OPFOR SMARTBOOK 3

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SECOND EDITION (OPFOR3-2)

Red Team Army/ OPFOR Overview

Offensive Operations

Defensive Operations

Specialized Warfare

Tactical Enabling Tasks

Small Unit Drills

Urban and Regional Environments

Rear Area Operations & Logistics

RED TEAM ARMY

Forces, Operations & Tactics

The Lightning Press
Larsen & Wade

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(OPFOR3-2) OPFOR SMARTbook 3 - Red Team Army, 2nd Ed

Forces, Operations & Tactics

OPFOR3-2 is the second edition of OPFOR SMARTbook 3 - Red Team Army, completely revised for 2019. In addition to the base FM 100-2-1/2/3 Soviet Threat series, new/updated material includes the FM/TC 7-100 Opposing Forces series, FM 3-0 Operations (Oct '17), ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Aug '18), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May '13), a review of modern (present-day) Russian forces, and more than a dozen historical vignettes.

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(OPFOR3-2) Notes to Reader

Red Team Army (Forces, Operations & Tactics)

In today's **complicated and uncertain world**, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict that might involve U.S. forces. This is the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past.

It has been nearly **thirty years** since a holistic explanation of the Soviet-based Opposing Force (OPFOR) was examined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-2 series. Recognizing this, "OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army" re-examines and outlines the doctrinal operational construct and **historical foundations of Soviet-era military forces** from the FM 100-2 series, which is now out-of-print and largely unavailable.

Second, OPFOR SMARTbook 3 reorganizes that foundational material and aligns it in keeping with **contemporary military doctrinal taxonomy** to include the FM/TC 7-100 Opposing Forces series, FM 3-0 Operations, ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense, and FMs 3-90-1 & -2 Tactics.

Third, OPFOR SMARTbook 3 **translates and bridges** the strategic- and operational-level doctrine into **tactical application at the small-unit level**.

Through this triangulation, a more modern rendition of **Red Team Armies** emerges.

OPFOR3-2 is the second edition of OPFOR SMARTbook 3 - Red Team Army, revised for 2019. In addition to the base FM 100-2-1/2/3 Soviet Threat series, new/updated material includes the FM/TC 7-100 Opposing Forces series, FM 3-0 Operations (Oct '17), ADP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Aug '18), FMs 3-90-1 & -2 (May '13), a review of modern (present-day) Russian forces, and more than a dozen historical vignettes.

Opposing Forces (OPFOR)

From the U.S. doctrinal perspective, an enemy is an individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. A potential adversary is sometimes designated as a threat. Once hostilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy. An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow U.S. forces to train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the wide range of possible opponents the military could face in actual conflict. It enables training of all branches of the military and prepares forces for potential combat operations.

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Prologue: Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Doctrine and the Historical "Soviet Threat" Model

When the Army established its OPFOR program in 1976 with Army Regulation 350-2, it defined an OPFOR simply as "an organized force created by and from U.S. Army units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force." Thus, all OPFORs were originally threat-based, in the sense that they replicated the forces, capabilities, and doctrine of a particular country officially recognized as a threat or potential adversary. In the midst of the Cold War, the 1976 regulation identified only one potential adversary against which to train: the Soviet Union. Over time, the Army developed other OPFORs.

The Soviet threat was described in great detail in the 80s with the FM 100-2 series. The three-volume set was the definitive source of unclassifed information on Soviet ground forces and the Soviet model of combined arms warfare. Used together, the series provided a thorough reference on the Soviet Army. Initiatlly, these publications were distritubution-restricted publications limited to US Government agencies. In Sept '94, they were marked as "Approved for Public Release, Distribution is Unlimited" by TRADOC. The series is now out-of-print and largely unavailable.

FM 100-2-1: The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84)

This field manual describes the operations and tactics of Soviet general purpose ground forces. The content is based on information in Soviet writings and other open source literature. Most available information is focused on potential battle in Central Europe. This manual reflects that focus. Though Soviet military activity extends to other parts of the world, the Soviet forces opposite NATO represent a general model for Soviet forces elsewhere, as well as for forces of Soviet allies and surrogates.

FM 100-2-2: The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84)

The term "specialized warfare," used in the title of this FM, is intended to be an abbreviated, collective description of combat actions which, in US terminology, may be described as "special operations." or "operations in special conditions." Special operations include airborne, heliborne,and amphibious operations, and unconventional warfare in the enemy rear. The Soviet concept of the "rear area" visualizes modern war in an unprecedented spatial scope. This rear area concept stretches from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) back to the national capital.

FM 100-2-3: The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment (Jul '91)

The Soviet armed forces include five separate components: the strategic rocket forces, the ground forces, the air forces, the air defense forces, and naval forces. The generic term "Soviet Army" normally includes all but naval forces. This manual concentrates on the largest of the these components, the Soviet ground forces. Highly modernized organization and equipment combine to make the Soviet ground forces the most powerful land army in the world, with unprecedented flexibility, mobility, and firepower.

In today's complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict that might involve U.S. forces. So the military must be ready to meet the challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats. This is the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past.

From the U.S. perspective, an enemy is an individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. A potential adversary is sometimes designated as a threat. In this sense, the military defines threat as "any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies." Once hostilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy.

An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow U.S. forces to train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the wide range of possible opponents the military could face in actual conflict. It enables training of all branches of the military and prepares forces for potential combat operations.

In its time, the threat-based OPFOR served the Army very well, particularly for units targeted against specific threats. The benefits of this training were borne out, for example, in Operation Desert Storm. Techniques and doctrine, including deep attack and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, developed to cope with specific threats and honed against the OPFOR, enabled the Army to achieve decisive results on the battlefield.

More recent recent endeavors to describe threats include a strategic perspective explored in FM 7-100 Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy (MAY 2003). Contemporary operational warfighting capabilities of the OPFOR are described in FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations (DEC 2004), TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat (NOV 2010); and TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces (JAN 2014). Additional OPFOR resources include Red Team University and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

In the FM 7-100 series, TRADOC has created a flexible baseline for an OPFOR that can be adapted to meet a variety of different training requirements in a number of different scenarios that reflect the current operational environment. The OPFOR operational doctrine outlined represents a realistic composite of potential adversaries the Army might encounter in the real-world situations of the foreseeable future. However, the world is continually changing, as are the threats and challenges for which the Army must be prepared. The Army must remain flexible, as must the OPFOR designed to serve as a challenging sparring partner in the training environment.

Glaringly, a gap exists in our explanation of small-unit tactics, techniques and procedures of potential adversaries, threats, and enemies – particularly regarding how those tactics bridge up to operational and strategic frameworks. This gap of tactical description encompasses "state actors" within Red Team Army doctrine, as well as "non-state actors" such as insurgents, guerillas, terrorists, pirates, bandits, and crime cartels. One of the goals of this work, therefore, is to enable the development of a robust OPFOR at the small unit level in live tactical simulation, based on the construct of the historical foundations and doctrinal underpinnings of available OPFOR doctrine.

This work does not purport to define a single military by name. However, it assumes that contemporary Red Team Army doctrine has evolved from the Soviet tradition. And while the now-defunct Soviet Army is not inherently synonymous with Red Team Army, the doctrinal underpinings, historical foundations and cultural lineage of the military forces is established. For editorial convenience, this manual may refer to the two as if synonymous. When "Soviet" is used, it is based on the historical foundations from the FM 100-2 series of the 80s and 90s (and is used in the present tense); when "Red Team Army (RTA)" is used, it refers to an amalgamation of historic enemies and current antagonists. Through a triangulation of potential, actual and historic threats, a credible OPFOR may be scripted, trained, and developed into a robust training simulation scenario.

(OPFOR3-2) References

The following references were used in part to compile "OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army." All military references used to compile SMARTbooks are in the public domain and are available to the general public through official public websites and designated as approved for public release with unlimited distribution. The SMARTbooks do not contain ITAR-controlled technical data, classified, or other sensitive material restricted from public release. SMARTbooks are reference books that address general military principles, fundamentals and concepts rather than technical data or equipment operating procedures.

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Army Publications/Field Manuals

ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, Aug 2018.

FM 3-0, Operations, Oct 2017 (w/Chg 1)

FM 3-90-1, Offense and Defense, Volume 1, Mar 2013 and FM 3-90-2, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 1, Mar 2013

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Intro

Opposing Forces (Overview/Introduction)

Ref: FM 7-100.1, Opposing Force Operations (Dec 2014) and FM 3-0, Operations (Oct '17).

In today's complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict that might involve the U.S. Army. So the Army must be ready to meet the challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats. This is the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past.

The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (DCSINT) of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is the Executive Agent for the development, management, administration, integration, and approval functions of the OPFOR Program across the Army. Thus, the TRADOC DCSINT is responsible for documenting the doctrine, organization, and capabilities of a contemporary OPFOR that is appropriate for training the Army's leaders, soldiers, and units for the COE.

> *"When the Cold War ended, U.S. defense policy postulated that a new era had dawned in which large-scale combat operations against a peer threat were unlikely. This hypothesis was supported by operations throughout the 1990s. While the U.S. military applied the relative conventional superiority it developed in competition with the Warsaw Pact to dominate a large, conventionally armed opponent in OPERATION DESERT STORM, it was an exception. U.S. forces conducted contingency operations at the lower end of the conflict continuum in the Balkans and elsewhere. In 2001 and 2003 the U.S. conducted two offensive joint campaigns that achieved rapid initial military success but no enduring political outcome, resulting in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The focus of Army training and equipping shifted from defeating a peer threat to defeating two insurgencies and the global terrorist threat.*
>
> *Adversaries have studied the manner in which U.S. forces deployed and conducted operations over the past three decades. Several have adapted, modernized, and developed capabilities to counter U.S. advantages in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Military advances by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran most clearly portray this changing threat.*
>
> *While the U.S. Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, large-scale ground combat against a peer threat represents the most significant readiness requirement."*
>
> *- FM 3-0, Operations (Oct '17).*

In the FM 7-100 (and now, TC 7-100) series, the TRADOC Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (ODCSINT) has created a flexible baseline for an OPFOR that can be adapted to meet a variety of different training requirements in a number of different scenarios that reflect the COE. The OPFOR operational doctrine outlined in FM 7-100.1 represents a realistic composite of potential adversaries the Army might encounter in the real-world situations of the foreseeable future. However, the world is continually changing, as are the threats and challenges for which the Army must be prepared. The Army must remain flexible, as must the OPFOR designed to serve as a challenging sparring partner in the training environment.

I. Contemporary Operational Environment (COE)

The DOD officially defines an operational environment (OE) as "a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander" (JP 1-02). The contemporary operational environment (COE) is the operational environment that exists today and for the clearly foreseeable future.

A. Critical Variables

Any OE, in the real world or in the training environment, can be defined in terms of eleven critical variables. While these variables can be useful in describing the overall (strategic) environment, they are most useful in defining the nature of specific OEs. Each of these "conditions, circumstances, and influences" and their possible combinations will vary according to the specific situation. In this sense, they are "variables." These variables are interrelated and sometimes overlap. Different variables will be more or less important in different situations. Each OE is different, because the content of the variables is different. Only by studying and understanding these variables -- and incorporating them into its training -- will the U.S. Army be able to keep adversaries from using them against it or to find ways to use them to its own advantage.

Critical variables of COE include:

- Nature and Stability of the State
- Regional and Global Relationships
- Economics
- Sociological Demographics
- Information
- Physical Environment
- Technology
- External Organizations
- National Will
- Time
- Military Capabilities

B. Today's Operational Environment

Today's operational environment presents threats to the Army and joint force that are significantly more dangerous in terms of capability and magnitude than those we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major regional powers like Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are actively seeking to gain strategic positional advantage.

The proliferation of advanced technologies; adversary emphasis on force training, modernization, and professionalization; the rise of revisionist, revanchist, and extremist ideologies; and the ever increasing speed of human interaction makes large-scale ground combat more lethal, and more likely, than it has been in a generation. As the Army and the joint force focused on counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism at the expense of other capabilities, our adversaries watched, learned, adapted, modernized and devised strategies that put us at a position of relative disadvantage in places where we may be required to fight.

The Army and joint force must adapt and prepare for large-scale combat operations in highly contested, lethal environments where enemies employ potent long range fires and other capabilities that rival or surpass our own. The risk of inaction is great; the less prepared we are to meet these challenges, the greater the likelihood for conflict with those who seek windows of opportunity to exploit. The reduction of friendly, forward-stationed forces, significant reductions in capability and capacity across the entire joint force, and the pace of modernization make it imperative that we do everything possible to prepare for worst-case scenarios.

II. Enemy, Threat, and OPFOR

Before going further into the COE, the contemporary OPFOR, and the intended uses of this manual, it may be useful to define some key terms and the distinctions among them. It is important to distinguish among the terms enemy, threat, and OPFOR and to use them correctly.

Enemy

From the U.S. perspective, an enemy is an individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. In other words, the enemy is whoever is actually opposing the United States in a particular conflict. Thus, this term is synonymous with adversary or opponent.

Threat

A potential adversary is sometimes designated as a threat. In this sense, the Army defines threat as "any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies." Once hostilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy.

A. Opposing Force (OPFOR)

An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow the U.S. Army to train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the wide range of possible opponents the Army could face in actual conflict. It enables training of all arms of the Army and prepares the Army for potential combat operations.

During the road to war leading up to events in a training scenario, the OPFOR may play the role of a "threat" (potential enemy) that is on the verge of becoming an enemy. However, the actual training event usually deals with a state of hostilities. Thus, once hostilities begin in the training event, the OPFOR acts as the "enemy" of the U.S. force in the training environment.

