Fifth Edition (w/Change 1)
Joint Doctrine Fundamentals
Joint Operations
Joint Planning
Joint Logistics
Joint Task Forces (JTFs)
Joint Air, Land, Maritime, & Special Operations
Multinational Operations
Interorganizational Cooperation
Fifth Edition with Change 1

(JFODS5-1) The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook

Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations

JFODS5-1 is Change 1 to our fifth revised edition of The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook. In addition to new/updated material from the latest editions of JP 3-0 Joint Operations (w/Change 1, Oct ’18), JP 4-0 Joint Logistics (Feb ’19), JP 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jan ’18), and JP 3-16 Multinational Operations (Mar ’19), JFODS5-1 features a completely new chapter on Joint Air, Land, Maritime and Special Operations (JPs 3-30, 3-31, 3-32 & 3-05). Additional topics and references include JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (w/Change 1, Jul ’17), JP 5-0 Joint Planning (Jun ’17), and JP 3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation (val. Oct ’17).

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The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests demand that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team across the conflict continuum. 

**Joint operations** are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not establish joint forces. The potential range of military activities and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in times of relative peace up through major operations and campaigns that typically involve large-scale combat.

**Joint planning** is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks.

**Joint logistics** is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments’ logistics resources to support the joint force. Sustainment provides the joint force commanders freedom of action, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach.

**A joint task force (JTF)** is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander.

Achieving national strategic objectives requires effective unified action resulting in unity of effort -- to include interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental and multinational partners. This is accomplished by interorganizational cooperation, synchronization, and coordination in the use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.

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**Joint Publications (JPs)**

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**Other Publications and Manuals**

| CJCSM 3122.05 | Dec 2011 | Operating Procedures for Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (Current as of 18 Nov 2014) |
| CJCSM 3130.03A | Feb 2019 | Planning and Execution Planning Formats and Guidance |

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I. Joint Doctrine
Theory & Foundations

Ref: JP 1 (w/Chg 1), Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the U.S. (Jul ’17), chap. I.

Joint Publication 1 provides overarching guidance and fundamental principles for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is the capstone publication of the US joint doctrine hierarchy and it provides an overview for the development of other joint service doctrine publications. It is a bridge between policy and doctrine and describes authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders use and other operational matters derived from Title 10, United States Code (USC).

I. Fundamentals

The purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of joint forces by providing fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces toward a common objective. With the exception of Joint Publication (JP) 1, joint doctrine will not establish policy. However, the use of joint doctrine standardizes terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes among all US forces to free joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to focus their efforts on solving strategic, operational, and tactical problems. Using historical analysis of the employment of the military instrument of national power in operations and contemporary lessons, these fundamental principles represent what is taught, believed, and advocated as what works best to achieve national objectives.

As a nation, the US wades war employing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives. The Armed Forces of the United States conduct military operations as a joint force. “Joint” notes activities in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate.

Joint matters relate to the integrated employment of US military forces in joint operations, including matters relating to:

- National military strategy (NMS)
- Deliberate and crisis action planning
- Command and control (C2) of joint operations
- Unified action with Department of Defense and interagency partners

The capacity of the Armed Forces of the United States to operate as a cohesive joint team is a key advantage in any operational environment. Unity of effort facilitates decisive unified action focused on national objectives and leads to common solutions to national security challenges.

Jointness and the Joint Force

The Armed Forces of the United States have embraced “jointness” as their fundamental organizing construct at all echelons. Jointness implies cross-Service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components). Some shared military activities are less joint than are “common;” in this usage “common” simply means mutual, shared, or overlapping capabilities or activities between two or more Services.

II. War

War can result from failure of states to resolve their disputes by diplomatic means. Some philosophers see it as an extension of human nature. Thomas Hobbes stated that man’s nature leads him to fight for personal gain, safety, or reputation.
IV. Instruments of National Power (DIME)


The ability of the United States to achieve its national strategic objectives is dependent on the effectiveness of the US Government (USG) in employing the instruments of national power. The appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council (NSC) direction, normally coordinate these instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). They are the tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will.

At the President’s direction through the interagency process, military power is integrated with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, the armed forces interact with the other responsible agencies to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. They also identify the ways in which military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other. The NSC plays key roles in the integration of all instruments of national power facilitating mutual understanding, cooperation, and integration of effort. This process of different USG agencies and organizations coordinating and working together is called “interagency coordination.” The use of the military to conduct combat operations should be a last resort when the other instruments of national power have failed to achieve our nation’s objectives.

### Instruments of National Power

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**D - Diplomacy**

Diplomacy is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance US values, interests, and objectives. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for the USG for foreign affairs. The credible threat of force reinforces, and in some cases, enables the diplomatic process. Leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States have a responsibility to understand US foreign policy and to assure that those responsible for US diplomacy have a clear understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military action. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are responsible for integrating military activities with diplomatic activities in their areas of responsibility (AORs). The US ambassador and the corresponding country team are normally in charge of diplomatic-military activities in countries abroad. When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the GCC employs military forces in concert...
with the other instruments of national power. In these circumstances, the US ambassador and the country team or another diplomatic mission team may have complementary activities (employing the diplomatic instrument) that do not entail control of military forces, which remain under command authority of the GCC. Since diplomatic efforts are often complementary with military objectives, planning should be complementary and coincidental.

I - Information
In a broad sense, the informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single center of control. The United States believes in the free market place of ideas. Therefore, information is freely exchanged with minimal government controls. Constraints on public access to USG information normally may be imposed only for national security and individual privacy reasons. Information readily available from multiple sources influences domestic and foreign audiences including citizens, adversaries, and governments. It is important for the official agencies of government, including the armed forces, to recognize the fundamental role of the media as a conduit of information.

The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. SC is focused USG processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advancing national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. SC’s primary communication capabilities are coupled with defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and military diplomacy activities to implement a holistic SC effort.

The predominant military activities that support SC themes and messages are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and DSPD. IO are those military actions to attack an adversary’s information and related systems while defending our own. PA are those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. DSPD comprises those activities and measures taken by DOD components to support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts.

M - Military
The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation’s wars. As the military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces must ensure their adherence to US values, constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of arms. The United States wields the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of military operations.

E - Economy
The United States free market economy is only partially controlled by governmental agencies. In keeping with US values and constitutional imperatives, individuals and entities have broad freedom of action worldwide. The responsibility of the USG lies with facilitating the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services worldwide. A strong US economy with free access to global markets and resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the enabler of a strong national defense, and an influence for economic expansion by US trade partners worldwide.

The USG’s financial management ways and means support the economic instrument of national power. The Department of the Treasury, as the steward of US economic and financial systems, is an influential participant in the international economy. In the international arena, the Department of the Treasury works with other federal agencies, the governments of other nations, and the international financial institutions to encourage economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crises.
Military planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. Regarding force planning for the future, DOD conducts capabilities-based planning (CBP). The essence of CBP is to identify capabilities that adversaries could employ against the US or a multinational opponent and to defend themselves; identify capabilities, US and multinational, that could be available to the joint or combined force to counter/defeat the adversary; and then identify and evaluate possible outcomes (voids or opportunities), rather than forecasting (allocating) forces against specific threat scenarios. Integral to a capabilities-based approach are joint capability areas (JCAs), DOD’s capability management language and framework. (National planning documents, fig. II-1, below.)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) consists of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS); the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS); the Chief of Staff, US Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, US Air Force; and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The Joint Staff supports the JCS and constitutes the immediate military staff of the SecDef. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, HSC, and SecDef.

The other members of the JCS are military advisors to the President, NSC, HSC, and SecDef as specified below.

- A member of the JCS may submit to the CJCS advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or in addition to, the advice or opinion presented by the CJCS. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the CJCS shall present that advice or opinion to the President, NSC, or SecDef at the same time that he presents his own advice. The CJCS shall also, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the NSC, or SecDef of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to any matter.
- The members of the JCS, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisors, shall provide advice on a particular matter when the President, NSC, HSC, or SecDef request such advice.
I. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

The CJCS is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular component of the United States Armed Forces. The CJCS is the principal military advisor to the President, the NSC, and the SecDef. The CJCS arranges for military advice, as appropriate, to be provided to all offices of the SecDef.

While holding office, the CJCS outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces. The CJCS, however, may not exercise military command over the CCDRs, JCS, or any of the Armed Forces.

Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the SecDef, the CJCS serves as the spokesperson for the CCDRs, especially on the operational requirements of their commands. CCDRs will send their reports to the CJCS, who will review and forward the reports as appropriate to the SecDef, subject to the direction of the SecDef, so that the CJCS may better incorporate the views of CCDRs in advice to the President, the NSC, and the SecDef. The CJCS also communicates, as appropriate, the CCDRs' requirements to other elements of DOD.

The CJCS assists the President and the SecDef in providing for the strategic direction of the Armed Forces. The CJCS transmits orders to the CCDRs as directed by the President or SecDef and coordinates all communications in matters of joint interest addressed to the CCDRs.

II. Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The VCJCS is appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the officers of the regular components of the United States Armed Forces.

The VCJCS holds the grade of general or admiral and outranks all other officers of the Armed Forces except the CJCS. The VCJCS may not exercise military command over the JCS, the CCDRs, or any of the Armed Forces.

The VCJCS performs the duties prescribed as a member of the JCS and such other duties and functions as may be prescribed by the CJCS with the approval of the SecDef. When there is a vacancy in the office of the CJCS, or in the absence or disability of the CJCS, the VCJCS acts as and performs the duties of the CJCS until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

The VCJCS is a member of the Joint Nuclear Weapons Council, is the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, and may be designated by the CJCS to act as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).

III. The Joint Staff

The Joint Staff is under the exclusive authority, direction, and control of the CJCS. The Joint Staff will perform duties using procedures that the CJCS prescribes to assist the CJCS and the other members of the JCS in carrying out their responsibilities.

The Joint Staff includes officers selected in proportional numbers from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force. Coast Guard officers may also serve on the Joint Staff. Selection of officers to serve on the Joint Staff is made by the CJCS from a list of officers submitted by the Services. Each officer whose name is submitted must be among those officers considered to be the most outstanding officers of that Service. The CJCS may specify the number of officers to be included on such a list.

After coordination with the other members of the JCS and with the approval of SecDef, the CJCS may select a Director, Joint Staff. The CJCS manages the Joint Staff and its Director. Per Title 10, USC, Section 155, the Joint Staff will not operate or be organized as an overall Armed Forces general staff and will have no executive authority.
Subject to the authority, direction, and control of SecDef and subject to the provisions of Title 10, USC, the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force, under their respective Secretaries, are responsible for the functions prescribed in detail in DODD 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components. Specific Service functions also are delineated in that directive.

See p. 1-16 for discussion of common functions of the military depts and Services.

USSOCOM is unique among the CCMDs in that it performs certain Service-like functions (in areas unique to SO) (Title 10, USC, Sections 161 and 167), including the following:

- Organize, train, equip, and provide combat-ready SOF to the other CCMDs and, when directed by the President or SecDef, conduct selected SO, usually in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the SO will be conducted. USSOCOM’s role in equipping and supplying SOF is generally limited to SO-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services.
- Develop strategy, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures for the conduct of SO, to include military information support operations (MISO) and CA forces. (Note: Joint doctrine is developed under the procedures approved by the CJCS.)
- Prepare and submit to SecDef program recommendations and budget proposals for SOF and other forces assigned to USSOCOM.
In accordance with the UCP, combatant commands are established by the President, through the SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the SecDef through the CJCS. JTFs can be established by the SecDef, a CCDR, subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

Geographic Combatant Commanders are assigned a geographic AOR by the President with the advice of the SecDef as specified in the UCP. Functional CCDRs support GCCs, conduct operations in direct support of the President or the SecDef normally in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the operation will be conducted, and may be designated by the SecDef as the supported CCDR for an operation.

See pp. 1-23 to 1-30 for further discussion of joint forces organization, roles and responsibilities, to include unified commands.

Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs)

GCCs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their geographical AORs. GCCs are responsible for a large geographical area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations within that area. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national, alliance, or coalition strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. As military force may not achieve national objectives, it must be coordinated, synchronized, and if appropriate, integrated with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, MNFs, and elements of the private sector.

Six combatant commanders have geographic area responsibilities. These combatant commanders are each assigned an area of responsibility (AOR) by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and are responsible for all operations within their designated areas: U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command.

U.S. Northern Command
northcom.mil

USNORTHCOM was established Oct. 1, 2002 to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM defends America’s homeland — protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action.

USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the president and secretary of defense.

U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
pacom.mil

USINDOPACOM encompasses about half the earth’s surface, stretching from the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. The 36 nations that comprise the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than fifty percent of the world’s population, three thousand different languages, several of the world’s largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties.

USINDOPACOM protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and partners, USINDOPACOM is committed to enhancing
stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness.

**U.S. Southern Command**
southcom.mil

USOUTHCOM is responsible for providing contingency planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South America, the Caribbean (except U.S. commonwealths, territories, and possessions), Cuba; as well as for the force protection of U.S. military resources at these locations. SOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal and canal area.

The U.S. Southern Command Area of Focus encompasses 31 countries and 10 territories. The region represents about one-sixth of the landmass of the world assigned to regional unified commands.

The services provide SOUTHCOM with component commands which, along with our Joint Special Operations component, two Joint Task Forces, one Joint Interagency Task Force, and Security Assistance Offices, perform SOUTHCOM missions and security cooperation activities.

**U.S. Central Command**
centcom.mil

USCENTCOM’s area of responsibility covers the “central” area of the globe and consists of 20 countries -- Afghanistan, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. There are also 62 coalition countries contributing to the war against terrorism.

With national and international partners, U.S. Central Command promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and nonstate aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity.

**U.S. European Command**
eucom.mil

USEUCOM is a Unified Combatant Command of the United States military, headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany. USEUCOM’s mission is to maintain ready forces to conduct the full range of operations unilaterally or in concert with coalition partners; enhance transatlantic security through support of NATO; promote regional stability; counter terrorism; and advance U.S. interests in the AOR. The area of responsibility (AOR) of the United States European Command includes 51 countries and territories. This territory extends from the North Cape of Norway, through the waters of the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, most of Europe, and parts of the Middle East. Several other countries and territories are considered to be part of EUCOM’s area of interest (AOI).

**U.S. Africa Command**
africom.mil

Based in Germany, with select personnel assigned to U.S. Embassies and diplomatic missions in Africa, USAFRICOM is responsible for coordinating military-to-military relationships between the United States and African nations and military organizations.

Africa Command’s military and civilian staff is dedicated to working closely with African nations and organizations, U.S. agencies and the international community to promote security and prevent conflict in support of U.S. foreign policy in Africa. U.S. Africa Command is prepared to respond to requests for support from African nations and from other U.S. government agencies by providing humanitarian or crisis response options.

Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs. In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10, USC, and as described in the UCP, CCMDs are established by the President, through SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Commanders of unified CCMDs may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by SecDef through the CJCS. JTFs can be established by SecDef, a CCDR, subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

See pp. 1-19 to 1-24 for discussion of the UCP, the six geographic combatant commands, and the three functional combatant commands. See chap. 5 for further discussion of joint task forces.

### Joint Commands

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<tr>
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<td>Specified Combatant Command</td>
<td>Subordinate Unified Command</td>
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<td>(There are currently no specified CCMDs designated.)</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force (JTF)</td>
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### Basis for Establishing Joint Forces

Joint forces can be established on either a geographic area or functional basis:

#### Geographic Area

Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. Note: Only GCCs are assigned AORs. GCCs normally assign subordinate commanders an operational area from within their assigned AOR.

- The UCP contains descriptions of the geographic boundaries assigned to GCCs. These geographic AORs do not restrict accomplishment of assigned missions; CCDRs may operate forces wherever required to accomplish their missions. The UCP provides that, unless otherwise directed by SecDef, when significant operations overlap the boundaries of two GCCs’ AORs, a JTF will be formed. Command of this JTF will be determined by SecDef and forces transferred to the JTF commander through a CCDR, including delegation of appropriate command authority over those forces.
Authority of the Commander of a Unified Command in an Emergency


In the event of a major emergency in the Geographic Combatant Command’s (GCC’s) AOR requiring the use of all available forces, the GCC (except for CDRUSNORTHCOM) may temporarily assume OPCON of all forces in the assigned AOR, including those of another command, but excluding those forces scheduled for or actually engaged in the execution of specific operational missions under joint OPLANs approved by the SecDef that would be interfered with by the contemplated use of such forces. CDRUSNORTHCOM’s authority to assume OPCON during an emergency is limited to the portion of USNORTHCOM’s AOR outside the United States. CDRUSNORTHCOM must obtain SecDef approval before assuming OPCON of forces not assigned to USNORTHCOM within the U.S. The commander determines when such an emergency exists and, on assuming OPCON over forces of another command, immediately advises:

• The CJCS
• The appropriate operational commanders
• The Service Chief of the forces concerned

The authority to assume OPCON of forces in the event of a major emergency will not be delegated. Unusual circumstances in wartime, emergencies, or crises other than war (such as a terrorist incident) may require a GCC to directly exercise COCOM through a shortened chain of command to forces assigned for the purpose of resolving the crisis. Additionally, the CCDR can assume COCOM, in the event of war or an emergency that prevents control through normal channels, of security assistance organizations within the commander’s general geographic AOR, or as directed by the SecDef. All commanders bypassed in such exceptional command arrangements will be advised of all directives issued to and reports sent from elements under such exceptional command arrangements. Such arrangements will be terminated as soon as practicable, consistent with mission accomplishment.

GCC Authority for Force Protection Outside the U.S.

GCCs shall exercise authority for force protection over all DOD personnel (including their dependents) assigned, attached, transiting through, or training in the GCC’s AOR, except for those for whom the chief of mission retains security responsibility. Transient forces do not come under the authority of the GCC solely by their movement across operational area boundaries, except when the GCC is exercising TACON authority for force protection purposes or in the event of a major emergency. This force protection authority enables GCCs to change, modify, prescribe, and enforce force protection measures for covered forces.

GCC Authority for Exercise Purposes

Unless otherwise specified by SecDef, and with the exception of the USNORTHCOM AOR, a GCC has TACON for exercise purposes whenever forces not assigned to that CCDR undertake exercises in that GCC’s AOR. TACON begins when the forces enter the AOR. In this context, TACON provides directive authority over exercising forces for purposes relating to force protection and to that exercise only; it does not authorize operational employment of those forces.

Assumption of Interim Command

In the temporary absence of a CCDR from the command, interim command will pass to the deputy commander. If a deputy commander has not been designated, interim command will pass to the next senior officer present for duty who is eligible to exercise command, regardless of Service affiliation.
III. Subordinate Unified Command

When authorized by SecDef through the CJCS, commanders of unified CCMDs may establish subordinate unified commands (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified CCMDs. A subordinate unified command (e.g., United States Forces Korea) may be established on a geographical area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified CCMDs and exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally over attached forces within the assigned joint operations area or functional area. The commanders of components or Service forces of subordinate unified commands have responsibilities and missions similar to those for component commanders within a unified CCMD. The Service component or Service force commanders of a subordinate unified command normally will communicate directly with the commanders of the Service component command of the unified CCMD on Service-specific matters and inform the commander of the subordinate unified command as that commander directs.

IV. Joint Task Force (JTF)

A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the SecDef, a CCDR, a subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

A JTF may be established on a geographical area or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall centralized control of logistics. The mission assigned to a JTF should require execution of responsibilities involving a joint force on a significant scale and close integration of effort, or should require coordination within a subordinate area or coordination of local defense of a subordinate area. The proper authority dissolves a JTF when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

The authority establishing a JTF designates the commander, assigns the mission, designates forces, and delegates command authorities. Based on the decision of the establishing JFC, the commander of a JTF exercises OPCON over assigned (and normally over attached) forces, or may exercise TACON over attached forces. The JTF commander establishes command relationships between subordinate commanders and is responsible to the establishing commander for the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. JTF commanders also are responsible to the establishing commander for the conduct of joint training of assigned forces.

See chap. 5 for further discussion of joint task forces.
I. Command Relationships

Command

Command is central to all military action, and unity of command is central to unity of effort. Inherent in command is the authority that a military commander lawfully exercises over subordinates including authority to assign missions and accountability for their successful completion. Although CDRs may delegate authority to accomplish missions, they may not absolve themselves of the responsibility for the attainment of these missions. Authority is never absolute; the extent of authority is specified by the establishing authority, directives, and law.

Unity of Command and Unity of Effort

Unity of command means all forces operate under a single CDR with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. During multinational operations and interagency coordination, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort — coordination through cooperation and common interests — is an essential complement to unity of command. Unity of command requires that two CDRs may not exercise the same command relationship over the same force at any one time.

Command and Staff

JFCs are provided staffs to assist them in the decision-making and execution process. The staff is an extension of the JFC; its function is command support and its authority is delegated by the JFC. A properly trained and directed staff will free the JFC to devote more attention to directing subordinate commanders and maintaining a picture of the overall situation.

- Chain of command is the succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised.
- Staffing is the term used to describe the coordination between staffs at higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters. Higher headquarters staff officers exercise no independent authority over subordinate headquarters staffs, although staff officers normally respond to requests for information.

Levels of Authority

The specific command relationship (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) will define the authority a commander has over assigned or attached forces.

See following pages (pp. 1-32 to 1-33) for further discussion.
**Command Relationships Overview & Assignment and Transfer of Forces**


## Levels of Authority

The specific command relationship (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) will define the authority a commander has over assigned or attached forces. An overview of command relationships is shown in Figure V-1, below.

### Command Relationships Synopsis

**Combatant Command (Command Authority)**

- Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process input
- Assignment of subordinate commanders
- Relationships with Department of Defense agencies
- Directive authority for logistics

**Operational control** when delegated

- Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
- Organize and employ commands and forces
- Assign command functions to subordinates
- Establish plans and requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities
- Suspend subordinate commanders from duty

**Tactical control** when delegated

Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission

**Support relationship** when assigned

Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another organization

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**Assignment and Transfer of Forces**

All forces under the jurisdiction of the Secretaries of the Military Departments (except those forces necessary to carry out the functions of the Military Departments as noted in Title 10, USC, Section 162) are assigned to combatant commands or CDR, US Element NORAD (USELEMNORAD) by the SecDef in the “Forces for Unified Commands” memorandum. A force assigned or attached to a combatant command may be transferred from that command to another CCDR only when directed by the SecDef and under procedures prescribed by the SecDef and approved by the President. The command relationship the gaining CDR will exercise (and the losing CDR will relinquish) will be specified by the SecDef. Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and JTFs may direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands and delegate the command relationship as appropriate.

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Command Relationships Overview

- Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders will exercise combatant command (command authority) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), will exercise operational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command and JFCs, normally through the Service component commander, will exercise OPCON over the attached forces.
- Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

A. Combatant Command (COCOM) - Command Authority
COCOM provides full authority for a CCDR to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations, normally JFCs, Service and/or functional component commanders.

See pp. 1-34 to 1-35 for further discussion.

B. Operational Control (OPCON)
OPCON is the command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCMD and may be delegated within the command. It is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish the mission.

See p. 1-36 for further discussion.

C. Tactical Control (TACON)
TACON is an authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements and maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks assigned by the commander exercising OPCON or TACON of the attached force.

See p. 1-37 for further discussion.

Support Relationships
Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a common superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The support command relationship is used by SecDef to establish and prioritize support between and among CCDRs, and it is used by JFCs to establish support relationships between and among subordinate commanders. There are four defined categories of support: general support, mutual support, direct support, and close support.

See p. 1-38 for further discussion.
Categories of Support


There are four defined categories of support that a CCDR may direct over assigned or attached forces to ensure the appropriate level of support is provided to accomplish mission objectives.

**General Support**
That support which is given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.

**Mutual Support**
That support which units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.

**Direct Support**
A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.

**Close Support**
That action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with the fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

Support Relationships Between Combatant Commanders
SecDef establishes support relationships between the CCDRs for the planning and execution of joint operations. This ensures that the supported CCDR receives the necessary support. A supported CCDR requests capabilities, tasks supporting DOD components, coordinates with the appropriate USG departments and agencies (where agreements have been established), and develops a plan to achieve the common goal. As part of the team effort, supporting CCDRs provide the requested capabilities, as available, to assist the supported CCDR to accomplish missions requiring additional resources. The CJCS organizes the JPEC for joint operation planning to carry out support relationships between the CCMDs. The supported CCDR has primary responsibility for all aspects of an assigned task. Supporting CCDRs provide forces, assistance, or other resources to a supported CCDR. Supporting CCDRs prepare supporting plans as required. Under some circumstances, a CCDR may be a supporting CCDR for one operation while being a supported CCDR for another.

Support Relationships Between Component Commanders
The JFC may establish support relationships between component commanders to facilitate operations. Support relationships afford an effective means to prioritize and ensure unity of effort for various operations. Component commanders should establish liaison with other component commanders to facilitate the support relationship and to coordinate the planning and execution of pertinent operations. Support relationships may change across phases of an operation as directed by the establishing authority. When the commander of a Service component is designated as a functional component commander, the associated Service component responsibilities for assigned or attached forces are retained, but are not applicable to forces made available by other Service components. The operational requirements of the functional component commander’s subordinate forces are prioritized and presented to the JFC by the functional component commander, relieving the affected Service component commanders of this responsibility, but the affected Service component commanders are not relieved of their administrative and support responsibilities.
III. Other Authorities

Other authorities outside the command relationships delineated above include:

A. Administrative Control (ADCON)
ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, USC. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a CCDR at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of CCDRs. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service commands assigned within Service authorities. Service commanders exercising ADCON will not usurp the authorities assigned by a CCDR having COCOM over commanders of assigned Service forces.

B. Coordinating Authority
Commanders or individuals may exercise coordinating authority at any echelon at or below the level of CCMD. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service (e.g., joint security coordinator exercises coordinating authority for joint security area operations among the component commanders). Coordinating authority may be granted and modified through an MOA to provide unity of effort for operations involving RC and AC forces engaged in interagency activities. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command may be exercised. It is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. Assignment of coordinating authority is based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

C. Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH)
DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.
Joint Operations / Joint Force
The primary way the Department of Defense (DOD) employs two or more Services (from at least two Military Departments) in a single operation is through joint operations. Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not establish joint forces. A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC).

I. Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges
The strategic environment consists of a variety of national, international, and global factors that affect the decisions of senior civilian and military leaders with respect to the employment of US instruments of national power in peace and periods of conflict. The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and can change rapidly, requiring military leaders to maintain persistent military engagement with multinational partners. Although the basic character of war has not changed, the character of conflict has evolved.

Transregional, Multi-domain, and Multi-functional (TMM)
The military environment and the threats it presents are increasingly transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) in nature. By TMM, we mean the crises and contingencies joint forces face today cut across multiple combatant commands (CCMDs); the physical domains of land, maritime, air, and space; and the information environment (which includes cyberspace), as well as the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and involve conventional, special operations, ballistic missile, electronic warfare (EW), information, strike, cyberspace, and space capabilities. The strategic environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist. The commander’s OE is influenced by the strategic environment.

By acquiring advanced technologies, adversaries are changing the conditions of warfare the US has become accustomed to in the past half century. Today’s threats can increasingly synchronize, integrate, and direct operations and other elements of power to create lethal and nonlethal effects with greater sophistication and are less constrained by geographic, functional, legal, or phasing boundaries. Conflict is now, and will remain, inherently transregional as enemies’ interests, influence,
II. Principles of Joint Operations

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ’18), pp. I-2 to I-3 and app. A.

Joint Warfare is Team Warfare. The Armed Forces of the United States—every military organization at all levels—are a team. The capacity of our Armed Forces to operate as a cohesive joint team is a key advantage in any operational environment (OE). Success depends on well-integrated command headquarters (HQ), supporting organizations, and forces that operate as a team. Integrating Service components’ capabilities under a single JFC maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the force. However, a joint operation does not require that all forces participate merely because they are available; the JFC has the authority and responsibility to tailor forces to the mission.

Principles of War
Joint doctrine recognizes the nine principles of war. Experience gained in a variety of IW situations has reinforced the value of three additional principles—restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy. Together, they comprise the 12 principles of joint operations.

