelligence gaps to the level of detail required to conduct JIPOE. As additional information and intelligence is received, the J-2 staff updates all JIPOE products. If any assumptions are repudiated by new intelligence, the CDR, the J-3, and other appropriate staff elements should reexamine any evaluations and decisions that were based on those assumptions.

(2) Products from step one may include assessments of each significant characteristic, overlays of each, if applicable, and an understanding and graphical depiction of the operational area and possibly of the area of interests and entities therein which could affect our ability to accomplish our mission.

k. **Step 2 — Describe the Impact of the Operational Environment.** Step 2, describing the OE impacts, *focuses on the environment*. The first action in describing OE effects is to analyze the military aspects of the terrain. The acronym that aids in addressing the various aspects of the OE is OCOKA - Observation and Fields of Fire, Concealment and Cover, Obstacles, Key Terrain, and Avenues of Approach. This analysis is followed by an evaluation of how these aspects of the OE will affect operations for both friendly and adversary forces (see figure below.)



(1) Products developed during this step might include overlays and matrices that depict the military effects of geography, meteorological (METOC) factors, demographics, and the electromagnetic and cyberspace environments. The primary product from JIPOE produced in Step 2 is the *Modified Combined Operations Overlay (MCOO)* and is shown in the following figure. The MCOO is “a JIPOE product used to portray the effects of each battlespace dimension on military operations. It normally depicts militarily significant aspects of the OE, such as obstacles restricting military movement, key geography, and military objectives.”⁶ Areas of the OE where the terrain predominantly favors one COA over others should be identified and graphically depicted. The most effective graphic technique is to construct a MCOO by depicting (in addition to the restricted and severely restricted areas already shown) such items as avenues of approach and mobility corridors, counter-mobility obstacle systems, defensible terrain, engagement areas, and key terrain.⁷



(2) A MCOO generally has standardized overlays associated with it. However, it is not a standardized product with respect to what it should portray simply because a CDR's requirements are based on their mission and intent – and they differ with each operation. Therefore, the MCOO should portray the relevant information necessary to support the CDR's understanding of the battlespace and decision-making process in context with his mission and intent. The results of terrain analysis should be disseminated to the joint force staff as soon as possible by way of the intelligence estimate (included in the order), documented analysis of the operational area, and the MCOO.

(3) Operational environments that you may be analyzing are broken down into dimensions (see respective figures on following pages), as follows:


- | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| • Land Dimension | • Cyberspace Dimension |
| • Maritime Dimension | • Human Dimension |
| • Air Dimension | • Analysis of Weather and Effects |
| • Space Dimension | • Other Characteristics of the OE |
| • Electromagnetic Dimension | |

⁶ DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD Dictionary)

⁷ Refer to Joint Pub 2-01.3 JIPOE for more information concerning the types of MCOOs generated during step 2 of JIPOE

(a) Land Dimension.


Analysis of the land dimension of the OE concentrates on terrain features such as transportation systems (road and bridge information), surface materials, ground water, natural obstacles such as large bodies of water and mountains, the types and distribution of vegetation, and the configuration of surface drainage and weather. Observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors are examples of what is required to be evaluated to understand the terrain effects on your plan.



Land MCOO (JP 2-01.3).

(b) Maritime Dimension.

The maritime dimension of the OE is the sea and littoral environment in which all naval operations take place, including sea control, power projection, and amphibious operations. Key military aspects of the maritime environment can include maneuver space and chokepoints; natural harbors and anchorages; ports, airfields, and naval bases; sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and the hydrographic and topographic characteristics of the ocean floor and littoral land masses.



Maritime MCOO (JP 2-01.3).

Climatological Effects on Military Operations							
Mission Area	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG
AIR							
NAVAL							
GROUND							
CHEM							
AMPHIB							

Unrestricted Moderate Restrictions Severe Restrictions

Weather Effect Matrix.

(h) Others characteristics of the OE. Other characteristics include all those aspects of the OE that could affect friendly or adversary COAs that fall outside the parameters of the categories previously discussed. Because the relevant characteristics will depend upon the situation associated with each mission, there can be no definitive listing of characteristics appropriate under all circumstances. For example, the characteristics of the OE that may be relevant to a sustained humanitarian relief operation will be very different from those required for a joint combat operation against an adversary. Some examples to be addressed while evaluating the battlespace environment are time, political and military constraints, environmental and health hazards, infrastructure, industry, agriculture, economics, politics, and history. The country characteristics of an adversary nation should be developed through the analytic integration of all the social, economic, and political variables listed above. Country characteristics can also provide important clues as to where a nation may use military force and to what degree.


I. Step 3 — Evaluate the Adversary. Step three of the JIPOE process, evaluating the adversary, identifies and evaluates the adversary's military and relevant civil COG, critical vulnerabilities (CVs), capabilities, limitations, and the doctrine and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) employed by adversary forces, absent any constraints that may be imposed by the OE described in step two. Failure to accurately evaluate the adversary may cause the command to be surprised by an unexpected adversary capability, or result in the unnecessary expenditure of limited resources against adversary force capabilities that do not exist (see figure on following page.)

(1) A COG can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act (more on COG in Chapter 5-2, *Mission Analysis*). The COG is always linked to the objective. If the objective changes, the center of gravity also could change. At the *strategic level*, a COG could be a military force, an alliance, a political or military leader, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national will. At the *operational level* a COG often is associated with the adversary's military capabilities — such as a powerful element of the armed forces — but could include other capabilities in the OE. Since the adversary will protect the center of gravity, the COG invariably is found among strengths rather than among weaknesses or vulnerabilities. *CDRs consider not only the enemy COGs*, but also identify and protect their own COGs, which is a function of the J-3.

Joint Planning Process (Overview)

1. Joint Planning Process (JPP)

JPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The application of operational design as explained in Chapter IV of JP 5-0 provides the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations. JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the CDR, staff, subordinate CDRs, and other partners, to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem to be solved. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission. CDRs and staffs can apply the thinking methodology (operational art and design) to discern the correct mission, develop creative and adaptive CONOPS to accomplish the mission, and synchronize those CONOPS so that they can be executed. Together with design, JPP facilitates interaction between the CDR, staff, and subordinate and supporting headquarters throughout planning. JPP helps CDRs and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and CDR's intent, and develop effective plans and orders. The following figure shows the Seven Steps and Four Functions of the JPP.



The Joint Planning Process Primary Steps and Functions

a. The seven-step JPP process aligns with the four Planning Functions discussed in Chapter 2-III, *Planning Functions*, which culminates with a published OPORD in a crisis and an OPLAN, CONPLAN, Base Plan or CDR's Estimate during contingency planning.¹

b. The four Joint Planning Functions are: *Strategic Guidance*, *Concept Development*, *Plan Development*, and *Plan Assessment*. Each of these functions is further broken down into JPP steps, 1-7 as seen in Figure A below.

Planning Functions			
I. Strategic Guidance	II. Concept Development	III. Plan Development	IV. Plan Assessment
1- Planning Initiation	3- COA Development	7- Plan Development	- Refine
2- Mission Analysis	4- COA Analysis		- Adapt
	5- COA Comparison		- Terminate
	6- COA Approval		- Execute

Figure A. Joint Planning Functions

The first two JPP steps (planning initiation and mission analysis) take place during the Strategic Guidance planning function. The next four JPP steps (COA Development, COA Analysis and Wargaming, COA Comparison, and COA Approval) align under the Concept Development planning function. The final JPP step (Plan or Order Development) occurs during the Plan Development planning function. While there is no JPP step associated with the Plan Assessment planning function, plans and orders are assessed with the RATE methodology in mind. Refer to Figure A above.

- Function I – Strategic Guidance consists of two steps: 1-Planning Initiation and 2-Mission Analysis.
- Function II – Concept Development consists of four steps: 3-COA Development, 4-COA Analysis and Wargaming, 5-COA Comparison and 6-COA Approval.
- Function III – Plan Development consists of 7-Plan or Order Development.
- Function IV – Plan Assessment. While there is no JPP step associated with the plan assessment planning function, plans and orders are assessed with refine, adapt, terminate, execute (RATE) methodology in mind. See Chapter 6-III, *Plan Assessment*, and JP 5-0 Chapter VI, *Operation Assessment*.

¹ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

c. JPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting CCDRs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the CCDR, staff, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning. JPP helps CCDRs and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and CCDR's intent, and develop effective plans and orders as detailed in Figure B.




Figure B. Joint Planning Process Steps and Products

d. JPP is applicable for all planning. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution. It is a tool to be used by planners, but is not prescriptive. Based on the nature of the problem, other tools available to the planner, expertise in the planning team, time, and other considerations, the process can be modified as required. Similarly, some JPP steps or tasks may be performed concurrently, truncated, or modified as necessary dependent upon the situation, subject, or time constraints of the planning effort. For example, force planning, as an element of plan development, is different for campaign planning and contingency planning.²

e. In a crisis, the steps of JPP may be conducted simultaneously to speed the process. Supporting commands and organizations often conduct JPP simultaneously and iteratively with the supported CCMD. In these cases, once mission analysis begins it continues until the operation is complete. Moreover, steps 4-7 are repeated as often as necessary to integrate new requirements (missions) into the development of the plan.

²JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

Providing Direction of the Armed Forces

Joint Planning Process




Figure A. Strategic Direction Promulgated Through Strategic Guidance

4. Summary

As discussed in Chapter 1, *Strategic Organization*, but worth repeating, the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the JS, CCMDs, Services, and CSAs is strategic direction. Strategic direction encompasses the processes and products (documents) by which the President, SecDef, and CJCS provide strategic vision and direction to the Joint force. Strategic direction is normally published in key documents referred to as *strategic guidance*. As seen in the Figure C these strategic guidance documents are the principle source for DOD GCPs, theater strategies, CCPs, operation plans, contingency plans, base plans, and CDRs' estimates. CCDRs, once provided the direction and guidance each prepares strategy and campaign plans in the context of national security and foreign policy goals.





Figure C. Strategy, Planning and Resourcing

Strategic planning translates strategy into actionable content. Strategic thinking generates insight into the present and foresight regarding the future.⁴

⁴ T. Irene Sanders, *Strategic Thinking and the New Science: Planning in the Midst of Chaos, Complexity, and Change* (New York: Free Press, 1998), 10

I(b). Planning Initiation



1. Step 1 to JPP — Planning Initiation

a. Linkage between Plan Initiation and National Strategic Endstate. The first step in the Joint Planning Process (JPP) is Initiation. Prior to joint operations, planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes a potential for military capability to be employed in response to a potential or actual crisis. The purpose of this step is to establish conditions for successful planning and on alerting the staff, forming the planning team, assessing available time for planning, Assessment Working Group (AWG) organization and deciding on a planning approach.

(1) At the strategic level planning is initiated when the President, SecDef or CJCS decides on developing military options and directs CCDRs through strategic guidance (Presidential Directives, NSS, UCP, CPG, JSCP, etc.) and related strategic guidance statements to begin planning. However, CCDRs and other CDRs may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. The CJCS may also issue a WARNORD in an actual crisis. Military options normally are developed in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power.¹

(2) Military doctrine recognizes three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. These three levels overlap. Planning and execution at each level is reliant on planning and execution at other levels. Clearly delineated strategic endstates and objectives form the nucleus from which military plans at all levels evolve. Proper or improper identification of

¹ JP 5-0, Joint Operations

strategic endstates and objectives affect how military leaders plan and utilize military power to support attainment of those strategic measures. An incorrect interpretation of the strategic measure can lead to failure to accomplish the desired mission.

(3) Strategic endstates and objectives are approved by the President with input from their closest advisors, staff, and administration officials. These strategic measures form the foundation that subordinate agencies, departments, and military planners use to develop strategic objectives that will support the overarching desired national endstate. A clear understanding of desired political goals and endstate is imperative at the strategic level to ensure that all elements of national power are applied effectively. For the military, clear delineation of strategic endstate is essential to ensuring that military force can be effectively and efficiently applied when necessary to support strategic success.

b. The CCDR and staff will analyze the planning guidance to determine time available until mission execution, the current status of intelligence products, to include JIPOE, and staff estimates, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The CCDR typically will provide their initial planning guidance, which could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, authorize movement of key capabilities within the CDR's authority, and direct other actions as necessary to provide the CDRs current understanding of the operational environment (OE), the problem, and operational approach for the campaign or operation.

c. CCDRs, subordinate CDRs, and supporting CDRs also initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. Additionally, analyses of the OE or developing or immediate crises may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS directing military planning through a planning directive. CCDRs normally develop military options in combination with other non-military options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. Whether or not planning begins as described here, the CDR may act within approved authorities and ROE and/or Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) in an immediate crisis.

d. For contingency planning purposes, the JSCP serves as the primary guidance to begin planning and COA development. During planning initiation, contingency planning tasks are transmitted, forces and resources are apportioned, and planning guidance is issued to the supported CCDR. CCDRs prepare contingency plans primarily in direct response to tasking in the JSCP.

(1) Strategic requirements or tasking for the planning of major contingencies may require the preparation of several alternative plans for the same requirement using different sets of forces and resources in order to preserve flexibility. For these reasons, contingency plans are based on reasonable assumptions (hypothetical situation with reasonable expectation of future action).

