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**Second Edition
(JIA1-2)**

**Planning
Fundamentals**

**Planning
Functions**

**Global Force
Mgmt (GFM)**

**JIPOE &
IPIE**

**Joint Planning
Process (JPP)**

**Plan/Order
Development**

**APEX
Execution**

**Annexes &
References**

joint strategic & operational **PLANNING**

Planning for Planners (Second Edition)

The Lightning Press
Santacroce



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Planning for Planners
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The Lightning Press
Michael A. Santacroce



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(JIA1-2) Note to Readers

The dawn of the 21st Century presents an increasingly complex global security environment. Within this environment United States national interest, citizens, and territories are threatened by regional instability, failed states, increased weapons proliferation, global terrorism, unconventional threats and challenges from adversaries in every operating domain. If we are to be successful as a nation, we must embrace the realities of this environment and operate with clarity from within. It is this setting that mandates a flexible, adaptive approach to planning and an ever-greater cooperation between all the elements of national power, supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various intergovernmental, nongovernmental and regional security organizations. It is within this chaotic environment that planners will craft their trade.

Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1: Joint Strategic & Operational Planning (Planning for Planners), 2nd Edition (JIA1-2), was developed to assist planners at all levels in understanding how to plan within this environment utilizing the Joint Planning Process (JPP); an orderly, logical, analytical progression enabling planners to sequentially follow it to a rational conclusion. By utilizing this planning process, which is conceptually easy to understand and applicable in all environments, any plan can come to life. Paramount to planning is flexibility. The ultimate aspiration of this book is to help develop flexible planners who can cope with the inevitable changes that occur during the planning process in any environment.

Planning for Planners has been utilized since 2007 by war colleges, joint staffs, Services, combatant commands and allies as a step-by-step guide to understanding the complex world of global planning and force management.

JIA1-2 is the second edition of Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1: Joint Strategic & Operational Planning (Planning for Planners), completely reorganized and updated with the latest joint publications for 2019. At 408-pgs, JIA1-2 is designed to give the reader a thorough understanding of joint planning and the adaptive planning and execution (APEX) enterprise, where the JPP resides. Topics and chapters include planning fundamentals, planning functions, global force management, JIPOE & IPIE, joint planning process (JPP), plan development, APEX execution functions, and annexes.

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Introduction: Planning for Planners

The criteria for deciding to employ United States military forces exemplify the dynamic link among the people, the government, and the military. The responsibility for the conduct and use of United States military forces is derived from the people and loaned to the government. The people of the United States do not take the commitment of their armed forces lightly. They charge the government to commit forces, our fathers, mothers, sons and daughters, only after due consideration of the range of options and likely outcomes. Moreover, the people expect the military to accomplish its missions in compliance with national values. The American people expect decisive victory and abhor unnecessary casualties. They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met. They demand timely and accurate information on the conduct of military operations.

"True genius resides in the capacity for evaluation of uncertain, hazardous, and conflicting information."

Winston Churchill

The Department of Defense commits forces only after appropriate direction from the President and in support of national strategy. The national strategy of the United States dictates where, when, and with what means the armed forces will conduct military campaigns and operations. The necessity to plan and conduct joint and combined operations across the operational continuum dictates a comprehensive understanding of the military strategy of the United States, and proficiency in current Service and joint **doctrine**.

"One should know one's enemies, their alliances, their resources and nature of their country, in order to plan a campaign. One should know what to expect of one's friends, what resources one has, and foresee the future effects to determine what one has to fear or hope from political maneuvers."

Frederick the Great

Instructions for His Generals, 1747

Never static, always dynamic, "**doctrine**" is firmly rooted in the realities of current capabilities. At the same time, it reaches out with a measure of confidence to the future. Doctrine captures the lessons of past wars, reflects the nature of war, conflict and crisis in its own time, and anticipates the intellectual and technological developments that will ensure victory now and in the future.

Doctrine derives from a variety of sources that profoundly affect its development: strategy, history, technology, the nature of the threats the nation and its armed forces face, inter-service relationships, and political decisions that allocate resources and designate roles and missions. Doctrine seeks to meet the challenges facing the armed forces by providing the guidance to deal with the range of threats to which its elements may be exposed. It reflects the strategic context in which armed forces will operate, sets a marker for the incorporation of developing technologies, and optimizes the use of all available resources. It also incorporates the lessons learned from the many missions, operations and campaigns of the United States.

Scenario

You're new on a Joint Operations staff for a Combatant Command. It's 0200 and the phone rings. The Chief of Staff is on the phone and relays the following Warning Order to you:

[A magnitude 9.1 - 9.3 earthquake with its epicenter off the west coast of northern Sumatra at Coordinates: 3.316°N 95.854°E, occurred at 00:58 UTC. News reports it is the third largest earthquake ever recorded. It's reported that an extensive series of tsunamis up to 100 feet high were created by the earthquake and have flooded communities along the Indian Ocean. At least 14 independent countries to include Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Bangladesh, Maldives, Malaysia, Myanmar, Madagascar, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, Seychelles, South Africa, and Yemen are affected. Sources indicate the possibility of over 250,000 casualties with millions displaced and homeless. The President wants to assist and needs options. Have an initial mission analysis brief for the CCCR by 0700, he'll brief the Chairman, Secretary and President following your brief so make it clear, succinct, and have several separate courses of action with differing degrees of assistance. Bring the State Department into your planning, they'll be a tremendous resource of country, state and local populations. They may have people on the ground already. Get your team together and get to work]

Continued on next page

What do you do?

Where do you begin?

You suddenly feel the full affect of the proverbial "planning fire hose."

#1- Take a breath.

#2- Pick up your well-worn and dove-tailed *Planner's SMARTbook* and get to work.

#3- Delegate!



Continued on next page

Introduction (Cont.)