During the Cold War period, the Army employed OPFORs based on specific real-world threats. However, the Army needs a different type of OPFOR to meet its training requirements for the COE.

B. Cold War OPFOR

When the Army established its OPFOR program in 1976 with Army Regulation 350-2, it could hardly have envisioned today's computerized constructive and virtual simulations, or even the evolving requirements of live simulations. It de¬fined an OPFOR simply as "an organized force created by and from U.S. Army units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force." Thus, all OPFORs were originally threat-based, in the sense that they replicated the forces, capabilities, and doctrine of a particular country officially recognized as a threat or potential adversary. In the midst of the Cold War, the 1976 regulation identified only one potential adversary against which to train: the Soviet Union; by 1978, a revision of the regulation added North Korea as a second threat for replication by an OPFOR. Over time, the Army developed other OPFORs to replicate other threats emerging in places ranging from Latin America and Southwest Asia.

In its time, the threat-based OPFOR served the Army very well, particularly for units targeted against specific threats. The benefits of this training were borne out, for example, in Operation Desert Storm. Techniques and doctrine, including deep attack and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, developed to cope with specific

threats and honed against the OPFOR, enabled the Army to achieve decisive results on the battlefield.

See "Prologue" (p. 2) for related discussion "Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Doctrine and the Historical Soviet Threat Model."

C. Contemporary OPFOR

Training U.S. forces for the COE requires a different kind of OPFOR from that of the past. The contemporary OPFOR must be less predictable and not based on the armed forces of a particular country. In today's world, the U.S. Army must be prepared to go into any OE and perform its full range of missions. It must be ready to do so in the face of a wide variety of possible threats and at the same time be prepared to deal with third-party actors that may have other interests. Not all threats are purely military in nature. Therefore, the U.S. Army now defines an OPFOR as "a plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces."

> **Contemporary OPFOR**
> A plausible, flexible military and/or paramilitary force representing a composite of varying capabilities of actual worldwide forces, used in lieu of a specific threat force, for training and developing U.S. forces.

Thus, in some training environments, a military force alone may be the OPFOR. In other cases, military forces may have paramilitary forces acting in loose affiliation with them, or acting separately from them within the same training environment. These relationships depend on the scenario, which is driven by training requirements. Various agencies and experts have different lists of real-world threats the United States might have to face. If the U.S. Army were to pick any one of these threats as the threat against which to train, that threat would almost certainly not be the one it would actually fight. What is needed is a composite that is representative of the full range and variety of possible threats and OEs. It must have a bit of everything--it could be virtually anybody, anywhere.

III. Contemporary Threats and Other Actors

There are many types of actors or participants in today's complex world environment. Some of the actors are countries (also called nation-states) and some are not. Nation-states are still dominant actors. However, some power is shifting to nontraditional actors and transnational concerns. There are many potential challenges to traditional concepts like balance of power, sovereignty, national interest, and roles of nation-state and non-state actors.

Of course, not all actors are threats. To be a threat, a nation or organization must have both the capabilities and the intention to challenge the United States.

> **Nation-states** fall into four basic categories according to their roles in the international community. The categories are core states, transition states, rogue states, and failed or failing states.
>
> **Non-state actors** are those that do not represent the forces of a particular nation-state. Such non-state elements include rogue actors as well as third-party actors.

See following pages (intro pp. 0-8 to 0-9) for related discussion "Anticipated Threat and the Future Operating Environment."

IV. Anticipated (RTA) Threat and the Future Operating Environment

Ref: TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040 (Oct '14), chap. 2.

While the United States must assess new and emerging threats, many current operational challenges will exist into the future. Harbingers of future conflict include competing powers (e.g., China and Russia), regional powers (e.g., Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)), transnational terrorist networks (e.g., al Qaida, its affiliates, and transnational criminals), and cyber threats. The following are examples only and illustrate a limited number of threats for which future Army forces must prepare.

DNI Worldwide Threat Assessment (2019)

Threats to US national security will expand and diversify in the coming year, driven in part by China and Russia as they respectively compete more intensely with the United States and its traditional allies and partners. This competition cuts across all domains, involves a race for technological and military superiority, and is increasingly about values. Russia and China seek to shape the international system and regional security dynamics and exert influence over the politics and economies of states in all regions of the world and especially in their respective backyards.

- China and Russia are more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s, and the relationship is likely to strengthen in the coming year as some of their interests and threat perceptions converge, particularly regarding perceived US unilateralism and interventionism and Western promotion of democratic values and human rights.
- As China and Russia seek to expand their global influence, they are eroding once well-established security norms and increasing the risk of regional conflicts, particularly in the Middle East and East Asia.
- At the same time, some US allies and partners are seeking greater independence from Washington in response to their perceptions of changing US policies on security and trade and are becoming more open to new bilateral and multilateral partnerships.

The post-World War II international system is coming under increasing strain amid continuing cyber and WMD proliferation threats, competition in space, and regional conflicts. Among the disturbing trends are hostile states and actors' intensifying online efforts to influence and interfere with elections here and abroad and their use of chemical weapons. Terrorism too will continue to be a top threat to US and partner interests worldwide, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. The development and application of new technologies will introduce both risks and opportunities, and the US economy will be challenged by slower global economic growth and growing threats to US economic competitiveness.

- Migration is likely to continue to fuel social and interstate tensions globally, while drugs and transnational organized crime take a toll on US public health and safety. Political turbulence is rising in many regions as governance erodes and states confront growing public health and environmental threats.
- Issues as diverse as Iran's adversarial behavior, deepening turbulence in Afghanistan, and the rise of nationalism in Europe all will stoke tensions.

Daniel R. Coats, Director Of National Intelligence, Statement for the Record, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Us Intelligence Community (Jan 29, 2019).

A. Competing Powers

Russia

Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and use of conventional and unconventional land forces in Ukraine suggest that Russia is determined to expand its territory and assert its power on the Eurasian landmass. Russia deployed and integrated a range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic means to conduct what some analysts have described as "non-linear" operations. Russia conducted operations to pursue its war aims below the threshold that would elicit a concerted North Atlantic Treaty Organization response. In addition, Russia used cyberspace capabilities and social media to influence perceptions at home and abroad and provide cover for large-scale military operations. While the long-term results of the incursion into Ukraine are not yet certain, Russia demonstrated the centrality of land forces in its effort to assert power and advance its interests in former Soviet states. Without a viable land force capable of opposing the Russian army and its irregular proxies, such adventurism is likely to continue undeterred. Russia's actions highlight the value of land forces to deter conflict as well as special operations and conventional force capability to project national power and exert influence in political contests.

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People's Republic of China (PRC)

Though the People's Republic of China remains committed to stable relationships with neighbors and the U.S. in the near-term, it continues to pursue a long-term, comprehensive military modernization program designed to improve the capacity of its armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional contingencies. China's goal over time is to expand its influence to establish stability along its periphery. While China prefers to avoid direct confrontation with the U.S., it uses civilian assets to challenge actions such as U.S. surveillance flights. Moreover, China's behavior has created friction with regional neighbors including U.S. allies and partners. Territorial disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands; border disputes with India; and increased maritime pressure on the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam are examples of China exerting power through force or threat of force. China works to negate U.S. advantages in space and cyberspace. China is developing significant anti-satellite capabilities, integrating cyber into all aspects of military operations, and developing sophisticated missiles and air defenses as part of an effort to challenge United States' ability to project power. Chinese doctrine calls for combining conventional and unconventional actions. The People's Liberation Army opened six combat training centers where it emphasizes combined arms operations and joint training. Chinese actions and force modernization efforts highlight the need for Army forces positioned forward or regionally engaged to prevent conflict, deter adversaries, and strengthen partners. Emerging Chinese capabilities also highlight the need for Army forces to project power from land into the air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains.

B. Regional Powers

Iran

Iran's management of its nuclear aspirations will shape its role as a rising power in the Middle East. Iran, empowered by expanding sectarian conflicts in the greater Middle East, poses a hybrid threat to U.S. interests and allies in the region. As it continues to apply pressure on the region to erode and supplant U.S. power, Iran uses combinations of economic and diplomatic overtures with irregular forces to advance its interests. Iran develops partnerships with disenfranchised populations, religious factions, and criminal elements to create disorder focused on subverting the influence of the U.S. and partner nations. Iran also develops relationships with weak governments and uses those governments to advance its interests. For example, Iran's support for President Bashar al

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IV. Anticipated (RTA) Threat and the Future Operating Environment (Cont.)

Ref: TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World 2020-2040 (Oct '14), chap. 2.

Assad in Syria is critical to its ability to sustain Lebanese Hezbollah, and Iran's support for militias in Iraq undermines government legitimacy and intensifies sectarian conflict. Iran avoids direct military confrontations while developing advanced capabilities and pursuing comprehensive military modernization. Iran's modernization efforts include the use of automated systems on land, sea, and air; ballistic missiles; and the development of nuclear capability. Iran is actively supporting militia in Iraq while confronting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Iran has become a more capable cyber actor as well. Taken collectively, Iranian activity has the potential to undermine U.S. regional goals as it continues to confront the U.S. indirectly on a number of fronts.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The DPRK, while in the same category as Iran, is at once a dangerous military threat and a failing state dependent upon the patronage of others, especially China. The DPRK is expanding its nuclear arsenal and improving its ballistic missile force to complement an aging but still large and capable conventional force. The DPRK's military possesses cyber and chemical-biological warfare capabilities. Key government facilities, military installations, and weapons are located in underground shelters. Because economic, social, and political pressures on the DPRK leadership could lead to war or a collapse of the regime, the U.S. prepares for the deployment of substantial ground, air, and maritime forces to operate as part of a coalition alongside Republic of Korea (South Korea) forces and in defense of South Korea. The threat on the Korean peninsula highlights the need for Army forces to operate in a CBRNE environment.

C. Transnational Terrorist Organizations

The emergence of ISIL is an example of how nonstate actors seize upon opportunities created by communal conflict and weak governance. ISIL is a nonstate actor that aims to create an Islamist militant state across large portions of Iraq, Syria, and surrounding areas. ISIL's military organization; ideological base; willingness to use murder and other forms of brutality against innocents; and ability to mobilize people, money, and weapons have enabled it to seize territory and establish control of populations and resources. ISIL moves into weakly governed spaces such as the Iraq-Syrian border where governments are unable to project power. The wider problem is ISIL's success combined with weaknesses of Middle Eastern governments has caused extremist Islam and terrorism to metastasize across much of the Middle East and North Africa. From Egypt to Yemen and from the Syrian Civil War to the disaster of Libya, the region is rife with weak governments and active terrorist groups.

Refer to CTS1: The Counterterrorism, WMD & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook for further discussion. CTS1 topics and chapters include: the terrorist threat (characteristics, goals & objectives, organization, state-sponsored, international, and domestic), hybrid and future threats, forms of terrorism (tactics, techniques, & procedures), counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, protection planning and preparation, countering WMD, and consequence management (all hazards response).

D. Large-Scale Combat Operations

As a nation, the United States wages war by employing all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The President employs the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve national strategic objectives. The nature and scope of some missions may require joint forces to conduct large-scale combat operations to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests. Such combat typically occurs within the framework of a major operation or a campaign.

Large-scale combat operations are at the far right of the conflict continuum and associated with war. Historically, battlefields in large-scale combat operations have been more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive than those the Army has experienced in the past several decades. During the 1943 battles of Sidi Bou Zid and Kasserine Pass in World War II, 5,000 American Soldiers were killed over the course of just 10 days; during the first three days of fighting the Army lost Soldiers at the rate of 1,333 per day. Even later in the war, when units were better seasoned, trained, and equipped, casualty rates remained high due to the inherent lethality of large-scale combat operations. In the Hürtgen Forest the Army sustained 33,000 total casualties over 144 days, a loss of 229 Soldiers per day. Similarly, the Battle of the Bulge cost the Army 470 Soldiers per day, for a total loss of 19,270 killed and 62,489 wounded over 41 days of sustained combat.

Large-scale combat operations are intense, lethal, and brutal. Their conditions include complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty. Future battlefields will include noncombatants, and they will be crowded in and around large cities. Enemies will employ conventional tactics, terror, criminal activity, and information warfare to further complicate operations. To an ever-increasing degree, activities in the information environment are inseparable from ground operations. Large-scale combat operations present the greatest challenge for Army forces.

Refer to AODS6: The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to FM/ADRP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of Combat Power). In addition to unified land operations (ADRP 3-0) and large-scale combat operations (FM 3-0), the 400-pg AODS6 includes completely refocused chapters on the elements of combat power: mission command (ADP/ADRP 6-0), movement and maneuver (ADPs 3-90, 3-07, 3-28, 3-05), intelligence (ADP/ADRP 2-0), fires (ADP/ADRP 3-09), sustainment (ADP/ADRP 4-0), & protection (ADP/ADRP 3-37).

Conclusion

Future armed conflict will be complex, in part, because threats, enemies, and adversaries are becoming increasingly capable and elusive. State and nonstate actors employ traditional, unconventional, and hybrid strategies that threaten U.S. security and vital interests. The complexity of future armed conflict is due to increasing momentum of human interaction, threats emanating from dense and weakly governed urban areas, the availability of lethal weapon systems, and the proliferation of CBRNE threats. Enemies and adversaries will challenge U.S. competitive advantages in the land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. Advanced technologies will transfer readily to state and nonstate actors. Enemies possess the capability to threaten the U.S. homeland and project power from land into all other domains. Because these threats may originate in dense urban areas or remote safe havens, long-range strikes will prove insufficient to defeat them.