(2) Planning for campaign plans is different from contingency plans in that contingency planning focuses on the anticipation of future events, while campaign planning assesses the current state of the OE and identifies how the command can shape the OE to deter crisis on a daily basis and support strategic objectives.

2. Integrating Assessment

The starting point for operation assessment activities coincides with the **initiation of joint planning** and are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the CDR ensure the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. This integrated approach optimizes the feedback senior leadership needs to appropriately refine, adapt, or terminate planning to be effective in the OE.^{2,3}

² JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

³ *Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution, Joint Staff, J-7*

5-22 (JPP) I(b). Planning Initiation

a. Assessments are interrelated and interdependent and apply to all levels of warfare and during all military operations. Although each level of assessment may have a specific focus and a unique battle rhythm, together they form a hierarchical structure in which the conduct of one level of assessment is crucial to the success of the next. Theater strategic and operational-level assessment efforts concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the endstate, while tactical-level assessment primarily focuses on task accomplishment.⁴

b. Assessment supports the CDR's decision-making and provide the CDR with the current state of the OE, the progress of the campaign or operation, and recommendations to account for discrepancies between the actual and predicted progress. CDRs then compare the assessment against their vision and intent and adjust operations to ensure objectives are met and the military end state is achieved. Assessment of the OE and the progress of operations are continuous.

c. As it relates to campaigns, where strategic objectives frame the CCMD's mission, assessments help CCDRs and supporting organizations refine or adapt the campaign plan and supporting plans to achieve the campaign objectives or, in coordination with SecDef and CJCS, to adapt the CPG- and/or JSCP-directed strategic objectives in response to changes in the OEs.⁵

d. Developing the **assessment plan** is a continuous process that is refined throughout all planning phases. The building of an assessment plan, including the development of collection requirements, normally begins during mission analysis after identification of the initial desired and undesired effects.

e. There is no single way to conduct an assessment. Every mission and OE has its own set of challenges, and every CDR assimilates information differently, making every assessment plan unique.

f. The following steps from ATP 5-0.3, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Operation Assessment* are an excellent guide in the development of an effective assessment plan and assessment activities during planning, preparation and execution.⁶

Step 1 – Develop the assessment approach (planning).

Step 2 – Develop the assessment plan (planning).

Step 3 – Collect information and intelligence (preparation and execution).

Step 4 – Analyze information and intelligence (preparation and execution).

Step 5 – Communicate feedback and recommendations (preparation and execution).

Step 6 – Adapt plans or operations (planning and execution).

(See ATP 5-0.3 for a detailed discussion of each step of the assessment process)

g. Staff sections record relevant information in running estimates. Each staff section maintains a continuous assessment of current operations as a basis to determine if they are proceeding according to the CDR's intent. In their running estimates, staff sections use this new information, updated facts, and assumptions as the basis for evaluation.

h. Incorporating the assessment plan into the appropriate plans and/or orders is the recommended mechanism for providing guidance and direction to subordinate organizations or requests for key external stakeholder assistance and support. Desired and undesired effects are most effectively communicated in the main body of the base plan or order and

⁴ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

⁵ *Commander's Handbook for Assessment Planning and Execution, Joint Staff, J-7*

⁶ ATP 5-0.3 *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Operation Assessment*

may be repeated in the Operations Annex. The assessment plan may be included as an Appendix to the Operations Annex, or alternatively, in the Reports Annex.

See ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, JP 5-0 *Joint Operations* and ATP 5-0.3, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Operation Assessment* for greater information on operations assessment.

“You must know the end, to know the beginning.”


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Operation Assessment Steps

Step	Operations Process Activity	Input	Personnel Involved	Staff Activity	Output
Develop Assessment Approach	Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • JIPOE • Staff estimates • Operational approach development • JPP • Joint targeting • AWG 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff • AWG personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clearly defined end states, objectives, and tasks 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information, intelligence, and collection plans
Develop Assessment Plan	Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a framework • Select measures (MOE and MOP) • Identify indicators • Develop a feedback mechanism 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operations planners • Intelligence planners • AWG personnel 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operational approach • JIPOE • Desired end state • Feedback mechanism parameters 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment plan
Collect Information and Intelligence	Execution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint targeting • JIPOE • Staff estimates • IR management • ISR planning and optimization 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence analysts • Current operations • AWG personnel • Assessment cell (if established) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multisource intelligence reporting, and joint force resource and disposition information • Operational reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimates of OE conditions, enemy disposition, and friendly disposition
Analyze and Synthesize the Feedback	Execution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment work group • Staff estimates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Primary staff • Special staff • AWG personnel • Assessment cell (if established) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intelligence assessments • Staff assessments • Analysis methods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimate of joint force effects on OE (draft assessment report)
Communicate the Assessment and Recommendations	Execution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provide a timely recommendation to the appropriate decision-maker 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander • Subordinate commanders (periodically) • Primary staff • Special staff • AWG personnel • Assessment cell (if established) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Estimate of joint force effects on OE (draft assessment report) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Assessment report, decisions, and recommendations to higher Headquarters
Adapt Plans	Execution Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Joint targeting • JPP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander • Planners • Primary staff • Special staff • AWG personnel • Assessment cell (if established) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Commander's guidance and feedback 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Changes to the operation and assessment plan
Legend:		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> AWG—assessment working group IR—information requirement ISR—intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance JIPOE—joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment OE—operational environment JPP—joint planning process MOE—measure of effectiveness MOP—measure of performance 			

Table from ATP 5-0.3 *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Operation Assessment*

II. Mission Analysis Overview & Key Steps



I. Step 2 to JPP — Mission Analysis

1. Mission Analysis Overview

The mission analysis process helps to build a common understanding of the problem to be solved and boundaries within which to solve it by key stakeholders.

a. The CCDR is responsible for analyzing the mission and restating the mission for subordinate CDRs to begin their own estimate and planning efforts. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the CCDR and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. ***There is perhaps no step more critical to the JPP and a successful plan.***

b. A primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the national strategic endstate and that set of national objectives and related guidance that define strategic success from the President's perspective. The endstate and national objectives will reflect the broadly expressed Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Infrastructure (PMESII) and other circumstances that should exist after the conclusion of a

has the staff collecting information for both the enemy and friendly COGs. Neither can be identified nor considered in a vacuum—a common staff planning mistake. The struggle between opposing forces employing their unique means and ways to achieve their respective ends (objectives) is a dynamic that can only be appreciated if they are viewed collectively. While the explanations and examples provided below are for enemy COGs analysis, the process is the same for determining and analyzing friendly COGs. The only differences are in the planning actions taken once the analysis is completed. Planners develop courses of action that focus on defeating the enemy's COG while at the same time mitigating risks to their own COG.

f. The Center of Gravity Flow Chart, on the following page, illustrates the flow used to identify a COG and to determine the ways in which it can be attacked. Each step of the process, as it corresponds to the numbers in Figure H are described below. Later in this section an example, Desert Storm Enemy COG Analysis, is provided.

(1) Step 1: Identifying the Objective(s). Identifying the objective is a critical first step. Before one can determine a COG, the objective(s) must be identified. If this portion of the analysis is flawed, then the error infects the remainder of the process. The planner should first determine the ultimate (strategic or operational) objectives and then the supporting intermediate (operational or major tactical) objectives. The operational objectives should show a direct relationship to the strategic objectives. If this linkage between strategic and operational objectives cannot be established, the objectives are suspect. Objectives, and particularly strategic objectives, usually have requirements/tasks that fall primarily into the responsibility of instruments of power other than the military. These are still important to identify since the military may have a supporting role in their accomplishment.




Figure H. Center of Gravity Flow Chart.

(2) Step 2: Identify Critical Factors. Critical factors are those attributes considered crucial for the accomplishment of the objective. These factors that in effect describe the environment (in relationship to the objective) must be identified and classified as either sufficient (critical strength) or insufficient (critical weakness). Critical factors are a cumulative term for critical strengths and critical weaknesses of a military or nonmilitary source of

power; they can be quantifiable (tangible) or unquantifiable (intangible). Critical factors are present at each level of war; they require constant attention because they are relative and subject to changes resulting from the actions of one's forces or of the enemy's actions. It is important while conducting the analysis for this step that planners maintain a sharp eye on the objectives identified in the first step—each level of war has critical factors that are unique to that level.

(a) The questions that should be asked when determining critical factors for the enemy are:

- “What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the enemy has and must use in order to attain his strategic (operational) objective?” *These are critical strengths.* The second question is,
- “What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the enemy has and must use in order to achieve his strategic (operational) objective, but which are weak and may impede the enemy while attempting to attain his objective?” *These are critical weaknesses.*

(b) The answers to these two questions will produce a range of critical strengths and critical weaknesses associated with specific levels of war. One should note that, like the close relationship expected to be found between strategic and operational objectives, there will undoubtedly be some critical strengths and critical weaknesses that have a similar close relationship between the corresponding critical factors. For example, a strategic critical weakness, such as a strategic leader having a tenuous communications link to their fielded forces, may also create an operational critical weakness for fielded forces unable to reliably communicate with their higher command.

(3) **Step 3: Identify the Centers of Gravity.** Joint doctrine defines a COG as “The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act.”⁴¹ While the definition is helpful for assisting in the identification of the operational COG, when considering the strategic COG, a planner should be alert to the fact that the definition is not focused upon only the military aspects of the analysis. In view of the discussion in the first step, when strategic objectives are being identified planners should consider the broader application of the definition, remembering that the role of instruments of power other than the military may prevail.

The COGs at each level of war should be found among the listed critical strengths identified within the critical factors of Step Two. While all of the identified strengths are critical, the planner must deduce which among those capabilities identified rise(s) above all others in importance in accomplishing the objective (that is, those tangible and intangible elements of combat power that would accomplish the assigned objectives). This critical strength is the COG. This does not diminish the importance of the other critical strengths; however, it forces the planner to examine closely the relationships of the various critical strengths to one another and the objective. This close examination of interrelationships could be improved by using a systems perspective of the OE. Such a study may well offer the planner an enhanced understanding of an adversary's COG and its interdependencies. See JP 5-0 for more information on the systems approach to COG refinement. This analysis of these relationships will prove important in the next step.

(4) **Step 4: Identify Critical Capabilities (CC).** Joint doctrine defines a critical capability as: “a means that is considered a crucial enabler for a COG to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective(s).”⁴²

(a) If the COG is a physical force (often the case at the operational level), the CDR and staff may wish to begin their examination of CC by reviewing the integration, support, and protection elements of the enemy's combat power as they apply to the COG.


(b) Many of these elements are often found in the joint functions as described in the Universal Joint Task List (C2, intelligence, sustainment, protection, fires, and movement

⁴¹ DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD Dictionary)

⁴² Ibid

and maneuver). Moreover, these capabilities often are located within the critical strengths and weaknesses identified in Step Two.

(c) The planner should be alert for two major considerations. First, although a capability is a critical strength, if it bears no relationship to the identified COG, it cannot be considered a CC. The second consideration is that although some capability may be perceived as a critical weakness, if it is an essential enabler for the enemy COG, then it is a critical capability, albeit weak in nature.




(5) Step 5: Identify Critical Requirements. Once a COG's critical capabilities are identified, the next step is for the staff to identify those essential conditions, resources, and means for a critical capability to be fully operational.

These are the critical requirements that support each of the critical capabilities. This is essentially a detailed view of what comprises a critical capability.


Example: a critical capability for an operational COG to accomplish its mission might be its ability to exert C2—its ability to receive direction as well as communicate directives to subordinates. The critical requirements might include tangible requirements such as: communication nodes, antennas, frequency bands, individual command posts, spare parts, bandwidth, specific satellites, and so forth. It may also include intangibles such as CDR's perceptions and morale.

**Note: Planners should be cautious at this point. One is often presented with a wealth of potential targets or tasks as each critical capability is peeled back and the numerous supporting critical requirements are identified. There is often a temptation to stop at this point of the analysis and begin constructing target lists. Such an action could result in a waste of resources and may not be sufficient to achieve the desired effects. The planner should find the sixth step as a more effective way to achieve the defeat of a COG.*



(6) Step 6: Identify Critical Vulnerabilities (CV). Joint doctrine defines a critical vulnerability as “an aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects.”⁴³

The planner should contemplate those critical capabilities and their supporting critical requirements in this regard, keeping in mind that these weaknesses must bear a direct relationship to a COG and its supporting critical capabilities for it to be assessed as a critical vulnerability. Striking a weakness that bears no such relationship is simply a measure taken to harvest “low hanging fruit” that offers no decisive benefit. The planner should also take this opportunity to consider the previously assembled lists of critical strengths and critical weaknesses from Step Two to determine if there are any critical factors with a close relationship to the COG that were not captured in the previous CC/CR steps (steps four and five).