Baron von Steuben's 1779 Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States was not penned in a setting of well-ordered formations and well-disciplined troops but, at a time of turmoil during a winter at Valley Forge. Baron von Steuben's doctrine, maybe our first written doctrine, set forth principles and created a discipline that went on to defeat the greatest army on the face of the earth. This doctrine, written over 200 years ago, and followed by others, has led to a highly professional armed force that generations later stands foremost in the world. Doctrine reflects the collective wisdom of our armed forces against the background of history and it reflects the lessons learned from recent experiences and the setting of today's strategic and technological realities. It considers the nature of today's threats and tomorrow's challenges.¹

Doctrinal principles set forth in planning are developed and written as the starting point for any variation or deviation from the planning process. One must understand doctrine prior to digressing from it. Doctrine should set forth principles and precious little more.² With that thought in mind Planning for Planners was designed to promulgate information from source documents and utilize best practices, lessons learned and common sense to fill in where the principles of Joint doctrine depart on the concepts of joint planning and the often misunderstood and complex world of global force management.

Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1 will assist planners at all levels with these challenges. It will furnish the planner with an understanding of doctrine and the intricate world of global planning. The ultimate aspiration being to develop planners who can cope with the inevitable change that occurs during the planning process.

Joint Planning and Variables

Joint planning is the overarching process that guides us in the development of plans for the employment of forces and capabilities within the context of national strategic objectives and national defense/military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises.

The JPP consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a mission, develop and compare potential courses of action, select the best course of action, and produce a plan or order.

This planning process underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of contingencies. It applies to all planners and helps them organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the method, purpose and end state and to develop effective plans and executable orders.

Planning provides an awareness and opportunity to study potential future events amongst multiple alternatives in a controlled environment. By planning we can evaluate complex systems and environments allowing us to break these down into small, manageable segments for analysis, assisting directly in the increased probability of success. In this way, deliberately planning for contingencies allows us to manage identified risks and influence the operational environment in which we have chosen to interact, in a deliberate way. The plans generated in this process represent actions to be taken if an identified risk occurs or a trigger event has presented itself.

¹ FM 100-5 Operations, Headquarters, Department of the Army.

² Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II, Strategic Studies Institute, Doctrine That Works, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub724.pdf.

The variance in any plan is the constant change in the operational environment (system). Whether a contingency or crisis scenario, we plan in a chaotic environment. In the time it takes us to plan, the likelihood that the operational environment has changed is a certain, whether by action or inaction, affecting the plan (i.e., assumptions change or are not validated, leaders change, the operational environment fluctuates, apportionment tables are poor assumptions, disputed borders fluctuate, weather changes the rules, plans change at contact, enemy gets a vote, etc.).

Variables are hard to predict because each environment and situation have their own unique challenges which can certainly affect an orderly plan. Given the size and scope of an operational environment a plan can only anticipate, or forecast, for a short duration without being updated. This is known as the plans horizon. In a fluid crisis situation the plans horizon may be very short and contain greater risk, causing the planner to constantly re-evaluate and update the plan. Inversely, for a contingency plan, the plans horizon may be relatively static with less risk allowing time for greater analysis. The number of variables within the operational environment and the interactions between those variables and known components of the operational environment increases exponentially with the number of variables, thus potentially allowing for many new and sometimes subtle planning changes to emerge.

As an example of a plans horizon, or stability, lets look at an environment that constantly influences us; the weather:

A forecaster endeavors to anticipate the path of a tropical cyclone and utilizes historical models and probabilities to predict the tropical cyclones path and warn residents. When a low pressure area first forms and the storm begins to take shape along the equator, forecasters are working within a complex environment with constant and multiple variables (i.e., winds, temperatures, currents, pressures, etc.) and few facts (i.e., exact location at this moment, jet stream location, ocean temperatures, surface winds, etc.). As variables amplify and the storm begins to move the storm's horizon shifts yet again, and the forecaster updates the assessment. Over days of surveillance, gathering information, updating, and studying the variables, the actual track of the storm begins to emerge and the storms horizon becomes more durable and predictable. The forecaster continuously narrows the storm's estimated track, eventually forecasting with some certainty the tropical cyclones land fall.

Planners employ the same technique by utilizing current knowledge of the operational environment to anticipate events, calculate what those may be by means of an in-depth analysis, update, and plan accordingly. But always remember, plans are orderly; probabilities and variables are not. Just as a tropical storm has a self-organizing phase within its environment, so must the planner.

So the challenge is how to plan within an environment with continuously changing and emerging variables. The planner must understand that every plan is unique and never as perfect as you want it, there are too many variables. But with constant awareness each iteration of the plan will improve the prospect of success as the variables become known and are planned for.

Simplicity should be the aspiration for every plan. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure a through understanding. A plan need not be more complicated than the underlying principles which generate it.



(JIA1-2) About the Author

Colonel Michael A. Santacroce has 35 years of joint and interagency experience working within the Department of Defense as a Joint Staff, Combatant Command and Service Planner. As Faculty and Chair for the Joint Advanced Warfighting School, Campaign Planning and Operational Art, Mike taught advanced planning to leaders from all branches of the DoD, government agencies and our allies. His current SMARTbook, Planning for Planners, walks the prospective or advanced planner through joint strategic and operational planning as well as the complex world of global force management.

During his Marine Corps career Mike served in a multiple of demanding leadership, senior staff, strategic and operational planning positions. As a Marine aviator he flew the AV-8B Harrier Jump Jet and participated in operations globally. Mike served as the Operations Officer of Marine Air Weapons and Tactics Squadron One (MAWTS-1), commanded a Marine Harrier Squadron (VMA-214 Blacksheep) and later led a Marine Air Group (Forward) for combat operations in Iraq. A seasoned military professional and teacher, Mike has a unique understanding of operations and planning at all levels. Mike retired with more than 30 years of military service.

"The inspiration of a noble cause involving human interests wide and far, enables men to do things they did not dream themselves capable of before, and which they were not capable of alone."

Joshua L. Chamberlain, October 3, 1869. Monument dedication ceremony, Gettysburg, Pa.

Today's preparation determines tomorrow's achievements. Dedicated to all planners; may this work assist you in some small way.

Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1: Joint Strategic & Operational Planning (Planning for Planners) is reviewed continually and updated as required. Point of contact is the author, Col (Ret) Mike Santacroce, USMC, at mike.santacroce@thelightingpress.com or mike.santa@yahoo.com





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Chap 1

I. Strategic Organization

"In pursuit of that future, we will look at the world with clear eyes and fresh thinking. We will promote a balance of power that favors the United States, our allies, and our partners. We will never lose sight of our values and their capacity to inspire, uplift, and renew. Most of all, we will serve the American people and uphold their right to a government that prioritizes their security, their prosperity, and their interests."

President Donald Trump, 2017 NSS

1. Background

- a. Civilian Control of the Military. Since the founding of the nation, civilian control of the military has been an absolute and unquestioned principle. The Constitution incorporates this principle by giving both the President and Congress the power to ensure civilian supremacy. The Constitution establishes the President as the Commander-in-Chief, but gives the Congress the power "to declare war," to "raise and support Armies – provide and maintain a Navy – (and) to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces."
- b. Joint Organization before 1900. As established by the Constitution, coordination between the War Department and Navy Department was effected by the President as the Commander in Chief. Army and naval forces functioned autonomously with the President as their only common superior. Despite Service autonomy, early American history reflects the importance of joint operations. Admiral MacDonough's naval operations on Lake Champlain were a vital factor in the ground campaigns of the War of 1812. The joint teamwork displayed by General Grant and Admiral Porter in the Vicksburg Campaign of 1863 stands as a fine early example of joint military planning and execution. However, instances of confusion, poor inter-Service cooperation and lack of coordinated, joint military action had a negative impact on operations in the Cuban campaign of the Spanish-American War (1898). By the turn of the century, advances in technology and the growing international involvement of the United States required greater cooperation between the military departments.
- c. Joint History through World War I. As a result of the unimpressive joint military operations in the Spanish-American War, in 1903 the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy created the Joint Army and Navy Board charged to address "all matters calling for cooperation of the two Services." The Joint Army and Navy Board was to be a continuing body that could plan for joint operations and resolve problems of common concern to the two Services. Unfortunately, the Joint Board accomplished little, because it could not direct implementation of concepts or enforce decisions, being limited to commenting on problems submitted to it by the secretaries of the two military departments. It was described as "a planning and deliberative body rather than a center of executive authority." As a result, it had little or no impact on the conduct of joint operations during the First World War. Even as late as World War I, questions of seniority and command relationships between the Chief of Staff of the Army and American Expeditionary Forces in Europe were just being resolved.
- d. Joint History through World War II. After World War I, the two Service secretaries agreed to reestablish and revitalize the Joint Board. Membership was expanded to six: the

chiefs of the two Services, their deputies, the Chief of War Plans Division for the Army and Director of Plans Division for the Navy. More importantly, a working staff (named the Joint Planning Committee) made up of members of the plans divisions of both Service staffs was authorized. The new Joint Board could initiate recommendations on its own. Unfortunately, the 1919 board was given no more legal authority or responsibility than its 1903 predecessor; and, although its 1935 publication, Joint Action Board of the Army and Navy, gave some guidance for the unified operations of World War II, the board itself was not influential in the war. The board was officially disbanded in 1947.

e. Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986. The Goldwater–Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of October 4, 1986 Pub. L. 99–433, made the most sweeping changes to the United States Department of Defense (DoD) since the department was established in the National Security Act of 1947 by reworking the command structure of the United States military.¹ The Goldwater–Nichols Act was an attempt to fix problems caused by inter-service rivalry, which had emerged during the Vietnam War, contributed to the catastrophic failure of the Iranian hostage rescue mission in 1980, and which were still evident in the invasion of Grenada in 1983.² It increased the powers of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and streamlined the military chain of command, which now runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense directly to combatant commanders, bypassing the Service Chiefs. The Act further outlined the responsibilities of those commanders, giving them total authority to accomplish assigned missions within their geographic areas of responsibility.³ The Service Chiefs were assigned to an advisory role to the President and the Secretary of Defense as well as given the responsibility for training and equipping personnel for the unified combatant commands.

Five years after the Goldwater-Nichols Legislation the U.S. military successfully conducted Operation Desert Storm and other associated operations (such as Operation Provide Comfort). The clarification of the operational chain of command, as well as the advances in jointness that were made as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, were viewed by many as instrumental to that success.⁴

f. Strategic Context.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) marked the most integrated joint force and joint campaign American armed forces had ever conducted up to that time. The OIF campaign is marked with a number of firsts. Arguably, it is the first “jointly” coherent campaign since the Korean War. American joint forces executed a large-scale, complex operation while simultaneously continuing active operations in Afghanistan, the Balkans, and in support of Homeland Defense. In OIF, a combined and joint land component commander directed all ground operations for the first time since the Eighth Army did so in the Korean War. Not since World War II have the armed forces of the United States operated in multiple theaters of war while simultaneously conducting security operations and support operations in several other theaters.

¹ *The Perfect Storm, The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Its Effect on Navy Acquisition/* Charles Nemfakos • Irv Blickstein • Aine Seitz McCarthy • Jerry M. Sollinger

² Cole, Ronald H. (1999). “Grenada, Panama, and Haiti: Joint Operational Reform” (PDF). *Joint Force Quarterly* (20 (Autumn/Winter 1998-99)): 57–74.

³ Richard W. Stewart, ed. (2005). “Chapter 12: Rebuilding the Army Vietnam to Desert Storm”. *American Military History, Volume II. United States Army Center of Military History*.

⁴ Leighton W. Smith, “A Commander’s Perspective,” as found in, Dennis J. Quinn (ed), *The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act: A Ten-Year Retrospective* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999) p. 29. See also Clark A. Murdock, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 1 Report* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004). http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/bgn_ph1_report.pdf, p. 14.