Objective
The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal. The purpose of military operations is to achieve specific objectives that support achievement of the overall strategic objectives identified to resolve the conflict.

Offensive
The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results.

Mass
The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results. To achieve mass, appropriate joint force capabilities are integrated and synchronized where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time.

Maneuver
The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force.

Economy of Force
The purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts.

Unity of Command
The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose.

Security
The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage.

Surprise
The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

Simplicity
The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.
IV. Strategic Direction


National Strategic Direction
National strategic direction is governed by federal law, USG policy, internationally recognized law, and the national interest as represented by national security policy. This direction provides strategic context for the employment of the instruments of national power and defines the strategic purpose that guides employment of the military as part of a global strategy. Strategic direction is typically published in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance, but it may be communicated through any means available. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changes in the global environment, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

DOD derives its strategic-level documents from guidance in the NSS. The documents outline how DOD will support NSS objectives and provide a framework for other DOD policy and planning guidance, such as the National Defense Strategy; Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF); Defense Planning Guidance; Global Force Management Implementation Guidance; and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (simply known as the JSCP).

See p. 1-7 for further discussion.

National, Functional, and Theater-Strategic and Supporting Objectives
From this broad strategic guidance, more specific national, functional, and theater-strategic and supporting objectives help focus and refine the context and guide the military’s joint planning and execution related to these objectives or a specific crisis. Integrated planning, coordination, and guidance among the Joint Staff, CCMD staffs, Service chiefs, and USG departments and agencies translate strategic priorities into clear planning guidance, tailored force packages, operational-level objectives, joint operation plans (OPLANs), and logistical support for the joint force to accomplish its mission.

See pp. 3-4 to 3-10 for further discussion.

The CCDR’s Strategic Role
Based on guidance from the President and SecDef, GCCs and functional combatant commanders (FCCs) translate national security policy, strategy, and available military forces into theater and functional strategies to achieve national and theater strategic objectives. CCMD strategies are broad statements of the GCC’s long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC’s long-term vision for the global employment of functional capabilities guided by and prepared in the context of SecDef priorities outlined in the GEF and the CJCS’s objectives articulated in the National Military Strategy (NMS). A prerequisite to preparing the theater strategy is development of a strategic estimate. It contains factors and trends that influence the CCMD’s strategic environment and inform the ends, ways, means, and risk involved in pursuit of GEF-directed objectives.

Using their strategic estimates and theater or functional strategies, GCCs and FCCs develop CCPs consistent with guidance in the UCP, GEF, and JSCP, as well as in accordance with (IAW) planning architecture described in the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise. In some cases, a CCDR may be required to develop a global campaign plan. FCCs develop operational support plans based on guidance in the UCP and their priorities and objectives in the GEF. FCCs may be responsible for developing functional-related global or subordinate campaign plans or both. As required, both GCCs and FCCs develop contingency plans, which are branch plans to the overarching CCP.

See pp. 3-8 to 3-10 and pp. 3-31 to 3-42 for further discussion.
II. The Art of Joint Command

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. II.

“When all is said and done, it is really the commander’s coup d’oeil, his ability to see things simply, to identify the whole business of war completely with himself, that is the essence of good generalship.”

Carl von Clausewitz
On War

I. Art of Command

Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Accompanying this authority is the responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions. Command includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

While command authority stems from orders and other directives, the art of command resides in the commander’s ability to use leadership to maximize performance. The combination of courage, ethical leadership, judgment, intuition, situational awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary views helps commanders make insightful decisions in complex situations. These attributes can be gained over time through training, education, and experience. Joint training and joint doctrine are designed to enable the conscious and skillful exercise of command authority through visualization, decision making, and leadership. Effective commanders combine judgment and visualization with information to determine whether a decision is required, when to decide, and what to decide with sufficient speed to maintain the initiative. Information management (IM), situational awareness, and a sound battle rhythm facilitate decision making.

II. Commander-Centric Leadership

A commander’s perspective of challenges in the OE is broad and comprehensive due to the interaction with USG civilian leaders; senior, peer, subordinate, and supporting commanders; and interorganizational partners. Clear commander’s guidance and intent, enriched by the commander’s experience and intuition, enable joint forces to achieve objectives. Employing the “art of war,” which has been the commander’s central historical command role, remains critical regardless of technological and informational improvements in control—the “science of war.”

The C2 function is commander-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decision making at the lowest appropriate level. Although joint forces have grown accustomed to communicating freely without fear of jamming or interception, US enemies and adversaries are likely to use technological advances in cyberspace and vulnerabilities in the EMS to conduct cyberspace or EMS attacks. Commanders should be prepared to operate in an environment degraded by electromagnetic interference. This is especially true at the lower echelons. If a commander loses reliable communications, mission command enables military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders. Mission command is built on subordinate leaders at all echelons who exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission. Mission-type orders focus on the purpose of the operation rather than details of how to perform assigned tasks.
The JFC leads using operational art and operational design, joint planning, rigorous assessment of progress, and timely decision making.

III. Operational Art

Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means. It is a thought process to mitigate the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex OE and develop insight into the problems at hand. Operational art also promotes unified action by enabling JFCs and staffs to consider the capabilities, actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interagency partners and other interorganizational participants, when they determine objectives, establish priorities, and assign tasks to subordinate forces. It facilitates the coordination, synchronization, and, where appropriate, the integration of military operations with activities of other participants, thereby promoting unity of effort.

The foundation of operational art encompasses broad vision; the ability to anticipate; and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their staffs organize their thoughts and envision the conditions necessary to accomplish the mission and reach the desired military end state in support of national objectives. Without operational art, campaigns and operations could be sets of disconnected events. Operational art informs the deployment of forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve military operational and strategic objectives.

Commander’s Role

The commander is the central figure in operational art, not only due to education and experience but also because the commander’s judgment and decisions guide the staff throughout joint planning and execution. Commanders leverage their knowledge, experience, judgment, and intuition to focus effort and achieve success. Operational art helps broaden perspectives to deepen understanding and enable visualization. Commanders compare similarities of the existing situation with their own experiences or history to distinguish unique features and then tailor innovative and adaptive solutions to each situation.

The commander’s ability to think creatively enhances the ability to employ operational art in order to answer the following questions (Ends, Ways, Means):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ends, Ways and Means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operational art applies to all aspects of joint operations and integrates ends, ways, and means, while accounting for risk, across the levels of war. Among the many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What are the objectives and desired military end state? (Ends)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those objectives and military end state? (Ways)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results in performing that sequence of actions? (Risk)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Operational art encompasses operational design—the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation or campaign plan and its subsequent execution. Together, operational art and operational design strengthen the relationship between strategic objectives and the tactics employed to achieve them.

See pp. 3-43 to 3-68 for further discussion of operational art and operational design from JP 5-0.
III. Joint Functions

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. III.

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions common to joint operations at all levels of warfare fall into seven basic groups—C2, information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as C2, information, and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the JFC’s mission requires. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function, and some could apply to more than one joint function.

The joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the functions is essential to mission accomplishment. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose from a wide variety of joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways to perform joint functions and accomplish the mission. Plans describe how the JFC uses military capabilities (i.e., organizations, people, and systems) to perform tasks associated with each joint function. However, forces and other assets are not characterized by the functions for which the JFC is employing them. Individual Service capabilities can often support multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task.

JFCs and staffs integrate, synchronize, employ, and assess a wide variety of information-related capabilities (IRCs) within and across joint functions, in concert with other actions to influence a target audience’s decision making while protecting our own. IRCs constitute tools, techniques, or activities employed through the information environment that can be used to create effects, accomplish tasks, or achieve specific objectives at a specific time and place.
D. Risk Management

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. III-19 to III-20. See also p. 3-41.

Risk management is the process to identifying and assessing hazards arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. It assists organizations and individuals in making informed decisions to reduce or offset risk, thereby increasing operational effectiveness and the probability of mission success. The commander determines the level of risk that is acceptable, with respect to aspects of operations, and should state this determination in commander’s intent. Risk is one of the key outputs of mission analysis and should be reviewed at every successive step in the JPP. The assessment of risk to mission includes an overall risk to mission analysis (e.g., low, moderate, significant, or high) along multiple criteria (e.g., authorities and permissions; policy; forces, basing, and agreements; resources; capabilities; PN contributions; and other USG support). To assist in risk management, commanders and their staffs may develop or institute a risk management process tailored to their mission or OA.


Risk management is a function of command and a key planning consideration that focuses on designing, implementing, and monitoring risk decisions. Risk management helps commanders preserve lives and resources; accept, avoid, or mitigate (reduce or transfer) unnecessary risk; identify feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist; and develop valid COAs. Prevention of friendly fire incidents is a key consideration in risk management. However, risk management does not inhibit a commander’s flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether (or support a zero-defects mindset), dictate a go/no-go decision to take a specific action, sanction or justify violating the law, or remove the necessity for standard operating procedures (SOPs).

Safety preserves military power. High-tempo operations may increase the risk of injury and death due to mishaps. Command interest, discipline, risk mitigation measures, education, and training lessen those risks. The JFC reduces the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, implementing a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel.
II. Information

All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects strategic outcomes.

The information function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors and to support human and automated decision making. The information function helps commanders and staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of information, its military uses, and its application during all military operations. This function provides JFCs the ability to integrate the generation and preservation of friendly information while leveraging the inherent informational aspects of military activities to achieve the commander’s objectives and attain the end state.

A. The Information Environment

The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three interrelated dimensions which continuously interact with individuals, organizations, and systems. These dimensions are the physical, informational, and cognitive. The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.

The Information Environment

1. The Physical Dimension

2. The Informational Dimension

3. The Cognitive Dimension

B. Information Function Activities

The information function includes activities that facilitate the JFC’s understanding of the role of information in the OE, facilitate the JFC’s ability to leverage information to affect behavior, and support human and automated decision making. See pp. 2-22 to 2-23 for an overview and further discussion of these information function activities.
C. Information Operations (IO)

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. III-17 to III-22.

All military activities produce information. Informational aspects are the features and details of military activities observers interpret and use to assign meaning and gain understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects strategic outcomes.

The information function encompasses the management and application of information and its deliberate integration with other joint functions to change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired behaviors and to support human and automated decision making.

The instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) provide leaders in the US with the means and ways of dealing with crises around the world. Employing these means in the information environment requires the ability to securely transmit, receive, store, and process information in near real time. The nation’s state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of this new technology, and will use information-related capabilities (IRCs) to gain advantages in the information environment, just as they would use more traditional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environments. As the strategic environment continues to change, so does information operations (IO).

Regardless of its mission, the joint force considers the likely impact of all operations on relevant actor perceptions, attitudes, and other drivers of behavior. The JFC then plans and conducts every operation in ways that create desired effects that include maintaining or inducing relevant actor behaviors. These ways may include the timing, duration, scope, scale, and even visibility of an operation; the deliberately planned presence, posture, or profile of assigned or attached forces in an area; the use of signature management in deception operations; the conduct of activities and operations to similarly impact behavioral drivers; and the employment of specialized capabilities -- e.g., key-leader engagements (KLE), cyberspace operations (CO), military information support operations (MISO), electronic warfare (EW), and civil affairs (CA) -- to reinforce the JFC’s efforts.

Inform activities involve the release of accurate information to domestic and international audiences to put joint operations in context; facilitate informed perceptions about military operations; and counter adversarial misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda. Inform activities help to assure the trust and confidence of the US population, allies, and partners and to deter and dissuade adversaries and enemies.

The joint force attacks and exploits information, information networks, and systems to affect the ability of relevant actors to leverage information in support of their own objectives. This includes the manipulation, modification, or destruction of information or disruption of the flow of information for the purpose of gaining a position of military advantage. This also includes targeting the credibility of information.

See following pages (pp. 2-20 to 2-21) for an overview of the integrating, coordinating, and planning functions of information operations (IO) from JP3-13.1.
Joint force commanders (JFCs) may establish an IO staff to provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates and supporting organizations on all aspects of IO. Most combatant commands (CCMDs) include an IO staff to serve as the focal point for IO. Faced with an ongoing or emerging crisis within a geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) area of responsibility, a JFC can establish an IO cell to provide additional expertise and coordination across the staff and interagency.

In order to provide planning support, the IO staff includes IO planners and a complement of information-related capabilities (IRCs) specialists to facilitate seamless integration of IRCs to support the JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS). IRC specialists can include, but are not limited to, personnel from the EW, cyberspace operations (CO), military information support operations (MISO), civil-military operations (CMO), military deception (MILDEC), intelligence, and public affairs (PA) communities.

Refer to Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 3: Information Operations (Multi-Domain Guide to IO & Information-Related Capabilities), when published.

All military activities produce information. Informational aspects affect the perceptions and attitudes that drive behavior and decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of military activities to gain an advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this advantage to others. Leveraging the informational aspects of military activities ultimately affects strategic outcomes.
E. Cyberspace Operations (CO) and Electronic Warfare (EW) Operations

Ref: JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations (Jun ’18).

United States armed forces operate in an increasingly network-based world. The proliferation of information technologies is changing the way humans interact with each other and their environment, including interactions during military operations. This broad and rapidly changing operational environment requires that today’s armed forces must operate in cyberspace and leverage an electromagnetic spectrum that is increasingly competitive, congested, and contested.

Cyberspace

Cyberspace reaches across geographic and geopolitical boundaries and is integrated with the operation of critical infrastructures, as well as the conduct of commerce, governance, and national defense activities. Access to the Internet and other areas of cyberspace provides users operational reach and the opportunity to compromise the integrity of critical infrastructures in direct and indirect ways without a physical presence. The prosperity and security of our nation are significantly enhanced by our use of cyberspace, yet these same developments have led to increased exposure of vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace, for the US in general and the joint force in particular.

Cyberspace Operations (CO)

Cyberspace Operations (CO) are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. CO comprise the military, national intelligence, and ordinary business operations of DOD in and through cyberspace. Although commanders need awareness of the potential impact of the other types of DOD CO on their operations, the military component of CO is the only one guided by joint doctrine and is the focus of JP 3-12. CCDRs and Services use CO to create effects in and through cyberspace in support of military objectives. Military operations in cyberspace are organized into missions executed through a combination of specific actions that contribute to achieving a commander’s objective. Various DOD agencies and components conduct national intelligence, ordinary business, and other activities in cyberspace.

The Relationship of Cyberspace Operations to Operations in the Information Environment

Cyberspace is wholly contained within the information environment. CO and other information activities and capabilities create effects in the information environment in support of joint operations. Their relationship is both an interdependency and a hierarchy; cyberspace is a medium through which other information activities and capabilities may operate. These activities and capabilities include, but are not limited to, understanding information, leveraging information to affect friendly action, supporting human and automated decision making, and leveraging information (e.g., military information support operations [MISO] or military deception [MILDEC]) to change enemy behavior. CO can be conducted independently or synchronized, integrated, and deconflicted with other activities and operations.

While commanders may conduct CO specifically to support information-specific operations, some CO support other types of military objectives and are integrated through appropriate cells and working groups. The lack of synchronized CO with other military operations planning and execution can result in friendly force interference and may counter the simplicity, agility, and economy of force principles of joint operations.
Cyberspace Missions

All actions in cyberspace that are not cyberspace-enabled activities are taken as part of one of three cyberspace missions: OCO, DCO, or DODIN operations. These three mission types comprehensively cover the activities of the cyberspace forces. The successful execution of CO requires integration and synchronization of these missions. Military cyberspace missions and their included actions are normally authorized by a military order (e.g., execute order [EXORD], operation order [OPORD], tasking order, verbal order), referred to hereafter as mission order, and by authority derived from DOD policy memorandum, directive, or instruction. Cyberspace missions are categorized as OCO, DCO, or DODIN operations based only on the intent or objective of the issuing authority, not based on the cyberspace actions executed, the type of military authority used, the forces assigned to the mission, or the cyberspace capabilities used.

Cyberspace Missions

A. DODIN Operations
B. Offensive Cyberspace Operations (OCO)
C. Defensive Cyberspace Operations (DCO)

Most DOD cyberspace actions use cyberspace to enable other types of activities, which employ cyberspace capabilities to complete tasks but are not undertaken as part of one of the three CO missions: OCO, DCO, or DODIN operations.

Cyberspace Actions

A. Cyberspace Security
B. Cyberspace Defense
C. Cyberspace Exploitation
D. Cyberspace Attack

Refer to CYBER1: The Cyberspace Operations & Electronic Warfare SMARTbook (Multi-Domain Guide to Offensive/Defensive CEMA and CO). Topics and chapters include cyber intro (global threat, contemporary operating environment, information as a joint function), joint cyberspace operations (CO), cyberspace operations (OCO/DCO/DODIN), electronic warfare (EW) operations, cyber & EW (CEMA) planning, spectrum management operations (SMO/JEMSO), DoD information network (DODIN) operations, acronyms/abbreviations, and a cross-referenced glossary of cyber terms.
II. Understanding an Operational Environment (OE)

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. IV-1 to IV-4.

Factors that affect joint operations extend far beyond the boundaries of the JFC’s assigned JOA. The JFC’s OE is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas of the air, land, maritime, and space domains; the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the EMS; and other factors. Included within these are enemy, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. The nature and interaction of these systems will affect how the commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations.

A Systems Perspective (PMESII)

A system is a functionally, physically, or behaviorally related group of regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a unified whole. One way to think of the OE is as a set of complex and constantly interacting political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems as depicted in Figure IV-1. The interaction of these systems can then be viewed as a network or networks based on the participants. The nature and interaction of these systems affect how the commander plans, organizes, and conducts joint operations. The JFC’s intergovernmental partners and other civilian participants routinely focus on systems other than military, so the JFC and staff should understand these systems and how military operations affect them. Equally important is understanding how elements in other PMESII systems can help or hinder the JFC’s mission. A commonly shared understanding among stakeholders in the operation can influence actions beyond the JFC’s directive authority and promote a unified approach to achieve objectives.

See pp. 3-52 to 3-53 for discussion of using PMESII as a tool in analyzing the current and future operational environment.

Physical Areas and Factors

Physical Areas
The fundamental physical area in the OE is the JFC’s assigned Operational Area (OA). This term encompasses more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which joint forces conduct military operations. See following pages (pp. 2-40 to 2-41) for further discussion.

Physical Factors
The JFC and staff must consider many factors associated with operations in the air, land, maritime, and space domains and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). These factors include terrain (including urban settings), population, weather, topography, hydrology, EMS, and other environmental conditions in the OA; distances associated with the deployment to the OA and employment of joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other supporting infrastructure; the physical results of combat operations; and both friendly and enemy forces and other capabilities. Combinations of these factors affect operations and sustainment.
**Information Environment**

The information environment comprises and aggregates numerous social, cultural, cognitive, technical, and physical attributes that act upon and impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world views, and, ultimately, actions of an individual, group, system, community, or organization. The information environment also includes technical systems and their use of data. The information environment directly affects all OEs.

*See p. 2-18 to 2-19 for related discussion of the information environment.*

**Information is Pervasive throughout the OE**

To operate effectively requires understanding the interrelationship of the informational, physical, and human aspects that are shared by the OE and the information environment. Informational aspects reflect the way individuals, information systems, and groups communicate and exchange information. Physical aspects are the material characteristics of the environment that create constraints on and freedoms for the people and information systems that operate in it. Finally, human aspects frame why relevant actors perceive a situation in a particular way. Understanding the interplay between the informational, physical, and human aspects provides a unified view of the OE.

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**Cyberspace**

Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment. It consists of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Most aspects of joint operations rely in part on cyberspace, which reaches across geographic and geopolitical boundaries—much of it residing outside of US control—and is integrated with the operation of critical infrastructures, as well as the conduct of commerce, governance, and national security. Commanders must consider their critical dependencies on information and cyberspace, as well as factors such as degradations to confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information and information systems, when they plan and organize for operations.

**Cyberspace Operations (CO)**

Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in cyberspace, accomplish the JFC’s objectives, deny freedom of action to enemies and adversaries, and enable other operational activities. CO include DODIN operations to secure and operate DOD cyberspace. CO rely on links and nodes that reside in the physical domains and perform functions in cyberspace and the physical domains. Similarly, activities in the physical domains can create effects in and through cyberspace by affecting the EMS or the physical infrastructure.

**Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)**

The EMS is the range of all frequencies of electromagnetic radiation. Electromagnetic radiation consists of oscillating electric and magnetic fields characterized by frequency and wavelength. The EMS is usually subdivided into frequency bands based on certain physical characteristics and includes radio waves, microwaves, millimeter waves, infrared radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-rays, and gamma rays.

*See pp. 2-26 to 2-27 for related discussion of cyberspace operations and electronic warfare.*
Threats to US and allied interests throughout the world can sometimes only be countered by US forces able to respond to a wide variety of challenges along a conflict continuum that spans from peace to war. Our national interests and the nature of crises that can occur along this continuum require our nation’s Armed Forces to be proficient in a wide variety of activities, tasks, missions, and operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity.

I. The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that helps relate military activities and operations in scope and purpose. The potential range of military activities and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in times of relative peace up through large-scale combat operations.

Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities develop local and regional situational awareness, build networks and relationships with partners, shape the OE, keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict, and maintain US global influence. Many missions associated with crisis response and limited contingencies, such as DSCA and FHA, may not require combat. But others, such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be dangerous and may require combat operations to protect US forces. Large-scale combat often occurs in the form of major operations and campaigns that achieve national objectives or contribute to a larger, long-term effort (e.g., OEF).

The complex nature of the strategic environment may require US forces to conduct different types of joint operations and activities simultaneously across the conflict continuum. Although this publication discusses specific types of operations and activities under the various categories in the range of military operations, each type is not doctrinally fixed and could shift within that range.

- **Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence.** See pp. 2-57 to 2-62.
- **Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations.** See pp. 2-63 to 2-68.
- **Large-Scale Combat Operations.** See pp. 2-69 to 2-88.
VII. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. V-17 to V-20.

A. Linear Operations

In linear operations, each commander directs and sustains combat power toward enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations with identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs). In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of friendly forces in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. Protected LOCs, in turn, increase the endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of action for extended periods. A linear OA organization may be best for some operations or certain phases of an operation. Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US forces lack the information needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely outnumbered. Linear operations also are appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy force or when the threat to LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these circumstances, linear operations allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat power more easily.

B. Nonlinear Operations

In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without geographic reference to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on creating specific effects on multiple decisive points. Nonlinear operations emphasize simultaneous operations along multiple LOOs from selected bases (ashore or afloat). Simultaneity overwhelms opposing C2 and allows the JFC to retain the initiative. In nonlinear operations, sustaining functions may depend on sustainment assets moving with forces or aerial delivery. Noncombatants and the fluidity of nonlinear operations require careful judgment in clearing fires, both direct and indirect. Situational awareness, coupled with precision fires, frees commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift maneuver against several decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire can induce paralysis and shock among enemy troops and commanders.

During nonlinear offensive operations, attacking forces must focus offensive actions against decisive points, while allocating the minimum essential combat power to defensive operations. Reserves must have a high degree of mobility to respond where needed. JFCs may be required to dedicate combat forces to provide for LOC and base defense. Vulnerability increases as operations extend and attacking forces are exposed over a larger OA. Linkup operations, particularly those involving vertical envelopments, require extensive planning and preparation. The potential for friendly fire incidents increases due to the fluid nature of the nonlinear OA and the changing disposition of attacking and defending forces. The presence of civilians in the OA further complicates operations.

During nonlinear defensive operations, defenders focus on destroying enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with other friendly units. Successful nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to understand the JFCs intent and maintain a common operational picture (COP). Noncontiguous defenses are generally mobile defenses; however, some subordinate units may conduct area defenses to hold key terrain or canalize attackers into engagement areas. Nonlinear defenses place a premium on reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain contact with the enemy, produce relevant information, and develop and maintain a COP. The defending force focuses almost exclusively on defeating the enemy force rather than retaining large areas. Although less challenging than in offensive operations, LOC and sustainment security will still be a test and may require allocation of combat forces to protect LOCs and other high-risk functions or bases. The JFC must establish clear command relationships to properly account for the added challenges to base, base cluster, and LOC security.
Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

JFCs consider incorporating combinations of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations as they conduct operational design. They choose the combination that fits the OE and the purpose of the operation. Association of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations creates these combinations:

**Linear Operations in Contiguous AOs**
- Typify sustained offensive and defensive operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically organized forces.
- The contiguous areas and continuous FLOT focus combat power and protect sustainment functions.

**Linear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs**
- This figure depicts a JFC’s OA with subordinate component commanders conducting linear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains responsibility for that portion of the OA outside the subordinate commanders’ AOs.

**Nonlinear Operations in Contiguous AOs**
- This figure illustrates the JFC’s entire assigned OA divided into subordinate AOs. Subordinate component commanders are conducting nonlinear operations within their AOs. This combination typically is applied in stability activities and DSCA actions.

**Nonlinear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs**
- This figure depicts a JFC’s OA with subordinate component commanders conducting nonlinear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains responsibility for that portion of the operational area outside the subordinate commanders’ AOs.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities provide the foundation of the CCDR’s theater campaign. The goal is to prevent and deter conflict by keeping adversary activities within a desired state of cooperation and competition. The joint operation model described in section V, “Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum,” has limited application with respect to phasing these activities for normal cooperative and competitive environments. Figure VI-1 shows a notional depiction of activities in an environment of cooperation and competition. DOD forces, as part of larger whole-of-government efforts, conduct operations with partners to prevent, deter, or turn back escalatory activity by adversaries.

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ’18), pp. VI-1 to VI-3.
VII. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Ops

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), chap. VII.

Crisis response and limited contingency operations typically are focused in scope and scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or operational-level objective in an OA. They may be conducted as a stand-alone response to a crisis (e.g., NEO) or executed as an element of a larger, more complex operation. Joint forces conduct crisis response and limited contingency operations to achieve operational and, sometimes, strategic objectives.

CCDRs plan for various situations that require military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or other contingencies and crises as directed by appropriate authority. The level of complexity, duration, and resources depends on the circumstances. Limited contingency operations ensure the safety of US citizens and US interests while maintaining and improving the ability to operate with multinational partners to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors. Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities operating in close cooperation with interorganizational participants. APEX integrates planning into one unified construct to facilitate unity of effort and transition from planning to execution. Planning functions can be performed in series over a period of time or they can be compressed, performed in parallel, or truncated as appropriate.

Initial Response
When crises develop and the President directs, CCDRs respond. If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs employ joint forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to train in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that threatens regional stability, US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (e.g., Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is within US territory (e.g., natural or man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces will conduct DSCA and HD operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt deployment of sufficient forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to deploy larger forces later. Effective early intervention can also deny an adversary time to set conditions in their favor, achieve destabilizing objectives, or mitigate the effects of a natural or man-made disaster.

Strategic Aspects
Two important aspects about crisis response and foreign limited contingency operations stand out. First, understanding the strategic objective helps avoid actions that may have adverse diplomatic or political effects. It is not uncommon in some operations, such as peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions that have significant strategic implications. Second, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also in strategic objectives that may warrant a change in military operations.

Economy of Force
The strategic environment requires the US to maintain and prepare joint forces for crisis response and limited contingency operations simultaneously with other operations, preferably in concert with allies and/or PNs when appropriate. This approach recognizes these operations will vary in duration, frequency, intensity, and the number of personnel required. The burden of many crisis response and limited contingency operations may lend themselves to using small elements like SOF in coordination with allied nations or PNs.
I. Typical Crisis Response Operations


A. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

NEOs are operations directed by DOS or other appropriate authority, in conjunction with DOD, whereby noncombatants are evacuated from locations within foreign countries to safe havens designated by DOS when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. Although principally conducted to evacuate US citizens, NEOs may also include citizens from the HN, as well as citizens from other countries. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, DOS is responsible for the protection and evacuation of US citizens abroad and for safeguarding their property. This order also directs DOD to advise and assist DOS to prepare and implement plans for the evacuation of US citizens. The US ambassador, or chief of the diplomatic mission, prepares the emergency action plans that address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The GCC conducts military operations to assist in the implementation of emergency action plans as directed by SecDef.