**Note: While the planner first seeks critical weaknesses within the critical capabilities and supporting critical requirements as implied by the definition, there might be opportunities found in critical strengths that provide decisive or significant results disproportionate to the military resources applied. An example might be the integrated air defense (IAD) that is protecting an operational COG. While this critical capability might be assessed as strength, its neutralization and the subsequent opening of the COG to direct attack may be assessed by the CDR as more favorable in regard to the amount of resources and time expended to achieve the desired effects.*

(7) Step 7: Identify Decisive Points. Joint doctrine defines decisive points as “a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows CDRs to gain a marked advantage over an adversary or contribute materially to achieving success.”⁴⁴ As with all previous steps, the value of a DP is directly related to its relationship to a COG and its objective:

(a) In the example shown in Figure I, from a friendly COG perspective, DPs 1 and 4, which provide access to the friendly COG, must be protected from attacks by the enemy COG. DP 2 and 3, which provide decisive access to the enemy COG, become friendly objectives or tasks. If there is no relationship, it is not a DP. A DP is neutral in nature; that is, it is by definition as important to both the enemy and friendly CDRs.

⁴³ JP 5-0, Joint Planning

⁴⁴ Ibid




Figure I. Theoretical relationship of two opposing COGs and their Decisive Points.

(b) Using Figure J for example, an APOD/SPOD complex is a DP for a friendly CDR, enabling that CDR to project the COG through it on the way to the objective, then the enemy CDR will also assess the complex as a threat to the enemy COG and should attempt to deny the friendly force CDR control of the DP. In both cases, this DP, if within the capability of the force, will undoubtedly become an objective or task assigned to both enemy and friendly subordinate commands. Using this APOD/SPOD DP example, one might find the friendly JFC assigning the JFMCC the tactical task of “Seize Redland SPOD NLT D+2 in order to support the flow of JTF Blue Sword forces into Redland.”

**Note: The planner must remember that this is a dynamic process. Any changes in the information considered in the first two steps of this process require the staff to revalidate its conclusions and subsequent supporting operations. As objectives change, the sources of power required to achieve the desired endstate might also change. As new sources of strength appear in the OE, how do they interact?*




Figure J. Example APOD/SPOD DP

“How can one man say what he should do himself, if he is ignorant of what his adversary is about?”
 Lt Gen Antoine-Henri,
 Baron de Jomini, 1838

Enemy COG Determination (Example)

Table 3 below provides an example enemy COG analysis (note that the same must be done for the friendly COG to ensure measures are taken to protect one's own COG). This example is not intended to be exhaustive and serves only as an illustrative example, exploring only a single critical capability and its associated critical requirements, and offering simply a selection of DPs.

Enemy Center of Gravity Determination **(Desert Storm Enemy COG Analysis)**

Identify

1a. Strategic Objectives (s)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Retain Kuwait as 19th Province• Enhance Saddam Hussein's hold on power• Increase Iraq's political and military influence in the Arab world• Increase Iraq's power and influence within OPEC
1b. Operational Objective(s)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Defeat or neutralize a coalition attack to liberate Kuwait• Prevent coalition forces from obtaining air superiority• Prevent coalition forces from obtaining sea control in the northern part of the Persian Gulf
2a. Critical Strengths Integrated Air Defense (IAD)
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• WMD• Land-based ballistic missiles (Scuds)• Republican Guards in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO)• Forces are in defensive positions• Saddam and his strategic C2• Combat experienced units and commanders• Missile armed surface combatants• Sea Mine inventories and delivery platforms
2b. Critical Weaknesses
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• World Opinion: Arab world outrage• Long and exposed Land• LOCs from Iraq to KTO• Combat skills and readiness of the Air Force• Numerical and qualitative inferiority of naval forces• Low morale and poor discipline of regular forces• Class IX for weapon systems• Inadequate forces to protect the Iraq-Iranian border
3a. Strategic COG
Saddam and his inner circle security apparatus
3b. Operational COG
Republican Guards in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO)
Note: For the sake of brevity, this example will only examine the Operational COG

team with the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) video-teleconferencing capabilities. NIST provides coordination with national intelligence agencies, analytical expertise, Indications and Warning (I&W), special assessments, targeting support, and access to national data bases, and facilitates RFI management.

I. Decision Support.⁵¹ CCIR support the CDR's future decision requirements and are often related to Measures of Effectiveness and Measures of Performance. PIR are often expressed in terms of the elements of PMESII while FFIR are often expressed in terms of DIME. All are developed to support specific decisions the CDR must make.

10. Key Step 10: Develop Mission Statement

a. Mission Statement. One product of the mission analysis process is the mission statement. Your initial mission analysis as a staff will result in a *tentative mission statement*. This tentative mission statement is a *recommendation* for the CDR based on mission analysis. It will serve to identify the broad options open to the CDR and to orient the staff. This recommendation is presented to the CDR for approval normally during the mission analysis brief. It must be a clear, concise statement of the **essential tasks** to be accomplished by the command and the **purpose** of those tasks. Although several tasks may have been identified during the mission analysis, the proposed mission includes only those that are essential to the overall success of the mission. The tasks that are routine or inherent responsibilities of a CDR are not included in the proposed mission. The proposed mission becomes the focus of the CDR's staff's estimates. It should be continually reviewed during the planning process to ensure planning is not straying from this critical focus (or that the mission requires adjustment). It is contained in Paragraph 1 of the CDR's Estimate and Paragraph 2 of the basic OPLAN or OPOD.



Figure M. Mission Statement

b. The mission statement should be a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task (or tasks) and purpose — a clear (*brevity and clarity*) statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. As denoted in Figure M the mission statement contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, but seldom specifies how. These five elements of the mission statement answer the questions:

⁵¹ JP 2-01, *Joint and National Support to Military Operations*

- Who will execute the tasks (unit/organization)?
- What is the essential task(s) (mission task)?
- When will the operation begin (time/event i.e., O/O, when directed)?
- Where will the operation occur (AO, objective)?
- Why will we conduct the operation (for what purpose)?

c. Clarity of the joint force mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the joint operation, is vital to success. *The mission statement along with the commanders' intent, provide the primary focus for subordinates during planning, preparations, execution and assessment.*⁵²

d. No mission statement should be written and not revisited thereafter; it's important to revisit it during the entire plan development process to ensure that it meets the needs of the CDR and the national leadership. A sample CDR's mission statement could look like this:

"When directed, CDRUSXXCOM deters regional aggressors; if deterrence fails, CDRUSXXCOM defends the country of X and defeats external aggressors and conducts stability and support operations in order to protect U.S. interests and the Government of X."

e. The who, where, when of the mission statement is straightforward. The *what* and *why*, however, are more challenging to write clearly and can be confusing to subordinates.

The **what** is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs (for example, deter, defeat, deny, conduct, provide, contain, isolate, etc.). These tasks are measurable and can be grouped by actions by friendly forces and effects on adversary forces/capabilities. The *what* in the mission statement is the essential task(s) to be accomplished. It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on an adversary force. CDRs should utilize doctrinal-approved tasks. These tasks have specific meaning, are measurable, and often describe results or effects of the tasks relationship to the adversary and friendly forces.

The **why** puts the task(s) into context by describing the reason for conducting the task(s). It provides the mission purpose to the mission statement-why are we doing this task(s)? The purpose normally describes using a descriptive phrase and is often more important than the task because it provides clarity to the task(s) and assists with subordinate initiatives.

Example: Task Lists

Terrain:	Enemy:	Friendly:
• Seize	• Disrupt	• Screen
• Secure	• Defeat	• Guard
• Clear	• Destroy	• Cover
• Occupy	• Block	• Withdraw
• Retain	• Contain	• Attack by Fire
• Recon	• Fix	• Support by Fire
	• Canalize	• Follow & Assume
	• Delay	• Follow & Support
	• Interdict	• Breach
	• Isolate	• Disengage
	• Penetrate	• Exfiltrate
	• Suppress	• Infiltrate
	• Neutralize	
	• Feint	
	• Demonstration	
	• Ambush	
	• Bypass	

Purpose (in order to...)

• Allow	• Influence
• Cause	• Open
• Create	• Prevent
• Deceive	• Protect
• Deny	• Restore
• Divert	• Support
• Enable	• Surprise

⁵² JP 3-0, Joint Operations

11. Key Step 11: Develop and Conduct Mission Analysis Brief

Upon conclusion of the Mission Analysis and JIPOE, the staff will present a Mission Analysis Brief to the CDR. The purpose of the Mission Analysis Brief is to provide the CDR with the results of the preliminary staff analysis, offer a forum to surface issues that have been identified, and an opportunity for the CDR to give their guidance to the staff and to approve or disapprove of the staff's analysis. However, modifications to this brief may be necessary based on the CDR's availability of relevant information. There is no set format for the Mission Analysis Brief, however Figure N contains two *tested examples* of Mission Analysis Briefings that work, just tailor them to your needs.

- a. The mission analysis briefing should not be a unit readiness briefing. Staff officers must know the status of subordinate and supporting units and brief relevant information as it applies to the situation.
- b. The mission analysis briefing is given to both the CDR and the staff. This is often the only time the entire staff is present, and the only opportunity to ensure that all staff members are starting from a common reference point. Mission analysis is critical to ensure thorough understanding of the task and subsequent planning.
- c. The briefing focuses on relevant conclusions reached as a result of the mission analysis. This helps the CDR and staffs develop a shared vision of the requirements for the OPLAN and execution.

Example #1	Example #2
<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Context/Background- Strategic Guidance- Military Endstate- Assigned Forces- Apportioned Forces- AO/AI- JIPOE- Adversary capabilities/organization/disposition- Adversary Mobilization Timelines- Adversary Most Dangerous COA- Adversary Most Likely COA- Facts- Initial Planning Assumptions- Assumptions- Limitations- COG Analysis: Adversary/Friendly- Tasks- Risk- CCIR: FFIRs/PIRs- Proposed/Tentative Mission Statement- Requested Planning Guidance	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Context/Background<ul style="list-style-type: none">• (i.e., Road to war)- Strategic Guidance<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Planning tasks assigned to supported commander• Forces/resources apportioned• Planning guidance- Task Analysis<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Specified/Implied/Mission Essential- Apportioned Forces- JIPOE/Initial Intelligence brief- Limiting Factors<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Restraints/constraints- Facts and Assumptions- Preliminary Risk Assessment- Determine Endstate- Center of Gravity Analysis<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Enemy/Friendly-Strategic, Operational- Critical Capabilities<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Enemy/Friendly- Critical Requirements<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Enemy/Friendly- Critical Vulnerabilities<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Enemy/Friendly- Decisive Points- Proposed/Tentative Mission Statement- Commander's Guidance

Figure N. Sample: Mission Analysis Briefs.

12. Key Step 12: Prepare Initial Staff Estimates

As discussed earlier, the development of an effective CDR's estimate must be supported by mission analysis, planning guidance, and *staff estimates*.

a. Battle rhythm is a deliberate daily cycle of command, staff, and unit activities intended to synchronize current and future operations.⁵³ The battle rhythm facilitates integration and collaboration. The Chief of Staff (COS) normally manages the headquarters battle rhythm. This battle rhythm serves several important functions, to include: establishing a routine for staff interaction coordination, facilitating interaction between CDR and staff, synchronizing activities of the staff in time and purpose and facilitating planning by the staff and decision-making by the CDR.

b. Early staff estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff. They are continually ongoing and updated based on changes in the situation. In the beginning, they tend to emphasize information collection more than analysis. CJCSM 3122.01 contains sample formats for staff estimates.

c. The role of the staff is to support the CDR in achieving situational understanding, making decisions, disseminating directives, and following directives through execution. The staff's effort during planning focuses on developing effective plans and orders and helping the CDR make related decisions. The staff does this by integrating situation-specific information with sound doctrine and technical competence. The staff's planning activities initially focus on mission analysis, which develops information to help the CDR, staff, and subordinate commanders understand the situation and mission. Later, during COA development and comparison, the staff provides recommendations to support the CDR's selection of a COA. Once the CDR approves a COA, the staff coordinates all necessary details and prepares the plan or order.

d. Throughout planning, staff officers prepare recommendations within their functional areas, such as system, weapons, and munitions capabilities, limitations and employment; risk identification and mitigation; resource allocation and synchronization of supporting assets; and multinational and interagency considerations. Staff sections prepare and continuously update staff estimates that address these and other areas continuously throughout the JPP. The staff maintains these estimates throughout the operation, not just during pre-execution planning.

e. Not every situation will require or permit a lengthy and formal staff estimate process. During a crisis situation the CDR may review the assigned mission, receive oral staff briefings, develop and select a COA informally, and direct that plan development commence. However, deliberately planning will demand a more formal and thorough process. Staff estimates should be shared collaboratively with subordinate and supporting commanders to help them prepare their supporting estimates, plans, and orders. This will improve parallel planning and collaboration efforts of subordinate and supporting elements and help reduce the planning times for the entire process.⁵⁴

13. Key Step 13: Approval of Mission Statement, Develop Commander's Intent and Publish Initial Planning Guidance

a. Restated Mission Statement. Immediately after the mission analysis briefing, the CDR approves a restated mission. This can be the staff's recommended mission statement, a modified version of the staff's recommendation, or one that the CDR has developed personally. Once approved, the restated mission becomes the unit mission.

b. Commander's Intent. The intent statement is the CDR's personal vision of how the campaign will unfold. Generally, the CDR will write his own intent statement. Frequently the staff will provide substantial input(s). The CDR's intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the military endstate. It provides focus to the staff and helps subordinate and supporting commanders take actions to achieve the military

⁵³ JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*

⁵⁴ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

endstate without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. It also includes where the CDR will accept risk during the operation. At the theater strategic level, CDR's intent must necessarily be much broader – it must provide an overall vision for the campaign that helps staff and subordinate commanders understand the intent for integrating all elements of national power and achieving unified action. The CCDR must *envision* and *articulate* how military power and joint operations will dominate the adversary and support or reinforce the interagency and our allies in accomplishing strategic success. Through their intent, the CDR identifies the major unifying efforts during the campaign, the points and events where operations must dominate the enemy and control conditions in the OE, and where other elements of national power will play a central role. The intent must allow for decentralized execution.