VII. Peer Threats (in Large-Scale Combat Operations)

Ref: FM 3-0, Operations (Oct '17), pp. 1-9 to 1-11.

A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland (ADRP 3-0). Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals, paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. In general, a threat can be categorized as an enemy or an adversary:

- An **enemy** is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized (ADRP 3-0). An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war.
- An **adversary** is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).

While ADRP 3-0 addresses various threats across the range of military operations, FM 3-0 is focused on **peer threats in large-scale combat operations**. A peer threat is an adversary or enemy with capabilities and capacity to oppose U.S. forces across multiple domains world-wide or in a specific region where they enjoy a position of relative advantage. Peer threats possess roughly equal combat power in geographical proximity to a conflict area with U.S. forces. A peer threat may also have a cultural affinity to specific regions, providing them relative advantages in terms of time, space, and sanctuary. Peers threats generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges that are an order of magnitude more challenging militarily than those the U.S. Army has faced since the end of the Cold War.

Peer threats employ strategies that capitalize on their capabilities to achieve their objectives. When these objectives are at odds with the interests of the United States and its allies, conflict becomes more likely. Peer threats prefer to achieve their goals without directly engaging U.S. forces in combat. They often employ information warfare in combination with conventional and irregular military capabilities to achieve their goals. During a conflict, peer threats will try to weaken the resolve of the United States and its partners to sustain conflict. They will exploit friendly sensitivity to world opinion and attempt to exploit American domestic opinion and sensitivity to friendly casualties. Peer threats believe they have a comparative advantage because of their willingness to endure greater hardship, casualties, and negative public opinion.

Peer threats employ their resources across multiple domains to attack U.S. vulnerabilities. They use their capabilities to create lethal and nonlethal effects throughout an OE. During combat operations, threats seek to inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short period of time. They seek to delay friendly forces long enough to achieve their goals and end hostilities before friendly forces reach culmination. Peer threats will employ various methods to employ their national elements of power to render U.S. military power irrelevant. Five broad peer threat methods, often used in combination, include information warfare, preclusion, isolation, sanctuary, and systems warfare.



Refer to AODS6: The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to FM/ADRP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of Combat Power). In addition to unified land operations (ADRP 3-0) and large-scale combat operations (FM 3-0), the 400-pg AODS6 includes completely refocused chapters on the elements of combat power: mission command (ADP/ADRP 6-0), movement and maneuver (ADPs 3-90, 3-07, 3-28, 3-05), intelligence (ADP/ADRP 2-0), fires (ADP/ADRP 3-09), sustainment (ADP/ADRP 4-0), & protection (ADP/ADRP 3-37).

(Red Team Armies)
I. Military Doctrine

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), chapter 2.

I. The Soviet Concept of War

To the Soviets, war is a manifestation of the class struggle. It is an expression of the conflict between the "progressive forces of socialism" and the "reactionary forces of imperialistic capitalism," which they feel will be ultimately resolved in favor of socialism. The Soviet concept of war represents a continuation of politics. In Western perceptions, war occurs when politics fail to resolve conflicts nonviolently. The Soviets feel that war is the least desirable method by which the forces of history will move toward complete victory for socialism.

The Soviet political and military theorists compare the socialist and capitalist camps by a concept called the "correlation of forces." This concept compares the relative political, moral, economic, and military strengths of both sides. In the Soviet view, the correlation of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist camp since the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism. The correlation of forces may be advanced by both violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by violent means, the military component of the correlation is the dominant factor.

II. The Structure of Soviet Military Thought

Soviet military doctrine is the officially accepted set of concepts that delineate the ways and means to achieve military objectives in the interest of politics. This doctrine also specifies the structure of the Soviet armed forces, allocates industrial resources and output, and orients research and development efforts to support armed forces.

(Red Team Armies)
II. Operational Concept

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), chapter 3.

Categories of Soviet Combat Action

Offense *(chap. 2)*

- Attack Against a Defending Enemy
- Attack from the March
- Attack from a Position in Direct Contact
- Meeting Engagement (enemy is also on offense)
- Pursuit (enemy is withdrawing)

Defense *(chap. 3)*

- Prepared Defense
- Hasty Defense
- Withdrawal

I. The Soviet Categorization of Combat Actions

An important consideration in understanding Soviet military thought is their categorization of types of combat actions. It is important to adhere to their categorization and terminology to fully understand the essence of Soviet operations and tactics. The 1966 Soviet book *Taktika* (Tactics) was written at a time when it was assumed that all major combat activity would take place under nuclear conditions. The book described four major categories of combat action: offense, meeting engagement, defense, and withdrawal.

The listing of the meeting engagement as a separate major category of combat reflects the view held at that time that it would be the most prevalent form of combat under nuclear conditions. More recent writings, to include the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, indicate that the meeting engagement is looked upon as one element of the broad category of offense, rather than a separate major category. This probably reflects the contemporary Soviet view that both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare are possible and that the attack against a defending enemy may be just as prevalent as the meeting engagement.

Contemporary Soviet writings describe only two basic, diametrically opposed forms of combat action: offense and defense.

III. Nuclear Warfare

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), pp. 2-7 to 2-9.

The advent of nuclear weapons caused Soviet planners to go through a long period of rethinking and revising their combined arms doctrine. Modern, totally mechanized armed forces- supported and threatened by weapons that can change the face of the battlefield in a matter of minutes gave a whole new meaning to the high-speed, combined arms operation in depth.

Possible nuclear or chemical attacks by the enemy make concentration inadmissable in its World War II sense. At the same time, the availability of friendly nuclear strikes and the longer ranges of conventional artillery reduce the requirement for massed artillery formations. Improved troop mobility permits both the rapid concentration and quick dispersal essential to the survival of tank and motorized rifle formations as they maneuver on a nuclear-threatened battlefield. In this context, the Soviets now stress that the "quality" of mass must compensate for the reduced quantity formerly provided by concentrations of troops and equipment. This quality takes the form of intense strikes with conventional air, artillery, and weapons of mass destruction.

Limited Nuclear War Considerations

In the past decade, the Soviet political and military leaders have discussed the possibility of a limited nuclear war. They accept that a war could be limited to a given theater of military operations (TVD) and would not necessarily escalate to an intercontinental exchange of nuclear strikes. Attempting to limit nuclear war to a TVD would place even greater pressure on Soviet forces to achieve theater objectives quickly to present enemy decision makers with a fait accompli that would make escalation clearly unattractive. In this context, the principles of tempo, decisiveness, and mission take on added importance.

The Soviets would prefer to avoid nuclear warfare. They would probably do so as long as their objectives were being achieved and there were no indications that the enemy was "going nuclear." However, the Soviets would attempt to preempt enemy nuclear use by a massive, initial, in-depth, theater nuclear strike.

IV. The Attack in Depth

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), pp. 2-6 to 2-7.

The principle of attacking in depth was the Soviets' response to the increased capability and mobility of fire support systems (artillery and aviation) and the appearance of mechanized infantry, tank, and airborne forces. Enemy weapons and formations located several kilometers from the FEBA became an immediate threat to forces opposing them and had to be engaged with the same urgency and decisiveness as closer targets. On the other hand, Soviet fire support systems could reach farther, and their tank and infantry formations had increased in mobility. Soviet military theorists concluded that the deeper threat and the potential for deeper fire and maneuver by Soviet forces necessitated a combined arms effort. They decided that simultaneous artilley attack and airstrikes through the entire depth of enemy defenses combined with tank and infantry formations to break through the enemy's tactical defensive and to drive rapidly and forcefully into the depth of his operational rear would best attain success in combat. The enemy's lines of communication, command and control would then be destroyed or disrupted and the remainder of the forward edge of the enemy's tactical defensive system would begin to fragment and collapse. Disorganized, demoralized, and isolated, enemy commanders would be unable to reestablish an effective and coordinated defense.

The successful execution of this high-speed, deep operation required closely coordinated aggressive action by tank, infantry, artillery, and aviation. The separate arms and services were required to combine their efforts under a single control element to implement a unified plan. As a consequence, the requirement for thorough and continuous coordination among all combat elements throughout the planning and execution phases of every operation increased markedly. Maintenance of reliable and continuous command and control became at once more difficult and more critical. The roles of the combined arms commander and combined arms staff were expanded and refined. The combined arms commander, advised by his staffs has the overall responsibility for the planning and execution of the operation as well as the authority to carry it out

To execute the operation in depth successfully, the combined arms force had to maintain a rapid tempo of advance. By tempo, the Soviets mean not only speed but also the flexibility and aggressiveness to create and develop opportunities and to build advantage upon advantage. To accomplish this, the Soviet armed forces adopted the practice of echeloning their formations.

The First Echelon

Typically, the first (assault) echelon attacked and penetrated the enemy's tactical defenses, and the second (exploitation) echelon drove through the penetration deep into the enemy's operational rear. Both echelons were controlled by the same combined arms commander. He assigned missions to the commanders of the first and second echelons in support of his overall mission and controlled the entire force until the operation's ultimate objective had been accomplished.

While the putpose of echeloning has changed little over the years, the circumstances under which echeloning is applied and the manner in which it is applied have varied considerably-depending on the relative strength and defensive tactics of the Soviets' enemies. During World War II, Soviet commanders usually employed a heavy second echelon (one third to one half of the entire formation) at the tactical level only when the enemy defensive formations were strong and deeply echeloned and the enemy had large reserves. When enemy defenses were thin and the defender did not possess significant reserves, the Soviets often attacked in a single large echelon (maintaining a relatively small combined arms reserve) to overwhelm the enemy along his entire front. Use of a

single-echelon formation simplified command and control problems for the Soviet commander and denied the weaker defender the opportunity to reinforce laterally and to deal with the attacking force as it presented itself in several "waves."

The Second Echelon

Even when they did not echelon their divisions (tactical echeloning), the Soviets would form an operational second echelon (within armies and fronts). The composition, size, and specific employment of the second echelon force was again determined largely by the enemy's strength, tactics, and disposition. When the enemy was able to establish a strong tactical defensive system of several echelons (reinforced by tactical reserves) and had sizable operational reserves available as well, the attacking Soviet second echelon comprised as much as half of the attacking formation (e.g., two divisions of a four-division army). The missions of this standard second echelon included reduction of bypassed enemy forces, exploitation through the penetration achieved by the first echelon, or an attack in a new direction, and possible replacement or reinforcement of the first echelon if the first echelon suffered heavy losses.

The Mobile Group

When the enemy was relatively understrength and lacked credible operational reserves, the army second echelon would take the form of a mobile group made up of a tank or mechanized corps (normally one to three divisions reinforced with highly mobile combat and combat service support elements). This group, essentially a large, mobile, operational raiding force, either replaced or supplemented the standard second echelon. The mobile group differed from the standard second echelon in that it was expected to drive to deeper objectives and be able to sustain itself longer without major additional support. It also differed in that while the standard operational-level second echelon usually was primarily nonmotorized infantry, the mobile group was composed of tank or motorized infantry forces. When the mobile group was the only follow-on element, part of its force would usually assist the first echelon to make the initial penetration. When a mobile group and a second echelon were formed to conduct an operation in anticipation of heavier resistance in the tactical defense zone, the mobile group could be committed before or after the second echelon, depending on the actual level of resistance encountered by first echelon units.

The mobile group of the front typically consisted of a tank army. The front mobile group's missions were similar to the army level group except that the objectives were larger and deeper.

In the post World War II era, the Soviets completely motorized all infantry units and increased the number of tanks in divisions. This full mechanization along with the advent of nuclear weapons resulted in dropping the different roles of a second echelon and a mobile group. The second echelon was thought capable of both building up the offensive or exploiting success of the first echelon.

The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG)

The concept of the mobile group and its role in combined arms combat received renewed Soviet interest as the basis for refining their contemporary operational offensive methods. The modern version of the mobile group, the operational maneuver group (OMG), can move faster, go deeper, and has better combat and combat service support than its World War II counterpart. The OMG concept significantly contributes to fulfilling the existing requirement for the deep theater offensive operation in keeping with the evolving nature of modern war.

The concentration of the necessary amount of force at the right time and place was critical to the maintenance of the tempo required for successful execution of the deep combined arms operation. During World War II, the Soviet Army concentrated tremendous force against a narrow sector of the enemy's defenses to achieve a rapid breakthrough.

(Red Team Armies)
III. Personnel & Training

Ref: FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment, chap. 2 and 3.

I. Historical Lineage

Red Team Armies (RTA) trace their historical lineage to the Soviet Union, which in turn was greatly influenced and shaped by German Blitzkrieg tactics of the Second World War and the linear tactics of the French and British prior to modern, mechanized warfare.

Because of these influences, RTA place enormous emphasis on the offense. So much so that if an RTA unit slows its momentum or stops to defend, resources of combat power are intentionally stripped from the stalled unit and diverted to other units still pushing the offense. Defense is not rewarded in RTA and may even be punished.

Incorporating much of the Blitzkrieg concepts of combined arms, RTA efficiently employs infantry and armor formations intermixed. Indirect fires from artillery units and also Close Air Support (CAS) from supporting helicopter gunship and fixed-wing aircraft support these formations.

II. Personnel

Ref: FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment (Jun '91), chap. 2.

At the height of the Soviet Union, there were more than 60 million males between the ages of 15 and 49. About 80 percent of these men are fit for military service. Each year, some 2 to 21/2 million young men reach the military registration age of 17. The government will induct at least one-half of them when they become 18 years old. These conscripts constituted approximately 75 percent of Soviet ground force personnel. The remainder, who were deferred for various reasons, serve at a later time on active duty unless they are declared physically unfit for military service. If deferred beyond their twenty-seventh birthday, they remained in the reserves, subject to periodic refresher training. All qualified male citizens remained in the armed forces reserve until their 50th birthday.