1-2 (Planning Fundamentals) I. Strategic Organization

OIF forces also employed emerging new concepts that had just been incorporated into the body of joint doctrine. Noteworthy joint coordination from OIF not imaged a decade earlier includes: the unprecedented degree of air-ground coordination and integration, coalition air forces shaping the fight allowing for rapid dominance on the ground, the establishment of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), the “running start,” integration of precision munitions with ground operations, supported by a largely space-based command and control network, effective integration of artillery and attack aviation, and air- and sea-launched precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and cruise missile strikes responding rapidly to targets developed by improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. These all represent the maturation of *joint doctrine* developed since Goldwater-Nichols and tested through joint simulations and training. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 enabled combat operations to occur in 2003 in ways only imagined a short decade earlier.

2. The Strategic and Security Environment

The strategic environment has shifted dramatically. Since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, a number of important historical events have taken place, starting with the end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the United States performed crisis management and contingency operations globally, in theaters including Iraq, the Balkans, Somalia, and Colombia. After the September 11, 2001, terror attacks, the United States undertook major counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as a number of smaller operations as part of its “global war on terror.”

The international security environment was already demanding when the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was enacted, yet most observers agree it has become significantly more complex and unpredictable in recent years.⁵ This is challenging the United States to respond to an increasingly diverse set of requirements.⁶ As evidence, observers point to a number of events, including (but not limited to) the rise of the Islamic State, including its military successes in northern Iraq and Syria; the strength of drug cartels in South and Central America; Russian-backed proxy warfare in Ukraine; heightened North Korean aggression; Chinese “island building” in the South China Sea; terror attacks in Europe; the ongoing civil war in Syria and its attendant refugee crisis to name a few.

Today’s security environment is not unlike those of historic times. The commanders during those eras considered the enemy extremely complex and fluid with continually changing coalitions, alliances, partnerships, and new threats constantly appearing and disappearing.

With the national and transnational threats we face today our political and military leaders conduct operations in an ever-more complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment. This increase in the scope of the operational environment may not necessarily result from actions by the confronted adversary alone, but is likely to result from other adversaries exploiting opportunities as a consequence of an overextended or distracted United States (U.S.) or coalition. These adversaries encompass a variety of actors from transnational organizations to states or even ad hoc state coalitions and individuals.

⁵ See, for example, CRS Report R43838, *A Shift in the International Security Environment: Potential Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress*, by Ronald O’Rourke ; James Clapper “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,” Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 9, 2016.

⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *Department of Defense Press Briefing by Deputy Secretary Work and Gen. Selva on the FY2017 Defense Department Budget Request in the Pentagon Press Briefing Room*, February 9, 2016, <http://www.defense.gov/News/News-Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/653524/departement-of-defense-press-briefing-by-deputy-secretary-work-and-gen-selva-on>.

A central challenge as noted in the Defense Strategy Review (DSR) is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy (NSS) classifies as revisionist powers.⁷ Along with these revisionist powers rogue regimes are destabilizing regions through their pursuit of nuclear weapons or sponsorship of terrorism. Both revisionist powers and rogue regimes are competing across all dimensions of power. They have increased efforts short of armed conflict by expanding coercion to new fronts, violating principles of sovereignty, exploiting ambiguity, and deliberately blurring the lines between civil and military goals.

The Joint Force faces two persistent realities. First, the security environment is always in flux. Change is relentless and occurs in all aspects of human endeavor. Ideas about how human beings should govern one another emerge, spread, and then fade away. Advances in science and technology progress and proliferate. Countries and political groups simultaneously cooperate and compete based on their relative power, capabilities, interests, and ideals. Change in the security environment occurs at an irregular pace, and over time small changes compound to shatter our assumptions. Second, the pursuit of political objectives through organized violence is and will remain a feature of the security environment. Strife, conflict, and war are certain to endure⁸ into the foreseeable future.

Today, every domain is contested—air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. We face an ever more lethal and disruptive battlefield, combined across domains, and conducted at increasing speed and reach—from close combat, throughout overseas theaters, and reaching to our homeland. Some competitors and adversaries seek to optimize their targeting of our battle networks and operational concepts, while also using other areas of competition short of open warfare to achieve their ends (e.g., information warfare, ambiguous or denied proxy operations, and subversion).⁹

To prepare the United States for today's threats and contingencies we have, over time, established a system of checks and balances to include numerous governmental organizations that are involved in the implementation of United States security policy. However, constitutionally, the ultimate authority and responsibility for the national defense rests with the President.

3. Strategic Direction

The common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), Services, and Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) is strategic direction. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products (documents) by which the President, Secretary of Defense (SecDef), and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide strategic vision and direction to the Joint force. Strategic direction is normally published in key documents, generally referred to as strategic guidance. As seen in the following figure these strategic guidance documents are the principle source for DOD global campaign plans (GCPs), theater strategies, CCMD campaign plans (CCPs), operation plans, contingency plans, base plans, and commanders' estimates. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), once provided the direction and guidance each prepares strategy and campaign plans in the context of national security and foreign policy goals.

a. The President provides strategic guidance through the National Security Strategy (NSS), Presidential Policy Directive (PPD), executive orders and other strategic documents in conjunction with additional guidance and refinement from the National Security Council (NSC).¹⁰


⁷Joint Operating Environment

⁸National Defense Strategy

⁹Defense Strategy Review

¹⁰Joint Pub 5-0, Joint Planning.

1-4 (Planning Fundamentals) I. Strategic Organization




Strategy, Planning and Resourcing

b. The President and SecDef, through the CJCS, direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders. The principal forum for deliberation of national security policy issues requiring Presidential Decisions (PDs) that will directly affect the CCDRs actions is the NSC. Knowledge of the history and relationships between elements of the national security structure is essential to understanding the role of JS organizations.


c. The National Security Council System (NSC). DOD participation in the interagency process is grounded within the Constitution and established by law in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47).