(1) It **provides the link between the mission and the concept of operations** by stating the method that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates to exercise initiative when unanticipated opportunities arise or when the original concept of operations no longer applies. If the CDR wishes to explain a broader purpose beyond that of the mission statement, they may do so. The mission and the CDR's intent must be understood two echelons down. The intent statement at any level must support the intent of the next higher CDR.

(2) The initial intent statement normally contains the purpose and military endstate as the initial impetus for the planning process. It could be stated verbally when time is short. The CDR refines the intent statement as planning progresses. The CDR's approved intent is written in the "Execution" paragraph as part of the operation plan or order.

(3) A well-devised intent statement enables subordinates to decide how to act when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in situations where the concept of operations no longer applies. This statement deals primarily with the military conditions that lead to mission accomplishment, so the CDR may highlight selected objectives and effects. The statement also can discuss other instruments of national power as they relate to the mission and the potential impact of military operations on these instruments. The CDR's intent may include the CDR's assessment of the adversary CDR's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation.

(4) Remember, the CDR's intent is not a summary of the CONOPs. It should not tell specifically how the operation is being conducted, but should be crafted to allow subordinate commanders sufficient flexibility and freedom to act in accomplishing their assigned mission(s) even in the "fog of war."

"It is the one overriding expression of will by which everything in the order and every action by every commander and soldier in the army must be dominated, it should, therefore, be worded by the commander himself."

Field Marshal Viscount William Joseph Slim, Defeat into Victory, Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945, Cooper Square Press, p. 211.

While there is no specified joint format for CDR's intent, a generally accepted construct includes the purpose, method, and endstate:

- **Purpose:** The purpose is the *reason* for the military action with respect to the mission of the next higher echelon. It explains why the military action is being conducted. This helps the force pursue the mission without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, participating commanders understand the purpose of the forthcoming action well enough to act decisively and within the bounds of the higher CDR's intent.

- **Method:** The “how,” in doctrinally concise terminology, explains the offensive form of maneuver, the alternative defense, or other action to be used by the force as a whole. Details as to specific subordinate missions are not discussed.
- **Endstate:** The endstate describes what the CDR wants to see in military terms after the *completion of the mission* by the friendly forces.

Commander's Intent (Purpose)

Maintain Green's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Commander's Intent (Method)

USXXCOM forces will secure LOCs to ensure a rapid build-up of forces in the JOA. The utilization of HN support will be maximized. Forces will deploy into theater under the auspices of participation in C/J (Coalition/ Joint) exercises demonstrating C/J force capabilities. IO will be optimized to communicate capability and coalition resolve against Red aggression. During these exercises, C/J forces will be positioned throughout the JOA with the capability to rapidly project full spectrum combat power against Red forces violating Green sovereignty.

Commander's Intent (Endstate)

Red forces withdrawn from forward staging bases and postured at their peacetime locations. These forces will be incapable of conducting rapid force build-up (>7 days) threatening Green.

Sample Commander's Intent Statement

c. **Initial Planning Guidance.** After approving the mission statement and issuing their intent, commanders provide the staff (and subordinates in a collaborative environment) with enough additional guidance (including preliminary decisions) to focus the staff and subordinate planning activities during COA development. As a minimum, the initial planning guidance should include the **mission statement; assumptions; operational limitations; a discussion of the national strategic endstate; termination criteria; military endstate military objectives; and the CDR's initial thoughts on desired and undesired effects.** The planning guidance should also address the role of agencies and multinational partners in the pending operation and any related special considerations as required.⁵⁵

(1) The CDR approves the derived mission and gives the staff (and normally subordinate commanders) initial *planning guidance*. This guidance is essential for timely and effective COA development and analysis. The guidance should precede the staff's preparation for conducting their respective staff estimates. The CDR's responsibility is to *implant a desired vision* of the forthcoming combat action into the minds of the staff. Enough guidance (preliminary decisions) must be provided to allow the subordinates to plan the action necessary to accomplish the mission consistent with his and the SecDef's intent. The CDR's guidance must focus on the essential tasks and associated objectives that support the accomplishment of the assigned national objectives. It emphasizes in broad terms when, where, and how the CDR intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher CDR's intent.

(2) The CDR may provide the planning guidance to the entire staff and/or subordinate commanders or meet each staff officer or subordinate unit CDR individually as the situation and information dictates. The guidance can be given in a written form or orally. No format for the planning guidance is prescribed. However, the guidance should be sufficiently detailed to provide a clear direction and to avoid unnecessary efforts by the staff or subordinate commanders.

⁵⁵ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

(3) The content of planning guidance varies from CDR to CDR and is dependent on the situation and time available. Planning guidance may include:

- Situation.
- The derived mission, including essential task(s) and associated objectives.
- Purpose of the forthcoming military action.
- Information available (or unavailable) at the time.
- Forces available for planning.
- Limiting factors (constraints and restraints) – including time constraints for planning.
- Pertinent assumptions.
- Tentative COAs under consideration: friendly strengths to be emphasized or enemy weaknesses the COAs should attack, or specific planning tasks.
- Preliminary guidance for use (or non-use) of nuclear weapons.
- Coordinating instructions.
- Acceptable level of risk to own and friendly forces.
- Information Operations guidance.

(4) Planning guidance can be very explicit and detailed, or it can be very broad, allowing the staff and/or subordinate CDR's wide latitude in developing subsequent COAs. However, no matter its scope, the content of planning guidance must be arranged in a logical sequence to reduce the chances of misunderstanding and to enhance clarity. Moreover, one must recognize that all the elements of planning guidance are *tentative only*. The CDR may issue successive planning guidance during the decision-making process. Yet, the focus of the staff should remain upon the framework provided in the initial planning guidance. The CDR should provide subsequent planning guidance during the rest of the plan development process.

(5) Initial planning guidance includes *Conflict Termination Criteria* and *Mission Success Criteria*. These criteria become the basis for assessment and include measures of performance (MOP) and measures of effectiveness (MOE).

14. Summary

The CCDR and staff conduct mission analysis to better understand the situation and problem, and identify what must be accomplished, when and where it must be done, and most importantly why—the purpose of the operation. In this step, the supported CCDR's analysis of his/her tasking from Strategic Direction and Guidance results in a mission statement. The mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph that describes the organization's essential task(s), purpose, and action containing the elements of who, what, when, where, and why. The mission statement provides the task or set of tasks, together with purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. Key considerations for a supported CCDR during mission analysis are the national strategic end state, and appropriately, theater strategic end state. Based on this understanding, CDRs issue their initial CDR's intent and planning guidance to guide the staff in COA Development.

(5) **Subordinate Commands.** This planning function produces detailed direction from HHQ that shapes subordinate command planning. The subordinate CDR and planning staff conduct their own concept development informed by the selected COA and CCDR's guidance or planning directive. The initial CONOPS and further refined force list and/or TPFDD provide a starting point for subordinate command plan development.

3. COA Development Preparation and Considerations

- Time Available.
- Political Considerations.
- Flexible Deterrent Options.
- Lines of Operation.

a. **Time Available.** The CDR and the nature of the mission will dictate the number of COAs to be considered. Staff sections continually inform COA development by an ongoing staff estimate process to ensure suitability, feasibility, acceptability, and compliance with Joint Doctrine (deviations from Joint Doctrine should be conscious decisions and not the result of a lack of knowledge of doctrinal procedures). Additionally, staffs ensure completeness (answers Who, What, When, Where, Why, How).

b. **Political Considerations.** Planning for the use of military forces includes a discussion of the political implications of their transportation, staging, and employment. The CCDR's political advisor is a valuable asset in advising the CCDR and staff on issues crucial to the planning process, such as overflight and transit rights for deploying forces, basing, and support agreements. Multinational and coalition force concerns and sensitivities must also be considered.

(1) Political objectives drive the operation at every level from strategic to tactical. There are many degrees to which political objectives influence operations: ROE restrictions and basing access and overflight rights are examples. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. *First*, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon today for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. *Secondly*, CDRs should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations. These changes may not always be obvious.

(2) The integration of U.S. political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. The global environment today with threats and challenges from adversaries in every operating domain requires an even greater integration and cooperation between political and military objectives.

(3) Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power and systems taxonomy of the multi-dimensional Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information and Infrastructure (PMESII). This situational understanding supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and regional security organizations is critical to success.

(4) Military operations must be strategically integrated and operational and tactically coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the USG, IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, the operations of foreign forces, and activities of various HN agencies. Sometimes the CDR draws on the capabilities of other organizations; sometimes the CDR provides capabilities to other organizations; and sometimes the CDR merely deconflicts their activities with those of others. These same organizations may be involved in pre-hostilities operations, activities during combat, and in the transition to post-hostilities activities. Roles and relationships among agencies and organizations, CCMDS, U.S. state and local

governments, and overseas with the U.S. Chief of Mission (COM), and country team in a U.S. embassy, must be clearly understood. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of national power. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination helps enable the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.

c. Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs). Flexible deterrent options are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to send the right signal and influence an adversary's actions. They can be established to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to deter further aggression during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of national power — diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and others (financial, intelligence and law enforcement-DIMEFIL) — but they are most effective when used in unison or as a combination with other instruments of national power.

(1) FDOs facilitate early strategic decision-making, rapid de-escalation and crisis resolution by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths. Examples of FDOs for each instrument of national power are listed in the figures on the following pages. *Key goals of FDOs are:*

- Deter aggression through communicating the strength of U.S. commitments to treaty obligations and peaceful development.
- Confront the adversary with unacceptable costs for its possible aggression.
- Isolate the adversary from regional neighbors and attempt to split the adversary coalition.
- Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA.

(2) FDOs Implementation. The use of FDOs must be consistent with U.S. national security strategy (i.e., the instruments of national power are normally used in combination with one another), therefore, continuous coordination with interagency partners is imperative. All operation plans have FDOs, and CCDRs are tasked by the JSCP to plan requests for appropriate options using all instruments of national power.²

(3) Military FDOs. Military FDOs underscore the importance of early response to a crisis. Deployment timelines, combined with the requirement for a rapid, early response, generally requires military FDO force packages to be light; however, military FDOs are not intended to place U.S. forces in jeopardy if deterrence fails (risk analysis should be an inherent step in determining which FDOs to use, and how and when to use them). Military FDOs are carefully tailored to avoid the classic “too much, too soon” or “too little, too late” responses. They rapidly improve the military balance of power in the OA, especially in terms of early warning, intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime forces, information operations, and force protection assets, without precipitating armed response from the adversary. Military FDOs are most effective when used in concert with the other instruments of power. They can be initiated before or after, and with or without unambiguous warning.³

² JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*

³ JP 5-0 *Joint Planning*

Example Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs)

Example of Requested Diplomatic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Alert and introduce special teams (e.g., public diplomacy).
- Reduce international diplomatic ties.
- Increase cultural group pressure.
- Promote democratic elections.
- Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures.
- Identify the steps to peaceful resolution.
- Restrict activities of diplomatic missions.
- Prepare to withdraw or withdraw U.S. embassy personnel.
- Take actions to gain support of allies and friends.
- Restrict travel of U.S. citizens.
- Gain support through the United Nations.
- Demonstrate international resolve.

Example of Requested Informational Flexible Deterrent Options

- Promote U.S. policy objectives through public statements.
- Ensure consistency of strategic communications themes and messages.
- Encourage Congressional support.
- Gain U.S. and international public confidence and popular support.
- Maintain open dialogue with the news media.
- Keep selected issues as lead stories.
- Increase protection of friendly critical information structure.
- Impose sanctions on communications systems technology transfer.
- Implement psychological operations.

Example of Requested Military Flexible Deterrent Options

- Increase readiness posture of in-place forces.
- Upgrade alert status.
- Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
- Initiate or increase show-of-force actions.
- Increase training and exercise activities.
- Maintain and open dialogue with the news media.
- Take steps to increase U.S. public support.
- Increase defense support to public diplomacy.
- Increase information operations.
- Deploy forces into or near the potential operational area.
- Increase active and passive protection measures.
- Ensure consistency of strategic communications messages.

Example of Requested Economic Flexible Deterrent Options

- Freeze or seize real property in the U.S. where possible.
- Freeze monetary assets in the U.S. where possible.
- Freeze international financial institutions to restrict or terminate financial transactions.
- Encourage U.S. and international financial institutions to restrict or terminate financial transactions.
- Encourage U.S. and international corporations to restrict transactions.
- Embargo goods and services.
- Enact trade sanctions.
- Enact restrictions on technology transfer.
- Cancel or restrict U.S.-funded programs.
- Reduce security assistance programs.