B. Peace Operations (PO)

PO are multiagency and multinational operations involving all instruments of national power—including international humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and military missions—to contain conflict, restore the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.

For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass PKO, predominantly military PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, PM processes, and conflict prevention. PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities and humanitarian efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict. PO support national/multinational strategic objectives. Military support improves the chances for success in the peace process by lending credibility to diplomatic actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political settlements.

- **Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).** PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Such actions are often taken under the authority of Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of the UN Charter.

- **Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO).** PEO are the application of military force or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. PEO may include the enforcement of sanctions and exclusion zones, protection of FHA, restoration of order, and forcible separation of belligerent parties or parties to a dispute. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict.

- **Peace Building (PB).** PB consists of stability actions (predominantly diplomatic, economic, and security related) that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions, build confidence, and support economic reconstruction to prevent a return to conflict. Military support to PB may include rebuilding roads, reestablishing or creating government entities, or training defense forces.

- **Peacemaking (PM).** This is the process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement that arranges an end to a dispute or resolves issues that led to conflict. It can be an ongoing process, supported by military, economic, diplomatic, and informational instruments of national power. The purpose is to instill in the parties an understanding that reconciliation is a better alternative...
to fighting. The military can assist in establishing incentives, disincentives, and mechanisms that promote reconciliation. Military activities that support PM include military-to-military exchanges and security assistance.

- **Conflict Prevention.** Conflict prevention consists of diplomatic and other actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or limit violence, deter parties, and reach an agreement before armed hostilities. These actions are normally conducted under Chapter VI, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, of the UN Charter. However, military deployments designed to deter and coerce parties will need to be credible, and this may require a combat posture and an enforcement mandate under the principles of Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, of the UN Charter.

**C. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)**

FHA operations relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in countries outside the US. These operations are different from foreign assistance primarily because they occur on short notice as a contingency operation to provide aid in specific crises or similar events rather than as more deliberate foreign assistance programs to promote long-term stability. DOS or the chief of mission in country is responsible for confirming the HN’s declaration of a foreign disaster or situation that requires FHA. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited in scope and duration; it is intended to supplement or complement efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies with the primary responsibility for providing assistance. DOD provides assistance when the need for relief is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian emergency dwarfs the ability of normal relief agencies to effectively respond.

**D. Recovery Operations**

Recovery operations may be conducted to search for, locate, identify, recover, and return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to national security, or human remains (e.g., JTF Full Accounting, which had the mission to achieve the fullest possible accounting of Americans listed as missing or prisoners of war from all past wars and conflicts). Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of recovery operation is generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning in order to execute. Recovery operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt depending on whether the OE is hostile, uncertain, or permissive.

**E. Strikes and Raids**

- **Strikes** are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. Strikes may be used to punish offending nations or groups, uphold international law, or prevent those nations or groups from launching their own attacks (e.g., Operation EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in response to the terrorist bombing of US Service members in Berlin). Although often tactical in nature with respect to the ways and means used and duration of the operation, strikes can achieve strategic objectives as did the strike against Libya.

- **Raids** are operations to temporarily seize an area, usually through forcible entry, in order to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel or equipment, or destroy an objective or capability. Raids end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.

Campaign
Traditionally, campaigns are the most extensive joint operations, in terms of the amount of forces and other capabilities committed and duration of operations. In the context of large-scale combat, a campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

Major Operations
A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes, and is the primary building block of a campaign. Major operations and campaigns typically include multiple phases (e.g., the 1990-1991 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and 2003 OIF). Campaign planning is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation.

Campaigns can occur across the continuum of conflict. In campaigns characterized by combat, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible; conclude hostilities; and establish conditions favorable to the HN, the US, and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions may require joint forces to conduct stability activities to restore security, provide essential services and humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction. Some crisis response or contingency operations may not involve large-scale combat but could meet the definition of a major operation or campaign based on their scale and duration (e.g., the Tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia or Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in the US, both in 2005).

Campaigns are joint in nature—functional and Service components of the joint force conduct supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Within a campaign, forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and space, conduct operations to achieve strategic or operational objectives in one or more OAs. Forces operate simultaneously or sequentially IAW a common plan, and are controlled by a single Service commander or the JFC.

Combatant Command (CCMD) Planning
The CCMD strategy links national strategic guidance to development of CCMD campaign and contingency plans. A CCMD strategy is a broad statement of the GCC’s long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC’s long-term vision for the global employment of functional capabilities. CCDRs prepare these strategies in the context of SecDef’s priorities outlined in the GEF and the CJCS’s objectives articulated in the NMS. However, the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of operations typically magnify the planning challenges. There are three categories of campaigns, which differ generally in scope and focus.

CCDRs document the full scope of their campaigns in the set of plans that includes the CCP or FCP and all of its GEF- and JSCP-directed plans, subordinate and supporting plans, posture or master plans, country plans (for the geographic CCMDs), OPLANs of operations currently in execution, and contingency plans.

See chap. 3 for further discussion.
Force Projection and Forcible Entry
(Seizing the Initiative)

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct ‘18), pp. VIII-12 to VIII-16.

Force Projection

Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive use of the international waters, international airspace, space, cyberspace, and the EMS to gain operational access. Our ability to freely maneuver to position and sustain our forces is vital to our national interests and those of our PNs. US forces may gain operational access to areas through invitation by an HN to establish an operating base in or near the conflict or by the use of forcible entry operations. Treaties, agreements, and activities that occur during the shape and deter phases may aid in the invitation to establish a base or support facility. However, gaining and maintaining operational access requires the ability to defeat the enemy’s A2/AD actions and capabilities.

The President and SecDef may direct a CCDR to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forces and appropriate FDOs as discussed above to preclude escalation. When these forces and actions are not sufficient, follow-on strikes and/or the deployment of forces from CONUS or another theater and/or the use of multinational forces may be necessary. Consequently, the CCDR must sequence, enable, and protect the deployment of forces to create early decisive advantage. The CCDR should not overlook enemy A2/AD capabilities that may affect the deployment of combat and logistic forces from bases to ports of embarkation. The CCDR may have to adjust the time-phased force and deployment data to meet a changing OE. The deployment of forces may be either opposed or unopposed by an enemy.

Opposed

Initial operations may be designed to suppress enemy A2/AD capabilities. For example, the ability to generate sufficient combat power through long-range air operations or from the sea can provide for effective force projection in the absence of timely or unencumbered access. Other opposed situations may require a forcible entry capability. In other cases, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry operations coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and pre-positioned forces. For example, the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by amphibious forces would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of forces and materiel into the theater. Both efforts demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

Unopposed

Unopposed deployment operations provide the JFC and subordinate components a more flexible OE to efficiently and effectively build combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for successful combat operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs arrange the flow of forces, to include significant theater opening logistics forces, that best facilitates the CONOPS. In these situations, logistics forces may be a higher priority for early deployment than combat forces, as determined by the in-theater protection requirements.

Commanders should brief deploying forces on the threat and force protection requirements prior to deployment and upon arrival in the OA. Also, JFCs and their subordinate commanders evaluate the timing, location, and other factors of force deployment in each COA for the impact of sabotage, criminal activity, and terrorist acts and their impact on joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) and the follow-on CONOPS. The threat could involve those not directly supporting or sympathetic to the enemy, but those seeking to take advantage of the situation.
Forcible Entry

Entry operations may be unopposed or opposed. Unopposed entry operations often, but not always, follow unopposed access. These circumstances generally allow orderly deployment into the OA in preparation for follow-on operations. Forcible entry is a joint military operation conducted either as a major operation or a part of a larger campaign to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition for the continuous landing of forces. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at the enemy COGs and can open new avenues for other military operations.

Forcible entry operations may include amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Forcible entry operations can create multiple dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability to respond. Commanders will employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to attack the objective area or areas. The net result will be a coordinated attack that overwhelsms the enemy before they have time to react. A well-positioned and networked force enables the defeat of any enemy reaction and facilitates follow-on operations, if required.

Forcible entry is normally complex and risky and should, therefore, be kept as simple as possible in concept. These operations require extensive intelligence, detailed coordination, innovation, and flexibility. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of command is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry. Participating forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust communications and intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements.

The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately transition to follow-on operations and should plan accordingly. Joint forcible entry actions occur in both singular and multiple operations. These actions include establishing forward presence, preparing the OA, opening entry points, establishing and sustaining access, receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations, sustaining the operations, and conducting decisive operations.

Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the enemy and ease forcible entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible MILDEC. Additionally, the actions, themes, and messages portrayed by all friendly forces must be consistent if MILDEC is to be believable.

SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, establish, or modify conditions in the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or assist in employing fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry, such as seizing airfields or conducting reconnaissance of landing zones or amphibious landing sites. They may conduct special reconnaissance and direct action well beyond the lodgment to identify, interdict, and destroy forces that threaten the conventional entry force.

The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs must carefully balance the introduction of sustainment forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment as well as forces required to transition to follow-on operations.

For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.
Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks. Ideally, planning begins with specified national strategic objectives and military end states to provide a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused. The joint planning and execution community (JPEC) conducts joint planning to understand the strategic and operational environment (OE) and determines the best method for employing the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) existing capabilities to achieve national objectives. Joint planning identifies military options the President can integrate with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, informational) to achieve those national objectives. In the process, joint planning identifies likely benefits, costs, and risks associated with proposed military options. In the absence of specified national objectives and military end states, combatant commanders (CCDRs) may propose objectives and military end states for the President's and/or the Secretary of Defense's (SecDef's) consideration before beginning detailed planning. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), as the principal military advisor to the President and SecDef, may offer military advice on the proposed objectives and military end states as a part of this process.

The Transregional, Multi-Domain, and Multi-Functional (TMM) Environment
The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and changes rapidly. While the nature of war has not changed, the character of warfare has evolved. Military operations will increasingly operate in a transregional, multi-domain, and multi-functional (TMM) environment. TMM operations will cut across multiple combatant commands (CCMDs) and across land, maritime, air, space, and cyberspace. Effective planning provides leadership with options that offer the highest probability for success at acceptable risk and enables the efficient use of limited resources, including time, to achieve objectives in this global environment. When specific objectives are not identified, planning identifies options with likely outcomes and risks to enable leaders at all levels to make informed decisions, without unnecessary expenditure of resources.

I. Joint Planning Purposes
At the CCMD level, joint planning serves two critical purposes. At the strategic level, joint planning provides the President and SecDef options, based on best military advice, on use of the military in addressing national interests and achieving the objectives in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and Defense Strategy Review (DSR).
At the operational level, once strategic guidance is given, planning translates this guidance into specific activities aimed at achieving strategic and operational-level objectives and attaining the military end state. This level of planning ties the training, mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces to the achievement of military objectives that contribute to the achievement of national security objectives in the service of enduring national interests.
The President, SecDef, and CJCS provide their orders, intent, strategy, direction, and guidance via strategic direction to the military to pursue national interests within legal and constitutional limitations. They generally communicate strategic direction to the military through written documents, but it may be communicated by any means available. Strategic direction is contained in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to changing situations, whereas strategic guidance documents are typically updated cyclically and may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

I. National & Department of Defense Guidance

The National Security Council (NSC) develops and recommends national security policy options for Presidential approval. The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. NSC decisions may be directed to any of the member departments or agencies. The President chairs the NSC. Its regular attendees (both statutory and nonstatutory) are the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, SecDef, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. CJCS is the statutory military advisor to the NSC, and the Director of National Intelligence is the intelligence advisor. For DOD, the President’s decisions drive SecDef’s strategic guidance, which CJCS may refine.

A. Strategic Guidance and Direction

The President provides strategic guidance through the NSS, Presidential policy directives (PPDs), executive orders, and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance and refinement from the NSC. The President also signs the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the contingency planning guidance in the SecDef-signed GEF, which are both developed by DOD.

SecDef has authority, direction, and control over DOD. SecDef oversees the development of broad defense policy goals and priorities for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of US military forces based on the NSS. For planning, SecDef provides guidance to ensure military action supports national objectives. SecDef approves assignment and allocation of forces.

USD(P) assists SecDef with preparing written policy guidance for the preparation of plans, reviewing plans, and assisting SecDef with other duties.

The CJCS provides independent assessments; serves as principal military advisor to the President, SecDef, and the NSC; and assists the President and SecDef with providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces. In this capacity, the CJCS develops the NMS and the JSCP, which provide military implementation strategies and planning direction.

See pp. 1-7 to 1-10 for discussion on national strategic direction from JP-1.
II. Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun ‘17), pp. II-6 to II-8.

The JSPS is the primary system by which the CJCS carries out USC-assigned statutory responsibilities. The JSPS enables the CJCS to conduct assessments; provide military advice to the President, SecDef, NSC, and Homeland Security Council (HSC); and assist the President and SecDef in providing strategic direction to the US Armed Forces. The NMS and JSCP are core strategic guidance documents that provide CJCS direction and policy essential to the achievement of NSS objectives by augmenting the strategic direction provided in the UCP, GEF, and other Presidential directives. Other elements of JSPS, such as the CJCS risk assessment, the joint strategy review, and the annual joint assessment (AJA), inform decision making and identify new contingencies that may warrant planning and the commitment of resources.

See fig. II-1 (facing page), Providing for the Direction of the Armed Forces, for an overview of these relationships. The JSPS is described in detail in CJCSI 3100.01B, Joint Strategic Planning System.

A. National Military Strategy (NMS)
The NMS, derived from the NSS and DSR, prioritizes and focuses the efforts of the Armed Forces of the United States while conveying the CJCS’s direction with regard to the OE and the necessary military actions to protect national security interests. The NMS defines the national military objectives (ends), how to accomplish these objectives (ways), and addresses the military capabilities required to execute the strategy (means). The NMS provides focus for military activities by defining a set of interrelated military objectives and joint operating concepts from which the Service Chiefs and CCDRs identify desired capabilities and against which the CJCS assesses risk.

B. Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
The JSCP is the primary document in which the CJCS carries out his statutory responsibility for providing unified strategic direction to the Armed Forces. The JSCP provides military strategic and operational guidance to CCDRs, Service Chiefs, CSAs, and applicable DOD agencies for preparation of plans based on current military capabilities. It implements the planning guidance provided in the GEF and the joint planning activities and products that accomplish that guidance. In addition to communicating to the CCMDS’s specific planning guidance necessary for planning, the JSCP operationalizes the strategic vision described in the NMS and nests with the strategic direction delineated by the NSS, DSR, and the DOD’s planning and resourcing guidance provided in the GEF. The JSCP also provides integrated planning guidance and direction for planners. The JSCP is described in detail in CJCSI 3110.01G, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

C. Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG)
The GFMIG documents force planning and execution guidance and show assignment of forces in support of the UCP. GFM aligns force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of the DSR and GEF, joint force availability requirements, and joint force assessments. It provides comprehensive insights into the global availability of US military resources and provides senior decision makers a process to quickly and accurately assess the impact and risk of proposed changes in force assignment, apportionment, and allocation. JS prepares the document for SecDef approval, with the Joint Staff J-8 [Director for Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment] overseeing the assignment and apportionment of forces and the Joint Staff J-3 [Operations Directorate] overseeing the allocation of forces.

Refer to “Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1: Joint Strategic and Operational Planning” for additional information and discussion.
Providing for the Direction of the Armed Forces

The President, SecDef, and CJCS use strategic direction to communicate their broad goals and issue-specific guidance to DOD. It provides the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and operations of the JS, CCMDs, Services, joint forces, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other DOD agencies. It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force. Strategic direction identifies a desired military objective or end state; national-level planning assumptions; and national-level constraints, limitations, and restrictions. In addition to previously mentioned documents, additional strategic direction will emerge as orders or as part of the iterative plans dialogue reflected in APEX.

The National Military Strategy is the foundation for strategic integration; command and control; strategy and planning; programming and budgeting; and assessments.
Joint Planning Activities, Functions, and Products

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun ’17), fig. II-4, p. II-14.

APEX integrates the planning activities of the JPEC and facilitates the transition from planning to execution. The APEX enterprise operates in a networked, collaborative environment, which facilitates dialogue among senior leaders, concurrent and parallel plan development, and collaboration across multiple planning levels.

APEX encompasses four operational activities, four planning functions, seven execution functions, and a number of related products (see Figure II-4). Each of these planning functions will include IPRs as necessary throughout planning and execution.
# Contingency and Crisis Comparison

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun ‘17), fig. II-6, p. II-28.

Planning initiated in response to an emergent event or crisis uses the same construct as all other planning. However, steps may be compressed to enable the time-sensitive development of OPLANs or OPORDs for the deployment, employment, and sustainment of forces and capabilities in response to a situation that may result in actual military operations. While planning for contingencies is based on hypothetical situations and normally is conducted in anticipation of future events, planning in a crisis is based on circumstances that exist at the time planning occurs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning for a CONTINGENCY</th>
<th>Planning in a CRISIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time available</strong></td>
<td>As defined in authoritative directives (normally 6+ months)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environment</strong></td>
<td>Distributed, collaborative planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Facts and assumptions</strong></td>
<td>Significant use of assumptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JPEC involvement</strong></td>
<td>Full JPEC participation (Note: JPEC participation may be limited for security reasons.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APEX operational activities</strong></td>
<td>Situational awareness Planning Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>APEX functions</strong></td>
<td>Strategic guidance Concept development Plan development Plan assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forces for planning</strong></td>
<td>Apportioned in JSCP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning guidance</strong></td>
<td>CJCS issues JSCP or WARNORD, CCDR issues PLANDIR and TPFDD LOI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>COA selection</strong></td>
<td>CCDR prepares COAs and submits to CJCS and SecDef for review. Specific COA may or may not be selected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CONOPS approval</strong></td>
<td>SecDef approves planning or directs additional planning or changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final planning product</strong></td>
<td>Campaign plan. Level 1–4 contingency plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final planning product approval</strong></td>
<td>CCDR submits final plan to CJCS for review and SecDef for approval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Execution document</strong></td>
<td>Not applicable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output</strong></td>
<td>Plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend**

- ALERTORD = alert order
- APEX = Adaptive Planning and Execution
- CCDR = combatant commander
- CJCS = Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- COA = course of action
- CONOPS = concept of operations
- EXORD = execute order
- JPEC = joint planning and execution community
- JSCP = Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
- LOI = letter of instruction
- OPORD = operations order
- PLANORD = planning directive
- PLAN = planning order
- SecDef = Secretary of Defense
- TPFDD = time-phased force and deployment data
- WARNORD = warning order community
DOD is tasked to conduct operations on a daily basis to aid in achieving national objectives. In turn, CCDRs are tasked to develop strategies and campaigns to shape the OE in a manner that supports those strategic objectives. They conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement, operations, posture, and other activities that seek to achieve US national objectives and prevent the need to resort to armed conflict while setting conditions to transition to contingency operations when required. The CCMD strategies and campaign plans are nested within the framework of the NSS, DSR, and NMS and are conducted in conjunction with the other instruments of national power. Specific guidance to the commanders is found in the UCP, GEF, and JSCP. Strategy prioritizes resources and actions to achieve future desired conditions. It acknowledges the current conditions as its start point, but must look past the current conditions and envision a future, then plot the road to get there. Plans address detailed execution to implement the strategy. National strategy prioritizes the CCMD’s efforts within and across theaters, functional, and global responsibilities; and considers all means and capabilities available in the CCMD’s operations, activities, and investments to achieve the national objectives and complement related USG efforts over a specified timeframe (currently five years). In this construct, the CCDRs and their planners develop strategy and plan campaigns to integrate joint operations with national-level resource planning and policy formulation and in conjunction with other USG departments and agencies.

**Vision**

The CCDR develops a long-range vision that is consistent with the national strategy and US policy and policy objectives. The vision is usually not constrained by time or resources, but is bounded by the national policy.

**Strategy**

Strategy is a broad statement of the CCDR’s long-term vision guided by and prepared in the context of SecDef’s priorities and within projected resources. Strategy links national strategic guidance to joint planning.

The CCDR’s strategy prioritizes the ends, ways, and means within the limitations established by the budget, GFM processes, and strategic guidance/direction. The strategy must address risk and highlight where and what level risk will be accepted and where it will not be accepted. The strategy’s objectives are directly linked to the achievement of national objectives.

Strategy includes a description of the factors and trends in the OE key to achieving the CCMD’s objectives, the CCDR’s approach to applying military power in concert with the other instruments of national power in pursuit of the objectives and the risks inherent in implementation.

Strategy must be flexible to respond to changes in the OE, policy, and resources. Commanders and their staff assess the OE, as well as available ways, means, and risk then update the strategy as needed. It also recognizes when ends need updating either because the original ones have been attained or they are no longer applicable.
I. Purpose of the CCDRs’ Campaign Plans

The CCDRs’ campaigns operationalize the CCDRs’ strategies by organizing and aligning operations, activities, and investments with resources to achieve the CCDRs’ objectives and complement related USG efforts in the theaters or functional areas. CCDRs translate the strategy into executable actions to accomplish identifiable and measurable progress toward achieving the CCDRs’ objectives, and thus the national objectives. The achievement of these objectives is reportable to DOD leadership through IPRs and operation assessments (such as the CCDRs’ annual input to the AJA).

CCMD campaign plans integrate posture, resources, requirements, subordinate campaigns, operations, activities, and investments that prepare for, deter, or mitigate identified contingencies into a unified plan of action.

The purpose of CCMD campaigns is to shape the OE, deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of a contingency, and/or execute combat operations in support of the overarching national strategy.

Shaping the OE is changing the current conditions within the OE to conditions more favorable to US interests. It can entail both combat and noncombat operations and activities to establish conditions that support future US activities or operations, or validate planning assumptions.

Deterrence activities, as part of a CCMD campaign, are those actions or operations executed specifically to alter adversaries’ decision calculus. These actions or operations may demonstrate US commitment to a region, ally, partner, or principle. They may also demonstrate a US capability to deny an adversary the benefit of an undesired action. Theater posture and certain exercises are examples of possible deterrent elements of a campaign. These actions are the most closely tied elements of the campaign to contingency plans directed in the GEF and JSCP. Additional deterrence activities are associated with early phases of a contingency plan, usually directed and executed in response to changes in threat posture.

Ref: JP 5-0, fig. III-1. The Campaign.
Differences Between CCMD Campaign Plans and Contingency Plans

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun ‘17), pp. III-3 to III-5.

CCMD Campaigns Plans
CCMD campaigns plans seek to shape the OE and achieve national objectives. They establish operations, activities, and investments the command undertakes to achieve specific objectives (set conditions) in support of national policy and objectives. CCMD campaigns are proactive and rarely feature a single measure of military success implying victory in the traditional sense. The campaign may include operations across the spectrum of conflict, to include ongoing combat operations, such as counterterrorism operations. In the event a contingency operation is executed, that operation is subsumed into the campaign and becomes an element the CCDR considers when identifying the impact of US operations on the OE, the opportunities to favorably affect the OE to achieve national-level and theater-level objectives, and examining MOEs that may impact the campaign’s intermediate objectives. Campaign plans seek to capitalize on the cumulative effect of multiple coordinated and synchronized operations, activities, and investments that cannot be accomplished by a single major operation.

Contingency Plans
Contingency plans identify how the command might respond in the event of a crisis or the inability to achieve objectives. Contingency plans specifically seek to favorably resolve a crisis that either was not or could not be deterred or avoided by directing operations toward achieving specified objectives. Contingency plans have specified end states that seek to re-establish conditions favorable to the US. They react to conditions beyond the scope of the CCMD campaign plan. Contingency plans have an identified military objective and set of termination criteria. Upon terminating a contingency plan, military operations return to campaign plan execution. However, the post-contingency OE may require different or additional military activities to sustain new security conditions. Although campaign plan operations, activities, and investments can have deterrent effects, contingency plan deter activities specifically refer to actions for which separate and unique resourcing and planning are required. These actions are executed on order of the President or SecDef and generally entail specific orders for their execution and require additional resources allocated through GFM processes.

Campaign plans will have some similarities with contingency plans:

Measurable and Time-Bound
Campaign plans, like contingencies, must have measurable objectives and a process for associating CCMD actions to the changes in the OE. The commander must be able to identify within a directed time-span the ability to effect change and whether or not given actions successfully affected an associated change.

Changeable and Flexible
Campaigns must adapt to changes in the OE, other actors actions, and changes in resourcing and priorities based on national and defense priorities. However, a campaign should not necessarily change every time a commander or staff changes. Well-designed campaigns can withstand changes in foreseeable national leadership fluctuations in the US and by the countries addressed in the campaign.
The JFC and staff develop plans and orders through the application of operational art and operational design in conjunction with JPP. They combine art and science to develop products that describe how (ways) the joint force will employ its capabilities (means) to achieve military objectives (ends), given an understanding of unacceptable consequences of employing capabilities as intended (risk).

The purpose of operational design and operational art is to produce an operational approach, allowing the commander to continue JPP, translating broad strategic and operational concepts into specific missions and tasks and produce an executable plan.

**Operational Art**
Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks. Operational art is inherent in all aspects of operational design.

**Operational Design**
Operational design is the conception and construction of the framework that underpins a campaign or operation and its subsequent execution. The framework is built upon an iterative process that creates a shared understanding of the OE; identifies and frames problems within that OE; and develops approaches, through the application of operational art, to resolving those problems, consistent with strategic guidance and/or policy. The operational approach, a primary product of operational design, allows the commander to continue JPP, translating broad strategic and operational concepts into specific missions and tasks (see Figure IV-1) to produce an executable plan.
an operation or campaign. This requires assessment and reflection that challenge understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of actions addressing that problem. Due to complexity and constant change, commanders should be comfortable in the recognition that they will never know everything about the given OE and will never be able to fully define its problems. As such, many of the problems in the OE may not have solutions.

II. Operational Art

Commanders, skilled in the use of operational art, provide the vision that links strategic objectives to tactical tasks through their understanding of the strategic and operational environments (OEs) during both the planning and execution phases of an operation or campaign. More specifically, the interaction of operational art and operational design provides a bridge between strategy and tactics, linking national strategic aims to operations that must be executed to accomplish these aims and identifying how to assess the impact of the operations in achieving the strategic objectives. Likewise, operational art promotes unified action by helping JFCs and staffs understand how to facilitate the integration of other agencies and multinational partners toward achieving strategic and operational objectives.

Operational Art

Ref: JP 5-0, fig. IV-2, Operational Art.

Through operational art, commanders link ends, ways, and means to attain the desired end state (see Figure IV-2). This requires commanders to answer the following questions:

- What is the current state of the OE?
- What are the military objectives that must be achieved, how are they related to the strategic objectives, and what objectives must be achieved to enable that strategic/national objective? How do these differ from the current conditions (state of the OE)? (Ends)
- What sequence of military actions, in conjunction with possible civilian actions, is most likely to achieve those objectives and attain the end state? How will I measure achievement of those objectives? (Ways)
- What military resources are required in concert with possible civilian resources to accomplish that sequence of actions within given or requested resources? (Means)
- What is the chance of failure or unacceptable consequences in performing that sequence of military actions? How will I identify if one or more of them occur? What is an acceptable level of “failure”? (Risk)
Understand the Operational Environment (Operational-Level Considerations)

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun ‘17), pp. IV-10 to IV-14.

The JIPOE process is a comprehensive analytic tool to describe all aspects of the OE relevant to the operation or campaign. In analyzing the current and future OE, the staff can use a PMESII analytical framework to determine relationships and interdependencies relevant to the specific operation or campaign (see Figure IV-5).

Holistic View of the Operational Environment

Ref: JP 5-0, fig. IV-5. Holistic View of the Operational Environment.

The size and scope of the analysis may also vary depending on particular aspects of the OE. For example, if a landlocked adversary has the capability to conduct space-based intelligence collection or cyberspace operations, then the relevant portions of space and the information environment would extend worldwide, while maritime considerations might be minimal. While most joint operations at the operational level may encompass many or all PMESII considerations and characteristics, the staff’s balanced JIPOE efforts should vary according to the relevant OE aspects of the operation or campaign.

