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MAGTF
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Operations
& Planning

**Guide to Planning & Conducting
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations**

The Lightning Press
Milburn & Wade

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The MAGTF Operations & Planning SMARTbook

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(MAGTF SMARTbook) Notes to Reader

Guide to Planning & Conducting Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations

The Marine Corps organizes its operational forces as Marine Corps components and as **Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs)** in order to provide task organized, self-sustaining, multipurpose forces to the **joint force or naval expeditionary force.** These uniquely organized Marine Corps forces are capable of responding to a wide range of operational and tactical missions and tasks, providing an **unmatched combination of deployment and employment options**.

Expeditionary maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps capstone operational concept. It applies the doctrine of maneuver warfare to Marine Corps expeditionary operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of conflict. Expeditionary maneuver warfare focuses on the application of expeditionary military power at the **right place, at the right time, and at the right level.**

The Marine Corps approach to the **range of military operations (ROMO)** links MAGTF capabilities with the collective, coordinated use of both traditional and non-traditional elements of national power into a cohesive foreign policy tool, and focuses on the ability to be expeditionary through forward-deployed naval forces.

The Marine Corps employs several planning processes. For units with staffs, the **Marine Corps planning process (MCPP)** is most appropriate. If time does not allow use of the full, six-step MCPP, the commander and the planners may use the **rapid response planning process (R2P2)**.

Marine Corps **warfighting functions** encompass all military activities in the battlespace. Commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions and synchronize the force to adapt to changing circumstances throughout the operations process. They use several **integrating processes** to do this.

Topics and chapters include Marine Corps roles & forces, the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF), expeditionary operations, Marine Corps operations (ROMO, offense, defense, tactical operations, reconnaissance & security, tactical tasks, etc), planning considerations, the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP & R2P2), integrating processes (IPB, collection management, targeting, operational risk management, information management), and the six warfighting functions.

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References & Related Publications

The following references are useful in conjunction with *The MAGTF Operations & Planning SMARTbook*. All references are considered public domain, available to the general public, and designated as "approved for public release; distribution is unlimited." The MAGTF SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive material restricted from public release.

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)
- 1-0   Marine Corps Operations
- 1-2   Campaigning

Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)
- 3-01   Offensive and Defensive Tactics
- 3-03   Stability Operations
- 3-10   MAGTF Ground Operations
- 3-20   Aviation Operations
- 3-31   Marine Air-Ground Task Force Fires
- 3-34   Engineering Operations
- 3-40.1 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Command and Control
- 3-40.4 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Information Operations
- 5-10   Marine Corps Planning Process

Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs)
- 2-10A   MAGTF Intelligence Collection
- 2-10B   MAGTF Intelligence Production and Analysis
- 3-01B   Helicopterborne Operations
- 3-02A   MAGTF Network Engagement Activities
- 3-03A   Marine Air-Ground Task Force Civil-Military Operations
- 3-10B   Marine Corps Tank Employment
- 3-10C   Employment of Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs)
- 3-10D   Employment of the Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion
- 3-10E   Artillery Operations
- 3-10F   Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat Element
- 3-20C   Antiair Warfare
- 3-20D   Offensive Air Support
- 3-20E   Assault Support
- 3-20F   Control of Aircraft and Missiles
- 3-20G   Air Reconnaissance
- 3-30C   Rear Area Operations
- 3-31A   Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations
- 3-34A   Combined Arms Mobility
- 3-34B   Combined Arms Countermobility Operations
- 3-34C   Survivability Operations
- 3-40B   Tactical-Level Logistics
- 8-10A   Unit Training Management Guide
- 8-10B   How to Conduct Training
- 10-10E MAGTF Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Operations
- 13-10E Ship-to-Shore Movement

Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)
- 1-10.1 Organization of the United States Marine Corps
- 2-10A.6 Ground Reconnaissance Operations

Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)

Marine Corps Administrative Messages (MARADMINs)

Miscellaneous Marine Corps Publications

Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTPs)

Contributing Authors/Editors

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Andy Milburn served for 31 years as a Marine infantry and Special Operations officer with extensive experience in both planning and operations. He has commanded at battalion and regimental level, most recently leading a Combined Special Operations Task Force in the counter-ISIS campaign. A distinguished graduate of the School of Advanced Warfighting and the Marine Corps War College, he has served as a planner on MAGTF and component level staffs, and subsequently led the Plans Division in the J-5 at European Command. He finished his career as the Deputy Commander of Special Operations Command Central where he led the planning effort for a campaign designed to counter US adversaries in the "Gray Zone". Since retirement he has taught the Special Operations Planning Course as part of the adjunct faculty at the Joint Special Operations University. His recent memoir, "When the Tempest Gathers", has received widespread critical acclaim.

Norman M. Wade

Norman M. Wade is the publisher and primary author of the "SMARTbook" series of reference books. With 20 separate titles currently in the military SMARTbook series in circulation (and more than 50 books over the past 20 years), the SMARTbook series is recognized as the doctrinal reference standard by military professionals around the world at the tactical, organizational/institutional, and strategic levels. His books are carried at virtually every major U.S. Army base around the world. As a publisher, Norm brings a unique perspective and approach to reference and technical writing and information art presentation. Now, in collaboration with a collective of respected subject matter experts and industry thought leaders, he is developing a comprehensive series of related "National Power" SMARTbooks. During his Army career, Norm served in a variety of operational, leadership and senior staff positions. As an Army aviator, he flew OH-58 Kiowa scout helicopters as an aeroscout platoon leader during combat in Desert Storm and commanded an attack helicopter company (AH-64 Apaches). Norm later served in a number of executive-level HQ and HQDA staff positions including the personal staff to the Secretary of the Army. He retired with more than 23 years of military service.

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(MAGTF SMARTbook) Table of Contents

Chap 1

Marine Corps Roles & Functions

<div style="float:left">Chap 2</div>

Expeditionary Operations

Chap 3

Marine Corps Operations

Marine Corps Planning

Chap 5

(MCPP) Marine Corps Planning Process

Chap 6

(R2P2) Rapid Response Planning Process

Chap 7

Integrating Processes

Warfighting Functions

Chap 1

I. Marine Corps Roles & Functions

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 1.

> *"The Marine Corps is, at its essence, composed of highly capable tactical units that can perform combined arms operations at all echelons, enabled by organic air and logistics."*
>
> - *General David Berger, Commandant's Planning Guidance*

I. An Expeditionary Force in Readiness

The Marine Corps organizes its operational forces as Marine Corps components and as Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) in order to provide task organized, self-sustaining, multipurpose forces to the joint force or naval expeditionary force. These uniquely organized Marine Corps forces are capable of responding to a wide range of operational and tactical missions and tasks, providing the National Command Authorities with an unmatched combination of deployment and employment options.

Like all members of the joint team, the Marine Corps conducts expeditions— military operations by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. Each Service contributes complementary capabilities to any expedition. The Navy, Air Force, and Army are optimized to dominate the sea, air, and land, respectively (but) ..simply put, there is a tradeoff between size and speed whenever an expedition is put in motion.

While the Marine Corps may operate on and from the sea, in and from the air, and on the land, it is not optimized to dominate any of them. Rather, the Marine Corps is optimized to be expeditionary—a strategically mobile middleweight force that can fill the gaps created by the size/speed tradeoff. Usually task- organized and employed as Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs).

Marine Corps forces are light enough to leverage various combinations of amphibious shipping, maritime prepositioning, and inter theater airlift to quickly get to the scene of action, yet heavy enough to either accomplish the mission or provide a stopgap pending the arrival of additional forces, whose arrival/ employment Marine Corps forces may facilitate.

A key aspect of being expeditionary is providing, in partnership with the Navy, the ability to bridge the difficult seam between operations on land and sea. From humanitarian assistance to peacekeeping, to combat Naval expeditions comprised of Navy and Marine Corps forces are normally the first on the scene and ready to respond. Additionally, sea-based forces are increasingly prized by the geographic combatant commanders to conduct engagement activities that address mutual security concerns while respecting partner-nation sovereignty.

II. Maneuver Warfare Philosophy and Mission Command

Maneuver Warfare is the Marine Corps' capstone operational concept. This philosophy recognizes that war is ultimately a violent clash of human wills with an enduring nature characterized by friction, uncertainty, disorder, and complexity. Success in fluid environments demands leaders and organizations that can understand the nature of a given situation and adapt to it faster than their opponents. There are several ways to increase speed:

1. Emphasize simplicity.

2. De-centralize execution through mission tactics and commander's intent. Mission tactics is the assignment of a task to a subordinate without specifying how it must be accomplished. Commander's intent provides the overall purpose behind that task along with the authority and responsibility to adapt their methods for achieving the task as the situation unfolds. Joint Doctrine describes this combination of mission tactics and commander's intent as Mission Command.

3. Gain experience through training, which promotes rapid decision making and implicit communication within the organization.

III. Enduring Marine Corps Operational Principles

The Marine Corps is an Expeditionary Naval Force

Marines are "soldiers of the sea," an integral part of the Naval Service—lean, versatile, flexible, and ready. Marines are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct naval campaigns on and from naval platforms or to fight in protracted campaigns ashore.

The Marine Corps is a Combined Arms Organization

The MAGTFs have unique and incomparable warfighting capabilities. They contain organic air, ground, and logistic elements under a single command element, making them integrated and self- sustaining.

Marines will be Ready and Forward Deployed

The intent of Congress that the Marine Corps serve as the Nation's "force in readiness" reflected a recognized national need for a force capable of rapid response to emerging crises. To meet this need, Marines routinely forward deploy around the globe with operational forces ready to deploy on short notice.

Expeditionary Mindset

Marines can adapt quickly across an extraordinary range of military operations with the organizational design and training to transition seamlessly between these operations, providing the necessary capability to operate effectively.

IV. Key Marine Corps Tasks

In 2010, the Marine Corps conducted a formal review of the security environment, strategic direction, public law, and departmental policy and guidance to refine the organization, posture, and capabilities necessary to ensure the Marine Corps can fulfill its role as the Nation's expeditionary force in readiness. As a result, this formal review identified the following five interrelated tasks that Marine Corps forces must be able to perform:

Conduct Military Engagement

The ability of the Marine Corps to conduct military engagement is essential to building partner capability and capacity, forging relationships across cultural barriers, and promoting diplomatic access. Sea-based military engagement also facilitates interac-

Chap 1

II. Marine Corps Operating Forces

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 2.

> *"We are by our nature 'expeditionary.' This means several things. It means a high state of readiness; we can go at a moment's notice. It means our organization, our equipment, our structure are designed to allow us to deploy very efficiently . . . It's a mind-set, too, about being ready to go, about being ready to be deployed, and about flexibility. We can easily and quickly move from fighting to humanitarian operations."*
>
> *- General Tony Zinni*
>   *Battle Ready*

I. Overall Structure

Operating forces are the heart of the Marine Corps. They provide the forward presence, crisis response, and combat power that our Corps makes available to the combatant commanders (CCDRs). The Marine Corps has established three permanent commands to provide forces to unified CCDRs:

• U.S. Marine Corps Forces Command (MARFORCOM)
• U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific (MARFORPAC)
• U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command (MARFORSOC)

The CMC retains Command of MARFORCOM and via the Joint Chiefs of Staff global force management allocation process, maintains II MEF and other unique capabilities under the Commander, MARFORCOM (COMMARFORCOM). In that capacity Commander, MARFORCOM provides forces to the combatant commanders when tasked through the Global Force Management process.

The Commander, MARFORPAC (COMMARFORPAC) is assigned to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM), and provides I MEF and III MEF to CDRUSPACOM.

The Commander, MARFORSOC (COMMARFORSOC) is assigned to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (COMUSSOCOM) and provides forces to COMUSSOCOM. These assignments reflect the peacetime disposition of our Corps' forces.

Marine forces are allocated to the remaining geographic and functional combatant commands for contingency planning through the Global Force Management process:

• U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM)
• U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)
• U.S. European Command (EUCOM)
• U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
• U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
• U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
• U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM)
• U.S. Forces Korea (USFK)

Whether assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in a geographic combatant commander's area of responsibility, a Marine Corps component commander commands those forces. He is responsible for:

- Training and preparing Marine Corps forces for operational commitment commensurate with the strategic situation and the combatant commander's requirements.
- Advising the combatant commander on the proper employment of Marine Corps forces, participating in associated planning, and accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
- Providing Service administration, discipline, intelligence, and operational support for assigned forces.
- Identifying requirements for support from the Marine Corps supporting establishment.

II. Marine Corps Components

Marine Corps forces normally conduct operations as part of a joint force, which consists of significant elements, assigned or attached, from two or more Military Departments operating under a single commander. As noted in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 3-0, Joint Operations, joint forces are established at three levels—unified combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces. While the terms combatant commander and geographic combatant commander are used in reference to the commanders of unified combatant commands, the broader term of joint force commander is applicable at all three levels (figure 2-1).

There are two levels of Marine Corps components: a Marine Corps component under a unified command and a Marine Corps component under a subordinate unified command or joint task force. The subordinate unified command-level or joint task force-level Marine Corps component will communicate directly to the combatant command-level Marine Corps component on Marine Corps-specific matters.

(MCWP 3-40.8)

Ref: MCDP 1-0, fig. 2-1. Commander's Level of War.

III. Role and Responsibility to the Commandant

Each Marine Corps component commander is responsible for and accountable to the Commandant for the internal discipline, training, and administration of his forces. While the Marine Corps component commander responds to the joint force commander in the operational chain of command, his component is equipped through the service chain.

Chap 1

III. Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF)

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 2-6 to 2-15.

Marine Corps component commanders normally task-organize for operations by forming MAGTFs—balanced, air-ground, combined arms formations under a single commander. Due to the operational flexibility inherent in its construct, the MAGTF is the principal organization for all Marine Corps missions across the range of military operations. Expeditionary by nature, MAGTFs vary in size and capability according to their assigned or likely missions and are specifically equipped for rapid deployment by air or sea. They all comprise four core elements: a Command Element (CE), a Ground Combat Element (GCE), an Aviation Combat Element (ACE) and a Logistics Combat Element (LCE.)

Ref: MCDP 1-0, fig. 2-4. MAGTF Organization.

There are five types of MAGTFs—Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs), Marine expeditionary forces (Forward) (MEFs[Fwd]), Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs), Marine expeditionary units (MEUs), and special purpose Marine air-ground task forces (SPMAGTFs).

Ref: MCDP 1-0, fig. 2-5. Types of MAGTF Organizations.

I. Types of MAGTFs (MEF, MEB, MEU, SPMAGTF)

Ref: NWC 3153K, Joint Military Operations Reference Guide (Jul '09), pp. 78-82.

There are four basic MAGTF organizations: Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), and Special Purpose MAGTFs (SPMAGTF).

MAGTF SIZE (Largest to Smallest)	ELEMENT		
	GCE	ACE	LCE
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)	Marine Division (MARDIV)	Marine Aircraft Wing (MAW)	Marine Logistics Group (MLG)
Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB)	Marine Regiment (RLT or RCT)	Marine Aircraft Group (MAG)	Combat Logistics Regiment (CLR)
Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)	Battalion Landing Team (BLT)	Reinforced Helicopter/Fixed Wing Squadron	Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB)
Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF)	Elements of a MARDIV	Elements of a MAW	Elements of a MLG

A. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)

The MEF is the largest standing MAGTF and the principal Marine Corps war fighting organization. It is capable of missions across the range of military operations through amphibious and sustained operations ashore in any environment. Each MEF is comprised of a Command Element (CE), Marine Division (GCE), Marine Aircraft Wing (ACE), and a Marine Logistics Group (LCE). The three standing MEFs provide a reservoir of capabilities and combat power from which all smaller MAGTFs are formed. There are three standing MEFs: I MEF, II MEF, and III MEF.

Each MEF is commanded by either a Lieutenant General or Major General and consists of anywhere from 20,000 to 90,000 personnel. A MEF generally deploys on U.S. Navy amphibious ships with support from Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Maritime Pre-positioned Force (MPF) vessels, as well as Air Mobility Command (AMC). A MEF deploys with 60 days of supplies for sustained operations ashore.

I. Expeditionary Operations

Ref: MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.4, The MAGTF Officer's Guide (Mar '10), pp. 3 to 6.

I. Characteristics of Expeditionary Operations

Successful expeditionary operations require—

- Expeditionary Mindset.
- Tailored Forces.
- Forward Deployment.
- Rapid Deployment.
- Expeditionary Basing.
- Forcible Entry.
- Sustainment.

II. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Concept

Expeditionary maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps capstone operational concept. It applies the doctrine of maneuver warfare to Marine Corps expeditionary operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of conflict. Supporting operational concepts such as Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM), MPF 2010, and Expeditionary Bases and Sites are all elements of expeditionary maneuver warfare. Expeditionary maneuver warfare builds on existing concepts of organization, deployment, and employment, adapting them to the future strategic landscape. Organizational concepts apply methods of task-organizing forces, tailoring them to meet the requirements of the mission and commander's intent. Deployment concepts apply the most appropriate, available means of achieving rapid force closure and sustainment, gaining operational advantage, and increasing tempo.

Expeditionary maneuver warfare focuses on the application of expeditionary military power at the right place, at the right time, and at the right level. In combat, this is achieved by using rapid and opportunistic maneuver flexibly to exploit physical, psychological, or temporal advantage over the enemy. New technologies such as the MV-22 Osprey tilt rotor aircraft, advanced Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), and the J35 Joint Strike Fighter will allow Marine forces to rapidly maneuver and strike unexpectedly deep in the enemy's rear. In crisis, expeditionary maneuver warfare may take the form of Marine Ospreys from amphibious ships rapidly transporting humanitarian aid to famine victims or Marines landing in Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles unexpectedly in the night to evacuate U.S. nationals from a riot-torn littoral city.

III. Tenets of Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare

The tenets of expeditionary maneuver warfare are—

- Focuses decisionmaking and effects on an operational objective.
- Maximizes maneuver battlespace (air, land, and sea) through enhanced mobility.
- Generates overwhelming tempo and momentum through enhanced strategic agility, operational reach, and tactical flexibility.

• Pits strengths against enemy weakness.

• Emphasizes intelligence, deception, flexibility, and sustainment.

• Promotes integration of organic, joint, interagency, and combined effects.

• Provides a joint/combined enabler and force multiplier.

• Capable across the entire spectrum of conflict.

IV. Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS)

OMFTS is a concept that is applicable across the range of military operations, from major theater war to smaller-scale contingencies. OMFTS applies maneuver warfare to expeditionary power projection in naval operations as part of a joint or combined campaign. OMFTS allows the force to exploit the sea as maneuver space while applying combat power ashore to achieve the operational objectives. It reflects the Marine Corps expeditionary maneuver warfare concept in the context of amphibious operations from a sea base, as it enables the force to—

• Shatter the enemy's cohesion.

• Pose menacing dilemmas.

• Apply disruptive firepower.

• Establish superior tempo.

• Focus efforts to maximize effect.

• Exploit opportunity.

• Strike unexpectedly.

In OMFTS, the force focuses on an operational objective, using the sea as maneuver space to generate overwhelming tempo and momentum against enemy critical vulnerabilities. OMFTS provides increased operational flexibility through enhanced capabilities for sea-based logistics, fires, and command and control. Sea-basing facilitates maneuver warfare by eliminating the requirement for an operational pause as the landing force builds combat power ashore, and by freeing the MAGTF from the constraints of a traditional beachhead or coalition partners.

V. Sustained Operations Ashore

The Marine Corps conducts sustained operations ashore to provide the joint force commander four options when fighting a land campaign—

• **Enabling Force**—to set the stage for follow-on operations by other components of the joint force.

• **Decisive Force**—to exploit its advanced command and control system to identify gaps necessary to conduct decisive operations and reduce enemy centers of gravity. Decisive actions run the gamut from destruction of enemy military units to interdiction of critical lines of communication to the evacuation of American and third country nationals from untenable urban areas.

• **Exploitation Force**—to take advantage of opportunities created by the activity of other components of the joint force.

• **Sustaining Force**—to maintain a presence ashore over an extended period of time in order to support continued operations by the joint force commander within the joint AO. The Marine Corps also has the capability to operate independently of the sea to support sustained land operations ashore with the Army or coalition partners.

Chap 2

II. Marine Corps Forces in Joint Operations

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 2.

The nation requires an expeditionary force-in-readiness capable of responding to a crisis anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps provides self-sustainable, task organized combined arms forces capable of conducting a full spectrum of operations in support of the joint force commander. These missions might include forcible entry operations, peace enforcement, evacuation of American citizens and embassies, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, or operations to reinforce or complement the capabilities of other Services to provide balanced military forces to the joint force commander. The unique capabilities of the Marine Corps as a sea service and partner with the U.S. Navy allow the use of the sea as both a maneuver space and a secure base of operations from which to conduct operations in the littoral areas of the world. The ability to remain at sea for long periods of time without the requirement of third nation basing rights makes the Marine Corps the force of choice in emerging crises.

Operations as Part of the Joint Force

Marine Corps forces normally conduct operations as part of a joint force. Regardless of the level of the joint force or how a joint force commander organizes his force, if Marine Corps forces are assigned, there is always a Marine Corps Service component. There are two levels of Marine Corps components-a Marine Corps component under a unified command and a Marine Corps component under a subordinate unified command or a joint task force.

Forward-deployed naval forces, including Marine Corps forces, are usually the first conventional forces to arrive in an austere theater or AO during expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps component commander's inherent capability to command and control Marine Corps forces—and attached or assigned forces of other Services or nations—allows him to serve as a functional component commander. Such assignments may be for limited contingencies or for some phases of a major operation or campaign, depending upon the size, scope, nature of the mission, and the functional area assigned.

If the Marine Corps component commander has functional component commander responsibilities, he normally executes them with his subordinate MAGTF. A Marine Corps component commander can also act as a functional component commander. This may be for a particular phase of an operation or for its full duration, depending upon the size, scope, and nature of the mission and the functional area assigned. The most common functional components the joint force commander may establish include:

- Joint force maritime component commander *(see p. 2-12)*
- Joint force land component commander *(see p. 2-17)*
- Joint force air component commander *(see p. 2-18)*

In addition to functional component duties, the joint force commander can assign the Marine Corps component commander other joint duties such as the area air defense commander or airspace control authority. Again, these functions are normally accomplished by the assigned MAGTF.

See following pages (pp. 2-10 to 2-11) for an overview and discussion of joint operations.

Joint Operations, Unified Action, & the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct '18).

Services may accomplish tasks and missions in support of Department of Defense (DOD) objectives. However, the DOD primarily employs two or more services in a single operation, particularly in combat, through joint operations. The general term, joint operations, describes military actions conducted by joint forces or by Service forces employed under command relationships. A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments operating under a single joint force commander. Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities through unified action, and joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve a desired military end state.

Unified Action

Whereas the term joint operations focuses on the integrated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States in a unified effort, the term unified action has a broader connotation. JFCs are challenged to achieve and maintain operational coherence given the requirement to operate in conjunction with interorganizational partners. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying joint force actions, since all of the elements and actions that comprise unified action normally are present at the CCDR's level. However, subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the operations of other military forces and the activities of nonmilitary organizations in the operational area to promote unified action.

Unified action is a comprehensive approach that synchronizes, coordinates, and when appropriate, integrates military operations with the activities of other governmental and nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort.

When conducting operations for a joint force commander, Army forces achieve unified action by synchronizing actions with the activities of components of the joint force and unified action partners.

The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

Range of Military Operations

Peace ⟵ — Conflict Continuum — ⟶ War

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Range of Military Operations

II. Joint Land Operations

In the 20th century, joint and multinational operations have encompassed the full diversity of air, land, maritime, and space forces operating throughout the operational area. Advances in capabilities among all forces and the ability to communicate over great distances have made the application of military power in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate joint land operations with other components' operations. Many of these advances have been realized through the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which has enabled the US military and allies to communicate and reach across geographic and geopolitical boundaries. However, these advances have also led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace and the EMS for the US and its allies.

Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, singly or in combination, performed across the range of military operations with joint land forces (Army, Marine, or special operations) made available by Service components in support of the joint force commander's (JFC's) operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint land operations require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Normally, joint land operations will also involve multinational land forces.