4. Lines of Operations (LOO)

So far, we've discussed the process of operational design in the following steps:

- *Endstate* (in terms of desired strategic political-military outcomes).
- *Objectives* that describe the conditions necessary to meet the endstate.
- Desired *effects* that support the defined objectives.
- Friendly and enemy *center(s) of gravity (COG)* using a systems approach.
- *Decisive points (DPs)* that allow the joint force to affect the enemy's COG and look for DPs necessary to protect friendly COGs.

Now let's look at identifying *lines of operation* that describe how decisive points are to be achieved and linked together in such a way as to overwhelm or disrupt the enemy's COG.

A *line of operations* is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. LOO can be thought of as the analytical bridge between the outcomes of the mission analysis process and the development of COAs. It is important to conduct LOO analysis prior to COA development to ensure COAs achieve military objectives. As CDRs visualize the design of the operation, they may use several LOO to help visualize the intended progress of the joint force toward achieving operational and strategic objectives. LOOs connect a series of DPs that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using LOO generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence. Major combat operations are typically designed using LOO with these lines tying offensive and defensive tasks to the geographic and positional references in the OA. CDRs synchronize activities along complementary lines of operations to achieve the endstate.

a. In operational design, LOO describe how DPs are linked to operational objectives. Joint doctrine defines LOO as "lines that define the orientation of the force in time, space, and purpose in relation to an adversary or objective."⁴ They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.

- CDRs establish the military conditions and endstate for each operation, developing LOO that focus efforts to create the conditions that produce the endstate.
- Subordinate CDRs adjust the level of effort and missions along each LOO. LOO are formulated during COA development and refined through continual assessment.⁵

b. LOO must be Derived from Decisive Points. The kinds of DPs related to a LOO define the description of the LOO. This is why DPs must be determined first before defining LOO. LOO are the least understood portion of operational design and therefore tend to be misapplied. The importance of well-defined and understood LOO is basic to linking DPs, COG, objectives, and endstate. Properly defined, LOO provide clarity and distinction and provide the rationale for everything that the joint force does. Therefore, poorly defined LOO weaken the plan and lead to confusion. LOO should be broadly defined to encompass a more flexible way of thinking.

c. Normally, joint operations require CDRs to synchronize activities along multiple and complementary LOO working through a series of military strategic and operational objectives to attain the military endstate. There are many possible ways to graphically depict LOO, which can assist planners to visualize/conceptualize the joint operation from beginning to end and prepare the OPLAN or OPORD accordingly.

⁴ DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD Dictionary)

⁵ FM 3-0, Operations

d. From the perspective of unified action, there are many diplomatic, economic, and informational activities that can affect the sequencing and conduct of military operations along both physical and logical LOO. Planners should consider depicting relevant actions or events of the other instruments of national power on their LOO diagrams.

(1) A LOO connects a series of DPs over time that lead to control of a geographic objective or defeat of an enemy force as illustrated in Figures A and B. CDRs use LOO to connect the force with its base of operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy is a factor.

Operations designed using LOO generally consist of a series of cyclic, short-term events executed according to a well-defined, finite timeline. Major combat operations are typically designed using LOO. These tie offensive and defensive operations to the geographic and positional references of the AO. CDRs synchronize activities along complementary LOO to attain the endstate. LOO may be either *interior* or *exterior*.⁶




Figure A. Sample Physical Line of Operation (JP 5-0).





Figure B. Lines of Operation.

⁶ FM 3-0, Operations

V. Course of Action (COA) Comparison



1. Step 5 to JPP — COA Comparison

COA comparison is a *subjective* process whereby COAs are considered independently of each other and evaluated *compared* against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and CDR. The goal is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest probability of success against the ECOA that is of the most concern to the CDR, so take some time and energy with this step. COA comparison facilitates the CDR's decision-making process by balancing the *ends, means, ways* and *risk* of each COA. The end product of this task is a briefing to the CDR on a COA recommendation and a decision by the CDR.


- Determine comparison criteria
- Define and determine the standard for each criteria
- Assign weight or priority to comparison criteria
- Construct comparison method and record
- Conduct and record the comparison recommend COA

a. In COA comparison the CDR and staff evaluate all friendly COAs – against established evaluation criteria (discussed in previous chapter), and select the COA which best accomplishes the mission. The CDR reviews the criteria list and adds or deletes as they see fit. The number of evaluation criteria will vary, but there should be enough to differenti-

ate COAs. Consequently, COAs are not compared to each other, but rather they are individually evaluated against the criteria that are established by the CDR and staff.

-COA comparison helps the CDR answer the following questions:

- What are the differences between each COA?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages?
- What are the risks?



COA Comparison.

b. Staff officers may each use their own matrix to compare COAs with respect to their functional areas as depicted in Table 1 below. Matrices use the evaluation criteria developed before the wargame. Decision matrices alone cannot provide decision solutions. Their greatest value is providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that, when met, produce mission success. They are analytical tools that staff officers use to prepare recommendations. CDRs provide the solution by applying their judgment to staff recommendations and making a decision.

Example: Staff Estimate Matrix (Intel Estimate)

Evaluation Criteria	Frontal COA 1	Envelopment COA 2
Effects of Terrain		√
Effects of Weather	√	
Utilize Surprise		√
Attacks CV		√
Collection Support		√
Counterintelligence	√	
Totals	2	4

Table 1. Identify and select the COA that best accomplishes the mission.

c. The staff helps the CDR identify and select the COA that best accomplishes the mission. The staff supports the CDR's decision-making process by clearly portraying the CDR's options and recording the results of the process. The staff compares feasible COAs to identify the one with the highest probability of success against the most likely enemy COA (MLCOA) and the most dangerous enemy COA (MDCOA).

COA Comparison

1. Determine evaluation criteria
2. Develop a construct for making comparison
3. Perform COA comparison
4. Decide on COA and prepare to recommend to CDR

2. Prepare for COA Comparison

The CDR and staff developed evaluation criteria prior to wargaming and using this refined evaluation criteria the staff outlined each COA, highlighting advantages and disadvantages. By doing this the staff compared the strengths and weaknesses of the COA and identified their advantages and disadvantages relative to each other. The staff assists the CDR in identifying and selecting the COA that best accomplishes the mission and clearly portraying the CDR's options and recording the results of this process. The staff evaluates feasible COA to identify the one that performs best within the evaluation criteria against the enemy's most likely and most dangerous COAs.

a. Determine/Define Evaluation Criteria. As discussed in Chapter 5-IV, *COA Wargaming and Analysis* criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation. There is no standard list of criteria, although the CDR may prescribe several core criteria that all staff directors will use. Individual staff sections, based on their estimate process, select the remainder of the criteria. Criteria are based on the particular circumstances and should be relative to the situation.

- Review CDR's guidance for relevant criteria.
- Identify implicit significant factors relating to the operation.
- Each staff identifies criteria relating to that staff function.
- Examples of other criteria might include:
 - Political, social, and safety constraints; requirements for coordination with Embassy/Interagency personnel.
 - Mission accomplishment.
 - Risks.
 - Costs.

b. Define and Determine the Standard for each Criterion.

(1) Establish standard definitions for each criterion. Define the criteria in precise terms to reduce subjectivity and ensure the interpretation of each remains constant between the various COAs.

(2) Establish definition prior to commencing COA comparison to avoid compromising the outcome.

(3) Apply standard for each criterion to each COA.

c. The staff evaluates feasible COAs using those criteria most important to the CDR to identify the one COA with the highest probability of success. The selected COA should also:

- (1) Mitigate risk to the force and mission to an acceptable level.
- (2) Place the force in the best posture for future operations.
- (3) Provide maximum latitude for initiative by subordinates.
- (4) Provide the most flexibility to meet unexpected threats and opportunities.

3. Determine the Comparison Method and Record

Actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching the best recommendation and the CDR making the best decision. There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs. The most common technique is the decision matrix, which uses evaluation criteria to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA. Here are examples of several decision matrices:

a. Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique. The example below provides a numerical aid for differentiating COAs. Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each COA for each of the criterion selected. Certain criteria have been weighted to reflect greater value (Figure A and Table 2 are examples).

b. Determine the Weight of each Criterion Based on its Relative Importance and the CDR's Guidance. The CDR may give guidance that result in weighting certain criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area scores each COA using those criteria. Multiplying the score by the weight yields the criterion's value. The staff member then totals all values. However, the staff must be careful not to portray subjective conclusions as the results of quantifiable analysis. Comparing COAs by category is more accurate than comparing total scores.

Each staff section does this separately, perhaps using different criteria on which to base the COA comparison. The staff then assembles and arrives at a consensus for the criterion and weights. The Chief of Staff/DCJTF should approve the staff's recommendations concerning the criteria and weights to ensure completeness and consistency throughout the staff sections.

Joint Planning Process

- (1) Criteria are those selected through the process described earlier
- (2) The criteria can be rated (or weighted). The most important criteria are rated with the highest numbers. Lesser criteria are weighted with progressively lower numbers
- (3) The highest number is best. The best criteria and the most advantageous COA ratings are with the highest number. Values reflect the relative strengths and weaknesses of each COA

		Courses of Action					
		COA 1		COA 2		COA 3	
Criteria	Weight	Rating	Product	Rating	Product	Rating	Product
Exploits Maneuver	2	3	6	2	4	1	2
Attacks COG	3	2	6	3	9	1	3
Integrates Maneuver and Interdiction	2	2	4	3	6	1	2
Exploits Deception	2	1	2	3	4	3	6
Provide Flexibility	2	1	2	2	6	2	4
ESS (best use of transportation)	1	3	3		2	1	1
Etc.							
Total		12		13		9	
Weighted Total			23		31		18

The CDRs intent explained that the most important criteria was "attacking the enemies COG." therefore....Assign a value of 3 for that criteria and lower numbers for other criteria that the staff devises (this is weighting the criteria). For "attacking enemy COGs," COA2 was rated the best (with a number of 3) therefore....(COA 2 - 9, COA 1 - 6, and COA 3 - 3) After multiplying the relative COA rating by the weight given to each criteria, and adding the product columns, COA 2 (with a score of 31) is rated the most appropriate according to the criteria used to evaluate it.

Figure A. Example Numerical Comparison.

Example #2 COA Comparison Matrix Format							
Evaluation Criteria	Weight	COA #1		COA #2		COA #3	
		Score	Weighted	Score	Weighted	Score	Weighted
Surprise	2	3	6	2	4	2	4
Risk	2	3	6	1	2	2	4
Flexibility	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
Retaliation	1	1	1	2	2	1	1
Damage to Alliance	1	2	2	1	1	1	1
Legal Basis	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
External Support	1	3	3	2	2	1	1
Force Protection	1	3	3	3	3	1	1
OPSEC	1	3	3	2	2	2	2
Total							
		27 - Green		18 - Yellow		16 - Red	

Table 2. Comparison Matrix Format.

c. Non-Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique. The same as the previous method except the criteria are not weighted. Again, the highest number is best for each of the criteria.

d. Narrative or Bulleted Descriptive Comparison of Strengths and Weaknesses. Review criteria and describe each COA's strengths and weaknesses. See Table 3 below:

Course of Action	Strengths	Weaknesses
COA 1	Narrative or bulleted discussion of strengths using the criteria	Narrative or bulleted discussion of weaknesses using the same criteria
COA 2	Same	Same
COA 3	Same	Same

Table 3. Criteria for Strengths and Weaknesses.

e. **Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison.** Base this comparison on the broad degree to which selected criteria support or are reflected in the COA. This is typically organized as a table showing (+) for a positive influence, (0) for a neutral influence, and (-) for a negative influence (Table 4).

Criteria	COA 1	COA 2
Casualty estimate	(-)	(-)
Casualty evacuation routes	(+)	(-)
Suitable medical facilities	0	0
Flexibility	(+)	(-)

Table 4. Plus/Minus/Neutral Comparison.

f. **Stop Light Comparison.** Criteria are judged to be acceptable or unacceptable with varying levels in between. Ensure you define each color in the stop light on a key along with corrective methods to elevate mid colors to green (Table 5).

COA Criteria	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Speed	Red	Green	Yellow
Surprise	Red	Orange	Green
Risk	Orange	Yellow	Green
Total	Red	Orange	Green

Table 5. Stop Light Comparison.

g. **Descriptive Comparison.** Simply a description of advantages and disadvantages of each COA (Table 6).

COA	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
COA 1	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Rapid Delivery•Meets critical needs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Rough integration of forces•Rough transition•Complex organization•Not flexible at all•Adequate force protection
COA 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Rapid delivery•Meets critical needs•Smooth integration•Smooth transition	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Complex organization•Less flexible•Adequate force protection
COA 3	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Smooth integration•Smooth transition•Simplest organization•Adequate force protection•Best force protection	<ul style="list-style-type: none">•Less rapid delivery•Does not meet all critical needs

Table 6. Descriptive Comparison.