The quality of military manpower, particularly of the Great Russian element, was generally good. The Great Russians comprised about 53 percent of the total population. Soviet youths were physically hardy as a result of participation in active sports programs. They were also better educated, more sophisticated, and substantially better trained than their World War II predecessors. Although the conscript received stern discipline and intensive political indoctrination, worked hard, and had few comforts or luxuries and little time to himself, his morale was relatively high. He had a genuine love of his native land. His hatred was easily aroused against an invading enemy, of which there have been many in Russia's and the Soviet Union's history. Moreover, Soviet soldiers and sailors have the capacity to withstand deprivations. The Soviet officer was a well-regarded professional who occupies a high social and economic position in society. The officer corps, with its prestige and privileges, stood apart from the troops. In summary, the Soviet armed forces, loyal to the regime, constituted a serious adversary; they were on a par with their counterparts in the West.

Officers

Officers for the Soviet armed forces entered the service from several sources. The largest number were commissioned upon graduation from military colleges. There were at least 143 military colleges, with average enrollments of 1,000, serving all branches of the armed forces. Besides commissions, graduates receive technical degrees from three-year schools and engineering degrees from schools whose programs can last up to five years.

II. Groupings of Forces

Front

The front is the largest field formation in war-time. It is an operational and administrative unit whose size and composition are subject to wide variation depending on its mission and situation. Roughly equivalent to a US/NATO army group, a front can include three to five armies. Other forces organic or attached to a front can include artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, chemical, signal, reconnaissance, and rear service units. They can also include aviation, airborne, air assault, airmobile, and special purpose forces.

Army

The Army is the highest peacetime combined arms formation. The Soviet ground forces designate two types of armies: the combined arms army (CAA) and the tank army (TA). By altering the mix of motorized rifle divisions (MRDs), tank divisions (TDs), and artillery and missile support in the army organizations, the Soviets gain flexibility in either offensive or defensive roles.

Combined Arms Army (CAA)

The combined arms army is an operational and administrative organization; it is the basic Soviet field army. A typical combined arms army includes two to four motorized rifle divisions and one or two tank divisions, plus artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance, and rear support units.

Tank Army (TA)

The Tank Army. The tank army is an operational and administrative unit, and, like the combined arms army, is a basic component of a front. The size and composition of the army will depend on the mission, the situa tion, and the area of operations. A typical tank army includes two to four tank divisions and one or two motorized rifle divisions, plus artillery, missile, air defense, engineer, chemical defense, signal, intelligence, reconnaissance, and rear service units. A typical role of a tank army is to exploit penetrations deep into the enemy's rear areas.

Manuever Divisions

There are three basic types of maneuver divisions in the Soviet ground forces: motorized rifle, tank, and airborne. They have a combined arms structure as well as a comprehensive array of combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) elements.

MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION	TANK DIVISION	AIRBORNE DIVISION
Division Headquarters	Division Headquarters	Division Headquarters
Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP)	Motorized Rifle Regiment (BMP)	Airborne Regiment (BMD)
Motorized Rifle Regiment (BTR)	Tank Regiment	Airborne Regiment (BMD)
Motorized Rifle Regiment (BTR)	Tank Regiment	Airborne Regiment (BMD)
Tank Regiment	Tank Regiment	Assault Gun Battalion
Artillery Regiment	Artillery Regiment	Artillery Regiment
SAM Regiment	SAM Regiment	AA Battalion
SSM Battalion	SSM Battalion	
Antitank Battalion		
Reconnaissance Battalion	Reconnaissance Battalion	Reconnaissance Company
Engineer Battalion	Engineer Battalion	Engineer Battalion
Signal Battalion	Signal Battalion	Signal Battalion
Materiel Support Battalion	Materiel Support Battalion	Transportation and Maintenance Battalion
Maintenance Battalion	Maintenance Battalion	
Chemical Protection Company	Chemical Protection Company	Chemical Protection Company
Medical Battalion	Medical Battalion	Medical Battalion
Artillery Command Battery	Artillery Command Battery	
Helicopter Squadron	Helicopter Squadron	
Other Support Elements	Other Support Elements	Other Support Elements

V. The Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR)

Ref: FM-100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment, chap. 4 and 5, and FM 100-63 Infantry-Based Opposing Force, chap 3.

I. The Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR)

At the heart of the RTA is the Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR). The MRR is the default maneuver organization. The MRR offers far greater mobility and logistical capacity over light infantry units, which are employed only within a very narrow scope of missions and therefore are not favored.

Although MRR formations employ costly armored vehicles; air assault infantry units require much more expensive helicopter formations. Even the relatively cheap paratroop infantry units require expensive fixed-wing transport aircraft, plus the airfields and instillations necessary to store and repair these vehicles.

Whether the MRR is equipped with heavy tracked or lighter wheeled armored vehicles, or heavy, medium, or light all-wheel drive trucks, the MRR retains mobility as its primary asset. Whereas a light infantry formation may cover 20 miles in a day's march, the MRR can cover 200 miles just as quickly. It arrives with rested troops, ready to fight. And the MRR arrives with greater capacity in terms of small arms capability and logistical supplies to keep it in the fight longer than any light infantry formation.

Yet again, the MRR costs just a fraction of the cost of expensive airmobile formations. So the MRR just makes good sense from a cost to benefit ratio.

D. Small Arm Weapons

Squads are equipped with rifle or carbine, most commonly the Kalashnikov weapons in 7.62x39mm (AKM and side-folding AKMS variant) or in 5.45x39mm (AK-74 also available in the folding "S" configuration). Additionally the 8-man dismounted squad most often carries one PKM medium machinegun in 7.62x51mm, one RPK light machinegun and six Kalashnikov weapons, the last of which is commonly fitted with either a 40mm or 30mm grenade launcher tube.

The machinegun team includes the primary gunner plus an assistant gunner who assists with carrying ammunition, identifying targets, and function of the gun. Often a grenadier is included in the MG team to cover the dead space of defilades. (Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

One of the riflemen is designated the antitank gunner and carries an RPG-7 rocket launcher. This combination of weapons systems permits a squad engagement range out to 800 meters. When used in conjunction with direct fire support from the bronegruppa, the squad has excellent firepower out to 2,000 meters. (Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

It is still the individual rifleman, working in teams who must close with and destroy the enemy. This rifleman carries an AKM and a disposable RPG-26, both of which have a practical range of 200m. Note the tourniquet wrapped around the stock. He also carries two fragmentation hand grenades in pouches on his right back. (Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

The MRR squad divides into dismounted infantry and the bronegruppa who stays with the vehicle. In addition to the heavy machinegun or automatic grenade launcher, the bronegruppa driver and vehicle gunner typically carry a pistol such as the Markov PK 9mm, but they may also be issued an AKM.

Vehicle platforms carry various heavy weapons such as the 14.5mm DShKM machinegun, or 12.7mm DShK machinegun, or AGS-30 automatic grenade launcher. At minimum vehicles are armed with a 7.62mm PKM medium machinegun.

Team/Position	Weapon	Caliber	Rate of Fire	Effective Range
Bronegruppa				
Vehicle Gunner	DShK Heavy MG	12.7mm	500 RpM	**2,000m**
Driver	AKM	7.62x39mm	700 RpM	200m
Squad				
Squad Leader	AKM	7.62x39mm	700 RpM	200m
Deputy Leader	AKM	7.62x39mm	700 RpM	200m
Machine Gunner	PKM Medium MG	7.62.54mm	600 RpM	**800m**
Assist. Gunner	AKM	7.62x39mm	700 RpM	200m
Rocket Grenadier	RPG AT Rocket	Various Warheads	4 RpM	**400m**
Assist. Grenadier	AKM	7.62x39mm	700 RpM	200m
Machine Gunner	RPK Light MG	7.62x39mm	700 RpM	**400m**
Rifleman	AKM	7.62x39mm	700 RpM	200m

VI. Modern (Present-Day) Russian Land Forces

Ref: Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (http://eng.mil.ru/).

Editor's Note: The following overview/snapshot of present-day Russian Land Forces is presented as a modern counterpoint (mission, operational construct, and force structure) to the now-historical Soviet-era threat as outlined in the original FM 100-2 threat series. The text is provided in the same gramatical style and presentation as sourced from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

I. Mission and Objectives of the Russian Armed Forces

Given the foreign policy shifts of recent years and new national security priorities, the Russian Armed Forces now have a totally new set of objectives that could be broken down into the following four major dimensions:

- Deterring the military and political threats to the security or interests of the Russian Federation
- Supporting economic and political interests of the Russian Federation
- Mounting other-than-war enforcement operations
- Using military force

Specifics of the ongoing global military and political shifts allow for transmutations of the aforementioned objectives. Understandably, the existing hot-button national security issues appear to be comprehensive and multidimensional by character.

The Russian Armed Forces deter war and military-political threats as well as provide for national security through performing the following tasks:

- tracking the rising military-political tensions and uncovering war preparations to attack the Russian Federation and/or its allies;
- sustaining the m9, status, operational availability and mobilizational preparedness of the strategic nuclear forces and the relevant support capabilities to assure their functionality and usability; keeping the C2 systems ready to inflict the desired losses on the aggressor under any conditions;
- maintaining operational capabilities, war and mobilizational preparedness and training of the peacetime general purpose forces on the level high enough to beat back local aggression;
- assuring readiness for strategic deployments as part of a state-run effort to put the nation on a war footing;
- making arrangements to put in place territorial defenses.

Supporting Russian economic and political interests breaks down into the following tasks:

- providing for security of Russian citizens in war zones and areas of political or other sort of instabilities;
- creating the friendly environment for Russian state or government-related economic activities;
- safeguarding Russian national interests in the territorial waters, continental shelf, exclusive economic zones and the World Ocean;

- running variable-scale enforcement operations directed by the Russian President to secure vital national economic and political interests;
- staging and conducting information counter-balancing operations.

The Russian Armed Forces can undertake the following peacetime enforcement operations:

- living up to the commitments in keeping with the relevant international treaty obligations and inter-governmental agreements;
- fighting international terrorism, political extremism and separatism; preventing and putting in check sabotage activities and terrorist acts;
- undertaking a partial or full-fledged strategic deployment, maintaining operational availability of the nuclear deterrence capabilities;
- running UN/CIS-mandated peace-keeping/peace-enforcement operations while operating either as part of a coalition set up by an international Russian-participated organization or on an ad-hoc basis;
- assuring a martial law/emergency regime in one or several constituent units of the Russian Federation pursuant to express directives from the National Command Authority;
- safeguarding the national borders of the Russian Federation in the air and underwater media;
- enforcing international sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council;
- preventing natural disasters and other emergencies, managing their consequences.

The use of force is in order to assure security of the Russian Federation.

Notably, the Russian Armed Forces should maintain the capability to:

- effectively wage two concurrent armed conflicts of any type in peacetime or in an emergency through the use of ready forces, while sustaining the strategic deterrence capability, maintaining readiness of the forces (other troops) and refraining from engaging call-up reinforcements. In addition, the Russian Armed Forces should command the capability to conduct peacekeeping missions, while operating either as part of a multinational contingent or unassisted;
- undertake strategic deployments to put in check escalation of tensions by way of assuring availability of the strategic deterrence weapons and maneuvering the committed ready forces in the event of rising military-political and strategic threats.
- beat back aerospace aggression in wartime through the use of available forces, and concurrently prosecute two local wars following completion of the full-fledged strategic deployment of the Russian Armed Forces.

II. High Command of the Land Forces

A. Motorised Rifle Troops

The Motorised Rifle Troops are the most numerous Arm of the Service, which forms the basis of the Land Force and the core of its combat orders. Along with the Tank Troops they perform the following tasks:

- **in defence** – to retain occupied areas, lines and positions, to repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat its attacking groups;
- **in offence (counterattack)** – to break through the enemy's defence, to destroy factions of its troops, to capture important areas, lines and objects, to cross water obstacles, to persecute the retreating enemy;

Chap 2

Offensive Operations

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), chapters 4 & 5.

The Soviets emphasize swift, efficient movement, or transfer, of combat power from one point on the battlefield to another. This is accomplished by rapid column movement in march formation and successive deployment into prebattle formation and attack formation. Commanders insure that their unit is constantly ready to perform a march, with minimum warning and preparation. Units frequently rehearse the march, and its conduct is strictly controlled. They practice deployment from march column into prebattle and attack formation in standard battle drills. These formations and drills are designed for a rapid transition into combat while maintaining maximum security, speed, and firepower.

Offensive Operations

Attack *(pp. 2-13 to 2-32)*

- Attack Against a Defending Enemy
- Attack from the March
- Attack from a Position in Direct Contact

Meeting Engagement *(pp. 2-33 to 2-35)*

Pursuit *(p. 2-36)*

Offensive actions are combat operations conducted to defeat and destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers. They impose the commander's will on the enemy. A commander may also conduct offensive actions to deprive the enemy of resources, seize decisive terrain, deceive or divert the enemy, develop intelligence, or hold an enemy in position. This chapter discusses the basics of the offense. The basics discussed in this chapter apply to all offensive tasks.

The commander seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative when conducting offensive actions. Specific operations may orient on a specific enemy force or terrain feature as a means of affecting the enemy. Even when conducting primarily defensive actions, wresting the initiative from the enemy requires offensive actions.

Effective offensive operations capitalize on accurate intelligence regarding the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Commanders maneuver their forces to advantageous positions before making contact. However, commanders may shape conditions by deliberately making contact to develop the situation and mislead the enemy. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden, shattering

action against enemy weakness that capitalizes on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation does not destroy the enemy, operations continue until enemy forces disintegrate or retreat to where they are no longer a threat.