(1) The NSC is a product of NSA 47. NSA 47 codified and refined the interagency process used during World War II, modeled in part on Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1919 proposal for a "Joint Plan-Making Body" to deal with the overlapping authorities of the Departments of State, War, and Navy. Because of the diverse interests of individual agencies, previous attempts at interagency coordination failed due to lack of national-level perspectives, a staff for continuity, and adequate appreciation for the need of an institutionalized coordination process. Evolving from the World War II experience (during which the Secretary of State was not invited to War Council meetings), the first State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was formed in 1945.

Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)



JSPS Product Linkages and Dependencies



(3) Joint Regional Strategies. Formerly called Bureau Strategic and Resource Plans, JRSs are developed jointly by the regional bureaus of DOS and USAID and identify U.S. foreign policy and development priorities for a given region. The regional bureaus of the DOS roughly correspond to the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). The geographic and functional seams should be coordinated with GCC theater strategies to achieve unity of effort. JRSs are considered Sensitive but Unclassified and can be found on the NIPRNET.

(4) Integrated Country Strategies. Formerly called Mission Strategic and Resource Plans, these documents are developed in each country by the embassy's Country Team and identify U.S. foreign policy and development priorities for that country. They are informed by the appropriate JRS for the region of that country. ICSs are considered Sensitive but Unclassified and can be found on the NIPRNET.

(5) Functional Strategies. Strategies are developed on functional topics (e.g., anti-terror countering weapons of mass destruction). These functional strategies should be considered during planning as appropriate.

e. Planning Policy and Joint Doctrine. Per Title 10, U.S.C. and IAW guidance and direction by the President, Secretary, and USD(P) provide guidance for the preparation of military plans. In accordance with this guidance and direction, the Chairman directs the development of plans and publishes additional planning policy documents in order to meet this statutory responsibility. This policy is necessary to maintain consistency of planning products and supports unity of effort across the JPEC. The Chairman also publishes policy issuances on the APEX processes. The Chairman also approves the joint doctrine in the Joint Publications.

6. Strategic and Operational Forums

a. National Security Council. As discussed in paragraph 3.c, the NSC is the principal interagency forum established by Title 50, U.S.C. (Section 3021) for developing policy options, considering implications, coordinating operational problems that require interdepartmental consideration, developing recommendations for the President, and monitoring policy implementation. The Secretary, as a statutory member, and Chairman, as the principal military advisor, regularly attend NSC meetings. Per statutory responsibility, the Chairman presents the views of the JCS and CDRs in providing the best military advice. The procedures of the NSC are further codified by Presidential Directive usually issued at the start of an administration.

(1) The NSC addresses policy issues with consideration for the proper application of all instruments of national power. These considerations and capabilities are integrated throughout planning and are designed to lead to more effective coordination of whole-of-government efforts during execution.

(2) Well-crafted plans, developed with frequent dialogue between stakeholders, provide an effective shared civilian-military understanding of existing or emerging threats. Should a crisis occur, this shared understanding developed during the NSC forums provides the foundation to address emergent events that impact national security interests.

b. Promote Cooperation. JS J-5 in conjunction with OSD(P) executes the Promote Cooperation program to facilitate further discussions and coordination between CCMD planners and interagency partners in the National Capital Region. It is intended to be an ongoing forum that leverages the expertise of interagency partners to inform development of CCMD plans. It enables interaction and coordination with stakeholders external to DoD and provides an opportunity to collaborate on planning. Promote Cooperation is initiated by CCMD planners and can take the form of consultations, seminars, workshops, or tabletop exercises depending upon requirements. These are typically held at the action officer level, with the option of holding a Deputy Assistant Secretary level out brief at the conclusion of the event. Promote Cooperation events provide an important opportunity for collaboration on planning.

II. Campaigning

1. Introduction

CCDRs can be tasked to address missions that cross geographic CCMD boundaries. CCDRs tasked with global missions provide planning and assessment expertise to identify tasks and missions other CCMDs (supporting commands) must perform to ensure success of global missions. Commands include supporting tasks as part of their campaign and contingency planning and coordinate to ensure assessments are complete. CCDRs with global responsibilities will also use the integrated planning process to provide an assessment of risk from the global, cross-AOR, perspective to ensure the military advice provided to the President and SecDef includes these considerations. CCMD Campaign Plans (CCP) and Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs), implement the military portion of national policy and defense strategy by identifying those actions the CCMDs will conduct on a daily basis. Campaign plans are intended to focus and direct steady-state activities that can prevent or mitigate conflict and set the conditions necessary for successful execution of contingency plans.¹

2. Global Campaign Plans

The Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, is responsible for developing, staffing, reviewing, and preparing Global Campaign Plans (GCP) for the CJCS and the SecDef's approval. The GCPs are integrated plans that address the most pressing trans-regional, multi-functional strategic challenges across all domains. The CJCS, as the global integrator, determines which challenges require GCPs. As problem-focused plans, GCPs look across geographic and functional CCMD seams and simultaneously provide direction to the CCDRs and military advice to the SecDef. GCPs are the focal point for integrated assessment and resource decisions regarding prioritization, posture, capabilities, risk, and risk mitigation measures. The Chairman's military advice, derived from GCP assessments, can take the form of a GCP memorandum focused on a single challenge or be contained within a broader JSPS product.² GCPs globally integrate the activities of the Joint Force to campaign against the priority challenges. GCPs contain linkages to key contingency plans, identify responsibilities, define objectives, and assign tasks. The CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility for a GCP generally serves as the Coordinating Authority (CA).

a. Global Integration. Global Integration shifts the focus of our strategic leaders from the regional model to a new paradigm of thinking globally about problems and recognizing the interrelationships between them. This ensures the Joint Force maintains a common understanding of the global operational environment, works in collaboration towards addressing threats and challenges, provides the information needed to assess and refine strategies and operations, and ensures that the CJCS is able to make informed decisions to provide military advice to coordinate joint force actions in time, space, and purpose across the globe.

b. The Chairman, in his role as the Global Integrator, assists the Secretary in military strategic planning, writing military plans, and providing strategic guidance to the armed forces to ensure the effective conduct of operations. Global Integration drives a more holistic and integrated review process. The JSCP lays out how the Joint Force will organize planning, the various plans that must be produced, and supplemental guidance needed to "set the globe" and accomplish non-standard tasks the Joint Force is assigned.