Joint land operations includes land control operations. These are described as the employment of land forces, supported by maritime and air forces (as appropriate) to control vital land areas. Such operations are conducted to establish local military superiority in land operational areas. Land control operations may also be required to isolate, seize, or secure weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to prevent use, proliferation, or loss.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, establishes the JFC's operational environment as composed of the air, land, maritime, and space domains as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Domains are useful constructs to aid in visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations are conducted. Nothing in the definitions of, or the use of the term domain, implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of that domain. C2 is established by the JFC based upon the most effective use of available resources to accomplish assigned missions. The land domain is the land area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals. The land domain shares the Earth's surface with the maritime domain.

Land operations are conducted within a complex operational environment. Numbers of civilians, amount of valuable infrastructure, avenues of approach, freedom of vehicular movement, and communications functionality vary considerably among land environments, creating challenges for the JFLCC. In addition, urban or emerging subterranean environments require special consideration for the conduct of joint land operations. As a result, joint land operations require an effective and efficient C2 structure to achieve success.

It is important to understand that in today's complex operational environment, adversary actions can be delivered on, from, within, and outside of the operational area, all with potentially global impacts and influence. To negate those threats, commanders at all levels should consider how space, cyberspace, and EMS capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations.

Organizing the Joint Land Force

Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, singly or in combination, performed across the range of military operations with joint land forces (Army, Marine, or special operations) made available by Service components in support of the joint force commander's (JFC's) operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force.

If the JFC does not choose to retain control at the JFC level, there are four primary options available to the JFC for employing land forces from two or more components:

• Subordinate unified command for land operations (available only to a combatant commander)

• Subordinate joint task forces

• Service components

• Functional land component with joint force land component commander (JFLCC)

Not only can the GCC designate a JFLCC, but each subordinate JFC may also designate their own JFLCC. Consequently, there may be multiple LCCs, each with an organization, duties, and responsibilities tailored to the requirements of their specific JFC, within a single AOR. Where multiple JOAs each have land operations being conducted, the JFLCC designated directly by the GCC may also be designated the theater JFLCC. The primary responsibilities of the theater JFLCC may be to provide coordination with other theater-level functional components, to provide general support to the multiple JFLCCs within the AOR, to conduct theater-level planning, or to conduct joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) for the entire joint land force. The most likely candidate for a theater JFLCC is the Army Service component command (ASCC)/theater army. Within a JOA or when there is only one JFLCC in an AOR, the JFC forms a functional land component to improve combat efficiency, unity of effort, weapons system management, component interaction, or control the land scheme of maneuver. Forming a functional land component is a key organizational decision, which will significantly influence the conduct of land operations.

The Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC)

The JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the CONOPS. The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization provides for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical; by making the JFLCC the single commander for joint land operations, the JFC has the ability to enhance synchronization of operations not only between US ground and component forces, but also with multinational land forces.

The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the functional component commanders based upon the CONOPS, and may alter this authority during the course of an operation.

The designation of a JFLCC normally occurs when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the JFC determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.

See related discussion of the JFLCC on p. 8-2 (movement warfighting function).

III. (EABO) Expeditionary Advance Base Operations

Ref: Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) Handbook, Considerations for Force Development and Employment, 1 June 2018, Version 1.1.

The fundamental operational assumption underlying the EABO concept is the new requirement for force resiliency to persist and operate within range of adversary precision long-range fires.

This operational concept employs expeditionary systems — emphasizing anti-ship cruise missile launchers — from austere, distributed land bases within adversary weapons engagement zones to contribute to sea control and sea denial operations.

As described in the LOCE concept, EABO seek to further distribute lethality by providing land-based options for increasing the number of sensors and shooters beyond the upper limit imposed by the quantity of seagoing platforms available. The EABO concept espouses employing mobile, relatively low-cost capabilities in austere, temporary locations forward as integral elements of fleet/JFMCC operations. Expeditionary advanced base operations may be employed to position naval ISR assets, future coastal defense cruise missiles (CDCM), anti-air missiles (to counter cruise and ballistic missiles as well as aircraft), and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs) and other expedient expeditionary operating sites for aircraft such as the F-35, critical munitions reloading teams for ships and submarines,or to provide expeditionary basing for surface screening/scouting platforms, all of which serve to increase friendly sensor and shooter capacity while complicating adversary targeting. They may also control, or at least outpost, key maritime terrain to improve the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and chokepoints or deny their use to the enemy, and exploit and enhance the natural barriers formed by island chains.

The EABO concept provides the opportunity to "turn the sea denial table" on potential adversaries and deter fait accompli actions. This can be done in a pre-crisis manner through security cooperation activities with our partners and allies. This could include pre-staging equipment and supplies in key regions, conducting EABO exercises, and perhaps even creating more persistently forward postured— but continuously mobile—forces task-organized for EABO. This would give the fleet commander/ JFMCC sea denial assets persistently postured in potentially disputed areas in order to deter aggression. In the event of crises, EABO can be employed in support of task forces maneuvering into the area to seize the initiative. To fully leverage the EABO initiative, the Navy and Marine Corps must pursue the ability to network sea-based and land-based sensors and shooters. Additionally, the Navy should determine what current or planned sensors and weapons can be fielded in an expeditionary variant while the Marine Corps should determine what changes to existing Marine systems can enhance their utility in a sea denial or sea control fight. Furthermore, new initiatives, such as fielding a common anti-ship missile that can be launched from existing surface combatants, submarines, manned (and perhaps unmanned) aircraft, and mobile ground launchers, should be explored.

EABO is the tactical operations and operational support activities conducted by forces hosted on Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EABs).

I. Expeditionary Advanced Bases (EAB)

To survive and operate within range of adversary long-range fires, the joint and naval personnel and capabilities required to create a persistent, distributed, credible, and operationally relevant inside force must be based and sustained on a more amor-

III. Marine Missions in EABO

Marine Expeditionary Forces advance and extend the joint line of operations by securing advantageous islands, archipelagos, and key terrain in proximity to close and confined seas to support JFMCC sea control and sea denial missions. Example missions and characteristics:

- Marine expeditionary forces secure (seize or occupy) forward bases to advance and distribute joint sensors, shooters and sustainment capabilities.
- Maximize use of permissive terrain and passive defense / force protection. (Mobility, cover, concealment, decoy, and deception)
- When practical, establish mutually-supporting strongpoints adjacent to close and confined seas to conduct tactical maritime defense-in-depth of key maritime terrain.
- Establish rotating FARP sites for fixed-wing, rotary-wing, & unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations.
- Lend resiliency to the joint force by proliferating mobile land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-air missiles, anti-ballistic, and ballistic BM missiles that are difficult to target by enemy long-range precision fires systems.
- Integrate landward sensor and fires systems with Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) under JFMCC C2. Close coordination to advantage fleet with land-based fires capability, range, and capacity.
- Provide secure advance locations for rearming of combatant ships, exchange of surface combatant modules, and basing of missile/torpedo/swarm boat flotillas.
- EABO enables persistent Scouting, Fires, Protection, and Sustainment

The employment of stand-in forces represents distributed maritime operations (DMO)–a concept that is, in its essence, not new to the Marine Corps. DMO entail networked units physically dispersed and operating over an extended battlespace. A distributed operations-capable force (as Stand-In forces are envisioned to be) is characterized by decentralization, multidimensionality, simultaneity, and continuous pressure over the adversary's entire system. In this way, stand in forces conducting DMO against an adversary comprise small, dispersed land and sea detachments that threaten the ability of adversary forces to concentrate from within their anti-access/area denial umbrella. These forces deny the enemy freedom of movement along key sea and air lines communication. Distributed forces change the adversary's cost calculus and buy time for flexible deterrence options and assembling a joint task force.

Marine forces are suited for many of these missions, but Marine forces alone will be inadequate to develop, man, and operate the full range of EABO capabilities. Crux naval capabilities for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of EABs are found in the NECC. The construction, small craft, and many other expeditionary capabilities of the NECC are integral to EABO. Navy and joint personnel involved in operational and functional support activities can be expected to support and operate from EABs. Not to be overlooked are the considerable capabilities and naval competencies of the US Coast Guard that can contribute to EABO.

As previously discussed, the optimized naval inside force capabilities necessary for sea control and denial operations are currently under development, and are the centerpiece of naval research and innovation efforts. These smaller platforms will be greatly advantaged by employment from EABs situated on partner territory in proximity to close and confined seas. As they are fielded, we can anticipate that more Sailors will be forward-postured ashore to maintain and operate these forward-deployed and employed naval capabilities

IV. Power Projection

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 2-20 to 2-30.

During the Cold War, the United States maintained significant military forces positioned overseas in close proximity to likely employment areas. Since the end of the Cold War, most US military forces are now based in the United States and deploy overseas, rotationally or episodically, to meet operational requirements. The Nation's global network of bases now includes a much smaller number of main operating bases complemented by a system of more temporary forward operating sites and cooperative security locations. Overall, however, US operations overseas are increasingly challenged by diplomatic, geographic, and military changes to access, necessitating a renewed emphasis on power projection capabilities.

Power projection is the ability of a nation to apply all or some of its elements of national power-political, economic, informational, or military-to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability. The United States has two broad military means-normally employed in combination-for projecting power overseas: air power and sea power. Air power provides a means to deliver fires, personnel (to include airborne and airmobile forces), and limited materiel very quickly. It is less effective, however, in delivering equipment and supplies in the volume necessary to sustain military operations. Sea power provides a means to deliver fires, personnel (to include amphibious forces), and resources with somewhat less immediacy than air power, but in much greater weight and volume. The preponderance of joint force materiel-vehicles, equipment, ammunition, and supplies-is delivered by sea. While air power can project a light force quickly, it is soon outpaced by and cannot compete with sea power in the projection and sustainment of forces.

Given the weight and volume advantages of seaborne transportation, sea power is the most useful means of projecting military power overseas for the range of military operations. It does so through two basic means -- naval maneuver and naval movement.

Naval Maneuver

Naval maneuver may be conducted from strategic distances. It involves fighting on and from the sea and projecting and sustaining ready-to-fight combat forces. It can also involve strikes on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Littoral maneuver is a critical subset of naval maneuver. Littoral maneuver is the ability to transition ready-to-fight combat forces from the sea to the shore in order to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy. It may be employed directly against an objective, including inland objectives, to accomplish the mission singly; to seize infrastructure or lodgments that enable the arrival of follow-on forces; or to pose a continuous coastal threat that causes an adversary to dissipate his forces. Amphibious capabilities provide the means to conduct littoral maneuver. While designed primarily for combat, such capabilities have wide applicability across the range of military operations. Since 1990, US naval forces have conducted more than 100 amphibious operations with 79 of them involving foreign humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, noncombatant evacuations, or similar crisis response events conducted in austere and uncertain environments. Collectively, naval maneuver capabilities provide the ability to conduct operational maneuver from the sea. Modem littoral maneuver capabilities provide the ability to conduct ship-to-objective maneuver, eliminating an operational pause at the shoreline.

See figure 2-6, following page.

Figure 2-6. Ship-to-Shore Movement and Subsequent Maneuver Ashore Versus Ship-to-Objective Maneuver.

Naval Movement

Naval movement involves military sealift and merchant vessels transporting vehicles, equipment, and supplies in volume over strategic distances for offload at a port or via expeditionary means, such as using roll-on/roll-off discharge facilities, causeway ferries, and/or causeway piers as part of joint logistics over the shore. Naval movement is normally employed in concert with the movement of personnel by intertheater airlift. Maritime prepositioning forces (MPFs) exemplify the combination of naval movement and intertheater airlift. This approach merges the weight and volume advantages of sealift with the speed of airlift. However, unlike naval maneuver, which projects units in a ready-to-fight condition, naval movement and intertheater airlift depend on a secure infrastructure ashore to deliver disaggregated elements. These elements undergo a process of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration before units can employ. Therefore, naval movement and intertheater airlift may require amphibious or airborne forces to seize existing infrastructure intact or secure a lodgment for the establishment of expeditionary facilities.

Both naval maneuver and naval movement may be enabled by naval forward presence, which includes sea-based Marines. The day-to-day operations of these deployed naval forces indirectly assures joint access by gaining familiarity with forward operating areas while fostering the international relationships that may alleviate diplomatic impediments to access. More directly, they also provide the means to overcome geographic and, when necessary, military challenges to access.

The Marine Corps conducts power projection primarily through amphibious operations, MPF operations, or a combination of the two.

I. Amphibious Operations

Amphibious operations require a high degree of training and specialized equipment to succeed. Marine Corps forces organize, train, and equip to operate from amphibious ships, which are designed to project combat power. Under United States Code, Title 10 the Marine Corps has primary responsibility for developing landing force doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and equipment that are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps. Furthermore, the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are meant to be dynamic and evolutionary, adaptable to new technology, threats, and requirements. The primary reference for amphibious operations is JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine/or Amphibious Operations.

A. Types of Amphibious Operations

There are five types of amphibious operations, following in the order of likelihood:

Amphibious Support to Other Operations

This type of support contributes to conflict prevention or crisis mitigation. It may include activities, such as security cooperation, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil support, noncombatant evacuations operations, peace operations, recovery operations, and disaster relief.

Amphibious Raid

Amphibious raids involve a swift inclusion into or a temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal

Amphibious Assault

Amphibious assault involves the establishment of a landing force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

Amphibious Withdrawal

Amphibious withdrawal involves the extraction of forces by sea in ships or craft from a hostile or potentially hostile shore.

Amphibious Demonstration

Amphibious demonstrations involve a show of force conducted to deceive the enemy with the expectation of deluding the enemy into a course of action (COA) unfavorable to him.

The types of amphibious operations apply to a variety of missions across the range of military operations. For example, a withdrawal could involve the evacuation of nonstate actors within the context of peace operations, as with the removal of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon (1982). Alternatively, a withdrawal could involve the evacuation of friendly forces within the context of a major war, as at Hungnam, Korea (1950). A demonstration could involve a show of force in support of United Nations' sanctions, as during Operation Restore Democracy (1998), or could be integral to the scheme of maneuver for a large-scale offensive action, as during Operation Desert Storm (1991).

Amphibious operations occur for the purposes of-

- Supporting operations that deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace and stability, and support civil authorities in response to crises, such as the 1999 peace operations in Macedonia or the 2006 disaster relief in the Philippines.
- Achieving operational or campaign objectives in one swift stroke, such as the rescue of American civilians in Grenada or the 1991 evacuation of the US embassy in Somalia.
- Initiating a campaign or major operation, such as the 1942 landing on Guadalcanal, which began the campaign to neutralize the enemy base at Rabaul in

Operational Employment for Amphibious Ready Groups with Embarked MEUs

Ref: JP 3-32, Joint Maritime Operations (Jun '18), fig. II-2, p. II-3 to II-4.

The ARG/MEU is a forward-deployed, flexible, sea-based force that provides the President and the geographic combatant commander (GCC) with credible deterrence and decision time across the range of military operations. The ARG and MEU affords the GCC a responsive, flexible, and versatile capability to shape the OE, respond to crises, and protect US and allied interests in permissive and select uncertain and hostile environments. ARG and MEU capabilities support initial crisis response, introduce follow-on forces, support designated SOF, and other missions in permissive and select uncertain and hostile environments, which include, but are not limited to: amphibious assaults, amphibious raids, amphibious demonstrations, amphibious withdrawals, and amphibious force support to crisis response and other operations (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, or MSO). The ARG and Navy detachments are organized under the command of a Navy O-6, while the MEU, with its embarked Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), is under the command of a Marine Corps O-6.

Aggregated

The most common form where the amphibious ready group (ARG) with embarked Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) is employed under a single geographic combatant commander (GCC) who maintains operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of the ARG/MEU. "Split" is a subset of aggregated, where the ARG and MEU remains employed within a single GCC's area of responsibility (AOR), but the units are separated by time, distance, or task while operating beyond the reach of tilt-rotor aircraft or landing craft. Aggregated is the preferred employment construct.

Disaggregated

This construct is driven by emergent requirements wherein the ARG and MEU is divided into parts to support multiple GCCs. The ARG and MEU elements operate within the distinct OPCON/TACON chains oft he respective GCCs. Disaggregation comes with a corresponding degradation of ARG and MEU operational readiness, training, and maintenance. This is the least preferred employment construct.

Distributed

The ARG and MEU is partitioned for emergent requirements for multiple GCCs. However, the original GCC to whom it was allocated retains OPCON while another exercises TACON of elements that are distributed for a specific mission or duration mission. The ARG and MEU is able to sustain its elements, facilitate planning, and conduct military engagement and joint/combined training across AOR boundaries, and is supported throughout operations. ARG and MEU communication and computers systems are critical for supporting distributed operations. The GCC that has OPCON may request re-aggregation at any time, and the ARG and MEU commanders cannot make changes to capabilities allocated OPCON or TACON without approval. Distributed is the preferred employment construct to support multiple GCCs.

V. Sustained Operations Ashore

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 2-31 to 2-33.

The Marine Corps also has the capability to operate independent of the sea to support sustained operations ashore with the Army or multinational partners.

I. Options for Sustained Operations Ashore

The Marine Corps provides the joint force commander with four options when conducting sustained operations ashore---enabling, decisive, exploitation, or sustaining forces.

A. Enabling Force

The enabling force sets the stage for follow-on operations by other joint force components. The amphibious landing and subsequent operations ashore on Guadalcanal (1942) set the stage for the arrival of other joint forces to complete the seizure of the island and the advance through the Solomon Islands toward Rabaul in 1943. Enabling actions are not limited to the opening phases of the campaign, such as establishing a lodgment, but may be conducted to divert attention from the main effort. An example of enabling actions is the role of I MEF in Operation Desert Storm (1991) in fixing the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and allowing United States Central Command's main effort, US Army VII Corps, to maneuver to envelop the enemy.

B. Decisive Force

The decisive force accomplishes the essential task required to achieve mission success. Decisive actions may include defeat of enemy military units, interdiction of critical lines of communications, or the evacuation of American and other country nationals from untenable urban areas. An example of such a decisive action is when the 1st MARDIV severed the North Korean lines of communications at Seoul, forcing their withdrawal from South Korea in 1950.

C. Exploitation Force

The exploitation force takes advantage of opportunities created by the activity of other joint force components. The joint force commander may exploit these opportunities through rapid and focused sea-based operations by the MAGTF that capitalize on the results of ongoing engagements to achieve decisive results. The 24th MEU served in this role during operations to seize Grenada and safeguard American citizens in 1983. While Army forces fixed the Cuban and Grenadian forces at one end of the island, the Marines landed and maneuvered freely across the island, accomplishing the joint force commander's objectives.

D. Sustaining Force

The sustaining force maintains a presence ashore over an extended period of time to support continued operations by the joint force commander within the joint area of operations. This force provides logistical sustainment to joint, allied, and/or coalition forces until theater-level sustainment is established. I :MEF fulfilled this role in the early days of Operation Desert Shield (1990) in Saudi Arabia and Operation Restore Hope (1992-93) in Somalia by providing sustainment to joint and Army forces until arrangements for theater support were complete.

Chap 3
Marine Corps Operations

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 8.

The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct '18).

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect US interests at home and abroad.

II. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Operations

A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests and/or prevent surprise attack or further conflict.

III. Large-Scale Combat Operations

When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign normally involving large-scale combat. During **major operations**, joint force actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. A **campaign** is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

I. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 4.

Forward-postured naval forces conduct a wide array of activities and operations designed to build the partnerships that promote a collective approach to mutual security concerns, as called for in national strategy documents. The imperative to build and sustain partnerships that contribute to collective security, deterrence, and combat effectiveness comes at a time when sensitivity to US bases overseas is rising and the overall number of US forces stationed on foreign soil is much lower

than during the Cold War. In this context, sea-based forward presence provides the opportunity to conduct cooperative activities with allies and an expanding set of international partners, while minimizing the political, economic, cultural, and social impacts sometimes associated with forward-stationed US forces.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities encompass a wide range of actions where the military instrument of national power prevents and deters conflict. These actions generally occur regularly in all geographic combatant commanders' areas of responsibility regardless of other ongoing contingencies, major operations, or campaigns. They include partnership activities designed to collectively address mutual security concerns as well as actions to alleviate or mitigate sources of conflict. They usually involve a combination of military forces and capabilities separate from and integrated with the efforts of other government agencies and intergovernmental organizations-generically referred to in joint doctrine as interorganizational partners-in a complementary fashion.

Because the Department of State plays a major role in many of these activities, joint force commanders maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their areas. Similarly, Marine Corps component commanders, subordinate commanders, and staffs tasked with conducting these activities should establish contact and maintain a dialogue with pertinent interorganizational partners to share information and facilitate operations.

Military engagement is the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of the US Armed Forces and either the armed forces of another nation or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies. This contact is designed to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence. Military engagement occurs as part of security cooperation, but also extends to interaction with domestic civilian authorities.

Security cooperation involves all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater shaping operations. The geographic combatant commanders shape their areas of operations through security cooperation activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The geographic combatant commander's theater campaign plans provide a framework within which Marine Corps components and subordinate echelons engage regional partners in cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, security cooperation activities lessen the causes of potential crises.

Deterrence is the prevention from action by fear of the consequences-a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. Naval forces have historically contributed to that form of deterrence by providing the nuclear strike and conventional power projection capabilities that discourage acts of aggression. Recognizing some rogue states or nonstate actors may not be deterred by nuclear or conventional retaliation and may actually seek to elicit reprisals to support their own strategic objectives, the United States has developed an expanded form of deterrence. It now includes promoting a collective approach to mutual defense concerns among international partners, denying rogue states or nonstate actors the likelihood of success. This expanded form of deterrence also includes addressing the local conditions that generate conflict, thereby eroding support for such actors within the populace. In this form of deterrence, military engagement and security cooperation activities provide an important, proactive complement to retaliatory deterrence capabilities.

The expeditionary character and forward posture of the Marine Corps¬maintained through rotational and permanently forward-deployed forces-have proven to be critical enablers of rapid crisis response. Concurrently, these qualities also enable

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence (Examples)

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 4-4 to 4-8.

Nation Assistance. Includes civil/military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include humanitarian and civic assistance, support to foreign internal defense, security assistance, and other United States Code, Title 10 programs and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or intergovernmental organizations.

Maritime Security Operations. Operations to protect sovereignty and resources, ensure free and open commerce, and counter maritime-related terrorism, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal seaborne immigration.

Combating Terrorism. Actions are taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. They include antiterrorism and counterterrorism.

Show of Force Operations. Show of force operations demonstrate US resolve. These operations involve increased visibility of deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives.

Arms Control. Includes those activities by military forces to verify conventional, chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear arms control agreements; seize or destroy weapons; dismantle or dispose of weapons and hazardous materials; and escort deliveries of weapons.

Sanctions Enforcement/Maritime Interception Operations
Enforcement of sanctions includes coercive measures to interdict the movement of designated items in or out of a nation or specified area to compel a country or group to conform to the objectives of the nation or international body that establishes the sanctions. Maritime interception operations include efforts to monitor, query, and board merchant vessels in international waters to enforce sanctions and/or prevent the transport of restricted goods.

Protection of Shipping. Protection of shipping involves the use of proportionate force by US warships, military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary, to protect US flag vessels and aircraft and US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign vessels) and their property against unlawful violence.

Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. Freedom of navigation and overflight operations demonstrate US or international rights to navigate sea or air routes in accordance with international law.

Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. Defense support to public diplomacy includes those activities and measures taken by DoD components to support and facilitate the public diplomacy efforts of the USG.

Exclusion Zones Enforcement. Exclusion zone enforcement operations employ coercive measures to prohibit selected activities in a specific geographic area.

DoD Support to Counterdrug Operations. The Department of Defense supports federal, state, local, and foreign law enforcement agencies in their efforts to disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs into the United States.

Support to Insurgency. An insurgency is an organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 1-02) It uses a mixture of political, economic, informational, and combat actions to achieve its political aims

I. Defensive Operations

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 8.

I. Defensive Operations

The Marine Corps forces conduct defensive operations, often in combination with offensive operations, to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, or economize forces. During the early days of the Korean War (1950-53) the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional) participated in defensive operations along the Pusan Perimeter. These operations gave the 1st MARDIV extra time to embark and deploy to Korea where it conducted an amphibious assault at Inchon to kick off the United Nation's long awaited offensive.

While opposing forms, the offense and defense are not mutually exclusive. In fact, they cannot exist separately. (MCDP I) For example, during the first 38 days of Operation Desert Storm, I MEF/United State Marine Corps Forces, Central Command's aviation forces conducted offensive operations while the other elements of the MAGTF completed preparations for the ground assault from defensive positions.

