


# ARMY SMARTBOOK



**7th Edition  
(AODS7)**

**FM 3-0 Multidomain  
Operations (2022)**

**Combat Power  
(Generating/Applying)**

**Command & Control  
(ADP 6-0)**

**Movement & Maneuver  
(ADP 3-90)**

**Intelligence  
(ADP 2-0)**

**Fires  
(ADP 3-19)**

**Sustainment  
(ADP 4-0)**

**Protection  
(ADP 3-37)**

**(AODS7) The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, 7th Ed.**

# FM 3-0 Multidomain OPERATIONS



# ARMY SMARTBOOK



7th Edition  
(AODS7)

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# Multidomain OPERATIONS

The Lightning Press  
Norman M Wade



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## Multidomain Operations

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ISBN: 978-1-935886-91-4

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# (AODS7) Notes to Reader

The Army's **primary mission** is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. Army forces shape operational environments, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.

Army forces achieve objectives through the **conduct of operations**. Operations vary in many ways. They occur in all kinds of physical environments and vary in scale of forces involved and duration.

**Multidomain operations** are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. Multi-domain operations are the Army's contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the **competition continuum**.

The Army provides forces capable of **transitioning to combat operations**, fighting for information, producing intelligence, adapting to unforeseen circumstances, and defeating enemy forces. Army forces employ capabilities from multiple domains in a **combined arms approach** that creates complementary and reinforcing effects through multiple domains while preserving combat power to maintain options for the joint force commander.

**Combat power** is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. It is the **ability to fight**. The complementary and reinforcing effects that result from synchronized operations yield a powerful blow that overwhelms enemy forces and creates friendly momentum. Army forces deliver that blow through a combination of five dynamics: leadership, firepower, information, mobility, and survivability.

The **warfighting functions** contribute to **generating and applying** combat power. Well sustained units able to move and maneuver bring combat power to bear against the opponent. Joint and Army indirect fires complement and reinforce organic firepower in maneuver units. Survivability is a function of protection tasks that focus friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Information contributes to the disruption and destruction of enemy forces. Intelligence determines how and where to best apply combat power against enemy weaknesses. C2 enables leadership, the most important qualitative aspect of combat power.

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
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# AODS7: The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Multidomain Operations)



*FM 3-0 (Oct '22)*  
See following  
pages for an  
overview.



(Chapters 1 & 2)

*"BSS6: The Battle Staff SMARTbook"*

## Chap 1: Operations (FM 3-0, 2022)

The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic roles for the joint force. Army forces shape operational environments, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains.



Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders (JFC). Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army's contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum.

The Army provides forces capable of transitioning to combat operations, fighting for information, producing intelligence, adapting to unforeseen circumstances, and defeating enemy forces. Army forces employ capabilities from multiple domains in a combined arms approach that creates complementary and reinforcing effects through multiple domains, while preserving combat power to maintain options for the joint force commander. Creating and exploiting relative advantages require Army forces to operate with endurance and in depth.

## Chap 2: Combat Power (Generating & Applying)

Combat power is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time. It is the ability to fight. The complementary and reinforcing effects that result from synchronized operations yield a powerful blow that overwhelms enemy forces and creates friendly momentum. Army forces deliver that blow through a combination of five dynamics: are leadership, firepower, information, mobility, and survivability.

The warfighting functions contribute to generating and applying combat power. Well sustained units able to move and maneuver bring combat power to bear against the opponent. Joint and Army indirect fires complement and reinforce organic firepower in maneuver units. Survivability is a function of protection tasks, the protection inherent to Army platforms, and schemes of maneuver that focus friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. Intelligence determines how and where to best apply combat power against enemy weaknesses. C2 enables leadership, the most important qualitative aspect of combat power.




*"TLS6: The Leader's SMARTbook"*




*Information*


# The Six Warfighting Functions




**ADP 6-0**  
(Chapter 3)




**ADP 3-90**  
(Chapter 4)




**ADP 2-0**  
(Chapter 5)



**ADP 3-19**  
(Chapter 6)



**ADP 4-0**  
(Chapter 7)



**ADP 3-37**  
(Chapter 8)

Continued on next page

## Chap 3: Command & Control (ADP 6-0)

The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

## Chap 4: Movement and Maneuver (ADP 3-90 & others)

The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a position of advantage over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area.

## Chap 5: Intelligence (ADP 2-0)

The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. This warfighting function includes understanding threats, adversaries, and weather. It synchronizes information collection with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders and is more than just collection. Developing intelligence is a continuous process that involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation.

## Chap 6: Fires (ADP 3-19)

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range of military operations. These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and Joint forces, as well as other unified action partners.

## Chap 7: Sustainment (ADP 4-0)

The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment.

## Chap 8: Protection (ADP 3-37)

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States and multinational military and civilian partners, to include the host nation. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and then counters or mitigates those threats.

Continued on next page

# FM 3-0 Operations (Oct' 22): Overview

The 2022 version of FM 3-0 establishes multidomain operations as the Army's operational concept. Conceptually, multidomain operations reflect an evolutionary inflection point, building on the incremental changes in doctrine as the operational environment has changed over the last forty years. In practice, however, these conceptual changes will have revolutionary impacts on how the Army conducts operations in the coming decades. The 2017 version of FM 3-0 introduced many multidomain considerations and ideas. This version of FM 3-0 codifies the multidomain approach to operations in terms of the combined arms employment of capabilities from multiple domains. The multidomain operations concept draws from previous Army operational concepts, including AirLand Battle, Full Spectrum Operations, and Unified Land Operations.

Multidomain operations are the Army's contribution to unified action, conducted by Army echelons in an operational environment consisting of five domains and three dimensions, and the strategic contexts of competition, crisis, and armed conflict. It concludes with a description of multidomain operations through guiding principles of war, tenets, and imperatives that enable Army forces to accomplish missions, defeat enemy forces, and meet objectives.

Full Spectrum Operations accounted for the operations that Army forces conducted outside the bounds of armed conflict. This version of FM 3-0 updates this material for the present by describing how Army forces operate during competition below armed conflict and during crisis. It goes a step further by describing how these operations set conditions for success during armed conflict.

Unified Land Operations emphasized the integration and synchronization of Army, joint, and other unified action partners during operations. This version of FM 3-0 retains the focus on large-scale combat operations. It also builds on the importance of integrating joint and multinational capabilities and expands the combined arms approach with a focus on creating complementary and reinforcing effects with capabilities from multiple domains.


The nature of war remains unchanged. The model for understanding an operational environment, specifically the physical, information, and human dimensions, reinforces the Clausewitzian idea that war is an act of force to compel the enemy's will. In other words, physical action can influence human perceptions, behavior, and decision making. Although there are new capabilities in space and cyberspace, Army forces use them just as they employ any other capability—to accomplish missions on land.

## Summary of major changes:

- Establishes multidomain operations as the Army's operational concept.
- Organizes chapters around the range of military operations that occur along the competition continuum in the context of competition, crisis, and conflict. Continues focus on large-scale combat operations.
- Emphasizes understanding an operational environment through three dimensions (physical, information, human) and five physical domains (land, air, maritime, space, cyberspace).
- Develops different Tenets (Agility, Convergence, Endurance, and Depth) and new Imperatives applicable to operations.
- Adopts the joint definition of Combat Power and clarifies relationship with Warfighting Functions.
- Adjusts the Operational Framework to assigned areas, main effort/supporting effort, and deep/close/rear operations; eliminates "decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations" component; emphasizes "continuous consolidation of gains" during all operations.
- Establishes the Theater Strategic level of warfare as a fourth distinct level separate from national strategic.

- Adds a chapter on the unique requirements of maritime environments and a contested deployment appendix.
- Establishes a 9th form of contact – Influence: interactions intended to shape perceptions, behaviors, and decisions.
- METT-TC mnemonic updated to METT-TC(I), adding informational considerations to the mission variables.

# FM 3-0 Operations (Oct '22) Logic Map



Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct '22), Introductory figure. FM 3-0 logic chart.





# (AODS7) References

The following references were used to compile The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook. All references are available to the general public and designated as “approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive material restricted from public release.

## Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs)

ADP 1-02	Aug 2018	Terms and Military Symbols
ADP 2-0	Jul 2019	Intelligence
ADP 3-0	Jul 2019	Operations
ADP 3-07	Jul 2019	Stability
ADP 3-19	Jul 2019	Fires
ADP 3-28	Jul 2019	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
ADP 3-37	Jul 2019	Protection
ADP 3-90	Jul 2019	Offense and Defense
ADP 4-0	Jul 2019	Sustainment
ADP 5-0	Jul 2019	The Operations Process
ADP 6-0	Jul 2019	Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces

## Field Manuals (FMs)

FM 3-0*	Oct 2022	Operations
FM 3-34	Apr 2014	Engineer Operations
FM 3-55	May 2013	Information Collection
FM 3-52	Oct 2016	Airspace Control
FM 3-90-1	Mar 2013	Offense and Defense, Volume 1
FM 3-90-2	Mar 2013	Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 2
FM 6-0*	May 2022	Commander and Staff Organization and Operations
FM 4-0*	Jul 2019	Sustainment

## Army Techniques Publications (ATPs)

ATP 3-35	Mar 2015	Army Deployment and Redeployment
ATP 2-01.3*	Mar 2019	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

## Joint Publications (JPs)

JP 3-0*	Jun 2022	Joint Campaigns and Operations
JP 5-0*	Dec 2020	Joint Planning

\* Denotes new/updated reference since previous edition.



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**Chap 8**

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# I. Foundations of Operations

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), chap. 1.

## I. Army Operations

The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. It supports four strategic roles for the joint force. Army forces shape operational environments, counter aggression on land during crisis, prevail during large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The Army fulfills its strategic roles by providing forces for joint campaigns that enable integrated deterrence of adversaries outside of conflict and the defeat of enemies during conflict or war. The strategic roles clarify the overall purposes for which Army forces conduct multidomain operations on behalf of joint force commanders (JFCs) in the pursuit of a stable environment and other policy objectives. Fulfilling policy objectives requires national-level leaders to orchestrate all instruments of national power throughout the entire government and coalition, in a manner commensurate with national will.


Military operations on land are foundational to operations in other domains because almost all capabilities, no matter where employed, are ultimately based on or controlled from land. While any particular domain may dominate military considerations in a specific context, conflicts are usually resolved on land because that is where people live and make political decisions and where the basis of national power exists.

### Operations

Army forces achieve objectives through the conduct of operations. An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1, Vol 1). Operations vary in many ways. They occur in all kinds of physical environments, including urban, subterranean, desert, jungle, mountain, maritime, and arctic. Operations vary in scale of forces involved and duration. Operations change factors in the physical, information, and human dimensions of an operational environment.

### Operational Categories

Army forces meet a diverse array of challenges and contribute to national objectives across a wide range of operational categories, including large-scale combat operations, limited contingency operations, crisis response, and support to security cooperation.



Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct. '22), fig. 1-1. Operational categories and the spectrum of violence.

Most operations occur on the lower end of the spectrum of violence, and their objectives do not reach the level of vital national interests or national survival. These operations typically shape operational environments in ways that stabilize global security and facilitate conditions that are generally favorable to the United States. They provide valuable options to JFCs because they achieve objectives best supported by persistent presence, often at relatively low cost.

While the overwhelming majority of operations conducted by Army forces occur either below the threshold of armed conflict or during limited contingencies, the focus of Army readiness is on large-scale combat operations. The United States always retains the option to employ greater levels of force when less coercive methods are ineffective, and when a vital interest or national survival is at stake. This requires Army forces to be prepared for the most demanding and dangerous types of operations. Army forces contribute to conventional deterrence through their demonstrated capability, capacity, and will to wage war on land in any environment against any opponent. Credible combat forces make the other instruments of national power more potent, and they help deter the enemy's escalation of violence during other types of operations.

The complex environment in which operations occur demands leaders who understand both the science and art of operations. Understanding the science of operations—such as combat power ratios, weapons ranges, and movement tables—helps leaders improve synchronization and reduce risk. However, there is no way to eliminate uncertainty, and leaders must exercise operational art to make decisions and assume risk. Intangible factors, such as the impact of leadership on morale, using shock effect to defeat enemy forces, and supportive populations are fundamentally human factors that can overcome physical disadvantages and often decide the outcomes of an operation.

Credible combat forces are those able to overcome the advantages peer threats generate within a specific regional context. Enemies typically initiate their aggression under conditions optimal for their success, requiring U.S. forces to respond at a disadvantage. U.S. combat operations typically involve force projection over long distances, providing advantages for enemy forces operating closer to their bases of support. Enemies typically have a degree of popular support cultivated through decades of propaganda and isolation from the free flow of information. This increases the enemy's will to fight and can make local populations hostile to U.S. forces and objectives. Although a combatant command and theater army may accrue a variety of advantages as they set the theater and prepare for armed conflict during periods of competition, Army forces are typically faced with challenges they have to overcome at the onset of hostilities and throughout the conduct of armed conflict.

## II. Multidomain Operations

Multidomain operations are the combined arms employment of joint and Army capabilities to create and exploit relative advantages that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders. Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army's contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the competition continuum.

Below the threshold of armed conflict, multidomain operations are how Army forces accrue advantages and demonstrate readiness for conflict, deterring adversaries while assuring allies and partners. During conflict, they are how Army forces close with and destroy the enemy, defeat enemy formations, seize critical terrain, and control populations and resources to deliver sustainable political outcomes.

*See facing page for further discussion.*

# Multidomain Operations

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 1-2 to 1-3. See also p. 1-37.

**Multidomain operations** are the **combined arms** employment of **joint and Army** capabilities to create and exploit **relative advantages** that achieve objectives, defeat enemy forces, and consolidate gains on behalf of joint force commanders.

Employing Army and joint capabilities makes use of all available combat power from each domain to accomplish missions at least cost. Multidomain operations are the Army's contribution to joint campaigns, spanning the **competition continuum**.

Army forces conduct operations in support of joint campaigns which for the most part occur as part of a larger coalition operation. Leaders must understand the interdependencies between their own assigned forces and the forces or capabilities provided by others to generate the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined arms approaches. Army forces employ joint and other unified action partner capabilities to the degree they are available. However, because peer threats can contest the force in all domains, Army forces must be prepared to conduct operations when some or all joint capabilities are unavailable to support mission accomplishment.

All operations are multidomain operations. Army forces employ organic capabilities in multiple domains, and they continuously benefit from air and maritime strategic transportation and space and cyberspace capabilities that they do not control, including global positioning, satellite communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Lower echelons may not always notice the opportunities created by higher echelons or other forces that operate primarily in other domains; however, leaders must understand how the absence of those opportunities affects their concepts of operations, decision making, and risk assessment.

During operations, small advantages can have significant impacts on the outcome of the mission, particularly when they accrue over time. Creating and exploiting relative advantages are therefore necessary for all operations, and they become even more critical when opposing sides are evenly matched. A relative advantage is a location or condition, in any domain, relative to an adversary or enemy that provides an opportunity to progress towards or achieve an objective. Commanders seek and create relative advantages to exploit through action, and they continually assess the situation to identify ways to expand opportunities.

Army leaders are accustomed to creating and exploiting relative advantages through the combined-arms approach that traditionally focuses on capabilities from the land, air, and maritime domains. The proliferation of space and cyberspace capabilities further requires leaders who understand the advantages those capabilities create in their operational environment. The ability to integrate and synchronize space and cyberspace capabilities at the most effective tactical echelon expands options for creating advantages to exploit.

Multidomain operations fracture the coherence of threat operational approaches by destroying, dislocating, isolating, and disintegrating their interdependent systems and formations, and exploiting the opportunities these disruptions provide to defeat enemy forces in detail. Army forces therefore require timely, accurate, relevant, and predictive intelligence to understand threat characteristics, capabilities, objectives, and courses of action. Intelligence initially drives what combinations of defeat mechanisms commanders pursue as they employ the capabilities of their forces in space and time against enemy forces. Army forces combine maneuver and targeting methods to defeat enemy formations and systems. Army forces employ maneuver to close with and destroy enemy formations in close operations. Targeting generally sets priorities for information collection, fires, and other key capabilities to disintegrate enemy networks and systems. Leaders execute the targeting process to create advantages that enable freedom of maneuver and exploit the positional advantages created by maneuver.

# Irregular Warfare

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), p. 1-9.


Irregular warfare is the overt, clandestine, and covert employment of military and non-military capabilities across multiple domains by state and non-state actors through methods other than military domination of an adversary, either as the primary approach or in concert with conventional warfare.

Irregular warfare may include the use of indirect military activities to enable partners, proxies, or surrogates to achieve shared or complementary objectives. The main objective of irregular warfare varies with the political context, and it can be successful without being combined with conventional warfare (for example, the Cuban Revolution). While it often focuses on establishing influence over a population, irregular warfare has also historically been an economy of force effort to fix enemy forces in secondary theaters of conflict or to cause enemy leaders to commit significant forces to less critical lines of effort. Two characteristics distinguish irregular warfare from conventional warfare:

- The intent is to erode a political authority's legitimacy and influence or to exhaust its resources and will—not to defeat its armed forces—while supporting the legitimacy, influence, and will of friendly entities engaged in the struggle.
- The nonmilitary instruments of power are more prominent because the military instrument of power alone is insufficient to achieve desired objectives.

JFCs can employ most Army forces and capabilities during irregular warfare. Certain forces and capabilities are irregular warfare focused (for example Army special operations forces), in that they are specifically designed and organized for irregular warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in conventional warfare (for example as combat advisors to host-nation forces). Other forces are irregular warfare capable, in that they are primarily designed and organized for conventional warfare, but they can also be employed effectively in irregular warfare. Historically, the overwhelming majority of Army forces employed to conduct irregular warfare have been conventional forces.

**Irregular forces** are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. The irregular OPFOR can be part of the hybrid threat (HT). The irregular OPFOR component of the HT can be insurgents, guerrillas, or criminals or any combination thereof. The irregular OPFOR can also include other armed individuals or groups who are not members of a governing authority's domestic law enforcement organizations or other internal security forces.



*A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Irregular forces are armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. Irregular forces are unregulated and as a result act with no restrictions on violence or targets for violence. OPFOR5 topics and chapters include irregular and hybrid threat (components, organizations, strategy, operations, tactics), insurgents and guerrillas forces, terrorists (motivations, behaviors, organizations, operations and tactics), criminals (characteristics, organizations, activities), noncombatants (armed & unarmed), foreign security forces (FSF) threats, and functional tactics.*




# I. Army Strategic Contexts

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 1-14 to 1-16.

Joint doctrine describes the strategic environment in terms of a competition continuum. Rather than a world either at peace or at war, the competition continuum describes three broad categories of strategic relationships—cooperation, competition below armed conflict, and armed conflict. Each relationship is defined as between the United States and another strategic actor relative to a specific set of policy aims. Cooperation, competition, and even armed conflict commonly go on simultaneously in different parts of the world. Because of this, the needs of CDDRs and Army component commanders in one area are affected by the strategic needs of others.

Refer to JP 3-0 for more information about the joint competition continuum. Note. This manual uses “competition” to mean “competition below armed conflict.”

Although combatant commands and theater armies campaign across the competition continuum, Army tactical formations typically conduct operations within a context dominated by one strategic relationship at a time. Therefore, Army doctrine describes the strategic situation through three contexts in which Army forces conduct operations:



Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct. '22), fig. 1-3. Army strategic contexts and operational categories.

The Army strategic contexts generally correspond to the joint competition continuum and the requirements of joint campaigns. Because cooperation is generally conducted with an ally or partner to counter an adversary or enemy, Army doctrine considers it part of competition. Army doctrine adds crisis to account for the unique challenges facing ground forces that often characterize transition between competition and armed conflict.

**A. Competition (Below Armed Conflict)** (See pp. 1-63 to 1-76.)

Competition below armed conflict exists when two or more state or non-state adversaries have incompatible interests, but neither seeks armed conflict. Nation-states compete with each other using all instruments of national power to gain and maintain advantages that help them achieve their goals. Low levels of lethal force can be a part of competition below armed conflict. Adversaries often employ cyberspace capabilities and information warfare to destroy or disrupt infrastructure, interfere with government processes, and conduct activities in a way that does not cause the United States and its allies to respond with force. Competition provides military forces time to prepare for armed conflict, opportunities to assure allies and partners of resolve and commitment, and time and space to set the necessary conditions to prevent crisis or conflict.

**B. Crisis** (See pp. 1-77 to 1-86.)

A crisis is an emerging incident or situation involving a possible threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national and/or strategic objectives (JP 3-0). Commanders have to consider the possibility that overt military action may escalate a crisis towards armed conflict. The use of space and cyberspace capabilities provides other options that are less likely to cause escalation. The context of crisis is relative to an adversary, which is different from crisis response, which can result from a natural or human disaster. During crisis, armed conflict has not yet occurred, but it is either imminent or a distinct possibility that requires rapid response by forces prepared to fight if deterrence fails.

*Note. A crisis can be long in duration, but it can also reflect a near-simultaneous transition to armed conflict. Leaders do not assume that a crisis provides additional time for a transition to armed conflict.*


Army forces contribute to joint operations, seeking to deter further provocation and compel an adversary to de-escalate aggression and return to competition under conditions acceptable for the United States and its allies or partners. Through rapid movement and integration with the joint force, Army forces help signal the readiness and willingness to prevail in combat operations. When authorized, Army forces can inform or influence perceptions about an operation's goals and progress to amplify effects on the ground during a crisis; however, commanders ensure their message aligns with reality and that their narratives are truthful and credible. Army forces help the joint force maintain freedom of action and associated positions of relative advantage through the activities they conduct and their presence on the ground. They operate in a way that disrupts adversary risk calculations about the cost of acting contrary to U.S. national interests, compels de-escalation, and fosters a return to competition conditions favorable to the United States. If deterrence fails to end a crisis, Army forces are better postured for operations during armed conflict.