¹ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

² JCSCM 3130.01 *Series*

c. Global Integration Planning Roles:

(1) Global Integrator. The CJCS is tasked by Title 10, Section 153, of U.S. Code with preparing and reviewing strategic campaign and contingency plans. The Chairman is responsible for operationalizing the national strategies and other policy guidance, aligning the actions of the Joint Force, balancing risk, assigning problems, and providing military advice to the SecDef for adjudicating competing priorities. The CJCS determines which sets of global challenges require GCPs that look across geographic and functional seams.³

(2) Coordinating Authority (CA). To integrate CCMD planning and day-to-day campaigning, the CJCS, in the role of Global Integrator, assigns a CA. A CA performs the key functions of planning, assessing, and recommending and will establish collaborative forums to develop integrated plans. A CA is generally a CCDR with the preponderance of responsibility aligned to a problem set and does not receive additional command authority beyond that already assigned in the UCP or other foundational documents. A CA does not have authority to compel agreement or direct resource allocation between CCMD or Services.⁴

(3) Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs). Global integration requires information from across functions, domains, regions, and processes. To assist in the execution of the NMS and JSCP, the CJCS employs cross-functional teams (CFTs) to facilitate shared understanding and support the development of military advice. CFTs consist of Joint Staff functional and regional experts as well as representatives from CCMDs, OSD, and other U.S. government departments and agencies. CFTs support globally integrated planning by contributing to NMS annexes on priority challenges and by maintaining the GCPs (in coordination with CCMDs). During a crisis or contingency, the CFTs may assist in developing a shared understanding of the strategic environment.⁵

(4) Collaborator. A Joint Force organization assigned formally in the JSCP to support integrated planning for a GCP. The collaborator works with the CA to develop and assess the viability of globally integrated plans. A Collaborator is also responsible for providing Support Plans to the CA.⁶

d. Global Defense Posture. A key consideration of GCPs and plan reviews is global defense posture. Foreign posture is the fundamental enabler of Joint Force activities. GCPs foster an integrated approach to requirements, trade-offs, and risk across three interdependent posture elements: *forces, footprints, and agreements*. The Director for Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5, is the lead directorate for posture issues. In that role, the directorate coordinates closely with the J-3, J-4, and J-8 on global defense posture issues, such as force management and prepositioned equipment, and introduces posture recommendations to the DoD's senior body overseeing global defense posture, the Global Posture Executive Council. The primary Joint Staff forum for reviewing posture issues and recommendations is the Operations Deputies Tank. As required, posture issues and recommendations are elevated for consideration in a Joint Chiefs of Staff Tank.⁷

e. Theater Level Documents.

The JSCP provides GCPs and directs three other types of campaign plans:

- Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs)
- Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs)
- Combatant Command Campaign Plans (CCPs)

"Perception is strong and sight weak. In strategy it is important to see distant things as if they were close and to take a distanced view of close things"

Miyamoto Musashi, legendary Japanese swordsman

³ CJCSI 3100.01 Joint Strategic Planning System

⁴ Ibid

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Ibid

⁷ Ibid

(1) Regional Campaign Plans (RCPs) – RCPs are plans written for regional challenges that do not rise to the interest/threat level of GCPs. RCPs are assigned to a CA and employ Collaborators to deal with cross-AOR elements of the challenge and/or solution.

(2) Functional Campaign Plans (FCPs) - FCPs are plans written for global challenges that do not rise to the interest/threat level of GCPs, and deal primarily with a function instead of a region. FCPs are also assigned to a CA and employ “Collaborators” to deal with cross-AOR elements of the challenge or solution. Cyber might be one area where an FCP would be produced.

(3) Combatant Command Campaign Plan (CCP) (legacy TCP/FCP) - The JSCP expands the role of the [legacy] theater/function campaign plan (TCP/FCP) from a regional or functional strategy to integrating globally focused requirements by reformatting the TCP/FCP into CCMD campaign plan. It becomes the method of execution for all assigned tasks in problem-focused plans (GCP, FCP, and RCP) to provide a comprehensive plan that fully integrates Operations, Activities and Interests (OAI)s spanning the command's assigned responsibilities. CCMD campaign plans are the centerpiece of the CCMDs' planning construct, and executes JSCP direction and CCMD strategies. CCMD campaign plans align the command's day-to-day activities (which include ongoing operations, military engagement, security cooperation, deterrence, and other shaping or preventive activities) with resources to achieve the CCMD's objectives. A CCP has a five-year planning horizon.⁸

3. Combatant Command Strategy (Theater or Functional)

A strategy is a broad statement of the commander's long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC's long-term vision for the global employment of functional capabilities. It is the bridge between national strategic guidance and the joint planning required to achieve national and command objectives and attain end states. Specifically, it links CCMD activities, operations, and resources to USG policy and strategic guidance. A strategy should describe the ends as directed in strategic guidance and the ways and means to attain them. A strategy should begin with the strategic estimate. Although there is no prescribed format for a strategy, it may include the commander's vision, mission, challenges, trends, assumptions, objectives, and resources. CCDRs employ strategies to align and focus efforts and resources to mitigate and prepare for conflict and contingencies, and support and advance US interests. To support this, strategies normally emphasize security cooperation activities, force posture, and preparation for contingencies. Strategies typically employ military engagement, close cooperation with DOS, embassies, and other USG departments and agencies. A strategy should be informed by the means or resources available to support the attainment of designated end states and may include military resources, programs, policies, and available funding. CCDRs publish strategies to provide guidance to subordinates and supporting commands/agencies and improve coordination with other USG departments and agencies and regional partners. A CCDR operationalizes a strategy through a campaign plan.⁹

a. Strategic Estimate. The CCDR and staff, with input from subordinate and supporting commands and agencies, prepare a strategic estimate by analyzing and describing the political, military and economic factors, and the threats and opportunities that facilitate or hinder achievement of the objective over the timeframe of the strategy. The CCMD's input to the Chairman's Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA) is produced annually and informs the strategic estimate and its periodic updates.