Defensive operations require agility and flexibility since the defender is constantly seeking to regain the initiative. An effective defense will normally involve the following:

- Use of intelligence assets to locate enemy forces.
- Combined use of fire and maneuver to blunt the enemy's momentum.
- Speed that facilitates transition of friendly forces to the offense.

While the defense can deny victory to the enemy, it rarely results in victory for the defender. The defense, however, tends to be the more efficient form of warfare, expending less energy than the offense. For example, favorable and familiar terrain, friendly civilian populations, known enemy operational patterns subject to exploitation, and interior lines may prompt a commander to assume the defense to reduce enemy capabilities that are essential to his success. The attacking enemy usually chooses the time and place he will strike the defender.

The defender uses his advantages of prepared defensive positions, concentrated firepower, obstacles, and barriers to slow the enemy's advance and disrupt the flow of his assault. Marines exploited these advantages in the defense of the Khe Sanh Combat Base, Republic of South Vietnam, during the Tet Offensive of 1968. Using aggressive defensive tactics and well-placed obstacles supported by responsive and continuous fires, the 26th Marines (Reinforced) destroyed two North Vietnamese army divisions.

"While in the defense, the commander conducts shaping actions, such as attacking enemy forces echeloned in depth and/or his sustainment capabilities. These shaping actions help to set the conditions for decisive action, such as the defeat of the enemy's main effort by a counterattack that could allow the friendly force to transition to offensive operations.

II. Types of Defense Operations

There are three fundamental types of defense-the mobile defense, the area defense, and retrogrades. In practice, Marine Corps commanders may use them in combination. Mobile defense orients on the destruction of the attacking force by permitting the enemy to advance into a position that exposes him to counterattack by a mobile reserve. An area defense orients on retention of terrain by absorbing the enemy in an interlocking series of positions and destroying him largely by fires. Retrogrades seek to reposition friendly forces to improve an operational or tactical situation and often involve trading space for time in order to prepare a decisive counterstrike. Combining these three types of defense can be very effective as the commander capitalizes on the advantages of each and the strengths and capabilities of his subordinate units.

Although these descriptions convey the general pattern of each type of defense, all may involve static and dynamic elements. Mobile defenses may employ static defensive positions to help control the depth and breadth of enemy penetration and ensure retention of ground from which to launch counterattacks. In area defenses, commanders may employ patrols, intelligence units, and reserve forces to cover the gaps among defensive positions, reinforcing as necessary and counterattacking from defensive positions as directed.

In retrogrades, commanders may employ dynamic elements to draw an adversary into a positional disadvantage as well as relatively static elements to wear an adversary down. Defending commanders may combine all three patterns, using static elements to delay, canalize, and halt the attacker, while using dynamic elements, such as spoiling attacks and counterattacks, to strike and destroy enemy forces. The balance of these patterns depends on the enemy, mission, force composition, mobility, relative combat power, and the nature of the conflict.

The specific design and sequencing of defensive operations is an art largely conditioned by experience; force capability; and mission, enemy, terrain, troops and support available-time available (METT-T). The MAGTF commander may elect to defend well forward with strong covering forces by striking the enemy as he approaches or he may opt to fight the decisive battle by facilitating GCE operations within the main battle area. If the MAGTF commander does not have to hold a specified location, he may draw the enemy deep into its defenses and then strike his flanks and rear. The MAGTF commander may even choose to preempt the enemy with spoiling attacks in the deep or security area if conditions favor such tactics.

A key characteristic of defensive operations is the ability of the commander to take offensive action and wrest the initiative from the enemy. With this in mind, the decision to conduct a hasty or deliberate defense is based on the time available or the requirement to quickly resume the offense.

A hasty defense normally occurs while in contact with the enemy or when contact is imminent and time available for organization is limited. It usually requires defensive strength, such as emplacements and obstacles. The hasty defense normally allows for only a brief leaders' reconnaissance and may entail the immediate engagement by security forces to buy time to establish the defense.

A commander may establish a deliberate defense when not in contact with the enemy or when contact is not imminent and time for organization and preparation is available. A deliberate defense normally includes fortifications, strong points, extensive use of barriers, and fully integrated fires. The commander normally is free to make a detailed reconnaissance, select the terrain on which to defend, identity key terrain, establish mutually supporting defensive positions, and determine the best distribution of forces.

See following pages (pp. 3-14 to 3-15) for an overview and further discussion.

III. Organization of the Defense

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 8-2 to 8-4.

As in the offense, the MAGTF commander must also consider the organization of the battlespace and the force for the defense. As with other types of operations, the MAGTF commander organizes his battlespace for the defense into three areas-deep, close, and rear-in which the defending force performs specific functions.

Deep Area

The MAGTF conducts security operations in its deep area consistent with the security missions of screen, guard, and cover. Accordingly the MAGTF commander seeks to gather, gain, and maintain contact (visual or physical); protect the force by fighting to gain time; and/or to intercept, engage, delay, and disorganize the enemy to facilitate GCE success during close operations should they be required. Security operations in the MAGTF deep area (spatial reference) are a form of shaping operations (purpose base).

The MAGTF deep area includes all the battlespace not assigned to subordinate units. Unless designated to subordinate units, the MAGTF command element is responsible for the conduct of all operations in the deep area. For the MAGTF commander, the operational reach of the ACE allows him to create depth to the defense by extending the deep area as far forward as is tactically feasible. During the stability and support phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (subsequent Operation Iraqi Freedom rotations) following the fall of Baghdad and the Hussein government, the Marine Corps-led Multinational Force-West established a security area as part of its deep operations. It included vast areas of largely unpopulated terrain within Al Anbar Province. The MEF (Fwd) command element, as Multinational Force-West, tasked the ACE to conduct reconnaissance to track activity in that area, and it occasionally conducted limited duration and limited objective operations in the security area to disrupt enemy safe havens and lines of communications.

Close Area

The close area is normally the province of the GCE(s). The MAGTF's role in the close area is to monitor, facilitate, and support the GCE operations primarily through resource allocation. The GCE will typically organize for the defense with security, main battle, and rear areas (see fig. 8-1). The GCE commander typically positions forces in the main battle area to defeat, destroy, or contain enemy assaults. Reserves/counterattack force may employ in the main battle area to destroy enemy forces, reduce penetrations or regain lost terrain, execute a counterattack, or exploit weakness in the attack that hastens defeat of the enemy's attack. The MAGTF may establish a separate reserve or dual-designate the GCE reserve. If the latter, the MAGTF commander must articulate who can commit the reserve.

Refer to MCWP 3-1 , Ground Combat Operations, for more information regarding the GCE in defense.

Rear Area

The MAGTF rear area extends forward from the command's rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the command's subordinate units. Rear area operations include those functions of security and sustainment required to maintain continuity of operations by the entire force. Rear area operations protect the sustainment effort as well as deny use of the rear area to the enemy. The rear area may not always be contiguous with the main battle area.

Marine Corps Operations

Types of the Defensive Operations

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 8-2 to 8-4.

A. Mobile Defense

A mobile defense uses maneuver and fires with terrain to seize the initiative from the enemy. The mobile defense destroys the attacking enemy through maneuver and offensive action. The commander allocates the bulk of his combat power to mobile forces to strike the enemy where he is most vulnerable and when he least expects attack. Minimum forces positioned forward canalize, delay, disrupt, and deceive the enemy about the actual location of the defensive positions. Retaining his mobile forces until the critical time and place are identified, the commander can focus combat power in a single or series of violent and rapid counterattacks throughout the depth of the battlespace, as illustrated in figure 8-2.

Ref: MCDP 1-0, fig. 8-2. Mobile Defense.

A mobile defense requires mobility greater than that of the attacker. Marines generate the mobility advantage necessary in the mobile defense with organic mechanized and armor forces and Marine aviation. The commander must have sufficient depth within the area of operations to trade space and draw the enemy into the defensive area, causing the enemy commander to overextend his force and expose his flanks and lines of communications to attack. The success of the mobile defense often presents the opportunity to resume the offense.

In mobile defense, the MAGTF commander:

- Commits minimum forces to fixed locations.
- Positions maximum combat power to catch the enemy as he attempts to overcome that part of the force in fixed locations.
- Takes advantage of terrain in depth, obstacles, and mines, while employing firepower and maneuver to wrest the initiative from the attacker.
- Employs a strong counterattack force to strike the enemy at his most vulnerable time and place.
- Uses reconnaissance and surveillance assets to track the enemy, identifying critical enemy nodes, such as command and control, radars, logistic trains, and indirect fire support elements.

II. Offensive Operations

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 9.

I. Offensive Operations

The offense is the decisive form of warfare. While defensive operations can do great damage to an enemy, offensive operations are the means to a decisive victory. Offensive operations seize the initiative, gain freedom of action, and create effects to achieve objectives. Offensive operations allow the commander to impose his will on the enemy by shattering the enemy's moral, mental, and physical cohesion. The enemy loses his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated force as Marine Corps forces generate an overwhelming tempo by conducting a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected offensive actions.

The offense gains, maintains, and exploits the initiative, causing the enemy to react. The focus of offensive operations is the enemy, not seizure of terrain. Even in the defense, a commander must take every opportunity to seize the initiative by offensive action. Offensive operations:

- Destroy enemy forces and equipment.
- Deceive and divert the enemy.
- Deprive the enemy of resources.
- Gain information.
- Fix the enemy in place.
- Seize key terrain.
- Force an enemy decision.
- Disrupt enemy actions or preparations.

Successful offensive operations-

- Avoid the enemy's strength and attack his weakness by focusing combat power against the enemy's critical vulnerabilities.
- Isolate the enemy from his sources of support, to include the population in counterinsurgency operations.
- Strike the enemy from unexpected directions, disrupting his plan.
- Exploit every advantage.
- Overwhelm the enemy commander's ability to observe, orient, decide, and act.

The Marine Corps warfighting philosophy is offensive in nature. It focuses on the enemy and uses speed to seize the initiative and degrade the enemy 's ability to resist. To be decisive in offensive operations, the attacker weights the main effort. The fundamentals of offensive action are general rules evolved from the time¬proven application of the principles of war. Many of the following fundamentals are related and reinforce one another:

- Orient on the enemy.
- Gain and maintain contact.
- Develop the situation.
- Achieve surprise.
- Exploit known enemy weaknesses.

- Seize or control key terrain.
- Gain and maintain the initiative.
- Neutralize the enemy's ability to react.
- Advance by fire and maneuver.
- Maintain momentum.
- Act quickly.
- Exploit success.
- Be flexible.
- Be aggressive.
- Provide for the security of the force.

II. Types of Offensive Operations

There are four types of offensive operations-movement to contact, attack, exploitation, and pursuit. These operations may occur in sequence, simultaneously, or independently across the depth of the battlespace. For example, a movement to contact may be so successful that it immediately leads to exploitation or an attack may lead directly to pursuit as shown in figure 9-1 .

All four types of offensive operations rarely occur in one campaign or in the sequence presented in this chapter; moreover, the dividing lines between the types of offensive operations are not always distinct. The successful commander uses the appropriate type of offensive operation for his mission and situation, not hesitating to change as the situation dictates. The goal of offensive operations is to move to exploitation and pursuit as rapidly as possible. The commander seeks to take advantage of enemy weaknesses and maneuvers to a position of advantage, creating the conditions that lead to exploitation. For example, during Desert Storm, 1st and 2d MARDIV went directly into the attack from defensive positions in Saudi Arabia. After clearing the obstacle belts, the two divisions were mostly in pursuit of Iraqi ground forces while 3d MAW was conducting exploitation along what became known as the "Highway of Death."

Ref: MCDP 1-0, fig. 9-1. Types of Offensive Operations.

A. Movement to Contact

Movement to contact is largely a GCE event supported by the other elements of the MAGTF. While the LCE provides sustainment, the ACE assists with assault support, reconnaissance, command and control, and offensive and antiair support. Because the ACE, in many cases, is already in contact with the enemy as a result of security/shaping operations, it can help develop the situation through interdiction and armed reconnaissance, as well as reporting on observations. *See figure 9-2 on p. 3-24.*

III. Relief in Place

When directed by higher authority, a relief in place operation involves the replacement of all or part of a unit in a specific area by an incoming force. Mission responsibilities for the replaced elements and the assigned zone of action transfer to the incoming force. This transfer of authority is usually part of the relief in place operation and is termed a relief in place-transfer of authority (RIP-TOA) The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered. The relief must occur in an expeditious and orderly manner. Ideally, the RIP-TOA will take place without weakening the tactical integrity and security of the assigned area.

During a relief in place operation, the outgoing commander is responsible for the defense of his sector until transfer of authority. Both commanders should collocate throughout the operation to facilitate the transfer. The outgoing commander assumes command of any subordinate forces that have completed the relief in place. Following the transfer, the incoming commander assumes control of all elements of the outgoing force that have not yet been relieved. The incoming commander reports to higher headquarters upon completion of the RIP-TOA.

The relief can be simultaneous throughout the area of operation or staggered over time. Simultaneous reliefs take less time, but can cause greater congestion, threaten the readiness of the defense, and increase the likelihood of enemy detection due to the greater level of movement. By contrast, a staggered relief takes longer, but a larger portion of the force is prepared to conduct operations.

IV. Obstacle Crossing

An obstacle is any obstruction that disrupts, fixes, turns, or blocks the movement of an opposing force. The objective is to impose the loss of personnel, time, and equipment. Obstacles can be natural, manmade, or both. They are impediments to movement that usually require specific techniques and equipment to overcome. A series of such obstacles is called a barrier. Crossing obstacles is a common requirement in the offense. Though any obstacle can be crossed given sufficient time and resources, extensive preparation can help minimize losses from enemy action. Employment of obstacles covered by fires should be a normal element of the defense.

A critical requirement in any obstacle crossing is the reduction or elimination of the effects of enemy fire covering the obstacle. The goal is to cross the obstacle with minimum delay to maintain momentum and limit casualties.

Upon encountering an obstacle, the commander can bypass or breach. Intelligence can reveal the enemy's capability to oppose the crossing, the characteristics of the obstacle and crossing points, and the terrain on the far side. "When possible, the attacker bypasses enemy obstacles, saving time, labor, and risk to personnel and equipment. However, the commander must exercise caution when bypassing, since obstacles can lead to predictability by canalizing forces. For example, a bypass route that at first appears desirable may lead to a kill zone.

A deliberate obstacle crossing should include a branch plan for a hasty attempt in the event the situation allows. The commander 's options may be limited due to maneuver restrictions, the ability to deliver supporting fires, and the time required to move forces across or around the obstacle. The commander may conduct demonstrations and feints at locations away from the main crossing or breaching point to draw the enemy 's attention and defenses or fires elsewhere.

The attacker advances to the obstacle quickly and on a broad front to increase the possibility of affecting a hasty crossing. The inherent capabilities of the ACE provide the MAGTF commander multiple options for moving on a broad front and rapidly crossing obstacles to establish security on the enemy side. The ACE can provide combat assault transport for MAGTF units attacking directly across the obstacle or carry MAGTF units far beyond the obstacle to bypass the enemy or conduct a turning movement.

Once forces and equipment commit to crossing, withdrawal or deviation from the initial plan is extremely difficult. During a crossing, a force is most vulnerable while astride the obstacle. After establishing units on the far side of the obstacle, the commander pushes his combat power across or through as quickly as possible.

A. Breach

A breach is the employment of any available means to break through or secure a passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification. The attacker attempts to breach an obstacle when it cannot be bypassed. A breach is the most common means of crossing an obstacle. The plan for breaching is based on the concept of operation on the far side. There are two types of breaching that generally correspond to hasty and deliberate attacks, with many of the same considerations, advantages, and disadvantages.

Hasty Breach

A hasty breach is the rapid creation of a route through a minefield, barrier, or fortification by any expedient method. It is a continuation of the operation underway with a minimum loss of momentum. A hasty breach involves speed and surprise, force dispersion, and decentralized control.

Deliberate Breach

A deliberate breach is the creation of a lane through a minefield or a clear route through a barrier or fortification. It requires a concentrated force to overcome the obstacle and enemy defenses on the far side. A deliberate breach requires extensive planning, detailed preparation, sustained supporting arms, and engineer support. When forced to conduct a deliberate breach, the attacker may lose momentum and the initiative.

B. River Crossing

Unfordable water obstacles have considerable influence on military operations due to their restrictions on movement and maneuver. They are obstacles in the attack and form natural lines of resistance for defense. The strength of a body of water as an obstacle increases with the width, depth, and velocity of the current.

A river crossing is a type of gap-crossing operation necessary for the projection of ground combat power on the other side. It is a centrally planned offensive operation that requires the allocation of external crossing means and a force dedicated to the security of the beachhead. The primary concern is the rapid buildup of combat power on the far side to continue offensive operations.

V. Breakout from Encirclement

An encircled force normally attempts a breakout when it:

- Does not have sufficient relative combat power to defend itself against the enemy.
- Does not have adequate terrain to conduct its defense.
- Cannot sustain itself and needs relief by friendly forces.

The sooner the breakout occurs, the less time the enemy has to strengthen his position and the more organic resources and support the encircled force has available. The encircled force may receive fire support and diversions from other elements of the MAGTF, such as the ACE. Most importantly, the encircled force must maintain the momentum of the attack. If the breakout fails, the force will be more vulnerable to defeat or destruction than it was before the breakout attempt.

The encircled force normally conducts a breakout by task-organizing with a force to conduct the rupture, a main body, and a rear guard. If the commander has enough forces, he may organize separate reserve, diversionary, and supporting elements.

IV. Reconnaissance and Security Operations

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 11.

The fog and friction of war will never allow the commander to have a perfect picture of the battlespace. However, reconnaissance operations can reduce uncertainties about an unfamiliar area and an enemy who is actively trying to conceal information about his forces and intentions.

Reconnaissance of some type should always precede a commitment of forces. Failure to conduct a thorough reconnaissance may lead to the loss of initiative or an inability to exploit fleeting opportunities. Lack of reconnaissance can result in the enemy achieving surprise, inflicting unacceptable losses on friendly forces, and causing the failure of the mission. As part of the overall MAGTF intelligence effort, reconnaissance operations support the commander's decisionmaking process by collecting information to develop situational awareness and satisfy critical information requirements.

Security operations may occur in concert with a variety of MAGTF operations. They can reduce risk by providing the MAGTF commander with early warning and increased reaction time. They protect the force from surprise and attempt to eliminate the unknowns in any tactical situation. Security operations prevent the enemy from collecting information on friendly forces, deceive him about friendly capabilities and intentions, and prevent enemy forces from interfering with friendly operations.

Reconnaissance operations support security operations by providing information on enemy forces, capabilities, and intentions and by denying the enemy information about friendly activities through counterreconnaissance. To succeed, a MAGTF's security operations should be an integral element of its reconnaissance operations. Security operations are required during offensive, defensive, and other tactical operations.

See pp. 7-47 to 7-54 for related discussion (collection management operations).

I. Reconnaissance Assets of the MAGTF

Reconnaissance attempts to answer the commander's questions about the enemy and the battlespace in which the MAGTF will operate. Reconnaissance is a mission-aerial, ground, or amphibious-undertaken to obtain, by visual or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of the enemy or to secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, electromagnetic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. More simply, reconnaissance obtains information about the characteristics of a particular area and any known or potential enemy within it.

The commander uses reconnaissance to collect information and to gain and maintain contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance activities may range from passive surveillance to aggressive measures designed to stimulate an enemy response, such as reconnaissance by fire. Passive surveillance includes systematically watching an enemy force or named area of interest; listening to an area and the activities in it to help develop intelligence needed to confirm or deny adversary COAs; or identifying adversary critical vulnerabilities and limitations. All MAGTF elements have reconnaissance capabilities, but each has a unique capacity. Organic MAGTF chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities provide chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard information to the MAGTF commander's overall intelligence collection. These capabilities support chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear passive defense and critical command decisions.

See following pages (pp. 3-32 to 33) for an overview and further discussion.

I. Primary Stability Operations Functions

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 12-3 to 12-6.

The primary stability operations functions align with the five end states-safe and secure environment, rule of law, stable governance, social well-being, and sustainable economy-adopted in the Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction published by the Department of State. The document provides a framework for stabilization efforts that stems from the policies, doctrine, and training of civilian agencies across the US Government and internationally. These guiding principles present a series of end states in stabilization, conditions describing those end states, and approaches to achieving those end states. These functions are:

- Security.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Economic stabilization and infrastructure.
- Rule of law.
- Governance and participation.

Together, they provide a framework for integration of the instruments of national power.

Security

Security activities seek to protect and control civil populations and territory¬friendly, hostile, or neutral. They may be performed as part of a military occupation during or after combat, to help defeat an insurgency, or in response to a humanitarian disaster. Security activities seek ultimately to reassure rather than compel. They conclude successfully when civil violence is reduced to a level manageable by host nation law enforcement authorities. A safe and secure environment is one in which the population has the freedom to pursue daily activities without fear of politically motivated, persistent, or large-scale violence. Such an environment is characterized by an end to large-scale fighting; an adequate level of public order; the subordination of security forces accountable to legitimate state authority; the protection of key individuals, communities, sites, and infrastructure; and the freedom for people and goods to move about the country and across borders without fear of undue harm.

Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Foreign humanitarian assistance includes programs conducted to meet basic human needs in order to ensure the social well-being of the population. Social well-being is characterized by equal access to and delivery of basic needs, such as water, food, shelter, sanitation, and health services; the provision of primary and secondary education; the return or voluntary resettlement of those displaced by violent conflict; and the restoration of a social fabric and community life. Some foreign humanitarian assistance activities are not conducted within the overall context of stability operations. Delivery of foreign humanitarian assistance in these cases may be of short duration, with no intention to intrude on society and culture.

Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure

The function of economic stabilization and infrastructure includes programs conducted to ensure an economy exists in which people can pursue opportunities for livelihoods within the local system of economic governance. A sustainable economy is characterized by market-based macroeconomic stability, control over the illicit economy and economic-based threats to the peace, development of a market economy, and employment generation. Meeting the needs of human security-both in terms of the provision of physical security and foreign humanitarian assistance-lays the foundation for the stabilization of fragile states. Economic stabilization and development help to consolidate gains made in

human security and enable political solutions. Although security and governance reform remain priorities, early attention to economic growth improves the likelihood of success. Accordingly, while economic measures and reconstruction are not the panacea for stability, they should constitute a significant component of the solution. Priorities for international agencies and forces include measures designed to stabilize the economy, protect, and reconstruct critical economic infrastructure, generate employment, and address any underlying economic drivers of conflict.

Rule of Law

The rule of law function refers to programs conducted to ensure all individuals and institutions, public and private, and the state itself are held accountable to the law. The rule of law in a country is characterized by just legal frameworks, public order, accountability to the law, access to justice, and a culture of lawfulness. Rule of law requires laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, and independently adjudicated and that are consistent with international human rights principles. It also requires measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in applying the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, and legal certainty. Such measures also help to avoid arbitrariness as well as promote procedural and legal transparency.

Governance and Participation

Programs that support governance and participation help people to share, access, or compete for power through nonviolent political processes and to enjoy the collective benefits and services of the state. Stable governance involves a government that provides essential services and serves as a responsible steward of public resources; government officials who are held accountable through political and legal processes; and a population that can participate in governance through civil society organizations, an independent media, and political parties. Stable governance is the mechanism through which basic human needs of the population are largely met, respect for minority rights is assured, conflicts are managed peacefully through inclusive political processes, and competition for power occurs nonviolently.

Refer to TAA2: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16), Interorganizational Cooperation (JP 3-08), and more.

Counterinsurgency and Foreign Internal Defense Interaction Scale

Ref: JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Nov '13), pp. V-8 to V-10.

The US will generally employ a mix of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military instruments of national power in support of these objectives. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) conducted by conventional forces and special operations forces (SOF) can assist the HN in reducing these contributing factors to insurgency and terrorism. FID operations can be indirect support or direct support (noncombat or combat).

Ref: JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, fig. V-1, p. V-9.

Indirect Support. These are FID operations that emphasize the principle of HN self-sufficiency. Indirect support focuses on building strong national infrastructures through economic and military capabilities that contribute to self-sufficiency.