**C. Armed Conflict** (See pp. 1-87 to 1-126.)

Armed conflict occurs when a state or non-state actor uses lethal force as the primary means to satisfy its interests. Armed conflict can range from irregular warfare to conventional warfare and combinations of both. Entering into and terminating armed conflict is a political decision. Army forces may enter conflict with some advanced warning during a prolonged crisis or with little warning during competition. How well Army forces are prepared to enter into an armed conflict ultimately depends upon decisions and preparations made during competition and crisis. At the onset of armed conflict, forward-positioned Army forces may defend key terrain or infrastructure while seeking opportunities to gain the initiative or reposition to more favorable locations with partner forces. Army forces help JFCs gain and maintain the initiative, defeat enemy forces on the ground, control territory and populations, and consolidate gains to establish conditions for a political settlement favorable to U.S. interests. Army forces provide landpower to the joint force and conduct limited contingency or large-scale combat operations to ensure enduring political outcomes favorable to U.S. interests.

## VI. Understanding an Operational Environment

An operational environment is the aggregate of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). For Army forces, an operational environment includes portions of the land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains understood through three dimensions (human, physical, and information). The land, maritime, air, and space domains are defined by their physical characteristics.



*Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct. '22), fig. 1-4. Domains and dimensions of an operational environment. Refer to JP 2-0 and JP 5-0 for more information on describing and analyzing an operational environment from a joint perspective.*

An operational environment is the totality of factors that affect what occurs in an assigned area. These factors include actors, events, or actions that occur outside the assigned area. How the many entities behave and interact with each other is difficult to discern. No two operational environments are the same, and all of them continually change. Changes result, in part, from opposing forces and actors interacting, learning, and adapting. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect challenging, and it contributes to the uncertain nature of war and human competition. This requires that commanders, supported by their staffs, develop and maintain the best possible understanding of their operational environment. Several tools and processes assist commanders and staffs in understanding their operational environment. They include—

- Domains. (See p. 1-18 to 1-19.)
- Dimensions. (See p. 1-20 to 1-21.)
- Operational and mission variables (See p. 1-23.)
- Running estimates (See p. 3-6 “See Yourself”).
- Army design methodology (See p. 3-15.)
- The military decision-making process (See p. 3-15.)
- Building intelligence knowledge (See chap. 5.)
- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (See pp. 3-20 and 5-6.)
- Sustainment preparation of the operational environment (See p. 7-13.)

# A. (Five) Domains

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 1-18 to 1-21.

Within the context of an operational environment, a domain is a physically defined portion of an operational environment requiring a unique set of warfighting capabilities and skills. Each military Service and branch trains and educates its leaders to be experts about operations in a primary domain, although each Service has some capability in each of the domains, and each develops shared understanding of how to integrate capabilities from different domains. Land operations require mastery of terrain and ground maneuver. Cyberspace operations require mastery of digital information systems and computer code. Space, air, and maritime operations likewise require specific capabilities and skills, which manifest themselves in separate Services within the joint force. Although most domains align with the skills developed in a particular Service, no Service focuses entirely upon or exerts total control of that single domain during operations. Joint commanders assign responsibilities and task-organize based on mission requirements. However, the domains present very different conditions of warfare and require the specialized warfighting skills developed by the different Services and subcomponents within each of the Services. Army leaders do not need to understand all the technical components of what the joint force does in other domains, but they do need to understand the complementary and reinforcing ways in which they can request and employ those capabilities and methods in support of operations on land.

## Land Domain (See also p. 1-34.)

The land domain is the area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals (JP 3-31). Variations in climate, terrain, and the diversity of populations have a far greater impact on operations in the land domain than in any other domain. The most distinguishing characteristic of the land domain is the human dimension. Humans transit the maritime, air, and space domains, but they ultimately live, make political decisions, and seek conflict resolution on land.

The nature of combat on land is unique due to the impacts of terrain on all warfighting functions and the application of combat power. For example, terrain provides forces opportunities for evading detection and increasing survivability. It also provides enemy forces the same opportunities. Although technology increases the range of capabilities, complex terrain causes opposing forces to fight at close ranges. Land combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environments containing all types of terrain and potentially nuclear, biological, and chemically degraded environments. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them through close combat. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets (ADP 3-0). The outcome of battles and engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to close with enemy forces and prevail in close combat.

## Maritime Domain (See also pp. 1-35.)

The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals (JP 3-32). It overlaps with the land domain in the seaward segment of the littoral. Maritime capability may be viewed as global, regional, territorial, coastal, and self-defense forces. Only a few navies are capable of sustained employment far from their countries' shores. However, whether or not their navies are capable of global power projection, most maritime nations also maintain air forces capable of conducting operations over the adjacent maritime domain. This air capability, combined with land-based long-range fires, greatly impacts operations in the maritime domain.

The Navy and its partners employ five functions in a combined arms approach to provide a unique relative advantage for the joint force. These functions are deterrence, operational access, sea control, power projection, and maritime security.

### **Air Domain** (See also p. 1-34.)

The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth's surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). The speed, range, and payload of aircraft, rockets, missiles, and hypersonic glide vehicles operating in the air domain directly and significantly affect operations on land and sea. Likewise, advances in AMD, electromagnetic warfare, directed energy, and cyberspace capabilities increasingly contest freedom of maneuver in the air.

Control of the air and control of the land are often interdependent requirements for successful campaigns and operations. Control of the air provides a significant advantage when attacking strategically valuable targets at long ranges. However, control of the land is necessary for operating secure airfields and protecting other key terrain that enables air operations. The desired degree of control of the air may vary geographically and over time from no control, to parity, to local air superiority, to air supremacy, all depending upon the situation and the JFC's approved concept of operations.

### **Space Domain** (See also p. 1-34.)

The space domain is the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects become negligible. Like the air, land, and maritime domains, space is a physical domain in which military, civil, and commercial activities are conducted. The U.S. Space Command (known as USSPACECOM) has an area of responsibility that surrounds the earth at altitudes equal to, or greater than, 100 kilometers (54 nautical miles) above mean sea level. It has responsibility for planning and execution of global space operations, activities, and missions.

### **Cyberspace Domain** (See also p. 1-35.)

For Army forces, the cyberspace domain is the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunication networks, computer systems, embedded processors and controllers, and relevant portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Cyberspace is an extensive and complex global network of wired and wireless links connecting nodes that permeate every domain. Cyberspace networks cross geographic and political boundaries to connect individuals, organizations, and systems around the world. Cyberspace allows interactivity among individuals, groups, organizations, and nation-states. Friendly, enemy, adversary, and host-nation networks, communications systems, computers, cellular phone systems, social media, and technical infrastructures are all part of cyberspace. Cyberspace is congested, contested, and critical to successful operations.

Commanders can use cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities to gain situational awareness and understanding of the enemy through reconnaissance and sensing activities. These reconnaissance and sensing activities augment and enhance the understanding a commander gains from other forms of information collection and intelligence processes. Cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare capabilities enable decision making and protect friendly information. They are a significant means for informing and influencing audiences.



# II. Strategic Environment

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), chap. 2.

## Combat Power\*

Combat power is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). It is the ability to fight. The complementary and reinforcing effects that result from synchronized operations yield a powerful blow that overwhelms enemy forces and creates friendly momentum.

\* Editor's note: For the purposes of this book, the discussion from FM 3-0 (2022) of combat power is presented in chap. 2, as a means of organizing and introducing chapters 3 through 8 (the six warfighting functions).

## I. Strategic Environment

The central challenge to U.S. security is the reemergence of long-term, great power competition with China and Russia as individual actors and as actors working together to achieve common goals.

### A. China and Russia (See pp. 1-90 to 1-93.)

China uses its rapidly modernizing military, information warfare, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to its advantage. Concurrently, Russia seeks veto authority over nations on its periphery in terms of its governmental, economic, and diplomatic decisions, to subvert the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and to change European and Middle East security and economic structures to its favor.

### B. North Korea and Iran (See pp. 1-88.)

In addition to China and Russia, several other states threaten U.S. security. North Korea seeks to guarantee survival of its regime and increase its leverage. It is pursuing a mixture of CBRN, conventional, and unconventional weapons and a growing ballistic missile capability to gain coercive influence over South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Similarly, Iran seeks dominance over its neighbors by asserting an arc of influence and instability while vying for regional hegemony. Iran uses state-sponsored terrorist activities, a network of proxies, and its missile capabilities to achieve its objectives.

### C. Non-state Actors (Irregular Warfare) (See pp. 1-10.)

While states are the principal actors on the global stage, non-state actors also threaten the strategic environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities. Terrorists, transnational criminal organizations, threat cyber actors, and other malicious non-state actors have transformed global affairs with increased capabilities of mass disruption. Terrorism remains a persistent tactic driven by ideology and enabled by political and economic structures.



## D. Threats / Threat Methods

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 2-7 to 2-10.

### Threat

A **threat** is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADP 3-0). Threats faced by Army forces are, by nature, hybrid. They include individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or military forces, criminal elements, nation-states, or national alliances. In general, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or an adversary:

- An **enemy** is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADP 3-0). An enemy is also a combatant under the law of war.
- An **adversary** is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0). Adversaries pursue interests that compete with those of the United States and are often called competitors.
- **Peer threats** are adversaries or enemies with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains worldwide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power to U.S. forces in geographic proximity to a conflict area. Peer threats may also have a cultural affinity with specific regions, providing them relative advantages in the human and information dimensions. (See discussion below.)

Peer threats employ strategies that capitalize on their advantages to achieve objectives. When these objectives are at odds with the interests of the United States and its allies, conflict becomes more likely. Peer threats prefer to achieve their goals without directly engaging U.S. forces in combat. They often employ information warfare in combination with conventional and irregular military capabilities to achieve their goals. They exploit friendly sensitivity to world opinion and attempt to exploit American domestic opinion and sensitivity to friendly casualties. Peer threats believe they have a comparative advantage because of their willingness to endure greater hardships, casualties, and negative public opinion. They also believe their ability to pursue long-term goals is greater than that of the United States.

Peer threats employ capabilities from and across multiple domains against Army forces, and they seek to exploit vulnerabilities in all strategic contexts. During conflict, peer threats seek to inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short amount of time. They seek to delay friendly forces long enough to achieve their goals and end hostilities before friendly forces can decisively respond.

### Threat Methods

- **Information Warfare**
- **Systems Warfare**
- **Preclusion**
- **Isolation**
- **Sanctuary**

Peer threats use various methods to render U.S. military power irrelevant whenever possible. Five broad peer threat methods, often used in combination during conventional or irregular conflicts, and below the threshold of conflict, include—



## II. Tenets

The tenets of operations are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations, and they are directly related to how the Army's operational concept should be employed. Commanders use the tenets of operations to inform and assess courses of action throughout the operations process. The degree to which an operation exhibits the tenets provides insight into the probability for success. The tenets of operations are—

### Tenets of Operations

- A** Agility
- B** Convergence
- C** Endurance
- D** Depth

The Army provides forces capable of transitioning to combat operations, fighting for information, producing intelligence, adapting to unforeseen circumstances, and defeating enemy forces. Army forces employ capabilities from multiple domains in a **combined arms approach** that creates **complementary and reinforcing effects** through **multiple domains**, while preserving **combat power** to maintain options for the joint force commander (JFC). **Creating and exploiting relative advantages** require Army forces to operate with endurance and in depth. Endurance enables the ability to absorb the enemy's attacks and press the fight over the time and space necessary to accomplish the mission. Depth applies combat power throughout the enemy's formations and the operational environment, securing successive operational objectives and consolidating gains for the joint force.

### A. Agility


The ability to act faster than the enemy is critical for success. Agility is the ability to move forces and adjust their dispositions and activities more rapidly than the enemy. Agility requires sound judgment and rapid decision to gain a relative advantage and control making, often gained through the creation and exploitation of the terms and information advantages. Agility requires leaders to anticipate needs or opportunities, and it requires trained formations able to change direction, tasks, or focus as quickly as the situation requires. Change may come in the form of a transition between phases of an operation or the requirement to adapt to a new opportunity or hazard.

The time available to create and exploit opportunities against adaptive threats is usually limited. Agile units rapidly recognize an opportunity and take action to exploit it. Speed of recognition, decision making, movement, and battle drills enable agility. During armed conflict, this often requires units to change their location and disposition rapidly. Units must be able to employ capabilities and then rapidly task-organize them again for movement or new tasks while remaining dispersed for survivability. C2 and sustainment nodes must maintain a level of functionality on the move and be able to rapidly emplace and displace in order to reduce the probability of enemy detection. Nodes that are critical to success and susceptible to enemy detection and destruction are most vulnerable, and they must be the most agile.

Agility helps leaders influence tempo. Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy (ADP 3-0). It implies the ability to understand, decide, act, assess, and adapt. During competition, commanders act quickly to control events and deny enemy forces relative advantages. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis and restore favorable conditions. During armed conflict, commanders normally seek to maintain a higher tempo than enemy forces do. A rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy force's ability to counter friendly actions, and it can enable friendly forces to exploit a short window of opportunity.

B. Convergence

Convergence is an outcome created by the concerted employment of capabilities from multiple domains and echelons against combinations of decisive points in any domain to create effects against a system, formation, decision maker, or in a specific geographic area. Its utility derives from understanding the interdependent relationships among capabilities from different domains and combining those capabilities in surprising, effective tactics that accrue advantages over time. When combined, the complementary and reinforcing nature of each friendly capability presents multiple dilemmas for enemy forces and produces an overall effect that is greater than the sum of each individual effect. The greater degree to which forces achieve convergence and sustain it over time the more favorable the outcome.



Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct. '22), fig. 3-1. Convergence.

Convergence occurs when a higher echelon and its subordinate echelons create effects from and in multiple domains in ways that defeat or disrupt enemy forces long enough for friendly forces to effectively exploit the opportunity. Convergence broadens the scope of mass, synchronization, and combined arms, by applying combat power to combinations of decisive points, instead of just one, across time, space, and domains. Convergence is a way to balance the principles of mass, objective, and economy of force, massing combat power on some parts of the enemy force while employing different techniques against other decisive points to create cumulative effects the enemy cannot overcome. Convergence requires the synchronization of specific targets and broad objectives by the senior tactical echelon below the land component command.

### III. Imperatives

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 3-8 to 3-18.

Imperatives are actions Army forces must take to defeat enemy forces and achieve objectives at acceptable cost. They are informed by the operational environment and the characteristics of the most capable threats Army forces can encounter. Imperatives include—

#### **See Yourself, See the Enemy, and Understand the Operational Environment** (See pp. 3-16 to 3-17.)

Commanders visualize operational environments in terms of the factors that are relevant to decision making. Operational environments are dynamic and contain vast amounts of information that can overload C2 systems and impede decision making. Commanders simplify information collection, analysis, and decision making by focusing on how they see themselves, see the enemy, and understand the operational environment. These three categories of factors are interrelated, and leaders must understand how each one relates to the others in the current context.

As part of the operations process, Army leaders use different methodologies to understand and weigh options. These methodologies include the Army design methodology, the military decision-making process, and the rapid decision-making and synchronization process. Each methodology provides a process that allows commanders and staffs to see themselves, see the enemy, and understand the operational environment.

#### **Account for Being Under Constant Observation and All Forms of Enemy Contact** (See pp. 4-2 to 4-3.)

Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities increase the likelihood that threat forces can gain and maintain continuous visual and electromagnetic contact with Army forces. Enemy forces possess a wide range of space-, air-, maritime-, and land-based ISR capabilities that can detect U.S. forces. Leaders must assume they are under constant observation from one or more domains and continuously ensure they are not providing lucrative targets for the enemy to attack. Leaders consider nine forms of contact in multiple domains.

#### **Create and Exploit Relative Advantages (Physical, Information, and Human) in Pursuit of Decision Dominance** (See p. 4-4.)

The employment of lethal force is based on the premise that destruction and other physical consequences compels enemy forces to change their decision making and behavior, ultimately accepting defeat. The type, amount, and ways in which lethal force compels enemy forces varies, and this depends heavily on enemy forces, their capabilities, goals, and the will of relevant populations. Understanding the relationship between physical, information, and human factors enables leaders to take advantage of every opportunity and limit the negative effects of undesirable and unintended consequences.

#### **Make Initial Contact with Smallest Element Possible** (See p. 4-4.)

Army forces are extremely vulnerable when they do not sufficiently understand the disposition of enemy forces and become decisively engaged on terms favorable to enemy forces. To avoid being surprised and incurring heavy losses, leaders must set conditions for making enemy contact on terms favorable to the friendly force. They anticipate when and where to make enemy contact, the probability and impact of making enemy contact, and actions to take on contact. Quickly applying multiple capabilities against enemy forces while preventing the bulk of the friendly force from being engaged itself requires an understanding of the forms of contract.

## **Impose Multiple Dilemmas on the Enemy** (See p. 4-5.)

Imposing multiple dilemmas on enemy forces complicates their decision making and forces them to prioritize among competing options. It is a way of seizing the initiative and making enemy forces react to friendly operations. Simultaneous operations encompassing multiple domains—conducted in depth and supported by deception—present enemy forces with multiple dilemmas. Employing capabilities from multiple domains degrades enemy freedom of action, reduces enemy flexibility and endurance, and disrupts enemy plans and coordination. The application of capabilities in complementary and reinforcing ways creates more problems than an enemy commander can solve, which erodes both enemy effectiveness and the will to fight.

## **Anticipate, Plan, and Execute Transitions** (See p. 3-18.)

Transitions mark a change of focus in an operation. Leaders plan transitions as part of the initial plan or parts of a branch or sequel. They can be unplanned and cause the force to react to unforeseen circumstances. Transitions can be part of progress towards mission accomplishment, or they can reflect a temporary setback.

## **Designate, Weight, and Sustain the Main Effort** (See p. 3-19.)

Commanders frequently face competing demands for limited resources. They resolve these competing demands by establishing priorities. One way in which commanders establish priorities is by designating, weighting, and sustaining the main effort. The main effort is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success (ADP 3-0). Commanders provide the main effort with the appropriate resources and support necessary for its success. When designating a main effort, commanders consider augmenting a unit's task organization and giving it priority of resources and support.

## **Consolidate Gains Continuously** (See p. 3-19.)

Leaders add depth to their operations in terms of time and purpose when they consolidate gains. Commanders consolidate gains at the operational and tactical levels as a strategically informed approach to current operations with the desired political outcome of the conflict in mind. During competition and crisis, commanders expand opportunities created from previous conflicts and activities to sustain enduring U.S. interests, while improving the credibility, readiness, and deterrent effect of Army forces. During large-scale combat operations, commanders consolidate gains continuously or as soon as possible, deciding whether to accept risk with a more moderate tempo during the present mission or in the future as large-scale combat operations conclude.

Consolidating gains at every echelon leads to better transitions out of armed conflict and into post-conflict competition. It serves as a preventative against the rise of an insurgency by those wishing to prolong the conflict.

## **Understand and Manage the Effects of Operations on Units and Soldiers** (See p. 2-9.)

Continuous operations rapidly degrade the performance of people and the equipment they employ, particularly during combat. In battle, Soldiers and units are more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually. Commanders and staffs must be alert to small indicators of fatigue, fear, indiscipline, and reduced morale, and they must take measures to deal with these before their cumulative effects drive a unit to the threshold of collapse. Staffs and commanders at higher echelons must take into account the impact of prolonged combat on subordinate units, which causes efficiency to drop, even when physical losses are not great. Leaders consider the isolation Soldiers experience when not being able to remain connected with family and friends via social media and other platforms for extended periods. Well-trained, physically fit Soldiers in cohesive units retain the qualities of tenacity and aggressiveness longer than those who are not.

# Defeat Mechanisms

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 3-19 to 3-20.

Army forces at all echelons commonly use combinations of four defeat mechanisms: destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate. Applying more than one defeat mechanism simultaneously creates multiple dilemmas for enemy forces and complementary and reinforcing effects not attainable with a single mechanism.

**Destroy.** When commanders destroy, they apply lethal force against an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform its function. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90-1). Destruction and the threat of destruction lie at the core of all the defeat mechanisms and make them more compelling. The other mechanisms work when friendly action has caused enemy forces to face a grim reality: their ability to fight and relative advantages are degraded, and their options are to surrender, withdraw, or be destroyed.

**Dislocate.** Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage in one or more domains, rendering the enemy's dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. Typically, the impact of dislocation increases when the friendly force exploits advantages in multiple domains. Commanders often achieve dislocation through deception and by placing forces in locations where enemy forces do not expect them. Achieving dislocation requires an understanding how enemy forces are oriented and how quickly they can shift. Envelopments and turning movements enable physical dislocation. Deception can create and enhance psychological effects of dislocation.

**Isolate.** Isolate means to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat (ADP 3-0). Isolation can encompass multiple domains and can have both physical and psychological effects detrimental to accomplishing a mission. Isolating an enemy force from the electromagnetic spectrum increases the effects of physical isolation by reducing its ability to communicate and degrading its situational awareness. The ability of an isolated unit to perform its intended mission generally degrades over time, decreasing its ability to interfere with an opposing force's course of action. When commanders isolate, they deny enemy forces access to capabilities that enable them to maneuver at will in time and space.