The offense is the default mode of operations for the RTA. It is the means by which the RTA imposes its will upon an enemy. Considerable resources are given to units that are conducting offensive actions, all the more true if that unit is appreciating significant gain within the battlespace.

RTA offensive operations may be directed against an enemy force, terrain, or enemy resources such as facilities or materiel supplies as the main objective.

Furthermore, RTA offensive action may come in the form of a detailed and deliberate attack against fortified enemy positions, or it may come in the form of a movement to contact against a dispersed enemy force that is conducting a mobile defense or retrograde.

Whichever the case, the RTA almost invariably employs classic "hammer and anvil" tactics to trap the enemy objective between two or more RTA forces.

Second Chechen War, August 1999 – April 2000

The Russian military learned from their mistakes made in the First Chechen War of 1994-96 in which just 25,000 Russian troops attempted to seize tactical control of the city of Grozny by storming key buildings.

In the Second Chechen War, Russian air forces conducted a massive two-month air campaign to destroy critical military and government infrastructure in Chechnya. In early October, a Russian ground force of 100,000 troops moved across the open terrain of Chechnya unopposed. By October 5, the Russian force had reached the Terek River. They reconsolidated and crossed the Terek River on October 12, forming a double envelopment of the region, seizing high ground overlooking Grozny by October 15. Over the next month, the Russians relentlessly bombarded the city with artillery while completing their envelopment, conquering nearby town after town.

The Russian military assault on Grozny began in early December. Grozny fell to Russian forces on February 2. The destruction of such a city had not been seen since the Second World War. Chechen separatist militia admitted to 2,700 killed and an unknown number of wounded. The Russian government claimed 1,173 Russian troops had been killed in Chechnya thus far. The war would grind on for years and ultimately end with a Russian victory, regaining the region.

(Offensive Operations) I. Front & Army Operations

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), chapter 4.

I. TVD Offensive

Front and army operations normally take place within a theater of military operations (Russian: TVD), encompassing a considerable part of the territory of a continent and comprising a level of command. A TVD offensive has a strategic mission to defeat and destroy enemy field forces, to capture vital territory, and to bring about the political destruction of the enemy.

Offensive operations within a IVD could be supported by-

- Strategic aviation
- Strategic rocket forces
- Airborne forces
- Transport aviation
- Naval and naval infantry furces

Within the TVD, the operational formations are fronts and armies. Afront is a wartime formation comprised of several armies or separate divisions. Its size varies with the mission it is given within the overall strategic operation. An army is the largest peacetime ground maneuver formation at the operational level. In wartime, the composition and size of an army also varies dependent upon mission. An army may be either tank or combined arms. Its structure provides adequate control and ground-based support for the divisions assigned to it during the army's participation in a front operation.

Divisions and smaller organizations are found at the tactical level. The division has a fixed organization and serves as the "building block" and maneuver element of

B. Offensive Phasing

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), pp. 4-2 to 4-3.

To assist in phasing offensive operations at the operational level, the Soviets have defined a series of terms outlining various depths of the enemy defenses and the objectives encompassed within those depths. The initial phase of the operation requires the penetration of the enemy's forward defenses and the neutralization or destruction of the enemy in the area defined as the "tactical depth." This depth includes the reserves of the forward enemy divisions. The subsequent phase calls for the neutralization or destruction of those enemy units in the area encompassed by the "immediate operational depth." The enemy corps reserves are found in this area. When the situation permits the introduction of a front's second echelon armies as exploitation forces, the enemy's strategic reserves at Anny Group and Theater level are attacked The final phase of the offensive is the accomplishment of the front final objectives: the capture of logistical, political, and economic centers and the neutralization of remaining enemy forces. The categories of objective depths which regulate front offensive operations are identified below.



Russo-Georgia War, August 2008

The war in Georgia illustrates RTA deliberate and fluid movement from tactical, to operational, to strategic objectives in a remarkably short duration of time:

1 AUG: Ossetian separatists detonate a bomb wounding five Georgian police officers. 2-6 AUG: Ossetian separatists and Georgian military exchange artillery bombardments. 7 AUG: Two Russian battalions, tank and motorized, invade Georgia via the Roki Tunnel. 8 AUG: Russian peacekeepers, a tank battalion, and separatists seize the city of Tskhinvali. 9 AUG: Russian air forces bomb the Georgian capital city of Tbilisi, plus Gori and other towns. 10 AUG: Russian navy sinks a Georgian naval ship at Abkhazia, opening a second front. 11 AUG: Russian forces seize the port city of Poti, south of Abkhazia. Air bombings continue. 12-13 AUG: Russian 58th Army seizes Gori, and marches on Tbilisi while air bombings continue. 14 AUG: A Russian ceasefire forces Georgia to surrender South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions.

Planning for the Attack

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), p. 5-14 to 5-17.

Division-level planning and preparation for the attack are based on the objectives and missions assigned by the army commander. The division commander assesses the situation, outlines his concept and intentions, specifies preliminary actions and missions, and directs the preparation of required information and planning. Warning orders are then passed to subordinate and attached units, specifying where, when, and by what means the attack will be conducted.

Preliminary actions are regulated by a strict timetable. The less time available, the more rigidly the work is regulated. Concurrent planning and action at all levels is emphasized.

Soviet attack plans are worked out in great detail. Despite the demands such planning may impose, in favorable circumstances the average reaction times to mounting an attack when already in contact, from receipt of orders or contact report to an H-Hour, are indicated below.



On receipt of a mission, the division commander and his chief of staff immediately assess the assigned mission, calculate available and required time, and establish what information about the situation they need, what they already have, and what is lacking. Analysis of the assigned mission centers on the role of the divisions in the attack; where, unless told, its main effort should be concentrated; what attack formation should be used; and what rates of advance are possible during the attack.

The division commander reviews the army's offensive plan, the allocation and procedures for employment of nuclear and chemical weapons, and the role of the division in the army's scheme. He notes the axes, objectives, and groupings of flanking division(s).

The basis for his attack planning stems from consideration of-

- Objective(s).
- Enemy dispositions.
- The army's fire plan, particularly the provision for nuclear/chemical fires, and the allocation of artillery.

Forms of Maneuver

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), pp. 5-13 to 5-14.

The three basic forms of maneuver in the attack are:

Frontal Attack

The frontal attack is directed against the enemy's frontline forces to penetrate his defenses along single or multiple axes. A unit conducting a frontal attack attempts to create openings for subsequent exploitation. The frontal attack was previously one of the most frequently employed forms of offensive maneuver. Its success depends on superiority of forces and firepower, the presence of sufficient reserves, and thorough planning. The frontal attack, by itself, is the least preferred form of maneuver. Normally, it is used in combination with a flank attack or an envelopment.

Flank Atttack

The flank attack is conducted to strike enemy forces in their flank or rear at a relatively shallow depth. It normally is initiated through gaps or breaches in enemy formations. Forces conducting the flank attack and those conducting a simultaneous frontal attack coordinate fire support.

Envelopment

The envelopment is a deeper attack that causes the enemy to turn and fight in a new direction. It is launched against enemy open flanks or through gaps or breaches. There is no requirement for mutual fire support with forces conducting a frontal attack.

The Soviets seek to exploit massive suppressive fires through the vigorous, sustained, forward movement of attacking units. Attacking forces attempt to bypass strongpoints and to envelop defensive positions. The maneuvers used vary with the situation. Units attempt to exploit gaps in a defense and to maneuver against its flanks and rear. The objective is a strike into the key points and to the full depth of an enemy defense.

Battle of Hwanggan, July 1950

On July 23, the North Korean People's Army (KPA) 2nd Division with the 4th Rifle Regiment (4RR) on point marched to the South Korean town of Hwanggan to secure the Seoul-Pusan highway. That night, a platoon of the US 27th Infantry Regiment ambushed a vanguard of the 4RR, halting their advance. After a month of success in fighting the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, this was the first engagement between the KPA 2nd Division and US military forces.

The next morning, supported by eight Soviet-made T34 tanks, 4RR conducted a frontal attack against the US 27th Infantry. Meeting stiff resistance, the tank formation broke the US defense when elements of the 4RR conducted a coordinated flank attack. The 4RR lost six of the eight tanks to ground combat and US close air support, but forced the US 27th Infantry to withdraw.

On the morning of July 25, the 4RR was joined by a battalion of the KPA 6RR and together they conducted a double envelopment against former positions of the US 27th Infantry. US forces engaged the 4RR and 6RR with intense fire from new positions, and foiled the envelopment.

On July 26, the KPA 2nd Division renewed frontal attacks to exploit gaps in the US defense where the US 27th Infantry tied into the US 7th Cavalry Regiment line. Under threat of envelopment, the battered US 27th Infantry withdrew into the defenses of the US 25th Division on July 28.

RTA forces flexibly flow from frontal attack, to flanking attack, to envelopment. RTA experience informs them that dogged persistence to offense will ultimately end in their victory.

(Offensive Operations) III. Small Unit Tactics

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), chap. 5, and Sharp, Soviet Infantry Tactic in World War II, chap. 3, 8 and 13.

I. Small-Unit Offensive Tactics

The offense is the default mode of operations for the RTA. It is the means by which the RTA imposes its will upon an enemy. Considerable resources are given to units that are conducting offensive actions, all the more true if that unit is appreciating significant gain within the battlespace.

RTA small-unit offensive operations may be directed against an enemy force, terrain, or enemy resources such as facilities or materiel supplies as the main objective.

Furthermore, RTA offensive action may come in the form of a detailed and deliberate attack against fortified enemy positions, or it may come in the form of a movement to contact against a dispersed enemy force that is conducting a mobile defense or retrograde.

Whichever the case, RTA small units almost invariably employ classic "hammer and anvil" tactics to trap the enemy objective between two or more RTA forces.

Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.

II. Hammer & Anvil Attack

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics, chap. 5.

The RTA divides its force depending on the nature of the enemy objective. It may maintain both elements as mounted mechanized forces, or it may dismount the infantry as a light force and maintain the armored vehicles as a separate, heavy bronegruppa force.



Ref: Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, p. 11 and FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army, p. 2-8. The hammer and anvil involves a mobile force that pushes the enemy back against prepared fighting positions conducting attack-by-fire into the engagement area.

Ref: Parallel ambush is the preference of RTA forces. In this example a third element (near) closes off the enemy's path, trapping them in the low ground below. Teams have set into position and coordinated their sectors of fire. Work priorities include camouflage next. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, map 39. (Courtesy of of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

As a rule of thumb, RTA daytime ambushes on dismounted enemy personnel are between 50m and 100m, terrain permitting. Nighttime ambushes on dismounted enemy are closer, typically between 10m and 50m, visibility permitting.

RTA daytime ambushes on a light armored enemy force are generally prescribed at 200m. And daytime ambushes on heavily armored enemy forces are common at 300m and farther, again terrain permitting.

Nighttime ambushes on vehicle convoys are rare because few of the appropriate weapon systems have reliable night vision sights. However there are notable exceptions, such as on brightly moonlit nights and in terrain where enemy armored formations are easily canalized.

Target Type	Effective Weapon	Optimal Range
Enemy Personnel	Light & Medium Machinegun	100m – 400m
	Rifle & Carbine	25m – 200m
	Anti-Personnel Mine	10m – 50m
Light Armor Vehicles	Medium & Heavy Machinegun	200m – 800m
	Rocket Propelled Grenade	200m – 400m
	Grenade Launcher	50m – 300m
Heavy Armor Vehicles	Guided Missile	300m – 1500m
	Rocket Propelled Grenade	200m – 400m
	Anti-Tank Mine	0m

Chap 3

Defensive Operations

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), chap. 6.

I. The Role and Nature of the Defense

Soviets consider the offensive as the only means to achieve decisive victory. However, defensive doctrine has not been totally overlooked. Grounded in the histories of World War II and the great defensive battles of Stalingrad, Moscow, and Kursk, the Soviets have developed a doctrine that is mindful of recent technological developments such as ATGMs and nuclear weapons. Stated reasons for assuming the defense are-

- To consolidate gains
- To await additional resources when temporarily halted by the enemy during the course of an offensive
- To protect the flanks of a formation or a seacoast
- To repulse an enemy counterthrust
- To regroup after severe losses suffered from nuclear weapons
- To free resources for other units that are on the offensive
- To await logistic support

Defensive Operations

In most of these cases, the defense is temporary and leads to the resumption of the offense. The two major forms of the defense are the prepared defense and the hasty defense (sometimes called "defense in the course of the offense"). A hasty defense may turn into a prepared defense if conditions and availability of resources do not favor resuming the offense in that sector.

The defense at front and army levels may involve the entire formation during the initial stage of hostility where an enemy attacks across international borders, or in a sector where no offensive action is planned. Usually only part of the formation is on the defense while the rest takes offensive action.

During World War II, entire theaters were on the defense. Extremely dense defenses sometimes were developed, consisting of three or more static defensive belts with the majority of the combat forces deployed in the first defensive belt.

Battle of Laoshan, April-July 1984 (Historical Vignette)

(U.S. Central Intelligence Agency map.)

The battle of Laoshan occurred April-July 1984. Five years earlier in 1979, China sent an invading force of 250,000 troops from the People's Liberation Army (PLA) into the northern border regions of Vietnam. The Sino-Vietnamese War was an effort by China to punish Vietnam for military excursions into Cambodia that sought to crush the Khmer Rouge. While the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) tactically outperformed the PLA, which had not seen direct combat since the Korean War some 26 years earlier, both nations claimed victory. However, both suffered significant battlefield and economic losses.