Direct Support (Not Involving Combat Operations). These operations involve the use of US forces providing direct assistance to the HN civilian populace or military. They differ from SA in that they are joint or Service funded, do not usually involve the transfer of arms and equipment, and do not usually, but may, include training local military forces. Direct support operations are normally conducted when the HN has not attained self-sufficiency and is faced with social, economic, or military threats beyond its capability to handle. DOD support could include activities such as providing intelligence, mobility support, or logistics support.

US Combat Operations. The introduction of US combat forces into FID operations requires a Presidential decision and serves only as a temporary solution until HN forces are able to stabilize the situation and provide security for the populace. If combat is authorized, normally this will include major operations.

VII. Tactical Tasks

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), app. C.

The MAGTF tactical tasks may be specified, implied, or essential. They define actions the commander may take to accomplish his mission. In special circumstances, tasks may be modified to meet METT-T requirements. The commander must clearly state that he is departing from the standard meaning of these tasks. One way this can be done is by prefacing the modified task with the statement, "What I mean by [modified task] is ...."

Tactical tasks are assigned based on capabilities. The GCE can execute all of the MAGTF's tactical tasks. The combat service support element can execute those tactical tasks essential for it to provide sustainment to the MAGTF The ACE can execute many of the MAGTF's tactical tasks, but it cannot secure, seize, retain, or occupy terrain without augmentation by the GCE. Weather and task duration may significantly affect the ACE's ability to execute assigned tactical tasks.

For additional information on tactical tasks, refer to JP 1-02; MCRP 5-12A, Operational Terms and Graphics; and MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

A. Enemy-Oriented Tactical Tasks

Ambush

A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving or temporarily halted enemy.

Attack By Fire

Fires (direct and indirect) destroy the enemy from a distance, normally used when the mission does not require or support occupation of the objective. *Note: This task is usually given to the supporting effort during offensive operations and as a counterattack option for the reserve during defensive operations. The assigning commander must specify the intent---destroy, fix, neutralize, or suppress.*

Block

To deny the enemy access to a given area or to prevent enemy advance in a given direction or on an avenue of approach. It may be for a specified time. *Note: Units assigned this task may have to retain terrain.*

Breach

To break through or secure a passage through a natural or enemy obstacle.

Bypass

To maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of advance. Previously unreported obstacles and bypassed enemy forces are reported to higher headquarters.

Canalize

To restrict operations to a narrow zone by the use of existing or reinforcing obstacles or by fires or bombing.

Chap 4

I. Marine Corps Planning

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), chap. 1.

Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP)

DESIGN

- **I** Problem Framing — *See p. 5-1*
- **II** COA Development — *See p. 5-17*
- **III** COA Wargaming — *See p. 5-25*
- **IV** COA Comparison and Decision — *See p. 5-39*
- **V** Orders Development — *See p. 5-43*
- **VI** Transition — *See p. 5-51*

Ref: Figure 1-1. Overview of the Marine Corps Planning Process.

The Marine Corps employs several planning processes:

- **Troopleading steps,** used principally as an introduction to planning by small unit leaders without staffs, comprise six steps—**BAMCIS** [begin planning, arrange for a reconnaissance, make the reconnaissance, complete the plan, issue the order, and supervise].

- For units with staffs, the **Marine Corps planning process (MCPP)** is most appropriate. It is also a six-step process comprising problem framing, course of action (COA) development, COA wargaming, COA comparison and decision, orders development, and transition. The Marine Corps often operates in a joint environment, where the MCPP is the vehicle through which commanders and their staffs in the operating forces provide input to the joint planning process. *See chap. 5, Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP).*

- If time does not allow use of the full, six-step MCPP, the commander and the planners may use the **rapid response planning process (R2P2)**, which is a time-constrained version of the MCPP. The R2P2 enables the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to plan and begin execution of certain tasks within six hours and is highly dependent on the use of standing operating procedures (SOPs). *See chap. 6, Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2).*

Marine Corps Planning

III. Marine Corps Planning Process Tools

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), app. E.

The commander and his/her staff use MCPP tools to record, track, and analyze critical planning information. These tools help the commander and the staff to better understand the environment, facilitate the commander's decisionmaking, assist in the preparation of plans and orders, and increase tempo. The MCPP tools must serve the needs of the commander and the requirements of the situation. Commanders and staffs can tailor these tools to meet their needs and use other tools available that are appropriate for their particular situation.

Table E-1 identifies commonly used templates, worksheets, and matrices and notes how each tool supports the MCPP. The examples in this appendix are at the MEF level, but these tools may be employed at any level of command. The formats and uses of these tools may be modified as required.

Overlays, Templates, Matrices, Worksheets, and Graphics and Narratives	Problem Framing	COA Development	COA War Game	Comparison and Decision	Orders Development	Transition
Modified combined obstacle overlay (see fig. E-1)	X	X	X			
Adversary template (see fig. E-2)	X	X	X			
Situation template (see fig. E-3)	X	X	X			
Event template (see fig. E-4)	X	X	X			
Event matrix (see table E-3)	X	X	X			
Decision support template (see fig. E-5)		X	X	X	X	X
Decision support matrix (see table E-4)		X	X	X	X	X
COA graphic and narrative (see fig. E-6)		X	X	X	X	
Synchronization matrix (see table E-5)		X	X	X	X	X
COA war game worksheet (see table E-6)			X	X	X	
Comparison and decision matrix with comments (see table E-7)				X		

Ref: Table E-1. Marine Corps Planning Process Tools.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) Products

The IPB is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of the adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By applying IPB, commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space. A continuous planning activity undertaken by the entire staff, IPB builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate.

See chap. 5, IPB, for full discussion.

The IPB products graphically display the results of the IPB process. Note that both the G- 2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3 are responsible for specific products. While IPB starts as an intelligence effort, it expands to an operational process and has logistic and communications applications:

- Modified Combined Obstacle Overlay (MCOO)
- Adversary Template
- Situation Template
- Event Template and Matrix
- Decision Support Template and Matrix

See pp. 7-8 to 7-9 for an overview of these major IPB products as related to the MCPP.

Planning Support Tools

Planning support tools support the commander's and staff's planning effort by recording and displaying critical planning information on the COAs and the commander's decisions and guidance. They aid the commander in decisionmaking by displaying critical information in a useful format. Planning support tools include the COA graphic and narrative, synchronization matrix, COA war game worksheets, and the comparison and decision matrix.

Course of Action Graphic and Narrative *(See p. 5-21.)*

The COA graphic and narrative, is a visual depiction and written description of a COA. They clearly portray how the organization will accomplish the mission, identifying the who (notional task organization), what (tasks), when, where, how, and why (intent). It should include the tasks and purpose of the main effort, supporting efforts, and reserve. It also includes maneuver control measures, such as boundaries. The COA narrative and graphic, when approved by the commander, forms the basis for the CONOPS and operations overlay in the OPLAN or OPORD.

Synchronization Matrix *(See p. 5-23.)*

A synchronization matrix is a planning support tool designed to integrate the efforts of the force. It can be organized across the warfighting functions, LOOs, or other activities based on the situation. It can also record the results of the COA war game. It depicts, over time, the diverse actions of the entire force necessary to execute the COA. When completed, it provides the basis for an execution matrix or Annex X (Execution Checklist) to the OPLAN or OPORD.

Course of Action War Game Worksheet *(See pp. 5-34 to 5-35.)*

The COA war game worksheet is used during the war game to record friendly action, adversary reaction, and friendly counteraction involved in each COA. It is also used to capture critical information that may be identified during the war game, such as potential CCIRs, decision points, and NAIs.

Course of Action Comparison and Decision Matrix *(See p. 5-40.)*

The COA comparison and decision matrix is a planning support tool designed to assist the commander and staff in recording the advantages and disadvantages of each COA as it is compared against the commander's evaluation criteria. It also provides a venue for further discussion. It may reflect various techniques for weighing the COA against the commander's evaluation criteria, as shown in table E-7. The commander may use the COA comparison and decision matrix to aid his/her decision-making process during the selection of a COA for execution. Commanders and staffs should guard against relying on numerical "rankings" or other simplistic methods that can fail to underscore the complexity involved in the decision-making process.

in a cycle that requires timely input from subordinates. Nevertheless, the air tasking order is produced in support of the plan—it is not the plan.

II. Planning Organizations

The MCPP is scalable from the component level down to the battalion and squadron level. Lower command levels, such as battalions and squadrons, adapt and consolidate certain planning responsibilities and functions within their limited structures. Normally at these command levels, most MCPP procedures are performed by the commander and his/her primary staff officers and selected special staff officers. Figure C-1 shows the planning organization and relationships found at lower levels of command, such as a battalion.

Ref: MCWP 5-10, fig. C-1. Lower Level Organizations and Planning Relationships.

Only the higher levels of command (MEF, division, wing, or logistic group) form specialized planning staff elements and organizations. Figure C-2 illustrates planning organizations at the Marine Corps component and MEF and their link to HHQ.

Ref: MCWP 5-10, fig. C-2. Component and Marine Expeditionary Force Organizations and Planning Relationships.

See facing page for further discussion of MAGTF planning organizations.

A. Planning Organizations

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), pp. C-2 to C-4.

Three organizations—future plans, future operations, and current operations—at the component and MEF levels are primarily responsible for the conduct of the planning process. They must coordinate their efforts to ensure a smooth transition from long-term planning to execution.

1. Future Plans Division

The future plans division is normally under the staff cognizance of the G-5. Among its many responsibilities, the G-5 normally forms a liaison element to the HHQ staff; integrates the HHQ plan into the MEF's planning process; plans the next mission, phase, or operation; and oversees the force deployment planning and execution process for the command. Upon receipt of tasks from HHQ, this division initiates the MEF's planning process by assisting the commander with the initial design and developing an outline plan. Depending on the situation, it may focus on a phase of a campaign, develop reconstitution requirements, or plan deployment. This division's responsibility is to conduct the initial design effort as a basis for subsequent planning.

The future plans division may also develop sequels, support relationships for the next phase, and develop plans to ensure the force does not reach a culminating point. Future plans will transition an outline plan to the future operations center. The outline plan provides the salient features of a mission and precedes detailed planning.

2. Future Operations Center

The future operations section is under the staff cognizance of the G-3 and is the focal point of the planning process. It usually forms the nucleus of an OPT and coordinates with both the future plans and current operations centers to integrate planning. The future operations center will either inherit outline plans from the future plans division or receive planning requirements from the current operations center that exceed its planning horizon. The future operations center fully integrates the other staff centers' plans officers, warfighting function representatives, and subordinate unit representatives into the planning process. It takes the outline plan from the future plans division and uses it as the basis for further planning.

The future operations center focuses on changes to subordinate missions and develops branch plans and sequels. This center interacts with intelligence collection and the targeting process to shape the next battle. The current operations center may provide a representative to the future operations center to facilitate an efficient transition process. This representative returns to the current operations center during transition. The future operations center's efforts generate tempo internal to the force.

3. Current Operations Center (COC)

The current operations center is under the staff cognizance of the G-3. During operations, it receives the OPORD from the OPT at the transition brief. The current operations center:

- Coordinates and executes the OPORD
- Prepares and transmits FRAGOs
- Monitors operations of the force
- Tracks CCIRs and reports relevant information to the commander
- Analyzes and synthesizes battlespace information

When unforeseen events develop, the current operations center refines or develops branch plans. To support the commander, the current operations center may develop new COAs, allocate resources, and prepare FRAGOs to modify the current OPORD. This center assesses change in the battlespace and progress toward the mission and purpose; monitors the status of forces and materiel; monitors rear area operations; coordinates terrain management; maintains a common operational picture and information; and provides the future operations center with situational awareness.

See pp. 8-8 to 8-9 for further discussion of the COC.

A. Battlespace Areas

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 3-6 to 3-9.

Battlespace includes areas of interest, influence, and operations. Operational areas for MAGTFs are usually areas of operations. Commanders must develop an appreciation of how conditions within the battlespace will impact and be impacted by friendly, enemy, and civilian actions. Commanders must consider how best to arrange friendly forces and execute actions within the battlespace to accomplish the mission.

Area of Interest

The area of interest contains friendly and enemy forces, capabilities, infrastructure, and terrain that concern the commander. This area includes the area of influence and those areas that contain current or planned objectives or enemy forces that are capable of endangering mission accomplishment. The size of the area of interest normally exceeds the commander's operational reach.

"While the area of interest includes any assigned area of operations and area of influence, the area of interest may stretch far beyond the other parts of the commander's battlespace. The commander is unconstrained in determining his area of interest and may include noncontiguous areas. A forward-deployed MEF, for example, may have an area of interest that extends back to the continental United States during the execution of the time-phased force deployment. The commander may also have areas of interest around airbases in neighboring regions.

Area of Influence

The area of influence is that area which a commander can affect through maneuver, fires, and other actions of his force. Its geographical size is normally based on the physical limits of organic systems, such as fire support, aviation, mobility, or reconnaissance capabilities, and operational requirements identified within each of the warfighting functions *(see chap. 8 for warfighting functions)*. However, actions within these areas may influence perceptions and events on a global scale. The area of influence normally reflects the extent of the force's operational reach. Because MAGTFs employing Marine fixed-wing aviation can extend their operational reach, their area of influence could be very large; however, determining the area of influence should not be based solely on the combat radius of the MAGTF's fixed-wing aircraft. The commander should consider his mission, forces, warfighting functions, and the area of operation to determine his area of influence. Understanding the area of influence allows the commander to assign subordinate areas of operations and focus intelligence collection and information operations.

Area of Operations

The joint force commander normally assigns areas of operations to land and maritime force commanders. Areas of operations are prescribed by physical boundaries and are normally large enough to allow commanders to accomplish their missions and to protect their force by employing their organic, assigned, and supporting systems to the limits of their capabilities. An area of operations is two-dimensional. Commanders of the MAGTF will need to request airspace above their assigned area of operations in order to properly employ the MAGTF.

The joint force commander or component commander normally assigns the MAGTF an area of operations. The MAGTF, in turn, will assign areas of operations to subordinate commanders whenever those commanders are assigned ground-based tactical tasks *(see the list of tactical tasks on pp. 3-45 to 3-48)*. Such assignments are not limited to the GCE. Area of operations assignments can include the ACE, when tasked with screening or guarding the MAGTF flank, for example. They may also include the LCE when serving as the main effort for a noncombatant evacuation operation or foreign humanitarian assistance mission.

Commanders who are assigned an area of operations must develop their own plans for accomplishing assigned tasks, which may involve further subdivision of the area of operations and tasks to their subordinate commanders. These plans may include sizing the operation and determining their contiguous and noncontiguous boundaries.

The size of an area of operations will normally change over the course of an operation. Many factors can influence that change to include

- Incorporating geopolitical constraints.
- Accomplishing objectives.
- Assuming a new task or mission.
- Shifting to a new phase of the operation.
- Anticipating exploitation and pursuit.
- Assuming the main effort.

Regardless of the MAGTF's size, its commander must be able to command and control his forces throughout the assigned area of operations. Commanders should neither seek nor assign areas of operations that are greater than the unit's area of influence.

A subordinate commander who is unable to directly influence his entire area of operations may have to request additional forces or assets that will extend his operational reach. Failing that, he may have to-

- Request a change in mission or tasks.
- Request a reduction in the size of his area of operations.
- Revise his concept of operations by phasing operations in such a way that he only needs to directly influence portions of his area of operations.
- Accept some degree of risk.

A **contiguous area of operations** is one in which all subordinate commands' areas of operations share one or more common boundaries. A noncontiguous area of operations involves one or more subordinate areas of operations do not share a common boundary. Commands with contiguous areas of operations are normally within supporting distance of one another. The commander establishes contiguous areas of operations when¬

- The area of operations is of limited size to accommodate the force.
- Political boundaries or enemy dispositions require concentration of force.
- There is a risk of being defeated in detail by enemy forces or the enemy situation is not clear.
- Concentration of combat power along a single axis of advance or movement corridor is required.

A **noncontiguous area of operations** is normally characterized by a 360-degree boundary. Because units with noncontiguous areas of operations must provide all-around security, such situations allow for less concentration of combat power along a single axis. There is additional risk for units operating in noncontiguous areas of operations because they are normally out of supporting range of each other. The commander establishes noncontiguous areas of operations when-

- Limited friendly forces must occupy or control widely separated key terrain.
- Subordinate units do not need to provide mutual support.
- Dispersed enemy or population centers throughout the area of operations require a corresponding dispersal of friendly units.

Operations in areas not included in assigned noncontiguous areas of operations are the responsibility of the common higher commander.

Marine Corps Planning

B. Battlespace Framework

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 3-6 to 3-9.

The battlespace framework depicts how the commander may organize his battlespace so he can relate his forces to one another in time, space, event, and purpose. The battlespace framework consists of envisioned deep, close, and rear operations (shown in fig. 3-2) as well as the organization of the force into the main effort, reserve, and security. The name of the mission may also mean organizing into contiguous or noncontiguous deep, close, and rear areas. The battlespace framework provides the commander and his staff with a means to ensure they consider all essential elements of military operations while in the planning and execution phases.

Note: JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater, changes joint rear area to joint security area. The Marine Corps continues to use the security area in the traditional sense, using the term rear area to mean the area to the rear of the main battle area where logistic and administrative functions are normally the dominant activity.

Ref: MCDP 1-0, fig. 3-2. Battlespace Organization.

Deep Operations

Deep operations afford commanders an opportunity to shape or prevent future close battles. Deep operations can strip away enemy capabilities, force an early culmination, or otherwise attack the enemy system so friendly forces can handle what remains when the enemy forces become a part of the close battle. By conducting deep operations, the commander can seize the initiative, create windows of opportunity for decisive action, restrict the enemy 's freedom of action, and disrupt the cohesion and tempo of enemy operations. Because of its operational reach, deep operations are primarily conducted by the ACE, although the GCE and LCE may play significant roles as well. The MAGTF intelligence assets, such as reconnaissance and signals intelligence, contribute to the conduct of deep operations. Also contributing to deep operations are ACE and GCE surveillance and reconnaissance assets, such as unmanned aircraft systems and ground surveillance radars.

Deep operations normally focus on the enemy's follow-on and supporting forces, command and control nodes, and key lines of communications or facilities. Deep operations may require coordination and integration with national-level assets and joint forces. They may include-

- Interdiction through fire and maneuver.
- Surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition.
- Information operations integrating deception and military information support operations.
- Offensive antiair warfare.
- Electronic warfare.

MCPP Step I. Problem Framing

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), chap. 2.

Ref: Figure 2-1. Problem Framing.

Problem framing is the first step in the MCPP. It may begin informally in response to indications and warnings or more formally when an order or directive—including the HHQ mission and tasks to subordinate commands—is received. The purpose of problem framing is to gain an enhanced understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. This greater understanding allows a commander to visualize the operation and describe his/her conceptual approach, providing context for the examination of what the command must accomplish, when and where it must be done, and most importantly, why—the purpose of the operation.

This higher level of understanding is especially useful in debunking invalid assumptions, inaccurate stereotypes, and erroneous capability assessments. Since no amount of subsequent planning can solve a problem insufficiently understood, framing the problem is critical. To achieve this understanding, problem framing requires both the judgment of synthesis and the systematic study of analysis. Accordingly, problem framing consists of a commander-driven design effort supported by staff actions.

I. Design

The goal of design is to achieve understanding gained largely through critical thinking and dialogue—the basic mechanism of design. The ability to address complex problems lies in the power of organizational learning through design. Group dialogue, when conducted within the proper command climate, can foster a collective level of understanding not attainable by any individual within the group.

To conceive and articulate a framework for solving a problem, commanders must understand the environment and nature in which the problem exists; the understanding of a problem points directly to possible solutions. Design begins during problem framing, but once underway it is continuous—informing and being informed by the results of the other planning steps, execution, and assessment.

A. Commander's Orientation

The commander's orientation is the first of many venues where the commander, his/her staff, and subordinate commanders collaborate through the exchange of information and the sharing of ideas and perspectives. Accordingly, the commander's orientation is the initial step in the design effort to begin to frame the problem as a basis for developing possible solutions.

The specific content of the commander's orientation will vary by the uniqueness and maturity of the situation and the experience of the commander. For example, Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm did little to prepare I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) for Joint Task Force Los Angeles [LA riots] and Joint Task Force Somalia [Operation Restore Hope], which represented entirely different paradigms. Other than terse planning directives to prepare for possible operations, there was little initial information other than what could be gleaned from media outlets. In contrast, multiple Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) tours could enable commanders to provide a wealth of information to initiate their planning efforts.

Most importantly, the commander's orientation demonstrates the commander's personal involvement in the planning process and allows him to set the tone for a dialogue. Once the commander provides his/her orientation, the commander, the staff, and others (as designated) participate in subsequent discussions, or "design dialogue," to collectively gain an enhanced understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem.

B. Understanding the Environment

Understanding the environment is an important aspect of design. The essential activities in understanding the environment include critical thinking and open discussion by all participants, including the commander, to help expose a broad range of ideas to be considered in the identification of the problem. Useful items to consider include the following:

- Design results from HHQ, including intent, orders, directives, estimate of the situation, and commander's guidance

- Available intelligence products, including intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB)

Note: The IPB enables the commander to gain an understanding of the adversary within the context of the broader operational environment. The nature of the intelligence products required to support the commander's systemic examination of the operational environment emphasizes the importance of this activity. See chap. 5, IPB, for further discussion.

- Information environment, which includes the physical, informational, and cognitive domains

- Culture

MCPP

Problem Framing
(Injects, Activities, and Results)

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), fig. D-1.

RESULTS

- Problem Framing Brief
- IPB products
- Tasks (Specified / Implied / Essential)
- Shortfalls (resources / SME)
- COG analysis
- Assumptions / Limitations
- RFIs
- Initial staff estimates
- CCIRs
- **Mission Statement**
- **Commander's Intent**
- **COA Development Guidance**
- **WARNO**

ACTIVITIES

Design
- **Understanding of the Environment**
- **Understanding of the Problem**
- **Commander's Initial Planning Guidance / Intent**

Task Analysis
- ID tasks
- Analyze COGs
- Assumptions / Limitations
- Draft Mission Statement

Ongoing Activities
- Refine intel and IPB products
- Alert / Convene Red Cell
- Running Estimates
- Refine Area of Interest and Area of Influence
- Shortfalls (Resources / SME)
- CCIRs / RFIs

INJECTS

Situational Info

HHQ
- Guidance & intent
- WARNO / OPORD
- Intel / IPB products
- Indications & warnings

Outside Info
- Govt Agencies
- Other Service
- Open Source

Commander & Staff
- **Expertise**
- **Experience**
- **Judgment**
- **Knowledge**
- **Confirmation Briefs**

*Items in **bold** are meant to highlight the personal involvement of the commander.*

Ongoing Activities

MCPP

- Language
- Demographics
- Religion
- Geography
- Local economics
- Key actors
- Tendencies
- Relationships
- Potential
- Security
- Climate
- Time

Understanding the environment provides background information, facts, status, connections, relevant actors, habitat, local beliefs, and a broad range of other factors that serve as context for the commander and his/her staff to better understand the problem. These factors also help the commander gain an appreciation for the situation as it exists. Coupled with any assigned or anticipated tasks, participants engaged in design can determine a desired future state. The difference between the current and desired states enables the participants to narrow their focus on the environment to determine the nature of the problem.

C. Understanding the Problem

Armed with an appreciation of the environment, the design effort shifts to understanding the problem. The essential activities in understanding the problem continue to be critical thinking and an open, frank dialogue to help reveal the underlying nature of the problem. Understanding the problem points to possible solutions. Useful items to consider include the following:

- Existing design results from HHQ in the form of mission and intent, orders, directives, estimate of the situation, and commander's guidance
- Adversary
- Friendly force update
- Information environment
- Terrain and weather
- Troops and support available
- Civil considerations (to include indigenous/local population)
- Difference between existing and desired conditions
- Limitations
- Assumptions
- Specified tasks
- Initial staff estimates
- Input from other commanders
- Experience and judgment
- Range of potential actions
- Tempo

With the larger environment as context, additional elements of the problem may emerge that require resolution during subsequent planning. For example, planners not only identify relevant actors, but also begin to understand their relationships,

tensions, and trends. All of these dynamics suggest ways to interact not only with adversaries, but also with the population and other elements within the battlespace. In this manner, commanders use their understanding of the problem to formulate their intent and guidance.