**Disintegrate.** Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy's command and control, degrading the synchronization and cohesion of its operations. Disintegration prevents enemy unity of effort and leads to a degradation of the enemy's capabilities or will to fight. It attacks the cohesion of enemy formations and their ability to employ combined arms approaches and work effectively together. Commanders can achieve disintegration by targeting enemy functions essential to the threat's ability to act as a whole. They often achieve disintegration by specifically targeting an enemy's command structure, communications systems, the linkages between them, and the capabilities they control. Disintegration can be achieved through the employment of the other three defeat mechanisms in combination, particularly when directed toward systems like integrated fires commands and integrated air defense systems heavily dependent upon C2 and sensor nodes.

Cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic warfare capabilities can help disintegrate enemy formations by degrading communications and disrupting the quality of enemy information and decisions. Separating enemy reserves and follow-on echelons from the main body with maneuver forces or fires is a physical way to isolate echelons, achieve favorable force ratios, and destroy those echelons. This in turn disintegrates the coherence of an enemy's attack or defense. Destroying enemy sustainment capability separates enemy fires and maneuver from fuel and ammunition and delays resupply operations.

## VII. Operational Framework

The operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). Commanders build their operational framework on their assessment of the operational environment, including all domains and dimensions. They may create new models to fit the circumstances, but they generally apply a combination of common models according to doctrine. The three models commonly used to build an operational framework are—

### Operational Framework



**Assigned Areas (AOs, Zones, & Sectors)**



**Deep, Close, And Rear Operations**



**Main Effort, Supporting Effort, & Reserve**

*Note. Commanders may use any operational framework models they find useful, but they must remain synchronized with their higher echelon headquarters' operational framework.*


### A. Assigned Areas

The JFC assigns land forces an operational area within a joint organizational construct. The land component or ARFOR commander subdivides their AO into subordinate assigned areas to best support the desired scheme of maneuver. Commanders assign areas to subordinates based on a range of factors, including the mission, friendly forces available, enemy situation, and terrain. An assigned area that is too large for a unit to effectively control or exceeds a unit's area of influence increases risk, allows sanctuaries for enemy forces, and limits joint flexibility. An assigned area that is too small constrains maneuver, limits opportunities for dispersion, and creates congested lines of communication. Most operations involve a combination of contiguous and noncontiguous assigned areas. Large areas with small forces typically conduct noncontiguous operations which place greater demands on C2 and sustainment. Commanders retain responsibility for any area not assigned to a subordinate unit. Within their assigned area, units use control measures to assign responsibilities, prevent fratricide, facilitate C2, coordinate fires, control maneuver, and organize operations. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and timing within their assigned areas. There are three types of assigned areas that a land component or ARFOR commander uses:

- Area of operations
- Zone
- Sector

*See following pages (pp. 1-56 to 1-57) for discussion of these assigned areas.*

*Note. Contiguous boundaries do not imply units are capable of mutual support or that their subordinate units have contiguous assigned areas. Therefore, mutual support between adjacent units and subordinate units must be part of commander dialogue to ensure the formation is assuming risk deliberately and at the right echelon.*



Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct. '22), fig. 3-3. Notional corps area of operations with noncontiguous divisions.

Operational environments are larger than the associated assigned area. They influence and are influenced by factors outside unit boundaries. To account for these factors commanders typically consider areas of influence and areas of interest relative through all domains and dimensions.

### Area of Influence

An area of influence is an area inclusive of and extending beyond an operational area wherein a commander is capable of direct influence by maneuver, fire support, and information normally under the commander's command or control (JP 3-0). The ranges of a unit's maneuver and fires capabilities typically define its area of influence; however, commanders consider all forms of contact they can make with enemy forces when visualizing their area of influence. A unit's area of influence contracts or expands based on the capabilities allocated by the higher headquarters and adjusts as the unit repositions its capabilities on the battlefield. An area of influence is normally larger than its associated assigned area, but it is smaller than its area of interest. Units typically have areas of influence that overlap with adjacent unit assigned areas. A unit might desire to collect information on or strike enemy forces traversing through an adjacent unit assigned area. This situation requires control measures to enable friendly forces to maintain pressure on enemy forces while mitigating the risk of fratricide. Understanding an area of influence helps commanders and staffs plan branches and sequels to the current operation in preparation for operations outside of the current assigned area.

### Area of Interest

An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent to it, and extending into enemy territory (JP 3-0). This visualization tool enables commanders and staffs to understand the impact of threats outside their assigned area and how their operation is progressing along with their adjacent and higher units. An area of interest includes those aspects of the domains from which enemy forces can employ capabilities that jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. The area of interest can shift according to the situation. For



## V. Competition Activities

*Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 4-9 to 4-12.*

Competition involves activities conducted under numerous programs within a combatant command. The CCDR uses these activities to improve security within partner nations, enhance international legitimacy, gain multinational cooperation, and influence adversary decision making. Competition activities include obtaining access for U.S. forces, maintaining sufficient forward-based presence within a theater to influence conditions in the strategic environment, and mitigating conditions that could lead to a crisis or armed conflict. At any time during competition, but especially during times of heightened tension, leaders must take great care to ensure Army forces avoid activities that accidentally provoke crisis or armed conflict. Army forces, as directed by the theater army, must stay within an activity level that meets the CCDR's intent for readiness without unintentionally increasing tensions.

Activities that occur during competition are directly tied to authorities provided in various titles of the United States Code and approved programs, and they are integrated and synchronized with the Department of State, other government agencies, country teams, and ambassadors' plans and objectives. The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) help produce the joint regional strategy to address regional goals, management, and operational considerations. Each country team develops both an integrated country strategy and a country development cooperation strategy to address joint mission goals and coordinated strategies for development, cooperation, security, and diplomatic activities. Working with the Department of State and various country teams, the CCDR develops country-specific security cooperation plans, which are codified in the country-specific security cooperation section of the combatant command campaign plan (CCP). Some CCPs include regional country plans, posture plans, and theater distribution plans that facilitate synchronization of resources, authorities, processes, and timelines to favorably affect conditions within the CCDRs' AORs.

Army forces execute activities during competition that support joint force campaigning goals, satisfy interagency requirements, and set the necessary conditions to employ Army combat power during crisis and armed conflict. The theater army works with the CCDR to develop objectives for the employment of Army forces in theater and develops support plans to address Army-specific activities. Army forces provide security cooperation capabilities across any given theater of operations by conducting military engagement, security cooperation, nuclear deterrence, counter-weapons of mass destruction activities, and humanitarian assistance.

### Military Engagement

Military engagement is contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies, to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence (JP 3-0). Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but it also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities. Army forces will also routinely communicate with nongovernmental organizations, either directly or indirectly, to ensure expectations and roles are understood.

CCDRs and Army senior leaders seek out partners and communicate with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and tension. This increases the knowledge base for subsequent decisions and resource allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions and may prevent conflict, or, if conflict is unavoidable, they may allow the United States to enter into conflict with greater access and stronger alliances or coalitions. Army forces support military engagement through deliberate interactions with unified action partners at the junior Soldier through senior leader levels. The State Partnership Program provides a good example of how powerful military engagement can be.

## Security Cooperation

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). These efforts may include Army forces participating in joint and multinational exercises and employing regionally aligned forces. Conducting security cooperation is one of the Army's primary stability tasks.

- **Security assistance** is a group of programs the U.S. Government uses to provide defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, lease, loan, credit, or cash sales.
- **Security force assistance** is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20).
- **Foreign internal defense** is participation by civilian agencies and military forces of a government or international organizations in any of the programs and activities undertaken by a host nation government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).
- **Security sector reform** is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken by a host nation to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07).

## Nuclear Deterrence and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction

U.S. nuclear capabilities are foundational to the deterrence of adversary weapons of mass destruction use. To ensure the credibility of this deterrent, joint and Army forces must integrate the planning and operations of nuclear and conventional forces. Further, Army forces must plan, train, and exercise to conduct operations under the adversary threat or use of weapons of mass destruction in order to deny the adversary any perceived advantage that might result from employing weapons of mass destruction. To do so, commanders and staffs must continuously assess, protect, and mitigate the effects of adversary chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons use and contamination hazards. They must train under simulated weapons of mass destruction conditions. When under threat of nuclear attack, commanders must balance the risk of dispersing forces to mitigate the impact of nuclear effects across their AO against the ability to concentrate sufficient combat power to achieve objectives. In a chemically contaminated environment, a commander's decision-making ability is complicated by the effects on Soldier stamina, reaction times, and sustainment. Each of these environments requires unique actions to ensure a formation's ability to maneuver, fight, and sustain operations.

## Humanitarian Assistance

USAID is the lead U.S. government agency, responsible to the Secretary of State, for administering civilian foreign aid and providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. USAID often works in concert with Army forces when Soldiers are tasked to provide assistance. It can supplement forces conducting civil affairs operations that the DOD conducts to build relationships and win the trust, confidence, and support of local populations.



Refer to TAA2: *Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability* SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16), Interorganizational Cooperation (JP 3-08), and more.

# IV(B). Crisis

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), chap. 5.

## I. Overview of Operations During Crisis

A crisis is an incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its citizens, military forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives (JP 3-0). A crisis may be the result of adversary actions or indicators of imminent action, or it may be the result of natural or human disasters. During a crisis, opponents are not yet using lethal force as the primary means for achieving their objectives, but the situation potentially requires a rapid response by forces prepared to fight to deter further aggression. When directed, the Army provides a JFC with capabilities to help deter further provocation and sufficient combat power to maintain or reestablish conventional deterrence. The introduction of significant land forces demonstrates the will to impose costs, provides options to joint force and national leaders, and signals a high level of national commitment. The effects of a persistent presence on the ground among allied or partner forces cannot be easily replicated with air or maritime power alone.

Success during a crisis is a return to a state of competition in which the United States, its allies, and its partners are in positions of increased advantage relative to the adversary. Should deterrence fail, Army forces are better positioned to defeat enemy forces during conflict.

Crisis response operations are characterized by high degrees of volatility and uncertainty. A crisis may erupt with no warning, or it may be well anticipated. Its duration is unpredictable. Additionally, adversaries may perceive themselves in a different context or state of conflict than U.S., allied, and partner forces. What is seen by one side as a crisis might be perceived by the other as armed conflict or competition. Army leaders must demonstrate flexibility anticipate changes in an operational environment, and provide JFCs with credible, effective options. This requires trained forces agile enough to adapt quickly to new situations and commanders and staffs adept at linking tactical actions to attaining policy objectives.

Regardless of the capabilities employed, there are generally two broad outcomes from a crisis. Either deterrence is maintained, and de-escalation occurs, or armed conflict begins. While this requires that Army forces be prepared for either type of transition, forces deploying during crisis always assume they are deploying to fight. While Army forces prepare for armed conflict, they avoid sending signals that armed conflict is inevitable, regardless of what the adversary does, to avoid inadvertent escalation. Generally, senior leaders at the corps and higher echelons influence those perceptions through public communications in support of the JFC and national leaders.

*Note. Army forces also respond to crises related to disaster response, humanitarian assistance, and defense support to civil authorities when tasked. These crisis contexts and response options are covered in separate doctrinal publications. Refer to JP 3-28, JP 3-29, ADP 3-07, ADP 3-28, FM 3-07, and ATP 3-57.20 for more information on these types of crises and associated response options.*

# V. Army Support to the Joint Force during Crisis

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 5-4 to 5-7.

The military supports unified action partners during crisis by providing flexible deterrent and response options.

A **flexible deterrent option (FDO)** is a planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to create a desired effect.

A **flexible response option (FRO)** is a military capability specifically task-organized for effective reaction to an enemy threat or attack and adaptable to the existing circumstances of a crisis.

FDOs and FROs occur across the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (known as DIME) instruments of national power, and they are not just confined to the military. They are most effective when integrated and implemented in a nearly simultaneous manner

Determining what threat and enemy forces perceive as important will inform U.S. understanding of their desired end state, associated courses of action, and employment of forces. This allows strategic leaders to determine the appropriate amount of military force to apply in concert with diplomatic, information, and economic activities to prevent adversaries from achieving their objectives.



Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct. '22), fig. 5-1. Simultaneous flexible deterrent and response option examples.

While FDOs are primarily intended to prevent a crisis from developing or worsening, FROs are designed to preempt or respond to attacks against U.S. interests. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions carefully tailored to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict, and they can be initiated before or after unambiguous warning of threat action. In comparison, FROs can be employed in response to aggression by adversaries, and they are intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of actions carefully tailored to produce desired effects. FDOs and FROs must be deliberately tailored in terms of timing, efficiency, and effectiveness to avoid undesired effects, such as eliciting an armed response should adversary leaders perceive that friendly FDOs or FROs are being used as preparation for a preemptive attack.

FDOs and FROs serve three basic purposes. First, they provide a visible and credible message to adversaries about U.S. will and capability to resist aggression. Second, they position U.S. forces in a manner that facilitates implementation of the operations or contingency plan should armed conflict occur. Third, they provide options for joint and national senior leaders. They allow for measured increases in pressure to avoid unintentionally provoking combat operations, and they enable decision makers to develop the situation to gain a better understanding of adversary capabilities and intentions. FDOs and FROs are elements of contingency plans executed to increase deterrence in addition to, but outside the scope of, the ongoing joint operations. The key goals of FDOs and FROs are—

- Communicate the strength of U.S. commitment to treaty obligations and regional peace and stability.
- Confront adversaries with unacceptable costs for their possible aggression.
- Isolate adversaries from regional neighbors and attempt to split adversary coalitions.
- Rapidly improve the military balance of power in the theater of operations without precipitating an armed response from adversaries.
- Develop the situation and better understand adversary capabilities and intentions.

Leaders exercise restraint and carefully calculate risk before recommending an increase in Army forces to address a crisis. Peer adversaries have global capabilities, and they can create multiple dilemmas for U.S. forces by escalating a crisis horizontally in a different theater. Surging forces in one region may address a crisis, but it potentially creates opportunities for adversaries or enemies in another region. Leaders must anticipate second- and third-order effects on other combatant commands and the risk to the homeland when forces are committed to address a specific crisis.

#### **Army contribution examples to joint flexible deterrent options**

Command and control headquarters—establishment of a field army or deployment of a corps or division.

Air defense to protect key infrastructure and population centers from theater ballistic missiles.

Additional personnel to expand the capability of theater-assigned headquarters.

Intelligence assets to support situational understanding, targeting, and information activities.

Deploying a security force assistance brigade to establish liaison capability or conduct security force assistance.

Building or expanding infrastructure and increasing sustainment capacity to facilitate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration.

#### **Army contribution examples to joint flexible response options**

Airborne or air assault units positioned to conduct joint forcible entry.

A brigade combat team drawing Army pre-positioned stocks.

Port opening to receive the joint force.

Multi-domain task force to respond to adversary antiaccess and area denial activities.

Special operations forces to conduct foreign internal defense, direct action, or special reconnaissance.

Civil affairs to enable civil-military operations and interorganizational cooperation.

Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear units for response to weapons of mass destruction employment.

Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct. '22), table 5-1. Potential Army contributions to joint flexible deterrent and response options.



Refer to JFODS6: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, 6th Ed. (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations). Completely updated for 2023, chapters include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0, 2022), joint planning (JP 5-0, 2020), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), joint force operations (JPs 3-30, 3-31, 3-32 & 3-05), multinational operations (JP 3-16), and interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08).

# IV(c). Armed Conflict

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), chap. 6.

Section I of this chapter introduces large-scale combat operations and the ways in which they vary. It addresses topics applicable to both offensive and defensive operations, including enemy methods, relative advantages, integrating with the joint force, defeat mechanisms, and enabling operations. Section II describes defensive operations. Section III describes offensive operations. Section IV describes transition to post-conflict competition and stability operations.

## I. Armed Conflict & Large-Scale Combat

### Armed Conflict

Armed conflict encompasses the conditions of a strategic relationship in which opponents use lethal force as the primary means for achieving objectives and imposing their will on the other. The employment of lethal force is the defining characteristic of armed conflict, and it is the primary function of the Army. Lethality's immediate effect is in the physical dimension—reducing the enemy's capability and capacity to fight. However, the utility of lethal force extends into the information and human dimensions where it, along with the other instruments of national power, influence enemy behavior, decision making, and will to fight.

During armed conflict, operations usually reflect combinations of conventional and irregular warfare approaches. Leaders apply doctrine for large-scale combat operations during limited contingencies that require conventional warfare approaches. Irregular warfare includes counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare, which other publications specifically address. The initial actions of large-scale combat operations will likely overlap with actions initiated during competition and crisis. For example, while some units are engaged in offensive or defensive operations, other units may be completing non-combat evacuations while in contact with enemy forces.

### Large-Scale Combat Operations (See p. 1-11.)

Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as campaigns aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives through the application of force. Large-scale combat on land occurs within the framework of a larger joint campaign, usually with an Army headquarters forming the base of a joint force headquarters. These operations typically entail high tempo, high resource consumption, and high casualty rates. Large-scale combat introduces levels of complexity, lethality, ambiguity, and speed to military activities not common in other operations.

Large-scale combat operations occur in circumstances usually associated with state-on-state conflict, and they encompass divisions and corps employing joint and Army capabilities from multiple domains in a combined arms manner. Irregular warfare activities often complement large-scale combat operations, with conventional, irregular, and special operations forces conducting operations close to each other. This proximity requires cooperation between friendly forces of all types to ensure success. In other cases, irregular warfare occurs largely in a secondary joint operations area (JOA) or another theater of operations. When this occurs, the combatant commander (CCDR) ensures sufficient coordination of operations to support unity of purpose at the national level.

## B. Relative Advantages During Armed Conflict

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 6-4 to 6-6.

Army formations most effectively achieve overmatch through the integration and synchronization of joint and multinational capabilities employed from positions in multiple domains that create cascading dilemmas and defeat the enemy's operational approach.

### Physical Advantages

Friendly forces require physical advantages to defeat enemy forces and occupy land areas, exert control over lines of communications, and protect the physical infrastructure used to attain information and human advantages. Throughout armed conflict, leaders seek physical advantages that include—

- Position.
- Range.
- Speed of movement.
- Technologically superior capabilities.
- Terrain and weather.

### Information Advantages

Information advantages invariably overlap with and emanate from physical and human advantages. To gain an information advantage, units first require a physical or human advantage. Army forces create and exploit information advantages by acting through the physical and human dimensions of an operational environment. Leaders combine information advantages with other advantages to understand the situation, decide, and act faster than enemy forces. Examples of information advantages during armed conflict include—

- The ability to access enemy C2 systems to disrupt, degrade, or exploit enemy information.
- Opportunities created by deception operations to achieve surprise and thwart enemy targeting.
- The ability to mask electromagnetic signatures.
- The ability to integrate and synchronize friendly forces in denied or degraded environments through use of redundant communications.
- The ability to rapidly share information with domestic and international audiences to counter enemy malign narratives.
- The ability to inform a wide range of audiences to maintain legitimacy and promote the friendly narrative.
- The ability to rapidly share and analyze information among commanders and staffs to facilitate decisions and orders.

### Human Advantages

Because war is a clash between opposing human wills, the human dimension is central to war. Army formations are principally designed to achieve objectives through the threat or employment of lethal force, which has a psychological effect. Understanding an enemy force's tolerance for casualties and the political and social will to endure them is important to understanding the level of effort required to prevail against enemy forces in large-scale combat operations. Leaders do everything possible in the physical and information dimensions to reduce the enemy's will to fight. During armed conflict, human advantages include—

- Political and national will that supports strategic objectives.
- Experienced, well-trained formations.
- Leadership well versed in the mission command approach to C2.
- Adherence to the law of war.
- Unit cohesion and Soldiers with the mental and physical stamina for combat.
- Interoperability and mutual trust between allies and host-nation partners.



# China

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 6-3 to 6-4.

China considers three aspects in the country's view of conflict: comprehensive national power, deception, and the Three Warfares. Comprehensive national power is made up of hard power and soft power. Hard power includes military capability and capacity, defense industry capability, intelligence capability, and related diplomatic actions such as threats and coercion. Soft power includes such things as economic power, diplomatic efforts, foreign development, global image, and international prestige. China views comprehensive national power as a vital measure of its global status. Ultimately, all forms of conflict—military, diplomatic, or other—must enhance China's comprehensive national power.

Deception plays a critical role in every part of the Chinese approach to conflict. People's Liberation Army planners employ stratagems to achieve their deception goals. Stratagems describe the enemy's mindset, focusing on how to achieve the desired perceptions by the opponent, and then they prescribe ways to exploit those perceptions.

China's strategic approach to conflict employs Three Warfares designed to support and reinforce the People's Liberation Army's traditional military operations. Though these approaches are called warfares, they are universally nonlethal and do not involve direct combat operations. If a battle must be fought, the Three Warfares are designed to unbalance, deceive, and coerce opponents to influence their perceptions in ways that create advantage. The Three Warfares are—

- Public opinion warfare.
- Psychological warfare.
- Legal warfare.

Public opinion warfare is China's high-level information campaign designed to set the terms of political discussion. China views this effort as capable of seizing the initiative in a conflict before any shots are fired by shaping public discourse, influencing political positions, and building international acceptance of Chinese interests.

China's psychological warfare is broadly similar to U.S. military information support operations in that it is intended to influence the behavior of a given audience. Psychological warfare is the deliberate manipulation of psychological reactions in target audiences, designed to create and reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to China's objectives and guide adversary behavior towards China's preferred outcomes.