Vietnam did not withdraw PAVN forces from Cambodia. PAVN forces sustained military action against the Khmer Rouge. Tensions between Vietnam and China continued to deteriorate.

In April 1984, Chinese PLA fired more than 60,000 artillery rounds into 16 provincial districts along the northern Vietnamese borders. The PLA also conducted multiple battalion-size raids as feign attacks, while focusing their decisive effort on eight hilltops of the Laoshan mountain range along the border of the two hostile nations. Unlike the Sino-Vietnamese War five years earlier, this battle would see significant use of dismounted combat by both Red Team Armies.

In the last days of April, the Chinese PLA launched an attack into the Laoshan mountains. The eight selected hilltops were covered in mature jungle forests with steep cliffs to the south overlooking the meeting of the Thanh Thuy River and Lo River, making counterattacks by the PAVN very difficult. The initial attacks were spearheaded by the 40th Infantry Division of the 14th PLA, and the 49th Infantry Division of the 16th PLA. More PLA divisions quickly followed.

For two weeks, the Laoshan mountains were hotly contested in battle, with the eight hilltops changing ownership numerous times. By the middle of May, the Chinese PLA appeared solidly in control of the mountain range with 29 strongpoints established. PAVN forces conducted counterattacks in mid-June and mid-July. Again, these attacks were primarily infantry divisions supported by artillery regiments, but the PLA repelled the PAVN to retain control of the high ground with four infantry divisions and two artillery divisions. Only after victory was secured did the Chinese send in two PLA tank regiments in supporting roles.

Casualties on both sides were substantially lighter than during the Sino-Vietnamese War that saw each military lose more than 10,000 troops killed and another 30,000 wounded in just four weeks of fighting. Still, the Chinese admitted to losses of 1,003 PLA troops killed in action, with an estimated 3,000 wounded in the five-week Battle of Laoshan. The Vietnamese government censored PAVN losses, but they were estimated to be about 2,600 troops killed in action and another 5,000 wounded in five weeks of ground warfare in the densely wooded mountains.

C. Establish the Tactical Outpost

The tactical outpost is established in nearly identical manner as the strongpoint defense, though admittedly there exist a few unique considerations for a tactical outpost.

RTA doctrine does not view tactical outposts and strongpoint defense as synonymous. Tactical outposts are thought of in terms of operationally offensive action, further blurring the line of defense and offense. Tactical outposts are used to control key terrain, supply routes, and even to influence civilian population traffic. (Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

1. The company commander is tasked to an outpost within the higher command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). Once on location, the commander seeks the most defensible position within the immediate surroundings, locating the headquarters section plus a reserve force in the center of the outpost.

2. The commander assigns all three platoons a sector within the company outpost, typically shaping either a triangular or circular perimeter around the company strongpoint. Platoon commanders quickly assess the terrain and locate their platoon strongpoints on the most defensible position. They too cascade their squads in the most suitable manner to defend the platoon's sector of the outpost.

3. Sectors of fire are next assigned to each platoon, each squad, and each fighting position. Subunit commanders create sector sketches to ensure the company commander's intent has been satisfied. In doing so, defilades and natural obstacles forward of each platoon are identified. From this information the commander will create a plan to employ engineer resources.

4. Fighting positions and trench works are dug. The time allotted for construction of fighting positions and vehicle redoubts are carefully calculated through algorithm worksheets. Engineer entrenching assets make this work much quicker.

5. As the fighting positions are being completed, wire obstacles and flares are emplaced without delay. Wire obstacles serve as the perimeter protective barricade, and flares serve as an early warning system for enemy attack. Aside from the fighting positions that protect the troops from direct and indirect enemy fires, the wire obstacles and flares form the mainstay of the outpost's perimeter defense.

6. Indirect fires are coordinated and registered for nearby dominant terrain, defilades and high-speed avenues of approach to the tactical outpost. The company commander must coordinate with battalion and regiment for these assets.

7. Minefields are coordinated with regiment or division engineers. Mines serve to further protect avenues of approach and defilades along the outpost's defenses.

8. External positions such as OP and checkpoints (CKP) are established to monitor and control all traffic into and out of the tactical outpost's AOR.

Chap 4 Specialized Warfare

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), introduction and chaps 2 to 4.

The term "specialized warfare," used in the title of this FM, is intended to be an abbreviated, collective description of combat actions which, in US terminology, may be described as "special operations" or "operations in special conditions." These are arbitrary categorizations used only to describe combatactions other than those general forms of Soviet ground forces operations and tactics discussed in FM 100-2-1. Use of the term "special" does not imply that the combat actions discussed in this FM represent abnormal forms of operations or tactics. They are all an integral part of Soviet military doctrine. Special operations include airborne, heliborne,and amphibious operations, and unconventional warfare in the enemy rear.

Specialized Warfare

I. Airborne Operations

During World War II, the Soviets gained some experience with airborne operations in combat. Because they lacked the transport aircraft required for large-scale operations. they employed the airborne troops mainly as infantry. Since the war, the Soviets have completely reequipped their large airborne force and built a large fleet of transport aircraft to support it. Airborne units played key roles in Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979). The airborne force currently consists of multiple divisions.

Heliborne operations are relatively new to the Soviets. They have built an impressive fleet of transport and gunship helicopters and have trained assault troops. However, until the Afghanistan intervention, they lacked actual combat experience with this type of operation. Motorized rifle or airborne troops or an air assault brigade assigned to a front, could conduct heliborne operations.

See pp. 4-3 to 4-6 for further discussion.

Chap 4

(Specialized Warfare)
II. Heliborne Operations

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), chap 3.

Heliborne regiments are essentially the only "light" infantry regiments of the RTA. They have no integral armored vehicles because too few helicopters have such lift capability. And while heliborne regiments can lift their artillery assets, they rarely do. Instead, heliborne units remain within the umbrella of fires from a larger unit to benefit from artillery, armor, and air defense support.

RTA heliborne units offer lightning strikes and tactical flexibility to their parent organization. RTA reconnaissance battalions are often assigned helicopter capabilities. Such units achieve peer status with the best militaries across the globe.

RTA heliborne formations are limited in numbers. Relatively slow speeds and altitude limitations leave them incredibly vulnerable to enemy air defense fires, minimizing the size, scope and frequency of heliborne operations.

Given the multi-mission flexibility of rotary wing aircraft – fast attack, observation, air lift supply, medical evacuation – RTA commanders are reluctant to allocate helicopters to high risk missions outside the umbrella of RTA artillery and air defense support.

[Note: The type of artillery (engagement range) determines the maximum possible distance of the heliborne objective.]

I. Preparation of Heliborne Forces

While in the past the short requirement of training in heliborne operations meant that virtually any RTA unit might be temporarily divorced from its armored vehicles to conduct heliborne operations; modern RTA forces select heliborne units on a competitive basis. The various capabilities and considerable expense of helicopter assets means only elite forces are assigned to RTA heliborne operations.

Heliborne units are virtually the only light infantry assets known to RTA forces, with the rare exception of alpine units. In special circumstances vehicles are assigned to heliborne units. Yet they are light skinned trucks and motorcycles that serve as logistic carriers and reconnaissance platforms, not as attack vehicles.

This means that while training unique to the helicopter is achieved in literally just a half day, the emphasis on dismounted patrolling operations requires specialized equipment and ongoing tactical training that can take months to complete.



RTA heliborne operations shape ground-based attacks by seizing key terrain or facilities within the umbrella of support of the decisive action. In this illustration a heliborne battalion is dispatched to the primary objective – to secure a bridgehead. Another heliborne rifle company is tasked to secure a secondary bridgehead.

II. Heliborne Forces in the Offense

RTA heliborne attack doctrine in practice suggests that operations are almost invariably conducted within artillery range of the principle regiment or division. In some cases heliborne units have airlifted their artillery, engineer, and air defense assets deep into enemy territory to create their own integral umbrella of support, very similar to airborne units. However, this is indeed rare.

Furthermore, RTA heliborne units are typically company or battalion-size missions in part due to the limited number of available helicopters. These units would not have the offensive power or force protection of a full regiment or division. Operations outside the umbrella of support of the principle unit leave heliborne forces extremely vulnerable to enemy fires and counterattack.

Battle of Jijiga, March 1978 (Historical Vignette)

After an aggressive and highly successful invasion by the Somali National Army (SNA) into the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in mid-1977, the Soviet Union entered the conflict on the side of Ethiopia. The contribution of war goods, training by military advisors, and combat troops from the Soviets, Cuba, and Yemen turned the tide of the Ogaden War to Ethiopia later that year.

(Shutterstock.com)

Nonetheless by late January 1978, SNA forces launched another attack against a reinforced Soviet-led coalition of communist militaries at the city of Harar. Although brilliantly simplistic in plan, the Somali forces were checked by the overwhelming numbers of Ethiopian defenders in Harar, backed by Cuban artillery and two Yemeni tank brigades. The SNA were in full retreat.

The communist coalition pursued the retreating Somalis in the last days of January and into early March, until the SNA established a defense in the Marda Pass, a mountainous region that presented the only feasibly ground approach to the town of Jijiga. Jijiga had quickly fallen to the SNA just six months earlier, and now remained a strong point bastion for Somali forces.

The Ethiopian 69th Brigade backed by Cuban artillery led the attack against the SNA holed up at the Marda Pass. The 69th Brigade infiltrated into the mountains and conducted frontal attacks, losing all but about 500 troops of its original numbers, but even then the 69th continued to press the Somalis in battle from the west. Indeed, this distraction allowed the Ethiopian 10th Infantry Division, along with the Cuban 3rd Mechanized Infantry Brigade in air-transportable BMD to be air assaulted by Soviet Mi-8 heavy lift helicopters to the northeast of Jijiga. This air assault envelopment caught Somali forces in a classic hammer and anvil pincer.

On March 4, the final attack of Jijiga began. The 10th Division attacked the Somali stronghold town of Jijiga with heavy artillery barrage and air bombardment. Simultaneously, the Ethiopian 75th Brigade and 1st Para Commando Brigade pressed eastward to capture the Marda Pass. The Somalis had fought bravely for three days against overwhelming numbers, but they could hold no longer. With half their forces lost, the SNA conducted a desperate retreat into Somalia.

Jijiga fell on March 5 to the Soviet-led communist coalition. By March 9, the Somali government announced a withdraw of all Somali forces in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.

Chap 5

Tactical Enabling Tasks

Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Aug '12), ADRP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Aug '12) and FM 3-90-2 Reconnaissance, Security and Tactical Enabling Tasks (Mar '13).

The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are reduced to a series of disconnected and unfocused actions.

Tactical Enabling Tasks

Tactical Enabling Tasks

Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the conduct of decisive action. Tactical enabling tasks are usually shaping or sustaining. They may be decisive in the conduct of stability tasks. Tactical enabling tasks include tasks such as reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement operations, and urban operations.

Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist; tactical enabling tasks; special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments; patrols & patrolling.

A. Assault Crossing from the March

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), pp. 6-3 to 6-7.

An assault crossing from the march is conducted with forces moving toward the river in dispersed, normally march, formation, across a wide frontage, at top speed. Forward detachments or airborne or heliborne forces may seize favorable crossing sites in advance. All measures are taken to insure that crossing is conducted as swiftly as possible and that the offen-sive is continued on the opposite shore.

A decision to conduct a crossing from the march is made as early as possible to allow maximum time for appropriate organization of forces and crossing equipment, and for reconnaissance of crossing sites.

The Soviets prefer crossing sites with gently sloping banks, fords, and a bend towards the attackers. Soviet commanders use maps, aerial photographs, engineer and combat patrols, radar, signal, and human intelligence to determine the following:

- River width, depth, and current
- Entry and exit gradients
- Composition of river bottom
- Bank composition and height
- Obstacles on banks
- Approach and exit routes
- Critical terrain features overlooking both banks
- Possible fording, ferrying, bridging, and snorkeling sites
- Information on enemy defenses

The number of reconnaissance patrols depends on the width of the river and the number of required crossing sites; patrols can vary from squad to platoon size. Reconnaissance patrols operate up to 50 kilometers forward of a division's main body.

Engineer reconnaissance units are equipped with tracked amphibians, scout cars, or APCs. They often mount a profilograph (a device used to determine width and depth of rivers) or the newer echo depth finder. Although such equipment significantly reduces exposure and reconnaissance time, it appears that most Soviet engineers use less sophisticated gear-a variety of bottom probes, range finders, and hydro-metric propellers or simply floats of some type and a stopwatch for measuring velocity. A sapper platoon assigned a reconnaissance mission would also typically have six mine detectors, grapnels with cables, radiation detectors, and light diving equipment.

Armored personnel carriers, preferably BMPs, make a rapid amphibious crossing to seize a bridgehead on the far shore. Their crossing normally is covered by smoke and supported from the rear shore by all available fires. Heliborne or, less probably, airborne forces, may be used to seize and hold a bridgehead on the far shore. Once the bridgehead is established, tanks cross by ferry, by fording, or by snorkeling. Artillery and other combat support equipment crosses on tracked amphihians. Later, tactical bridging is emplaced for follow-on forces.

The Soviets consider units engaged in a river crossing to be especially vulnerable to enemy aviation. They emphasize the need for tactical air defense at river crossing sites before a crossing is attempted. In some tactical situations they may choose to move part of their air defense assets across first to maximize the range of these weapons in protecting subsequent units making the crossing. Placement and movement sequence of air defense assets will vary as the Soviet commander assesses each new tactical situation.

Subunits acting as forward detachments advance as quickly as possible to the river, by-passing enemy forces whenever possible, to seize near-shore crossing sites or to swim the river to seize a far-shore bridgehead. A forward detachment differs from an advance guard, which has the responsibility of clearing a route for advancement of its main force. Forward detachments attempt to slip through enemy lines to force and hold crossing sites. Advance guards follow and fight through any enemy encountered to make way for the main forces.