II. Plan Review Process

I. PLAN REVIEW

1. General

a. If a strategy is the implementation of policy while balancing available ends, ways and means, a strategic planning dialog is the iterative conversation among civilian and uniformed senior leaders that considers potential contingencies and the application of military power to address them. A shared understanding of the problem, the goal, and the potential ways to apply military power, and the resources required is critical to presenting these leaders with credible choices. Military power may or may not be the last resort in influencing the problem or trying to bring it to resolution; its allocation is dependent upon senior decision-makers having a clear understanding of what can be accomplished, the inherent risks, and how military power complements other elements of a USG response. This is the ultimate purpose of plan reviews.

b. The plan review process is a continuous review based on “planning to date.” This is intended to ensure the SecDef and President have the best planning advice available based on the current OE. It maintains the requirement to ensure the Joint Staff and OSD are updated on plans in development. In the review process CCMDs provide a thorough view of demand on the force in the event of a contingency or crisis. It is recognized that a crisis rarely requires the implementation of a single CCMD plan, but the integration of operations across CCMD AORs, functions, and domains that may require the re-allocation or reassignment of forces to mitigate risk globally.¹

(1) Plan reviews provide a venue for senior military and civilian leaders to develop a shared understanding of the emerging problem (situation), how military power might address that problem to reach USG preferred resolution (strategic options), what resources can be applied across the government (USG unity of effort); what specific military actions might be taken (operational approach) – or COA); and what decisions, resources, and abilities the military needs in order to take specific actions. The plan reviews also ensure that the entire JPEC, as well as other USG agencies, is involved in the plan development and understands the guidance.

(2) The intent of the plan review process is to produce globally integrated plans to advance U.S. interests and achieve U.S. strategic objectives. This review process addresses the full range of plans, e.g., GCPs, CCPs, and ICPs. These plans provide the SecDef and President the best possible information and options to address the complex and uncertain global environment.

2. Plan Review Purposes

a. The review process has four purposes:

(1) The *first* is to ensure that the plans are executable. That means they are:

(a) Feasible. The assigned mission can be accomplished using available resources within the time contemplated by the plan to advance U.S. security interests. The plan is prepared in a global context and accounts for both ongoing (continuing) operations and the rest of the integrated plan (cross CCMD requirements).

¹ CJCSI 3141.01, *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans*

(b) **Acceptable.** The plan and related operations are consistent with policy and law; and are within the risk tolerance of the President and the SecDef (The contemplated COA is proportional, worth the cost, consistent with the law of war, and militarily and politically supportable.)²

(c) **Complete.** The plans incorporate all major operations and tasks necessary to accomplish the designated objective(s). The plan must identify forces required, decision points, deployment concept and requirements, employment concept, sustainment concept and requirements, time estimates for achieving objectives, mission success criteria and mission conflict termination criteria.

(2) **Second**, this process is a mechanism that allows the CJCS to ensure plans are up to date and provide military advice to civilian leadership and guidance to the CCMDs based on a perspective that looks across CCMDs and Services.

(3) **Third**, this process integrates policy guidance from the SecDef and USD(P) to military leadership, providing perspective and guidance to the Joint Staff and CCMDs. Reviews are also a forum for the SecDef, USD(P), or designated representative to refine strategic direction and policy guidance (national-level objectives, assumptions, limitations, restrictions, and risk) to CCDRs.

(4) **Fourth**, it facilitates integration of plans across domains, functions, and regions; enabling integrated planning and a global perspective.

b. The plan review process addresses GCPs and ICPs as the planning baseline for achieving U.S. national objectives. While not all plans address global issues, at a minimum, plans should exist in a federation of plans where they are mutually supporting and informed.

c. This process supports the necessity for integrated planning across CCMDs and the JPEC.

d. Although the Joint Staff is responsible for the conduct of the plan review process, the entire JPEC conducts the review. The JPEC incorporates the CCMDs, the JS, OSD, the Services, NGB, CSA, and other affected defense agencies to create shared understanding, synchronize efforts across the Joint Force, develop integrated products, and establish the optimal confluence of military plans, operations, and strategy to enable the Chairman to provide military advice from a global perspective.³

3. Plan Review Dialogue

a. The plans review process is a dialogue among the SecDef, CJCS, USD(P), and CCDRs. The SecDef, with USD(P) assistance, establishes the review requirements and publishes guidance on the timing of directed plans reviews. The plans review process ensures plans align with the NSS, NDS, CPG, and the JSCP. The plans review process also assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the President, the SecDef, and civilian leadership while assisting the CCMDs in incorporating policy guidance from the OSD and integrating planning across domains, functions, and regions.

b. The plan review process has two complementary lines of effort: *first, ensure plans align with policy; and second, ensure plans are militarily executable and provide realistic military options to the SecDef and President.*

(1) OSD manages one line of effort on behalf of the SecDef to ensure plans align with policy in the NSS, NDS, and other strategic documents. The SecDef also determines the acceptable level of risk. The SecDef or USD(P) establishes the review requirements and publishes guidance on which problem sets and plans require review and timing of those reviews for all CPG- and JSCP-tasked problem sets and plans.

² JP 5-0 Joint Operations

³ CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans

(2) The Joint Staff, through the J-5, manages the other line of effort with the JPEC. This line supports the Chairman's responsibility to provide military advice to the SecDef and President.

c. As a plan is produced, it may undergo reviews to ensure it remains consistent with policy, strategic guidance, and intent of the Department. Additionally, changes in the environment (strategic and operational) may require changes to previous approved plans and planning assumptions.^{4,5}

4. Plan Review Process

a. The review process is a series of interactions between the CCMD planners, the JPEC (led by the Joint Staff), and OSD representatives to support policy-guided and globally-integrated planning.

b. **Plans Review Criteria.** CCDRs may have their plans reviewed by OSD and the Joint Staff for any of the following:

- (1) There exists a military problem that requires a SecDef or CJCS decision due to incurred risk because of available capabilities (e.g., time distance requires posturing more forces forward to alleviate force flow problems);
- (2) There are policy gaps creating military problems not resolvable at the CCMD level;
- (3) Priority Challenge Integrated Contingency Plans (by exception);
- (4) Major revision to plan (e.g., due to changes in strategic environment, threat capabilities, U.S. capabilities);
- (5) Directed by SecDef or CJCS.

c. The number of in-process reviews (IPRs) depends on the maturity of the plan, changes in policy, updates in the global campaigns and their assessments, and SecDef requirements.

(1) IPRs are an in-stride process to ensure necessary updates on plans of concern to the SecDef.

(2) The Joint Staff J-5 will publish a calendar of expected plan reviews annually.


d. Forums exist for plans review that could be executed subsequent to a JPEC staffing of the plan. The review process may take place through paper review—in the case of few or no contentious issues of the plan, or face-to-face/secure video teleconference (SVTC). The lowest level of formal review is an 0-7 /8-level Joint Planning Board (JPB) with subsequent reviews, as required, for Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD), Operations Deputies (OPSDEPS), USD(P), JCS Tank, and SecDef approval briefs. At any point, if all contentious issues have been resolved, a paper review may suffice. The nature of the plan (e.g., a global threat covered by a GCP vs. a regional threat covered by a RCP) and the extent of the revision will determine the final level of review.

e. The process is also meant to be agile and efficient for CCMD planners. As appropriate, plan reviews and updates can be done by paper, SVTC, or in-person. When an issue arises in an IPR and the SecDef, USD(P), or designated representative identifies the need for a follow-up, the intermediate steps can be compressed to ensure the information is presented to the SecDef in a timely manner.

⁴ The review process, addressed here, is complementary to planning processes and guidance provided in CJCSI 3110.01 series Joint Strategic Campaign Plan and Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning

⁵ Refer to CJCSI 3141.01, Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans for greater details.

III. Plan Assessment (Function IV)



I. PLANNING FUNCTION IV – PLAN ASSESSMENT

1. Overview

Plan assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process and a primary feedback mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn and adapt. Effective assessment relies on an accurate understanding of the logic used to build the plan. Plans are based on imperfect understanding, assumptions and an operational approach on how the CDR expects a situation to evolve. The reasons or logic as to why the CDR believes the plan will produce the desired results are important considerations when determining how to assess the operation/plan. Continuous assessment helps CDRs recognize shortcomings in the plan and changes in the OE. In those instances when assessment reveals minor variances from the CDR's visualization, CDRs adjust plans as required. In those instances when assessment reveals a significant variance from the CDR's original visualization, CDRs reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan as required.¹

a. Plan assessment is part of planning and the plan review process (Chapter 6-II, *Plan Review Process*). Effective plan assessment measures progress toward mission accomplishment (achieving IMOs as applicable and progress toward endstates), identifies changes in the operational and strategic environment, and risk associated with the potential requirement to execute contingency plans. Accordingly, assessment considerations should:

- Be developed in concert with mission success criteria;
- Help guide operational design of campaign and contingency plans;
- Employ common methods that can be developed and applied across all planning and assessment requirements, and be briefed during plan reviews.

¹FM 5-0 Overview, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate

b. CCDRs are tasked to develop campaign plans that integrate security cooperation and other foundational activities with operations and contingency plans IAW the strategic policy guidance provided by the CPG and JSCP. Campaign plans also provide for conducting a comprehensive assessment of how the CCMDs activities are contributing to the achievement of IMOs, and how those activities best deter, shape, or mitigate the potential to execute assigned plans. Accordingly, plan assessments should:

- Provide the basis for the Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute (RATE) recommendation during IPRs.
- Ensure that assessment of subordinate campaign and contingency plans nest under the assessment of the CCDR's CCP, as well as the FCP they support. This nesting provides the mechanism to synchronize assessment activities across the CCDR's planning requirements and eliminate redundant or contradictory activities.

2. Plan Assessment

The focus of assessment differs during **planning, preparation, and execution**. During *planning*, assessment focuses on gathering information to understand the current situation, the framed problem, and outputs of design methodology to develop an assessment plan. During *preparation*, assessment focuses on monitoring changes in the situation and on evaluating the progress of readiness to execute the operation. Assessment during *execution* involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to actual events, using indicators to judge progress toward attaining desired endstate conditions and help CDRs adjust plans based on changes in the situation, when the operation is complete, and when to transition into the next cycle of the operations process.

a. **Plan Assessment**. Plan Assessment deliberately measures a **completed plan's** effectiveness in accomplishing prescribed objectives. A plan assessment may also identify changes in the OE or strategic direction that may impact the plan, and provide risk-informed recommendations to senior leaders regarding subsequent planning or execution options. As mentioned, plan assessment is also part of the plan review process and is orchestrated by the JS J-5 in support of the Chairman's statutory responsibility to review and assess plans.²


(1) **Plan Assessment Concurrent to Plan Development**. During plan development, a plan or order is analyzed for its feasibility, and the plan refined to address identified shortfalls. When planning under crisis conditions, this feasibility analysis may supplant a more deliberate assessment of the completed plan. Under these circumstances, the results of the feasibility analysis are shared by the supported CCDR with the JS and OSD in order to expedite plan approval by the Secretary. If a crisis situation does not prompt immediate execution of a plan or order, a more deliberate plan assessment maybe conducted following plan development.

(2) **Plan Assessment Outcomes**. The results of a plan assessment may lead to a decision to pursue one of four outcomes for the plan: *refine, adapt, terminate, or execute (RATE)*. All four outcomes can be applied to contingency plan assessments while campaign plan assessments generally do not consider termination as they are in constant execution.

"It is the mark of an educated mind to be able to entertain a thought without accepting it."

— Aristotle

² CJCSI 3141.01 Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans



Plan Assessment Inputs and Outputs

(3) Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute (RATE). CDRs continually review and evaluate the plan; determine one of four possible outcomes: refine, adapt, terminate, or execute; and then act accordingly. CDRs and the JPEC continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would require changes in the plan. The CDR will brief SecDef during routine plan update IPRs of modifications and updates to the plan based on the CDR's assessment of the situation, changes in resources or guidance, and the plan's ability to achieve the objectives and attain the endstates.³

(a) Refine. During all planning efforts, plan refinement typically is an orderly process that follows plan development and is part of the assessment function. Refinement is facilitated by continuous operation assessment to confirm changing OE conditions related to the plan or potential contingency.

(b) Adapt. Planners adapt plans when major modifications are required, which may be driven by one or more changes in the following: strategic direction, OE, or the problem facing the JFC.

(c) Terminate. CDRs may recommend termination of a plan when it is no longer relevant or the threat no longer exists. For CPG- or JSCP-tasked plans, SecDef, with advice from the CJCS, is the approving authority to terminate a planning requirement.

(d) Execution. Execution begins when the President or SecDef authorizes the initiation of a military operation or other activity. An execute order (EXORD), or other authorizing directive, is issued by the CJCS at the direction of the President or SecDef to initiate or conduct the military operations.

"Even the finest sword plunged into salt water will eventually rust."

— Sun Tzu

³ JP 5-0, Joint Planning

I. Execution Functions

1. Function Overview

Execution functions are the required elements for implementing military activities as directed by the President or Secretary. Execution, in this context, applies to the range of military activities including but not limited to operations, exercises, and security cooperation. There are seven functions that comprise Execution:

- allocation
- mobilization
- deployment
- distribution
- employment
- re-deployment
- de-mobilization

While depicted sequentially in Figure A below these functions can be accomplished in parallel and steps can be combined or truncated depending on the time available. During crisis, execution functions may be conducted in parallel with planning functions to rapidly respond to an emergent event. Throughout execution, the operational activities (situational awareness, planning, and assessment) continue and execution functions (Figure B) are adapted to changes in the OE. This Chapter discusses each execution function.