Legal warfare for China is the setting of legal conditions for victory—both domestically and internationally. Legal warfare seeks to unbalance potential opponents by exploiting international or domestic law to hinder their military operations, to create legal justification for People's Liberation Army operations worldwide, and to support Chinese interests through a valid legal framework. It guides how the People's Liberation Army trains to treat prisoners of war, detainees, and civilians, and it guides how the People's Liberation Army abides by international legal conventions, codes, and laws.

During armed conflict, China employs systems warfare in combination with the other threat methods, such as preclusion, isolation, and sanctuary. China employs these threat methods throughout all domains and at all levels of warfare. Systems warfare involves—

- Bypassing enemy systems' areas of strength, thus gaining a combat advantage by approaching them asymmetrically.
- Developing systems that excel at exploiting perceived weaknesses in enemy systems.
- Undermining international alliances through diplomatic efforts.
- Conducting cyberspace attacks to disable air or seaports.
- Using special operations forces to undermine civilian morale through covert operations.


*Note. China uses the term “special operations forces” to identify their special forces units per ATP 7-100.3. Russian doctrine uses the term “special purpose forces” for their special forces units. For brevity, this manual uses “special operations forces.”*

Although many actors on the world stage have embraced the concepts of systems warfare, including Russia, China has woven the idea into every aspect of their warfighting capabilities and methods. The systems warfare concept consists of two basic ideas: creating purpose-built operational systems that combine key capabilities under a single command, and the use of these operational systems to asymmetrically target and exploit vulnerable components of an opponent's system. The People's Liberation Army believes that by effectively destroying, isolating, neutralizing, or offsetting key capabilities, it can degrade the enemy's will and ability to resist enough to achieve victory.

At the tactical level, systems warfare centers largely on targeting high-value battlefield systems such as radars, command and communications nodes, field artillery and air defense systems, and critical logistics support means. China relies on heavy employment of long-range fires at maximum standoff distance to target friendly joint enablers and command and control (C2) nodes. Examples of tactical system warfare include using heavy rocket artillery to defeat or destroy enemy radars and artillery systems, electronic warfare to suppress or neutralize enemy command and communications networks, and deception operations to target enemy leaders' situational understanding.

- The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will continue efforts to achieve President's Xi Jinping's vision of making China the preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage. The CCP will work to press Taiwan on unification, undercut U.S. influence, drive wedges between Washington and its partners, and foster some norms that favor its authoritarian system. China's leaders probably will, however, seek opportunities to reduce tensions with Washington when it suits their interests.
- Beijing will press Taiwan to move toward unification and will react to what it views as increased U.S.–Taiwan engagement. We expect that friction will grow as China continues to increase military activity around the island, and Taiwan's leaders resist Beijing's pressure for progress toward unification. China's control over Taiwan probably would disrupt global supply chains for semiconductor chips because Taiwan dominates production.
- In the South China Sea, Beijing will continue to use growing numbers of air, naval, and maritime law enforcement platforms to intimidate rival claimants and signal that China has effective control over contested areas. China is similarly pressuring Japan over contested areas in the East China Sea.

- Excerpts, Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment (Feb '22).



For more than two thousand years, China has been surrounded by enemies, adversaries, and other competitors. With a force that totals approximately two million personnel in the regular forces, the PLA views protecting Chinese sovereignty and security as a sacred duty. OPFOR1 topics and chapters include the strategic environment (defense & military strategy, strategic & operational environments, territorial disputes), force structure (PLA: Army, Navy, Marine, Air Force, Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force), system warfare, information operations, reconnaissance and security, offensive and defensive actions, antir-orrism and stability actions, and capabilities (maneuver, fire support, air defense, aviation, engineer and chemical defense, network and communications, and special operations forces).

# Russia

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 6-2 to 6-3.

The Russian view of war is that it is often undeclared, fought for relatively limited policy objectives, and occurs across all domains. Russian leaders assess that modern conflicts are characterized by a destructive and rapid initial period of war that is more decisive than in the past. Additionally, Russia considers that non-nuclear strategic precision-guided weapons can achieve strategic effects on par with nuclear weapons. Doctrinally, Russia plans to employ nuclear weapons in response to non-nuclear attacks when those attacks threaten Russian sovereignty.

During armed conflict, Russia seeks to exert simultaneous pressure in all domains. Russian strategies intend to increase the costs of confrontation and make the objectives of the United States and its allies politically and economically unsupportable. Russia's objective is to weaken U.S. national will to continue a conflict by inflicting highly visible and embarrassing losses on U.S. forces.

Russian forces intend to win conflicts with massed and precision fires. Russian forces will attempt to set the operational conditions so that deployment of U.S. forces is ultimately counter to U.S. interests. If the U.S. does deploy forces, Russian goals are centered on creating constraints that prevent success of the United States' campaign. Russian methodologies focus on four key areas:

- **Disrupt or prevent understanding of the operational environment.** Russian information warfare activities manipulate the acquisition, transmission, and presentation of information in a way that suits Russia's preferred outcomes.
- **Target stability.** Russia may foster instability in key areas and among key groups so that regional security conditions do not support U.S. operational requirements.
- **Disaggregate partnerships.** Russia acts upon U.S. allies and partners to reduce the ability of the United States to operate in its preferred combined, joint, and inter-agency manner.
- **Prevent access.** Russia employs pre-conflict activities to deny access to U.S. forces, using nonlethal means initially and transitioning to lethal means if necessary. It seeks to undermine relationships, raise political stakes, manipulate public opinion, and attack resolve to constrain or deny basing rights, overflight corridors, logistics support, and concerted allied action.

As it applies instruments of national power, Russia integrates military forces and other means at selected times and locations to achieve desired objectives as part of its overall campaign. It uses offensive and defensive tactics and techniques that include acts of crime and terrorism. These actions can also be employed to manipulate population perceptions and dissuade support to U.S. military forces or other institutions. When necessary, Russia uses acts of physical violence, psychological operations, and different means of manipulating information to gain influence and develop voluntary or coerced cooperation in a target population. Concurrently, it uses indirect means to progressively degrade U.S. combat power and infrastructure resources and to otherwise psychologically influence the political, social, economic, military, and information variables of the operational environment.

Russian tactical-level units operate as combined arms forces to exploit the effects of both precision strikes and massed fires. Against lesser opponents, Russian forces employ deep maneuver when possible to defeat an enemy's will to resist early in a conflict. In other cases, they mass capabilities in pursuit of more limited objectives while fixing their adversary along a broad front. Regardless of the situation, a basic principle of Russian military actions is to use the effects of strike actions to create the conditions for military success.

Russia prefers to employ all available national elements of power prior to using maneuver forces, and after force-on-force operations begin, it will continue to employ these integrated national capabilities to support tactical maneuver. Russian forces also employ denial and deception (maskirovka) to mask the true intent of their operation. To execute tactics, Russian units apply intelligence methods and decision making, that are scientifically based, to—

- Understand the conditions of an operational environment that will impact operations.
- Determine the tactical functions required and calculate the required allocation of combat power needed to accomplish a mission in a specific time and location.
- Understand the psychological and cognitive issues among competing friendly forces, aggressor forces, the local population, and other actors in an operational environment.

• We expect that Moscow will remain an influential power and a formidable challenge to the United States amidst the changing geopolitical landscape during the next decade. It will continue to pursue its interests in competitive and sometimes confrontational and provocative ways, including pressing to dominate Ukraine and other countries in its “near-abroad,” while exploring possibilities to achieve a more stable relationship with Washington.

• In the Middle East and North Africa, Moscow is using its involvement in Syria, Libya, and Sudan to increase its clout, undercut U.S. leadership, present itself as an indispensable mediator, and gain military access rights and economic opportunities.

• In the Western Hemisphere, Russia has expanded its engagement with Venezuela, supported Cuba, and used arms sales and energy agreements to try to expand access to markets and natural resources in Latin America, in part to offset some of the effects of sanctions.

• In the former Soviet republics, Moscow is well positioned to increase its role in the Caucasus and, if it deems necessary, intervene in Belarus and Central Asia to halt instability after widespread anti-government protests, as it did in Belarus after the fraudulent 2020 election and early this year in Kazakhstan.

• We expect Russia to continue to use energy as a foreign policy tool to coerce cooperation and force states to the negotiating table, as it recently did in 2021, when Russia stopped coal and electricity exports to Ukraine. Russia also uses its capabilities in COVID-19 vaccine development and civilian nuclear reactor construction as a soft-power tool in its foreign policy.

- Excerpts, *Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment (Feb '22).*



*It has been nearly thirty years since a holistic explanation of the Soviet-based Opposing Force (OPFOR) was examined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-2 series. Recognizing this, OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army (Second Edition) re-examines and outlines the doctrinal operational construct and historical foundations of Soviet-era military forces from the FM 100-2 series, which is now out-of-print and largely unavailable. OPFOR3 topics and chapters include RTA overview, offensive and defensive operations, specialized warfare, tactical enabling tasks, small unit drill, urban & regional environments, rear area operations and logistics. Future editions will be revised and updated to focus centrally on modern Russian forces, operations, tactics and lessons learned in the Ukraine.*

# Defeat Components of Enemy Antiaccess and Area Denial (A2&AD)

*FM 3-0, Operations (Oct '22), pp. 6-15 to 6-17.*

Enemy A2 and AD approaches deny friendly force protection and freedom of action. Enemies pursue A2 and AD approaches with lethal means that significantly increase the risk to forward-stationed forces and the ability to deploy and stage additional forces into tactical assembly areas. Understanding the structure and function of the enemy's integrated fires command helps friendly forces disintegrate the cohesion of enemy A2 and AD approaches and create exploitable opportunities for the joint force to conduct offensive operations.

## Enemy Integrated Fires Command

An integrated fires command is a dedicated combination of C2 structures and organic and attached joint fire support units. The integrated fires command exercises centralized C2 of all allocated, dedicated fire support assets retained by its level of command. This can include aviation, artillery, naval gunfire, and surface-to-surface missile units from different commands and services. It also exercises C2 over all reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition assets dedicated to its support. An integrated fires command is tasked to engage designated operational and strategic targets. Integrated fires commands are typically associated with campaign-level headquarters. However, there are circumstances where an integrated fires command may be formed at the theater level. For example, the theater could have two separate campaigns, requiring a centralization of critical fire support assets at theater level to achieve the strategic or theater campaign objectives. Enemy forces integrate air and missile defense capabilities with the integrated fires command in different ways depending on their capabilities and the situation.

The integrated fires command executes all fire support tasks for the supported command. The integrated fires command is designed to—

- Exploit precision and massed fires through carefully integrated ground and air fire support.
- Minimize the amount of time from target acquisition to engagement.

An integrated fires command and its component systems have key vulnerabilities that Army forces can target when supporting joint force operations. Like any military system, it requires sustainment capabilities and other support that Army forces can detect and attack. It has electromagnetic signatures that enable detection from friendly joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) from all domains. Enemy networks depend on C2 nodes Army forces can target. Perhaps most importantly, systems within an integrated fires command are comprised of land-based capabilities, including sensors, fires capabilities, and C2 nodes, all of which Army forces can attack.

## Defeating Antiaccess (A2) and Area Denial (AD) Approaches

Defeating enemy A2 and AD approaches requires continuous effort, best facilitated by forward-stationed forces positioned and protected before hostilities commence. This allows air and naval capabilities to stage closer to joint force targets, increasing the number of sorties they conduct. It allows Army forces and the rest of the forward-postured joint force to retain the terrain and facilities necessary for the introduction of additional friendly forces into theater. Preserving forward-stationed forces and retaining critical terrain inside a theater during the opening stages of a conflict provides depth and operational reach of the joint force.

A2 and AD are two different enemy approaches that the joint force typically expects to encounter. The joint force often considers them as part of the same challenge because retaining or regaining access to geographic areas requires a cohesive joint approach through all domains. Defeating A2 and AD requires a multidomain approach that includes Army forces retaining or seizing critical terrain to establish the depth necessary for defeating enemy forces.

Commanders defeat enemy A2 and AD approaches by employing multiple attacks through multiple domains. Complementary and reinforcing networked A2 and AD capabilities are resilient against a single line of attack. An enemy operating near its border is able to reconstitute forces and capabilities from homeland sanctuaries. Maneuvering the right capabilities within range to attack critical vulnerabilities might incur too much risk when all threat systems are operating at full capability. Therefore, leaders destroy or isolate the most exposed parts of the enemy's systems over time, degrading them enough to support maneuver and create other opportunities to exploit. Destruction, isolation, and dislocation of various parts of an enemy integrated fires complex or air defense system can all contribute to its disintegration.

The main physical components of enemy A2 and AD systems are sensors, firing platforms, networks, C2, sustainment, and the forces securing them. Army forces attack these components as part of a joint operation that integrates all available capabilities. The JFLCC requests joint effects to support Army forces. The JFLCC may request space capabilities to detect enemy systems, offensive space operations for specific effects, and offensive cyberspace operations or electromagnetic capabilities to attack an enemy's networks.

The JFLCC is responsible for integrating joint capabilities and synchronizing their employment and effects to achieve convergence in order to enable subordinate maneuver. Achieving convergence is a key part of the approach to defeating enemy A2 and AD.

Army forces request space and cyberspace effects to disrupt A2 and AD C2 networks and create other effects. Army formations synchronize cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare effects against the enemy's network, disrupting human and automated communications between sensors, firing units, and command posts. When Army planners identify a requirement, they request space and cyberspace effects according to unit procedures. They must understand the planning and preparation timelines required for the effects they are requesting. For example, initiating cyberspace effects takes time, and it should be part of initial OPLAN development and revisions. Many cyberspace effects can take months to generate, even though they can be delivered rapidly once developed. This is a challenge for Army echelons whose planning horizons during combat are measured in terms of hours and days. Therefore, it is important that Army leaders anticipate desired cyberspace effects well in advance of when they will need to integrate them.

Army forces employ combinations of defeat mechanisms to attack components of an enemy's A2 and AD system within the overall intent of degrading and ultimately defeating its ability to function cohesively. Subordinate echelons align their operations and objectives with conditions set by the land component command and act rapidly to exploit them. This combination of attacks and objectives ultimately defeats the enemy's preferred operational approach and renders the enemy force vulnerable to follow-on operations by the JFC. Commanders use deliberate and dynamic targeting to create opportunities to attack the enemy and create redundancies for friendly forces.

Commanders must account for the possibility that enemy forces are able to regenerate some or all of their capabilities, in some cases by repositioning forces from elsewhere. Commanders and staffs continually assess enemy A2 and AD systems and maintain enough combat power to defeat enemy regeneration efforts to avoid surprise and preserve friendly freedom of action. Defeating enemy A2 and AD approaches typically enables joint forcible entry operations and the movement of friendly forces from aerial ports of debarkation and seaports of debarkation to their tactical assembly areas.



## II. Defensive Operations

Defensive operations defeat an enemy attack, buy time, economize forces, hold key terrain, or develop conditions favorable for offensive operations. Although offensive operations are usually required to achieve decisive results, it is often necessary, even advisable, to defend. Defensive operations alone do not normally achieve a decision unless they are sufficient to achieve the overall political goal, such as protecting an international border.

### A. Purpose and Conditions for the Defense

One purpose of defending is to create conditions for the offense that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting the defense include—

- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to an enemy force.
- Attriting or fixing an enemy force as a prelude to the offense.
- Countering enemy action.
- Accepting risk in one area to create offensive opportunities elsewhere.

There are many potential conditions for defensive operations. They include—

- Enemy aggression initiating armed conflict requires forward-stationed friendly forces to defend to buy time and conserve combat power until reinforced.
- Offensive operations culminate and the commander needs to build combat power while countering enemy offensive operations.
- A unit is assigned an economy of force defensive role as a supporting effort.
- The higher echelon headquarters directs a mission to defend an area, population, key infrastructure, or other key terrain in support of the overall course of action.
- U.S. forces accomplish all objectives and transition to a defense to deter future enemy aggression.

The key to a successful corps or division defense is a concept of operations that allows defensive forces to break the enemy's momentum and seize the initiative. Surprise is as important in defense as in offense, and the defensive concept should avoid obvious dispositions and techniques. When executing a defense, commanders orchestrate combat power from all available domains to synchronize effects at a decisive place and time that results in the enemy's defeat. Commanders decide where to concentrate combat power and where to accept risk. Success may require that a defending unit exploit opportunities to seize the initiative, such as a spoiling attack or counterattack.

Time is often the most important resource for defending forces. The enemy chooses the time and location for its attack, so the amount of time friendly units have to prepare a defense is often unknown and usually inadequate. Defending corps and divisions must have a sense of urgency to complete their planning, coordinating, rehearsing, and conducting information collection. Their subordinate units need time to develop engagement areas by preparing battle positions, pre-positioning sustainment assets, and emplacing obstacles. Taken together this means that strict adherence to priorities of work and priorities of effort is critical to time management.

Defending commanders seek to create more time to prepare an effective defense. A corps or division commander may task-organize and resource a security force for employment in the security area to guard or cover main battle area forces as a means to create additional preparation time and prevent surprise. Commanders may also launch spoiling attacks, raids, or feints to disorganize enemy preparations and gain more time to prepare. A defender continually attacks enemy forces in depth with joint and Army fires and aviation to attrit the enemy force and disrupt its scheme of maneuver. Friendly conventional and special operations forces can slow an enemy



## B. Types of Defensive Operations

Ref: ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Jul '19), pp. 4-3 to 4-4 and FM 3-0, *Operations* (Oct '22), pp. 6-34 to 6-35.

Friendly forces use three types of defensive operations to deny enemy forces advantages:

- Area defense focuses on terrain
- Mobile defense focuses on the movement of enemy forces
- Retrograde focuses on the movement of friendly forces

Although on the defense, the commander remains alert for opportunities to attack the enemy whenever resources permit. Within a defensive posture, the defending commander may conduct a spoiling attack or a counterattack, if permitted to do so by the mission variables of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC).

### A. Area Defense

The area defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on denying enemy forces access to designated terrain for a specific time rather than destroying the enemy outright. The focus of an area defense is on retaining terrain where the bulk of a defending force positions itself in mutually supporting, prepared positions. Units maintain their positions and control the terrain between the position of enemy forces and the terrain they desire. The decisive operation focuses fires into engagement areas, possibly supplemented by a counterattack.

### B. Mobile Defense

The mobile defense is a type of defensive operation that concentrates on the destruction or defeat of the enemy through a decisive attack by a striking force. The mobile defense focuses on defeating or destroying enemy forces by allowing them to advance to a point where they are exposed to a decisive counterattack by a striking force.

### C. Retrograde

The retrograde is a type of defensive operation that involves organized movement away from the enemy. An enemy force may compel these operations, or a commander may perform them voluntarily. The higher echelon commander of a force executing a retrograde must approve the retrograde before its initiation. A retrograde is not conducted in isolation. It is always part of a larger scheme of maneuver designed to regain the initiative and defeat the enemy.

*Refer to FM 3-0, pp. 6-26 to 6-46, for detailed discussion of defensive tasks at the corps and division levels. Corps and division commanders combine area and mobile defense tasks based upon availability of assets, terrain, their higher echelon commander's concept of operations, and enemy capabilities. Corps and divisions may also conduct retrograde operations. Both the area and mobile defenses contain static and dynamic elements. The dynamic elements involve the maneuver of combat forces and the movement of their supporting combat multipliers.*



*Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.*

### III. Offensive Operations

The key to successful offensive operations is to achieve all desired objectives prior to culmination. This requires the force in the offense to have some combination of relative advantage in the physical, information, or human dimensions. Typically, offensive operations require advantages in multiple domains, but commanders may achieve those advantages through deception operations and surprise rather than the physical means of combat power alone.

#### A. Purpose and Conditions for the Offense

The purpose of the offense is to defeat or destroy enemy forces and to gain control of terrain, resources, or population centers. Offensive operations take something from an enemy force. They are characterized by aggressive initiative on the part of subordinate commanders, by rapid shifts of the main effort to create and exploit opportunity, by momentum, and by the deepest, most rapid possible destruction of enemy defensive schemes and the capabilities that enable them.

#### B. Characteristics of the Offense

The high risk, tempo, and physical toll of offensive operations require high levels of unit training, morale, and cohesion. Successful offenses share these characteristics:

- **Audacity**—the ability to assume risk to create opportunity with bold action.
- **Concentration**—orchestrating forces or effects to create and exploit opportunity. (Concentrating effects is called “mass.”)
- **Surprise**—taking action that catches enemy forces off guard.
- **Tempo**—maintaining a pace of operations that is faster than the enemy’s, but not so fast that it cannot be sustained for as long as necessary to achieve all assigned objectives.

*Refer to ADP 3-90 for more information on the characteristics of the offense.*

#### C. Enemy Defense

The purposes of enemy defensive operations are to set military conditions to resume offensive operations or defend until the enemy achieves a favorable political outcome. The enemy employs two types of defenses generally, a maneuver defense and an area defense. A maneuver defense trades terrain for the opportunity to destroy portions of an opponent’s formation and render the opponent’s combat system ineffective. In an area defense, the enemy denies key areas to friendly forces. In most situations against a peer or superior opponent, enemy forces are willing to surrender terrain to preserve their major combat forces, since the loss of those forces threatens the survival of the enemy’s state or regime. Figure 6-6 on page 6-42 depicts a notional enemy maneuver defense.

The enemy establishes a defensive system on favorable terrain and employs capabilities throughout the depth of the battlefield. The enemy’s goal is to resist the joint force’s ability to attack in depth by creating layered standoff that makes integrated action between ground forces and the rest of the U.S. joint force impossible. In the disruption zone, enemy forces attack the joint force with long-range fires and limited objective attacks by ground forces to preempt or disrupt the joint force’s planned attack. Enemy forces employ aviation, artillery, and ballistic missiles in long-range attacks against the joint force’s C2 systems, long-range fires capabilities, attack helicopters, logistics bases, and assembly areas. The enemy uses special operations forces, guerilla forces, and proxy forces in limited objective attacks to harass and disrupt the friendly forces’ preparations for offensive operations.