D. Commander's Initial Intent and Guidance

Having engaged in a design dialogue with his/her planners and staff in order to gain insight into the problem, the commander provides his/her initial intent and guidance in order to direct continued actions in the planning process.

Commander's intent is the commander's personal expression of the purpose of the operation. It must be clear, concise, and easily understood. It may also include end state or conditions, that, when satisfied, accomplish the purpose. Commander's intent helps subordinates understand the larger context of their actions and guides them in the absence of orders. It allows subordinates to exercise judgment and initiative—when the task assigned is no longer appropriate given the current situation—in a way that is consistent with the higher commander's aims. This freedom of action, within the framework of the commander's intent, creates tempo during planning and execution. Higher and subordinate commanders' intents must align. The purpose of the operation derives from the "in order to…" portion of the mission statement or the execution paragraph of the higher commander's operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD).

As with visualization, the commander may develop his/her intent early in the planning process, but he will review and revise it as required. As the commander proceeds through the planning process, he gains additional levels of understanding about the environment, which allows him to formulate and refine his/her intent as well as his/her vision of actions.

The commander's initial guidance can be as detailed or as broad as the commander desires. His/her initial guidance should address his/her understanding of the environment and the nature of the problem. This is the kind of information you would expect to read in Paragraph 1 (Situation) of a five-paragraph order. This guidance may also include his/her thoughts on friendly and enemy COGs as well as information requirements.

There is no prescriptive format for the commander's initial guidance. In some instances, the commander may quickly understand the environment, the problem, and how the problem may be solved. In other instances, the commander may need the staff to provide him with additional information and will not be ready to describe how the problem will be solved until later in the problem framing step.

II. Staff Actions

Design does not occur in isolation; much of the information available to the commander comes from staff actions, primarily in the form of analysis. Accordingly, staff actions should be viewed as concurrent and complementary—versus sequential—activities. For example, understanding the nature of the problem, to include the purpose of the operation, provides the context to drive task analysis. Conversely, the learning gained through task analysis deepens the understanding of the problem and contributes to design.

These complementary activities are of little value unless they interact. The planning process provides venues for interactions between the commander and the staff, the OPT, and/or subordinate units. When the staff or OPT briefs the commander, they are providing, in part, the results of their actions. When the commander provides guidance, his/her direction represents a synthesis of the staff's input, along with other sources of information, which manifest in the form of a decision about how to proceed. All of the following actions enhance understanding and increase planning effectiveness.

MCPP

Staff Estimates and Estimates of Supportability

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), app. G.

Staff Estimates

The staff and warfighting function representatives develop staff estimates. The staff summarizes significant aspects of the situation that influence the COA, analyzes the impact of the factors on the COA, and evaluates and determines how the means available can best support the COA. Staff sections may also require their functional representatives to develop functional estimates within their areas of expertise. A staff estimate is not a replacement for an order or for supporting concepts; however, a thorough staff estimate will shorten the time it takes to fully develop a COA and write the order or plan. The generic staff estimate format standardizes the way staff members construct estimates. The G-2, with input assistance from all staff members, will still prepare and disseminate the IPB as separate and continuously updated products. The staff develops estimates for all the warfighting functions and uses these estimates to recommend a COA and to develop plans to support the selected COA.

Staff Estimate Format Sample

1. <u>Mission</u>. Mission statement results from problem framing.

2. <u>Situation and Considerations</u>

   a. <u>Characteristics of the Area of Operation</u>

      (1) <u>Weather</u>. How will different military aspects of weather affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?

      (2) <u>Terrain</u>. How will aspects of terrain affect specific staff areas of concern and resources?

      (3) <u>Other Pertinent Facts</u>. Analyze political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors and infrastructure as they relate to the area.

   b. <u>Adversary Forces</u>. Adversary disposition, composition, strength, capabilities, and COA(s) as they affect specific staff areas of concern.

   c. <u>Friendly Forces</u>

      (1) Friendly COA(s).

      (2) Current status of resources.

      (3) Current status of other resources.

      (4) Comparison of requirements versus capabilities and recommended solutions.

      (5) Key considerations (evaluation criteria) for COA supportability.

   d. <u>Assumptions</u>

3. <u>Analysis</u>. Analyze each COA using key considerations (evaluation criteria) to determine advantages and disadvantages.

4. <u>Comparison</u>. Compare COA(s) using key considerations (evaluation criteria). Rank order COA(s) for each key consideration. Visually support each comparison with a decision matrix.

5. <u>Recommendations and Conclusions</u>

   a. Recommended COA based on the comparison (most supportable from specific staff perspective).

   b. Issues, deficiencies, and risks with impact mitigations.

Ref: MCWP 5-10, fig. G-1. Staff Estimate Format Sample.

MCPP

Staff estimates are generally **functional** in nature, such as for fires, logistics, or intelligence, and often require subordinate unit information, such as the ACE's sortie calculations. Once the commander approves a COA, staff estimates become the first drafts of their respective portion of the order or plan. Estimates of supportability from subordinate commanders provide a single battle approach to recommended COAs with a functional slant, whether air, ground, or logistics. Commanders of the ACE, GCE, and logistics combat element (LCE) discuss how each will support the MAGTF COA(s) through their respective CONOPS while addressing advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

Functional Staff Estimate Format Sample

1. <u>Key Facts and Assumptions</u>. Identify key facts and assumptions associated with the specific functional area.

2. <u>Functional Units Available</u>. List all units assigned to the MAGTF with the functional capability to include known host nation and contracted support.

3. <u>Computations</u>. Focus on a worst case scenario. Break out all requirements. The category could be expressed as classes of supply; field services; maintenance functions, such as maintenance support team support or recovery; transportation types, such a breakbulk, Class III, or water; or explosive ordnance disposal support.

Category	Total Requirements	Total Capabilities	Shortfall	Excess Capability	Potential Solutions

4. <u>Analysis</u>

    a. <u>Issues</u>. Excess capacity or shortfall. Indicate all shortfall and excess capabilities.

    b. <u>Vulnerabilities/Risks</u>. Indicate how any shortfalls can impact the outcome of the MAGTF mission. Be accurate, concise, and direct.

    c. <u>Recommendations</u>. Indicate how you think the LCE can either reallocate internal CSS assets, find a way to reduce requirements, or increase capacity to counter shortfalls. Also, recommend how to best make use of idle CSS assets.

Ref: MCWP 5-10, fig. G-2. Functional Staff Estimate Format Sample.

Estimate of Supportability

Estimates of supportability are produced by subordinate commanders in order to assist the "higher" commander with COA selection. Staff estimates support their commander's estimate of supportability provided to the MAGTF commander. Estimates of supportability should indicate the subordinate unit's ability to support each COA and identify the risks associated in supporting each COA.

See following pages (pp. 5-12 to 5-13) for a sample Estimate of Supportability Format.

MCPP

MCPP Step II. COA Development

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), chap. 3.

II. COA Development

Ref: MCWP 5-10, fig. 3-1. Course of Action Development.

Course of action development (see fig. 3-1) leads to one or more options for how the mission and commander's intent might be accomplished in accordance with the commander's understanding as a result of the design effort that began during problem framing. Design helps to inform the commander's intent and guidance and provides options for the commander while continuing to refine the understanding of the environment and problem. To be distinguishable, each COA must employ different means or methods that address the essential tasks and incorporate the commander's intent and guidance.

During COA development, planners use the products carried forward from problem framing to generate options or COAs that satisfy the mission in accordance with the commander's intent and guidance. Developed COAs should be:

• **Suitable:** Does the COA accomplish the purpose and tasks? Does it comply with the commander's guidance?

• **Feasible:** Does the COA accomplish the mission within the available time, space, and resources?

- **Acceptable:** Is the COA proportional and worth the cost in personnel, equipment, materiel, time involved, or position? Is it consistent with the law of war and is it militarily and politically supportable?
- **Distinguishable:** Does the COA differ significantly from other COAs?
- **Complete:** Does the COA include all tasks to be accomplished? Does it address the entire mission (main and supporting efforts, reserve, and associated risks)?

The staff develops COAs for follow-on wargaming and comparison. Accordingly, the commander may limit the number of COAs the staff develops or direct a single COA if he is comfortable doing so based on his/her intuition and experience or if operating under severe time constraints. Planning tools useful in COA development include:

- Design products, such as commander's intent and guidance
- Updated IPB products
- Task analysis (specified, implied, and essential)
- Restraints/constraints
- Assumptions
- Resource shortfalls
- COG analysis (friendly and enemy)
- CCIRs
- RFIs
- Initial staff estimates and estimates of supportability

Planners develop broad COAs considering a number of factors, including mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T); adversary versus friendly capabilities assessment; civilian and cultural considerations; and possible employment options.

Planners consider two fundamental questions:

- What needs to be accomplished?
- How should it be done?

Answering the second question is the essence of COA development. The following staff actions assist COA development:

- **Update IPB Products.** The IPB enables planners to view the battlespace in terms of the adversary and the environment. It helps planners determine how the adversary will react to proposed friendly COAs, the purpose of adversary actions, the most likely and most dangerous adversary COAs, and the type of friendly operations that the terrain and infrastructure will allow. It is critical that planners continue to update and refine IPB to deepen their understanding of the situation and to answer the two fundamental questions posed in COA development.
- **Display Friendly Forces.** The graphic display of friendly forces in relation to the terrain allows planners to see the current and projected locations of friendly forces and can help reveal possible options.
- **Refine COG Analysis.** The COG analysis began during problem framing. The commander and staff refine COG analysis based on updated intelligence and IPB products, initial staff estimates, and input from the red and green cells. The refined COGs and critical vulnerabilities are used in the development of the COAs. If COGs and critical vulnerabilities are not known yet, the focus should be on both friendly and adversary strengths and weaknesses.
- **Continue Red and Green Cell Planning.** In problem framing, the red cell performed an analysis from the adversary's perspective while the green cell provided insights regarding civilian considerations. There could be multiple adversaries to consider as well as varying civilian groups, such as tribes,

A. Course of Action Graphic and Narrative

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), table E-5.

The COA graphic and narrative portray how the organization will accomplish the mission. Together, the graphic and narrative identify who (notional task organization), when, what (tasks), where, how, and why (intent). The COA graphic and narrative are essential and inseparable. Together, they help the commander, subordinate commanders, and the staffs understand the method by which the organization will accomplish its mission. During conventional operations, the graphic portrays the activities of the main and supporting efforts and critical maneuver control measures (such as objectives, boundaries, and phase lines) and fire support coordination measures. The narrative provides the purpose and tasks of the main and supporting efforts, the reserve, and the sequencing of the operation.

In other types of operations, such as stability operations, the graphic may display civil-military activities, locations of relief organizations and dislocated civilians, demographic variations (tribal, ethnic, religious patterns) of the population, key infrastructure, and culturally or historically significant areas. The COA graphic and narrative, when approved by the commander, form the basis for the CONOPS and operations overlay in the basic plan or order.

A MARDIV, as the main effort, conducts an envelopment to defeat adversary forces north of Gray City. A MARDIV (-) (rein), as a supporting effort, attacks in zone to fix and defeat adversary forces west of Tealton and conducts a link up with Blueland forces in Tealton. The Marine aircraft wing (MAW), as a supporting effort, isolates the MEF battlespace from enemy reinforcements from the south, while focusing efforts against the 102d and 103d Armored Brigades and the 401st and 402d Artillery Regiments. The supporting MARDIV (-) (rein) designates one infantry regiment as the MEF reserve and one battalion as the MEF tactical combat force. This phase concludes with enemy forces defeated north of Gray City.

Ref: MCWP 5-10, fig. E-6. Course of Action Graphic and Narrative.

MCPP

A. Commander's Wargaming Guidance and Evaluation Criteria

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), pp. F-1 to F-2.

Wargaming pits friendly COAs against adversary COAs to identify strengths and weaknesses of the friendly COAs and opportunities that can be exploited in future operations. The staff wargames selected friendly COAs against selected adversary COAs—most likely, most advantageous, or most dangerous—to determine how best to attack adversary critical vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical vulnerabilities. The results of wargaming, like all the other planning steps, improve the commander's understanding of the problem and influence his/her vision of actions. A better understanding inevitably leads to plan adjustments. Planners can conduct war games either manually or through computer-aided modeling and simulation applications. Time, resources, and priorities will influence which method the command will use.

On larger staffs, a red cell plays the adversary during the wargame. The red cell is a task-organized element under the staff cognizance of the G-2/S-2. It presents a "thinking" adversary that combines his/her doctrine with the red cell's operational experience. The red cell ensures assessed adversary capabilities and vulnerabilities are realistically evaluated against each friendly COA. At the MEF or major subordinate command level, the red cell may include four to six persons; at the battalion or squadron level, the red cell function may be exercised by the S-2 or a representative designated by the commander. Similarly, a green cell ensures environment and civilian aspects are applied against the friendly COAs.

Generally, the COA war game step includes the commander's wargaming guidance and evaluation criteria, war game preparation, and the conduct of the war game. The results of the war game inform COA comparison and decision, but, more importantly, wargaming generates an intuitive level of understanding about the problem that will accelerate decisionmaking during execution.

Wargaming also generates the needed level of detail with which to populate the plan or order (appendices, tabs, exhibits, attachments) necessary for implementation.

The commander assesses the time available at the conclusion of the COA development brief before providing guidance for the war game. The degree to which a COA achieves the essential tasks allows the commander to determine which COA is most suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete based on the available time, space, and resources. The evaluation criteria addresses specific issues/questions that the commander wants the staff to determine on each validated COA during the war game. At this point in the planning process, the commander has begun to think about various options and capabilities available to the adversary commander. He/She is also mindful of his/her own command's vulnerabilities. The commander will evaluate the major concerns, select the most important concerns, and incorporate them into his/her wargaming guidance.

Commander's Wargaming Guidance

The commander's wargaming guidance may include the following items:

- Friendly COAs that will be wargamed against specific adversary COAs, such as the adversary's most likely, most dangerous, or most advantageous COA.
- Critical events that must be wargamed in specific detail, such as critical decision points identified during COA development.
- The level of war game detail. Is there a key event or major activity, such as a river crossing, that requires a detailed examination?

- Validation of the main effort.
- Specification of the weather conditions to be assumed by the wargamers, such as rain, although the norm for the time of year is dry weather.
- Timeline for the phase or stage of the operation.

Commander's Evaluation Criteria

To be adopted as the plan, a COA has to survive two sets of evaluation criteria. The first broad set, discussed in COA development in chapter 3, requires that a COA be suitable, feasible, acceptable, distinguishable, and complete. The second set is intended to iden-tify which COA—among those that passed the first test—is the best. The commander's evaluation criteria may include the following items:

- Principles of war
- Limitation on casualties
- Exploitation of the adversary's weaknesses/friendly strengths
- Defeat of the adversary's COGs
- Population considerations
- Asymmetrical operations
- Opportunity for maneuver
- Concentration of combat power
- Speed
- Mass versus dispersion
- Risk
- Phasing
- Weighting the main effort
- Logistical supportability
- Political considerations
- Force protection
- Time available and timing of the operation

Staff Evaluation Criteria

The staff should also develop its own evaluation criteria to support its staff estimates dur-ing the COA comparison and decision step. The staff criteria may include the following:

- Risk assessment
- Casualty projections/limitations
- Personnel replacement requirements
- Projected adversary losses
- Adversary prisoner of war handling procedures
- Intelligence collection requirements and limitations
- HVT acquisition
- HPT identification
- Supporting arms limitations
- Support limitations or opportunities
- Projected assets and resource requirements
- Operational reach
- Sorties/capabilities required versus sorties/capabilities available
- Prepositioning equipment and supplies
- Projected location of units/supplies for future operations
- Projected location of combat operations centers or command posts
- Command and control systems shortfalls and limitations

MCPP

MCPP Step IV. COA Comparison & Decision

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), chap. 5.

IV. COA Comparison and Decision

- **I** Problem Framing *See p. 5-1*
- **II** COA Development *See p. 5-17*
- **III** COA Wargaming *See p. 5-25*
- **IV** COA Comparison and Decision — Select a COA
- **V** Orders Development *See p. 5-43*
- **VI** Transition *See p. 5-51*

DESIGN

Ref: Figure 5-1. Course of Action Comparison and Decision.

During COA comparison and decision, the commander evaluates each friendly COA against established criteria, compares them with each other, and selects the COA he believes will best accomplish the mission. The COA comparison and decision inputs require graphics and narratives for each wargamed COA and the commander's evaluation criteria. Other inputs useful in COA comparison and decision may include:

- Updated IPB products
- Planning support tools
- COA war game worksheet
- Synchronization matrix
- War game results
- Initial task organization
- Resources and any shortfalls
- Updated CCIRs
- List of critical events and decision points

• Staff estimates
• Subordinate commander's estimates of supportability
• Branches and sequels identified for further planning

I. Evaluate Courses of Action

Using his/her evaluation criteria, the commander or his/her representative (deputy commander, chief of staff, or operations officer) leads a discussion about the relative merits of each COA. The staff records the advantages and disadvantages for each. To the extent that operations allow, subordinate commanders, staffs, and planners should participate and provide input based on their estimates of supportability.

II. Compare Courses of Action

The COA comparison provides the commander with an understanding of the relative merit of each COA and aids in his/her decisionmaking. The commander compares the COAs against one another using the results of the COA evaluation. The commander may use a comparison and decision matrix to help him compare one COA with another.

Commander's Evaluation Criteria	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Force protection	Moderate casualties	High casualties; Increased chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threat	Light casualties
Tempo, surprise		Achieving surprise unlikely	High chance of achieving surprise
Shapes the battlespace	ACE interdiction of adversary lines of communications limits adversary's ability to reinforce		Deception likely to be effective
Asymmetrical operations	ACE operates against second echelon armor forces; GCE mechanized forces attack adversary dismounted infantry	MEF mechanized forces against adversary mechanized forces	
Maneuver	Frontal attack followed by penetration	Frontal attack	Turning movement
Decisive actions	ACE disrupts deployment of second echelon forces through interdiction		Isolate first echelon forces; Disrupt lines of communications, logistic facilities, and assembly areas
Simplicity		Simplest	Demanding command and coordination requirements.

Ref: MCWP 5-10, table E-7. Comparison and Decision Matrix with Comments.

III. Commander's Decision

The commander selects a COA. In making his/her decision, the commander may:

• Select a COA without modification
• Modify a COA
• Develop a new COA by combining favorable elements of multiple COAs
• Discard all COAs and resume problem framing or COA development, as required

Once the commander has made a decision, he should review the approved COA with subordinate commanders. With a decision, detailed planning can accelerate now that the entire command's focus is on a single COA. To facilitate detailed planning, the staff uses the approved COA as the basis for the CONOPS.

Operations Plan/Order Format

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), p. 182.

HEADING

Copy number. Assigned by issuing headquarters to each copy. Log maintained of specific copies issued to addressees.

Official Designation of Command. Use code name if required for security.

Place of Issue. May be code name, postal designator, or geographic location (including map coordinates). Always capitalized.

Date/Time. Day, month, and year order is signed, issued, and becomes effective, unless specified otherwise in paragraph 3f (Coordinating Instructions.)

Message Reference Number. Allows acknowledgment in the clear. Assigned by originator. Consists of letters, numbers, or a combination. It has no connection with the message center numbering system. Annexes issued separately are assigned different numbers.

BODY

Paragraph 2. Clear, concise statement of the tasks and purpose of the operation. State the who, what, when, where, why, and as much of the how as necessary. No subparagraphs. Always stated here even if shown on the operation overlay or map.

Commander's Intent. Commander's personal statement of the purpose of the operation.

Concept of Operations. A summary statement of how the operation will be accomplished. Amplifies paragraph 2. May be shown graphically or published as an appendix to annex C. Specific unit designations are not used.

OPERATION PLAN/ORDER FORMAT

CLASSIFICATION
(No change from oral orders)

Copy no.___ of ___ copies
I MEF
GREENTOWN, BLUELAND
17 Apr 2010
ABD–1

OPERATION ORDER 0002-10 (OPERATION SHARP SWORD) (U)
BASIC ORDER (U)

(U) REFERENCES:

(a) Maps and Charts: Series ONC, sheet G-2 (ORANGELAND, BLUELAND), edition 12

(b) USCINCPAC Planning Directive, 27 March 2010

(U) TIME ZONE: Zulu

(U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Annex A.

1. (U) Situation

a. (U) General. With the failure of deterrence, Blueland forces crossed the Orangeland border and have been successful in their initial battles.

b. (U) Battlespace. See appendix 18 to annex C.

c. (U) Enemy Forces. See appendix B and current intelligence summaries.

d. (U) Friendly Forces.

e. (U) Attachments and Detachments

2. (U) Mission. On order, I MEF, as the main effort, conducts offensive operations to defeat enemy forces in zone in order to restore the Blueland border. Be prepared to continue offensive operations into Orangeland to destroy remaining Orangeland offensive military capabilities.

3. (U) Execution.

a. (U) Commander's Intent.

b. (U) Concept of Operations. This operation will be conducted in three phases.

c. (U) Tasks.

(1) (U) 1st MARINE DIVISION (REIN)

(2) (U) 3d MARINE DIVISION (–) (REIN)

Classification. As appropriate, centered at the top and bottom of the page.

HEADING

Changes from Oral Orders. Used when oral orders regarding this operation have been previously issued. Enclosed in parentheses. Example: "(No change from oral orders except paragraphs 3b and 3f.)" Omitted in plans. Omitted in orders when no oral orders have been issued.

Title. Numbered consecutively for a calendar year. Two or more issued on the same day are given consecutive numbers. Joint operation plan or order is so designated. Code name, if any, as shown.

References. Documents, such as maps, charts, photomaps, or SOPs, necessary for understanding must be available to recipients. Entry is always included (use "References: None" when applicable). Map entries include series number, country, sheet names or numbers, edition, and scale.

BODY

Time Zone. If same for the place of issue and execution and will be the same throughout execution, then entry may be omitted. If time zone is different in area of execution, which frequently occurs in amphibious or air-transported operations, then state when indicated time zone becomes effective.

Task Organization. May be shown in the following ways:

1. As an unnumbered entry before paragraph 1 (Situation). Used when the entire command of issuing headquarters is organized into task organizations for a particular operation and task organizations are too complicated to be shown using other methods.

MCPP

(R2P2) Rapid Response Planning Process

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), app. H.

> If time does not allow use of the full, six-step MCPP, the commander and the planners may use the rapid response planning process (R2P2), which is a time-constrained version of the MCPP. The R2P2 enables the Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) to plan and begin execution of certain tasks within six hours and is highly dependent on the use of standing operating procedures (SOPs).
>
> *- MCWP 5-10, pp. 1-1 to 1-2.*

The goal of the R2P2 is to spend less time planning in order to provide the executing forces with the maximum time allowable to prepare for the mission. When circumstances impose severe time constraints on the executing command, the commander and the staff must allocate enough time to develop a feasible COA, time to coordinate critical details, and time to prepare for execution. The commander and the staff must be thoroughly familiar with potential contingencies or missions and the individuals involved with planning must know their roles in the planning process. Successful rapid planning is predicated on:

• An understanding of the MCPP

• Detailed preparation, training, and organization of the force and equipment

• Intelligence and mission planning products developed previously

• Current intelligence information

• Refined, well-rehearsed SOPs

If rapid planning is to be successful, both mission planning and preparation requirements are conducted concurrently. The speed with which a unit can plan an operation varies with the complexity of the mission, the experience of the commander and the staff, and METT-T factors. The R2P2 was developed to enable the MEU to plan and commence execution of certain tasks within six hours. The rapid planning techniques discussed in this appendix focus on the MEU and its six-hour timeline, but these techniques may be tailored and employed to meet any unit's needs. Rapid planning by non-MEU units is usually more effective when conducting routine missions or tasks for which the unit has been well trained and has established SOPs.

I. Actions Prior to Rapid Planning

To best employ R2P2, a unit must develop capabilities in four areas—integrated planning cells, planning and operations SOPs, intelligence, and information management. If one of these areas is lacking, effective rapid planning may not be achieved.