Figure A. The Seven Execution Functions




Figure B. Execution Function of Joint Planning and Execution Process

2. Execution Function - Allocation

Allocation, via GFM, is the Secretary's distribution of limited forces or individuals for employment among competing CCMD requirements that cannot be met with assigned or previously allocated forces. Allocation and other sourcing methodologies (e.g., joint exercises, security assistance programs) provide available forces to CCMDs based on stated capability requirements, balanced against risks (operational, future challenges, force management, institutional) and strategic and operational priorities. Figure C below depicts the elements in the allocation execution function.¹ The GFM allocation process is discussed in detail in Chapter 3, *GFM*.




Figure C. Execution Function - Allocation

¹ CJCSM 3130.06 Series, *Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*

a. Requirement Identification. This step comprises the identification of CCMD force requirements for approved military activities to include operations, exercises, and security cooperation. The process for identifying force requirements depends upon the nature of the activity to be conducted.

(1) Assigned Forces. During execution, the supported CCCR may task their assigned forces to fill force requirements in order to perform authorized missions. CCRDs exercise COCOM over assigned forces and employ them for missions, operations, and activities they have authority to execute. These requirements constitute the assigned force demand and are documented in the Joint Capabilities Requirements Manger (JCRM) (the program of record for enabling the GFM allocation process) by the supported CCCR. If additional forces are required, the supported CCCR requests those forces through the GFM allocation process via the annual submission or a RFF. Under crisis conditions assigned forces may be the most responsive to an emergent crisis and may be execution sourced by the supported CCCR to conduct authorized operations.

(2) Operational Requirements. The GFM allocation process is designed to distribute forces to meet CCMDs' force and individual requirements that cannot be met with assigned and previously allocated forces. CCMDs submit annual force submissions or an RFF. The Secretary's decision to allocate forces to operational requirements involves weighing the FP's risks of sourcing with operational risks to both current and potential future operations.

(a) Security Cooperation Requirements. For security cooperation requirements, CCRDs may employ assigned or allocated forces. Forces conducting approved security cooperation events are either allocated via the GFMAP or documented in the GFMAP as assigned force demand. Separate from the allocation process, Services may provide forces or personnel to support security assistance programs with consideration of Service capacity, Service priority or equity in the security assistance program, and CCMD priorities.²

(b) Counter Drug/Counter Narcotics-Terrorism Requirements. CCRDs may employ assigned or allocated forces to conduct approved CD/CNT activities. Forces conducting approved CD/CNT activities are either allocated via the GFMAP or documented in the GFMAP as assigned force demand.³

(c) SOF training with foreign forces. Execution sourcing of SOF for JCET events requires specific coordination and approval. Coordination of SOF participation in JCET events is conducted by USSOCOM and execution sourcing of forces is documented in the GFMAP Annex C for allocation.⁴

(d) Joint Individual Augmentation (JIA). As a part of operational force requirements, planners may identify the need for military or DOD civilians to augment existing staff capability.JIAs are allocated via GFM and the Secretary's decisions for allocation are documented in Annex D of the GFMAP.^{5,6}

(e) Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA). Forces allocated through GFM to support a DSCA mission may include active component (AC) or mobilized RC forces operating under U.S.C., Title 10 authorities. Separately, state or territory governors may employ their own National Guard forces or the National Guard forces of other states or territories ICW their respective governors under U.S.C., Title 32. These National Guard forces operating under U.S.C., Title 32 are not allocated through GFM, but should influence the number and capabilities of U.S.C., Title 10 forces requested via GFM allocation.

(f) GFM Allocation during Crisis. Under crisis conditions, the allocation of forces may occur simultaneous to the decision to initiate execution. A decision from the President or Secretary to execute may be accompanied by SecDef direction to allocate specific forces.

² DoDD 5132.03, *DOD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*

³ JCJCSM 3130.06 Series, *Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*

⁴ *Ibid*

⁵ *Ibid*

⁶ JCJCSI 1301.01 Series, *Joint Individual Augmentation Procedures*

(5) Termination of military operations is ultimately a political decision that is directed by the President or Secretary. Established termination criteria is a tool which informs their decision to terminate military operations.

7. Execution Function - Redeployment

Redeployment is the transfer of deployed forces and accompanying materiel from one operational area to support another JFC's operational requirements within a new operational area or home/demobilization station. Redeployment is initiated by a CCDR decision (end-of-mission for a force) or a Service decision for force rotation.²⁵ The process for redeployment is depicted in Figure J below.




Figure J. Execution Function - Redeployment

a. **Redeployment Planning.** Redeployment planning is based upon a planned CONOPS and refined during execution at redeployment decision points necessary to meet lead times for effective execution.

(1) **Supported CCDR.** A CCDR REDEPORD is issued when a force requirement is no longer needed. The order directs the unit to redeploy and informs the GFM stakeholders that the requirement for replacement units is no longer needed. A CCDR REDEPORD is not required to conduct a Service (or USSOCOM for SOF) force rotation or to redeploy a force when it is properly relieved by a replacement force. Movement requirements for redeployment are entered into the TPFDD by the supported CCMD Service component pending validation by the supported CCDR. The CCDR redeployment planning must also consider the drawdown and redeployment of contracted support and retrograde of non-unit equipment and materiel.

(2) **CCMD Components.** A CCMD Service component issues a REDEPORD either in response to a CCDR order or on its own authority in compliance with Service (or USSOCOM of SOF) force rotation policy. CCDR Service component REDEPORDs do not cancel the CCDR's force requirement. Ensuring coordination for a replacement rotation force, the supported CCDR Service component issues a REDEPORD. Movement requirements for redeployment are entered into the TPFDD by the supported CCMD Service component while movement requirements for the deployment of replacement force are entered by the Service (or USSOCOM for SOF). Both verify the movement requirements to the CCDR who then validates them in the TPFDD.

(3) USTRANSCOM exercises its UCP responsibilities as mobility JFP, DOD single manager for transportation, DOD single manager for patient movement, DPO, global distribution operations synchronizer, and for providing mission-tailored Global Standing Joint Force Headquarter capabilities in support of CCDRs and ICW supporting CCDRs, Services, and appropriate USG agencies.

²⁵ JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*

(a) USTRANSCOM analyzes strategic mobility lift allocations needed to meet the Chairman's priority for all CCDR force redeployment requirements.

(b) USTRANSCOM performs lateral coordination of recommended resource deliberations with the supported CCDRs. USTRANSCOM prioritizes redeployment support globally in support of multiple supported CCDRs.

(c) USTRANSCOM forwards coordinated strategic mobility assets allocation recommendation to the Chairman.

(4) Chairman.

(a) The Secretary determines priority of supported CCDR force requirements and the Chairman executes that priority.

(b) USTRANSCOM keeps the Chairman apprised of progress through the JS.

(c) In cases where redeployment lift requirements exceed USTRANSCOM capacity, the Chairman may need to arbitrate a solution with the supported CCDRs. The Chairman may leverage the analysis and recommendation of the JLOC or JTB, if established, to support his/her adjudication decisions.²⁶

(5) Supporting CCMDs. Align their supporting activities with the execution of the supported CCDR's redeployment plan.

(a) Verify Forces in the TPFDD and report redeployment movement requirements within JOPES IT.

(b) Continue to coordinate for the sustainment of forces through the completion of redeployment.

b. Prepare Forces Redeployment Activities. The supported CCMD and its Service components prepare forces and individuals for redeployment. The activities are fundamentally the reverse of the JRSOI activities conducted during the deployment function.

(1) Establish Redeployment Command and Control. To meet its execution responsibilities, USTRANSCOM established a DDOC that directs the global air, land, and sea transportation capabilities ICW supported and supporting commands. Supported CCDRs establish a JDDOC that works with the DDOC to balance and regulate the force flow from origin to destination. Movement control elements confirm diplomatic and ground movement clearances with relevant host nations, state, and USG agencies.

(2) Schedule Force Movements. USTRANSCOM assists the supported CCDR and ensures that validated movement requirements are routed and scheduled IAW the TPFDD.

(3) Force Rotation. As directed, the supported CCMD Service components or subordinate commands establish and coordinate requirements for relief-in-place of rotating forces. Tactical CDRs tasked to redeploy conduct relief-in-place and transfer of authority operations as required prior to starting redeployment movement.

(4) Conduct theater requirements for redeployment based upon the location and nature of the operation. Requirements may include:

(a) Redeployment training or medical screening

(b) Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) requirements

(c) Customs or other legal requirements of the host nation or destination

c. Move Forces. Forces redeploy via common user lift or may self-deploy as capable.

(1) The supported CCDR is responsible for intra-theater movement of forces to redeployment port of embarkation (POE). The supported CCDR manages and regulates the redeployment flow with consideration of force throughput and staging capacity.

(2) CDR, USTRANSCOM will manage the strategic common-user transportation assets needed for the redeployment of forces, develop lift allocations, and report the progress and shortfalls to the Chairman and the supported CCDRs.

²⁶ JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*

d. Monitor and Control Redeployment Operations.

(1) Supported CCDR. Balances and regulates the force flow to support the overall CONOPS with consideration for theater distribution, JRSOI capacity, and strategic lift capacity. Force Rotation relief-in-place requirements are considered when managing the redeployment schedule and its alignment with deployment of replacement forces.

(2) USTRANSCOM. Coordinates with its Service components and commercial transportation industry to manage the flow of lift assets IAW the supported CCDR's movement priorities. Provides ITV of redeployment and documents force movements in JOPES IT.

(3) Supporting CCDRs, Military Departments, and CSAs monitor redeployment TPFDD execution and posture to receive redeploying forces.

e. JRSOI at Destination. The responsibility for JRSOI following redeployment will depend upon the subsequent mission of the redeploying force. If redeploying to another AOR for a follow-on mission, the receiving CCDR, in conjunction with its Service components, conducts JRSOI. If redeploying to home station, the originating Service and its subordinate organizations conduct JRSOI. During redeployment to home station, the receiving CCDR or Service assumes responsibility for returning units and personnel when OPCON is relinquished IAW the directing order. The receiving CCDR or Service must have visibility of the redeployment schedule to effectively support its JRSOI activities. That visibility may be through USTRANSCOM provided ITV or via Service coordination of self-redeploying forces.

8. Execution Function - Demobilization

Demobilization activities can begin before the end of the crisis or war as the need for resources diminish and assets for demobilization support become available. Most demobilization actions will commence following the conflict when immediate post-conflict missions have been assigned by the supported CCDR and requirements for military forces and resources decline. Although demobilization, like mobilization, is essentially a Military Department responsibility, the supported and supporting CDRs play coordinating and synchronizing roles. In any event, the CCDRs monitor the status and progress of demobilization and concurrent recovery operations to assess the adequacy of actions to restore readiness of assigned forces to required levels for future conflicts. Following redeployment, the Military Departments deactivate RC units or individuals and return them to a reserve status.²⁷ The process of demobilization is depicted in Figure K below.




Figure K. Execution Function: Demobilization

²⁷ JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations

II. Execution

"In the military, as in any organization, giving the order might be the easiest part. Execution is the real game."

LTG Russel Honore

1. Effective Planning

Planning and preparation accomplish nothing if not executed effectively. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying forces and capabilities to accomplish the mission and using situational awareness to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions.¹ Often, the decision to deploy the military will be in conditions significantly different from the original planning guidance or the conditions planned. Assessments and reframing the problem, if required, inform the applicability of, or necessary modifications to the plan in response to changes in the OE. Plans are rarely executed as written regardless of how much time and effort went into the planning process. However, planning provides a significant head start and gives you insight into potential problem areas.

a. CDRs fight the enemy, not the plan. Moltke's dictum of "No plan of operations goes with any degree of certainty to beyond the first contact," rather than condemning the value of planning, reminds CDRs, staffs, and subordinate unit leaders the proper relationship between planning and execution. A plan provides a reasonably forecast of execution. However, it remains a starting point, not an exact script to follow. As General George S. Patton, Jr., cautioned, "...one makes plans to fit circumstances and does not try to create circumstances to fit plans."²

b. Effective planning enables transition. Integrated staff effort during planning ensures the plan is a team effort and the knowledge gained across the staff in the planning process is shared and retained. This staff work assists in identifying changes in the OE and guidance, speeding transition to execution.

c. Detailed planning provides the analysis of the threat and the OE. The knowledge and understanding gained enables a well-trained staff to quickly identify what is different between their plan and current conditions and make recommendations based on their prior work.