In the main battle zone, the enemy force designs its defensive system to defeat penetrations of its main defensive lines and envelopments by the joint force’s ground, airborne, or air assault forces. Along its defensive lines, the enemy attempts to slow



Chap 1

# V. Army Operations in Maritime Environments

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), chap. 7.

## I. Overview of the Maritime Environment

Previous conflicts have proven the critical role of land forces in maritime theaters. In almost all cases it is land that makes a maritime area important to a combatant commander. Land masses near or surrounded by water create maritime choke points, enable force projection in and out of maritime areas, and contain the majority of the world's population. The ultimate objective of conflict is typically not control over vast expanses of open water, but rather the land and people who control it. Planning and training for the unique considerations of operations in these environments is critical, as is an integrated planning approach with the rest of the joint force. A maritime operational environment adds coordination and synchronization requirements for Army echelons that typically operate and train in land operational environments. Army and joint force planning must reflect an understanding of the dynamic nature of the threats and constraints to land forces in maritime regions. Army movement and maneuver between land masses is almost entirely dependent on joint capabilities. Control of critical land masses is essential to the sustainment and protection of joint operations in a maritime operational environment. This interdependence has been historically crucial to success during armed conflicts against peer threats in maritime theaters, and it continues to be crucial in the foreseeable future.

### A. Considerations Unique to the Maritime Environment

Threats to Army forces in a maritime theater include those in any other type of theater. Additionally, commanders and staffs must take into account unique joint and enemy courses of action in planning and executing operations in a maritime environment.

#### Joint Force Considerations in a Maritime Environment

The heavily interdependent nature of joint operations means that the defeat of one part of the joint force puts the other parts at significant risk. The failure of Army forces to retain key terrain or protect air and naval bases while preserving their own combat power could result in the loss of air and maritime superiority, which in turn could lead to the ultimate defeat in detail of unsupported Army forces in an entire area of responsibility (AOR).

Army forces require a joint common operational picture (COP) of friendly forces and their operations, including those of allies and partners, in all domains. An inaccurate joint or partner COP could cause flawed assumptions and situational understanding that decreases effective decision making.

As with other environments, planning land operations in maritime environments should address relevant factors affecting friendly and enemy operations. The products and tools typically gathered to plan and portray the unique characteristics of a maritime environment include riverine and coastal navigation charts or tidal reports and observations from local fishing communities. Additional characteristics to consider include—

- Coastal terrain and soil compositions.
- Commerce and trade along navigable waterways.
- Maritime-specific infrastructure.

Chap 1

# VI. Contested Deployment

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), app. C.

## I. Force Projection and Threat Capabilities

Army forces cannot expect to deploy without being challenged by the threat. For decades, U.S. military forces conducted uncontested and generally predictable deployments from home stations to operational theaters because threat actors lacked the capability to significantly affect deploying units at home station or while in transit to a theater of operations. This is no longer the case. Peer threats possess the capability and capacity to observe, disrupt, delay, and attack U.S. forces at any stage of force projection, including while still positioned at home stations in the United States and overseas. Commanders and staffs must therefore plan and execute deployments with the assumption that friendly forces are always under observation and in contact.

A peer threat's ability to impact U.S. military operations prior to arrival in an operational area extends beyond directly targeting unit personnel and equipment. The Army relies on various interdependent infrastructures, the majority of which it does not own or operate, making its domestic operations heavily reliant on external resources. This includes the use of civilian transportation infrastructure to move from installations to ports of embarkation, and it also includes home station military dependencies on civilian infrastructure for power, communications, fuel, water, and other life support.

During armed conflict, Army forces should expect deployments to be contested by enemy actions in all domains. Army forces will require greater emphasis on protection functions to conserve combat power and should expect to provide forces to support homeland defense and DSCA operations. Defending U.S. territory against attacks by state and non-state actors through an active, layered defense while simultaneously seeking to project forces in a conflict with a peer enemy requires coordination across organizations, agencies, and jurisdictions at the local, state, and federal levels.

Threat actions to contest a deployment are most visible during crisis and armed conflict, but they can also occur during competition. Army forces deploy globally as part of operations during competition to meet national objectives, assure allies and partners, and deter adversary malign actions. Adversary abilities to disrupt these deployments create risks that leaders must assess and mitigate during movement planning and execution. While a conventional attack on U.S. forces conducting operations during competition is unlikely, the greater the perceived danger to their vital national interests, the greater the chance a peer threat will contest U.S. military force projection. Leaders account for this intensified risk during planning and conduct training to improve their units' resilience and ability to mitigate risk, coordinate with appropriate partner organizations, and respond effectively.



Refer to SMFLS5: The Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Guide to Operational & Tactical Level Sustainment), chapter nine for 44 pages on deployment operations from ATP 3-35 and JP 3-35. Topics include Predeployment, Movement; (RSO&I) Reception, Staging, Onward movement, Integration; and redeployment. See also p. 4-10 and 7-32.

## II. Movement Phase

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), p. C-4 to C-6.

### Fort to Port

As part of the strategic support area, home station installations, Reserve Centers, National Guard Armories, and other designated points of origin are where force projection begins. They present targets that enemy forces may attack to delay, disrupt, and degrade force flow into theater. Additional vulnerabilities are present along all routes of movement, and at all potential sea and aerial ports of embarkation. Army forces at all echelons must comprehensively assess emerging threat capabilities that will impede deployment in a contested environment. To the greatest extent possible, formations should account for being under constant observation through strict operations security, including the safeguarding of information on specific deployment timelines and locations and maintaining dispersion of critical assets. The effects of attacks on critical military, national, or private infrastructure could halt or delay unit deployment operations before units have departed the United States.

Contested deployments are a national issue, and they require coordination with a large number of civilian unified action partners to overcome the challenges peer threats can create. However, moving Army forces from military installations to ports of embarkation is also a local and regional challenge. When routine deployment is not possible, installations and units should have a plan to mitigate deployment disruptions.

Deployment disruption mitigation planning requires collaboration between the deploying unit, the installation, appropriate federal, state, and local agencies (both government and law enforcement), and U.S. Army Reserve and National Guard elements. Installations are responsible for building these relationships and understanding how threats will likely affect their local areas. Installations do this by modifying their threat working groups to incorporate relevant military, government, and other local and regional stakeholders. The working group shares information about threats that promote civil unrest, cyber threats that impact critical transportation infrastructure, and other threat activities that impact deployment operations. Key planning and training considerations are—

- The local, state, and federal authorities able to mitigate deployment disruptions.
- Coordination and relationship building with local, state, and federal civilian law enforcement agencies to ensure effective movement control from fort to port.
- Understanding about critical infrastructure vulnerable to sabotage and unsuited for the movement of heavy equipment along surface lines of communication, both road and rail.
- Planning to use alternate railheads and marshalling yards and multiple lines of communication to reach ports of embarkation.
- Developing alternate surface transportation options to deliver unit equipment to a sea port of embarkation when rail service is degraded or disrupted.
- Establishment of fuel, maintenance, and rest locations along lines of communications.
- Implementation of a communication plan that informs the public while maintaining operations security.
- Establishing specific cyber defenses for systems and associated data used to support movement.

# I. Combat Power (Generating & Applying)


Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), chap. 2.

## Combat Power

Combat power is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). It is the ability to fight. The complementary and reinforcing effects that result from synchronized operations yield a powerful blow that overwhelms enemy forces and creates friendly momentum.

Army forces integrate capabilities and synchronize **warfighting functions** to generate **combat power** and apply it against enemy forces. Successful application of combat power requires leaders to understand the enemy and understand friendly capabilities. A broad understanding of the strategic environment (pp. 1-23 to 1-36) and threat methods (pp. 1-24 to 1-27) provides a basis for understanding specific enemy situations. Leaders must understand how Army forces enable joint operations through multiple domains and the basic roles of Army echelons. They must also understand how the joint force enables the Army to integrate capabilities through all domains to generate more effective landpower.

## Dynamics of Combat Power



## I. Warfighting Functions

A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives (ADP 3-0). The warfighting functions are command and control (C2), movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common critical capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons and levels of war. See following pages (pp. 2-2 to 2-3).



## **B. Firepower** (See chap. 6)

Firepower is the primary source of lethality, and it is essential to defeating an enemy force's ability and will to fight. Leaders generate firepower through direct and indirect fires, using mass, precision, or, typically, a combination of the two. Intelligence enables the identification and selection of targets and objectives for the application of lethal force. Movement and maneuver enable the positioning of fires capabilities where they can be most lethal.

Firepower facilitates maneuver by suppressing enemy fires and disrupting or preventing the movement of enemy forces. Firepower exploits maneuver by neutralizing enemy forces when they react, destroying equipment and people, and degrading the will of enemy forces to fight.

Leaders increase firepower by using capabilities from all domains in combinations that overwhelm an enemy targets, while they rely on conventional unguided munitions against enemy units and area targets. Large-scale combat requires large reserves of both precision and unguided munitions and the sustainment capacity to move them to forward locations. Air, maritime, space, and cyberspace-based fires enhance the firepower of ground forces. Similarly, ground-based firepower complements firepower from other domains. A multidomain approach to firepower requires understanding the techniques for controlling and integrating joint fires. This includes requesting and integrating space and cyberspace capabilities, electromagnetic attack capabilities, and air capabilities.

## **C. Information** (See pp. 2-13 to 2-18.)

Information contributes to the disruption and destruction of enemy forces. It is central to the application and amplification of combat power. It enables decision making and influences enemy perceptions, decision making, and behavior. Information, like leadership, provides a qualitative advantage to friendly combat power when it can be acted upon more quickly and effectively than the enemy.

Army forces collect data and information for analysis and process it to understand situations, make decisions, and direct actions that apply combat power against enemy forces. Army forces must fight for information about enemy forces while protecting their own information. Friendly counterintelligence, counterreconnaissance, and security operations prevent enemy access to friendly information. Offensively, commanders fight for information about enemy forces and terrain through continuous reconnaissance and surveillance and offensive tasks such as movement to contact or reconnaissance in force.

Army forces also use information to enhance the effects of destructive or disruptive physical force to create psychological effects that disrupt morale, cause human error, and increase uncertainty. Using information to manipulate shock and confusion amplifies the psychological effects of lethality and other dynamics of combat power.

Employing information to confuse, manipulate, or deceive can induce threats to act in ways that make them more vulnerable to destruction by Army forces. Employing information creatively can enable Army forces to achieve surprise, cause enemy forces to misallocate or expend combat power, or mislead them as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces.

## **D. Mobility** (See pp. 4-25 to 4-30.)

Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-36).

Mobility encompasses the capability of a formation to move and apply capabilities in specific terrain under specific conditions relative to enemy forces. Exploiting mobility requires intelligence of an enemy force's disposition, composition, strength, and course of action. This understanding allows leaders to assess their mobility in rela-

# Commander Presence on the Battlefield

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 8-2 to 8-4.

Commanders provide leadership in combat to inspire their Soldiers, especially in challenging situations. Command presence is the influence commanders have on those around them, through their physical presence, communications, demeanor, and personal example. Commanders establish command presence through personal interaction with subordinates, either physically or virtually through C2 systems, and demonstrating their character, competence, dignity, strength of conviction, and empathy prior to and throughout operations.

Commanders go where they can best influence operations, assess units, and improve unity of effort. Where commanders place themselves on the battlefield is one of the most important decisions they can make. Commanding forward allows commanders to effectively assess and manage the effects of operations on their formations through face-to-face interactions. It allows them to gather information about actual combat conditions, but it must be balanced against the requirement to be where the best overall situational awareness can be maintained for the entire formation. As far as operational conditions allow, leadership should be exercised up front at critical times and places without interfering with subordinate leader prerogatives, becoming unreachable by other elements of the unit, or making it simpler for the enemy to target multiple echelons of leadership in one place.

At the battalion level and below, commanders lead by personal example, acquire much information themselves, and communicate face to face with those they direct. Typically, they position themselves well forward to influence the main effort during different phases of an operation. However, even at these levels, commanders cannot provide direct leadership for their whole unit given the challenges of maintaining continuous communications when units are dispersed or in contested electromagnetic environments.

At higher levels, echeloned command posts are central to effective C2. During operations, commanders must assess the situation up front as often as possible without being disruptive to the focus of subordinate commanders. They deliberately plan and organize their C2 approach to mitigate their loss of broad situational understanding during battlefield circulation by the development of subordinate commanders, and staff officers empowered to make decisions on the commander's behalf to exploit opportunities and respond to changing circumstances without needing to ask permission.

Commanders convey importance and focus the efforts of the command by how they communicate, regardless of where they are physically located. A calm and authoritative tone of voice generates a sense of presence, as does a crisp and efficient manner of providing guidance; both require practice to master. No matter their location, effective commanders encourage their troops, sense their morale, and inspire through personal example.

## Imperative: Understand and Manage the Effects of Operations on Units and Soldiers

Continuous operations rapidly degrade the performance of people and the equipment they employ, particularly during combat. In battle, Soldiers and units are more likely to fail catastrophically than gradually. Commanders and staffs must be alert to small indicators of fatigue, fear, indiscipline, and reduced morale, and they must take measures to deal with these before their cumulative effects drive a unit to the threshold of collapse. Staffs and commanders at higher echelons must take into account the impact of prolonged combat on subordinate units, which causes efficiency to drop, even when physical losses are not great.

*Provided here as an example. See pp. 1-44 to 1-45 for a listing of all imperatives.*

# III. Information (as a Dynamic of Combat Power)

Ref: FM 3-13, *Information Operations* (Dec '16) and FM 3-0, *Operations* (Oct. '22), chap. 2.

## I. Information

All military activities produce **information**. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects strategic outcomes.

Information contributes to the disruption and destruction of enemy forces. It is central to the application and amplification of combat power. It enables decision making and influences enemy perceptions, decision making, and behavior. Information, like leadership, provides a qualitative advantage to friendly combat power when it can be acted upon more quickly and effectively than the enemy.

Army forces collect data and information for analysis and process it to understand situations, make decisions, and direct actions that apply combat power against enemy forces. Army forces must fight for information about enemy forces while protecting their own information. Friendly counterintelligence, counterreconnaissance, and security operations prevent enemy access to friendly information. Offensively, commanders fight for information about enemy forces and terrain through continuous reconnaissance and surveillance and offensive tasks such as movement to contact or reconnaissance in force.

Army forces also use information to enhance the effects of destructive or disruptive physical force to create psychological effects that disrupt morale, cause human error, and increase uncertainty. Using information to manipulate shock and confusion amplifies the psychological effects of lethality and other dynamics of combat power.

Employing information to confuse, manipulate, or deceive can induce threats to act in ways that make them more vulnerable to destruction by Army forces. Employing information creatively can enable Army forces to achieve surprise, cause enemy forces to misallocate or expend combat power, or mislead them as to the strength, readiness, locations, and intended missions of friendly forces.

## II. Information Operations (IO)

Information Operations (IO) is the integrated employment, during military operations, of **information-related capabilities** in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own (JP 3-13).

See p. 2-15 for an overview of the information-related capabilities (IRCs) and also on p. 6-14, as related to employment of fires across the domains.

### The Purpose of Information Operations

The purpose of IO is to **create effects in and through the information environment that provide commanders decisive advantage over enemies and adversaries**. Commanders achieve this advantage in several ways: preserve and facilitate decision making and the impact of decision making, while influencing, disrupting or degrading enemy or adversary decision making; get required information faster and with greater accuracy and clarity than the enemy or adversary; or influence the attitudes and behaviors of relevant audiences in the area of operations having an impact on operations and decision making.

### III. Information (as one of the Joint Functions)

*Ref: JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations (Jun '22), pp. III-16 to III-27.*

*There are seven joint functions common to joint operations: C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment.*

The elevation of information as a joint function impacts all operations and signals a fundamental appreciation for the military role of information at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels within today's complex operational environment.

The information function encompasses the management and application of information to support achievement of objectives; it is the deliberate integration with other joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired relevant actor behaviors; and to support human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the prevalent nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to preserve friendly information and leverage information and the inherent informational aspects of military activities to achieve the commander's objectives. The information joint function provides an intellectual framework to aid commanders in exerting one's influence through the timely generation, preservation, denial, or projection of information.

All military activities have an informational aspect since most military activities are observable in the IE. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage in the OE; failing to leverage those aspects in a timely manner may cede this advantage to an adversary or enemy. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities can support achieving operational and strategic objectives. The information function also encompasses the use of friendly information to influence foreign audiences and affect the legitimacy, credibility, and influence of the USG, joint force, allies, and partners. Additionally, JFCs use friendly information to counter, discredit, and render irrelevant the disinformation, misinformation, and propaganda of other actors.

The information joint function helps commanders and their staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application across the competition continuum, to include its role in supporting human and automated decision making. Information planners should consider coordination activities not only within the information joint function but also among all other joint functions. The information joint function organizes the tasks required to manage and apply information during all activities and operations. The three tasks of the information joint function stress the requirement to incorporate information as a foundational element during the planning and conduct of all operations.

#### A. Joint Force Capabilities, Operations, and Activities for Leveraging Information

In addition to planning all operations to derive benefit from the inherent informational aspects of physical actions and influence relevant actors, the JFC also has additional means with which to leverage information in support of objectives. Leveraging information involves the generation and use of information through tasks to inform relevant actors; influence relevant actors; and/or attack information, information systems, and information networks. Planning for operations in the information environment (OIE) provides the means for the integrated employment of military information. The JFC uses various forces, operations, and activities to reinforce the actions of assigned or attached forces, support lines of operation (LOOs) or lines of effort (LOEs), or as the primary activity in an LOE to drive the behavior of selected target audiences or decision makers.

*See p. 2-18 for examples of information use across the competition continuum.*

## B. Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)

Ref: FM 3-13, Information Operations (Dec '16), p. 1-3.


An **information-related capability (IRC)** is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions (JP 1-02). The formal definition of IRCs encourages commanders and staffs to employ all available resources when seeking to affect the information environment to operational advantage. For example, if artillery fires are employed to destroy communications infrastructure that enables enemy decision making, then artillery is an IRC in this instance. In daily practice, however, the term IRC tends to refer to those tools, techniques, or activities that are inherently information-based or primarily focused on affecting the information environment.

The information-related capabilities (IRCs) include—

- Military deception
- Military information support operations (MISO)
- Soldier and leader engagement (SLE), to include police engagement
- Civil affairs operations
- Combat camera
- Operations security (OPSEC)
- Public affairs
- Cyberspace electromagnetic activities (see following pages)
- Electronic warfare (see following pages)
- Cyberspace operations
- Space operations
- Special technical operations

All unit operations, activities, and actions affect the information environment. For this reason, whether or not they are routinely considered an IRC, a wide variety of unit functions and activities can be adapted for the purposes of conducting information operations or serve as enablers, to include:

- Commander's communications strategy or communication synchronization
- Presence, profile, and posture
- Foreign disclosure
- Physical security
- Physical maneuver
- Special access programs
- Civil military operations
- Intelligence
- Destruction and lethal actions




Refer to INFO1: The Information Operations & Capabilities SMARTbook (Guide to Information Operations & the IRCs). INFO1 chapters and topics include information operations (IO defined and described), information in joint operations (joint IO), information-related capabilities (PA, CA, MILDEC, MISO, OPSEC, CO, EW, Space, STO), information planning (information environment analysis, IPB, MDMP, JPP), information preparation, information execution (IO working group, IO weighted efforts and enabling activities, intel support), fires & targeting, and information assessment.

# Command & Control Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (Jul '19) and ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 5-3.

## I. Command & Control Warfighting Function

The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0). The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. The command and control warfighting function consists of the command and control warfighting function tasks and the command and control system.



Ref: ADP 6-0 (Jul '19), Figure 1-2. Combat power model.

The command and control warfighting function tasks focus on integrating the activities of the other elements of combat power to accomplish missions. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force through the mission command warfighting function:

- Command forces
- Control operations
- Drive the operations process (See pp. 3-9 to 3-18.)
- Establish the command and control system (See p. 3-8.)



Refer to BSS6: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 6th Ed. for further discussion. BSS6 covers the operations process (ADP 5-0); commander's activities; Army planning methodologies; the military decisionmaking process and troop leading procedures (FM 7-0 w/Chg 2); integrating processes (IPB, information collection, targeting, risk management, and knowledge management); plans and orders; mission command, C2 warfighting function tasks, command posts, liaison (ADP 6-0); rehearsals & after action reviews; and operational terms and military symbols (ADP 1-02).

## IV. Command and Control System

Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (May '12), pp. 1-20 to 1-21 and chap. 4.

Commanders need support to effectively exercise command and control. At every echelon of command, each commander establishes a command and control system—the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations. The command and control system supports the commander's decision making, disseminates the commander's decisions to subordinates, and facilitates controlling forces. Commanders employ their command and control system to enable the people and formations conducting operations to work towards a common purpose. All the equipment and procedures exist to achieve this end. Commanders organize the four components of their command and control system to support decision making and facilitate communication. The most important of these components is people.

### People

A commander's command and control system is based on people. The human aspects of operations remain paramount regardless of the technology associated with the system. Therefore, commanders base their command and control systems on human characteristics more than on equipment and processes. Trained personnel are essential to an effective command and control system. Technology cannot support command and control without them.