b. Policy-Strategy Dynamic. Strategy is always subordinate to policy. However, there is a two-way dependent relationship between policy and strategy. CCDRs bridge the inevitable friction that policy and politics create when developing the theater strategy. Military strategy must be clear, achievable, and flexible to react to changing policy. Policy may evolve as the theater strategy is implemented in a dynamic operational environment. Also, policy may change in reaction to unanticipated opportunities or in reaction to unanticipated

⁸ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

⁹ *Ibid*

Plans Relationships and Nesting




Figure A. Plans Relationship (CJCSM 3141.01 series)




Figure B. Nested Plans in Generic CCP Framework (CJCG 3130)

III. Sequencing Actions

"If I were given one hour to save the planet, I would spend fifty-nine minutes defining the problem and one minute resolving it."

-Albert Einstein

This section gives a broad overview of sequencing actions and phasing.

1. Sequencing Actions and Phasing

Part of the art of planning is determining the sequence of actions that best accomplishes the mission. The concept of operations describes in sequence the start of the operation to the projected status of the force at the operation's end, or endstate. If the situation dictates a significant change in mission, tasks, task organization, or priorities of support during the operation, the commander may phase the operation.¹ A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity.

a. **Phasing.** A phase is a definitive stage of an operation or campaign during which a large portion of the forces and capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities for a common purpose. Phasing, which can be used in any operation regardless of size, helps the commanders organize operations by integrating and synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing helps commanders and staffs visualize, design, and plan the entire operation or campaign and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. It helps them systematically achieve military objectives that cannot be attained all at once by arranging smaller, related operations in a logical sequence. Phasing also helps commanders mitigate risk in the more dangerous or difficult portions of an operation.

(1) Each phase is designed to nest with the intent for the overall campaign and sequenced to achieve an end state that will set conditions for commencement of the next phase. The commander will declare his intent for each phase that supports his overall intent for the operation or campaign. Each phase must have a specified set of conditions for both the beginning and intended end state. Leaders should recognize that lines of operation (LOO) or effort (LOE) (see Chapter 5-3a, *Concept Development*) are likely to run throughout the phases to provide the logical framework for the entire operation or campaign. Each operation or campaign is unique and the phasing must make sense for the campaign. While phases should ideally be flexibly event-oriented, the staff must also consider the time-oriented resourcing requirements for the activities of each phase.

(2) For each phase, the campaign's CONOPS should describe the following elements:

(a) **Intent and schemes of movement and maneuver.** The commander's intent for the phase must be clear. Describe the purpose, end state, and the operational risk to the campaign during this phase. The schemes of movement and maneuver may be narratives of the various lines of operation and effort as they are executed during this particular phase. The flow of forces and capability into theater are broadly described as are subsequent joint force maneuver schemes to achieve the various operational objectives. In campaigns where LOEs are used (as opposed to LOOs) and/or where positional advantage may not be consistently critical to success, the scheme of maneuver uses the logic of purpose and

¹ ADRP 3-0

may describe how and when certain objectives within each LOE must be achieved, especially in relation to the objectives on the other LOEs of the campaign.

(b) Objectives and effects (desired and undesired). Describe the objectives for each phase, and the major effects that must be achieved to realize those objectives. Describe how the force's objectives are related to those of the next higher organization and to other organizations (especially if the military is a supporting effort).

(c) Tasks to subordinate and supporting commands and agencies. The commander assigns tasks to subordinate commanders, along with the capabilities and support necessary to achieve them. Area tasks and responsibilities focus on that specific area to control or conduct operations. Functional tasks and responsibilities focus on the performance of continuing efforts that involve the forces of two or more Military Departments operating in the same domain (air, land, sea, or space) or where there is a need to accomplish a distinct aspect of the assigned mission. Include identification of requests for support to organizations outside of DOD.

(d) Command and control organization and geometry of the area of operations (AO). Note any changes to the command and control (C2) structure or to the geometry of the area of responsibility (AOR) (for combatant commands) or joint operations area (JOA) (for subordinate joint forces) or area of operations (for subordinate non-joint forces).

(e) Assessment methodology. Identify the basic methodology for assessing accomplishment of objectives. Include assessments to help gauge if the objectives actually support achievement of the end state.

(f) Risk mitigation. Identify the areas of risk concern to the commander and outline how the risk may be mitigated.

(g) CCIR and associated decision points.

(h) Transition to the next phase. Describe how the joint force will move to the next phase. Describe the end state conditions for the phase, which should tie directly to the initiation conditions for the next phase. Include a description of transition of control from the joint force to other parties for aspects of the overall campaign.

(3) While phasing has traditionally been described in a 6-phase model, this model has been problematic in describing operations that are not predominately military. While it works well for operations such as Desert Storm, it breaks down in describing some of the operations, activities and actions associated with long term campaigns and competition activities that occur below the level of armed conflict (e.g. U.S. actions toward Russia in Ukraine). JP 3-0 models several phasing constructs that may apply. The bottom line is that the phases should be adapted to the environment, the problem, and the operational approach – not vice versa.

Inducement: Increases the benefits of and/or reduces the cost of compliance (increasing overall utility of complying with our demands).


Persuasion: Alters the preferences against which the costs and benefits are evaluated (changing the decision context).

(4) Phasing Model.

(a) Phasing is critical to arranging all tasks of an operation that cannot be conducted simultaneously. It describes how the commander envisions the overall operation unfolding. It is the logical expression of the commander's visualization in time. Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase.

(b) The notional phasing model below displays six phases: shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize the environment, and enable civil authority. Each phase may

be considered during planning and assessment. This construct is meant to provide planners a template while not imparting constraints on the flexibility of CCDRs. This notional six-phase model is not intended to be a universally prescriptive template for all conceivable joint operations and is expected to be tailored to the character and duration of the operation to which it applies.