Additional factors that should be considered, include:

- Geographical features and meteorological and oceanographic characteristics.
- Population demographics (ethnic groups, tribes, ideological factions, religious groups and sects, language dialects, age distribution, income groups, public health issues).
- Social and cultural factors of adversaries, neutrals, and allies in the OE (beliefs, how and where they get their information, types and locations of media outlets).
- Political & socioeconomic factors (economic system, political factions, tribal factions).
- Infrastructure, such as transportation, energy, and information systems.
• Operational limitations such as rules of engagement (ROE), rules for the use of force (RUF), or legal restrictions on military operations as specified in US law, international law, or HN agreements.
• All friendly, adversary, and enemy conventional, irregular, and paramilitary forces and their general capabilities and strategic objectives (including all known and/or suspected chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear threats and hazards).
• Environmental conditions (earthquakes, volcanic activity, pollution, naturally occurring diseases).
• Location of toxic industrial materials in the area of interest that may produce chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear hazards.
• Psychological characteristics of adversary decision making.
• All locations of foreign embassies, international organizations, and NGOs.
• Friendly and adversary military and commercial capabilities provided by assets in space, their current or potential use, and critical vulnerabilities.
• Knowledge of the capabilities and intent, COGs, and critical vulnerabilities of forces, individuals, or organizations conducting cyberspace operations.
• Financial networks that could impact the adversary’s ability to sustain operations.

To produce a holistic view of the relevant adversary, neutral, and friendly systems within a larger system that includes many external influences, analysis should define how these systems interrelate. Most important to this analysis is describing the relevant relationships within and between the various systems that directly or indirectly affect the problem at hand. Although the J-2 manages the JIPOE process, other directorates and agencies can contribute valuable expertise to develop and assess the complexities of the OE.

Tendencies and Potentials. In developing an understanding of the interactions and relationships of relevant actors in the OE, commanders and staffs consider observed tendencies and potentials in their analyses. Tendencies reflect the inclination to think or behave in a certain manner. Tendencies are not considered deterministic but rather model the thoughts or behaviors of relevant actors. Tendencies help identify the range of possibilities that relevant actors may develop with or without external influence. Once identified, commanders and staffs evaluate the potential of these tendencies to manifest within the OE. Potential is the inherent ability or capacity for the growth or development of a specific interaction or relationship. However, not all interactions and relationships support attaining the desired end state. The desired end state accounts for tendencies and potentials that exist among the relevant actors or other aspects of the OE. Early in JPP, pertinent lessons learned should be collected and reviewed as part of the analysis to allow previously learned lessons to make their way into the plan. The Joint Lessons Learned Information System provides a database of past lessons learned. However, people experienced in the mission, OE, and lessons learned functions should be sought for their knowledge and experience.

Describe the key conditions that must exist in the future OE to achieve the objectives. Planners should put a temporal aspect to this set of conditions in order to be able to conduct feasibility and acceptability analyses.

Determine the objectives of relevant actors affecting the OE. These actors will have different sets of conditions for achieving their respective objectives. Such opposition can be expected to take actions to thwart US and partner nations’ objectives. Other actors, neutral or friendly, may not have an opposing mindset, but may have desired conditions (or unintended consequences of their actions) that oppose our desired end state conditions. The analysis of the OE should identify where the contradictions between the competing sides, allies, partners, and neutrals lie and recognize the conflicts of interests. In the course of developing the plan, planners should ask themselves if the COA being considered addresses these conflicts.
IV. Elements of Operational Design

The elements of operational design can be used for all military planning. However, not all of the elements of operational design may be required for all plans.

See pp. 3-57 to 3-68 for an overview and further discussion.

A. Termination

Termination criteria are the specified standards approved by the President and/or SecDef that must be met before military operations can be concluded. Termination criteria are a key element in establishing a military end state. Termination criteria describe the conditions that must exist in the OE at the cessation of military operations. The conditions must be achievable and measurable so the commander can clearly identify the achievement of the military end state. Effective planning cannot occur without a clear understanding of the military end state and the conditions that must exist to end military operations. Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages is key to attaining the national strategic end state. To plan effectively for termination, the supported JFC must know how the President and SecDef intend to terminate the joint operation and ensure that the conditions in the OE endure. CCMD campaign plans will not normally have termination criteria. Termination criteria are developed first among the elements of operational design as they enable the development of the military end state and objectives. Commanders and their staffs must think through, in the early stages of planning, the conditions that must exist in order to terminate military operations on terms favorable to the US and its multinational partners. Termination criteria should account for a wide variety of operational tasks that the joint force may need to accomplish, to include disengagement, force protection, transition to post-conflict operations, reconstitution, and redeployment.

Military end states are briefed to SecDef as part of the IPR process to ensure the military end states support the termination criteria. Once approved, the criteria may change. It is important for commanders and staffs to keep an eye out for potential changes, as they may result in a modification to the military end state as well as the commander’s operational approach. As such, it is essential for the military to keep a dialogue between the civilian national leadership, and the leadership of other agencies and partners involved.

B. Military End State

Military end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of all military objectives. It normally represents a point in time and/or circumstances beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining national objectives. As such, the military end state is often closely tied to termination. While it may mirror many of the
conditions of the national strategic end state, the military end state typically will be more specific and contain other supporting conditions. These conditions contribute to developing termination criteria, the specified standards approved by the President and/or SecDef that must be met before a joint operation can be concluded. Aside from its obvious association with strategic or operational objectives, clearly defining the military end state promotes unity of effort, facilitates synchronization, and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the campaign or operation. Commanders should include the military end state in their planning guidance and commander’s intent statement.

C. Objectives

An objective is clearly defined, decisive, and attainable. Once the military end state is understood and termination criteria are established, operational design continues with development of strategic and operational military objectives. Joint planning integrates military actions and capabilities with those of other instruments of national power in time, space, and purpose in unified action to achieve the JFC’s military objectives, which contribute to strategic national objectives. Objectives and their supporting effects provide the basis for identifying tasks to be accomplished. In GEF- and JSCP-directed campaign plans, objectives rather than an end state, define the path of the command’s actions in contributing to national objectives. Military missions are conducted to achieve objectives and are linked to national objectives. Military objectives are an important consideration in plan development. They specify what must be accomplished and provide the basis for describing desired effects.

A clear and concise end state allows planners to better examine objectives that must be met to attain the desired end state. Objectives describe what must be achieved to reach or attain the end state. These are usually expressed in military, diplomatic, economic, and informational terms and help define and clarify what military planners must do to support the national strategic end state. Objectives developed at the national-strategic and theater-strategic levels are the defined, decisive, and attainable goals toward which all military operations, activities, and investments are directed within the OA.

Achieving operational objectives ties execution of tactical tasks to reaching the military end state.

There are four primary considerations for an objective.

- An objective establishes a single desired result (a goal).
- An objective should link directly or indirectly to higher level objectives or to the end state.
- An objective is specific and unambiguous.
- An objective does not infer ways and/or means—it is not written as a task.

D. Effects

An effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect can also be thought of as a condition that can support achieving an associated objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress toward an objective. In seeking unified action, a JFC synchronizes the military with the diplomatic, informational, and economic power of the US to affect the PMESII systems of relevant actors.

See facing page for further discussion of “End State, Objectives, Effects and Tasks.”
The joint planning process (JPP) is an orderly, analytical set of logical steps to frame a problem; examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order.

JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission. JPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

JPP is applicable for all planning. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution. It is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive. Based on the nature of the problem, other tools available to the planner, expertise in the planning team, time, and other considerations, the process can be modified as required. Similarly, some JPP steps or tasks may be performed concurrently, truncated, or modified as necessary dependent upon the situation, subject, or time constraints of the planning effort.

In a crisis, the steps of JPP may be conducted simultaneously to speed the process. Supporting commands and organizations often conduct JPP simultaneously and iteratively with the supported CCMD.
I. Planning Initiation

Joint planning begins when an appropriate authority recognizes potential for military capability to be employed in support of national objectives or in response to a potential or actual crisis. At the strategic level, that authority—the President, SecDef, or CJCS—initiates planning by deciding to develop military options. Presidential directives, NSS, UCP, GEF, JSCP, and related strategic guidance documents (e.g., SGSs) serve as the primary guidance to begin planning.

CCDRs, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders also initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority. Additionally, analyses of the OE or developing or immediate crises may result in the President, SecDef, or CJCS directing military planning through a planning directive. CCDRs normally develop military options in combination with other nonmilitary options so that the President can respond with all the appropriate instruments of national power. Whether or not planning begins as described here, the commander may act within approved authorities and ROE/RUF in an immediate crisis.

The commander and staff will receive and analyze the planning guidance to determine the time available until mission execution; current status of strategic and staff estimates; and intelligence products, to include JIPOE, and other factors relevant to the specific planning situation. The commander will typically provide initial planning guidance based upon current understanding of the OE, the problem, and the initial operational approach for the campaign or operation. It could specify time constraints, outline initial coordination requirements, or authorize movement of key capabilities within the JFC’s authority.

While planning is continuous once execution begins, it is particularly relevant when there is new strategic direction, significant changes to the current mission or planning assumptions, or the commander receives a mission for follow-on operations. Planning for campaign plans is different from contingency plans in that contingency planning focuses on the anticipation of future events, while campaign planning assesses the current state of the OE and identifies how the command can shape the OE to deter crisis on a daily basis and support strategic objectives.

II. Mission Analysis

The CCDR and staff analyzes the strategic direction and derives the restated mission statement for the commander’s approval, which allows subordinate and supporting commanders to begin their own estimates and planning efforts for higher headquarters’ concurrence. The joint force’s mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned tasks and to identify all other tasks necessary to accomplish the mission. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. When the commander receives a mission tasking, analysis begins with the following questions:

• What is the purpose of the mission received? (What problem is the commander being asked to solve or what change to the OE is desired?)
• What tasks must my command do for the mission to be accomplished?
• Will the mission achieve the desired results?
• What limitations have been placed on my own forces’ actions?
• What forces/assets are needed to support my operation?
• How will I know when the mission is accomplished successfully?

The primary inputs to mission analysis are strategic guidance; the higher headquarters’ planning directive; and the commander’s initial planning guidance, which may include a description of the OE, a definition of the problem, the operational approach, initial intent, and the JIPOE (see following page).
Joint Planning Process (JPP) Overview

Operational design and JPP are complementary tools of the overall planning process. Operational design provides an iterative process that allows for the commander’s vision and mastery of operational art to help planners answer ends—ways—means—risk questions and appropriately structure campaigns and operations in a dynamic OE. The commander, supported by the staff, gains an understanding of the OE, defines the problem, and develops an operational approach for the campaign or operation through the application of operational design during the initiation step of JPP.

Commanders communicate their operational approach to their staff, subordinates, supporting commands, agencies, and multinational/nongovernmental entities as required in their initial planning guidance so that their approach can be translated into executable plans. As JPP is applied, commanders may receive updated guidance, learn more about the OE and the problem, and refine their operational approach. Commanders provide their updated approach to the staff to guide detailed planning. This iterative process facilitates the continuing development and refinement of possible COAs into a selected COA with an associated initial CONOPS and eventually into a resource informed executable plan or order.

The relationship between the application of operational art, operational design, and JPP continues throughout the planning and execution of the plan or order. By applying the operational design methodology in combination with the procedural rigor of JPP, the command can monitor the dynamics of the mission and OE while executing operations in accordance with the current approach and revising plans as needed. By combining these approaches, the friendly force can maintain the greatest possible flexibility.
The primary products of mission analysis are staff estimates, the mission statement, a refined operational approach, the commander’s intent statement, updated planning guidance, and initial CCIRs.

Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process. The JFC and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical activities, such as those shown in Figure V-4 (facing page).

- Although some activities occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial concurrent processing of information by the commander and staff, particularly in a crisis situation.

- During mission analysis, it is essential the tasks (specified and implied) and their purposes are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements, limitations (constraints—must do, or restraints—cannot do) on actions that the commander or subordinate forces may take are understood, and the correlation between the commander’s mission and intent and those of higher and other commanders is understood. Resources and authorities must also be evaluated to ensure there is not a mission-resource-authority mismatch and second, to enable the commander to prioritize missions and tasks against limited resources.

- Additionally, during mission analysis, specific information may need to be captured and tracked in order to improve the end products. This includes requests for information regarding forces, capabilities, and other resources; questions for the commander or special assistant (e.g., legal); and proposed battle rhythm for planning and execution. Recording this information during the mission analysis process will enable a more complete product and smoother mission analysis brief.

A. Analyze Higher Headquarters’ Planning Directives and Strategic Guidance

Strategic Guidance
Strategic guidance is essential to joint planning and operational design. The President, SecDef, and CJCS promulgate strategic direction documents that cover a broad range of situations, and CCDRs provide guidance that covers a more narrow range of theater or functional situations. Documents such as the UCP, GEF, and JSCP provide near-term (0-2 years) strategic direction, and the CCDR’s theater or functional strategy provide the mid- to long-term (greater than 3 years) GCC or FCC vision for the AOR or global employment of functional capabilities prepared in the context of SecDef’s priorities. CCDR strategy links national strategic direction to joint planning.

Specific Guidance/Planning Directives
For a specific crisis, an order provides specific guidance, typically including a description of the situation, purpose of military operations, objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, and pertinent limitations. The GFMIG apportionment tables identify forces planners can reasonably expect to be available. Supported and supporting plans for the same military activity are constrained to the same resources. Planners should not expect to use additional forces beyond those listed in the apportionment tables without CJCS approval. The CJCS may amplify apportionment guidance for the specific crisis. This planning can confirm or modify the guidance for an existing contingency plan or order. This might simplify the analysis step, since consensus should already exist between the supported command and higher authority on the nature of the OE in the potential joint operations area (JOA)—such as the political, economic, social, and military circumstances—and potential US or multinational responses to various situations described in the existing plan. But even with a pre-existing contingency plan, planners need to confirm the actual situation matches the
Mission Analysis (Overview)
Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun ‘17), pp. V-5 to V-6 (fig. V-3 and V-4).
Mission analysis helps the JFC understand the problem and purpose of the operation and issue appropriate guidance to drive the rest of the planning process.

Mission Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Inputs</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher headquarters’ planning directive</td>
<td>Staff estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic direction</td>
<td>Mission statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander’s planning guidance</td>
<td>Commander’s refined operational approach including:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Description of the operational environment</td>
<td>• JFC’s intent statement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Definition of the problem</td>
<td>• JFC’s updated planning guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commander’s operational approach</td>
<td>Problem framing, initial force identification, mission success criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Commander’s initial intent</td>
<td>initial risk assessment, mission analysis briefing, and planning directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic estimate and intelligence products to include JIPOE</td>
<td>(as necessary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initial commander’s critical information requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Course of action evaluation criteria</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mission Analysis Activities *(not necessarily sequential)*
- Begin logistics supportability analysis
- Analyze higher headquarters planning activities and strategic guidance
- Review commander’s initial planning guidance, including his initial understanding of the operational environment, of the problem, and description of the operational approach
- Determine known facts and develop planning assumptions
- Determine and analyze operational limitations
- Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks
- Develop mission statement
- Conduct initial force allocation review
- Develop risk assessment
- Develop mission success criteria
- Develop commander’s mission requirements
- Develop commander’s critical information requirements
- Prepare staff estimates
- Prepare and deliver mission analysis brief
- Publish commander’s updated planning guidance, intent statement, and refined operational approach
COA Development Briefing (Example)

Operations Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-3)/
Plans Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-5)
• Context/background (i.e., road to war)
• Initiation—review guidance for initiation
• Strategic guidance—planning tasks assigned to supported commander, forces/resources apportioned, planning guidance, updates, defense agreements, theater campaign plan(s), Guidance for Employment of the Force/Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
• Forces apportioned/assigned

Intelligence Directorate of a Joint Staff (J-2)
• Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
• Enemy objectives
• Enemy courses of action (COAs)—most dangerous, most likely; strengths and weaknesses

J-3/J-5
• Update facts and assumptions
• Mission statement
• Commander’s intent (purpose, method, end state)
• End state: political/military
  – termination criteria
• Center of gravity analysis results: critical factors; strategic/operational
• Joint operations area/theater of operations/communications zone sketch
• Phase 0 shaping activities recommended (for current theater campaign plan)
• Flexible deterrent options with desired effect
• For each COA, sketch and statement by phase
  – task organization
  – component tasking
  – timeline
  – recommended command and control by phase
  – lines of operation/lines of effort
  – logistics estimates and feasibility
  – COA risks
  – synchronization matrices
• COA summarized distinctions
• COA priority for analysis
• Update Course of Action Development Briefing to Include:
  – Red objectives

Commander’s Guidance
D. The Planning Directive

The planning directive identifies planning responsibilities for developing joint force plans. It provides guidance and requirements to the staff and subordinate commands concerning coordinated planning actions for plan development. The JFC normally communicates initial planning guidance to the staff, subordinate commanders, and supporting commanders by publishing a planning directive to ensure everyone understands the commander’s intent and to achieve unity of effort.

Generally, the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5) coordinates staff action for planning for the CCMD campaign and contingencies, and the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) coordinates staff action in a crisis situation. The J-5 staff receives the JFC’s initial guidance and combines it with the information gained from the initial staff estimates. The JFC, through the J-5, may convene a preliminary planning conference for members of the JPEC who will be involved with the plan. This is the opportunity for representatives to meet face-to-face. At the conference, the JFC and selected members of the staff brief the attendees on important aspects of the plan and may solicit their initial reactions. Many potential conflicts can be avoided by this early exchange of information.

IV. Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming

COA analysis is the process of closely examining potential COAs to reveal details that will allow the commander and staff to tentatively identify COAs that are valid and identify the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed friendly COA. The commander and staff analyze each COA separately according to the commander’s guidance. While time-consuming, COA analysis should reaffirm the validity of the COA while answering ‘is the COA feasible, and is it acceptable?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Inputs</th>
<th>Key Outputs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revised staff estimates</td>
<td>Potential decision points</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA alternatives with concept narrative and sketch including:</td>
<td>Potential branches and sequels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Objectives</td>
<td>Refined COAs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Key tasks</td>
<td>Revised staff estimates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Major capabilities required</td>
<td>Synchronization matrices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Timeline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Task organization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Main and supporting efforts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Sustainment concept</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Deployment concept and timeline</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Communication synchronization supporting themes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Identification of reserve</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Identification of required supporting interagency tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synchronization matrices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation criteria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. COA Analysis/Wargaming Products

Certain products should result from the war game in addition to wargamed COAs.

Event Template

Planners enter the wargame with a rough event template and must complete the wargame with a refined, more accurate event template. The event template with its named areas of interest (NAIs) and time-phase lines will help the J-2 focus the intelligence collection effort. An event matrix can be used as a “script” for intelligence reporting during the wargame. It can also tell planners if they are relying too much on one or two collection platforms and if assets have been overextended.

Decision Support Template and Matrix (DST/DSM)

A first draft of a DST should also come out of the COA wargame. As more information about friendly forces and threat forces becomes available, the DST may change. The critical events are associated with the essential tasks identified in mission analysis. The decision points are tied to points in time and space when and where the commander must make a critical decision.

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) and Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIRs)

Decision points should be tied to the CCIRs. CCIRs generate two types of information requirements: PIRs and FFIRs. The commander approves CCIRs. From a threat perspective, PIRs tied to a decision point will require an intelligence collection plan that prioritizes and tasks collection assets to gather information about the threat. JIPOE ties PIRs to NAIs, which are linked to adversary COAs. The synchronization matrix is a tool that will help determine if adequate resources are available.

Primary Outputs of the Wargame

- Wargamed COAs with graphic and narrative. Branches and sequels identified
- Information on commander’s evaluation criteria
- Initial task organization
- Critical events and decision points
- Newly identified resource shortfalls to include force augmentation
- Refined/new CCIRs and event template/matrix
- Initial DST/DSM
- Refined synchronization matrix
- Refined staff estimates
- Assessment plan and criteria

The outputs of the COA wargame will be used in the JPP steps COA comparison, COA approval, and plan or order development. The results of the wargame are an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of each friendly COA, the core of the back brief to the commander.

The commander and staff normally will compare advantages and disadvantages of each COA during COA comparison. However, if the suitability, feasibility, or acceptability of any COA becomes questionable during the analysis step, the commander should modify or discard it and concentrate on other COAs. The need to create additional combinations of COAs may also be identified.
V. Course of Action Comparison

COA comparison is a subjective process whereby COAs are considered independently and evaluated/compared against a set of criteria that are established by the staff and commander. The objective is to identify and recommend the COA that has the highest probability of accomplishing the mission.

The figure below depicts inputs and outputs for COA comparison. Other products not graphically shown in the chart include updated JIPOE products, updated CCIRs, staff estimates, and commander’s ID of branches for further planning.

COA comparison facilitates the commander’s decision-making process by balancing the ends, means, ways, and risk of each COA. The end product of this task is a briefing to the commander on a COA recommendation and a decision by the commander. COA comparison helps the commander answer the following questions:

- What are the differences between each COA?
- What are the advantages and disadvantages?
- What are the risks?

**Course of Action Comparison**

**Key Inputs**
- Advantages and disadvantages
- Wargaming results
- Evaluation criteria
- Revised staff estimates

**Key Outputs**
- Evaluated COAs
- Recommended COA
- COA selection rationale
- Revised staff estimates
- Refined commander’s critical information requirements
- Synchronization matrices


In COA comparison, the staff determines which COA performs best against the established evaluation criteria. The commander reviews the criteria list and adds or deletes, as required. The number of evaluation criteria will vary, but there should be enough to differentiate COAs. COAs are not compared with each other within any one criterion, but rather they are individually evaluated against the criteria that are established by the staff and commander. Their individual performances are then compared to enable the staff to recommend a preferred COA to the commander.

Staff officers may each use their own matrix to compare COAs with respect to their functional areas. Matrices use the evaluation criteria developed before the wargame. Decision matrices alone cannot provide decision solutions. Their greatest value is providing a method to compare COAs against criteria that the commander and staff believe will produce mission success. They are analytical tools that staff officers use to prepare recommendations. Commanders provide the solution by applying their judgment to staff recommendations and making a decision.
V(b). Joint Operation Plan (OPLAN) Format

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Aug ‘11), app. A.

Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing a joint OPLAN. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. However, joint OPLANS/CONPLANS will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as paragraph 3, “Execution”) and their primary subparagraphs (such as paragraph 3a, “Concept of Operations”). The JPEC typically refers to a joint contingency plans that encompasses more than one major operation as a campaign plan, but JFCs prepare a plan for a campaign in joint contingency plan format.

The CJCSM 3130 series volumes describe joint planning interaction among the President, SecDef, CJCS, the supported joint commander, and other JPEC members, and provides models of planning messages and estimates. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats and Guidance, provides the formats for joint plans.

Notional Operation Plan Format

a. Copy No. ______________________
b. Issuing Headquarters
c. Place of Issue
d. Effective Date/Time Group
e. OPERATION PLAN: (Number or Code Name)
f. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .
g. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan.)

1. Situation
(This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses [see national intelligence estimate, any multinational sources, and strategic and commanders’ estimates].)

a. General. (This section describes the general politico-military variables that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the contingency plans. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict, identify primary antagonists, state US policy objectives and the estimated objectives of other parties, and outline strategic decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy objectives and conduct effective US military operations to achieve US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

(1) Assessment of the Conflict. (Provide a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context [JSCP, UCP].)
VI. Operation Assessment

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun ‘17), chap. VI.

Operation assessments are an integral part of planning and execution of any operation, fulfilling the requirement to identify and analyze changes in the OE and to determine the progress of the operation. Assessments involve the entire staff and other sources such as higher and subordinate headquarters, interagency and multinational partners, and other stakeholders. They provide perspective, insight, and the opportunity to correct, adapt, and refine planning and execution to make military operations more effective. Operation assessment applies to all levels of warfare and during all military operations.

Assessment

A continuous activity that supports decision making by ascertaining progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, achieving an objective, or attaining an end state for the purpose of developing, adapting, and refining plans and for making campaigns and operations more effective.

Commanders maintain a personal sense of the progress of the operation or campaign, shaped by conversations with senior and subordinate commanders, key leader engagements (KLEs), and battlefield circulation. Operation assessment complements the commander’s awareness by methodically identifying changes in the OE, identifying and analyzing risks and opportunities, and formally providing recommendations to improve progress towards mission accomplishment. Assessment should be integrated into the organization’s planning (beginning in the plan initiation step) and operations battle rhythm to best support the commander’s decision cycle.

The starting point for operation assessment activities coincides with the initiation of joint planning. Integrating assessments into the planning cycle helps the commander ensure the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable in the context of higher policy, guidance, and orders. This integrated approach optimizes the feedback senior leadership needs to appropriately refine, adapt, or terminate planning and execution to be effective in the OE.

CCMDs, subordinate Service, joint functional components, and JTFs devote significant effort and resources to plan and execute operations. They apply appropriate rigor to determine whether an operation is being effectively planned and executed as needed to accomplish specified objectives and end states. Assessment complements that rigor by analyzing the OE objectively and comprehensively to estimate the effectiveness of planned tasks and measure the effectiveness of completed tasks with respect to desired conditions in the OE.

Background

TCPs and country-specific security cooperation sections/country plans are continuously in some stage of implementation. Accordingly, during implementation CCMD planners should annually extend their planning horizon into the future year. The simultaneity of planning for the future while implementing a plan requires a CCMD to continually assess its implementation in order to appropriately revise, adapt, or terminate elements of the evolving (future) plan. This synergism makes operation assessment a prerequisite to plan adaptation. Operation assessment is thus fundamental to revising implementation documents ahead of resource allocation processes.
Notional Combatant Commander Assessment Review

Line of Effort (LOE) Assessment
1. Leads. LOE leads should guide the development and assessment of LOE intermediate objectives, critical conditions, indicators, tasks, and associated metrics and recommendations through the LOE working groups.
2. Output. The LOE assessment produces updated findings, insights, and recommendations by LOE. These are consolidated for presentation and validation during the strategic assessment working group (SAWG).

Strategic Assessment Working Group (SAWG)
1. Leads. Designated lead (typically from a J-3, J-5, or J-8 element) chairs this O-6 level review working group. LOE assessors and leads brief their subcampaign assessments, findings, insights, and recommendations to this group.
2. Output. The SAWG produces an assessment brief and recommendations for presentation and approval during the commander’s assessment board (CAB).

Commander’s Assessment Board (CAB)
1. Leads. CCDRs chair this board. LOE leads present a consolidated assessment brief with SAWG-validated, command-level recommendations for the commander’s decision. As a note, this board may occur as part of the commander’s council or the commander’s update brief.
2. Outputs. The CAB validates recommendations for staff action and higher level coordination and produces refined commander’s guidance.

Component Command Assessment
If required by the CCDR, component and subordinate commands will provide an annual assessment briefing to CCDR detailing their progress toward key LOE objectives and conduct of key operations and activities.
II. Operation Assessment Process

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Planning (Jun ’17), pp. VI-12 to VI-26 (and fig. VI-3).