### Processes

Commanders establish and use processes and procedures to organize activities within their headquarters and throughout the force. A process is a series of actions or steps taken to achieve a specific end, such as the military decision-making process. In addition to the major activities of the operations process, commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the operations process.

See pp. 3-20 to 3-21 for discussion of the integrating functions from ADP 3-0.

Procedures are standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks (CJCSM 5120.01). Processes and procedures can increase organizational competence, for example, by improving a staff's efficiency or by increasing the tempo.

### Networks

Generally, a network is a grouping of things that are interconnected for a purpose. Networks enable commanders to communicate information and control forces. Networks enable successful operations. Commanders determine their information requirements and focus their staffs and organizations on using networks to meet these requirements. These capabilities relieve staffs from handling routine data, and they enable extensive information sharing, collaborative planning, execution, and assessment that promote shared understanding. Each network consists of—

- End-user applications
- Information services and data
- Network transport and management

### Command Posts

Command posts provide a physical location for the other three components of a command and control system (people, processes, and networks). Command posts vary in size, complexity and focus. Command posts may be comprised of vehicles, containers, and tents, or located in buildings. Commanders systematically arrange platforms, operation centers, signal nodes, and support equipment in ways best suited for a particular operational environment.

See pp. 3-29 to 3-30 for further discussion of command posts.



# I. The Operations Process


Ref: ADP 3-0, *Operations* (Jul '19), chap. 4.

Commanders establish and use processes and procedures to organize activities within their headquarters and throughout the force.

## I. The Operations Process

The Army's framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process—the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation. Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand their operational environment (OE); visualize and describe the operation's end state and operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess operations.

Cmd & Control  
(ADP 6-0)



Ref: ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*, fig. 1-1, p. 1-4.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinate headquarters employ the operations process to organize efforts, integrate the warfighting functions across multiple domains, and synchronize forces to accomplish missions. This includes integrating numerous processes and activities such as information collection and targeting within the headquarters and with higher, subordinate, supporting, and supported units. The unit's battle rhythm helps to integrate and synchronize the various processes and activities that occur within the operations process.

A goal of the operations process is to make timely and effective decisions and to act faster than the enemy. A tempo advantageous to friendly forces can place the enemy under the pressures of uncertainty and time. Throughout the operations process, making and communicating decisions faster than the enemy can react produces a

tempo with which the enemy cannot compete. These decisions include assigning tasks; prioritizing, allocating, and organizing forces and resources; and selecting the critical times and places to act. Decision making during execution includes knowing how and when to adjust previous decisions. The speed and accuracy of a commander's actions to address a changing situation is a key contributor to agility.

## II. Principles of the Operations Process


The operations process, while simple in concept, is dynamic in execution. Commanders must organize and train their staffs and subordinates as an integrated team to simultaneously plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. In addition to the principles of mission command, commanders and staffs consider the following principles for the effective employment of the operations process:

### Principles of the Operations Process

- Drive the operations process
- Build and maintain situational understanding
- Apply critical and creative thinking

### A. Drive the Operations Process

Commanders are the most important participants in the operations process. While staffs perform essential functions that amplify the effectiveness of operations, commanders drive the operations process through understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations. Accurate and timely running estimates maintained by the staff, assist commanders in understanding situations and making decisions.



Ref: ADP 5-0, The Operations Process (Jul '19), fig. 1-2, p. 1-8.

See facing page for further discussion.

# II. Command and Support Relationships

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), app B.

Command and support relationships provide the basis for unity of command and unity of effort in operations. Command relationships affect Army force generation, force tailoring, and task organization. Commanders use Army support relationships when task-organizing Army forces. All command and support relationships fall within the framework of joint doctrine. *Note: JP 1 discusses joint command relationships and authorities.*

## I. Chain of Command

The President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the armed forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command, as described in JP 1, Volume 2: the operational and administrative branches. The operational branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the CCDRs for missions and forces assigned to combatant commands. The administrative branch runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments.

The typical operational chain of command extends from the CCDR to a joint task force (JTF) commander, then to a functional component or Service component commander. JTFs comprise forces from more than one Service placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the JTF. Within their commands, CCDRs and JTF commanders establish joint command relationships among forces.

Under joint doctrine, each Unified Command includes a Service component command that provides administrative control (ADCON) for Service forces assigned to that Unified Command. A Service component command consists of the Service Component headquarters and all Service Forces assigned to the Unified Commander. Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command and Army components of other joint forces.

### Army Service Component Command (ASCC)

Under Army doctrine, Army Service component command (ASCC) refers to the Army component assigned to a combatant command. There is only one ASCC within a combatant command's area of responsibility.

### ARFORs

The Army components of all other joint forces are called ARFORs. An ARFOR is the Army component and senior Army headquarters of all Army forces assigned or attached to a combatant command, subordinate joint force command, joint functional command, or multinational command. (FM 3-94) It consists of the senior Army headquarters and all Army forces that the CCDR subordinates to the JTF or places under the control of a multinational force commander. The ARFOR becomes the conduit for ADCON functions specified in unit deployment orders.

See FM 3-94 and JP 3-0 for more information on ARFOR.

## II. Joint Command Relationships

JP 1, Volume 2 specifies and details four types of joint command relationships:

### A. Combatant Command (Command Authority)

COCOM is the command authority over assigned and allocated forces vested only in commanders of combatant commands or as directed by the President or the Secre-

## II. Types of Command Posts

Ref: FM 6-0, *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, (May '22), pp. 7-4 to 7-8.

### Main Command Post

A main command post is a portion of a unit headquarters containing the majority of the staff designed to command and control current operations, conduct detailed analysis, and plan future operations. The main CP is the unit's principal CP serving as the primary location for plans, analysis, sustainment coordination, and assessment. It includes representatives of all staff sections, warfighting functions, and information systems to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. The main CP is larger in size and in staffing and less mobile than the tactical CP. The COS or XO provides staff supervision of the main CP. All units at battalion and higher echelons have a main CP. General functions of the main CP include—

- Controlling operations.
- Receiving reports for subordinate units and preparing reports required by higher echelon headquarters.
- Planning operations, including branches and sequels.
- Integrating intelligence into current operations and plans.
- Synchronizing the targeting process.
- Planning and synchronizing sustaining operations.
- Assessing the overall progress of operations.

### Contingency Command Post

A contingency command post is a portion of a unit headquarters tailored from the theater army headquarters that enables the commander to conduct small-scale operations within the assigned area of operations. Employing the contingency CP for a mission involves a tradeoff between the contingency CP's immediate response capability and its known limitations. These limitations include the scale, scope, complexity, intensity, and duration of operations that it can effectively command without significant augmentation. The contingency CP depends on the main CP for long-range planning and special staff functional support.

### Tactical Command Post

A tactical command post is a portion of a unit headquarters designed to command and control operations as directed. Commanders employ the tactical CP as an extension of the main CP to allow the main CP to displace or to control major events while the main CP focuses on other events, such as shaping operations. The tactical CP maintains continuous communications with subordinates, higher echelon headquarters, other CPs, and supporting units. The tactical CP is fully mobile and includes only essential Soldiers and equipment. The tactical CP relies on the main CP for planning, detailed analysis, and coordination. A deputy commander or operations officer (G-3 or S-3) generally leads the tactical CP. While corps through battalion commanders employ a tactical CP as an extension of the main CP, corps and division tactical CPs are resourced differently for functionality. The division tactical CP is resourced to afford the division commander the ability to separate into two functional elements to be used as the commander requires. The corps tactical CP is resourced as a stand-alone capability that nearly mirrors the main CP's functionality. The functions of a tactical CP include but are not limited to—

- Controlling decisive operations or specific shaping operations.
- Controlling a specific task within larger operations such as a gap crossing, passage of lines, relief in place, or air assault operations.
- Controlling the overall unit's operations for a limited time when the main CP is displacing or otherwise not available.
- Performing short-range planning.

- Providing input to targeting and future operations planning.
- Providing a forward location for issuing orders and conducting rehearsals.
- Forming the headquarters of a task force with subordinate units task-organized under its control.

See FM 3-94 for more details on the corps and division tactical CP.

When the commander does not employ the tactical CP, the staff assigned to it reinforces the main CP. Unit SOPs address the specifics for this reinforcement, including procedures to quickly detach the tactical CP from the main CP.

## Rear Command Post

Depending on the situation—including the threat, size of the rear area, and number of units within the support and consolidation areas—division and corps commanders may form a rear CP to assist in controlling operations. The rear CP disperses the C2 signature and enables division and corps commanders to exercise C2 over disparate, functionally-focused elements operating between the close area and the division and corps rear boundary that may exceed the effective span of control of the main CP.

Functions of the rear CP may include planning and directing sustainment, terrain management, movement control, and area security. When augmented by the maneuver enhancement brigade staff, the rear CP may also plan and control combined arms operations with units under division or corps control, coordinate airspace, and employ fires.

## Combat Trains Command Post

Combined arms battalions and infantry battalions are also resourced a combat trains CP. The combat trains CP controls and coordinates administrative and logistics support. It consists of members from the S-1 staff section, S-4 staff sections, and aid station. The battalion S-4 leads this CP. The battalion's forward support company normally co-locates with the combat trains CP.

## Field Trains Command Post

The Army resources combined arms battalions and infantry battalions with a field trains CP. The battalion field trains and field trains CPs are located in the best positions to facilitate sustainment support. Field trains and field trains CPs are normally located within their battalion's area of operations. Field trains usually include a personnel administration center, elements of the S-4 sustainment staff section, elements of company supply sections, and elements of the forward support company. The brigade headquarters and headquarters company commander leads the field trains CP.

## Command Group and Mobile Command Group

A command group and mobile command group allow the commander to maintain command and control when separated from the main, tactical, or rear command post. The mobile command group consists of assigned equipment to support the command group when necessary, and it is directed by the commander. A command group consists of the commander and selected staff members who assist the commander in controlling operations. Command group personnel include staff representation that can immediately affect current operations, such as maneuver, fires (including the air liaison officer), and intelligence. The mission dictates the command group's makeup.

## Early-Entry Command Post (EECP)

An early-entry command post is a lead element of a headquarters designed to control operations until the remaining portions of the headquarters are deployed and operational. While not a separate section of the unit's TO&E, the early-entry CP (sometimes referred to as an assault command post) is an ad hoc organization comprised of equipment and personnel from the staff of the tactical, main, and rear CPs. Commanders can establish an early-entry CP to assist them in controlling operations during the deployment phase of operations or to exercise C2 of early-entry forces during a joint forcible entry operation. The early-entry CP performs the functions of the main and tactical CPs until those CPs are deployed and operational.

# Movement & Maneuver Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 5-4 and FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), p. 2-2.

The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver directly gains or exploits **positions of relative advantage**. Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support.

- Movement and maneuver.
- Employ direct fires.
- Occupy an area.
- Conduct mobility and countermobility.
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Employ battlefield obscurity.

**Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver.** The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to position and disperse the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver directly gains or exploits positions of relative advantage. Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum.

Effective maneuver requires some combination of **reconnaissance, surveillance, and security operations** to provide early warning and protect the main body of the formation. Every Soldier on the battlefield is a potential sensor that makes key contributions to information collection and the development of intelligence. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Movement and maneuver contribute to the development of information advantages through the positioning of units able to employ capabilities in close proximity to the enemy, as well as by physically establishing the facts on the ground that an enemy or adversary cannot refute.

**Maneuver requires sustainment.** The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include routine transportation of personnel and materiel that support operations, which falls under the sustainment warfighting function.

For the purposes of The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, an overview of the following are provided: offense and defense (pp. 4-6 to 4-7), stability operations (pp. 4-8 to 4-9), and deployment/force projection operations (p. 4-10).



Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.

# Imperatives: Movement & Maneuver

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 3-13 to 3-16.

*Editor's Note: The following select imperatives of Army operations from FM 3-0 (2022) are highlighted here in greater detail to illustrate application within the movement and maneuver warfighting function. See pp. 1-44 to 1-45 for a listing of all imperatives.*

## Account for Constant Enemy Observation

Enemy forces possess a wide range of space-, air-, maritime-, and land-based reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities that can detect U.S. forces. To counter these robust and persistent capabilities requires counterintelligence efforts and the disciplined application of operations security.

Enemy forces employ UASs in large numbers and with a diverse array of capabilities. Leaders account for enemy capabilities and likely reconnaissance objectives as they develop their counter-UAS plan. Leaders implement techniques and procedures for countering enemy UASs based on their organic capabilities, attached capabilities, and the mission variables.

Leaders combine multiple measures, including deception, to make it more difficult for enemy forces to detect friendly forces. These measures include—

- Counterreconnaissance, including counter-UAS operations.
- Cover and concealment, both natural and manmade.
- False battle positions and deception obstacles.
- Obscuration.
- Dispersion.
- Noise and light discipline.
- Limited visibility operations, particularly for sustainment functions and large unit movements.
- Electromagnetic emission control and masking, to include social media and personal communication discipline.

Because Army forces employ an increasing number of capabilities that emit electromagnetic radiation that enemies can target, leaders must apply emission control measures, balancing the risks to the force with the risks to the mission. As risk to the force increases, leaders increase their emission control measures. There may be times that the risk of friendly emissions being detected and targeted is assessed as too high, causing Army forces to use methods of communications with no electromagnetic signature.

**Implementing Dispersion.** Leader efforts to preempt and mitigate enemy detection are essential, but they cannot eliminate the risk of enemy massed and precision fires, including CBRN and weapons of mass destruction. To improve survivability from enemy indirect fires, Army forces maintain dispersion and remain as mobile as possible to avoid presenting themselves as lucrative targets to the enemy's most capable systems. When mission demands require units to remain static for more than short periods of time, those units must dig in to increase survivability.

*Refer to ATP 3-37.34 for information on survivability positions.*



## Account for All Forms of Enemy Contact

Leaders consider **nine forms of contact in multiple domains**. They are—

- **Direct**: interactions from line-of-sight weapon systems (including small arms, heavy machine guns, and antitank missiles).
- **Indirect**: interactions from non-line-of-sight weapons systems (including cannon artillery, mortars, and rockets).
- **Non-hostile**: neutral interactions that may degrade or compromise military operations (including civilians on the battlefield).
- **Obstacle**: interactions from friendly, enemy, and natural obstacles (including minefields and rivers).
- **CBRN**: interactions from friendly, enemy, and civilian CBRN effects (including chemical attacks, nuclear attacks, industrial accidents, and toxic or hazardous industrial materials).
- **Aerial**: interactions from air-based combat platforms (including attack helicopters, armed unmanned aircraft systems [UASs], air interdiction, and close air support).
- **Visual**: interactions from acquisition via the human eye, optical, or electro-optical systems (including ground reconnaissance, telescopic, thermal, and infrared sights on weapons and sensor platforms such as unmanned aircraft systems and satellites).
- **Electromagnetic**: interactions via systems used to acquire, degrade, or destroy using select portions of the electromagnetic spectrum (including radar, jamming, cyberspace, space, and electromagnetic systems).
- **Influence\***: interactions through the information dimension intended to shape the perceptions, behaviors, and decision making of people relative to a policy or military objective (including through social media, telecommunications, human interaction, and other forms of communication).

*\* Influence is introduced as a ninth form of contact in this edition of FM 3-0 (2022)*

In all contexts, direct, indirect, non-hostile, CBRN, and aerial contacts are sporadic. However, Army forces are typically in continuous visual, electromagnetic, and influence contact with adversaries. Army forces are under persistent visual surveillance by space and other capabilities. Army forces and individuals are in constant electromagnetic contact with adversaries who persistently probe and disrupt individual, group, and Army capabilities dependent on space and cyberspace. Army forces are subject to adversary influence through disinformation campaigns targeting Soldiers and their family and friends through social media and other platforms.

During competition, adversary forces employ multiple methods of collecting on friendly forces to develop an understanding of U.S. capabilities, readiness status, and intentions. They do this in and outside the continental United States. They co-opt civilians and employ space-based surveillance platforms to observe unit training and deployment activities. They also penetrate networks and gain access to individual and group cyberspace personas to create options for future intimidation, coercion, and attack. Soldiers and their families should use telecommunications, the internet, and social media in ways that do not make them or their units vulnerable to adversary surveillance.

During armed conflict, enemy networked land-, maritime-, air-, and space-based capabilities enable threats to detect and rapidly target friendly forces with fires. Forces that are concentrated and static are easy for enemy forces to detect and destroy. Dispersing forces has multiple survivability benefits. It increases opportunities to use cover and concealment to reduce probability of detection. In the event the enemy detects elements of the friendly force, dispersion acts as a form of deception, helping to conceal the intentions of the friendly force. Leaders only concentrate forces when necessary and balance the survivability benefits of dispersion with the negative impacts dispersion has on mis-

Continued on next page

Movement & Maneuver

Continued on next page

# Reconnaissance

Ref: ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Jul '19), pp. 5-1 to 5-2.

Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographical characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance accomplished by small units primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. It is performed before, during, and after operations to provide commanders and staffs information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process so they can formulate, confirm, or modify courses of action (COAs).

## I. Types of Reconnaissance

The five types of reconnaissance: route, zone, area, reconnaissance in force, and special.

### Forms of Reconnaissance



**Route Reconnaissance**



**Zone Reconnaissance**



**Area Reconnaissance**



**Reconnaissance in Force**



**Special Reconnaissance**

The responsibility for accomplishing reconnaissance does not reside solely with reconnaissance units. Every unit has an implied mission to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions. Troops in contact with an enemy and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units, at all echelons, collect information on enemy units and activities. In echelon support and consolidation areas, reserve maneuver forces, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, other governmental agencies, and multinational forces observe and report civilian, adversary, and enemy activity and significant changes in terrain trafficability. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, ground cavalry, aviation attack reconnaissance units, scouts, and special forces are specifically trained to conduct reconnaissance operations. Some branches, such as the Corps of Engineers and Chemical Corps, conduct specific reconnaissance operations that complement the force's overall reconnaissance effort. However, BCT, division, and corps commanders primarily use their organic or attached reconnaissance—ground or air—and intelligence elements to accomplish reconnaissance.

## A. Route Reconnaissance

Route reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. Route reconnaissance provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy, adversary, and civilian activity along the route.

## B. Zone Reconnaissance

Zone reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. Obstacles include existing, reinforcing, and areas with CBRN contamination. Commanders assign a zone reconnaissance mission when they need additional information on a zone before committing other forces. Zone reconnaissance is the most time-and resource-intensive form of reconnaissance

## C. Area Reconnaissance

Area reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. Commanders assign an area reconnaissance when information on the enemy situation is limited or when focused reconnaissance will yield specific information on the area in question. An area reconnaissance differs from a zone reconnaissance in that the unit conducting an area reconnaissance starts from an LD.

## D. Reconnaissance in Force

A reconnaissance in force is a type of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the enemy's strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information. A commander assigns a reconnaissance in force when an enemy force is operating within an area and the commander cannot obtain adequate intelligence by other means. The unit commander plans for both the retrograde or reinforcement of the friendly force (in case it encounters superior enemy forces) and for the exploitation of its success.

## E. Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance is reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (JP 3-05). Special reconnaissance provides an additional capability for commanders and supplements other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions.

Reconnaissance is characterized as either stealthy or aggressive. A key factor in executing reconnaissance is the time available to conduct the mission. The commander recognizes the increased risk to both the reconnaissance element and the main body when accelerating the pace of reconnaissance. This risk can be somewhat offset by employing air reconnaissance and technical means to cover open terrain or areas of lower threat. (FM 3-90-2, pp. 1-13 to 1-14.)



Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.

# Obstacle Planning

Ref: Adapted from FM 5-102, *Counter mobility, chap. 2 and BCBL*.

Obstacle planning begins with understanding the fundamentals of the obstacle framework. Precise use of these terms creates a common language and prevents confusion during planning and execution.

## A. Obstacle Classification

Obstacle classification consists of two types of obstacles: existing obstacles and reinforcing obstacles.

- **Existing Obstacles.** Existing obstacles are obstacles that are present in the battlespace as inherent aspects of the terrain. The two types of existing obstacles are: natural (terrain features) and cultural (man-made terrain features).
- **Reinforcing Obstacles.** Reinforcing obstacles are obstacles that military forces specifically construct, emplace, or detonate to reduce threat mobility. The two types of reinforcing obstacles are tactical and protective.

## B. Obstacle Intent

Obstacle intent is how the commander wants to use tactical obstacles to support his scheme of maneuver. Obstacle intent consists of:

- **Target.** Target is defined as the threat force's size and type along an avenue of approach.
- **Obstacle Effect.** Obstacle effect is achieved through the integration of both fires and obstacles to manipulate the threat's movement in support of the commander's scheme of maneuver. All tactical obstacles should disrupt, turn, fix, or block the enemy.
- **Relative location.** Relative location is where the commander wants the desired effect on the target.

## C. Principles of Obstacle Emplacement

Regardless of the type of defense employed by the tactical commander, there are five basic employment principles for reinforcing obstacles:

- **Reinforcing obstacles support the maneuver commander's plan.** Reinforcing obstacles must be planned and emplaced to support the tactical plan. Obstacles other than mines emplaced outside the range of friendly weapons are of little use. Reinforcing obstacles that do not accomplish one or more of the basic purposes are also of little value.
- **Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with observed fires.** Obstacles are used to develop engagement areas in which enemy maneuver is restricted and slowed, thereby increasing the hit probability of friendly direct and indirect fires.
- **Reinforcing obstacles are integrated with existing obstacles and with other reinforcing obstacles.** Reinforcing obstacles are sited to take the maximum advantage of existing obstacles. They are placed where they can close the gaps or openings between existing obstacles and/or close any passages through them.
- **Reinforcing obstacles are employed in depth.** A series of simple obstacles arranged one behind the other along a probable axis of enemy advance is far more effective than one large, elaborate obstacle. Restricting the design of obstacles to correspond with the strength of the existing obstacle helps to conserve effort and direct it toward executing obstacles in depth.
- **Reinforcing obstacles are employed for surprise.** Using obstacles in order to obtain surprise is one means available to the commander to retain a degree of initiative even when defending.