A. Integrated Planning Cells

The amount of staff turnover in the planning cells, to include the commander, directly impacts the staff's ability to plan rapidly; therefore, the composition and membership of the various planning cells used in rapid planning should remain constant, especially during the predeployment training program and deployment of the MEU and amphibious ready group (ARG). The planning cells employed by the MEU and ARG usually include the CAT, the battlestaff, and the mission planning cells. These cells must participate in frequent planning exercises that involve real-world scenarios similar to those the unit might encounter. These exercises ensure the CAT,

R2P2

battlestaff, and mission planning cells are thoroughly trained in rapid planning; their members know their commanders and each other; and the planners possess situational awareness of likely contingency missions and areas of operations. Planning cells should understand where they are to meet, what they are to accomplish, and how much time they have to complete their planning efforts. The planning cells also must be capable of conducting concurrent (simultaneous at different echelons of the same command) and parallel (between equivalent echelons of different commands) planning.

B. Planning and Operations

Standing Operating Procedures The SOPs are the cornerstone of rapid planning. The planning SOP should be second nature to all concerned. Operations SOPs are equally important because they allow planners to select proven and practiced tasks that provide solutions to tactical problems. The SOPs allow major subordinate elements (MSEs) to carry out familiar tasks effectively and efficiently with minimal or no higher-level guidance or communications. The SOP for each type of mission should include a predesignated task organization, equipment and ordnance lists, elements of a landing plan, mission execution procedures, and an execution checklist with code words.

The SOPs must be current, studied, rehearsed, executable on a moment's notice, and supported by timesaving factors. For example, standard ordnance packages for likely missions, such as tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel (TRAP) or a platoon-sized reinforcement, are prestaged in readily accessible locations in their magazines in order to reduce the time needed to break out and issue ammunition. In addition, mission smart packs are created for each mission profile. Smart packs contain specific planning information and SOPs based on the mission profile, such as for a light, medium, or heavy helicopter raid. Smart pack planning and coordination of information are also used as references during mission execution.

C. Intelligence

The commander and the staff must anticipate possible contingencies based on continual analyses of open-source news and classified intelligence reports. For each situation, the staff should be equipped with the latest intelligence (a MEU usually prepares mission folders), possible targets, area studies, and other relevant information. Periodic reviews of potential contingencies permits situational awareness to be maintained and provides current information. When appropriate, a commander conducts contingency planning and refocuses unit training based on likely scenarios. The intelligence staff must also be familiar with the Generic Intelligence Requirements Handbook (GIRH), which is produced by Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. This handbook contains essential elements of information for various mission types.

D. Information Management

Due to the time constraints inherent in rapid planning, there is less opportunity for the commander and the staff to analyze information requirements. Also, computer technology is increasing the speed and volume of information flow, so an overabundance of information may obscure vital facts. It is critical that each participant in the planning process realizes the importance of his mission area and takes positive steps to appropriately share knowledge. Commanders and staff officers must possess the ability to present clear and concise information. Simple, concise presentations best support rapid planning.

R2P2 Overview

Ref: MEU3: The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) SMARTbook, 3rd Ed. (Guide to Battle Staff Operations & the Rapid Response Planning Process)

Mission Analysis
COA Development
COA Wargame / COA Decision
Orders Development
Transition

Develop R&S COAs

COA Brief to Battle Staff

Staff Estimates

MEU/CPR COs' Estimate & Decision

Assemble Battle Staff

CONOPS (MESSAGE)

Develop Courses of Action (COA)

MEU/CPR COs' Guidance

R&S ConOps / COA

Assemble Battle Staff

Each COA must be:
- Suitable
- Acceptable
- Feasible
- Distinguishable
- Complete
- Develop phasing
- Developed by ME
- "Big blue arrows"
- Graphic description of Concept of Ops
- R&S develops COA

MEU/CPR COs' Initial Guidance

Prep Detailed Plans

R&S Confirmation Brief

Initial Staff Orientation

Assemble Battle Staff

Confirmation Brief

Can Delay ME Conf Brief for R&S Reports

R&S Final Inspection

CAT Determines Info Reqs

MEU/CPR COs' Approval

R&S Insert

Assemble CAT

- Essential, specified and implied tasks
- Restated mission & Commander's intent
- Assumptions
- Constraints / restraints
- Fire support guidance
- Comm guidance
- Sea echelon / OTH
- COA guidance / assign Main Effort (ME)

- Task organization
- Principle objectives
- Scheme of maneuver / Actions on obj
- Method of insert and ship's placement
- Fire support concept
- Comm concept
- Develop smart packs

CAT Problem Framing

Issue the Order

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT (MESSAGE)

Prior to Receipt of Mission
- Anticipate
- Prepare SOPs
- ID CAT, Battle Staff & Orders Group
- Prepare Generic Intel Requirements for Potential Missions
- Prepare objective folders for potential targets
- Develop notional plans
- Conduct drills and STXs
- Inspect readiness of personnel, equipment, aircraft and ammo

Receipt of Mission

Supervision

R2P2

Refer to MEU3: The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) SMARTbook, 3rd Ed. (Guide to Battle Staff Operations & the Rapid Response Planning Process) for further discussion. Updated for 2020 with 34 pages of updated/additional material, the 336-page MEU3 SMARTbook is designed to be a reference for MEU and PHIBRON Commanders, MEU and PHIBRON staffs and the commanders and staffs of the Major Subordinate Elements (MSE) and Naval Support Elements (NSE) of the ARG-MEU team.

Chap 7

Integrating Processes

Commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions and synchronize the force to adapt to changing circumstances throughout the operations process. They use several integrating processes to do this. An integrating process consists of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines to achieve a specific end. For example, during planning, the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) integrates the commander and staff in a series of steps to produce a plan or order. Key integrating processes that occur throughout the operations process include—

Integrating Processes

I Intel Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)

II Collection Management

III Targeting (D3A)

IV Operational Risk Management (ORM)

V Information Management (IM)

I. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) *(See p. 7-3.)*

Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. Led by the intelligence officer, the entire staff participates in IPB to develop and sustain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPB helps identify options available to friendly and threat forces.

IPB consists of four steps. Each step is performed or assessed and refined to ensure that IPB products remain complete and relevant:

• Define the Operational Environment
• Describe Environmental Effects on Operations
• Evaluate the Threat
• Determine Threat Courses of Action

IPB begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. IPB results in intelligence products used to aid in developing friendly COAs and decision points for the commander. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products created during IPB are critical to planning information collection and targeting.

II. Collection Management *(See pp. 7-47 to 7-54.)*

If during the conduct of operations, it is determined that an RFI must be converted into a collection requirement, a nomination for collection is submitted and collection management begins. Collection management is the process of converting intelligence-related information requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking as required. Collection management is composed of two components:

- Collection requirements management
- Collection operations management

III. Targeting (D3A) *(See pp. 7-55 to 7-64.)*

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions. The emphasis of targeting is on identifying enemy resources (targets) that if destroyed or degraded will contribute to the success of the friendly mission. Targeting begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. The steps of the Marine targeting process are—

- Decide
- Detect
- Deliver
- Assess

This methodology facilitates engagement of the right target, at the right time, with the most appropriate assets using the commander's targeting guidance.

IV. Operational Risk Management (ORM) *(See pp. 7-65 to 7-68.)*

The operational risk management (ORM) process is a decision making tool used by personnel at all levels to increase operational effectiveness by identifying, assessing, and managing risks to reduce the potential for loss and increase the probability of a successful mission. It also increases our ability to make informed decisions by providing a formal risk management process. Lastly, it minimizes risk to acceptable levels commensurate with mission accomplishment. The amount of risk we will accept in war is much greater than that we should accept in peace, but the process is the same. Correct application of the ORM process will reduce mishaps and associated costs. Operational risk management consists of the following steps:

- Identify hazards
- Assess hazards
- Make risk decisions
- Implement controls
- Supervise

V. Information Management (IM) *(See pp. 7-69 to 7-74.)*

Information Management (IM) is the means and processes to obtain, manipulate, direct, and control information in support of decision-making and execution. IM includes all activities involved in identifying, collecting, filtering, fusing, processing, disseminating and using information. IM promotes an understanding of the battlespace, enabling commanders to better formulate and analyze courses of action, make decisions, and execute those decisions.

IM is focused on providing quality information to support decision-making. Simply put, IM is getting the right information to the right person at the right time so they can make decisions faster than their adversary.

Integrating
Process

I. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB)

Chap 7

Ref: ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (Nov '14).

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations. *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) is the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area.*

IPB Process

I   **Define the Operational Environment**

II **Describe Environmental Effects on Operations/** *Describe The Effects On Operations*

III **Evaluate the Threat/***Adversary*

IV **Determine Threat/***Adversary* **Courses of Action**

The G-2/S-2 begins preparing for IPB during the generate intelligence knowledge task/ *problem framing step.* The intelligence staff creates data files and/or databases based on the operational environment. Given the limited time available to collect and evaluate information, this information may not be specific enough to support the military decision-making process (MDMP)/*Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP).* However, this information helps create the operational environment frame during the design methodology.

IPB results in the creation of intelligence products that are used during the MDMP/ *MCPP* to aid in developing friendly courses of action (COAs) and decision points for the commander. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products created during IPB are critical to planning information collection/intelligence collection and targeting operations.

Editor's Note: Since ATP -2-01/MCRP 2-3A is a dual-designated Army and Marine Corps manual, **terms and phrasing specific to the Marine Corps are provided in italics.** *Change 1 to ATP 2-01.3 (dated Mar 2015) changed the distribution restriction notice of this publication to "distribution unlimited;" because the posted cover remained dated Nov 2014, it is cited as such. The U.S. Army released an updated edition of ATP 2-01.3 in Mar 2019, but since it is no longer a dual-designated manual with Marine Corps input, the original 2014 version MCRP 2-3A is referenced here. (For the 2019 ATP 2-01.3 Army version, refer to BSS6: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 6th. Ed.)*

Integrating Processes

The G-2/S-2 leads this staff effort and begins preparing for IPB during the generate intelligence knowledge process associated with force generation and is incorporated into the Army design methodology. During generate intelligence knowledge, the intelligence staff creates data files on specific operational environments based on an evaluation of the information and intelligence related to the operational variables identified in the memory aid PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time)/*PMESII* (political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure). (For the Marine Corps, see MCWP 5-1 for more information on intelligence support to planning and problem framing.)

Given the limited time available to collect and evaluate information and intelligence on the operational variables, this information may not be specific enough to support the MDMP/*MCPP*. However, it can be used by the commander and the entire staff to aid the Army design methodology. Throughout the operations process, the commander and staff continue to collect information and analyze the operational variables in order to provide increased situational understanding. Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, they draw relevant information that was categorized by the operational variables and filter it into the mission variables used during mission analysis/*problem framing*. During IPB, the staff focuses on the relevant aspects of the operational environment as it pertains to their warfighting function and the mission variables. The intelligence staff is primarily focused on the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations.

To be effective, IPB must—

• Accurately define the commander's area of interest in order to focus collection and analysis on the relevant aspects of the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. Relevant is defined as having significant effect on friendly operations and threat/*adversary* operations, and population in a unit's area of operations (AO).

• Describe how each of these four mission variables will affect friendly operations and how terrain, weather, and civil considerations will affect the enemy.

• Provide the IPB products necessary to aid each step of the MDMP/*MCPP* in accordance with the planning timelines and guidance provided by the commander.

• Determine how the interactions of friendly forces, enemy forces, and indigenous populations affect each other to continually create outcomes that affect friendly operations. This aspect of IPB is not the sole responsibility of the intelligence staff. This complex analysis involves the commander and the entire staff working together to determine these effects.

IPB is most effective and best aids the commander's decisionmaking when the intelligence staff integrates the expertise of the other staff and supporting elements, such as civil affairs teams and military information support personnel, into its analysis. This is especially true when operating in environments where the effects of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations are complex and not easily determined.

IPB aids commanders in reducing uncertainty by evaluating how the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations may affect operations and decisionmaking. Most intelligence requirements are generated as a result of IPB and its interrelationship with decisionmaking.

A key aspect of IPB is refinement. The conclusions made and the products developed during IPB are continually refined throughout the operation. This information is incorporated into the running estimate as new information is obtained and further analysis is conducted during situation development. This refinement ensures that the commander's decisions are based on the most current information and intelligence available.

IPB Process Activities (Overview)

Ref: ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (Nov '14), chap. 1.

The IPB process consists of the following four steps:

Step 1—Define The Operational Environment *(See p. 7-10.)*

Defining the operational environment results in the identification of significant characteristics of the operational environment that can affect friendly and enemy operations. This step also results in the identification of gaps in current intelligence holdings.

Step 1 is important because it assists the commander in defining relative aspects of the operational environment in time and space. During step 1, the intelligence staff must identify those significant characteristics related to the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations that are relevant to the mission and justify that analysis to the commander. Failure to identify or misidentify the effect these variables may have on operations can hinder decisionmaking and result in the development of an ineffective information collection strategy/*intelligence collection strategy* and targeting effort.

Understanding friendly and enemy forces is not enough; other factors, such as culture, languages, tribal affiliations, and operational and mission variables, can be equally important. Defining the significant characteristics of the operational environment is essential in identifying the additional information needed to complete IPB. Once approved by the commander, this information becomes the command's initial intelligence requirements. This focuses the command's initial information collection efforts/*intelligence collection efforts* and the remaining steps of the IPB process.

For the Marine Corps, the term "operational environment" is consistent with the need to study and learn as much as possible about a situation. Essentially, commanders analyze the operational environment in order to determine the physical dimensions of their battlespace in the form of areas of interest, influence, and operations. (See MCDP 1-0.)

Step 2—Describe Environmental Effects On Operations/ *Describe The Effects On Operations* *(See p. 7-17.)*

Once the intelligence staff has identified in step 1 of IPB the significant characteristics related to enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations of the operational environment, step 2 describes how these characteristics affect friendly operations. The intelligence staff also describes how terrain, weather, civil considerations, and friendly forces affect enemy forces. This evaluation focuses on the general capabilities of each force until threat/*adversary* COAs are developed in step 4 of IPB and friendly COAs are developed later in the MDMP/*MCPP*. Finally, the entire staff determines the impact and effects to the population of friendly and enemy force actions.

If the intelligence staff does not have the information it needs to form conclusions, it uses assumptions to fill information gaps—always careful to ensure the commander understands when assumptions are used in place of fact to form conclusions.

Step 3—Evaluate The Threat/*Adversary* *(See p. 7-26.)*

The purpose of evaluating the threat/*adversary* is to understand how a threat/*adversary* can affect friendly operations. Although threat/*adversary* forces may conform to some of the fundamental principles of warfare that guide Army/*Marine Corps* operations, these forces will have obvious, as well as subtle, differences in how they approach situations and problem solving. Understanding these differences is essential in understanding how a threat/*adversary* force will react in a given situation. Threat/*adversary* evaluation does not begin with IPB. The intelligence staff conducts threat/*adversary* evaluation and

develops threat/*adversary* models as part of the generate intelligence knowledge task of support to force generation. Using this information, the intelligence staff refines threat/*adversary* models, as necessary, to support IPB. When analyzing a well-known threat/*adversary*, the intelligence staff may be able to rely on previously developed threat/*adversary* models. When analyzing a new or less well-known threat/*adversary*, the intelligence staff may need to evaluate the threat/*adversary* and develop models during the mission analysis step of the MDMP/*problem framing step of MCPP*. When this occurs, the intelligence staff relies heavily on the threat/*adversary* evaluation conducted by higher headquarters and other intelligence agencies.

In situations where there is no threat/*adversary* force, the intelligence analysis conducted and the products developed relating to terrain, weather, and civil considerations may be sufficient to support planning. An example of this type of situation is a natural disaster.

Step 4—Determine Threat/*Adversary* COAs *(See p. 7-36.)*

During step 4 the intelligence staff identifies and develops possible threat/*adversary* COAs that can affect accomplishing the friendly mission. The staff uses the products associated with determining threat/*adversary* COAs to aid in developing friendly COAs during the COA development and selecting a friendly COA during COA steps of the MDMP/*MCPP*. The identification and development of all valid threat/*adversary* COAs minimize the potential of the commander being surprised by an unanticipated enemy action.

Failure to fully identify and develop all valid threat/*adversary* COAs may lead to the development of an information collection strategy/*intelligence collection strategy* that does not provide the information necessary to confirm what COA the enemy has taken and may result in the commander being surprised. When needed, the staff should identify all significant civil considerations (this refers to those civil considerations identified as significant characteristics of the operational environment) so that the interrelationship of threat/*adversary*, friendly forces, and population activities is portrayed.

The staff develops threat/adversary COAs in the same manner friendly COAs are developed. Although written specifically as a guide to develop friendly COAs, the COA development discussion in ADRP 5-0/MCWP 5-1 is an excellent model to use in developing valid threat/adversary COAs that are suitable, feasible, acceptable, unique, and consistent with threat/adversary doctrine. Although the intelligence staff has the primary responsibility for developing threat/adversary COAs, it needs assistance from the rest of the staff to ensure the most accurate and complete analysis is presented to the commander.

Intelligence Estimate

The intelligence estimate includes all the IPB products necessary to support planning and operations, such as—

• Enemy situation overlays with associated COA statements and high-value target lists (HVTLs)

• Event templates and associated event matrices

• Modified combined obstacle overlays (MCOOs), terrain effects matrices, and terrain assessments

• Weather forecast charts, weather effects matrices/*operational impacts charts*, light and illumination tables, and weather estimates

• Civil considerations overlays and assessments

Staff Integration Into IPB

Staff sections bring their own areas of expertise to IPB. Collaborative analysis among the staff facilitates a greater degree of situational understanding for the commander.

Integrating Processes

IPB Process Integration into the MCPP

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), pp. E-1 to E-7.

The IPB is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the portions of the mission variables of the adversary, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By applying IPB, commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operational effectiveness at critical points in time and space. A continuous planning activity undertaken by the entire staff, IPB builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate.

In conventional military operations, determining adversary COAs will normally include templating with an adversary assessment. Templating continues from planning to execution, both to assess current operations and to support planning for future operations. In irregular warfare, adversary templating will focus on pattern analysis, which involves tracking, analyzing, and identifying specific trends, such as improvised explosive devices or population support, over time.

	Problem Framing	COA Development	COA War Game	Comparison and Decision	Orders Development	Transition
Modified combined obstacle overlay	G-2/S-2 →					
Adversary template	G-2/S-2 →					Continuous[1]
Situation template	G-2/S-2 →					Continuous[1]
Pertinent adversary COAs	G-2/S-2 →					Continuous[1]
Refined and prioritized adversary COAs and event templates and matrices		G-2/S-2 →				Continuous[1]
Initial decision support template		G-3/S-3/OPT →				Continuous[1]
Decision support template matrix		G-3/S-3/OPT →				Continuous[1]
Note [1]Templates are updated throughout the operation						

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Table E-2. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace Integration Throughout the Marine Corps Planning Process.

The IPB products graphically display the results of the IPB process. Table E-2 identifies the major IPB products and shows their integration with the planning process. Note that both the G- 2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3 are responsible for specific products. While IPB starts as an intelligence effort, it expands to an operational process and has logistic and communications applications that are not shown in the table. The following provide a short description of each product.

Step 1—Define the Operational Environment

Step 1 of the IPB process identifies for further analysis the significant characteristics of the operational environment that may influence friendly COAs and command decisions. Within an operational environment, an Army leader may be faced with major combat, military engagements, and humanitarian assistance simultaneously in the same AO.

Desired End State

Step 1 of the IPB process focuses the IPB effort on the characteristics of the operational environment that can influence friendly and threat/*adversary* operations. The intelligence staff acquires the intelligence needed to complete IPB in the degree of detail required to support the decisionmaking process. The primary outputs associated with step 1 of the IPB process may include developing the—

- Determination of the AO and area of interest.
- Determination of the area of intelligence responsibility.
- Identification of general characteristics of the AO that could influence the unit's mission.
- Identification of gaps in current intelligence holdings, translating them into requirements for collection (requests for information, requests for collection) in order to complete IPB.

So What?

The "so what" in this step is clearly defining for the commanders what the relevant characteristics of their areas of interest are.

- Success results in saving time and effort by focusing only on those characteristics that will influence friendly COAs and command decisions.

Consequences of failure:

• Failure to focus on only the significant characteristics leads to wasted time and effort collecting and evaluating intelligence on characteristics of the operational environment that will not influence the operation.

• Failure to identify all the significant characteristics may lead to the command's surprise and unpreparedness when some overlooked feature of the operational environment has an effect on the operation for which the commander did not plan.

A. Identify the Limits of the Commander's Area of Operations

The area of operations is defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). The AO is comprised of an external boundary that delineates the AOs of adjacent units and includes subordinate unit AOs. Subordinate unit AOs may be contiguous or noncontiguous. Parts of an AO not assigned to subordinate units are called deep areas. The AO may be impacted due to political boundaries and/ or other civil considerations. Once assigned, an AO can be subdivided by that command, as necessary, to support mission requirements.

Figure 3-2. Example areas of operations

An area of influence is a geographical area where a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control (JP 3-0). The area of influence is—

• An area that includes terrain inside and outside the AO
• An area determined by both the G-2/S-2 and the G-3/S-3

B. Identify the Limits of the Commander's Area of Interest

An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto and extending into enemy territory. This area also

Integrating Processes

Threat/Adversary Models

Ref: ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (Nov '14), pp. 5-21 to 5-23.

A threat/*adversary* model is a three-part analytical work aid designed to assist in the development of situation templates during step 4 of the IPB process. Threat/adversary models consist of three parts:

1. Convert Threat/*Adversary* Doctrine or Patterns of Operation to Graphics

Threat/*adversary* templates graphically portray how the threat/adversary might utilize its capabilities to perform the functions required to accomplish its objectives. Threat/ *adversary* templates are scaled to depict the threat's/*adversary's* disposition and actions for a particular type of operation (for example, offense, defense, insurgent ambush, or terrorist kidnapping operation). When possible, templates should be depicted graphically as an overlay, on a supporting system or through some other means. Threat/*adversary* templates are tailored to the needs of the unit or staff creating them. They may depict, but are not limited to, unit frontages, unit depths, boundaries, engagement areas, and obstacles.

2. Describe the Threat's/*Adversary's* Tactics and Options

The threat/*adversary* model includes a description of the threat's/*adversary's* preferred tactics. A description is still needed even if the threat/adversary has preferred tactics are depicted in a graphic form. The description—

- Lists the options available to the threat/*adversary* should the operation fail or succeed.
- Prevents the threat/*adversary* from becoming more than a "snapshot in time" of the operation being depicted.
- Aids in mentally wargaming the operation over its duration and during the development of threat/*adversary* COAs and situation templates.
- Addresses typical timelines and phases of operation, points where unit's transition from one form of maneuver to the next and how each warfighting function contributes to the success of the operation.

The analyst describes the actions of the supporting warfighting function in enough detail to allow for identification and development of HVTs. The analyst also examines each phase separately because target values may change from phase to phase.

3. Identify High-Value Targets (HVTs)

The following techniques may be useful in identifying and evaluating HVTs:

- Identify HVTs from existing intelligence studies, evaluation of the databases, patrol debriefs, and SALUTE reports. A review of threat/*adversary* TTP and previous threat/*adversary* operations as well as understanding the threat's/*adversary's* objective, tasks, purpose, and intent will be useful.
- Identify assets that are key to executing the primary operation or sequels.
- Determine how the threat/*adversary* might react to the loss of each identified HVT. Consider the threat's/*adversary's* ability to substitute other assets as well as adopt branches or sequels.

After identifying the set of HVTs, place them in order of their relative worth to the threat's/*adversary's* operation and record them as part of the threat/*adversary* model. A HVTs value will vary over the course of an operation. Staffs should identify and annotate changes in value by phase of operations. The identification of HVTs assists the staff in the creation of HPTs.

Integrating Processes

Threat Characteristics/Adversary Order of Battle (Considerations)

Ref: ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (Nov '14), table 4-4, pp. 5-3 to 5-20.

There are 11 broad areas the intelligence staff considers when analyzing threat characteristics/*adversary order of battle*: composition, disposition, strength, combat effectiveness, doctrine and tactics, support and relationships, electronic technical data, capabilities and limitations, current operations, historical data, and miscellaneous data.

Refer to MCWP 2-3 for a discussion on adversary order of battle factors such as composition, disposition, strength, tactics, training, logistics, combat effectiveness, electronic technical data, information operations data, and other support data.

1. Composition
Composition is the identification and organization of a threat/*adversary*. It applies to specific units or commands as opposed to types of units. Regular forces are normally self-identified and organized similar to friendly forces. Irregular forces may follow similar rules but most often are organized based on a cellular structure.