The assessment process is continuous. Throughout JPP, assessment provides support to and is supported by operational design and operational art. The assessment process complements and is concurrent with JPP in developing specific and measurable task-based end states, objectives, and effects during operational design. These help the staff identify the information and intelligence requirements (including CCIRs). During execution, assessment provides information on progress toward creating effects, achieving objectives, and attaining desired end states. Assessment reports are based on continuous situational awareness and OE analysis from internal and external sources and address changes in the OE and their proximate causes, opportunities to exploit and risks to mitigate, and recommendations to inform decision making throughout planning and execution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Primarily in Planning or Execution</th>
<th>Personnel Involved</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Associated Staff Activity</th>
<th>Output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop Assessment Approach</td>
<td>Planning ● Operational Design ● JPP Steps 1-6</td>
<td>Commander Planners ● Primary staff ● Special staff ● Assessment element</td>
<td>Strategic guidance CIPG ● Description of OE Problem to be solved</td>
<td>Conduct JIPOE ● Support development and refinement of end states, objectives, effects, and tasks</td>
<td>Assessment approach which includes: ● Assessment framework and construct ● Specific outcomes (end state, objectives, effects) ● Commander’s estimate/CONOPS (from JPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop Assessment Plan</td>
<td>Planning ● JPP Step 7</td>
<td>Commander Planners ● Primary staff ● Special staff ● Assessment element ● Operations planners ● Intelligence planners ● Subordinate commanders ● Interagency and multinational partners ● Others, as required</td>
<td>Assessment approach which includes: ● Assessment framework and construct ● Specific outcomes (end state, objectives, effects) ● Commander’s estimate/CONOPS (from JPP)</td>
<td>Document assessment framework and construct ● Finalize the data collection plan ● Coordinate and assign responsibilities for monitoring, collection, and analysis</td>
<td>Approved assessment plan Data collection plan Approved contingency plan/operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collect Information and Intelligence</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Intelligence analysts ● Current operations ● Assessment element ● Subordinate commanders ● Interagency and multinational partners ● Others, as required</td>
<td>Approved assessment plan Data collection plan</td>
<td>JIPOE ● Staff estimates ● IR management ● ISR planning and optimization</td>
<td>Data collected and organized, relevant to joint force actions, current and desired conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze Information and Intelligence</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Primary staff ● Special staff ● Assessment element</td>
<td>Data collected and organized, relevant to joint force actions, current and desired conditions</td>
<td>Assessment working group ● Staff estimates ● Vet and validate recommendations</td>
<td>Draft assessment products Vetted and validated recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicate Feedback and Recommendations</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Commander ● Subordinate commanders (periodically) ● Primary staff ● Special staff ● Assessment element</td>
<td>Draft assessment products Vetted and validated recommendations</td>
<td>Provide timely recommendations to appropriate decision makers</td>
<td>Approved assessment products, decisions, and recommendations to higher headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adapt Plans or Operations/ Campaigns</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>Commander Planners ● Primary staff ● Special staff ● Assessment element</td>
<td>Approved assessment products, decisions, and recommendations to higher headquarters</td>
<td>Develop branches and sequels ● Modify operational approach/plan ● Modify objectives, effects, tasks, and assessment approach/plan</td>
<td>Revised plans or fragmented orders Updated assessment plan Updated data collection plan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Repeat Steps 3-6 until operation terminated/replaced/transitioned. (Adjust using steps 1 and 2 as required during execution.)

There is no single way to conduct assessment. Every mission and OE has its own unique challenges, making every assessment unique. The following steps can help guide the development of an effective assessment plan and assessment performance during execution. Organizations should consider these steps as necessary to fit their needs.
Step 1—Develop the Operation Assessment Approach
Operation assessment begins during the initiation step of JPP when the command identifies possible operational approaches and their associated objectives, tasks, effects, and desired conditions in the OE. Concurrently, the staff begins to develop the operation assessment approach by identifying and integrating the appropriate assessment plan framework and structure needed to assess planning and execution effectiveness. The assessment approach identifies the specific information needed to monitor and analyze effects and conditions associated with achieving operation or campaign objectives. The assessment approach becomes the framework for the assessment plan and will continue to mature through plan development, refinement, adaptation, and execution in order to understand the OE and measure whether anticipated and executed operations are having the desired impact on the OE.

Step 2—Develop Operation Assessment Plan
Developing, refining, and adapting the assessment plan is concurrent and complementary throughout joint planning and execution. This step overlaps with the previous step during ID of the objectives and effects. Developing the assessment plan is a whole of staff effort and should include other key stakeholders to better shape the assessment effort. The assessment plan should identify staff or subordinate organizations to monitor, collect, analyze information, and develop recommendations and assessment products as required. Requirements for staff coordination and presentation to the commander should also be included in the plan and integrated into the command’s battle rhythm to support the commander’s decision cycle.

Step 3—Collect Information and Intelligence
Commands should collect relevant information throughout planning and execution. Throughout planning and execution the joint force refines and adapts information collection requirements to gather information about the OE and the joint force’s anticipated and completed actions as part of normal C2 activities. Typically, staffs and subordinate commands provide information about planning and execution on a regular cycle through specified battle rhythm events. Intelligence staffs continually provide intelligence about the OE and operational impact to support the collective staff assessment effort. In accordance with the assessment plan, assessment considerations may help the staff determine the presence of decision point triggers and other mission impacts.

Step 4—Analyze Information and Intelligence
Accurate, unbiased analysis seeks to identify operationally significant trends and changes to the OE and their impact on the operation or campaign. Based on analysis, the staff can estimate the effects of force employment and resource allocation, determine whether objectives are being achieved, or determine if a decision point has been reached. Using these determinations, the staff also may identify additional risks and challenges to mission accomplishment or identify opportunities to accelerate mission accomplishment.

Step 5—Communicate Feedback and Recommendations
The staff may be required to develop assessment products (which may include summary reports and briefings) containing recommendations for the commander based upon the guidelines set forth in the assessment plan. The commander’s guidance is the most critical step in developing assessment products. Regardless of quality and effort, the assessment process is useless if the communication of its results is deficient or inconsistent with the commander’s personal style of digesting information and making decisions.

Step 6—Adapt Plans or Operations/Campaigns
Once feedback and recommendations have been provided, commanders typically direct changes or provide additional guidance that dictate updates or modifications to operation or campaign plan. The commander’s guidance may also induce modifications to the assessment plan. Even without significant changes to the plan or order, changes to the assessment plan may be necessary to reflect changes in the OE or adjustments to the information or intelligence requirements.
Joint Logistics

Sustainment
Sustainment—one of the seven joint functions (command and control [C2], information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment)—is the provision of logistics and personnel services to maintain operations until mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Joint force commanders (JFCs) are called upon to maintain persistent military engagement in an uncertain, complex, and rapidly changing environment to advance and defend US values and interests, achieve objectives consistent with national strategy, and conclude operations on terms favorable to the US. Effective sustainment provides the JFC the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and to extend operational reach. Sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Joint logistics supports sustained readiness for joint forces.

I. Joint Logistics
The relative combat power that military forces can generate against a threat is constrained by their capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to points of application. Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and often sharing of two or more combatant commands (CCMDs) or Military Departments’ logistics resources to support the joint force. To meet the wide variety of global challenges, combatant commanders (CCDRs), subordinate commanders, and their staffs must develop a clear understanding of joint logistics, to include the relationship between logistic organizations, personnel, core functions, principles, imperatives, and the operational environment (OE). This publication provides logistics guidance essential to the operational capability and success of the joint force. It focuses on the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts while leveraging the global joint logistics enterprise (JLEnt) to affect the mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to sustain a JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS). Additionally, it provides guidance for joint logistics; describes core logistics functions essential to success; and offers a framework for CCDRs and subordinate commanders to integrate capabilities from national, multinational, Services, and combat support agencies (CSAs) to provide forces properly equipped and trained, when and where required. The identification of established coordination frameworks, agreements, treaties, theater distribution, and posture plans creates an efficient and effective logistics network to support the JFC’s mission.

Refer to SMFLS4: Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Warfighter’s Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support) -- updated with the latest doctrinal references (ADRP 4-0 Sustainment, ATP 4-93 Sustainment Brigade, JP 4-0 Joint Logistics, and more than 20 other joint and service publications) -- for complete discussion of strategic, operational, and tactical logistics, force projection, deployment and redeployment, and RSO&I operations.
Core logistics functions provide a framework to facilitate integrated decision making, enable effective synchronization and allocation of resources, and optimize joint logistics processes. The challenges associated with support cut across all core logistics functions, especially when multiple joint task forces (JTFs) or multinational partners are involved.

### Core Logistic Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Functions</th>
<th>Functional Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deployment and Distribution</td>
<td>• Move the force&lt;br&gt;• Sustain the force&lt;br&gt;• Operate the joint deployment and distribution enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>• Manage supplies and equipment&lt;br&gt;• Inventory management&lt;br&gt;• Manage global supplier networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>• Depot maintenance operations&lt;br&gt;• Field maintenance operations&lt;br&gt;• Equipment reset</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Services</td>
<td>• Food service&lt;br&gt;• Water and ice service&lt;br&gt;• Contingency base services&lt;br&gt;• Hygiene services&lt;br&gt;• Mortuary affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Contract Support</td>
<td>• Contract support integration&lt;br&gt;• Contracting support&lt;br&gt;• Contractor management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>• General engineering&lt;br&gt;• Combat engineering&lt;br&gt;• Geospatial engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Health Services</td>
<td>• Force health protection&lt;br&gt;• Health service support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: Figure II-1. Core Logistics Functions

The core logistics functions are: deployment and distribution, supply, maintenance, logistics services, operational contract support (OCS), engineering, and joint health services. The core logistics functions are considered during the employment of US military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and provide global force projection and sustainment.
**Core Logistics Functions**

*Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Feb ‘19), pp. II-1 to II-13.*

**A. Deployment and Distribution**

The global dispersion of the threats, coupled with the necessity to rapidly deploy, execute, and sustain operations worldwide, makes the deployment and distribution capability the cornerstone of joint logistics. These operational factors necessitate a shift from a supply-based system to a system that is primarily distribution-based with beginning-to-end synchronization to meet JFC requirements. Through sharing critical information, it is possible to create unity of effort among diverse distribution organizations to satisfy deployment, execution, and sustainment operations.

**B. Supply**

The joint logistician must understand the complexities of supply operations, the functions and processes that define them, and the organizations and personnel responsible for executing tasks to meet the JFC’s requirements. The Services and DLA are primarily responsible for DOD supply chain operations and manage the supply processes to provide common commodities and services to joint forces. Planning for supply operations requires a collaborative environment to fully consider all major components of the JLEnt, to include the return and retrograde of equipment and supplies.

**C. Maintenance**

Maintenance supports system readiness for the JFC. The Services, as part of their Title 10, United States Code (USC), responsibilities, execute maintenance as a core logistics function. The Services employ a maintenance structure of depot- and field-level maintenance to improve the JFC’s freedom of action and sustain the readiness and capabilities of assigned units.

**D. Logistics Services**

Logistics services comprise the support capabilities that collectively enable the US to rapidly provide global sustainment for our military forces. Logistics services include many scalable and disparate capabilities. Included in this area are food service, water and ice service, contingency base services, hygiene services, and mortuary affairs (MA).

**E. Operational Contract Support (OCS)**

OCS is a core logistics function and a critical component of total force readiness. DOD relies on contractors to perform many tasks. OCS provides the CCDR flexibility and options to employ commercially sourced logistics solutions from JLEnt partners such as BOS intra-theater transportation, logistics services, maintenance, storage, construction, security operations, and common-user commodities.

**F. Engineering**

Engineer capabilities enable joint operations by facilitating freedom of action necessary for the JFC to meet mission objectives. Engineer operations integrate combat, general, and geospatial engineering to meet national and JFC requirements. Joint engineer operations facilitate the mobility and survivability of friendly forces; counter the mobility of enemy forces; provide infrastructure to position, project, protect, and sustain the joint force; contribute to a clear understanding of the physical environment; and provide support to civilian authorities and other nations.

**G. Health Services**

Joint health care services are conducted as part of an interrelated health system that shares medical services, capabilities, and specialists among the Service components and partners with multiple agencies and nations to implement a seamless unified health care effort in support of a joint force. Joint medical capabilities encompass both health service support (HSS) and force health protection (FHP) functions and are employed across the full range of military operations. These capabilities span the OA from prevention to point of injury/illness to definitive care.
II. Coordinating & Synchronizing Joint Logistics

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Feb ’19), chap. III.

This section describes the authorities, organizations, and controls that synchronize logistics in support of the JFC. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, identifies C2 as a joint function. Command includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and the art of motivating and directing people and organizations to accomplish missions. Control is inherent in command. However, logistics assets will rarely fall under one command, which makes control, coordination, collaboration, synchronization, and management of joint logistics more challenging.

To control joint logistics, commanders direct forces and functions consistent with a commander’s command authority. It involves organizing the joint logistics staff, operational-level logistics elements, CSAs, and their capabilities to assist in planning and executing joint logistics. Designating lead Service, assigning agency responsibilities, and developing procedures to execute the CCDR’s directive authority for logistics (DAFL) will assist in planning, integrating, synchronizing, and executing joint logistics support operations. While logistics remains a Service responsibility, there are other logistics organizations, processes, and tasks to consider when developing a concept of logistics support (COLS) to optimize joint logistics objectives.

I. Logistics Authority

Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL)

CCDRs exercise authoritative direction over logistics, in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 164. DAFL cannot be delegated or transferred. However, the CCDR may delegate the responsibility for the planning, execution, and/or management of common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC or Service component commander to accomplish the subordinate JFC’s or Service component commander’s mission. For some commodities or support services common to two or more Services, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate one provider as the EA (see Appendix D, “Logistic-Related Executive Agents”). Other control measures to assist in developing common user logistics are joint tasks or inter-Service support agreements. However, the CCDR must formally delineate this delegated authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. The exercise of DAFL by a CCDR includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary for the execution of military operations in support of the following: execution of approved OPLANs; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

DAFL of a GCC applies to the entire AOR and affects all subordinate components, commands, and direct reporting units in the AOR. Some CCDR responsibilities include:

- Issuing directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary for the execution of military operations, in support of the following: execution of approved OPLANs, effectiveness and economy of operation, and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.
• Coordinating with USTRANSCOM to identify transportation-related requirements and initiatives (e.g., establishment of aerial port of debarkation [APOD]/seaport of debarkation [SPOD], determining transportation routes and infrastructure to support).

• Coordinating with DLA to identify logistics requirements and initiatives (e.g., establishing storage locations, identifying pre-positioned material and equipment, determining fuel requirements, providing contingency contracting solutions).

• Establishing host-nation support (HNS) (e.g., acquisition and cross-serving agreements [ACSAs]/mutual logistics support agreements, status-of-forces agreements, cost-sharing agreements).

Unless otherwise directed by SecDef, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistics support of their forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance:

• Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistics authority exercised by the CCDR will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by SecDef or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). Where these factors preclude execution of a CCDR’s directive by component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the CCDR, together with the comments of the component commander concerned, normally will be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the CCDR, through the CJCS, to SecDef.

• Under crisis, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistics process necessary, the logistics authority of CCDRs enables them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands for the accomplishment of their missions. The President or SecDef may extend this authority to attached forces when transferring those forces for a specific mission and should specify this authority in the establishing directive or order. Joint logistics doctrine and policy developed by the CJCS establishes wartime logistics support guidance to assist the CCDR in conducting successful joint operations.

A CCDR’s DAFL does not:

• Discontinue Service responsibility for logistics support.

• Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement.

• Disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations.

• Include the ability to provide contracting authority or make binding contracts for the US Government.

In exercising DAFL, CCDRs have an inherent obligation to ensure accountability of resources. This obligation is an acknowledgement of the Military Departments’ Title 10, USC, responsibilities and recognizes that the Military Departments, with rare exceptions, do not resource their forces to support other DOD forces. In that regard, CCDRs will coordinate with appropriate Service components before exercising DAFL or delegating authority for subordinate commanders to exercise common support capabilities to one of their components. In keeping with the Title 10, USC, roles of the Military Departments, CCDRs should maintain an accounting of resources taken from one Service component and provided to another. This accounting can be used to reimburse the losing Service component in kind over time within the AOR when possible, or can be used to pass back a requirement to DOD for resource actions to rebalance Military Department resource accounts.
C. Joint Logistic Boards, Centers, Offices, and Cells

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Feb ’19), app. B.

The CCDR may also establish boards, centers, offices, and cells (e.g., subarea petroleum office [SAPO], joint facilities utilization board [JFUB], joint mortuary affairs office [JMAO], operational contract support integration cell [OCSIC]) to meet increased requirements and to coordinate the logistics effort.

Strategic-level Boards, Offices, and Centers

Strategic-level joint logistic boards, offices, and centers provide advice or allocation recommendations to the CJCS concerning prioritizations, allocations, policy modifications or procedural changes.

- Joint Logistics Board (JLB)
- Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB)
- Joint Transportation Board (JTB)
- Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC)
- Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC)
- Defense Health Agency (DHA)
- Contingency Basing Executive Council (CBEC)
- Global Posture Executive Council (GPEC)
- Medical Logistics Division
- United States Transportation Command, Office of the Command Surgeon (TCSG)
- Armed Services Blood Program (ASBP)

Operational Joint Logistic Boards, Centers, and Cells

Operational-level joint logisticians must provide advice and recommendations to the supported CCDR concerning prioritizations, allocations, or procedural changes based upon the constantly changing operational environment.

- Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC)
- Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC)
- Combatant Commander Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB)
- Joint Requirements Review Board (JRRB)
- Joint Contracting Support Board (JCSB)
- Joint Environmental Management Board (JEMB)
- Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB)
- Logistics Coordination Board
- Joint Movement Center (JMC)
- Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC)
- Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC)
- Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO)
- Joint Petroleum Office (JPO)
- Sub-area Petroleum Office (SAPO)
- Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO)
- Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC)
- Joint Munitions Office (JMO)
- Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC)
Geographic Combatant Commander (GCC) Option Selection and Design

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Feb ‘19), p. III-19 to III-21 and app. D.

JP 4-0, appendix E provides amplifying information detailing the joint logistics factors and enablers with regard to the staff and organization control options.

GCCs require visibility over the JLEnt to meet the command priorities. The factors below should be considered when the GCC is establishing the logistics control required by the JFC. These factors are not absolute nor all inclusive; but they do reflect the best practices observed in the field. These factors are applicable regardless of the control option selected by the GCC.

Centralized Joint Logistics Planning
This factor implies a capability to match joint logistics planning with the planning done during the execution of a mission.

Maintenance of Situational Awareness
This factor represents more than using radio signals and internet-based application data to track cargo movement (ITV). It involves elements such as the design and use of logistics situation reports and the building of ground truth in logistics input to the JFC’s COP.

Adjudication of Conflicting Priorities
This factor is to have processes in place to identify conflicts when following the commander’s priorities. For example, a reliable logistics input to the JFC’s COP may provide the means to identify conflicts, and a fusion cell may provide the capability to adjudicate.

Timely Identification of Factors and Shortfalls
To meet this factor a process that links the logistics portion of the battle rhythm with the planning windows must exist.

Clear Understanding of Component Capabilities
This factor involves the building of databases that reflect current Service component and support agencies logistics capabilities. Fulfilling this factor may require liaison and physical presence of logisticians representing all appropriate Service components within the selected joint logistics control option.

Ability to Synchronize Components Capabilities
This factor matches the best capability, regardless of Service component, to the joint logistics need.

Integrated Logistics Processes
This factor is founded on the notion that the joint logistic staff comprehends the Service components logistic processes and uses this understanding to build the visibility required by the JFC to control joint logistics.

Integrated Distribution
This factor deals with the establishment of the JDDOC and its integration within the joint theater logistics construct. It maximizes the capabilities of the JDDOC to fill the seams between strategic and operational level deployment and distribution tasks. The JDDOC also strives to maximize and synchronize the use of common user land transportation and intratheater lift.

Cross Component Supply
This factor involves the establishment of CUL responsibilities and the processes required to achieve their execution.
Cross Component Visibility
This factor refers to the ability for the Service components to see and understand assets available from other components.

Improved Capability to Direct the Process
This factor proposes the establishment of a decision-making process to direct logistics actions. These actions usually are directed in the form of further guidance to enhance the planning or assessment processes, or the publication of a FRAGORD to direct an action.

Designation of Contracting Construct
It is imperative that a detailed analysis of the OCS aspects of the OE be prepared to help shape COA development and determine the possible intended and unintended outcomes of OCS.
Joint logistics planning provides the process and the means to integrate, synchronize, and prioritize joint logistics capabilities toward achieving the supported commander’s operational objectives during all phases of plan development. This section is applicable to combatant command campaign plans (CCPs), subordinate campaign plans, campaign support plans, and contingency plans tasked in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (commonly referred to as the JSCP), or as directed by the CCDR. This section also addresses planning considerations, input and output products used by joint logisticians to create OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs) that enable transition from peacetime activities to execution of orders. Focus is on the JPP in development of the theater logistics overview (TLO) as a segment of the CCP.

Joint logistics planning is conducted under the construct of joint planning and the JPP addressed in JP 5-0, Joint Planning. Joint planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations by CCDRs and their subordinate commanders in response to contingencies and crises. It transforms national strategic objectives into activities by development of operational products that include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces and supporting contractors. Joint planning occurs at multiple strategic national and operation levels using process, procedures, tactics, techniques, and facilitating information technology tools/applications/systems aligned to the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise.

The theater logistics overview (TLO) segment of the CCP articulates the overarching logistic architecture of the GCC’s AOR. It is the start point of subsequent JPP logistics planning for regional OPLAN development and other contingencies.

I. Planning Functions

Joint planning encompasses a number of elements, including four planning functions: strategic guidance, concept development, plan development, and plan assessment. Depending upon the type of planning and time available, these functions can be sequential or concurrent. Joint planning features detailed planning guidance and frequent dialogue between senior leaders and commanders to promote a common understanding of planning assumptions, considerations, risks, COA, implementing actions, and other key factors. Plans may be rapidly modified throughout their development and execution. This process involves expeditious plan reviews and feedback, which can occur at any time, from SecDef and the CJCS. The intent is to give SecDef and the CCDR a mechanism for adapting plans rapidly as the situation dictates.

Integrated planning coordinates resources, timelines, decision points, and authorities across CCMD functional areas and AORs to attain strategic end states. Integrated planning produces a shared understanding of the OE, required decisions, resource prioritization, and risk across the CCMDs. JFCs and component commanders need to involve all associated commands and agencies within DOD in their plans and planning efforts. Moreover, planning efforts must be coordinated with other US Government department and agency stakeholders in the execution of the plan to assure unity of effort across the whole-of-government. The integrated planning process is the way the joint force will address complex challenges that span multiple CCMDs.
AORs and functional responsibilities. Integrated planning also synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision points, and authorities across multiple GCCs to achieve GEF-directed campaign objectives and attain contingency end states.

**Supported CCDR**

The supported CCDRs lead integrated logistics planning for their problem sets, inclusive of all associated plans related to the logistics problem both intertheater and intratheater. As such, supported CCDRs have coordinating authority for logistics planning. They lead the logistics planning process with all supporting CCMDs to develop a common understanding of logistics requirements, synchronize logistics planning activities, identify problem set logistics resource requirements, and provide logistics supportability analyses (quantitative and qualitative), as well as risk and supportability assessments associated with the plans. The supported commander designates and prioritizes objectives, timing, and duration of the supporting action. The supported commander ensures supporting commanders understand the operational approach and the support requirements of the plan. If required, SecDef will adjudicate competing demands for resources when there are simultaneous requirements amongst multiple supported CCDRs.

**Supporting Commander**

Supporting commanders will ensure their logistics planning is sufficiently integrated and synchronized across the problem set. They assist the supported CCMDs’ efforts to develop a unified view of the logistics environment and synchronize resources, timelines, logistics C2, decision points, and authorities. The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing support. The supporting commander advises and coordinates with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of required support, assists in planning for the integration of support into the supported commander’s effort, and ensures support requirements are appropriately communicated throughout the supporting commander’s organization.

**A. Strategic Guidance**

The primary end product of the strategic guidance function and an in-progress review (IPR) is an approved CCDR’s mission statement for contingency planning and a commander’s assessment (operational report-3 pinnacle command assessment) or commander’s estimate for crisis planning.

**B. Concept Development**

During concept development, if an IPR is required, the CCDR outlines COAs and makes recommendations to higher authority for approval and further development. Products from concept development include an approved mission statement, preliminary COAs, and prepared staff estimates. The CCDR recommends a COA for SecDef approval in the commander’s estimate. The SecDef’s approved COA from a concept development IPR is the basis for CONOPS.

**C. Plan Development**

This function is used to develop a feasible plan or order that is ready to transition into execution. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, conflict termination, redeployment, and demobilization activities through all phases of the plan. When the CCDR believes the plan is sufficiently developed, the CCDR briefs the final plan to SecDef (or a designated representative) for approval. Plan development solidifies the CONOPS and the OPLAN, concept plan (CONPLAN), or OPORD and required supporting documents are prepared.
Logistics Planning Integration (Strategic Guidance, Plans, & Operations)

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Feb ‘19), fig. IV-1, p. IV-5.

Using the JPP framework for planning, Figure IV-1 reflects the cascading relationship from strategic guidance and tasking to planning and developing OPORDs with a focus on CCP and associated key logistics area products. These key logistics area products, TLO, logistics estimate, and COLS support the CCP and provide the basis for plan and OPORD development. These products are key to the GCC’s conduct of missions throughout the AOR. Figures IV-2 and IV-3 (following pages) reflect the joint logistics planning process combined with elements of the joint planning activities, functions, and products depicted in Figure IV-1 (below).
Likely Expected Logistics Outputs to JPP

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Feb ‘19), pp. IV-13 to IV-14.

Figure IV-4, below, depicts logistics planning products by level of plan. Within JPP, key logistics outputs are OPORD TLO; logistics estimate supporting development of the commander’s estimate and COLS. The COLS further supports annex D for deliberate plans and OPORDs. Appendix 4 to annex D for deliberate plans provides the LSA for the plan. In terms of operations execution, logistics supportability is addressed and status update reported in the JFC’s situation report (SITREP) per CJCSM 3150.5, Joint Reporting System Situation Monitoring Manual.

### Likely Expected Logistics Outputs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plan Level</th>
<th>Strategic Guidance</th>
<th>Concept Development</th>
<th>Plan Approval</th>
<th>Plan Review</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1 “Commander’s Estimate”</td>
<td>TLO, ILE, and RLE (briefing)</td>
<td>Paragraph 4 (written and briefing)</td>
<td>Δs to TLO and RLE (briefing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2 Base Plan</td>
<td>TLO, ILE, and RLE (briefing)</td>
<td>Paragraph 4, Annex D, logistics enablers, preparation tasks, COLS, and LSM (written and briefing)</td>
<td>Δs to TLO and RLE (briefing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 Base Plan with Select Annexes</td>
<td>TLO, ILE, and RLE (briefing)</td>
<td>Paragraph 4, Annex D, logistics enablers, preparation tasks, COLS, and LSM (written and briefing); Annex Q</td>
<td>Δs to TLO and RLE (briefing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3 with TPFDD</td>
<td></td>
<td>Transportation feasible TPFDD, Annex W, CSSM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 4 Base Plan with Annexes and Detailed TPFDD</td>
<td>TLO, ILE, and RLE (briefing)</td>
<td>Paragraph 4, Annex D, Annex W, logistics enablers, preparation tasks, COLS, LSM, and CSSM (written and briefing); Annex Q</td>
<td>Logistics portions of plan, draft supporting plans, logistics inputs to TPFDD, and LSA (written and briefing); Δs to TLO, RLE, COLS, and LSA; status of supporting plans (briefing)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend

- Δ: change
- COLS: concept of logistic support
- CSSM: contracted support synchronization matrix
- ILE: initial logistics estimate
- LSA: logistics supportability analysis
- LSM: logistics synchronization matrix
- RLE: refined logistics estimate
- TLO: theater logistics overview
- TPFDD: time-phased force and deployment data

Ref: JP 4-0 (Feb ‘19), fig. IV-4. Likely Expected Logistics Outputs.

Logistics input to the SITREP assists in providing shared situational awareness and visibility within and across echelons of command to address the core logistics functions, force and sustainment tracking, JRSOI supporting declaration of force closure for operational employment, and other conditions that increase, or materially detract from, the adaptability and readiness of forces.
V. Key Logistics Planning Process Outputs

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Feb ‘19), pp. IV-13 to IV-16.

A. Theater Logistics Analysis (TLA)
The TLA is a supporting process facilitating development of the TLO through examination, assessment, and codification of an understanding of current conditions of the OE. Analysis determines infrastructure, logistics assets/resources, and environmental factors in the OE that will optimize or adversely impact means for supporting and sustaining operations within the theater. To facilitate developing the TLA, logistics planners leverage all interactions with PN logistics professional counterparts (e.g., during multinational exercises logistics planning and execution) to capture insights into their capabilities, processes, and policies by writing and distributing detailed after action reports (AARs). To effectively share best practices and lessons learned from logistics operations across DOD, observations, insights, and AARs should be entered into the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). Entry into JLLIS facilitates awareness of issues and may provide solutions to logistics planning issues. The TLA provides a detailed country-by-country analysis of key infrastructure by location or installation (main operating base/forward operating site/cooperative security location); footprint projections (including contingency locations); HN agreements; and available contracted support capabilities, existing contracts, and task orders to logistically support the theater during peacetime through contingency operations. Work completed supports TLO development as a segment of the CCP and development of directed plans and OPORDs. Information and data collected and codified during the TLA process are the basis for analysis which assists in identifying, resolving, and/or mitigating risk associated with theater shaping operations. Additionally, the TLA provides the framework for conceptual planning, which involves understanding the OE and the problem, determining the operation's end state, and visualizing an operational approach. Using the TLA, the operational approach is initially addressed in a logistics estimate and transitions to culminate in the TLO. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of force as a whole to achieve objectives. Effective planning requires the integration of both the conceptual and detailed components of planning. The TLA assists in improving the JFC's situational awareness and understanding of theater logistics support capabilities and readiness to support/execute theater operations.