Based on reconnaissance, the Soviet commander organizes his unit to insure the most expedient crossing and continuation of the offense. The Soviets stress that tactical air support is more critical during river crossing operations than during other types of ground operations.

A motorized rifle battalion acting as a forward detachment usually is reinforced with a tank company, an artillery battalion, ferry and tracked amphibians, and air defense, anti-tank, and chemical defense subunits ranging from squad to company size. When acting as a forward detachment a motorized rifle battalion would be 2 or 3 hours in front of the main body.

Advance guards destroy enemy forces to insure unhindered advance by the main force. As they approach the water barrier, advance guards exploit the success of forward detachments or air landed elements, forcing the obstacle from the march and developing the attack into the depth of enemy defenses when possible.

Depending on the tactical situation, a division crosses a major waterbarrier with one, two, or three regiments in the first echelon in a zone 20 to 30 kilometers wide. A division's combat elements can cross a 200-meter-aide river in approximately 5 or 6 hours, using equipment organic to the division. If reconnaissance and site preparation time is included, a division's total crossing time may approximate 9 hours. A division might receive reinforcement from army or front engineer units.

The Soviets believe river crossings can be managed successfully with equipment presently organic to their maneuver units. However, some Soviet theorists express concern that present levels may prove inadequate to conduct successive crossings of two or more major water obstacles. One way to solve this problem is to leapfrog divisions. Army-and front-level engineer units have augmentation potential sufficient to establish a significant number of ponton bridges.

Combat bridging is further supplemented by LOC sectional bridging. According to Soviet estimates, LOC bridging can be erected by road construction troops in as little as 8 hours after the initial assault crossing. It is left in place for subsequent use by front-level units.

(Tactical Enabling Tasks)
IV. Relief in Place

Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics, p. 6-11, and Frasche, The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion, chap. 7, fig. 67.

As defined by U.S. military doctrine, a relief in place is an operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. A commander conducts a relief in place as part of a larger operation, primarily to maintain the combat effectiveness of committed units. A relief in place may also be conducted--

- To reorganize, reconstitute, or re-equip a unit that has sustained heavy losses
- To rest units that have conducted sustained operations
- To establish the security force or the detachment left in contact (DLIC) during a withdrawal operation
- To allow the relieved unit to conduct another operation

RTA forces have employed Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority (RIP/TOA) in every major conflict. Yet, as noted earlier, for smaller conflicts of short duration there has been little attention paid to RIP/TOA and the nuanced demands of such coordination is often lost or overlooked.

From regiment commander to platoon leader, each must thoroughly brief their subunit leaders. Here a platoon commander briefs his squad leaders on how the unit will conduct the RIP/TOA of a sister platoon. (Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

Russian Annexation of Crimea, February-March 2014 (Historical Vignette)

The Viktor Yanukovych government of Ukraine had been duly elected in 2010 by a populous largely sympathetic to Russia. However, Yanukovych's close ties with Russia soon offended much of the Ukrainian population, and after many months of violent protests, Yanukovych was ousted and fled for strong pro-Russian sympathies in eastern Ukraine. The Ukrainian parliament voted to restore the 2004 Constitution of Ukraine in Yanukovych's absence.

Demonstration against Putin's intervention in Crimea Mar 9, 2014 (Shutterstock.com).

Russia grew concerned over the large Ukrainian navy and Russian access to warm water ports of the Crimean Peninsula in the Black Sea. On February 20, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the Russian military into Crimea. This military annex of sovereign Ukrainian territory was largely supported by the pro-Russian populous of Crimea, and in fact within days almost half of the Ukrainian forces in Crimea had defected to the Russian side of the conflict.

Led by reconnaissance units, masked Russian soldiers and unmarked vehicles conducted large scale troop movements and convoy operations into Crimea. Checkpoint networks were quickly established to cordon Ukrainian military posts. For those Ukrainian military defecting units, the Russians conducted relief in place. Follow-on Russian forces conducted numerous passage of lines as they surrounded and secured Ukrainian strongholds.

Russia's annexation of Crimea was swift and overwhelming. Casualties were surprisingly low, amounting to just 1 Russian soldier killed and 2 Ukrainian soldiers killed in light skirmishes. Russian forces seized the Supreme Council of Crimea and dissolved the Council. Russians replaced the Council with pro-Russian members. The Supreme Council then held a vote to declare the Republic of Crimea an independent and sovereign nation. Russia recognized Crimea's status as an independent nation, and on March 16 the Supreme Council held a referendum with a majority vote for the Republic of Crimea to join the Russian Federation. On March 18, the Republic of Crimea and the Russian Federation signed a treaty at the Kremlin.

Russia's annexation of Crimea had been planned for months, if not for years. The political unrest within Ukraine that unseated the pro-Russian Yanukovych government subsequently opened the door of opportunity for Putin's government to respond. They did so under the pretense of coming to the aid of the ethnic Russian people of Crimea.

Chap 6

Small Unit Drills

Ref: SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., The Lightning Press, chap. 1.

I. The Tactical Level of War (U.S. Doctrine)

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (CJCSM 5120.01A). The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement, movement, and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to enemy forces to achieve assigned objectives.

Tactical operations always require judgment and adaptation to the unique circumstances of a specific situation. Techniques and procedures are established patterns that can be applied repeatedly with little or no judgment in a variety of circumstances. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and staffs with a set of tools to use in developing the solution to a tactical problem.

Individuals, Crews, and Small Units

Individuals, crews, and small units act at the tactical level. At times, their actions may produce strategic or operational effects. However, this does not mean these elements are acting at the strategic or operational level. Actions are not strategic unless they contribute directly to achieving the strategic end state. Similarly, actions are considered

2. Actions on Contact

Mounted - When halted for any reason, vehicles assume a herringbone formation by alternating the primary direction of the vehicle slightly left or right and pulling to the shoulder of the road.

Upon order of the platoon commander, squads vehicles may be directed to assume an echelon front, left or right of the column and dismount to fend off an enemy attack, to avoid enemy indirect fires, or to pull security for details such as engineer road repair and vehicle maintenance and recovery. In the case of indirect fires, the troops may remain buttoned up within the armored vehicles, depending on the situation.



Ref: The herringbone is the default formation for armored column halts. However, echelon right and echelon left drills are employed to react to enemy contact or when used in overwatch. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain, vignette 38 pp. 145-147.

The point and rear guards maintain their positions. They await further order of the platoon commander and may be recalled immediately to counterattack an enemy force.

Dismounted – When halted for any reason, troops move immediately to the side of the road alternating left and right between individual troops. Troops take a knee to lower their profile and await further order.



Upon order of the platoon commander, squads may be directed to assume overwatch positions to the most immediately defendable terrain to fend off an enemy attack or to avoid enemy indirect fires.

The point and rear guards maintain their positions. They await further order of the platoon commander and may be recalled immediately to counterattack an enemy force.

C. The Rifle Squad

A mounted squad does not dismount a front or rear guard, and instead remains as single unit for maneuver. Squads mounted in armored vehicles never operate independently from their platoon. As such, this section discusses dismounted squad drill only.

With only 8 to 10 troops, the dismounted rifle squad cannot deploy both a weapon crew forward and behind its formation. The squad leader is left with two options, either he requests more troops from the platoon for the sake of force protection, or he foregoes the rear guard. In the latter case only a point guard is deployed.

The point security team assumes a wedge formation, while the rest of the squad walks in column or double column. Rear security also forms a reverse wedge when employed. (Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

1. Array the Squad

The point guard and rear guard, when used, are deployed no farther than the squad's integral firepower can support. In open terrain and during daylight hours a dismounted squad generally sends the guard a distance no greater than 400 meters. More commonly in urban, mountainous or forested terrain the squad point and rear guards maintain a distance of 30 to 50 meters from the squad main body. And in periods of darkness or limited visibility, the point and rear guards may be as little as 10 meters away.

2. Actions on Contact

Squad Halt – When the dismounted squad is halted for any reason, all troops stop and lower their profile by going to knee and facing left or right into their prescribed sectors of fire. When halted longer than three minutes, or upon order, all troops move two paces out from their kneeling position and toward their prescribed sector of fire, and go prone.

Point and rear guard merely hold their current positions and go prone. This creates a cigar-shaped 360-degree security position for long term halts. The cigar-shaped security position is also suitable for assault positions and Objective Rally Points (ORP).

When halted troops kneel. After three minutes or as ordered, they'll form a 360⁰ security halt. (Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

A. Dismount Front

When the squad leader wants to place firepower forward, he issues the order to dismount front.

1. Upon vehicle halt, the leader yells, “All Clear!”
2. The squad visually confirms that the door is clear for opening and yells “All Clear!”
3. Either the driver or nearest troop disconnects the rear door latch.
4. The squad leader yells, “Dismount Front!”
5. The squad repeats, “Dismount Front!” and begins to move in two files out the rear door.
6. The squad leader exits the vehicle and positions to the immediate left or right of the door, depending on his preference. The next troop (deputy leader or machinegunner) positions to the opposite side of the door. Both assume a weapons-up overwatch position and may begin engaging enemy targets.
7. The next two troops follow out the rear door in a fluid motion and assume a prone position to the immediate flanks of the vehicle and orient their fires forward.
8. All subsequent troops exit the rear of the vehicle following in this fluid manner until they form online extending out both flanks of the vehicle.
9. With troops online, the squad leader can now move the dismounted squad to the front, firing and bounding in concert while the bronegruppa provides cover and suppressive fires against the enemy.



Ref: Frasche, The Soviet Motorized Rifle Battalion, chap. 8, fig. 92. As a general rule of thumb, the mounted RTA force does not dismount until it is upon its objective. It then executes a dismount drill – in this illustration a Dismount Front. (Courtesy of Haejung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

Chap 7

Urban & Regional Environments

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), chap 7 to 10.

Army doctrine addresses five regional environments: desert, cold, temperate, mountain, and jungle. Another area of special consideration involves urban areas*.

Relative Units of Control, Action & Maneuver

	Unit of Control	Unit of Action	Unit of Maneuver	Relative Command & Control
Desert Region	JTF	BDE	BN/CO	Decreasing Unit Size
Cold Region	BDE	BN	CO/PLT	
Temperate Region	BDE	BN	CO/PLT	
Urban Area	BN	CO	PLT/SQD	
Mountain Region	BN	CO	PLT/SQD	
Jungle Region	CO	PLT	SQD/TM	Increasing Unit Autonomy

I. Urban Operations

The continued trend worldwide of urban growth and the shift of populations from rural to urban areas continues to affect Army operations. The urban environment, consisting of complex terrain, dense populations, and integrated infrastructures, is the predominant operational environment in which Army forces currently operate. *ATTP 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain (Jun '11)*, establishes doctrine for combined arms operations in urban terrain for the brigade combat team (BCT) and battalion/squadron commanders and staffs, company/troop commanders, small-unit leaders, and individual Soldiers.

See pp. 7-3 to 7-6.

II. Mountain Operations

With approximately 38 percent of the world's landmass classified as mountains, the Army must be prepared to deter conflict, resist coercion, and defeat aggression in mountains as in other areas. Throughout the course of history, armies have been significantly affected by the requirement to fight in mountains. *ATP 3-90.97, Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations (Apr '16)*, describes the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the U.S. Army uses to fight in mountainous regions. It provides key information and considerations for commanders and staffs regard-

Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.

ing how mountains affect personnel, equipment, and operations. It also assists them in planning, preparing, and executing operations, battles, and engagements in a mountainous environment. Army units do not routinely train for operations in a mountainous environment. The jungle environment includes densely forested areas, grasslands, cultivated areas, and swamps. Jungles are classified as primary or secondary jungles based on the terrain and vegetation.

See pp. 7-7 to 7-10.

III. Desert Operations

Arid regions make up about one-third of the earth's land surface, a higher percentage than that of any other climate. Desert operations demand adaptation to the environment and to the limitations imposed by terrain and climate. Success depends on the an appreciation of the effects of the arid conditions on Soldiers, on equipment and facilities, and on combat and support operations. *FM 90-3/FMFM 7-27, Desert Operations (Aug '93)*, is the Army and Marine Corps' manual for desert operations. It is the key reference for commanders and staff regarding how desert affects personnel, equipment, and operations. It will assist them in planning and conducting combat operations in desert environments.

See pp. 7-11 to 7-14

IV. Cold Region Operations

When conducting military operations in cold regions, leaders, Soldiers, and Marines must plan to fight two enemies: the cold and the opposing force. Despite the difficulties that cold regions pose, there are armies that have prepared for and can conduct large-scale, sustained operations in cold environments. In contrast, few U.S. Army units or personnel have trained extensively in cold region operations. *ATP 3-90.97, Mountain Warfare and Cold Weather Operations (Apr '16)*, is the Army's doctrinal publication for operations in the cold region environment. This manual will enable leaders, Soldiers, and Marines to accurately describe cold region environments, their effects on military equipment, impacts these environments have on personnel, and most importantly, how to employ the elements of combat power in cold region environments. It provides the conceptual framework for conventional forces to conduct cold region operations at operational and tactical levels.

See pp. 7-15 to 7-18.

* Jungle Operations

Jungles, in their various forms, are common in tropical areas of the world—mainly Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The climate in jungles varies with location. Close to the equator, all seasons are nearly alike, with rains throughout the year; farther from the equator, especially in India and Southeast Asia, jungles have distinct wet (monsoon) and dry seasons. Both zones have high temperatures (averaging 78 to 95+ degrees Fahrenheit), heavy rainfall (as much as 1,000 centimeters [400+ inches] annually), and high humidity (90 percent) throughout the year. Severe weather also has an impact on tactical operations in the jungle. *FM 90-5, Jungle Operations (Aug '93)*, is the Army's field manual on jungle operations.