2. Disposition
Disposition refers to how threat/*adversary* forces are arrayed on the battlefield/*battlespace*. It includes the recent, current, and projected movements or locations of tactical forces. Regular threat/*adversary* forces are generally conducting some form of offensive or defensive maneuver. Irregular threat/*adversary* forces are generally in some part of the plan, prepare, execute, and assess phases for an operation such as a raid or ambush. Understanding how the threat/adversary doctrinally arrays itself on the battlefield/*battlespace* is essential in developing threat/adversary models in step 3 of the IPB process and threat/*adversary* situation overlays in step 4 of the IPB process. The intelligence staff familiarizes themselves with graphic training aids that visually depict range fans with weapons' fire limits and direct and indirect weapons capabilities to better understand enemy weapon systems.

3. Strength
Strength describes a unit in terms of personnel, weapons, and equipment. Information concerning strength provides the commander with an indication of enemy capabilities and helps determine the probable COAs or options open to threat/*adversary* commanders. A lack of strength or a preponderance of strength has the effect of lowering or raising the estimate of the capabilities of an enemy force. Likewise, a marked concentration or build-up of units in an area gives the commander certain indications of enemy objectives and probable COAs. During peacetime, changes in the strength of potential threat/*adversary* forces are important factors which may indicate changes in the threat's/*adversary's* intention. Strength is determined by comparing how a threat/*adversary* organization is doctrinally staffed and equipped with what the organization actually has on hand.

4. Combat Effectiveness
Combat effectiveness describes the abilities and fighting quality of a unit. Numerous tangible and intangible factors affect it.

5. Doctrine and Tactics
Doctrine and tactics include tactical doctrine as well as tactics employed by specific units. While tactical doctrine refers to the enemy's accepted organization and employment principles, tactics refer to the threat/*adversary* force's conduct of operations. Based on knowledge of a threat's/*adversary's* tactical doctrine, the intelligence staff can

- **Who**—the organizational structure of the threat/*adversary* organization, including external organizations providing support
- **What**—the type of operation: attack, defend, other
- **When**—the earliest time the action can begin
- **Where**—the battlefield/*battlespace* geometry that frames the COA (boundaries, objectives, routes, other)
- **How**—the threat/*adversary* will employ its assets to achieve its objectives
- **Why**—the threat's/*adversary's* objectives

3. Evaluate and Prioritize Each Enemy/*Adversary* COA

6-23. The commander approves a plan that is optimized to counter the most likely enemy COA, while allowing for contingency options should the threat/*adversary* choose another COA. Therefore, the staff evaluates each enemy COA and prioritizes it according to how likely it is that the threat/*adversary* adopts that option. Generally, threat/*adversary* forces are more likely to use a COA that offers the greatest advantage while minimizing risk. However, based on the situation and its objectives, the threat/*adversary* may choose to accept risk to achieve a desired end state. It is impossible to predict what COA the threat/*adversary* will choose. Therefore, the staff develops and prioritizes as many valid threat/*adversary* COAs as time allows but at a minimum develops the most likely and most dangerous COAs.

4. Develop Each COA in the Amount of Detail Time Allows

A threat/adversary COA consists of the following products:

- Situation template for the threat/*adversary* COA *(see p. 7-40)*
- Threat/*adversary* COA statement *(see p. 7-44)*
- HVTs and HVTL for the threat/*adversary* COA *(see p. 7-44)*

5. Identify Initial Collection Requirements for Each COA

After identifying the full set of potential threat/*adversary* COAs, the staff develops the tools necessary to determine which COA the threat/*adversary* will implement. Because the threat/*adversary* has not acted yet, this determination cannot be made during IPB. However, the staff can develop the information requirements and indicators necessary to support the construction of an information collection plan/*intelligence collection plan* that can provide the information necessary to confirm or deny threat/*adversary* COAs and locate enemy targets. Information requirements are those items of information that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of the commander. An indicator is an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of a threat/*adversary* to adopt or reject a COA.

For the Marine Corps, after identifying potential adversary COAs, the analyst must determine which one the enemy will adopt. Initial collection requirements are designed to help answer the challenge. The identification of initial intelligence collection requirements revolves around predicting specific areas and activities, which, when observed, will reveal which COAs the adversary has chosen. The areas where the analyst expects key events to occur are designated NAIs. The activities that reveal the selected COA are called indicators.

Integrating Processes

Situation Template for the Threat/ Adversary COA

Ref: ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (Nov '14), pp. 6-6 to 6-8.

When constructing a situation template, the staff uses the threat/*adversary* template developed as part of the threat/*adversary* model during step 3 of the IPB process as a base. That template is modified based on the significant effects the operational environment will have on the threat/*adversary* COA. For example, an enemy may prefer to establish battle positions 1 to 1.5 kilometers apart. The terrain, however, may force the enemy to increase this distance in order to protect its flanks. Another example is, the enemy prefers to attack on high speed AAs but also prefers to avoid complex terrain. Therefore, the location of an urban area along a high speed, optimal AA may force the threat/adversary to use a suboptimal approach.

A threat/*adversary* situation template is a depiction of a potential threat/*adversary* COA as part of a particular threat/*adversary* operation. Situation templates are developed using the threat's/*adversary's* current situation, based on threat/adversary doctrine and the effects of terrain, weather, and civil considerations. Situation templates can be simple sketches, reserving in-depth development and analysis for later when more time is available.

A technique is to design a sketch to depict an enemy action or COA which is a graphic representation that will show key outputs or a graphic representation of an enemy action or enemy COA. Each enemy COA has a corresponding situation template.

Figure 6-2 is an example of a situation template.

Constructing an Event Template

Ref: ATP 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (Nov '14), fig. 6-8 and 6-9, p. 6-16.

Constructing an event template is an analytical process that involves comparing the multiple enemy COAs developed earlier in step 4 of the IPB process to determine the time or event and the place or condition in which the enemy commander must make a decision on a particular COA.

Figure 6-8 and figure 6-9 on page 6-16 are examples of how to illustrate the basic mechanics of this process. The figures only display some minimal, but not all-inclusive information, for what is included on the event template.

The initial event template and matrix are normally developed prior to COA analysis, refined during COA analysis, and further refined during execution as the situation changes. In addition to using the event template and matrix to support its own planning, the staff normally disseminates the event template to subordinate units to aid in the development of subordinate unit information collection plans/*intelligence collection plans*.

Event Template

Constructing an event template is an analytical process that involves comparing the multiple enemy COAs developed earlier in step 4 of the IPB process to determine the time or event and the place or condition in which the enemy commander must make a decision on a particular COA.

Figure 6-8 and figure 6-9 on the previous page 7-45 are examples of how to illustrate the basic mechanics of this process.

Event Matrix

Constructing an event matrix is an analytical process that involves determining the indicators of enemy activity that aid in identifying the decisions the enemy commander has made. Table 6-1 below illustrates the basic mechanics of this process.

Named area of interest	Indicators	Enemy decision point	Time (Hour)	Enemy course of action (COA) indicated
1, 2, 3	• Establishment of battle positions and obstacles • Presence of armored vehicles • Presence of engineer assets	1	H–12	COA 1 area defense
1, 3 4	• Establishment of battle positions and obstacles • Presence of armored vehicles • Presence of engineer assets • Identification of company (+) sized reserve	2	H–12	COA 2 forward defense
1, 2, 3 5, 6	• Absence of maneuver and engineer assets • Presence of mobile armored formation	3	H–3	COA 3 mobile defense

Figure 6-10 below is an example of a completed event template for an enemy conducting offensive operations. This figure is for illustrative purposes and is not based on a tactical scenario.

II. Collection Management

Ref: Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group (MCTOG), Tactical MAGTF Integration Course Handbook (Aug '18), pp. 7-10 to 7-11.

Request for Information (RFI)
If during the conduct of operations, it is determined that a RFI must be converted into a collection requirement, a nomination for collection is submitted and collection management begins. **Collection management** is the process of converting intelligence-related information requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking as required. Collection management is composed of two components: CRM and COM.

I. Collection Requirements Management (CRM)

CRM is the authoritative development and control of collection, processing, exploitation, and information reporting requirements. CRM organizes, prioritizes, validates, and manages the developed intelligence collection requirements (ICRs) that the collection effort must fulfill. ICRs are focused on the commander's intent, objectives, approved PIRs established during the planning and direction phase of the intelligence cycle. The compilation of ICRs is the basis for the collection plan and matrix.

Step 1 – Identify, Validate, and Prioritize PIRs and IRs
This is the foundation of the ICR development process. It is the basis for collection planning and execution. A common mistake regarding PIRs and IRs in general is that they lack adequate specificity. Poorly developed PIRs increase the potential of failure regarding timely, pertinent collection, and follow-on intelligence operations. Focused, specific requirements are needed to make informed, effective plans and decisions.

Step 2 – Identify Indicators
Once the critical IR question has been determined, the next step is to identify the activities that will confirm (or deny) the event specified in each PIR and IR. These activities, called indicators, are usually stated in general terms, such as "forward deployment of artillery." Indicators provide positive or negative evidence of threat activity or a characteristic of the environment that may influence the commander's selection of a course of action (COA). An indicator will often be associated with a named area of interest (NAI), which is a geographical area where activity is expected to occur that will confirm or deny an enemy COA.

Step 3 - Derive Specific Information Requirements (SIRs)
Each PIR/IR generates sets of associated specific information requirements (SIRs). SIRs are the observable bits of information that describe the information required to answer all or part of an ICR. A completed SIR describes the information required, the location where the required information can be collected, and the timeframe when it can be collected. Drafting SIRs is an analytical, time-consuming process requiring a thorough understanding of the PIR or IR.

Step 4 – Develop Specific Orders or Requests (SORs)
Each indicator generates a number (or sets) of SIRs. Each SIR will, in turn, generate a SOR(s) that can be used to task collection assets or request collection from external assets that drive the COM process. A well-written SIR is easily translated into an effective SOR by making a directive vice inquisitive statement. In other words, if a SIR is a question, the SOR directs a collection asset or resource to find an answer.

III. Targeting (D3A)

The MAGTF uses the "decide, detect, deliver, and assess" (D3A) methodology for targeting within its AO using organic forces/capabilities. The MAGTF uses the joint targeting process for targeting outside their AO or when targeting inside their AO using other services' forces/capabilities (other than joint air). The MAGTF interacts with the joint air tasking cycle during joint air operations.

(Joint Pub 3-09, MCWP 3-16)

Deliberate Targeting

Deliberate targeting normally supports the joint force's *future plans* effort, which is overseen by the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5). (Normally, the future operations directorate focuses on 24 hours out to 72 hours. This is a critical linkage during targeting execution.)

Planned targets are known to exist in the operational environment with engagement actions scheduled against them. Planned targets may be further divided into:

• **Scheduled targets** are prosecuted at a specific time.

• **On-call targets** have actions planned, but not for a specific delivery time.

Dynamic Targeting

Dynamic targeting is normally employed in *current operations* planning because the nature and time frame associated with current operations (usually the current 24-hour period) typically requires more immediate responsiveness than is achieved in deliberate targeting.

Targets may be described as two different categories: planned targets and targets of opportunity. Each has two separate subcategories:

Targets of opportunity refer to targets that meet the criteria to achieve objectives but were not selected for action during the current joint targeting cycle. Targets of opportunity can be divided into two subgroups:

• **Unplanned targets** are known targets and are included on a target list, but not selected for engagement because the target was not nominated, was nominated but did not make the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL), or was not expected to be available for engagement within the target cycle. However, changes to the target status (priority, access, permissions) could result in the need (or opportunity) to engage the target during the current cycle.

• **Unanticipated targets** are unknown or not expected to be present in the operational environment. These targets are not included on a target list and an evaluation of the target is needed to determine engagement requirements and timing.

See pp. 8-13 to 8-20 for related discussion of fires as a warfighting function.

I. The MAGTF Targeting Board

At the MAGTF command element, the targeting cell hosts a targeting board. The board assesses targeting effectiveness and updates priorities and the target list. Its basic process inputs subordinates' recommendations from target lists. It considers them with the commander's guidance and priorities, and produces a prioritized target list. [The MAGTF targeting board must integrate within the joint targeting board.]

II. MAGTF Targeting Process (D3A)

Ref: ADP 3-19, Fires (Jul '19), pp. 3-7 to 3-9.

The MAGTF uses the "decide, detect, deliver, and assess" (D3A) methodology for targeting within its AO using organic forces/capabilities. Normally, targeting within the MEF command element is performed by the force fires coordination center (FFCC) targeting cell. In a MEF, the focus is on the deep operation with necessary transition to the close operation. The MEF must integrate D3A with the air tasking cycle since the commander's primary tool for deep operations is aviation.

> The MAGTF uses the joint targeting process for targeting outside their AO or when targeting inside their AO using other services' forces/capabilities (other than joint air). The MAGTF interacts with the joint air tasking cycle during joint air operations.
>
> *See pp. 7-58 to 7-59 for an overview of the joint targeting process and pp. 7-60 to 7-61 for an overview of the joint air tasking cycle.*

D - Decide

Decide is the first function in targeting and occurs during the planning portion of the operations process. It is the most important function, requiring close interaction between the commander, intelligence, plans, operations, the fires cell, and staff judge advocate. It begins during the mission analysis portion of the MDMP and continues throughout the operation.

D - Detect

Detect is the second function in targeting and occurs initially during the prepare portion of the operations process, continuing throughout the operation. A key resource for fires planning and targeting is the intelligence generated through information collection to answer the targeting information requirements. Commanders express requirements for target detection and action as priority intelligence and information requirements. During large-scale combat operations, it might be challenging to prioritize the detection of targets and could require the opening of windows of opportunity for specific collection capabilities in support of fires. High-payoff targets must be integrated and support associated priority intelligence requirements. Their priority depends on the importance of the target to the friendly course of action and target acquisition requirements. Targets are prioritized through a quantitative and qualitative valuation methodology. An example of a valuation methodology is the target value analysis process that prioritizes targets based on the target's criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, and recognizability. Targeting working groups incorporate priority intelligence and information requirements that support acquisition of high-payoff targets into the overall information collection plan along with named areas of interest, target areas of interest, and engagement areas.

D - Deliver

Deliver is the third function in targeting and occurs primarily during the execution portion of the operations process. The main objective is to engage targets in accordance with the commander's guidance or engagement authority's direction. The selection of a weapon system or a combination of weapons systems leads to the tactical decision of time of engagement and then the technical solution for the selected weapon.

A - Assess

Assess is the fourth function of targeting and occurs throughout the operations process. The commander and staff assess the results of mission execution. The assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander's decisions throughout planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

Integrating
Process

III. Dynamic Targeting (Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, and Assess)

Targets identified too late, or not selected for action in time to be included in targeting, are prosecuted using dynamic targeting procedures, often referred to as find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess (or the "kill chain") by air and maritime component forces and the decide, detect, deliver, and assess methodology by land component forces. Dynamic targeting produces targets of opportunity that include unplanned targets and unanticipated targets and those targets that meet the criteria to achieve objectives but were not selected for action during the current joint targeting cycle.

The Dynamic Targeting Process

Commander's Targeting Guidance

- Intelligence feed (e.g., ISR collection)
- Detect (emerging target detection)

FIND

Probable Target

FIX
- Focus sensors
- Locate
- Identify
- Determine time available

Confirmed Target

TRACK
- Prioritize ISR
- Maintain track
- Maintain ID
- Update time available

Tracked Target

TARGET
- Deconflict
- Assess risk
- Select method
- Decide (final approval)

- Determine available resources
- Develop options to achieve desired effect(s)
- Weaponeer
- Satisfy target restrictions

Tasking

ENGAGE
- Order engagement (and transmit order)
- Confirm ID requirements met
- Monitor and manage engagement
- Attack target

Engaged Target

ASSESS
- Assess (tactical assessment)
- Report results
- Make re-attack recommendation

REATTACK

The JFC will issue SPINS for dynamic targeting, which should include minimum required criteria prior to target engagement. The timeline for engaging targets using dynamic targeting procedures could be minutes, versus hours, days, or longer, but the procedures for target acquisition (TA) and identification, including specific combat identification (CID), friendly force tracking (FFT), positive identification (PID), and target validation criteria, is still required. In some instances, a single aircrew could perform every step in the "kill chain," including being designated as the target engagement authority. Missions flown to specifically detect, locate, identify, and engage targets of opportunity include:

- Strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR)
- Airborne alert air interdiction (AI)
- Close air support (CAS)
- Suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD)

For additional information regarding SEAD, see JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, and ATP 3-01.4/MCRP 3-22.2A/NTTP 3-01.42/AFTTP 3-2.28, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses.

For more detailed information regarding dynamic targeting, see ATP 3-60.1/ MCRP 3-31.5/NTTP 3-60.1/AFTTP 3-2.3, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Dynamic Targeting.

Integrating Processes

IV. Risk Management Process

Ref: Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group, Operations & Tactics Instructor (OTI) Guide, Version 1 (Jul '11), pp. 66 to 67.

Risk Management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. (JP 3-0)

The five-step ORM process includes:

Step 1. Identify Hazards

Begin with an outline or chart of the major steps in the operation (operational analysis). Next, conduct a preliminary hazard analysis by listing all of the hazards associated with each step in the operational analysis along with possible causes for those hazards.

Step 2. Assess Hazards

For each hazard identified, determine the associated degree of risk in terms of probability and severity. Although not required, the use of the matrix provided below may be helpful in assessing hazards.

Step 3. Make Risk Decisions

First, develop risk control options. Start with the most serious risk and select controls that will reduce the risk to a minimum consistent with mission accomplishment. With selected controls in place, decide if the residual risk is acceptable and the benefit of the operation outweighs the risk. If risk outweighs benefit or if assistance is required to implement controls, communicate with higher authority in the chain of command.

Step 4. Implement Controls

The following measures can be used to eliminate hazards or reduce the degree of risk. These are listed by order of preference:

- **Engineering Controls**. Controls that use engineering methods to reduce risks by design, material selection, or substitution.
- **Administrative Controls**. Controls that reduce risks through specific administrative actions, such as:
  - Providing suitable warnings, markings, placards, signs, and notices.
  - Establishing written policies, programs, instructions and standard operating procedures.
  - Training personnel to recognize hazards and take appropriate precautionary measures.
  - Limiting the exposure to a hazard (either by reducing the number of assets or personnel exposed, or the duration of exposure).
- **Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)**. Serves as a barrier between personnel and a hazard. PPE should be used when other controls do not reduce the hazard to an acceptable level

Step 5. Supervise

Conduct follow-up evaluations of the controls to ensure they remain in place and have the desired effect. Monitor for changes, which may require further ORM. Take corrective action when necessary.

Integrating Processes

V. Risk Assessment Matrix

Ref: Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group, Operations & Tactics Instructor (OTI) Guide, Version 1 (Jul '11), pp. 68 to 69.

A Risk Assessment Matrix can be used to accomplish the second step of the ORM process. Using a matrix to quantify and prioritize the risk(s) does not lessen the inherently subjective nature of risk assessment. However, a matrix does provide a consistent framework for evaluating risk. Although different matrices may be used for various applications, any risk assessment tool should include the elements of hazard severity and mishap probability. The Risk Assessment Code defined in the matrix represents the degree of risk associated with a hazard considering these two elements. While the degree of risk is subjective in nature, the RAC does accurately reflect the relative amount of perceived risk between various hazards. Using the matrix, the RAC is derived as follows:

Hazard Severity

An assessment of the worst credible consequence that can occur as a result of a hazard. Severity is defined by potential degree of injury, illness, property damage, loss of assets, or effect on mission. The combination of two or more hazards may increase the overall level of risk. Hazard severity categories are assigned as Roman numerals:

- **Category I**. The hazard may cause death, loss of facility/asset, or result in grave damage to national interests.
- **Category II**. The hazard may cause severe injury, illness, property damage, damage to national or service interests, or degradation to efficient use of assets.
- **Category III**. The hazard may cause minor injury, illness, property damage, damage to national, service, or command interests, or degradation to efficient use of assets.
- **Category IV**. The hazard presents a minimal threat to personnel safety or health property, national, service, or command interests or efficient use of assets.

Mishap Probability

The probability that a hazard will result in a mishap or loss, based on an assessment of such factors as location exposure, affected populations, experience, or previously established statistical information. Mishap probability will be assigned a letter according:

- **Subcategory A**. Likely to occur immediately or within a short period of time. Expected to occur frequently to an individual item or person or continuously to a fleet, inventory, or group.
- **Subcategory B**. Probably will occur in time. Expected to occur several times to an individual item or person or frequently to a fleet, inventory, or group.
- **Subcategory C**. May occur in time. Can reasonably be expected to occur sometime to an individual item or person or several times to a fleet, inventory, or group.
- **Subcategory D**. Unlikely to occur.

Risk Assessment Code (RAC)

The RAC is an expression of risk that combines the elements of hazard severity and mishap probability. Using the matrix below, the RAC is expressed as a single Arabic number that can be used to help determine hazard abatement priorities.

		PROBABILITY			
		A	B	C	D
SEVERITY	I	1	1	2	3
	II	1	2	3	4
	III	2	3	4	5
	IV	3	4	5	5

RAC Definitions: 1 - Critical risk; 2 – Serious risk; 3 – Moderate risk; 4 – Minor risk; 5 – Negligible risk

Chap 8

Warfighting Functions

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), app. B.

Marine Corps warfighting functions encompass all military activities in the battlespace. Planners consider and integrate the warfighting functions when determining how to accomplish the mission. Integrating the warfighting functions ensures an integrated plan and helps achieve unity of effort and focus.

As stated in MCDP 1-2, Campaigning, Marine forces obtain maximum impact by harmonizing the warfighting functions to accomplish the desired objective within the shortest time possible and with minimum casualties. The six warfighting functions are command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. They apply equally across the range of military operations and are the building blocks for all types of operations, including prolonged, amphibious, distributed, information, and COIN.

Warfighting Functions

I	**Command and Control**
II	**Maneuver**
III	**Fires**
IV	**Intelligence**
V	**Logistics**
VI	**Force Protection**

I. Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction over assigned or attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. It is how the commander transmits his intent and decisions to the force and receives feedback. Command and control involves arranging personnel, equipment, and facilities to allow the commander to extend his influence over the force during the planning and conduct of military operations. Good planning facilitates command and control.

See pp. 8-3 to 8-10.

II. Maneuver

In JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, the DOD defines maneuver as the employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. Maneuver allows for the distribution or concentration of capabilities in support of a commander's CONOPS. The Marine Corps maneuver warfare philosophy expands the concept of maneuver to include taking action in any dimension, whether temporal, psychological, or technological, to gain an advantage. In COIN operations, for example, forces may achieve advantages through key leader engagements, provision of security, governance, economics, and the rule of law.

See pp. 8-11 to 8-12.

III. Fires

In JP 1-02, the DOD defines fires as the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. Fires harass, suppress, neutralize, or destroy in order to accomplish the targeting objective, which may be to disrupt, delay, limit, persuade, or influence. Fires include the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition systems, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft of all types, and other lethal and nonlethal means. Fires are normally used in concert with maneuver, which helps shape the battlespace, setting conditions for decisive action.

See pp. 8-13 to 8-20.

IV. Intelligence

Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the adversary and the operational environment and it identifies the adversary's COGs and critical vulnerabilities. It assists the commander in understanding the situation, alerts him to new opportunities, and helps him assess the effects of actions within the battlespace. This warfighting function supports and is integrated with the overall operational effort and must be focused on the commander's intelligence requirements.

See pp. 8-21 to 8-24.

V. Logistics

Logistics encompasses all activities required to move and sustain military forces. At the tactical level, logistics is combat service support (CSS) that deals with feeding, fueling, arming, and maintaining troops and equipment. Tactical logistics involves the actual performance of the logistic functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, general engineering, and other services.

See pp. 8-25 to 8-32.

VI. Force Protection

Force protection is the measures taken to preserve the force's potential so that it can be applied at the appropriate time and place. It includes those measures the force takes to remain viable by protecting itself from the effects of adversary activities and natural occurrences. Force protection safeguards friendly COGs and protects, conceals, reduces, or eliminates friendly critical vulnerabilities.

See pp. 8-33 to 8-36.

I. Command and Control

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), app. B and MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.4, The MAGTF Officer's Guide (Mar '10), pp. 35 to 39.