B. Theater Logistics Overview (TLO)
The TLO is a segment of the iterative planning process which addresses identification, understanding, and framing the theater’s mission at the campaign level, not for a specific operation. The TLO uses TLA information to inform decisions about the approaches to be used for sourcing and distribution of logistics support for theater operations. Having captured influencing elements in the TLA as a frame, the JFC’s logistics staff elements develop and codify an overarching approach to theater operations in the TLO. The TLO then serves as an important link between conceptual planning and the detailed planning tasked in the GEF/JSCP. Additionally, the TLO helps the JFC and operations and logistics staff segments measure the overall effectiveness of employing forces, force sustainability, and logistics capability readiness to ensure that the operational approach remains feasible and acceptable. As such, the TLO is key to help identify and address capability gaps, risk mitigations, and residual risk. If risk cannot be resolved or mitigated to an acceptable level then the operational concept may be reframed. Reframing involves revisiting earlier COAs, conclusions, and decisions that underpin the current operational CONOPS. Reframing can lead to a modification of the current CONOPS or result in preparation of a branch plan or entirely new plan. In developing the TLO, logistics planners, in coordination with intelligence and operations staff segments, identify opportunities/initiatives by anticipating events. This allows them to identify decision points to operate inside the threat's decision cycle or to react promptly to deteriorating conditions.
situation advancing beyond shaping operations. Time to complete the TLA and resulting TLO assists in optimizing available planning time for associated detailed plans. Based on their understanding and learning gained during TLO development, the JFC and senior logistics staff representative issue logistics planning guidance to support and enable the operational approach expressed in the CONOPS and to guide more detailed planning. Refer to JP 4-0, Appendix A, for an example of a TLO format.

C. Logistics Estimate

Logistics estimate supports the commander’s estimate, COLS, OPORD development, and execution. Execution planning may involve abbreviated and compressed timelines from situational awareness/initiating event and reporting to potential JFC planning guidance or CJCS planning order to OPORD and execution. The TLA and TLO provide a foundation for rapid review and response development. Due to accelerated timelines, availability, and incorporation of TLA information and TLO segments, preparation of the logistics estimate may be compressed supporting the commander’s estimate and initial work for COA development, analysis, and selection. Updating the TLA/TLO baseline, the logistics estimate supporting the commander’s estimate informs the COLS and OCS concept prepared for OPORD annex D and annex W development and iterative planning during operations execution. The logistics estimate is an analysis of how CSS factors can affect mission accomplishment. It contains the logistics staff’s comparison of requirements and capabilities, conclusions, and recommendations about the feasibility of supporting a specified COA. This estimate includes how the core logistics functions affect various COAs. Preparation of the logistics estimate provides a coordinated and formalized means for the staff to identify and consider logistics shaping in support of the operational CONOPS. Planners should evaluate the feasibility of OPLANs in light of strategic lift capabilities and limitations. The logistics effort and development of the logistics estimate refined as COLS for OPORD annex D must be integrated into the JPP and OPORD development upfront. Using the TLA/TLO baseline, logistics staff segments will be able to identify if specific operational actions to augment or expand theater logistics capabilities to support the operational CONOPS must be taken. The previously developed TLA/TLO assists the logistics planners in providing logistics characteristics of the AOR and area of operations/area of interest for the specified operations. The TLA/TLO aids planners in identification of logistics infrastructure of the OE (what exists in the OA that may be put to use).

D. Concept of Logistic Support (COLS)

In support of the CCDR and preparation of plans/OPORDs, the logistics staff elements prepare a logistics estimate which is further refined and developed into a COLS. The COLS provides a foundational basis in preparation of annex D for assigned contingency plans and/or OPORD development tasks. The COLS establishes priorities of support across all phases of operations to support the JFC’s CONOPS. Logistics staff elements’ active participation within and across JPP activities at all echelons facilitates CONOPS and associated COLS development. A COLS addresses the sustainment of forces, to include identification and status of contingency basing. Through exercising DAFL, the CCDR may assign a component commander with the responsibility for conducting various theater logistics functions, as well as base support at designated theater locations. Logistics functions may include management of afloat assets; identification and status of theater sustainment elements, to include identification and/or forecast of required augmentation; priority of sustainment by class of supply with guidance on days of supply to be maintained (minimum and maximum); movement priorities for airlift and sealift aligned to JFC’s CONOPS; guidance for employment of sea-air interfaces to facilitate JRSOI; controlling CUL; JFC’s declaration of force closure; actions by phase; logistics assets required; and designation of contracting construct (e.g., lead Service for contracting [LSC], joint theater support contracting command [JTSCC]).

For more information on the COLS, refer to CJCSI 3110.03, (U) Logistics Supplement (LOGSUP) for the 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).
II. Joint Logistics Execution

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Feb ‘19), pp. IV-1 to IV-3.

JFCs adapt to evolving mission requirements and operate effectively across a range of military operations. These operations differ in complexity and duration. The joint logistician must be aware of the characteristics and focus of these operations and tailor logistics support appropriately. This range of military operations extends from shaping activities to major operations and campaigns. US and multinational partners collaborate to expand mutual support and leverage capabilities to quickly respond to future contingencies.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

The GEF directs development of CCPs focused on current operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventative activities. Specific issues that can be addressed in the CCMD campaigns include securing interagency approvals; addressing PN and regional sensitivities, changing politics, and overall stability; determining optimal presence and posture; BPC; and developing formal agreements/permissions between the US and PNs. Developing mutually supportive relationships to enhance coordination is an important enabler for joint logistics operations. ACSAs are bilateral international agreements that allow for the provision of cooperative logistics support under the authority granted in Title 10, USC, Sections 2341-2350. They are governed by DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, and implemented by CJCSI 2120.01, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

US military history indicates crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically single, small-scale, limited-duration operations. Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces, the private sector, and capabilities in close cooperation with other US Government departments and agencies, international organizations, and NGOs. Logisticians must understand multinational, private-sector, and interagency logistics capabilities and coordinate mutual support, integrating them into the joint operation when appropriate. Many crisis response missions, such as foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, require time-sensitive sourcing of critical commodities and capabilities, and rapid delivery to the point of need. In these operations, joint logistics is often the main effort, often operating in support of the Department of State.

Major Operations or Campaigns

Major operations or campaigns typically involve the deployment, sustainment, redeployment, and retrograde of large combat forces. Joint logistics can be executed by an appointed lead Service or agency for CUL. Joint logisticians develop support plans for the duration of the operation, as well as the return of personnel and equipment to CONUS or other locations. These plans often leverage contractor support to augment Service logistics capabilities. The primary challenges for logisticians during these types of operations are identifying the requirements, ensuring logistics issues are considered among competing priorities and adjusting to the situation to ensure sustained readiness and synchronized timelines as the operation transitions across phases. Logistics plans must account for and have the flexibility to mitigate the impact of CBRN-contaminated APODs and SPODs on force flow. This includes identifying locations for transload and exchange zone operations. A critical planning requirement during any operation is to plan for the transition to the final phase, where logisticians will have competing requirements to support stability activities, provide basic services while conducting contract closeout and changes to the contractor management plan, support foreign humanitarian assistance, and assist with reconstruction efforts all while conducting movement of redeploying forces and equipment. The retrograde of contaminated materiel will require special handling to control contamination and protect the force and mission resources.
A joint task force (JTF) is one of several command and control (C2) options for conducting joint operations. A JTF may be established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the operation require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JFC). The size, composition, capabilities, and other attributes will vary significantly among JTFs based on the mission and various factors of the operational environment (OE), such as the threat, the geography of the joint operations area (JOA), the nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to accomplish the mission. CJTFs typically function at the operational level and employ their capabilities throughout the JOA.

See pp. 1-23 to 1-30 for discussion of considerations for establishing joint forces.

**JTF Organizational Options**

A naval task force consisting of Navy and Marine Corps forces does not by itself constitute a joint task force.

**Operational JTFs** are the most common type of JTF and is established in response to a Secretary of Defense (SecDef)-approved military operation or crisis.

**Contingency JTFs** are identified and designated to support operation plan execution or specific on-call missions, such as national special security events, on a contingency basis.

A **Standing JTF** is a JTF originally established as an operational JTF, but that has an enduring mission that is projected to continue indefinitely.

A **combined JTF** is a multinational JTF the commander commands from a multinational and joint headquarters (HQ).

A National Guard (NG) **joint force headquarters-state** (NG JFHQ-State) liaison officer (LNO) provides C2 of all NG forces in the state for the governor and can act as a joint HQ for national-level response efforts during contingency operations.
Joint Task Force
Establishing Authority Responsibilities


A CJTF has authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and require coordination among subordinate commanders. Unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution are key considerations. Generally, a CJTF should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function as they were designed. The intent is to meet the CJTF’s mission requirements while maintaining the functional integrity of Service components. A CJTF may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.

- Appoint the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assign the mission and forces, and exercise command and control of the joint task force (JTF)

- In coordination with the CJTF, determine the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission

- Allocate or request forces required

- Provide the overall mission, purpose, and objectives for the directed military operations

- Define the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified)

- Provide or coordinate communications, personnel recovery, and security for forces moving into or positioned outside the JOA thus facilitating the commander’s freedom of action.

- Develop, modify as required, and promulgate to all concerned rules of engagement and rules for the use of force tailored to the situation.

- Monitor the operational situation and keep superiors informed through periodic reports

- Provide guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execute orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements)

- Promulgate changes in plans and modify mission and forces as necessary

- Provide or coordinate administrative and sustainment support

- Recommend to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF

- Establish or assist in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation

- Determine supporting force requirements

- Prepare a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).

- Approve CJTF plans

- Delegate directive authority for common support capabilities (if required)
III. Typical Joint Task Force Organization

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jan ‘18), fig. II-6, p. II-22.

Typical Joint Task Force Organization

Figure II-6 is not meant to be directive or all-inclusive, depicts an example of a JTF HQ’s staff alignment of cross-functional organizations. The figure shows the most common proponent (by staff directorate or special staff group) for each cross-functional organization. As a practical matter, the CJTF and staff establish and maintain only those cross-functional organizations that enhance planning and decision making within the HQ. They establish, modify, and dissolve these entities as the needs of the HQ evolve.
V. Cross-Functional Organizations and Staff Integration

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jan ’18), pp. II-18 to II-21.

Effective joint operations require close coordination, synchronization, and information sharing across the staff directorates. There are clear benefits of the J-code structure in terms of effectiveness, efficiency, administration, accountability, and “plug and play” functionality. However, there is a common tendency for knowledge and expertise to “stovepipe” within the J-code directorates due to the sheer number of ongoing staff actions. Effective knowledge sharing and IM plans will increase collaboration and sharing, which can mitigate this risk. The most common technique for promoting cross-functional collaboration is the formation of an organizational structure that blends J-code functional management with task accomplishment by cross-functional teams of subject matter experts from multiple J-codes (Figure II-3).

Cross-Functional Organizations

* Optional directorates established at JFC’s discretion.

Ref: JP 3-33, fig. II-3. Cross-Functional Organizations and Staff Integration.

Although cross-functional in their membership, most of these teams fall under the principal oversight of the staff directorates or their functional chiefs. This arrangement strengthens the staff effort in ways that benefit the JTF and its commander in mission execution. These organizations are venues through which the cross-functional expertise of the staff is brought to bear on the planning and execution problems being addressed by the commander. Horizontal, cross-functional organizations overlaid on the vertical J-code structure provide a powerful method of staff integration.
**Center**
A center is an enduring functional organization, with supporting staff, designed to perform a joint function within a JFC’s HQ. Often, these organizations have designated locations or facilities. Examples of centers include the JOC, joint personnel processing center (JPPC), and the CMOC.

**Group**
A group is an enduring functional organization formed to support a broad HQ function within a JFC’s HQ. Normally, groups within a JTF HQ include a JPG that manages JTF HQ planning. JPG functions include leading designated planning efforts, resourcing and managing subordinate planning teams, and coordinating planning activities with other staff directorates.

**Cell**
A cell is a subordinate organization formed around a specific process, capability, or activity within a designated larger organization of a JFC’s HQ. A cell usually is part of both functional and traditional staff structures. An example of a cell within the traditional staff structure could be a joint electronic spectrum operations cell subordinate to the operations branch within the J-3. An example of a cell within a functional staff structure could be a current operations cell within the JOC.

**Working Group**
A Working Group (fig. II-4) is an enduring or ad hoc organization within a JFC’s HQ formed around a specific function whose purpose is to provide analysis to users. The WG consists of a core functional group and other staff and component representatives.

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**Basic Working Group Model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Element</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Functional Chief, Deputy and Administrative Section</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Plans (Planning and Assessment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Operations (Planning and Assessment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Operations (Direct and Monitor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other functional members, other stakeholders, and component representatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Working Group Agenda**
- Current operations update
- Future operations estimate
- Future plans estimate
- Functional assessment of the campaign

**Expected Outcomes**
- Broad understanding of functional priorities in support of planning and decision making
- Approved future operations staff estimate
- Approved future plans staff estimate
- Approved functional estimate in support of campaign assessment

Ref: JP 3-33, fig. II-4. Basic Working Group Model.
Office
An office is an enduring organization that is formed around a specific function within a JFC’s HQ to coordinate and manage support requirements. An example of an office is the joint mortuary affairs office (JMAO).

Element
An element is an organization formed around a specific function within a designated directorate of a JFC’s HQ. The subordinate components of an element usually are functional cells. An example of an element is the joint fires element (JFE).

Board
A board is an organized group of individuals within a JFC’s HQ, appointed by the commander (or other authority) that meets with the purpose of gaining guidance or decision. Its responsibilities and authority are governed by the authority that established the board. Boards are chaired by a senior leader with members representing major staff elements, subordinate commands, LNOs, and other organizations as required. There are two different types of boards: command board and functional board.

Operational Planning Team (OPT)
OPTs (fig. II-5) are established to solve a single problem related to a specific task or requirement on a single event horizon. In most cases, OPTs are not enduring and will dissolve upon completion of the assigned task. OPT membership is typically determined by the staff officer responsible for the event horizon in which the OPT is working (i.e., the J-5 [future plans], J-35 [future operations], and J-33 [current operations]).

### Operational Planning Teams

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future Plans</th>
<th>Mission Analysis</th>
<th>COA Development</th>
<th>COA Analysis and Wargaming</th>
<th>COA Comparison and Approval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OPT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Future Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Solves single planning problem on single event horizon</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational Planning Team**
- Leads specific planning efforts in accordance with operation planning process
- Provides direction to functional working groups
- Integrates staff estimates and recommendations from multiple working groups
- Gains decisions through designated boards

**OPT Examples:**
- Sequel “X”
- Branch “Y”
- Crisis “Z”

Ref: JP 3-33, fig. II-5. Operational Planning Teams.
Functional Component Commands


CJTFs may normally establish functional component commands to control military operations. A functional component command typically consists of forces of two or more Military Departments established to perform designated missions.

Example functional component commands include the following:

A. Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC)
The CJTF usually designates a JFACC to establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air operations. A CJTF will typically assign JFACC responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of forces tasked and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air. See pp. 6-2 to 6-3 for further discussion.

B. Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC)
The CJTF should designate a JFLCC and establish the commander’s authority and responsibilities to exercise C2 over land operations, when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation. See pp. 6-8 to 6-9 for further discussion.

C. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)
The CJTF may designate a JFMCC to C2 joint maritime operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces or assets made available for tasking to perform operational missions. Generally, maritime assets may include navies, marines, SOF, coast guards and similar border patrol and revenue services, nonmilitary shipping managed by the government, civil merchant marines, army/ground forces (normally when embarked), and air and air defense forces operating in the maritime domain. See pp. 6-18 to 6-20 for further discussion.

D. Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF)
A SOJTF is a modular, tailorable, and scalable SOF organization that allows the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM), to more efficiently provide integrated, fully capable, and enabled joint SOF to GCCs and subordinate JFCs based on the strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level context.

See p. 6-30 for further discussion.

E. Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF)
A JSOTF is generally composed of units of two or more SOF Service components formed to unilaterally carry out specific special operations or activities or to support a JFC conducting joint operations. A JSOTF may have CF supporting it for specific missions. A JSOTF is normally established by a JFC. For example, a GCC could establish a JTF to conduct operations in a specific JOA of the theater; then, either the GCC or the CJTF could designate a JSOTF commander and establish a JSOTF, subordinate to that CJTF, to plan and execute special operations.

F. Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC)
The CJTF may designate a JFSOCC, SOJTF commander, or JSOTF commander to accomplish a specific mission or control SOF in the JOA. The JFSOCC will generally be the commander with the preponderance of SOF and the requisite C2. The commander of the TSOC may function as the SOJTF commander, JSOTF commander, or JFSOCC. In certain situations, the SOJTF commander or JSOTF commander may be appointed by CDRUSSOCOM.
III. Joint Task Force Command & Control

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jan ‘18), chap. IV.

Chapter 4 of JP 3-33 describes C2 factors and management processes that influence JTF C2. The C2 factors are: the role of the commander in the JTF C2, command relationships, understanding the OE, OA management, operational limitations, interorganizational coordination considerations, multinational considerations, and CMO considerations. The management processes are: JTF IM, the commander’s decision cycle, and the HQ battle rhythm.

I. JTF Headquarters Command & Control Factors

A. Role of the Commander in JTF C2

The CJTF has the authority and responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions. The CJTF's actions associated with these responsibilities are central to JTF C2. The CJTF leverages the full range of skill, knowledge, experience, and judgment to guide the command through the fog and friction of operations towards mission accomplishment. See following page (p. 5-19) for discussion of the commander’s role in planning.

B. Command Relationships

C2 Functions of the JTF Establishing Authority

The JTF establishing authority exercises either combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) or OPCON of the JTF. The JTF establishing authority either transfers forces from subordinate commands and attaches them to the JTF or transfers forces allocated to the CCMD by SecDef via the GFM process, as appropriate. The JTF establishing authority also establishes the command relationships between the CJTF and other subordinate commanders to ensure the success of the JTF.

C2 Functions of the CJTF

The CJTF normally exercises OPCON or TACON over attached forces through designated component, major subordinate command, or subordinate task force commanders. The CJTF may also be a supported or supporting commander. Further, the CJTF may delegate OPCON or TACON of, or establish support relationships for, specific JTF forces or military capabilities to or between subordinate commanders to accomplish specified tasks or missions. For more details concerning command relationships, see pp. 1-31 to 1-40.

C. Understanding the Operational Environment (OE)

The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the operational environment helps commanders understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how these affect the JTF mission accomplishment. See pp. 2-38 to 2-39 and p. 3-50 for further discussion of the operational environment.
D. Operational Area (OA) Management
A critical function of the CJTF is to organize the OA to assist in the integration, coordination, and deconfliction of joint actions. The CJTF can employ areas of operations (AOs), joint special operations areas (JSOAs), amphibious objective areas (AOAs), and joint security areas (JSAs) to support the organization of the OA within the assigned JOA. See pp. 2-40 to 2-42 or further discussion of operational areas from JP 3-0.

E. Operational Limitations
Operational limitations include actions required or prohibited by higher authority (a constraint or restraint) and other restrictions that limit the commander’s freedom of action (such as diplomatic agreements, ROE, diplomatic/political considerations, economic conditions in affected countries, and HN issues). Authorities, in the form of international and domestic law, national policy, and higher HQ guidance and intent, determine the commander’s freedom of action. Authorities can be both permissive and restrictive, at times permitting a wide range of options available to the commander, while at other times restricting the actions that may be taken. An operational constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that directs an action, thus restricting freedom of action. An operational restraint is a requirement placed on the command that prohibits an action, thus restricting freedom of action. Authorities approved for an operation play an integral role in planning, while operational limitations may restrict or bind COA selection or may even impede implementation of the chosen COA. Commanders must identify the approved authorities and operational limitations, understand their impacts, and develop options that maximize approved authorities. This must be done while minimizing the impact of operational limitations to promote maximum freedom of action during execution. A common area of concern for every commander with regard to authorities and limitations is the use of force in mission accomplishment and self-defense.

F. Interorganizational Cooperation Considerations
Relationships between the JTF and USG departments and agencies, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector should not be equated to the C2 relationships and authorities of a military operation. Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency coordination. Successful interorganizational and private sector coordination enables the JTF to build support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared objectives through unity of effort. See chap. 8, Interorganizational Cooperation, for further discussion.

G. Multinational Considerations
The President retains and does not relinquish command authority over US forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider placing appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a competent UN, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or multinational commander for specific operations authorized by the UN Security Council, or approved by the North Atlantic Council, or other authorized regional organization. See chap. 7, Multinational Operations, for further discussion.

H. Considerations for DSCA Operations
The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over federal (Title 10, USC) military forces. On a case-by-case basis, the President may consider placing appropriate Title 10, USC, forces under the OPCON or TACON of a dual-status (Title 10/Title 32, USC) commander in support of the governor of a US state or territory. Title 10, USC, forces under the command (assigned or attached OPCON or TACON) of a dual-status commander will follow the Title 10, USC, RUF unless directed otherwise by the President or SecDef.
V. Joint Planning Group (JPG) Composition

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jan ’18), fig. IX-7, p. IX-11.

The JPG is a group of staff and command representatives formed by the J-3 and charged with developing JTF plans and orders. The JPG typically forms for crisis planning, but the J-3 can also use it for more deliberate future operation planning requirements.

Notional JPG Composition


Composition of a JPG varies depending on the planning activities being conducted. Normally, all supporting components will have permanent representation in the JPG. There are no mandatory rules to determine the precise number of personnel to staff the JPG. Representation to the JPG should be a long-term assignment to provide continuity of focus and consistency of procedure. Often representatives from the supported and supporting CCMDs and multinational representatives or LNOs will augment the JPG.

The JPG is often the focal point for OPORD development. The JTF OPORD will typically be based on the establishing authority’s OPORD (if available). Upon completion of the plan or OPORD and based on CJTF guidance, designated planning teams focus on execution phase planning. A core JPG should be expanded for select planning functions. Typically, these additional planners will be needed when specific subject matter expertise and staff or component planning input is required.

**JTF Plans and Operations Synchronization**

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jan ’18), pp. IX-7 to IX-8.

Upon completion of the plan or OPORD and based on CJTF guidance, designated planning teams focus on execution phase planning. Figure IX-3 (above) represents one organizational option to synchronize long- and short-term planning, assessment, and guidance for commanders.

**Legend**

- **CCIR**: commander’s critical information requirement
- **CDR**: commander
- **COP**: common operational picture
- **FRAGORD**: fragmentary order
- **J-3**: operations directorate of a joint staff
- **J-5**: plans directorate of a joint staff
- **JTF**: joint task force
- **OPLAN**: operation plan
- **OPORD**: operation order
- **POLMIL**: political-military
- **ROE**: rules of engagement
- **RUF**: rules for the use of force
- **SITREP**: situation report
- **WARNORD**: warning order
- **Wargaming**: Wargaming
- **POLMIL issues**: POLMIL issues
- **Situational awareness/ COP/monitor plan execution**: Situational awareness/ COP/monitor plan execution
- **Briefings/CDR SITREP**: Briefings/CDR SITREP
- **SITREP/near-term FRAGORD**: SITREP/near-term FRAGORD
- **Message draft and release**: Message draft and release
- **Track actions/suspenses**: Track actions/suspenses
- **‘What’**: ‘What’
- **‘What If’**: ‘What If’
- **‘What Next’**: ‘What Next’
- **Initial CDR guidance/CDR estimate**: Initial CDR guidance/CDR estimate
- **OPORD-OPLAN/campaign plan**: OPORD-OPLAN/campaign plan
- **Sequel plans for future phases**: Sequel plans for future phases
  - Concept of operations
  - Draft CDR intent
- **Wargaming**: Wargaming
- **POLMIL issues**: POLMIL issues
- **Refines, Adjusts, and Modifies OPORDs/OPLANs (Based Upon Current Situation)**
- **Issues OPORDs, FRAGORD, WARNORD**
- **Monitors, Assesses, Directs and Controls Execution of Plans**
- **JTF: Current Operations**
- **J-3 Current Operations**
- **Collaboration Tools**
- **‘Hand-Off’ of Plan**
- **JTF: Near-Term Planning**
- **Refine, Adjusts, and Modifies OPORDs/OPLANs (Based Upon Current Situation)**
- **‘What’**
- **‘Hand-Off’ of Plan**
- **Planning Products**
- **JTF: Long-Term Planning**
- **Initial OPLAN/OPORD and Campaign Plan**
- **Follow-on Phase-Plans**
- **‘What Next’**

Air Domain
The air domain is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth’s surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible. While domains are useful constructs for visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations are conducted (the operational area), the use of the term “domain” is not meant to imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of any domain. Specific authorities and responsibilities within an operational area are as specified by the appropriate JFC.

Control of the Air
Historically, control of the air has been a prerequisite to success for modern operations or campaigns because it prevents enemy air and missile threats from effectively interfering with operations of friendly air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations forces (SOF), facilitating freedom of action and movement. Dominance of the air cannot be assumed. In the air, the degree of control can range from no control, to a parity (or neutral) situation wherein neither adversary can claim any level of control over the other, to local air superiority in a specific area, to air supremacy over the entire operational area. Control may vary over time. It is important to remember, the degree of control of the air lies within a spectrum that can be enjoyed by any combatant. Likewise, that degree of control can be localized geographically (horizontally and vertically) or defined in the context of an entire theater. The desired degree of control will be at the direction of the JFC and based on the JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS) and will typically be an initial priority objective of joint air operations.

Organization of Forces
A JFC has three basic organizational options for C2 of joint air operations: designate a JFACC, designate a Service component commander, or retain C2 within the JFC’s headquarters. In each case, effectively and efficiently organizing the staff, C2 systems, and subordinate forces that will plan, execute, and assess joint air operations is key. Factors impacting selection of each option may include the overall mission, forces available, the ability to C2, and the desired span of control.

When designated, the JFACC is the commander within a combatant command (CCMD), subordinate unified command, or joint task force (JTF) responsible for tasking joint air forces, planning and coordinating joint air operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The JFACC is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander.
II. Joint Air Operations Planning

Ref: JP 3-30, Joint Air Operations (Jul ‘19), chap. III.

Planning for joint air operations begins with understanding the JFC’s mission and intent. The JFC’s estimate of the operational environment and articulation of the objectives needed to accomplish the mission form the basis for determining components’ objectives. The JFACC uses the JFC’s mission, commander’s estimate and objectives, commander’s intent, CONOPS, and the components’ objectives to develop a course of action (COA). When the JFC approves the JFACC’s COA, it becomes the basis for more detailed joint air operations planning—expressing what, where, and how joint air operations will affect the adversary or current situation. The JFACC’s daily guidance ensures joint air operations effectively support the joint force objectives while retaining enough flexibility in execution to adjust to the dynamics of military operations.

**Joint Air Operations Planning**

- Joint Force Mission
- JFC Estimate
- Objectives and Comprehensive AOR and JOA Perspective
- JFACC/JFC Staff Estimate of the Situation
- JFACC and/or JFC Staff Recommended COA
- JFC Approves COA
- Joint Air Operations Plan
- Supporting Plan
- Area Air Defense Plan - Airspace Control Plan
- JFACC’s Daily Guidance
- Master Air Attack Plan and Supporting Orders
- Air Operations Directive - Air Tasking Order
- Airspace Control Order


The JFACC’s role is to plan joint air operations. In doing so, the JFACC provides focus and guidance to the JAOC staff. The amount of direct involvement depends on the time available, preferences, and the experience and accessibility of the staff. The JFACC uses the entire staff during planning to explore the full range of adversary and friendly COAs and to analyze and compare friendly air capabilities with the threat. The JFACC should ensure planning occurs in a collaborative manner with other components. Joint air planners should meet on a regular basis with the JFC’s planners and with planners from other joint force components.