### D. Obstacle Protection

Obstacle protection is protecting the integrity of obstacles. This protection can be achieved through counterreconnaissance, breach asset destruction, obstacle repair, and using phony obstacles. Counterreconnaissance prevents the threat from gathering information on friendly preparation. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan includes obstacle protection.. Early breach asset destruction will reduce the threat's ability to maneuver and ensure maximum effectiveness of the obstacles. Obstacle repair must occur when the threat has attempted to breach tactical obstacles and during lulls in the battle, between echelons.

### E. Obstacle C2

Obstacle C2 focuses on obstacle emplacement authority and obstacle control.

- **Obstacle Emplacement Authority.** The authority that a unit commander has to emplace reinforcing obstacles.
- **Obstacle Control.** The commander uses control measures, specific guidance, and orders to maintain obstacle control.


### Obstacle Control Measures

Obstacle control measures are specific control measures that simplify granting obstacle emplacement authority and providing obstacle control (FM 3-0, Operations, w/Chg. 1).

Obstacle control measure	Emplacement authority		Graphic	Example
	From	To		
Zone	CORPS  DIV	DIV  BDE		
Belt	CORPS  DIV  BDE	DIV <sup>1</sup>  BDE <sup>1</sup>  TF		
Group	BDE <sup>2</sup>  TF	TF <sup>2</sup>  CO TRP	 Effect symbol is the graphic	
Obstacle restricted area	Any			
1 - Rarely done by corps and divisions, but possible.				
2 - Done only when directed and integrated with corps or division fire plans.				
Graphic effects symbols	 Disrupt Fix Turn Block			

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct '17), fig. 6-8, p. 6-11.

# Intelligence Logic Map



Ref: ADP 2-0, Intelligence (Jul '19), introductory figure. ADP 2-0 logic chart.

Ensuring an effective intelligence effort is a challenge described as fighting for intelligence. The following aspects of fighting for intelligence are critical:

- Effective intelligence requires developing an effective intelligence architecture well before large-scale combat operations.
- The commander must own the intelligence effort.
- The commander and staff-
  - Must forge an effective relationship and excel in staff integration.
  - Must understand intelligence limitations, especially collection gaps, at their echelon overcome or mitigate those limitations through effective information collection.
  - At times, may have to conduct combat operations or find creative solutions to enable information collection.
- The unit must adjust the information collection plan, adapt to threat counter-collection measures, and maintain a layered and aggressive information collection effort.

## II. Intelligence Warfighting Function Tasks

The intelligence warfighting function is the Army's contribution to the joint intelligence effort. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment (ADP 3-0). Specifically, other significant aspects of the operational environment include threats, adversaries, the operational variables, and can include other aspects depending on the nature of operations.

Intelligence Warfighting Function Tasks		
Intelligence tasks ►	Commander's focus ►	Commander's decisions
<b>Provide intelligence support to force generation:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provide intelligence readiness.</li><li>• Establish an intelligence architecture.</li><li>• Provide intelligence overwatch.</li><li>• Generate intelligence knowledge.</li><li>• Tailor the intelligence force.</li></ul>	Orient on contingencies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Should the unit's level of readiness be increased?</li><li>• Should the operation plan be implemented?</li></ul>
<b>Provide support to situational understanding:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Perform IPB.</li><li>• Perform situation development.</li><li>• Provide intelligence support to protection.</li><li>• Provide tactical intelligence overwatch.</li><li>• Conduct police intelligence operations.</li><li>• Provide intelligence support to civil affairs operations.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Plan an operation.</li><li>• Prepare.</li><li>• Execute.</li><li>• Assess.</li><li>• Secure the force.</li><li>• Determine 2d and 3d order effects on operations and the populace.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Which COA will be implemented?</li><li>• Which enemy actions are expected?</li><li>• What mitigation strategies should be developed and implemented to reduce the potential impact of operations on the population?</li></ul>
<b>Conduct information collection:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Collection management.</li><li>• Direct information collection.</li><li>• Execute collection.</li><li>• Conduct intelligence-related missions and operations.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Plan information collection for an operation, including PED requirements.</li><li>• Prepare.</li><li>• Execute.</li><li>• Assess.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Which DPs, HPTs, and HVTs are linked to the threat's actions?</li><li>• Are the assets available and in position to collect on the DPs, HPTs, and HVTs?</li><li>• Have the assets been repositioned for branches or sequels?</li></ul>
<b>Provide intelligence support to targeting and information operations:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provide intelligence support to targeting.</li><li>• Provide intelligence support to information operations.</li><li>• Provide intelligence support to combat assessment.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Create lethal or nonlethal effects against targets.</li><li>• Destroy, suppress, disrupt, or neutralize targets.</li><li>• Reposition intelligence or attack assets.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Are the unit's lethal and nonlethal actions and maneuver effective?</li><li>• Which targets should be re-engaged?</li><li>• Are the unit's information operations effective?</li></ul>

Ref: ADP 2-0 (Jul '19), table 2-1. Overview of intelligence warfighting function tasks.



## V. Types of Intelligence Products

The G-2/S-2 staff produces and maintains a broad variety of products tailored to its consumers. These products are developed and maintained in accordance with the commander's guidance. For all of these products, the primary focus of the G-2/S-2 staff's analysis is presenting predictive intelligence to support operations. The intelligence products include the—

### A. Intelligence Estimate

An intelligence estimate is the appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the threat and the order of probability of their adoption. The G-2/S-2 staff develops and maintains the intelligence estimate. The primary purpose of the intelligence estimate is to—

- Determine the full set of COAs open to the threat and the probable order of their adoption
- Disseminate information and intelligence
- Determine requirements concerning threats and other relevant aspects of the operational environment

### B. Intelligence Summary

INTSUMs provide the context for commander's situational understanding. The INTSUM reflects the G-2's/S-2's interpretation and conclusions regarding threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations over a designated period of time. This period will vary with the desires of the commander and the requirements of the situation. The INTSUM provides a summary of the threat situation, threat capabilities, the characteristics of terrain and weather and civil considerations, and COAs. The INTSUM can be presented in written, graphic, or oral format, as directed by the commander.

### C. Intelligence Running Estimate

Effective plans and successful execution hinge on accurate and current running estimates. A running estimate is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if the planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Failure to maintain accurate running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions during execution.

Running estimates are principal knowledge management tools used by the commander and staff throughout the operations process. In their running estimates, the commander and each staff section continuously consider the effect of new information and update the following:

- Facts
- Assumptions
- Friendly force status
- Threat activities and capabilities
- Civil considerations
- Recommendations and conclusions

### D. Common Operational Picture (COP)

A common operational picture is a single display of relevant information within a commander's area of interest tailored to the user's requirements and based on common data and information shared by more than one command (ADRP 6-0). The COP is the primary tool for supporting the commander's situational understanding. All staff sections provide input from their area of expertise to the COP.

## 5-8 (Intelligence) Warfighting Function

# Fires Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP 3-19, *Fires* (Jul '19), chap. 1, ADP 3-0, *Operations* (Jul '19), p. 5-5 and FM 3-0, *Operations* (Oct '22), p. 2-2.

## I. The Fires Warfighting Function

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and Joint forces, as well as other unified action partners. The fires warfighting function does not wholly encompass, nor is it wholly encompassed by, any particular branch or function.

Many of the capabilities that contribute to fires also contribute to other warfighting functions, often simultaneously. For example, an aviation unit may simultaneously execute missions that contribute to the movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, protection, and command and control warfighting functions. Additionally, air defense artillery (ADA) units conduct air and missile defense (AMD) operations in support of both fires and protection warfighting functions.

Space and cyberspace capabilities can provide commanders with options to defeat, destroy, disrupt, deny, or manipulate enemy networks, information, and decision making.

Commanders must execute and integrate fires, in combination with the other elements of combat power, to create and converge effects and achieve the desired end state. Fires tasks are those necessary actions that must be conducted to create and converge effects in all domains to meet the commander's objectives. The tasks of the fires warfighting function are:

Integrate Army, multinational, and joint fires through:

- Targeting.
- Operations process.
- Fire support.
- Airspace planning and management.
- Electromagnetic spectrum management.
- Multinational integration.
- Rehearsals.
- Air and missile defense planning and integration.

Execute fires across all domains and in the information environment, employing:

- Surface-to-surface fires.
- Air-to-surface fires.
- Surface-to-air fires.
- Cyberspace operations and EW.
- Space operations.
- Multinational fires.
- Special operations.
- Information operations.

## III. Fires Across the Domains

Ref: ADP 3-19, *Fires* (Jul '19), pp. 1-4 to 1-5.

The Army operates within all **domains**: land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace (including the electromagnetic spectrum) as well as in the information environment.

Commanders use fires to create effects in support of Army and joint operations.

**Cross-domain fires** are fires executed in one domain to create effects in a different domain. Cross-domain fires provide commanders with the flexibility to find the best system to create the required effect and to build redundancy into their plan.

**Multi-domain fires** are fires that converge effects from two or more domains against a target. Multi-domain fires may produce synergistic effects that are greater than the sum of the individual effects that would have been created separately. Surface-based fires converged with other effects across domains creates multiple dilemmas, taxing the enemy's ability to effectively respond. For example, a commander may employ offensive cyberspace operations to attack an enemy air defense network while surface-to-surface fires destroy enemy air defense radars and air-to-surface fires destroy the air defense command and control nodes. The converged effects provide reduced risk to allied operational aircraft.

The **land domain** is the area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals (JP 3-31). The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is the supported commander within the land area of operations (AO) designated by the joint force commander (JFC). Within the designated AO, the JFLCC has the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires in order to integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction.

The **air domain** is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth's surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). The JFC normally assigns joint force air component commander responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of forces and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations. In addition, as all component commands will need to utilize the air domain to some extent, the JFC normally designates the joint force air component commander as the airspace control authority to promulgate airspace coordinating measures to deconflict the multiple users on behalf of the JFC. The Army air-ground system is the Army's system to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate air-ground operations, joint air support, and airspace.

The **maritime domain** is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals (JP 3-32). Naval and maritime forces operate on (surface), under (subsurface), or above the sea (air). Fires from the maritime domain support the land scheme of fires with traditional naval surface fires, and joint fires to include cruise missile and anti-ship missiles, as well as protecting global shipping lanes and friendly maritime assets to maintain freedom of maneuver.

The **space domain** is the space environment, space assets, and terrestrial resources required to access and operate in, to, or through the space environment (FM 3-14). Space is a physical domain where military operations are conducted. Space capabilities include the ability to access information collection; environmental monitoring; early warning, satellite based sensors and communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing.

**Cyberspace** is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12.) Commanders will generally create effects in the cyberspace domain through offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. However, they may also create effects on the physical network layer of cyberspace.

See pp. 6-5 to 6-14 for further discussion of fires across the domains.

# I. Execute Fires Across the Domains

*Ref: ADP 3-19, Fires (Jul '19), chap. 3. (See also p. 6-4.)*

The commander is responsible for the integration of fires within the AO. The commander consults the fire support coordinator, chief of fires, air liaison officer, fire support officer, and experts on AMD, cyberspace, EW, space, special operations, and information operations for advice on the allocation, integration, and use of available fires resources. Fires in all domains require detailed coordination and planning to support the commander's objectives. Employment of these systems requires the use of common terminology and coordination measures across the joint force. It includes surface-to-surface fires, air-to-surface fires, and nonlethal means that the commander uses to support the concept of the operation.

## I. Surface-to-Surface Fires

Army surface-to-surface indirect fires includes cannon, rocket, and missile systems as well as mortars organic to maneuver elements. Field Artillery is the equipment, supplies, ammunition, and personnel involved in the use of cannon, rocket, or surface-to-surface missile launchers (JP 3-09). The role of the field artillery (FA) is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, and missile fire and to integrate and synchronize all fire support assets into operations. Fire support is fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives (JP 3-09).

At times, the FA must enable fires in other domains through the employment of surface-to-surface fires converged with effects in other domains. For example, surface-to-surface capabilities contribute significantly to counterair operations, targeting and destroying enemy air and missile weapons, command and control elements, and supporting infrastructure, ultimately reducing the threats that Army, joint, and multinational air-to-surface assets must face.

FA cannon, rocket, and missile systems organic, assigned, attached, or operational control to the FA battalions of brigade combat teams, division artillery, and field artillery brigades provide continuously available fires under all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. FA can shift and mass fires rapidly from dispersed locations and displace rapidly to new position areas. FA units are positioned to provide continuous fires.

Army surface-to-surface fires are applied to deliver effects in concert with all other fires capabilities. Fires are integrated through the targeting process, fire support planning, unit airspace plan (UAP), and military decision making process (MDMP). Surface-to-surface fires are integrated with other airspace users to facilitate massing of effects.

The integration of surface fires is a critical factor in the success of operations. The commander is responsible for the integration of fires within the AO. The fire support coordinator, chief of fires, and fire support officer advise the commander on the allocation and use of available indirect fires and fire support resources. The chief of fires is the senior fires staff officer at echelons above corps who advises the commander on the best use of available fires resources and provides input to the necessary orders.

Commanders integrate fire support into the concept of operations during planning. FA commanders assisted by fire support personnel and organizations at all echelons

integrate Army, joint, interagency and multinational fires capabilities during the operational process for use at the designated place and time. Fires are critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive tasks. However, nonlethal effects are also important contributors to decisive action, regardless of which element dominates. Accomplishing the mission by creating an appropriate mix of effects remains an important consideration for every commander.

Naval surface fire support provides fire support by naval surface gun, missile, and EW systems in support of a unit or units tasked with achieving the commander's objectives. Naval assets can provide support in a unique manner and should be considered as one source of fire support along with other components and weapon systems.

## II. Air-to-Surface Fires

Army and joint forces employ various types of air-to-surface capabilities, to include fixed-wing aircraft, rotary-wing aircraft, and unmanned aircraft systems (UASs). These systems provide lethal and nonlethal effects, standoff weapons, and target acquisition capabilities that can be employed to detect and create integrated effects against adversary targets.

### Fixed-Wing Aircraft

Fixed-wing aircraft provide flexibility, range, speed, lethality, precision, and the ability to mass fires at a desired time and place. The capacity of aircraft to deliver precision guided munitions can limit collateral damage, as well as strike otherwise inaccessible targets. Aircraft also provide surveillance and combat assessment.

### Rotary-Wing Aircraft

Rotary-wing aircraft employ a variety of weapons. They provide attack, reconnaissance, and terminal guidance for other weapon platforms. Army attack aviation conducts two basic types of attack missions: attacks against enemy forces in close, friendly contact with other Army maneuver forces and attacks against enemy forces out of friendly contact with other Army forces.

### UAS

The long endurance of UAS necessary to support their intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions enables them to provide extended support to many types of missions. UAS can participate in supporting close air support (CAS), air interdiction, and other joint fires missions. Specific tasks may include target acquisition and marking, terminal guidance of ordnance, providing precision coordinates for Global Positioning System (GPS)-aided munitions, delivery of onboard precision-guided ordnance, battle damage assessment, signal intelligence, communication data relays, and retargeting such as shoot-look-shoot missions. UAS should be requested, tasked, routed, controlled, and deconflicted in a manner similar to methods used for fixed-winged and rotary-winged manned aircraft, with exceptions made for their unmanned nature (e.g., inability to see and avoid other air traffic). See JP 3-09, JP 3-09.3, and ATP 3-60.2 for additional information on joint missions and UAS integration.

### Air Force Assets

Air Force assets, with their inherent speed, range, and precision attack capabilities, are combat multipliers for the ground commander. The destruction of decisive points, forces, and capabilities by striking enemy military targets such as fielded land forces, command and control (C2) nodes, vital logistics, or supporting infrastructure degrades the enemy system and contributes to an enemy incapable of effective resistance.

*See following pages (pp. 6-14 to 6-15) for an overview and further discussion of Air Force assets for air-to-surface fires.*

## III. Army Targeting Process (D3A)

Ref: ADP 3-19, Fires (Jul '19), pp. 3-7 to 3-9.

The Army targeting process organizes the efforts of the commander and staff to accomplish key targeting requirements. This methodology is referred to as the D3A. D3A assists the commander and staff decide which targets must be acquired and engaged and to help develop options to engage those targets. Options may include lethal or non-lethal, organic or supporting assets at all levels, including maneuver, electronic attack, psychological operations, attack aircraft, surface-to-surface fires, air to surface fires, other information-related capabilities, or a combination of these options.

The D3A methodology is an integral part of the MDMP. As the MDMP is conducted, targeting becomes more focused based on the commander's guidance and intent. Certain targets may require special considerations or caution, because engaging them improperly could create unintended effects. Examples include targets that should be handled with sensitivity due to potential political and or diplomatic repercussions and targets located in areas with a high risks of collateral damage, to include weapons of mass destruction facilities. These measures are incorporated in the coordinating instructions and appropriate annexes of the operation plan or operation order.

### A. Decide

Decide is the first function in targeting and occurs during the planning portion of the operations process. It is the most important function, requiring close interaction between the commander, intelligence, plans, operations, the fires cell, and staff judge advocate. It begins during the mission analysis portion of the MDMP and continues throughout the operation.

### B. Detect

Detect is the second function in targeting and occurs initially during the prepare portion of the operations process, continuing throughout the operation. A key resource for fires planning and targeting is the intelligence generated through information collection to answer the targeting information requirements. Commanders express requirements for target detection and action as priority intelligence and information requirements. During large-scale combat operations, it might be challenging to prioritize the detection of targets and could require the opening of windows of opportunity for specific collection capabilities in support of fires. High-payoff targets must be integrated and support associated priority intelligence requirements. Their priority depends on the importance of the target to the friendly course of action and target acquisition requirements. Targets are prioritized through a quantitative and qualitative valuation methodology. An example of a valuation methodology is the target value analysis process that prioritizes targets based on the target's criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability. Targeting working groups incorporate priority intelligence and information requirements that support acquisition of high-payoff targets into the overall information collection plan along with named areas of interest, target areas of interest, and engagement areas.

### C. Deliver

Deliver is the third function in targeting and occurs primarily during the execution portion of the operations process. The main objective is to engage targets in accordance with the commander's guidance or engagement authority's direction. The selection of a weapon system or a combination of weapons systems leads to the tactical decision of time of engagement and then the technical solution for the selected weapon.

### D. Assess

Assess is the fourth function of targeting and occurs throughout the operations process. The commander and staff assess the results of mission execution. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

# The Sustainment Warfighting Function

*Ref: ADP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '19), chap. 1, ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 5-5 to 5-6 and FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), p. 2-3.*

The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and system that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment employs capabilities from all domains and enables operations through each domain. Sustainment determines the limits of depth and endurance during operations. Sustainment demands joint and strategic integration, and it should be meticulously coordinated across echelons to ensure continuity of operations and that resources reach the point of employment.

Sustainment employs an integrated network of information systems linking sustainment to operations. As a result, commanders at all levels see an operational environment, anticipate requirements in time and space, understand what is needed, track and deliver what is requested, and make timely decisions to ensure responsive sustainment. Because the situation is always changing, sustainment requires leaders capable of improvisation. Because sustainment operations are often vulnerable to enemy attacks, sustainment survivability depends on active and passive measures and maneuver forces for protection.

Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number of options available to the commander. Sustainment is essential for retaining and exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting function consists of four elements: logistics, financial management, personnel services and health service support:

## A. Logistics

Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: design and development; acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of materiel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services. The explosive ordnance disposal tasks are discussed under the protection warfighting function. Army logistics elements are:

- Maintenance
- Transportation
- Supply
- Field Services
- Distribution
- Operational contract support
- General engineering



*Refer to SMFLS5: The Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Guide to Operational & Tactical Level Sustainment). SMFLS5 topics include the sustainment warfighting function; sustainment operations), sustainment execution (logistics, financial management, personnel services, & health services support); sustainment planning; brigade support; division, corps & field army sustainment; theater support; joint logistics; and deployment & redeployment.*



# Basing

Ref: ADP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '19), pp. 3-8 to 3-9.

A base camp is an evolving military facility that supports military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations (ATP 3-37.10). Basing directly enables and extends operational reach, and involves the provision of sustainable facilities and protected locations from which units can conduct operations. Army forces typically rely on a mix of bases and/or base camps to deploy and employ combat power to operational depth. Options for basing range from permanent basing in CONUS to permanent or contingency (non-permanent) basing OCONUS. A base camp is an evolving military facility that supports military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations.

Bases or base camps may have a specific purpose (such as serving as an intermediate staging base, logistics base, or forward operating base) or they may be multifunctional. A base or base camp has a defined perimeter and established access controls, and should take advantage of natural and man-made features.

Bases or base camps may be joint or single service and will routinely support both U.S. and multinational forces, as well as interagency partners, operating anywhere along the range of military operations. Commanders often designate a single commander as the base or base camp commander that is responsible for protection, terrain management, and day-to-day operations of the base or base camp. This allows other units to focus on their primary function. Units located within the base or base camp are under the tactical control of the base or base camp commander for base security and defense.