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Control involves arranging personnel, equipment, and facilities to allow the commander to extend his influence over the force during the planning and execution of military operations. Command and control is the overarching warfighting function that enables all of the other warfighting functions.

Command

Command has two vital components—decision making and leadership. Decision making is choosing if to decide, then when and what to decide. It also includes recognizing the consequences of the act of deciding, and anticipating the outcomes that can be expected from the implementation of the decision. Leadership is taking responsibility for decisions; being loyal to subordinates; inspiring and directing Marines toward a purposeful end; and demonstrating physical and moral courage in the face of adversity. Command remains a very personal function. Professional competence, personality, and the will of strong commanders represent a significant part of any unit's combat power. The commander goes where he can best influence the action, where his moral and physical presence can be felt, and where his will to achieve a decision can best be expressed, understood, and acted upon. The focus of command and control is on the commander—his intent, guidance, and decisions and how he receives feedback on the results of his actions. Commanders command while staffs coordinate and make necessary control adjustments consistent with the commander's intent.

Control

Control is inherent in command. Control allows the staff to monitor the status of the command, assess the gap between what was planned and what has been accomplished, and direct action to exploit new opportunities or correct deficiencies. Control serves its purpose if it allows the commander freedom to operate, delegate authority, lead from any critical point on the battlefield, and synchronize actions across his AO.

No single command and control option works best for all expeditionary operations. A MAGTF should be flexible in modifying its standing operating procedures to meet the specific requirements of each situation.

If the MAGTF is part of a multinational force, the Commander must be prepared to provide increased liaison officers or advisors. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational partners. Liaison and advisory teams must be adequately organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to overcome these detractors. Liaison teams must be provided with adequate and redundant communications means to ensure they maintain connectivity to the MAGTF. Deployment of a team

I. Command and Support Relationships

Command Relationships

The commander is responsible for accomplishing the assigned mission. While the commander may delegate authority to accomplish the mission, the commander cannot delegate responsibility for mission accomplishment. The authority given to a commander must match the assigned responsibility. Command relationships include—

Combatant Command (COCOM)

The COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in Combatant Commanders (CCDR) by United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, or by the President in the Unified Command Plan. This authority cannot be transferred or delegated, and it allows a CCDR to perform those functions of command over assigned forces that involve organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command.

Operational Control (OPCON)

OPCON is the command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command and involves—

• Organizing and employing commands and forces. Assigning tasks.

• Designating objectives.

• Giving authoritative direction necessary to mission.

Unless specifically delegated by the CCDR, OPCON does not include authoritative direction of logistic or administrative support, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. OPCON may be delegated to commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in COCOM.

Tactical Control (TACON)

TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or the military capability made available for tasking. TACON is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish the commander's assigned missions or tasks. TACON provides the authority to give direction for military operations and control designated forces.

TACON provides authority to control and direct the application of force or tactical use of combat support forces or capabilities. TACON does not include organizational authority or authoritative direction for logistic or administrative support. The parent unit commander maintains this authority unless otherwise specified. Functional component commanders typically exercise TACON over military forces or over capabilities made available to the joint force commander for tasking through functional component commanders. TACON may be delegated to commanders at any level at or below the level of combatant command. TACON is inherent in OPCON.

Support Relationships

A senior commander establishes a support relationship between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Support relationships establish priorities to commanders and staffs as they plan or execute joint operations. JP 1 describes this relationship as follows:

"The support command authority is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common superior CDR) is responsible for ensuring the supported commander and supporting CDRs understand the degree of authority that the supported CDR is granted."

IV. The Combat Operations Center (COC)

Ref: Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group (MCTOG), Tactical MAGTF Integration Course Handbook (Aug '18), pp. 2-8 to 2-13.

The COC functions as the commander's primary information management center for message traffic, reports, imagery, and orders. In an artillery battalion, the COC is also the battalion fire direction center, conducting all technical fire direction for its subordinate firing batteries (i.e. developing technical firing solutions for cannon and rocket artillery systems). An efficient COC accomplishes the following:

- Helps the commander and staff to plan, prepare, execute, and fight.
- Integrates, synchronizes, and leverages the six warfighting functions.
- Pushes, pulls, and manages the information flow throughout the battalion or regiment.
- Collects, analyzes, assimilates, and disseminates information (i.e. information management).
- Develops and manages the battalion or regiment's battlespace.
- Directs and controls fires.
- Controls, tracks, and directs all subordinate units, including attachments and units in DS.
- Maintains contact with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.
- Establishes and sustains the unit's battle rhythm.
- Maintains static and mobile COC capabilities.
- Executes and coordinates the commander's operational directives and policies.
- Alerts the commander concerning decisions that need to be made.
- Assesses the situation to ensure proper understanding of the battlespace.

COC Layouts and Configurations

The COC system assigned to regiments and battalions is the AN/TSQ-239 capability set, often referred to as a "capset." The version 3 is used at the regimental level, while the smaller version 4 is used at the battalion level. These are designed to be self-contained units transportable on towable trailers. While there are many possible configurations for the COC, Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group (MCTOG) recommends either the "Battle I" or "Battle U" configurations for a regimental COC and the "Power I" configuration for a battalion COC, as shown in the following figures.

Recommended for a Regimental COC:

COC in "Battle I" Configuration.

COC in "Battle U" Configuration.

Warfighting Functions

III. Fires

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), app. B and MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.4, The MAGTF Officer's Guide (Mar '10), pp. 45 to 50.

The Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Dictionary of Military Terms defines fires as the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or non-lethal effect on a target. Within Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF), weapon systems include direct and indirect fires, aviation and naval surface fires as well as nonlethal capabilities like electronic attack (EA), directed energy, and psychologi-cal operations (PSYOP). Desired effects can range from physical destruction and psychological paralysis resulting from lethal fires to influencing the will of the people through nonlethal actions. MAGTF targets include inanimate objects such as bridg-es, power grids or artillery pieces, as well as socially complex, adaptable targets like military units and civilian populations.

(MCWP 3-43.3)

Fires are the employment of firepower against air, ground, and sea targets. Fires delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities, as well as affect the enemy's will to fight. It includes the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition systems, direct and indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft of all types, and other lethal and nonlethal means, such as electronic warfare and physical destruction. Fires re normally used in concert with maneuver and help to shape the battlespace, setting conditions for decisive action.

Synchronizing fires with maneuver is critical to the successful prosecution of combat operations. Commanders synchronize organic and supporting joint fire assets with their scheme of maneuver to get maximum effects of fires. Generating effective firepower against an enemy requires that organic and supporting fires be coordi-nated with other warfighting functions such as intelligence, maneuver, and logistics. Subordinate fire support systems and processes for determining priorities, identifying and locating targets, allocating fires assets, attacking targets, and assessing battle damage must be fully integrated. The employment of all available fires through-out the depth of the battlespace as an integrated and synchronized whole is done through the process of fire support planning, coordination, and execution.

(MCDP 1)

I. Fire Support Planning

Fires support planning is the continuous process of analyzing, allocating and scheduling fire support to effectively integrate fires into the commander's concept of operations.

Fire planning occurs in three overlapping, sequential stages: conceptual, functional, and detailed. Conceptual planning establishes the aims, objectives, and intentions and involves developing broad concepts for action. Conceptual planning is primar-ily the province of the commander and generally corresponds to the art of war. The commander may provide a concept of fires as part of his guidance. Otherwise, fires planners will recommend the concept of fires for each course of action based on the commander's intent, vision of decisive and shaping actions, and any targeting guid-ance and priorities.

Functional planning is the design of plans for the employment of discrete functional activities. The commander and his staff perform functional planning, which is a com-

bination of the art and science of war. Fires planners design supporting functional plans for artillery, aviation, naval surface fire support, and all nonlethal capabilities that fall within the purview of their respective fire support organization.

Detailed planning translates the results of conceptual and functional planning into complete and practical plans. Detailed planning encompasses the specifics of implementation and generally corresponds to the science of war. Detailed planning does not establish objectives; it prescribes the actions or tasks that accomplish the objectives. Detailed planning for fires includes targeting, scheduling, FSCM(s), rehearsals, battle drills, and coordination with higher, adjacent, supporting and subordinate units to promote an integrated effort. (MCWP 3-43.3)

II. The Principal Command and Control Agencies for Fire Support

Under direction of the target information officer, the targeting cell, in close coordination with the target intelligence officer, helps plan future operations by incorporating the tactical targeting methodology of D3A with the six step, joint targeting cycle. It executes in current operations by integrating the time-driven air tasking order of the ACE with event driven need for fires in the operation.

Ground combat element (GCE) fire support coordination centers (FSCC) interact with the command element through the Force Fires Coordination Center (FFCC). The FFCC coordinates those matters that cannot be coordinated by FSCCs within the GCE and those matters that affect the MAGTF as a whole. The FFCC coordinates fires with higher, adjacent, and external commands. It maintains close coordination with the GCE for integrating fire support plans of the deep and close battle.

The GCE interfaces with the ACE through the Marine air command and control system (MACCS). Control and coordination of direct air support is achieved through tactical air control parties organic to GCE units, through the direct air support center, and through other MACCS agencies. The GCE coordinates naval surface fire support through naval gunfire liaison sections including U.S. Navy personnel communicating to support ships.

(MCWP 3-16)

III. The Marine Corps' Targeting Process

The MAGTF uses the "decide, detect, deliver, and assess" (D3A) methodology for targeting within its AO using organic forces/capabilities. The MAGTF uses the joint targeting process for targeting outside their AO or when targeting inside their AO using other services' forces/capabilities (other than joint air). The MAGTF interacts with the joint air tasking cycle during joint air operations.

The MAGTF Targeting Board

At the MAGTF command element, the targeting cell hosts a targeting board. The board assesses targeting effectiveness and updates priorities and the target list. Its basic process inputs subordinates' recommendations from target lists. It considers them with the commander's guidance and priorities, and produces a prioritized target list. [The MAGTF targeting board must integrate within the joint targeting board.]

(MCWP 3-16)

IV. Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCMs)

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), pp. 3-12 to 3-14 and Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group (MCTOG), Tactical MAGTF Integration Course Handbook (Aug '18), pp. 7-12 to 7-15.

Commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control combat operations. These measures delineate areas of operations or other areas in which commands will conduct their operations or coordinate maneuver or fires between adjacent units. Each of these measures has specific purposes. Therefore, it is critical Marines use these measures as they were designed and clearly articulate to all affected higher, adjacent, and subordinate units any modifications to the doctrinally-based measures.

Boundaries are the basic maneuver control measures used by commanders to designate the geographical area for which a particular unit is tactically responsible. They affect fire support in two ways:

- They are **restrictive** in that no fire support means may deliver fires across a boundary unless those fires are coordinated with the force having responsibility for the area within that boundary *(see following pages for examples).*

- They are **permissive** in that the maneuver commander has complete freedom of fire and maneuver within his boundaries, unless otherwise restricted by higher headquarters. Many times, boundaries negate the need for fire support coordination measures *(see following pages for examples).*

Ref: MCDP 1-0, fig. 3-3. Unit Boundaries and Fire Support Coordination Measures.

	Legend		
ACA	airspace coordination area	MIN	minimum
ALT	altitude	MEF	Marine expeditionary force
CFL	coordinated fire line	PL	phase line
EFF	effective	NFA	no-fire area
FFA	free fire area	RCT	regimental combat team
FSCL	fire support coordination line	RFA	restrictive fire area
MAX	maximum		

As shown in figure 3-3, fire support coordination measures facilitate the rapid engagement of targets while providing safeguards for friendly forces. They ensure fire support will not jeopardize the safety of personnel, will interface with other fire support means, and/or will not disrupt adjacent unit operations.

Warfighting Functions

IV. Intelligence

Ref: MCWP 5-10, Marine Corps Planning Process (Apr '18), app. B and MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.4, The MAGTF Officer's Guide (Mar '10), pp. 70 to 72.

Intelligence provides the commander with an understanding of the enemy and the battlespace and identifies the enemy's centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. It assists the commander in understanding the situation, alerts him to new opportunities, and helps him assess the effects of actions upon the enemy. Intelligence drives operations, is focused on the enemy, and supports the formulation and subsequent modification of the commander 's estimate of the situation by providing as accurate an image of the battlespace and the enemy as possible. It is a dynamic process used to assess the current situation and confirm or deny the adoption of specific COAs by the enemy. It helps refine the commander 's understanding of the battlespace and reduces uncertainty and risk.

For purposes of the MAGTF SMARTbook, see the following sections for additional discussion of the following intelligence warfighting function-related topics:
- Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB), pp. to 7-3 to 7-46.
- Collection Management, pp. 7-47 to 7-54.
- Intelliegence Disciplines, pp. 7-50 to 7-51.
- Reconnaissance and Surveillance, pp. 7-52 to 7-53.

I. Purposes of Intelligence

Intelligence has two primary purposes. The first is to support the Commanders decision making process by reducing uncertainty, and therefore reducing risk. The second is to assist in protecting friendly forces through counterintelligence. Intelligence must possess the following characteristics:
- **Objective** – free of bias
- **Thorough** – satisfies commanders information requirements
- **Accurate** – factually correct
- **Timely** – to support decision making
- **Useable** – provided in a useable format
- **Relevant** – to decision making
- **Available** – accessible to commanders

II. Collection Assets Organic to the MEF

MEF-Level Assets
Radio battalion, ground sensor platoon, imagery interpretation platoon, counterintelligence/human intelligence (CI/HUMINT) company, unmanned aircraft systems.

GCE Assets
Reconnaissance battalion, light armored reconnaissance battalion, counterbattery radar (artillery regiment), scout-sniper platoon (infantry battalion) and unmanned aircraft systems.

ACE Assets
Unmanned aircraft systems, F/A-18D with the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (ATARS), and rotary and fixed wing assets with listening pod.

III. Intelligence (during Joint Operations)

Ref: MCWP 3-40.7, Joint Force Land Component Commander Handbook, app. A.

The JFLCC is the JFC's focal point for adversary ground forces intelligence, target development, and battle damage assessment (BDA). He ensures required intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) support is provided to the JFC, functional components, and subordinate land component forces. Also, he defines intelligence responsibilities and prioritizes intelligence requirements of subordinate land forces. In addition, he provides representation for the land component and its subordinates at the JFC's daily joint coordination and targeting boards. The staff incorporates and synchronizes their human intelligence (HUMINT) and counterintelligence (CI) efforts with that of the commander-in-chief JTF J-2X.

The intelligence effort focuses on the integration of multisource information and multi-echelon intelligence into all-source intelligence products. These products provide clear, relevant, and timely knowledge of the adversary and operational environment. The intelligence products and services must be in forms that are readily understood and usable by the recipient in a timely manner without overloading the user and, at the same time, minimizing the information management workload.

The JFLCC and his J-2 staff must understand the intelligence requirements of superior, subordinate, and component commands; identify organic intelligence capabilities and shortfalls; and access theater and national systems to ensure appropriate intelligence and CI products are provided or available.

The JFLCC J-2 is responsible for supporting the commander and staff by ensuring the availability of reliable intelligence and timely indications and warning on the characteristics of the area. The J-2 also ensures adequate intelligence collection and reporting to identify enemy capabilities and intentions as quickly as possible. The actual composition of the J-2 is dictated by the organization and operations to be conducted by the JFLCC. At a minimum, a core element of analytical, ISR management, and administrative capabilities is required.

J-2 responsibilities may include the following:

- Prioritizing the JFLC command intelligence requirements. This includes reviewing the CCIR to ensure that intelligence requirements for production, collection, and support to force protection are identified and processed.

- Ensuring the intelligence support to targeting and BDA is performed. This responsibility includes analyzing the adversary situation to identify, nominate, and assess those vulnerabilities that can be exploited by direct military operations. The J-2 provides appropriate targeting intelligence support, including target intelligence packages, to the JFLCC, JFACC, JTCB, and components.

- Developing concept-of-intelligence support operations to include intelligence and CI support to force protection. • Executing intelligence battle handover. The J-2 follows established procedures for exchange of critical intelligence data

Joint Analysis and Control Element (JACE)

The joint analysis and control element (JACE) is the hub of intelligence production and ISR management in the JFLCC. The JACE is located at the JFLCC level and works directly for the J-2. This element is responsible for providing the complete ground adversary situation by integrating and adding to the combatant commander's intelligence organization. The JACE is formed from the Army Service component or corps analysis and control element or from the equivalent MAGTF intelligence support organization.

The JACE is a tailored subset of the intelligence support organization providing intelligence support to JFLCC operational forces and performs common intelligence func-

V. Logistics

Ref: MCDP 1-0, Marine Corps Operations (Aug '11), chap. 13 and MSTP Pamphlet 5-0.4, The MAGTF Officer's Guide (Mar '10), pp. 50 to 64.

Logistics encompasses all activities required to move and sustain military forces. At the tactical level, it is referred to as combat service support and involves elements properly staffed to arm, fuel and repair equipment; issue supplies; and provide general engineering, transportation, health support and other services to the MAGTF. A dependable uninterrupted logistics system helps the commander seize and maintain the initiative. Commanders should anticipate requirements in order to push the right support forward at the right time. Tactical and operational success depends on fully integrating concepts of logistics and operations. Commanders should develop a logistics system that can react rapidly in crises or can sustain efforts to exploit tactical success.

I. Levels of Logistic Planning

Although the Marine Corps generally focuses on the tactical level of logistics, it is imperative Marines understand the interaction of all three logistic levels. These levels interconnect like sections of a pipeline, tying together logistics at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

A. Strategic Logistics

Strategic logistics supports organizing, training, and equipping the force. It applies the national economic base-people, resources, and industry-toward fielding the desired operational capabilities. These capabilities include Department of Defense; the Military Services; functional component commands, such as the United States Transportation Command or other government agencies, as necessary or appropriate; and the private sector.

The Marine Corps supporting establishment and Headquarters, Marine Corps plan and conduct Marine Corps strategic logistics-with the exception of aviation-peculiar support, which is planned and conducted by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Navy supporting establishment, and the Navy Reserve. At the strategic level, the Marine Corps-

- Procures weapons and equipment, except aircraft and aviation ordnance.
- Recruits, trains, and assembles forces.
- Establishes bases, stations, and facilities, to include ranges and airspace, to stockpile resources and house, train, and maintain forces.
- Mobilizes forces.
- Oversees and coordinates employment of strategic-level transportation assets.
- Regenerates forces.
- Provides command and control to manage the flow of resources from the strategic, to the operational/theater, to the tactical levels, using nodes controlled by organizations, such as the Defense Distribution Center under the Defense Logistics Agency and the United States Transportation Command.

B. Operational Logistics

Operational logistics involves the preparation, movement, and positioning of forces and resources in the sequence, timeliness, and readiness-level necessary to accomplish established operational goals and objectives. It includes the support required to

sustain campaigns and major operations. Marine Corps operational logistics orients on force closure, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of Marine Corps forces in theater. Operational logisticians coordinate with logisticians at the tactical level to identify and communicate theater shortfalls to the strategic source. The focus of operational logistics is to balance the MAGTF deployment, employment, and support requirements to maximize the overall effectiveness of the force. Marine Corps operating forces, assisted by Headquarters, Marine Corps and the supporting establishment, are responsible for operational logistics. The Marine Corps component commander conducts operational logistics. In large operations, the Marine Corps component commander may establish a logistic support organization to perform operational logistic functions to support tactical logistics in the area of operations. During joint operations, the US Army will establish and control the theater/operational distribution nodes.

C. Tactical Logistics

Tactical logistics includes organic unit capabilities and the combat service support activities conducted in support of military operations. The goal of tactical-level logistics is to support maneuver forces in the battlespace.

The MAGTF task-organizes combat service support capabilities to accomplish assigned missions. Although no single MAGTF element has all of the logistic capabilities to operate independently for extended periods, each element can accomplish at least some basic self-support tasks.

The LCE provides general ground logistics to all MAGTF elements, while the ACE possesses logistic capabilities essential for aircraft operations. The MAGTF is able to deploy with accompanying supplies that enable it to conduct operations for 15 to 60 days, but resupply channels and the flow of supplies to support the MAGTF begin prior to the consumption of the MAGTF's organic supplies.

Refer to MCDP 4, and MCWP 4-1 for in-depth discussion on the levels of logistics.

II. The Functional Areas of Logistics

Logistics is normally categorized in six functional areas. *(See facing page for further discussion of planning considerations.)*

Supply

Supply consists of requirements determination (routine, pre-planned or long range), procurement, distribution, disposal, storage, and salvage. Supply is broken down into ten classes of supply which are discussed later in this chapter.

See following page (p. 8-29) for the classes of supply.

Maintenance

Maintenance involves those actions taken to retain or restore materiel to serviceable condition. Maintenance includes inspection and classification; servicing, adjusting, and tuning; testing and calibration; repair; modification; rebuild and overhaul; reclamation; recovery and evacuation.

Transportation

For a MAGTF, transportation is the requirement to put sustainability assets (personnel and materiel) in the correct location at the correct time to commence operations on time and to sustain operations. Transportation includes embarkation, landing support, motor transport, port and terminal operations, air delivery, material handling equipment as well as freight and passenger transportation.

General Engineering

General engineering is a wide range of tasks to sustain forward combat operations. This includes engineer reconnaissance, horizontal and vertical construction, facilities maintenance, demolition and obstacle removal, and explosive ordnance disposal.

III. Logistics Planning Considerations

Ref: Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group (MCTOG), Tactical MAGTF Integration Course Handbook (Aug '18), pp. 11-12 to 1-13.

Supply
• Identifying the required supply stocks (days of supply/days of ammunition)
• Identifying possible contracts.
• Identifying and training the contracting officer representative (i.e. COR).
• Consolidated memorandums of receipt (CMRs) are accounted for.
• CMRs are secured and stored properly.
• Responsible officers are assigned for CMRs.
• Ammunition ordering, handling, and reporting procedures.
• Repair part (Class IX) stocking.

Maintenance
• Establishing maintenance management procedures.
• Identifying maintenance requirements and relationships for attachments such as tank, LAR, and assault amphibian (AA) units.
• Identifying recovery/ repair methods in the operation order.
• Preparing maintenance contact teams.
• Identifying the readiness of the reportable ground principal end items and MEE.

Transportation
• Establishing the unit movement control center (UMCC).
• Establishing accounts in Transportation Capacity Planning Tool (TCPT) system.
• Posting the ground transportation order.
• Identifying the ground transportation request.
• Plan for any necessary rapid replenishment points (RRPs).
• Requests and coordination of air transportation is done through the S3 air officer.
• Identifying main supply routes and alternate supply routes.

Engineering
• Identifying utilities requirements, including—
• Mission essential mobile electric power support for unit HQs and other locations.
• Shower and laundry requirements.
• Any construction projects identified and planned for, including—
• Earthmoving projects (i.e. horizontal construction), to include roads and trails.
• Temporary structures (i.e. vertical construction).
• Line of communications bridges and infrastructure.
• Identifying construction materiel (Class IV) requirements.
• Identifying requirements for materials handling equipment (i.e.forklifts/cranes).

Health Services
• Setting up the regimental or battalion aid station.
• Identifying casualty collection points.
• Planning for medical or casualty evacuation and tracking.

Services
• Postal services.
• Mortuary affairs.
• Disbursing.
• Exchange services.

(MAGTF SMARTbook) Index

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
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
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MAGTF

The MAGTF Operations & Planning SMARTbook

Guide to Planning & Conducting Marine Air-Ground Task Force Operations

The Marine Corps organizes its operational forces as Marine Corps components and as **Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs)** in order to provide task organized, self-sustaining, multipurpose forces to the **joint force or naval expeditionary force**.

Expeditionary maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps capstone operational concept. The Marine Corps approach to the **range of military operations (ROMO)** links MAGTF capabilities with the collective, coordinated use of both traditional and non- traditional elements of national power into a cohesive foreign policy tool, and focuses on the ability to be **expeditionary through forward-deployed naval forces**.

The Marine Corps employs several planning processes. For units with staffs, the **Marine Corps planning process (MCPP)** is most appropriate. If time does not allow use of the full, six-step MCPP, the commander and the planners may use the **rapid response planning process (R2P2)**.

Marine Corps **warfighting functions** encompass all military activities in the battlespace. Commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions and synchronize the force to adapt to changing circumstances throughout the operations process. They use several **integrating processes** to do this.

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