**The Joint Air Operations Plan (JAOP)**

The JFACC uses the joint planning process for air (JPPA) to develop a JAOP, which guides employment of air capabilities and forces made available to accomplish missions assigned by the JFC. The JAOP is the JFC’s plan to integrate and coordinate joint air operations and encompasses air capabilities and forces supported by, and in support of, other joint force components.
components. The JFACC’s planners should anticipate the need to make changes to plans (e.g., sequels or branches) in a dynamic and time-constrained environment.

### JPPA Inputs, Steps, Outputs

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Refer to AFOPS2: The Air Force Operations & Planning SMARTbook, 2nd Ed. (Guide to Curtis E. LeMay Center & Joint Air Operations Doctrine). Topics and references of the 376-pg AFOPS2 include airpower fundamentals and principles (Vol 1), command and organizing (Vol 3); command and control (Annex 3-30/3-52), airpower (doctrine annexes), operations and planning (Annex 3-0), planning for joint air operations (JP 3-30/3-60), targeting (Annex 3-60), and combat support (Annex 4-0, 4-02, 3-10, and 3-34).
III. Airspace Control Authority (ACA)

The ACA is a commander designated by the JFC to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system (ACS) in the airspace control area. Developed by the ACA and approved by the JFC, the ACP establishes general guidance for the control of airspace and procedures for the ACS for the joint force operational area. The ACO implements specific control procedures for established time periods. It defines and establishes airspace for military operations as coordinated by the ACA and notifies all agencies of the effective time of activation and the structure of the airspace. The ACO is normally published either as part of the ATO or as a separate document and provides the details of the approved requests for coordination measures such as airspace coordinating measures, air defense measures, and fire support coordination measures (FSCMs). All air missions are subject to the ACO and the ACP. The ACO and ACP provide direction to integrate, coordinate, and deconflict the use of airspace within the operational area. (Note: This does not imply any level of command authority over any air assets.) Methods of airspace control vary by military operation and level of conflict from positive control of all air assets in an airspace control area to procedural control of all such assets or any effective combination.

IV. Area Air Defense Commander (AADC)

The AADC is responsible for DCA operations, which include the integrated air defense system for the JOA. DCA and OCA operations combine as the counterair mission, which is designed to attain and maintain the degree of control of the air and protection desired by the JFC. In coordination with the component commanders, the AADC develops, integrates, and distributes a JFC-approved joint AADP. Typically, for forces made available for DCA, the AADC retains TACON of air sorties, while surface-based air and missile defense forces (e.g., Patriot missile systems) may be provided in support from another component commander. As such, the Army air and missile defense command (AAMDC) should be collocated with the joint air operations center (JAOC), if established, and conduct collaborative intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), planning, and execution control. In distributed operations, the AAMDC may not be in the JAOC but is still functionally tied to it. The Navy component commander (NCC) (or joint force maritime component commander [JFMCC], if designated) exercises OPCON of maritime multi-mission and missile defense ships. When designated, these air and missile defense capabilities are in direct support of the AADC for C2 and execution of air defense.

V. Joint Air Operations Command and Control

Normally, the joint air operation C2 system will be built around the C2 system of the Service component commander designated as the JFACC. Each Service component has an organic system designed for C2 of their air operations. Whether it is the Air Force’s theater air control system (TACS), the Army air-ground system (AAGS), the Navy’s composite warfare commander (CWC)/Navy tactical air control system (NTACS), Marine air command and control system (MACCS), or the special operations air-ground system (SOAGS) that serves as the nucleus for C2 of joint air operations, the remainder will be integrated to best support the JFC’s CONOPS.

Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS)

When all elements of the TACS, AAGS, CWC/NTACS, MACCS with fire support coordination center hierarchy, and SOAGS integrate, the entire system is labeled the TAGS.
II. Joint Land Operations

Ref: JP 3-31, Joint Land Operations (Feb ‘14).

In the 20th century, joint and multinational operations have encompassed the full diversity of air, land, maritime, and space forces operating throughout the operational area. Advances in capabilities among all forces and the ability to communicate over great distances have made the application of military power in the 21st century more dependent on the ability of commanders to synchronize and integrate joint land operations with other components’ operations. Many of these advances have been realized through the use of cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which has enabled the US military and allies to communicate and reach across geographic and geopolitical boundaries. However, these advances have also led to increased vulnerabilities and a critical dependence on cyberspace and the EMS for the US and its allies.

Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, singly or in combination, performed across the range of military operations with joint land forces (Army, Marine, or special operations) made available by Service components in support of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force. Joint land operations require synchronization and integration of all instruments of national power to achieve strategic and operational objectives. Normally, joint land operations will also involve multinational land forces.

Joint land operations include land control operations. These are described as the employment of land forces, supported by maritime and air forces (as appropriate) to control vital land areas. Such operations are conducted to establish local military superiority in land operational areas. Land control operations may also be required to isolate, seize, or secure weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to prevent use, proliferation, or loss.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, establishes the JFC’s operational environment as composed of the air, land, maritime, and space domains as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace). Domains are useful constructs to aid in visualizing and characterizing the physical environment in which operations are conducted. Nothing in the definitions of, or the use of the term domain, implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of that domain. C2 is established by the JFC based upon the most effective use of available resources to accomplish assigned missions. The land domain is the land area of the Earth’s surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals. The land domain shares the Earth’s surface with the maritime domain.

See chap. 2, Joint Operations.

Land operations are conducted within a complex operational environment. Numbers of civilians, amount of valuable infrastructure, avenues of approach, freedom of vehicular movement, and communications functionality vary considerably among land environments, creating challenges for the JFLCC. In addition, urban or emerging subterranean environments require special consideration for the conduct of joint land operations. As a result, joint land operations require an effective and efficient C2 structure to achieve success.

It is important to understand that in today’s complex operational environment, adversary actions can be delivered on, from, within, and outside of the operational area, all with potentially global impacts and influence. To negate those threats, commanders at all levels should consider how space, cyberspace, and EMS capabilities enhance the effectiveness and execution of joint land operations.
Organizing the Joint Land Force

Joint land operations include any type of joint military operations, singly or in combination, performed across the range of military operations with joint land forces (Army, Marine, or special operations) made available by Service components in support of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force.

If the JFC does not choose to retain control at the JFC level, there are four primary options available to the JFC for employing land forces from two or more components:

- Subordinate unified command for land operations (available only to a combatant commander)
- Subordinate joint task forces
- Service components
- Functional land component with joint force land component commander (JFLCC)

Not only can the GCC designate a JFLCC, but each subordinate JFC may also designate their own JFLCC. Consequently, there may be multiple LCCs, each with an organization, duties, and responsibilities tailored to the requirements of their specific JFC, within a single AOR. Where multiple JOAs each have land operations being conducted, the JFLCC designated directly by the GCC may also be designated the theater JFLCC.

I. The Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC)

The JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the CONOPS. The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships, and establishes coordinating instructions for the component commanders. Sound organization provides for unity of command, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Unity of command is necessary for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning and direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution is essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals. When organizing joint forces, simplicity and clarity are critical; by making the JFLCC the single commander for joint land operations, the JFC has the ability to enhance synchronization of operations not only between US ground and component forces, but also with multinational land forces.

The JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of the functional component commanders based upon the CONOPS, and may alter this authority during the course of an operation.

The designation of a JFLCC normally occurs when forces of significant size and capability of more than one Service component participate in a land operation and the JFC determines that doing this will achieve unity of command and effort among land forces.
III. The Army in Joint Operations

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19).

The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force and unified action partners in four strategic roles: shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which the Army is organized, trained, and equipped. Strategic roles are not tasks assigned to subordinate units.

Unified Land Operations

Unified land operations is the Army’s warfighting doctrine, and it is the Army’s operational concept and contribution to unified action. Unified land operations is an intellectual outgrowth of both previous operations doctrine and recent combat experience. It recognizes the nature of modern warfare in multiple domains and the need to conduct a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA simultaneously. Unified land operations acknowledges that strategic success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of interagency and multinational partners. Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to joint operations through the conduct of unified land operations. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action.

The goal of unified land operations is to establish conditions that achieve the JFC’s end state by applying landpower as part of a unified action to defeat the enemy. Unified land operations is how the Army applies combat power through 1) simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or DSCA, to 2) seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and 3) consolidate gains. Military forces seek to prevent or deter threats through unified action, and, when necessary, defeat aggression.

Decisive Action

Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authority tasks. Army forces conduct decisive action. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense.

Army forces create depth in time and space through combined arms, economy of force, continuous reconnaissance, and joint capabilities. Conducting operations across large areas forces an adversary or enemy to react in multiple directions and opens up opportunities that can be further exploited to create additional dilemmas.

Refer to AODS6 (w/Change 1): The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to FM/ADP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of Combat Power). Completely updated with the Jul 2019 ADPs, Chg 1 to the 400-pg AODS6 includes operations (ADP 3-0), large-scale combat operations (FM 3-0 w/Chg 1), and refocused chapters on the elements of combat power: command & control (ADP 6-0), movement and maneuver (ADPs 3-90, 3-07, 3-28, 3-05), intelligence (ADP 2-0), fires (ADP 3-19), sustainment (ADP 4-0), & protection (ADP 3-37).
The Army’s Operational Construct

The Army’s operational concept of unified land operations—including its principles, tenets, and operational structure—serves as the basic framework for all operations across the conflict continuum. It is the core of Army doctrine and guides how Army forces contribute to unified action.

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul ‘19), Introductory figure. ADP 3-0 unified logic chart.
The nation requires an expeditionary force-in-readiness capable of responding to a crisis anywhere in the world. The Marine Corps provides self-sustainable, task organized combined arms forces capable of conducting a full spectrum of operations in support of the joint force commander. These missions might include forcible entry operations, peace enforcement, evacuation of American citizens and embassies, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, or operations to reinforce or complement the capabilities of other Services to provide balanced military forces to the joint force commander. The unique capabilities of the Marine Corps as a sea service and partner with the U.S. Navy allow the use of the sea as both a maneuver space and a secure base of operations from which to conduct operations in the littoral areas of the world. The ability to remain at sea for long periods of time without the requirement of third nation basing rights makes the Marine Corps the force of choice in emerging crises.

Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare Concept
Expeditionary maneuver warfare is the Marine Corps capstone operational concept. It applies the doctrine of maneuver warfare to Marine Corps expeditionary operations to achieve desired effects across the spectrum of conflict. Supporting operational concepts such as Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS), Ship-To-Objective Maneuver (STOM), MPF 2010, and Expeditionary Bases and Sites are all elements of expeditionary maneuver warfare.

Operations as Part of the Joint Force
Marine Corps forces normally conduct operations as part of a joint force. Regardless of the level of the joint force or how a joint force commander organizes his force, if Marine Corps forces are assigned, there is always a Marine Corps Service component. There are two levels of Marine Corps components—a Marine Corps component under a unified command and a Marine Corps component under a subordinate unified command or a joint task force.

Forward-deployed naval forces, including Marine Corps forces, are usually the first conventional forces to arrive in an austere theater or AO during expeditionary operations. The Marine Corps component commander’s inherent capability to command and control Marine Corps forces—and attached or assigned forces of other Services or nations—allows him to serve as a functional component commander. Such assignments may be for limited contingencies or for some phases of a major operation or campaign, depending upon the size, scope, nature of the mission, and the functional area assigned.

If the Marine Corps component commander has functional component commander responsibilities, he normally executes them with his subordinate MAGTF. A Marine Corps component commander can also act as a functional component commander. This may be for a particular phase of an operation or for its full duration, depending upon the size, scope, and nature of the mission and the functional area assigned. The most common functional components the joint force commander may establish include:

- Joint force maritime component commander
- Joint force land component commander
- Joint force air component commander

In addition to functional component duties, the joint force commander can assign the Marine Corps component commander other joint duties such as the area air defense commander or airspace control authority. Again, these functions are normally accomplished by the assigned MAGTF.
III. Joint Maritime Operations


Maritime forces operate on (surface), under (subsurface), or above (air) the sea and/or above and on the land in support of amphibious operations, port security, infrastructure protection, strike, and integrated air and missile defense (IAMD) operations and other types of operations across the range of military operations.

- Movement and maneuver of forces within international waters can take place without prior diplomatic agreement.
- Maritime forces are mostly a self-deploying, self-sustaining, sea-based expeditionary force and a combined-arms team. Maritime forces are manned, trained, and equipped to operate with limited reliance on ports or airfields.

Maritime Domain

The maritime domain is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. Nothing in the definition of, or the use of the term domain, implies or mandates exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of that domain. Per JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, the littoral comprises two segments of the OE. First, “seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore.” Second, “landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.”

The maritime domain also has unique economic, diplomatic, military, and legal aspects. US naval forces operate in the deep waters of the open ocean and other maritime environments, including coastal areas, rivers, estuaries, and landward portions of the littorals; including associated airspace. In many regions of the world, rivers mark and define international borders and facilitate intracontinental trade. Ensuring access and securing these waterways are often priorities of state governments seeking to maintain stability and sovereignty.

Maritime forces can participate in multiple operations ashore. They can execute, support, or enable missions ashore by conducting forcible entry operations (such as an amphibious assault), seizing/establishing expeditionary advance bases, seabasing of assets, moving land forces into the operational area via sealift, providing fire and air support, and influencing operations through deterrence.

Maritime forces may be employed in littoral waters for the conduct of sea control or denial, ballistic missile defense (BMD), and to support joint force or component C2 platforms. Joint forces can support maritime operations with surveillance, logistics, fires, air support, and military engineering.

Refer to The Naval Operations & Planning SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning & Conducting Maritime Operations) for complete discussion of essential Navy keystone warfighting doctrine and maritime operations at the JFMCC/CFMCC, Fleet and JTF levels. Topics include maritime forces, organization and capabilities; maritime operations; maritime headquarters (MHQ) and the maritime operations center (MOC); the maritime operations process; naval planning; naval logistics; and naval theater security cooperation.
II. Operational Employment for Amphibious Ready Groups with Embarked MEUs


The ARG/MEU is a forward-deployed, flexible, sea-based force that provides the President and the geographic combatant commander (GCC) with credible deterrence and decision time across the range of military operations. The ARG and MEU affords the GCC a responsive, flexible, and versatile capability to shape the OE, respond to crises, and protect US and allied interests in permissive and select uncertain and hostile environments. ARG and MEU capabilities support initial crisis response, introduce follow-on forces, support designated SOF, and other missions in permissive and select uncertain and hostile environments, which include, but are not limited to: amphibious assaults, amphibious raids, amphibious demonstrations, amphibious withdrawals, and amphibious force support to crisis response and other operations (e.g., noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian assistance, or MSO). The ARG and Navy detachments are organized under the command of a Navy O-6, while the MEU, with its embarked Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF), is under the command of a Marine Corps O-6.

Aggregated

The most common form where the amphibious ready group (ARG) with embarked Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) is employed under a single geographic combatant commander (GCC) who maintains operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of the ARG/MEU. “Split” is a subset of aggregated, where the ARG and MEU remains employed within a single GCC’s area of responsibility (AOR), but the units are separated by time, distance, or task while operating beyond the reach of tilt-rotor aircraft or landing craft. Aggregated is the preferred employment construct.

Disaggregated

This construct is driven by emergent requirements wherein the ARG and MEU is divided into parts to support multiple GCCs. The ARG and MEU elements operate within the distinct OPCON/TACON chains of the respective GCCs. Disaggregation comes with a corresponding degradation of ARG and MEU operational readiness, training, and maintenance. This is the least preferred employment construct.

Distributed

The ARG and MEU is partitioned for emergent requirements for multiple GCCs. However, the original GCC to whom it was allocated retains OPCON while another exercises TACON of elements that are distributed for a specific mission or duration mission. The ARG and MEU is able to sustain its elements, facilitate planning, and conduct military engagement and joint/combined training across AOR boundaries, and is supported throughout operations. ARG and MEU communication and computers systems are critical for supporting distributed operations. The GCC that has OPCON may request re-aggregation at any time, and the ARG and MEU commanders cannot make changes to capabilities allocated OPCON or TACON without approval. Distributed is the preferred employment construct to support multiple GCCs.

See pp. 6-14 to 6-15 for an overview and related discussion of Marine Corps Forces and Expeditionary Operations.
III. Organizing and Manning the Maritime Component Headquarters

Ref: JP 3-32 (Chg 1), Cmd & Control for Joint Maritime Operations (May ’08), app. G.

The component HQ organization and staffing will differ depending upon the mission, OE, existing and potential adversaries, nature of the crisis (e.g., tsunami, cyclone, earthquake), time available, and desired end state. The JFMCC’s staff is typically built from an existing Service component, numbered fleet, MAGTF, or subordinate Service force staff and then augmented as required. A joint air component coordination element is often included to coordinate JFACC missions.

Maritime Operations Center (MOC) and N-Code Structure

In a maritime HQ, two complementary methods of organizing people and processes exist. The first is the doctrinal N-code structure, which organizes people by the function they perform (i.e., intelligence, logistics). The second is a cross-functional staff that organizes the staff into boards, centers, cells, and working groups that manage specific processes or tasks that do not fit well under the N-code structure and require cross-functional participation, such as targeting and assessment. The fast pace of military operations and cross-talk needed to support an operational-level command has made the cross-functional approach the preferred manner of organization, while maintaining the doctrinal roles of the N-code structure. The maritime operations center (MOC) can be thought of as a loosely-bound network of staff entities overlaying the N-code structure. If a Navy component or numbered fleet commander is designated as the JFMCC, their existing staff or MOC will normally form the nucleus of the JFMCC staff or MOC. The formalized addition of this cross-functional network and process to the doctrinal N-code organizational structure is what constitutes the MOC. The MOC’s focus is on operational tasks and activities (versus fleet management or support). It must be recognized, however, that when a commander establishes a MOC, the traditional staff code organization does not disappear. Indeed, the doctrinal N-code directorates are the foundation of the MOC. They supply the manpower, expertise, and facilities needed by the MOC to function. As a practical matter, the commander establishes and maintains only those boards, centers, cells, and working groups that enhance planning and decision making within the HQ. A fires cell, for example, is likely not required during a disaster relief operation. The commander establishes, modifies, and dissolves these functional entities as the needs of the command evolve. MOCs provide an organizational framework through which maritime commanders may exercise operational-level C2.

For more information on Navy MOCs, see Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-32, Maritime Operations at the Operational Level of War, and Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3-32.1, Maritime Operations Center.

Liaison elements from and to other joint force and Service components are also considerations in composition and required infrastructure. Joint force command relationships, the nature of the mission, and standing Service agreements help determine liaison manning requirements. The naval and amphibious liaison element is the primary coordination element at the joint air operations center (AOC).

Task Organization of Subordinate Forces

The JFMCC normally delegates the authority to plan and execute tactical missions to subordinate CTF or task group (TG) commanders. This enables the JFMCC to focus attention on the operational level and empowers subordinate commanders to employ their forces to support the commander’s intent. Individual platforms are assigned or attached to these subordinate CTFs. Each CTF is assigned a commander, and only the commander reports to the JFMCC. The CTF may further subdivide the TF into TGs, task units, and task elements to exercise control at the tactical level. These subdivisions may be organized based on capabilities, missions, geography, or a hybrid of all three.
The JFMCC establishes the support relationships between the subordinate CTFs for various lines of operation. Further, given the nature of maritime operations and tasks assigned to a CTF, each CTF will likely be both a supported and supporting commander for a number of missions. As the common superior, the JFMCC organizes the TFs structure, delegates appropriate authorities, and establishes supporting relationships across the CTFs for the planned operation. These relationships may change by phase of an operation.

For more information on task organization with respect to amphibious forces, refer to JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

Navy Composite Warfare Doctrine

USN tactical commanders typically exercise decentralized control over assigned forces through use of composite warfare doctrine. This doctrine establishes a composite warfare organization within the task organization by assigning the commander’s warfare command functions to subordinates. The composite warfare construct allows the officer in tactical command (OTC) to assign some or all of the command functions associated with mission areas to warfare commanders, functional group commanders, and coordinators, thus supporting decentralized execution. The composite warfare organization enables offensive and defensive combat operations against multiple targets and threats simultaneously. Flexibility of implementation, reinforced by clear guidance to subordinates and use of command by negation, are keys to decentralized control of the tactical force. The OTC may implement a composite warfare organization whenever and to whatever extent required, depending upon the composition and mission of the force and the capabilities of the threat. Within the composite warfare construct, the OTC may establish a subordinate composite warfare commander (CWC) who in turn may establish subordinate warfare commanders and/or functional warfare commanders. The warfare commanders that may be established include the air and missile defense commander (AMDC), the antisubmarine warfare commander (ASWC), the information operations warfare commander (IWC), the strike warfare commander (STWC), and the surface warfare commander (SUWC). The functional group commanders that may be established include the BMD commander, the maritime interception operations commander (MIOC), the mine warfare commander (MIWC), the screen commander, and the underway replenishment group commander. When the levels of activity and complexity in the mission areas involved are considered manageable, the tasks of ASWC and SUWC can be assigned to one commander, titled the sea combat commander.

In maritime usage, the OTC is the senior officer present eligible to assume command or the officer to whom the senior officer has delegated tactical command. If only one task organization (e.g., TF, TG) is operating independently in a portion of the maritime operational area, the commander of that task organization is the OTC. However, when multiple task organizations are operating together in the maritime operational area, the OTC is either the common superior or the commander to whom the common superior has assigned OTC command functions. In a maritime operational area that has multiple TFs operating within it, the common superior will be the NCC/JFMCC. Unless this commander assigns OTC command functions to one of the CTFs, the command will simultaneously be an operational- and tactical-level command. Care has to be exercised to ensure cross-functional working groups within these commands have clear charters and understandings on which level they are supporting and how their products support the commander’s decision making associated with that level. When warfare functions are assigned to subordinate commanders, it is assumed the necessary authority for command, control, direction, and coordination required for the execution of those functions are delegated with it.

While acknowledged in joint doctrine, the OTC and CWC are maritime, unique constructs. Joint community understanding of these C2 constructs is important when coordinating or working with maritime forces. The OTC controls CWC and subordinate warfare commander’s actions through command by negation. Allied and multinational maritime procedures and instructions use the term command by veto to mean the same thing.
IV. Special Operations

Ref: JP 3-05, Special Operations (Jul ‘14).

Special operations require unique modes of employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment. They are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk. Special operations provide JFCs and chiefs of mission (COMs) with discrete, precise, and scalable options that can be synchronized with activities of other interagency partners to achieve United States Government (USG) objectives. These operations are designed in a culturally attuned manner to create both immediate and enduring effects to help prevent and deter conflict or prevail in war. They assess and shape foreign political and military environments unilaterally, or with host nations (HNs), multinational partners, and indigenous populations. Although special operations can be conducted independently, most are coordinated with conventional forces (CF), interagency partners, and multinational partners, and may include work with indigenous, insurgent, or irregular forces. Special operations may differ from conventional operations in degree of strategic, physical, and political and/or diplomatic risk; operational techniques; modes of employment; and dependence on intelligence and indigenous assets.

Special operations can be a single engagement, such as direct action (DA) against a critical target; as a protracted operation or series of activities such as support to insurgent forces through unconventional warfare (UW); or support to a HN force through foreign internal defense (FID) or security force assistance (SFA). Military information support operations (MISO) can be used during special operations to influence selected target audiences’ behavior and actions. Civil affairs operations (CAO) also provide essential support to a JFC or country team. Special operations, synchronized with MISO and CAO, can create effects disproportionate to the size of the units involved.

I. Designated Special Operations Forces

United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is a unified combatant command (CCMD). It is unique among the CCMDs in that it performs Service-like functions and has Military Department-like responsibilities and authorities. A theater special operations command (TSOC) is a subordinate unified command of USSOCOM. TSOCs perform broad, continuous missions uniquely suited to special operations forces (SOF) capabilities. Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has assigned operational control (OPCON) of the TSOCs and attached SOF tactical units to their respective geographic combatant commander (GCC) via the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance.

United States Army Special Operations Command is the designated Army component command for USSOCOM and provides manned, trained, and equipped Army special operations forces. Naval Special Warfare Command is designated the Navy component command of USSOCOM and mans, trains, equips, and provides SEALs. US Air Force Special Operations Command is designated the Air Force component of USSOCOM and organizes, trains, equips, and provides trained Air Force special operations forces. US Marine Corps Forces, Special Operations Command is designated the Marine Corps component of USSOCOM and trains, equips, and provides Marine Corps special operations forces.
Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Two primary forms of multinational partnership that the joint force commander (JFC) will encounter are an alliance or a coalition.

**Alliance**
An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

**Coalition**
A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are typically ad hoc; formed by different nations, often with different objectives; usually for a single problem or issue, while addressing a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.

## I. Strategic Context
Nations form regional and global geopolitical and economic relationships to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), conduct peace operations (PO), and promote their ideals. Cultural, diplomatic, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence multinational operations and participation. However, a nation’s decision to employ military capabilities is always a political decision. Since Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, the trend has been to conduct US military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). Therefore, US commanders should be prepared to perform either supported or supporting roles in military operations as part of an MNF. These operations could span the range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, foreign military forces, local authorities, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The move to a more comprehensive approach toward problem solving, particularly in regard to counterinsurgency operations, other counter threat network activities, or stability activities, increases the need for coordination and synchronization among military and nonmilitary entities.

II. Security Cooperation (SC)

Security cooperation (SC) provides ways and means to help achieve national security and foreign policy objectives. US national and Department of Defense (DOD) strategic guidance emphasizes the importance of defense relationships with allies and PNs to advance national security objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the risk of having to employ US military forces in a conflict. SC activities are likely to be conducted in a combatant command’s (CCMD’s) daily operations. SC advances progress toward cooperation within the competition continuum by strengthening and expanding the existing network of US allies and partners, which improves the overall warfighting effectiveness of the joint force and enables more effective multinational operations. SC activities, many of which are shaping activities within the geographic combatant commander (GCC) campaign plans—the centerpiece of the planning construct from which OPLANs/concept plans (CONPLANs) are now branches—are deemed essential to achieving national security and foreign policy objectives. SC activities also build interoperability with NATO Allies and other partners in peacetime, thereby speeding the establishment of effective coalitions—a key factor in potential major combat operations with near-peer competitors.

The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) provides the foundation for all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments and supports the President’s National Security Strategy. With respect to SC, the GEF provides guidance on building partner capacity and capability, relationships, and facilitating access (under the premise that the primary entity of military engagement is the nation state and the means which GCCs influence nation states is through their defense establishments). The GEF outlines the following SC activities: defense contacts and familiarization, personnel exchange, combined exercises and training, train and equip/provide defense articles, defense institution building, operational support, education, and international armaments cooperation.

 GCC theater strategies, as reflected in their combatant command campaign plans (CCPs), typically emphasize military engagement, SC, and deterrence activities as daily operations. GCCs shape their areas of responsibility through SC activities by continually employing military forces to complement and reinforce other instruments of national power. The GCC’s CCP provides a framework within which CCMDs conduct cooperative military activities and development. Ideally, SC activities lessen the causes of a potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires substantial US military intervention.

The CCP is the primary document that focuses on each command’s activities designed to attain theater strategic end states. The GEF and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan (JSCP) (referred to as the JSCP), provide regional focus and SC priorities.

DOD components may develop supporting plans that focus on activities conducted to support the execution of the CCPs and on their own SC activities that directly contribute to the campaign end states and/or DOD component programs in support of broader Title 10, US Code, responsibilities. The Services conduct much of the detailed work to build interoperability and capacity with NATO Allies and mission partners.

The DOD State Partnership Program establishes enduring relationships between emerging PNs of strategic value and individual US states and territories. The DOD State Partnership Program is an important contribution to the DOD SC programs conducted by the GCCs in conjunction with the National Defense Strategy, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, Department of State (DOS), campaign plans, and theater SC guidance to promote national and combatant commander (CCDR) objectives, stability, and partner capacity.