Within large echelon support areas, controlling commanders may designate base clusters for mutual protection and mission command. Within a support area, a designated unit such as a BCT or maneuver enhancement brigade provides area security, terrain management, movement control, mobility support, clearance of fires, and required tactical combat forces. Operational area security operations focus on the protected force, base, base camp, route, or area. This allows sustainment units to focus on their primary function. Sustainment commanders and planners must constantly coordinate with supported operational staffs to synchronize sustainment operations to include all activities of the base camp life cycle and the basing strategy.

Refer to ATP 3-37.10 for more information on base camps

## Intermediate Staging Bases (ISB)

An intermediate staging base is a tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment and/or extraction into and out of an operational area (JP 3-35). While not a requirement in all situations, the intermediate staging base may provide a secure, high-throughput facility when circumstances warrant. The commander may use an intermediate staging base as a temporary staging area en route to a joint operation, as a long-term secure forward support base, and/or secure staging areas for redeploying units, and noncombatant evacuation operations. An intermediate staging base is task organized to perform staging, support, and distribution functions as specified or implied by the CCDR and the theater Army operations order.

## Forward Operating Bases (FOB)

Forward operating bases extend and maintain the operational reach by providing secure locations from which to conduct and sustain operations. They not only enable extending operations in time and space; they also contribute to the overall endurance of the force. Forward operating bases allow forward deployed forces to reduce operational risk, maintain momentum, and avoid culmination. Forward operating bases are generally located adjacent to a distribution hub. This facilitates movement into and out of the operational area while providing a secure location through which to distribute personnel, equipment, and supplies.

# Theater Opening

Ref: ADP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '19), pp. 3-6 to 3-9.

Theater opening is the ability to establish and operate ports of debarkation (air, sea, and rail), to establish a distribution system and sustainment bases, and to facilitate port throughput for the reception, staging, onward movement and integration of forces within a theater of operations. Preparing for theater opening operations requires unity of effort among the various commands and a seamless strategic-to-tactical interface. It is a complex joint process involving the GCC and strategic and joint partners such as USTRANSCOM and DLA. Theater opening functions set the conditions for effective support and lay the groundwork for subsequent expansion of the theater distribution system.

When given the mission to conduct theater opening, a sustainment brigade, and a mix of functional battalions and multi-functional CSSBs are assigned based on mission requirements. The sustainment brigade will participate in assessing and acquiring available HN infrastructure capabilities and contracted support and coordinating with military engineers for general engineering support.

For additional information refer to ATP 4-93 and ATP 4-0.1.

## Port Opening

Port opening is a subordinate function of theater opening. Port opening is the ability to establish, initially operate and facilitate throughput for ports of debarkation to support unified land operations.

The port opening process is complete when the port of debarkation and supporting infrastructure is established to meet the desired operating capacity for that node. Supporting infrastructure can include the transportation needed to support port clearance of cargo and personnel, holding areas for all classes of supply, and the proper in-transit visibility systems established to facilitate force tracking and end-to-end distribution.

Port opening and port operations are critical components for preparing and conducting theater opening. Commanders and staffs coordinate with the HN to ensure seaports and aerial ports possess sufficient capabilities to support arriving vessels and aircraft. USTRANSCOM is the port manager for deploying U.S. forces (ATP 4-0.1).

## Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO)

The joint task force-port opening is a joint capability designed to rapidly deploy and initially operate aerial and seaports of debarkation, establish a distribution node, and facilitate port throughput within a theater of operations (JP 4-0). It is a standing task force that is a jointly trained, ready set of forces constituted as a joint task force at the time of need. The Army contribution to the Joint Task Force-Port Opening is the rapid port opening element which deploys within hours to establish air and seaports of debarkation in contingency response operations. The rapid port opening element also provides in-transit visibility and cargo clearance.

The joint task force-port opening facilitates joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration and theater distribution by providing an effective interface with the theater joint deployment and distribution operations center and the sustainment brigade for initial aerial port of debarkation (APOD) operations. It is designed to deploy and operate for up to 60 days. As follow-on theater logistics capabilities arrive, the joint task force-port opening will begin the process of transferring mission responsibilities to arriving sustainment brigade forces or contracted capabilities to ensure the seamless continuation of airfield and distribution operations.

## Seaports

USTRANSCOM's SDDC is the single port manager for all common user seaports of debarkation (SPODs) and as the single port manager it develops policy and advises the GCC on port management, recommends ports to meet operational demands, and is primarily

# II. Sustain Large-Scale Combat

Ref: FM 4-0, *Sustainment Operations* (Jul '19), chap. 5 and FM 3-0, *Operations* (Oct. '22), pp. 6-18 to 6-19.

## I. Overview

Large-scale combat operations require greater sustainment than other types of operations. Their high tempo and lethality significantly increase maintenance requirements and expenditure of supplies, ammunition, and equipment. Large-scale combat incurs the risk of mass casualties, which increase requirements for health service support, mortuary affairs, and large-scale personnel and equipment replacements. Large-scale combat operations demand a sustainment system to move and distribute a tremendous volume of supplies, personnel, and equipment.

See p. 1-87 for an overview of large-scale combat operations from FM 3-0 (2022).

Army sustainment is a key enabler of the joint force on land. Army forces provide sustainment to other elements in the joint force according to the direction of the JFC. The JFC has the overall responsibility for sustainment throughout a theater, but the JFC headquarters executes many of its sustainment responsibilities through the TSC. When directed, Army sustainment capabilities provide the bulk of Army support to other services through executive agency, common-user logistics, lead Service, and other common sustainment resources.

Capabilities from other domains enable sustainment of Army forces. Air sustainment capabilities provide responsive sustainment for high priority requirements. Maritime-enabled sustainment supports large-scale requirements. Space- and cyberspace-enabled networks facilitate rapid communication of sustainment requirements and precise distribution.

Successful sustainment operations strike a balance between protecting sustainment capabilities and providing responsive support close to the forward line of troops.

A well-planned and executed logistics operation permits flexibility, endurance, and application of combat power. Plans must anticipate and mitigate the risk posed by enemy forces detecting and attacking friendly sustainment capabilities. Sustainment formations pursue operations security, survivability, and protection with the same level of commitment as all other forces. While most rear and support operations are economy of force endeavors when allocating combat power in divisions and corps, the continuity and survivability of those operations are vital to deep and close operations.

Dispersion of assets and redundancy help protect sustainment formations. Dispersing sustainment formations makes it less likely that enemy long-range fires can destroy large quantities of material. Dispersion also creates flexibility, as several nodes can execute the sustainment concept without a single point of failure. However, dispersed sustainment operations complicate C2 and can be less efficient than a massed and centralized approach. Commanders balance the risk between dispersion and efficiency to minimize exposure to enemy fires while maintaining the ability to enable the supported formation's tempo, endurance, and operational reach.

Commanders must plan for the possibility of heavy losses to personnel, supplies, and equipment. Even with continuous and effective sustainment support, units may rapidly become combat ineffective due to enemy action. Commanders at all levels must be prepared to conduct reconstitution efforts to return ineffective units to a level of effectiveness that allows the reconstituted unit to perform its future mission. Reconstitution is an operation that commanders plan and implement to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources (ATP 3-94.4).

# V. Large-Scale Offensive Operations

Ref: FM 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '19), chap. 7.

Sustainment commanders and their staffs prepare to support each offensive tasks. Sustainment determines the depth, duration, and endurance of Army operations, and plays a key role in enabling decisive action. Failure to provide adequate sustainment during offensive operations can result in a tactical pause, culmination of offensive operations, and prevent consolidation of gains. Operational and sustainment planners at each echelon of command work closely to synchronize sustainment support to allow commanders the freedom of action to maneuver and provide extended operational reach for the offense.

See pp. 1-118 to 1-126 for discussion of offensive operations from FM 3-0.

## Sustaining Offensive Operations

- Continually update running estimates
- Support offense and consolidate gains simultaneously
- Understand enemy threat and challenges
- Increased class III (bulk and package) and class IX requirements
- Increased casualties and personnel replacements over extended battlefield

## Sustainment Fundamentals

Offensive tasks involve an intense operational tempo, requiring sustainers to continually update their running estimates to anticipate friction points on the battlefield. Sustainers need to be able to accurately envision the offensive operation in time and space to accurately forecast operational requirements. Continuous coordination between planners at the various echelons is required for mission success.

If offensive momentum is not maintained, the enemy may recover from the shock of the first assault, gain the initiative, and mount a successful counterattack. Maintaining an understanding of offensive operations and future operations allows sustainment planners to simultaneously transition between offensive operations and the consolidation of gains. What starts out as a movement to contact could rapidly turn into a lengthy pursuit of enemy forces requiring extended operational reach to capitalize on opportunities. This requires robust planning and consideration for all possible outcomes.

Offensive operations require situational understanding of the enemy threat. Sustainment commanders should not assume unobstructed LOCs and should anticipate challenges across multiple domains. These commanders prepare for challenges of degraded sustainment systems, interdicted LOCs, and challenges from an enemy that has equal or overmatch capabilities. Sustainment commanders and planners prepare to push forward critical supplies in an OE where degraded systems and communications exist.

If the force is to maintain the initiative and combat power necessary for the successful performance of offensive tasks, the continued forward movement of units and sustainment support is critical. Maintaining the initiative in the close area often results in significant numbers of bypassed enemy forces and remnants of defeated units as friendly forces maneuver deep into enemy areas by avoiding enemy units in well prepared positions. The fluidity and rapid tempo of operations pose challenges when planning for the area security of support and consolidation areas.

Enemy commanders look for opportunities to counter or at least hinder the performance of corps and division offensive tasks. Enemy commanders attempt to strike deeply into friendly support and consolidation areas using multiple combinations of lethal and nonlethal effects from multiple domains. The enemy will seek to employ special purpose forces, irregular forces, electronic warfare, long-range artillery, rockets, missiles,

information capabilities, and cyberspace electromagnetic activities to disrupt sustainment activities. Sustainment commanders remain aware of conventional enemy units and other elements bypassed during the advance of friendly forces and the threat presented by their presence in support and consolidation areas.

Sustainment units synchronize with maneuver units to ensure security of support and consolidation areas. Corps and division headquarters must plan to keep CPs operating, sustainment capabilities functional, respective LOCs open, and supply stocks at an acceptable level. The conduct of noncontiguous operations increases the difficulty of these tasks, as does the lack of friendly host nation security forces.

Sustainment of offensive tasks is a high-intensity operation. Sustainment commanders and staffs plan for increased requirements in class III (B), IX items, and personnel replacements to sustain the pace and tempo of operations. Plan and rehearse command and control, forward positioning, orders issuance, personnel accounting, logistical support, processing, and transportation of replacements, and most critically maneuver unit rapid integration of replacements. Sustainment planners anticipate where the greatest need might occur during offensive operations. Planners consider positioning sustainment units in close proximity to operations to reduce response times for critical support. Planners also consider alternative methods for delivering sustainment in emergencies. Extended LOCs require analysis of how to best emplace forward sustainment elements to support the commander. It is important to clearly lay out key actions for rehearsing offensive operations for example casualty evacuation routes, logistics release points, support area displacement times and locations, detainee collection points and holding areas, and fuel and ammunition resupply points to foresee potential problems and means to mitigate them.

### Risks during Large-Scale Combat

Risk, uncertainty and chance are inherent in all military operations. Sustainment professionals must seek to understand, balance and take risks rather than avoid risks to ensure sustainment of the operational force. Sustainment commanders must assess and mitigate risk continuously throughout large-scale combat operations. The following is a sample list of risk considerations during large-scale offensive operations:

- Are sustainment forces properly dispersed and camouflaged? Are movements in and out of sustainment areas coordinated to avoid drawing attention to the area?
- Does the force have a sufficient number of mobile fueling vehicles to maintain offensive momentum? At what point will a loss of tankers cause mission failure?
- Are sufficient quantities of the correct class V available for rapid replenishment? Are munition dumps established forward and their contents dispersed?
- Are sustainment systems hardened against cyber-attack? How do you validate requirements received through electronic systems? Does the threat have the capability to change information verses directed denial of service attacks?
- Do medical units have sufficient class VIII to address mass casualty events?
- Are sufficient recovery vehicles available and placed to support rapid transportation of disabled vehicles to maintenance collection points?
- Does the enemy have plans to leave stay behind forces to interdict sustainment lines of supply? Do friendly forces have sufficient EOD assets available and positioned to remove enemy ordnance or IEDs emplaced on the MSRs?
- Are reinforcements available by skill/grade, and accessible in sufficient quantity to replace losses and maintain units at strength? Which units are the resourcing priority at what points during the operation?

# Protection Warfighting Function

*Ref: ADP 3-37, Protection (Jul '19), ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 5-7 and FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), p. 2-3.*

Protection safeguards friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure and is inherent to command. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power through the integration of protection capabilities throughout operational preparation, operations to shape, operations to prevent, large-scale ground combat operations, and operations to consolidate gains.

## I. The Protection Warfighting Function

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks, systems, and methods that prevent or mitigate detection, threat effects, and hazards to preserve combat power and enable freedom of action. Protection encompasses everything that makes Army forces hard to detect and destroy. Protection requires commanders and staffs to understand threats and hazards throughout the operational environment, prioritize their requirements, and commit capabilities and resources according to their priorities. Commanders balance their protection efforts with the need for tempo and resourcing the main effort. They may assume risk in operations or areas that may be vulnerable, but that are considered low enemy priorities for targeting or attack. Commanders account for threats from space, cyberspace, and outside their assigned area of operations (AO) as they develop protection measures. Protection results from many factors, including operations security, dispersion, deception, survivability measures, and the way forces conduct operations.

Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is a continuous and enduring activity. Defending networks, data, and systems; implementing operations security; and conducting security operations contribute to information advantages by protecting friendly information. Prioritization of protection capabilities is situationally dependent and resource informed.

The protection warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Conduct survivability operations.
- Provide force health protection.
- Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
- Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
- Coordinate air and missile defense support.
- Conduct personnel recovery.
- Conduct detention operations.
- Conduct risk management.
- Implement physical security procedures.
- Apply antiterrorism measures.
- Conduct police operations.
- Conduct population and resource control.
- Conduct area security.
- Perform cyberspace security and defense.
- Conduct electromagnetic protection.
- Implement operations security.

*See pp. 8-4 to 8-5 for an overview and discussion of primary protection tasks.*

## IV. Survivability (One of the Five Dynamics of Combat Power)

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. '22), pp. 2-3 to 2-6, ADP 3-37, Protection (Jul '19), 2-1 to 2-2 and ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Jul '19), p. 4-16.

*Combat power is the total means of destructive and disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against an enemy at a given time (JP 3-0). It is the ability to fight. The complementary and reinforcing effects that result from synchronized operations yield a powerful blow that overwhelms enemy forces and creates friendly momentum. Army forces deliver that blow through a combination of five dynamics: leadership, firepower, information, mobility and survivability. See pp. 2-4 to 2-6 for further discussion.*

### Survivability

Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (ATP 3-37.34). It represents the degree to which a formation is hard to kill. Survivability is relative to a unit's capabilities and the type of enemy effects it must withstand, its ability to avoid detection, and how well it can deceive enemy forces. Survivability is also a function of how a formation conducts itself during operations. For example, an infantry BCT's survivability against indirect fire is contingent on it not being detected, being dispersed, digging in, and adding overhead cover when stationary. An armor BCT's survivability is a function of logistics, security, and avoiding situations that constrain its mobility or freedom of action.

Leaders assess survivability as the ability of a friendly force to withstand enemy effects while remaining mission capable. Armor protection, mobility, tactical skill, avoiding predictability, and situational awareness contribute to survivability. Enforcement of operations security techniques and avoiding detection while initiating direct fire contact on favorable terms also increases survivability. Situational awareness regarding the nine forms of contact and minimizing friendly signatures contributes to survivability.

To increase survivability, units employ air defense systems, reconnaissance and security operations, modify tempo, take evasive action, maneuver to gain positional advantages, decrease electromagnetic signatures, and disperse forces. Dispersed formations improve survivability by complicating targeting and making it more difficult for enemy forces to identify lucrative targets. Tactical units integrate procedures for the use of camouflage, cover, concealment, and conducting electromagnetic protection—including noise and light discipline. During large-scale combat operations, survivability measures may include radio silence, communication through couriers, or alternate forms of communication. Space-based missile warning systems provide early warning of adversary artillery and missile attacks, allowing friendly forces to seek cover. Application of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) defense measures increase survivability in CBRN environments.

### Conduct Survivability Operations

Survivability is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (ATP 3-37.34). Personnel and physical assets have inherent survivability qualities or capabilities that can be enhanced through various means and methods. These qualities are especially important where elements that are targeted by threats and other protection capabilities are in limited supply. Survivability and survivability operations are not interchangeable. Survivability refers to a quality or capability, while survivability operations are a specific group of tasks that enhance survivability.



Units conduct survivability within the limits of their capabilities. When existing terrain features offer insufficient cover and concealment, altering the physical environment to provide or improve cover and concealment enhances survivability. Similarly, using natural or artificial materials such as camouflage may confuse or mislead the enemy or adversary. Together, these are called survivability operations—those protection activities that alter the physical environment by providing or improving camouflage, cover, and concealment. While such activities often have the added benefit of providing shelter from the elements, survivability focuses on providing camouflage, cover, and concealment. Movement, such as rapid dispersal, is used with cover and concealment to enhance protection.

Survivability operations enhance the ability to avoid or withstand hostile actions by altering the physical environment. They accomplish this by providing or improving camouflage, cover, and concealment via the following four tasks:

- Employing camouflage, cover, concealment, and movement.
- Constructing fighting positions.
- Hardening facilities.
- Constructing protective positions.

Constructing survivability positions against threats from indirect and direct fire may also require actions to protect forces and equipment from other explosive hazards. Enemy forces employ moving or mobile improvised explosive devices (vehicle borne, personnel-borne, airborne, and waterborne) against stationary targets in a unit's area of operation. Units harden structures against the effects of mobile improvised explosive devices by creating standoff distance between a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack against a high occupancy structure such as a living area or headquarters. Captured enemy ammunition and bulk explosives located in the area of operations and under friendly force control may require protective barriers constructed around them or they require manpower to assist in proper disposal using demolitions. These actions to construct barriers, walls, shields, or berms enhance a unit's protection.

### Considerations in the Defense

An attacking enemy force usually has the initiative. A defending commander must take a wide range of actions to reduce the risk of losses, including developing a survivability plan. Survivability in the defense prioritizes hardening command posts, artillery positions, air and missile defenses, and other critical equipment and supply areas. It also includes preparing individual, crew-served, and combat vehicle fighting positions.

To avoid detection and destruction by enemy forces, units move frequently and quickly establish survivability positions. To provide flexibility, units may need primary, alternate, and supplementary positions. Units enhance their survivability using concealment, military deception, decoy or dummy positions, dispersion, and field fortifications. Commanders increase security during defensive preparations because an enemy force will attack lightly defended areas whenever possible.

Survivability tasks include using engineer equipment to help in constructing trenches, command post shelters, and artillery, firing, radar, and combat vehicle fighting positions. Commanders use dispersion to limit the damage done by enemy attacks. Enemy forces should never be able to put a unit out of action with just a single attack. Dispersed troops and vehicles force attacking forces to concentrate on a single small target that may be missed. The wider the dispersion of unit personnel and equipment is, the greater potential for limiting damage it has. Commanders protect supply stocks against blast, shrapnel, incendiaries, and CBRN contamination using dispersion and constructing survivability positions. Units also use cover to limit the amount of damage and casualties that they can receive because of an enemy attack.

*Refer to ATP 3-37.34 for information on survivability and ATP 3-34.20 for information on countering explosive hazards.*

## II. Scheme of Protection Development

Ref: ADP 3-37, *Protection* (Jul '19), pp. 3-9 to 3-10.

The scheme of protection describes how protection tasks support the commander's intent and concept of operations, and it uses the commander's guidance to establish the priorities of support to units for each phase of the operation. A commander's initial protection guidance may include protection priorities, civil considerations, protection task considerations, potential protection decisive points, high-risk considerations, and prudent risk.

The protection cell (supported by the protection working group) develops the scheme of protection after receiving guidance and considering the principles of protection in relation to mission variables, the incorporation of efforts, and the protection required. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables, thus it includes protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource. It addresses how protection is applied and derived during all phases of an operation. For example, the security for routes, bases/base camps, and critical infrastructure is accomplished by applying protection assets in dedicated, fixed, or local security roles; or it may be derived from economy-of-force protection measures, such as area security techniques. It also identifies areas and conditions where forces may become fixed or static and unable to derive protection from their ability to maneuver. These conditions, areas, or situations are anticipated; and the associated risks are mitigated by describing and planning for the use of response forces.

The protection cell considers the following items, at a minimum, as it develops the scheme of protection:

- Protection priorities.
- Work priorities for survivability assets.
- Air and missile defense positioning guidance.
- Specific terrain and weather factors.
- Information focus and limitations for security efforts.
- Areas or events where risk is acceptable.
- Protected targets and areas.
- Civilians and noncombatants in the AO.
- Vehicle and equipment safety or security constraints.
- Personnel recovery actions and control measures.
- FPCON status.
- Force health protection measures.
- Mission-oriented protective posture guidance.
- Environmental guidance.
- Scheme of information operations.
- Explosive ordnance and hazard guidance.
- Ordnance order of battle.
- OPSEC risk tolerance.
- Fratricide avoidance measures.
- Rules of engagement, standing rules for the use of force, and rules of interaction.
- Escalation of force and nonlethal weapons guidance.
- Operational scheme of maneuver.
- Military deception.
- Obscuration.
- Radiation exposure status.
- Contractors in the AO.



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


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
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
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