2. Transition

a. Transition to Execution. As discussed in Chapter 6, *Plan Development*, transition may involve a wide range of briefs, drills, or rehearsals necessary to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution and be subject to the variables of echelon of command, mission complexity, and, most importantly, time.

b. At a minimum, this step includes a CONOPS brief along with the handover and explanation of any execution tools developed during planning, such as a decision support

¹ FM 3-0, *Operations*

² ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*

matrix or an execution checklist. If time and resources allow, the transition step may include ROC drills and confirmation briefs by subordinate units. Successful transition enhances the situational understanding of those who will execute the order, maintains the intent of the CONOPS, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo.³

c. Transition is a continuous process that requires a free flow of information between CDRs and staffs by all available means. At higher echelons where the planners may not be executors, the CDR may designate a representative as a proponent for the order or plan. After orders development, the proponent takes the approved order or plan forward to the staff charged with supervising execution. As a full participant in the development of the plan, the proponent is able to answer questions, aid in the use of the planning support tools, and assist during execution in determining necessary adjustments to the order or plan. Transition occurs at all levels of command. A formal transition normally occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams. For transition to occur, an approved order or plan must exist. The approved order or plan and the products of continuing staff actions form the input for transition.⁴

These inputs may include—

- Refined intelligence and IPB products.
- Planning support tools.
- Outlined FRAGOs for branches.
- Information on possible future missions (sequels).
- Any outstanding issues.

d. Regardless of the level of command, a successful transition ensures those who execute the order understand the CDR's intent, the CONOPS, and any planning tools. Transition may be internal or external and in the form of briefs, drills, or the relocation of a planner to the current operations for execution. Internally, transition occurs either between future plans and the future operations center or future operations and current operations centers. Externally, transition occurs between the CDR and his subordinate CDRs.⁵ (See Chapter 6, *Plan or Order Development* and JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* for details on the Transition Brief.)

"A good plan violently executed now is better than a perfect plan executed next week."

Gen. George S. Patton

3. Execute

a. In execution the CCDR, staffs, components and supporting CDRs focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. In the case of a contingency the decision to execute will often be presented as an examination of options in response to a developing crisis or action rather than a specific directive to execute a specific CONPLAN or OPLAN. During execution, the situation may change rapidly and operations the CDR envisioned in the plan may bear little resemblance to actual events in execution

b. The decision to execute will often be presented as an examination of options in response to a developing crisis such as a natural disaster or action by a competitor state or threat (state or non-state) rather than a specific directive to execute a specific CONPLAN or OPLAN.

³ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

⁴ MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*

⁵ *Ibid*

A. Summary

“Don’t let day to day operations drive out planning”

Donald Rumsfeld

Today’s operational environment continues to present multiple, diverse and difficult strategic challenges for the United States. A national level of effort involving seamless integration and coordination of multiple elements of national power—diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military (and in some cases, alliance and coalition partners) is required to win current and future fights and to ensure the viability of a government capable of “defending the people” and our vital national interests at home and abroad.

“Today’s strategic landscape is also extraordinarily volatile, and the nation faces threats from an array of state and nonstate actors. These realities are why some have called today’s operating environment the most challenging since World War II.”

Gen. Joe Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Although conflict, violence, and war endure, the methods through which political goals are pursued are always evolving. How this change in the character of conflict will play out and what the Joint Force must do to prepare to meet the demands of tomorrow requires our collective attention.¹

Forecasting the future, particularly the deep future, is a daunting task, but the global trends are rapidly gathering momentum and shaping every facet of society and international discourse, including security policy and warfare.²

The National Defense Strategy acknowledges an increasingly complex global security environment, characterized by overt challenges to the free and open international order and the re-emergence of long-term, strategic competition between nations. This increasingly complex security environment is defined by rapid technological change, challenges from adversaries in every operating domain, and the impact on current readiness resulting from the longest continuous stretch of armed conflict in our Nation’s history.

The U.S. military finds itself at a historical inflection point, where disparate, yet related elements of the operational environment are converging, creating a situation where fast-moving trends across our multiple elements of national power are rapidly transforming the nature of all aspects of society and human life – including the character of warfare. These trends include significant advances in science and technology, where new discoveries and innovations are occurring at a breakneck pace, a dizzying pace of human interaction and a world:³

- that is connected through social media where cognition, ideas, and perceptions, are almost instantaneously available.
- where economic disparities are growing between and within nations and regions.

¹ *Joint Operating Environment 2035*

² *The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare Forecasting the Future: Toward a Changing Character of Warfare, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command*

³ *Ibid*

- with competition for natural resources, especially water, becoming more common.

Where geopolitical challenges to the post-Cold War U.S.-led global system in which near-peer competitors, regional hegemons, ideologically-driven non-state actors, and even super empowered-individuals, are competing with the U.S. for leadership and influence in an ever-shrinking world.

These trends must be considered in the military sphere, matched with advances in our adversaries' capabilities and operational concepts, and superimposed over a U.S. military that has been engaged in a non-stop state of all-consuming counter-insurgency warfare for the last 20-plus years. The result is a U.S. military that may find itself with the very real potential of being out-gunned, out-ranged, out-protected, outdated, out of position, and out of balance against our adversaries. These potential foes have had time to refine their approaches to warfare, develop and integrate new capabilities, and in some cases expedite growing changes in the character of warfare.⁴

In this, today's global operating environment, we, as joint planners, must adjust our view of the adversary and the environment writ large. A logical way of gaining that increased understanding is to break the OE into its major parts, examine these parts individually, and then study the relationships and interaction between them to comprehend not only what is occurring, but why, and then plan to it, realizing that as the environment evolves, so will OUR plan!

The CCDRs environment of today is potentially overwhelming with information. Our job as planners is to present that information in a logical flow to the CCDR, using JPP as a tool to assist us plan. Remember, the plan you're working on is probably not the CCDR's only plan, nor concern. The CCDR's time is valuable and your job is to get the point across in a relevant, well-thought-out manner. Give the CCDR solutions, not problems, or if you are lacking the solution, give the CCDR options - well worked, learned and vetted.

"Planning for Planners" has outlined an approach to planning utilizing the construct of the Joint Planning Process. As this document has presented, the JPP is key to making logical, sequential and learned decisions. It is a standardized planning process that is conceptually easy to understand and capable of being applied in campaign, contingency or crisis environments; however, it is only a guide.

The traditional military-centric single center of gravity [focus] planning approach that worked so well in the Cold War doesn't allow us to accurately analyze, describe, and visualize today's networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary. This adversary has no single identifiable source of all power. Rather, because of globalization, the information revolution, and, in some cases, the non-state characteristic of our adversary, this form of adversary can only be described (and holistically attacked) as a system of systems. This environment requires astute multi-dimensional and adaptive planners. Our resources are limited, but our adversaries are not. Plan well, plan often, don't be married to your plan and never stop asking the most important questions in planning; "WHAT IF," and as General Zinni, USMC is often quoted as saying, "THEN WHAT?"

"And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor."

Final lines of the Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776

⁴ *The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare Forecasting the Future: Toward a Changing Character of Warfare, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command*

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- CJCSI 3110.01, *Joint Strategic Campaign Plans*
- CJCSI 3110.03 Series, *Logistics Supplement to the JSCP*
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- CJCSM 3122.02, *Series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III Time Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution*
- CJCSM 3130.00, *Crisis Action TPFDD Development and Deployment Execution*
- CJCSM 3130.01, *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities*
- CJCSM 3130.03, *Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance*
- CJCSM 3130.04, *Deployment Policies and Procedures.*
- CJCSM 3130.06, *Series, Global Force Management Allocation Policies and Procedures*
- CJCSM 3314.01, *Intelligence Planning*
- CJCSM 3500.04, *Universal Joint Task List*
- CJCSM 3500.05A, *JTFHQ Master Training Guide*
- DoDD 1235.10, *Activation, Mobilization, and Demobilization of the Ready Reserve*
- DODD, 1322.18, *Military Training.*
- DODD 1400.31, *DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning and Execution.*
- DODD 1404.10, *DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce*
- DODD 3000.05, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR)*
- DODD 3000.06, *Combat Support Agencies*
- DODD 3020.42, *Defense Continuity Plan Development*
- DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*
- DODD 5100.3, *Support of the Headquarters of Combatant and Subordinate Joint Commands*
- DoDD 5132.03, *DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation*
- DODD 5143.01, *Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))*
- DODI 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix*
- DoDI I235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)*
- DODI 3000.05, *Stability Operations*
- DoDI 3000.12, *Management of U.S. Global Defense Posture (GDP)*
- DODI 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the US Armed Forces*
- DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components*

C. Timelines/Dates & OPLAN Annexes

1. Times

(C-, D-, M-days end at 2400 hours Universal Time (Zulu time) and are assumed to be 24 hours long for planning.) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff normally coordinates the proposed date with the CDRs of the appropriate unified and specified commands, as well as any recommended changes to C-day. L-hour will be established per plan, crisis, or theater of operations and will apply to both air and surface movements. Normally, L-hour will be established to allow C-day to be a 24-hour day.

a. C-Day. The unnamed day on which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapon systems, or a combination of these elements using any or all types of transport. The letter "C" will be the only one used to denote the above. The highest command or headquarters responsible for coordinating the planning will specify the exact meaning of C-day within the aforementioned definition. The command or headquarters directly responsible for the execution of the operation, if other than the one coordinating the planning, will do so in light of the meaning specified by the highest command or headquarters coordinating the planning.

b. D-Day. The unnamed day on which a particular operation commences or is to commence.

c. F-Hour. The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the Military Departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units.

d. H-Hour. The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.

e. H-Hour (amphibious operations). For amphibious operations, the time the first assault elements are scheduled to touch down on the beach, or a landing zone, and in some cases the commencement of countermine breaching operations.

f. I-Day. (CJCSM 3110.01/JSCP). The day on which the Intelligence Community determines that within a potential crisis situation, a development occurs that may signal a heightened threat to U.S. interests. Although the scope and direction of the threat is ambiguous, the Intelligence Community responds by focusing collection and other resources to monitor and report on the situation as it evolves.

g. L-Hour. The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence.

h. L-Hour (Amphibious Operations). In amphibious operations, the time at which the first helicopter of the helicopter-borne assault wave touches down in the landing zone.

i. M-Day. The term used to designate the unnamed day on which full mobilization commences or is due to commence.

j. N-Day. The unnamed day an active duty unit is notified for deployment or redeployment.

k. R-Day. Redeployment day. The day on which redeployment of major combat, combat support, and combat service support forces begins in an operation.

l. S-Day. The day the President authorizes Selective Reserve call-up (not more than 200,000).

m. T-Day. The effective day coincident with Presidential declaration of national emergency and authorization of partial mobilization (not more than 1,000,000 personnel exclusive of the 200,000 call-up).

n. W-Day. Declared by the President, W-day is associated with an adversary decision to prepare for war (unambiguous strategic warning).

2. Operational Plan Annexes

- A Task Organization
- B Intelligence
- C Operations
- D Logistics
- E Personnel
- F Public Affairs
- G Civil-Military Operations
- H Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Operations
- J Command Relationships
- K Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems
- L Environmental Considerations
- M Geospatial Information and Services
- N Assessments
- P Host Nation Support
- Q Health Services
- R Reports
- S Special Technical Operations
- T Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response (CBRN-R)
- U Notional Counterproliferation Decision Guide
- V Interagency-Interorganizational Coordination
- W Operational Contract Support
- X Execution Checklist
- Y Commander's Communication Strategy
- Z Distribution
- AA Religious Support

Annexes A-D, K, and Y are required annexes for a Crisis OPOD per JOPES. All others may either be required by the JSCP or deemed necessary by the supported CCDR.

D. Commander's Estimate

1. Purpose

a. The CDR's estimate, submitted by the supported CDR in response to a CJCS WARNORD, provides the CJCS with time-sensitive information for consideration by the NCA in meeting a crisis situation. Essentially, it reflects the supported CDR's analysis of the various COAs that may be used to accomplish the assigned mission and contains recommendations as to the best COA (recommended COAs submitted for President, SecDef approval may be contained in current OPLANS or CONPLANS or may be developed to meet situations not addressed by current plans. Regardless of origin, these COAs will be specifically identified when they involve military operations against a potential enemy). Although the estimative process at the supported CDR's level may involve a complete, detailed estimate by the supported CDR, the estimate submitted to the CJCS will normally be a greatly abbreviated version providing only that information essential to the President, SecDef and the CJCS for arriving at a decision to meet a crisis.

b. Supporting CDRs normally will not submit a CDR's estimate to the CJCS; however, they may be requested to do so by the supported CDR. They may also be requested to provide other information that could assist the supported CDR in formulating and evaluating the various COAs.

2. When Submitted

a. The CDR's Estimate will be submitted as soon as possible after receipt of the CJCS WARNORD, but no later than the deadline established by the CJCS in the WARNORD. Although submission time is normally 72 hours, extremely time-sensitive situations may require that the supported CDR respond in 4 to 8 hours.

b. Follow-on information or revisions to the CDR's Estimate should be submitted as necessary to complete, update, or refine information included in the initial estimate.

c. The supported CDR may submit a CDR's Estimate at the CDR's own discretion, without a CJCS WARNORD, to advise the SecDef and CJCS of the CDR's evaluation of a potential crisis situation within the AOR. This situation may be handled by a SITREP instead of a CDR's Estimate.

3. How Submitted

The CDR's Estimate is submitted by record communication, normally with a precedence of IMMEDIATE or FLASH, as appropriate. GCCS Newsgroup should be used initially to pass the CDR's estimate, but must be followed by immediate record communication to keep all crisis participants informed.

4. Addressees

The message is sent to the CJCS with information copies to the Services, components, supporting commands and combat support agencies, USTRANSCOM, and other appropriate commands and agencies.

5. Contents

a. The CDR's Estimate will follow the major headings of a CDR's Estimate of the Situation as outlined in Appendix A to Enclosure J but will normally be substantially abbreviated in content. As with the WARNORD, the precise contents may vary widely, depending on the nature of the crisis, time available to respond, and the applicability of prior planning. In



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
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


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
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