See pp. 2-57 to 2-62 for related discussion of engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence missions, tasks and actions from JP 3-0, Joint Operations.
III. Nature of Multinational Operations


After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that “mutual confidence” is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” While the tenets discussed below cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort.

1. Respect
In assigning missions and tasks, the commander should consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, discussion, and consideration of partner ideas are essential to building effective relationships, as are respect for each partner’s culture, customs, history, and values.

2. Rapport
US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from partner countries, as well as the multinational force commander (MNFC). This requires personal, direct relationships that only they can develop. Good rapport between leaders will improve teamwork among their staffs and subordinate commanders and overall unity of effort. The use of liaisons can facilitate the development of rapport by assisting in the staffing of issues to the correct group and in monitoring responses.

3. Knowledge of Partners
US commanders and their staffs should have an understanding of each member of the MNF. Much time and effort is spent learning about the enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, customs, history, and values of each partner. This will facilitate the effective integration of multinational partners into the operation and enhance the synergistic effect of their forces.

4. Patience
Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires untiring, even-handed patience. This is more difficult to accomplish within coalitions than within alliances; however, it is just as necessary. It is therefore imperative that US commanders and their staffs apply appropriate resources, travel, staffing, and time not only to maintain, but also to expand and cultivate multinational relationships. Without patience and continued engagement, established partnerships can easily dissolve.

5. Mission Focus
When dealing with other nations, US forces should temper the need for respect, rapport, knowledge, and patience with the requirement to ensure that the necessary tasks are accomplished by those with the capabilities and authorities to accomplish those tasks. This is especially critical in the security line of operation, where failure could prove to have catastrophic results. If operational necessity requires tasks being assigned to personnel who are not proficient in accomplishing those tasks, then the MNF commander must recognize the risks and apply appropriate mitigating measures.

6. Trust and Coordination
Commanders should engage other leaders of the MNF to build personal relationships and develop trust and confidence. Developing these relationships is a conscious collaborative act rather than something that just happens. Commanders build trust through words and actions. Trust and confidence are essential to synergy and harmony, both within the joint force and also with our multinational partners. Coordination and cooperation among organizations are based on trust.

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IV. Command Structures of Forces in Multinational Operations


No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. Organizational structures include the following:

A. Integrated Command Structure
Multinational commands organized under an integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example of this command structure is found in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup.

B. Lead Nation Command Structure
A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure is Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan wherein a US-led headquarters provides the overall military C2 over the two main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces and the other predominately Afghan forces.

C. Parallel Command Structures
Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers. Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible.

See pp. 8-16 to 8-17 for discussion and listing of US organizational structures in foreign countries: Ambassadors, Chiefs of Mission, Country Team, Defense Attaches, etc.
I. Diplomatic and Military Considerations

Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational response, from man-made actions (such as interstate aggression) to natural disasters (like an earthquake). In responding to such situations, nations weigh their national interests and then determine if, when, and where they will expend their nation’s resources. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The composition of an MNF may change as partners enter and leave when their respective national objectives change or force contributions reach the limits of their nation’s ability to sustain them.

Factors Affecting Military Capabilities of Nations

- National Interests
- Domestic Politics
- Objectives
- Arms Control Limitations
- Doctrine
- Organization
- Training
- Leader Development
- Equipment
- History
- Defense Budget
- Domestic Law
- Treaties

Some nations may even be asked to integrate their forces with those of another, so that a contribution may, for example, consist of an infantry company containing platoons from different countries. The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated diplomatic decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance. The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the MNTF’s command structure. In a parallel command structure, national forces essentially operate under their own doctrine and procedures within the guidelines determined by the strategic national guidance and are not significantly impacted by multinational influences. Under the integrated and LN command structures, more multinational involvement and interaction occurs.

As shown in Figure III-1 above, numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations. The operational-level commander must be aware of the specific operational limitations and capabilities of the forces of participating nations and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. MNTF commanders at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, HN officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats should not be underestimated.
JP 3-08 describes the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) coordination with various external organizations that may be involved with, or operate simultaneously with, joint operations. This coordination includes the Armed Forces of the United States; United States Government (USG) departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal government agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and the private sector. Interagency coordination describes the interaction between USG departments and agencies and is a subset of interorganizational cooperation.

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational cooperation across a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interest, structures, and authorities. The terms “interagency” and “interorganizational” do not define structures or organizations, but rather describe processes occurring among various separate entities.
I. Foundations of Cooperation

Commitment to interorganizational cooperation can facilitate cooperation in areas of common interest, promote a common operational picture (COP), and enable sharing of critical information and resources. This commitment is based on recognition that external organizations will affect the JFC’s mission, and vice versa. Interorganizational cooperation may enable:

Unity of Effort
The translation of national objectives into unified action is essential to unity of effort and ultimately mission success.

Common Objectives
Joint and multinational operations are integrated at the strategic level and coordinated at the operational and tactical level with the activities of participating United States Government (USG) departments and agencies, relevant international organizations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), host nation (HN) agencies, and elements of the private sector to achieve common objectives.

Common Understanding
Common understanding can enable the joint force commander (JFC) to identify opportunities for cooperation, assist in mitigating unnecessary conflict or unintended consequences, and operate effectively in the same space as external organizations.

II. Unity of Effort

Within the USG, unity of effort can be diminished by organizational stovepiping, crisis-driven planning, different core missions, and divergent organizational processes and cultures. When USG departments and agencies do not coordinate sufficiently, they may interpret national policy guidance differently, develop different objectives and strategies, and set different priorities, and therefore, not act in concert toward national objectives. In a coalition, the interests and practices of participating foreign governments and military forces, international organizations, NGOs, and private sector entities are distinct from, and at times can compete with, USG interests, further exacerbating these issues. Interorganizational cooperation can build mutual understanding of respective goals.

Interorganizational cooperation seeks to find commons goals, objectives, or principles between different organizations; set the conditions for unified action through planning and preparation; and leverage cross-organizational capabilities for unity of effort during execution.

In military operations, unity of effort is facilitated by first establishing unity of command. Unity of command is based on the designation of a single commander with the authority to direct and coordinate the efforts of all assigned and attached forces in pursuit of a common objective. In operations involving interagency partners and other stakeholders where the commander may not control all elements, commanders should seek cooperation and build consensus to achieve unity of effort toward mission objectives.

While unity of command and the exercise of C2 apply strictly to military forces and operations, unified action among all stakeholders is necessary to achieve unity of effort in military operations involving civilian organizations and foreign military forces or military participation in civilian-led operations. Unified action is the DOD doctrinal term that represents a comprehensive approach. Unified action is promoted through close, continuous coordination and cooperation, which seeks to minimize confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic or personnel limitations.
III. US Government Department and Agency Coordination


One difficulty of coordinating operations among USG departments and agencies is determining appropriate counterparts and exchanging information among them when habitual relationships are not established. Organizational differences exist between the US military and USG departments’ and agencies’ hierarchies, particularly at the operational level. In defense support of civil authorities (DSCA), military forces may not be familiar with existing structures for disaster response. In foreign operations, existing structures may be limited or not exist at all. Further, overall lead authority in a crisis response and limited contingency operation is likely to be exercised not by the GCC, but by a US ambassador, COM (usually, but not always, the ambassador), or other senior civilian who will provide policy and goals for all USG departments and agencies. When a disaster is declared, the DOS geographic bureau of the affected area becomes the key participating bureau.

### Relative Organizational Structures (Levels)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Levels of Decision Making</th>
<th>United States Executive Departments and Agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Strategic</td>
<td>National Security Council&lt;br&gt;Secretary of Defense&lt;br&gt;Joint Chiefs of Staff&lt;br&gt;Secretaries of State, Homeland Security, etc.&lt;br&gt;United States Agency for International Development administrator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Strategic</td>
<td>Combatant Commander&lt;br&gt;Embassy Country Team staffs&lt;br&gt;FEMA region directors&lt;br&gt;Federal coordinating officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>Joint Task Force&lt;br&gt;Defense Coordinating Officer&lt;br&gt;Embassy Country Team staffs&lt;br&gt;FEMA region directors&lt;br&gt;Federal coordinating officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Task Force or Service Component Commander&lt;br&gt;Agency Field Representatives (e.g., Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance disaster assistance response team)&lt;br&gt;Domestic response teams</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: JP 3-08, fig. I-2. Relevant United States Agency Organizational Structures Levels. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent organizations. Physical or virtual interagency teaming initiatives, such as joint interagency task forces (JIATFs), joint interagency coordination groups (JIACGs), or routine interagency video teleconferences, improve reachback and expedite decision making. Figure I-2 depicts comparative organizational structures in the context of four levels of decision making.
USG organizations working to achieve national security objectives require increased and improved communications and coordination. This section provides a frame of reference that reflects all levels of interorganizational involvement.

**Joint Planning**

Joint planning should include key external stakeholders, ideally starting with mission analysis. Where direct participation is not feasible, joint planners should consider the activities and interests of external stakeholders that affect the command’s mission. The CCDR, through the campaign plan, works with civilian organizations to build annex V (Interagency Coordination) of the joint plan. Emphasis should be placed on operationalizing the theater TCP or functional campaign plan (FCP) to facilitate cooperation among all partners, awareness of non-partners, and collective problem framing and synchronization of the CCDR’s campaign plan with other interagency planning products. Subordinate JFCs leverage the planning efforts of the CCMD while also building civilian organization participation into their plan and participate in integrated planning with the embassies. Within the area of responsibility (AOR) and the joint operations area (JOA), structures are established at the CCMD, subordinate joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), task force, and Service component levels to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This section identifies tools for the commander to facilitate interorganizational cooperation in domestic or foreign operations.

**I. Whole-of-Government Approach**

A whole-of-government approach integrates the collaborative efforts of USG departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort. Under unified action, a whole-of-government approach identifies combinations of USG capabilities and resources that could be directed toward the strategic objectives in support of US regional goals as they align with global security priorities. Commanders integrate the expertise and capabilities of participating USG departments and agencies, within the context of their authorities, to accomplish their missions.

Whole-of-government planning refers to NSC-sponsored processes by which multiple USG departments and agencies come together to develop plans that address challenges to national interests. Whole-of-government planning is distinct from the contributions of USG departments and agencies to DOD planning, which remains a DOD responsibility.

Planning and consulting with stakeholders optimizes the instruments of national power to achieve operational objectives and attain strategic end states in support of US regional goals in support of global security priorities.

USG civilian departments and agencies have different cultures and capacities, and understand planning differently. Many organizations do not conduct operational planning. To compensate for these differences, commanders should ensure joint force organization initiatives and broader interagency processes help sustain civilian presence in military planning.
Hallmarks of successful whole-of-government planning and operations include:

- A designated lead or primary agency.
- All USG instruments of national power are integrated into the process.
- Agency core missions are related to mission goals.
- Participants forge a common understanding of the operational environment and the problem USG activities are intended to solve.
- Active lines of communications and pre-established relationships to allow for the ease of information sharing.
- A shared USG goal and clearly stated objectives to achieve results through comprehensive integration and synchronization of activities at the implementation level.
- A common determination of what resources and capabilities are to be aligned to achieve the planning objectives.
- A defined strategic objective.

Guidelines to operationalize a whole-of-government approach require that:

- Commanders and civilian decision makers consider all USG capabilities to achieve objectives.
- Planning groups include personnel from all sectors and organizations.
- Ongoing or existing policies and programs are reassessed, modified where necessary, and integrated into the objectives and desired outcomes defined for the mission and strategic end state.
- Planners consider and incorporate interagency capabilities, resources, activities, and comparative advantages in the application of the instruments of national power.

II. Joint Planning and Interorganizational Cooperation

CCMD campaign plans, also known as TCPs and FCPs, implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy as identified in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) or other issuances, and implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy. Designated CCMD campaign plans direct the activities the command will do to shape the operational environment and deter crises on a daily basis. The commander identifies the resources assigned and allocated to the CCMD, prioritizes objectives (to include the contingencies the command is directed to prepare for), and commits those resources to shape the operational environment and support the national strategic objectives. The commander assesses the commitment of resources and makes recommendations to civilian leadership on future resources and national efforts in the region. CCMD campaign plans direct military activities (including ongoing operations, security cooperation activities, intelligence collection, exercises, and other shaping or preventive activities) that shape the operational environment to prevent, prepare for, or mitigate contingencies.

Strategic Guidance
CCDRs develop objectives based on strategic guidance provided by the President, SecDef, and CJCS. CCDRs coordinate planning for operations, actions, and activities at the theater, strategic, and operational levels to achieve strategic objectives.

Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
Once approval has been provided within the proper chains of command, the CCDRs coordinate with affected USG entities throughout the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) enterprise to align the instruments of national power. The CCDR is guid-
IV. Joint Task Forces (JTFs) in the Interagency Process


When it is necessary to establish a Joint Task Force (JTF), the establishing authority is normally a CCDR. The CCDR develops the mission statement and CONOPS based upon direction from SecDef, as communicated through the CJCS. The CCDR appoints a commander, joint task force (CJTF), and, in conjunction with the CJTF, determines the capabilities required to achieve military objectives. The CJTF has the authority to organize forces and the JTF HQ, to accomplish the objectives.

The mission assigned to a JTF will require not only the execution of responsibilities involving two or more military departments but, increasingly, the mutual support of numerous USG departments and agencies, and collaboration with international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. Normally, a JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved. The JTF HQ commands and controls the joint force and coordinates military operations with the activities of other USG departments and agencies, MNFs, international organizations, NGOs, the private sector, and HN forces and agencies. A principal distinction between a JTF and a Service command is the JTF’s greater emphasis on interorganizational cooperation to achieve unity of effort.

JTFs in the Interagency Process

Unlike the military, most USG departments and agencies are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Therefore, JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization’s activities at more than one level. The USG interagency process requires the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of USG departments and agencies, international organizations, HN forces and agencies, NGOs, and the private sector. The JTF HQ provides an important basis for a unified effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. Depending on the type of operation; the extent of military operations; and the degree of agency, international organization, NGO, and private sector involvement, the focal point for operational- and tactical-level coordination with civilian departments and agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the country team, the joint field office (JFO), the CMOC, or the humanitarian operations center (HOC). JTF personnel may also participate actively, or as observers, in a civilian-led functional coordinating group concentrating on a specific issue or project.

- Upon activation of a JTF outside the US, the CCDR determines whether the JTF has direct liaison authority with the affected COM and with the senior defense official/defense attaché (SDO/DATT) to provide consistent, efficient communication with the COM and the country team.
- JTFs should channel most communications through the LNO team to avoid overwhelming interagency partners with JTF coordination and planning requests.
- JTFs should designate the staff office responsible for interorganizational cooperation. Many JTFs designate their plans directorate of a joint staff or CMOC, while others may form a separate directorate.
- When a large country team or JFO and a military JTF exist side-by-side, detailed procedures should be developed for staff coordination.
- For DSCA operations, the JTF HQ is ideally colocated with the JFO per NRF guidance. All ESFs are represented in the JFO.
- JTFs should consider how to integrate military elements that may not be part of the core JTF (e.g., special operations forces).
A JIATF may be formed when the mission requires close integration of two or more USG departments and agencies.

The joint interagency task force (JIATF) is a force multiplier that uses a unique organizational structure to focus on a single mission. A JIATF is typically formed for a specific task and purpose as are most task forces. JIATFs are formal organizations usually chartered by the DOD and one or more civilian agencies and guided by a MOA or other founding legal documents that define the roles, responsibilities, and relationships of the JIATF’s members. The JIATF is staffed and led by personnel from multiple agencies under a single commander or director.

Forming a national level JIATF takes a national charter that lays out authorities and mandates membership and resourcing. An executive order, national level directive, or mandate from the NSC/HSC that directs all agencies involved to support the JIATF with actual resources may be required. SecDef may, in cooperation with other Cabinet members, form a JIATF through the establishment of detailed memoranda of agreement. JFCs can form JIATFs with one or more USG agencies based on mutual cooperation and agreement.

The establishment of functional and enduring JIATFs transcends the internal capabilities and authorities of combatant commands and JTFs. Based upon the analysis and the desire to establish JIATFs, the JIACG (or equivalent organization) or another designated staff entity should document the requirements for formal submission through command channels to JS and OSD for approval and pursuit through the NSC or HSC system. Success would be manifest in interagency consensus, commitment, and MOAs or MOUs that infuse JIATFs with supporting policy, legitimacy, defined purpose, authorities, leadership parameters, functional protocols, and resources.

Coordinating authorities, channels, and terms of reference must be carefully established and documented for JIATFs, with the aim of facilitating their missions and flexibility while not promoting duplication of effort and confusion. Such authorities constitute the rules of the road for JIATFs, and they must contribute to unity of effort and common situational awareness.

Increasingly, JIATFs are being formed to achieve unity of effort and bring all instruments of national power to bear on asymmetric threats. JIATFs are often created to address problems such as militias, “bad neighbors,” and foreign fighters, all of which complicate the security environment. JIATFs may be separate elements under the JFC, or they may be subordinate to a functional component command, a joint special operations task force, or a staff section such as the J-3. JIATF members can coordinate with the country team, their home agencies, JIACGs (or equivalent organization) in the area of interest, and other JIATFs in order to defeat complex hostile networks. Because they use more than the military instrument of national power, JIATFs are generally not a lethal asset, but rather develop and drive creative nonlethal solutions and policy actions to accomplish their mission.

**Joint Support Force (JSF)**

A joint support force may be formed when the mission is a DSCA operation and DOD is operating in support of one or more USG departments and agencies. Although organized similar to a JTF (i.e., with a commander, command element, and forces), the title indicates a more cooperation-focused organization to the interorganizational community.
II. Domestic Considerations

I. Key Government Stakeholders

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) leads the unified national effort to secure America by preventing terrorism and enhancing security, securing and managing our borders, enforcing and administering immigration laws, safeguarding and securing cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters. Within DOD, the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) has overall authority and is the President’s principal advisor on military matters concerning use of federal forces in homeland defense (HD) and defense support to civil authority (DSCA). CNGB is SecDef’s principal advisor, through the CJCS, for non-federalized NG forces. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Global Security) (ASD[HD&GS]) serves as the principal staff assistant delegated the authority to manage and coordinate HD and DSCA functions at the SecDef level.

The two CCMDs with major HD and DSCA missions are United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) and United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), as their AORs include the US and its territories. USNORTHCOM and USPACOM HD missions include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the US, its territories, and interests within the assigned AOR; and, as directed by the President or SecDef, provide DSCA.

These geographic CCMDs may also have senior DHS representatives and a NG representative assigned as advisors. The senior DHS representative advises the commander and staff on HS and DSCA issues and requirements, and facilitates information sharing, coordination, and collaboration between the command and the operational agencies of DHS (e.g., FEMA, US Customs and Border Protection [CBP], and United States Coast Guard [USCG]).

II. State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal Considerations

When a disaster threatens or occurs, a governor may request federal assistance. If DOD support is required and approved as part of that federal assistance, then DOD may execute mission assignments in support of the primary federal agency that often result in a wide range of assistance to local, tribal, territorial, and state authorities. Incidents can have a mix of public health, economic, social, environmental, criminal, and political implications with potentially serious long-term effects. Significant incidents require a coordinated response across organizations and jurisdictions, political boundaries, sectors of society, and multiple organizations.

Federal law, as codified in Title 10 and Title 32, USC, creates distinct mechanisms for local and state authorities to request NG forces or resources. Local and state authorities may also request federal forces (active and reserve) under Title 10, USC, authority for a contingency response. The NG of the US is administered by the NGB, which is a joint activity under DOD and provides communication for NG to DOD to support unified action. The NG active, reserve framework is built on mechanisms that coordinate among federal, state, territorial, tribal, and local governments to prevent, protect against, and respond to threats and natural disasters. NG forces operate under state active duty, Title 32, USC, or federal active duty, Title 10, USC, depending on activation status.
III. DOMESTIC Considerations for Interorganizational Cooperation


DOD works closely with other USG departments and agencies when planning. The supported GCCs are DOD principal planning agents and provide joint planning directives for peacetime assistance rendered by DOD within their assigned AORs. Upon issuance of an execute order by the CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, to initiate or conduct military operations, the supported commander implements and relays the authority of the order with their own orders directing action to subordinate commanders, supporting commanders, and directors of supporting agencies. Thorough joint planning requires that a GCC’s operations and activities align with national security objectives contained in strategic guidance. The GEF prioritizes these objectives and DOD priorities for each CCMD, which then develop a FCP or TCP, as required. In addition to participating in interagency steering groups and councils, DOD has responsibilities under the NRF. The salient frameworks and directives that will guide DSCA operations are the following:

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief & Emergency Assistance Act
This Act provides the authority for the USG to assist with state and local government response to a major disaster or emergency. The act gives the President the authority to declare an area a major disaster, declare an area an emergency, exercise 10-day emergency authority, and send in federal assets when an emergency occurs in an area over which the federal government exercises primary responsibility.

National Response Framework (NRF)
The NRF is a guide that details how the nation conducts all-hazards response—from the smallest incident to the largest catastrophe. The NRF identifies the response principles, to include DOD, as well as the roles and structures that organize national response. It describes how communities, states, the USG, private sector, and US NGO partners apply these principles to coordinate a national response.

National Incident Management System (NIMS) / Incident Command System (ICS)
The NIMS, and its associated ICS, provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government, NGOs, and the private sector to work seamlessly to prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from, and mitigate the effects of incidents, regardless of cause, size, location, or complexity, to reduce the loss of life and property and harm to the environment. NIMS is integrated with the NRF. The NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management. The NIMS is a tested system that interagency partners utilize and practice regularly. Leaders with NRF responsibilities should have an understanding of its principles, structures, and techniques.

To align DOD planning with the needs of those requiring DSCA, DOD coordinates with interagency partners and with the NGB. Coordination should align national frameworks, NIMS, and interagency guidelines provided in the JSCP. The standing CJCS DSCA Execute Order delegates limited approval authority to supported CCDRs to respond to domestic emergencies and/or disasters and aligns with the NRF to provide a unified national response.

Domestic Operating Environment
The domestic operating environment for DSCA presents unique challenges to the JFC. When executing DSCA, the US military is normally in support of another USG department or agency that is coordinating the federal response. The President can direct DOD
Interorganizational Cooperation

II. Domestic Considerations

Refer to our series of related Homeland Defense & DSCA, Counterterrorism, and Disaster Response SMARTbooks for further discussion. The US Armed Forces have a historic precedent and enduring role in supporting civil authorities during times of emergency, and this role is codified in national defense strategy as a primary mission of DOD. In the past decade alone, natural disasters of considerable severity resulted in 699 Presidential Disaster Declarations, an average of nearly six per month. Disaster management (or emergency management) is the term used to designate the efforts of communities or businesses to plan for and coordinate all the personnel and materials required to mitigate or recover from natural or man-made disasters, or acts of terrorism.

CBRN Response

Supporting CBRN missions requires a number of specialized capabilities. These capabilities may be required to support civil authorities as part of efforts ranging from the prevention of an attack to technical nuclear forensics to support attribution. For example, the 2011 Interagency Domestic Radiological/Nuclear Search Plan specifies that DOD maintains an operational radiological/nuclear search capability. Additionally, managing the consequences of a CBRN incident is a USG effort.
Within the executive branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external political-military relationships with overall US foreign policy. USAID is the lead agency for overseas development and disaster response and carries out programs that complement DOD efforts in stabilization, foreign internal defense, and security force assistance.

I. USG Structure in Foreign Countries

A. The Diplomatic Mission

The United States Government (USG) has bilateral diplomatic relations with almost all of the world’s independent states. The US bilateral representation in the foreign country, known as the diplomatic mission, is established IAW the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, of which the US is a party.

Missions are organized under DOS regional and functional bureaus. The boundaries for the DOS regions roughly approximate those of the CCMDs and therefore geographic and functional seams must be addressed and managed. DOS provides the core staff of a diplomatic mission and administers the presence of representatives of other USG departments and agencies in the country. A diplomatic mission is led by a COM, usually the ambassador, but at times another person designated by the President, or the Chargé d’Affaires (the chargé) when no US ambassador is accredited to the country or the ambassador is absent from the country. The deputy chief of mission (DCM) is second in charge of the mission and usually assumes the role of chargé in the absence of the COM.

For countries with which the US has no diplomatic relations, the embassy of another country represents US interests and at times houses an interests section staffed with USG employees. In countries where an international organization is headquartered, the US may have a multilateral mission to the international organization in addition to the bilateral mission to the foreign country.

See following pages (pp. 8-20 to 8-21) for an overview and further discussion.

B. Combatant Commands (CCMDs)

USG departments and agencies augment CCMDs to help integrate the instruments of national power in plans. GCCs, functional CCDRs, and, increasingly, JTF commanders are assigned a POLAD by DOS. POLADs are senior DOS officers (often flag-rank equivalent) detailed as personal advisors to senior US military leaders and commanders, and they provide policy analysis and insight regarding the diplomatic and political aspects of the commanders’ duties. The POLAD is directly responsible to the CCDR or CJTF. They do not serve as DOS representatives.

See following pages (pp. 8-20 to 8-21) for an overview and further discussion.
VI. Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)


Military forces should normally develop relations with USG departments and agencies, civilian authorities, international organizations, NGOs, private sector entities, and the population during contingency operations. The CMOC is a mechanism to coordinate CMO that can also provide operational and tactical level coordination between the JFC and other stakeholders. The CMOC generally does not set policy or direct operations, but rather coordinates and facilitates. The CMOC is the meeting place of stakeholders. It may be physical or virtual, and conducted collaboratively through online networks, as NGOs may be reluctant to conduct coordination meetings in settings managed by the military. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC. In fact, more than one CMOC may be established in an operational area and each is task-organized based on the mission. Horizontal and vertical synchronization among multiple CMOCs assists in unity of effort.

During large-scale FHA operations, US forces may organize using the CMOC. If both are established, the CMOC should collocate with the HOC to facilitate operations and assist in later transition of any CMOC operations to the HOC.

In FHA operations, the UN organizes along key clusters. Coordination meetings hosted by UN elements may supplant the need for a US-military run CMOC. Commanders should complement, rather than compete with, the UN cluster meetings. NGOs are far more likely to participate in UN-sponsored meetings than US- (especially US military) sponsored coordination and deconfliction meetings.

The CJTF must carefully consider where to locate the CMOC. Security, FP, and easy access for external stakeholders are all valid considerations. The location should be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, even if geographically collocated, and should be segregated from any nation’s classified information. If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate the CMOC “outside the wire” to maximize participation by organizations that want to minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.

Political representatives in the CMOC may provide the CJTF with avenues to align operational considerations and concerns with political actions. Additionally, the CMOC provides stakeholders a single point to coordinate with the military, which facilitates the efforts of a joint force and the relief community.

- The military should not attempt to dictate USG civilian counterpart or international organization, NGO, and private sector partner activities, but to coordinate a team approach to problem resolution.

- JFCs cannot direct organizations or people not under their command to cooperate. However, a JFC can work with these entities to forge unity of effort on issues like security, logistic support, information sharing, communications. Periodic meetings can be scheduled in the CMOC to match civil-sector needs to organizations capable of meeting them. USG validated RFAs go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for action.

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Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves do not establish joint forces. The potential range of military activities and operations extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence in times of relative peace up through major operations and campaigns that typically involve large-scale combat.

Joint planning is the deliberate process of determining how (the ways) to use military capabilities (the means) in time and space to achieve objectives (the ends) while considering the associated risks.

JFODS5-1 is Change 1 to our fifth revised edition of The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook. In addition to new/updated material from the latest editions of JP 3-0 Joint Operations (w/Change 1, Oct ’18), JP 4-0 Joint Logistics (Feb ’19), JP 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jan ’18), and JP 3-16 Multinational Operations (Mar ’19), JFODS5-1 features a completely new chapter on Joint Air, Land, Maritime and Special Operations (JPs 3-30, 3-31, 3-32 & 3-05). Additional topics include JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (w/Change 1, Jul ’17), JP 5-0 Joint Planning (Jun ’17), and JP 3-08 Interorganizational Cooperation (val. Oct ’17).