(Urban & Regional Environments)
I. Urban Operations

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), chap 10.

Red Team Army (RTA) doctrine readily anticipates urban warfare as the norm, and not the exception. In fact, armed conflict can be viewed through RTA doctrine as the conquest of one population center after another, in sequence.

Nowhere does RTA doctrine codify rules of engagement for urban operations. However historically speaking, the rules of engagement for RTA forces operating in urban areas suggest an inverse correlation with regard to civil consideration. The correla-



RTA doctrine for urban operations is battle-proven. In defense strongpoint positions make excellent use of cover, concealment, and canalized approaches. The regiment places two battalions forward and holds one in reserve. In offense each regiment conducts a movement to contact with the reconnaissance company as a forward vanguard. RTA forces use a synchronous combination of tank, mechanized infantry and artillery for the main attack and shaping attacks. An airborne regiment is vertically inserted to form blocking positions in the enemy's rear area.

(Urban & Regional Environments) IV. Cold Wx Operations

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), chap 9.

Depending on their location, many Red Team Armies (RTA) are well suited to military operations in extreme cold environments. Much of Russia as well as parts of China and North Korea experience arctic conditions during the year, and so these forces are compelled to master cold region operations.

The RTA emphasis on the armored vehicle as the core of the fighting unit means that RTA forces can be kept reasonably warm by vehicle heaters while traversing otherwise difficult terrain in forbidding weather conditions.

However, cold region operations come with numerous and significant limitations. Extreme cold temperatures present a unique danger to humans and equipment. There is greater demand for logistical support, placing greater value on roadways and railways from airports and seaports.

Cold regions are remarkably sparse in human population. Townships are small in size and number. They are often centered on seaports, airports, train depots, or critical road junctions. This means that cold region operations are often focused on capturing or defending townships – which also offer protection from the elements.

I. Impact on Maneuver, Fire Support & Command

Maneuver

RTA forces tend to be quite capable in cold regions; yet ideal maneuver conditions are significantly limited to specific seasons with solid permafrost ground and roughly 30cm (12in) or less depth of snow.

Tracked vehicles can navigate snow as deep as 1.5 meters (58in) reasonably well. Yet in such deep snow dismounted troops cannot keep up with tracked vehicles. In that case the troops must be towed in a skijoring technique leaving them vulnerable

to enemy fires, or they must complete the entire assault while still inside their tracked vehicles, unable to effectively employ their small arm weapon systems.

If the weather is too warm, the open terrain turns into a grassland marsh that is impassable for most tracked or wheeled vehicles. Even foot patrols can get stuck in the grassland marshes.



Cold region operations are characterized as a waiting game interrupted by brief moments of lightning fast strikes when weather conditions permit. Main supply routes and port cities are key assets in cold regions. The defense is densely formed into an inverted stronghold with 1/3rd of the force on the line while 2/3rds are kept warm as a ready reserve in tents or buildings. The defense is maintained even during offensive actions. Offensive action is similarly densely formed due to impeded maneuverability and shorter ranges of fire for weapons systems.

Fire Support

Close air support is advantageous in cold regions, yet "peer" enemies place as much emphasis on a multiple-layered umbrella of air defense – the same as RTA forces in cold region operations. If so, close air support may not be regularly available.

Artillery ranges and rates of fire are impacted in extreme cold temperatures. Additionally the effect of artillery is reduced because deep snow absorbs much of the shrapnel and directs the bursting radius upward. Artillery bombardment requires more rounds to destroy a target.

Chap 8

(Rear Area Operations & Logistics)
I. The Rear Area

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), chap 12.

I. The Rear Area

The Soviet concept of the "rear area" visualizes modern war in an unprecedented spatial scope. This rear area concept stretches from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) back to the national capital.

To the Soviets, there are two aspects of the rear area concept: broad and narrow. The broad aspect includes the entire country, its population, economy, government, and its political structure. It is the production base for necessary war materiel, the mobilization base for personnel replacements, and the control center for the complete war effort. The narrow aspect includes the activities of all military units that supply technical, materiel, and medical support to combat forces in established theaters of military operations (TVD).

Soviet rear area support has a dual task: peacetime support and wartime support. In peacetime, rear area support maintains the Soviet armed forces in a high state of preparedness for commitment on short notice. Soviet military doctrine requires that the armed forces and the entire population constantly be prepared for the sudden outbreak of a major war. In wartime, rear area support provides technical, materiel, and medical support to forces engaged in combat. The Soviets think a major war in Europe is likely to be a short highly intense conflict with conventional or nuclear weapons disrupting the flow of service support. They expect logistic requirements to be quite large when their offensive is in the initial stage. After the penetration, logistic requirements will lessen because attacking forces will encounter less organized resistance deep in the enemy's rear.

II. Rear Area Forces

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), p. 14-1 to 14-3.

KGB Troops

Besides its major role in intelligence activities, the Committee for State Security (KGB) is responsible for border security and special communications. In the event of an enemy invasion, the KGB border guard detachments would fight delaying actions until relieved by ground forces units. Conversely, during a Soviet offensive, border guard missions would include securing the operational armies' rear, conducting counterespionage, forestalling desertions, thwarting deep enemy penetrations, and conducting mop-up operations in the rear area.

MVD Troops

Interior troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) are primarily responsible for maintaining domestic security. Missions in the civilian sector include criminal investigation, motor vehicle inspectionand control, and issuance of visas. In wartime, they also have the missions to suppress insurrection, to conduct counterespionage, and to transport prisoners.

KGB and MVD troops are organized, equipped, and trained much the same as Soviet ground forces, but special attention is given to security functions. In general, KGB and MVD troops are considered to be extremely reliable and are very well trained.

Military Districts

Although not still applicable, the Soviet Union was divided into 16 Soviet military districts. The 16 Soviet military districts were administrative commands which did not correspond to the political boundaries of the Soviet Union's 15 republics. In wartime, the assets of many military districts probably would be organized into fronts, providing both the command and control structure and units for combat operations.

Military activity within a military district continues, however, even when troop units are deployed elsewhere. Military installations such as schools and garrisons, and operations such as logistics and communications would continue to function, and in certain instances, even be augmented.

Military district mobilization plans cover not only units, installations, and activities of the district, but also the call-up of reserves.Reserve call-up is selective to permit orderly activation and to insure an adequate labor force for critical civilian occupations. Civil defense activities also are conducted through the military district command structure.

Civil Defense

Overall civil defense of the Soviet Union is directed by a Deputy Minister of Defense. Civil defense troops, numbering approximately 40,000, are a branch of the Soviet military under the command of the Chief of Civil Defense. They are subordinate to deputy commanders for civil defense in the 16 military districts. Most civil defense efforts involve organization and training for survival, rescue, repair, and restoration. The intent is to involve the Soviet population. Civil defense is one of several means of involving the population in disciplined activity and of keeping them aware of the everpresent "threat" posed by the enemies of the Soviet Union. Perhaps 70 percent of workers engaged in vital industry belong to civil defense organizations. Their principal objectives are:

- To prevent panic.
- To maintain law and order
- To maintain agricultural and industrial production
- To insure organized decontamination

Civil defense activities involve over thirty million people and are closely tied to the overall war and survival effort. Organized and trained personnel, controlled by the government, will be capable of at least the following activities:

- Fire-fighting
- First aid
- Camouflage of industrial targets
- Chemical defense and decontamination
- Damage control
- Rescue
- Public order and safety
- Communication and warning
- Evacuation
- Reconnaissance
- Radiological monitoring and decontamination

Civilian civil defense formations insure a potentially valuable laborforce for the Soviets. They are also a source for intelligence gathering, particularly in areas threatened by airborne or seabome attack, guerrilla or partisan activity, or large-scale invasion.

Civil defense receives extensive propaganda treatment in the Soviet media. There is civil defense training in schools, for housewives, and for retirees besides the training given in factories and civil defense formations.

However, Soviet civil defense programs have been criticized for their lack of imagination, heavy ideological (rather than practical) emphasis, lack of realism, poor quality instruction, inadequate planning, and poor coordination. Many mass evacuation plans have not been rehearsed for years, if at all. Nevertheless, the Soviet civil defense program reaches virtually every citizen in the nation with at least minimal instruction and indoctrination.

Reserves

Soviet conscripts have a reserve obligation until age 50. The total Soviet potential reserve manpower pool is estimated to be twenty five million men. About 6.8 million of these men are young, recently-trained veterans.

Soviet reservists are not organized in specific reserve units. Instead, reservists called up for training report to existing active units. In the event of a large-scale mobilization, reservists will be assigned where required. Many would fill out low-strength divisions and other units.

The Soviet reserve system provides a vast resource of former servicemen. Younger and more recently trained personnel probably would be mobilized for combat service. Older reservists easily could take over numerous garrison, guard, and rear area responsibilities.

Given such vast numbers of men with prior military service plus a citizenry which has received consider-able exposure to civil defense indoctrination and training, the Soviets can count on a population that is potentially more aware and prepared, and that is used to discipline.

Industrial Survival

The Soviets expect to survive and to win any future war. To do this, special attention has been devoted to protecting the industrial and technological base. Protective measures include dispersion of industrial facilities, physical hardening of factories, stockpiling materials and parts, constructing shelters for workers, and creating evacuation plans. Dispersion reduces vulnerability but it also increases the transportation problem and the security burden.

(Rear Area Operations & Logistics)
III. Logistics

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), chap 13.

Comparison of US and Soviet military elements has led to the incorrect view that the Soviet logistic structure is austere and inadequate to support their combat forces. Because of differences in concept and organization, Soviet logistic operations have been falsely referred to as the "Achilles' heel" of Soviet military power. However, Soviet military forces do receive effective logistic support.

Battles are won and lost for want of water, ammunition, batteries and supplies. A careful plan of logistical support is provided for each mission.

The Soviets have spent enormous sums of money to develop a modern and highly mechanized logistic support system. The use of pallets, containers, and packages has greatly improved the efficiency of Soviet logistic efforts. The Soviets have increased the depth and range of forward service areas and increased the mobility and range of logistic formations in support of frontline forces. They have developed a tactical pipeline capability and introduced improved transportation assets in great numbers. Also, Soviet capabilities for air delivery to forward areas and the use of helicopters for resupply have shown marked improvements.

Refer to SMFLS4: Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support). Includes ATP 4-94 Theater Sustainment Command, ATP 4-93 Sustainment Brigade, ATP 4-90 Brigade Support Battalion, Sustainment Planning, JP 4-0 Joint Logistics, ATP 3-35 Army Deployment and Redeployment (Mar '15), and more than a dozen new/updated Army sustainment references.

I. Principles of Logistics

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), pp. 13-1 to 13-3.

Centralized Planning

This principle requires concurrent tactical and logistical planning as well as coordination with civilian industry and transportation. Centralized planning insures coordination of civilian war production with military requirements.

Tailoring of Logistic Units

This principle allows allocation of logistic resources to the combat elements most essential to the success of the mission. Tailoring allows the Soviet military to assign priorities for logistic support.

Fixed Supply Priorities

The Soviet logistic system operates on the following sequence of priorities:

1. Ammunition of all types
2. POL
3. Technical supplies
4. Rations and clothing

However, these priorities can change with the combat situation. For example, a unit advancing rapidly with no opposition has a greater need for POL than for ammunition.

Delivery Forward

Higher headquarters handle supply requirements for their subordinate units. Supplies and services are delivered directly to subordinate units using the organic transportation assets of the higher headquarters. For example, an army headquarters uses its own trucks to deliver supplies to its subordinate divisions. In emergencies, one level may be bypassed in supply delivery. A division may deliver supplies directly to subordinate battalions, or a regiment may deliver directly to subordinate companies. This concept does not prevent a subordinate unit from using its assets to obtain supplies from its superior headquarters, especially in critical situations.

Continuous Supply Base Support

Supply bases and repair facilities are established as far forward as possible to insure the flow of supplies from the central logistics level directly to combat units. These echelons of bases from the homeland to deployed battalions assure continuous support for tactical elements.

Standardization of Equipment

The Soviet system of standardization is both extensive and effective. For example, of the 3,544 parts that make up the ZIL-131 3 1/2-ton truck, 45 percent may be used on other ZIL-produced vehicles, and 23 percent may be used on other trucks of the same weight class. A T-62 tank and the MAZ537 tank transporter share a common power plant. The chassis used for the amphibious PT-76 light tank has been adapted for BTR-50 armored personnel carriers, SA-6 and FROG-2,-3, -4 and -5 TEIs, the GSP amphibious ferry, the GT-T amphibious tractor, the ASU-85 airborne SP gun, and the ZSU-23-4SP AA gun. Extensive standardization has reduced the volume of repair parts and improved the Soviets' ability to repair forward through cannibalization. Also, obsolete vehicles and weapons can be retained for training purposes without having to keep a large stockpile of repair parts.

Locations of Tactical Logistic Elements

Ref: FM 100-2-2 The Soviet Army: Special Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul '84), p. 13-5.



(OPFOR3-2) Index

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(OPFOR3-2) RED TEAM ARMY

Forces, Operations & Tactics



It has been nearly **thirty years** since a holistic explanation of the Soviet-based Opposing Force (OPFOR) was examined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-2 series. Recognizing this, "OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army" re-examines and outlines the doctrinal operational construct and **historical foundations of Soviet-era military forces** from the FM 100-2 series, which is now out-of-print and largely unavailable.

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

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