Notional Phasing Model

(5) A phase can be characterized by the “focus” that is placed on it. Phases are distinct in time, space, and/or purpose from one another, but must be planned in support of each other and should represent a natural progression and subdivision of the campaign or operation. Each phase should have a set of starting conditions (that define the start of the phase) and ending conditions (that define the end of the phase). The ending conditions of one phase are the starting conditions for the next phase. Phases are necessarily linked and gain significance in the larger context of the campaign.

The nature of operations and activities during a typical joint combat operation will change from its beginning (when the CJCS issues the execute order) to the operation’s end (when the joint force disbands and components return to a pre-operation status). Shaping activities usually precede the operation and may continue during and after the operation. The purpose of shaping activities is to help set the conditions for successful execution of the operation. The figure on the following page shows that from deter through enable civil authority, the operations and activities in these groups vary in magnitude—time, intensity, forces, etc., — as the operation progresses. At various points in time, each specific group might characterize the main effort of the joint force.

For example, dominate activities would characterize the main effort after the joint force seizes the initiative until the enemy no longer is able to effectively resist. Even so, activities in the other groups would usually occur concurrently at some level of effort. The following illustration and paragraphs provide more information on the nature of these activities.

“It ain’t what you don’t know that gets you into trouble. It’s what you know for sure that just ain’t so.”
Mark Twain

I. Planning

I. PLANNING AND PLANS

Plan: Written account of intended future course of action (scheme) aimed at achieving specific goal(s) or objective(s) within a specific timeframe. It explains in detail what needs to be done, when, how, and by whom, and often includes best case, expected case, and worst-case scenarios.

(Dictionary.com)

1. Planning

Planning is the process of thinking about and organizing the activities required to achieve a desired goal (forethought). It is an anticipatory decision-making process that helps in coping with complexities and combines forecasting of developments with the preparation of scenarios and how to react to them. Planning is conducted for different planning horizons, from long-range to short-range. Depending on the echelon and circumstances, units may plan in years, months, or weeks, or in days, hours, and minutes.

Planning:

- (1) identifies the goals or objectives to be achieved,
- (2) formulates strategies to achieve them,
- (3) arranges or creates the means required, and
- (4) implements, directs, and monitors all steps in their proper sequence.

(Dictionary.com)

The defining challenges to effective planning are uncertainty and time. Uncertainty increases with the length of the planning horizon and the rate of change in an operational environment (OE). A tension exists between the desire to plan far into the future to facilitate preparation and the fact that the farther into the future the commander plans, the less certain the plan will remain relevant. Given the uncertain nature of the operational environment, the object of planning is not to eliminate uncertainty, but to develop a framework for action in the midst of such uncertainty.¹

a. Planning provides an informed forecast of how future events may unfold. It entails identifying and evaluating potential decisions and actions in advance to include thinking through consequences of certain actions. Planning involves thinking about ways to influence the future as well as how to respond to potential events. Put simply, planning is thinking critically and creatively about what to do and how to do it, while anticipating changes along the way.

b. Planning keeps us oriented on future objectives despite the requirements of current operations. By anticipating events beforehand, planning helps the commander seize, retain, or exploit the initiative. As a result, the force anticipates events and acts purposefully and effectively before the adversary can act or before situations deteriorate. In addition, planning helps anticipate favorable turns of events that could be exploited during shaping operations.

¹ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*

2. Defining Challenges


a. Planning is also the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out an operational approach to achieve that future. Planning is both a continuous and a cyclical activity of the operations process which translates strategic guidance and direction. Based on this understanding and operational approach, planning continues with the development of a fully synchronized campaign plan, operation plan or order that arranges potential actions in time, space, and purpose to guide the force during execution.²

b. While planning may start an iteration of the operations process, planning does not stop with production of a plan or an order. During preparation and execution, the plan is continuously refined as assessments and situational understanding improves. Supporting commands, subordinates and others provide feedback as to what is working, what is not working, and how the force can do things better.

c. Planning may be based on defined tasks identified in the strategic guidance, or it may be based on the need for a military response to an unforeseen current event, emergency, or time-sensitive crisis. The value of following the well-established Joint Planning Process (JPP) has been reinforced through operational and exercise experiences. Key to the process is the detailed analysis necessary to produce the requisite plans and orders that will direct subordinates. In addition to the required analysis, planners must strive to ensure the generated solution does not further exacerbate the problem or limit future options.

3. Conceptual and Detailed Planning

Planning consists of two separate, but closely related, components: a *conceptual component* and a *detailed component* as shown in the figure below. Conceptual planning involves understanding the operational environment and the problem, determining the operation's end state, and visualizing an operational approach. Conceptual planning generally corresponds to operational art and is the focus of the commander with staff support. Detailed planning translates the broad operational approach into a complete and practical plan. Generally, detailed planning is associated with the science of operations including the synchronization of the forces in time, space, and purpose. Detailed planning works out the scheduling, coordination, or technical problems involved with moving, sustaining, and synchronizing the actions of force as a whole toward a common goal. Effective planning requires the integration of both the conceptual and detailed components of planning.³



Conceptual and Detailed Planning

² ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process*

³ ADRP 5-0, *The Operations Process*

fyng or developing a new solution as required. The object of problem solving is not just to solve near-term problems, but to do so in a way that forms the basis for long-term success.

6. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)

a. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX). APEX encompasses the full spectrum of military DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy). It is the compilation of joint policies, processes, procedures, tools, training, and education used by the JPEC to monitor, plan, asses and execute the many planning activities involved to include; mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. APEX integrates strategic and operational planning with execution activities of the JPEC to meet national security objectives and facilitate seamless transition from planning to execution. APEX informs the entire chain of command, including the President and SecDef, facilitating informed decisions on how, when, and where to employ the military. APEX is an iterative process with each activity and function influencing and being influenced by activities and functions which are performed and reviewed at multiple echelons of commands in overlapping timeframes. Facilitating communication and understanding of strategic guidance between these echelons of command takes place in several formats: formal strategy and policy documents; the plans review process; and via specific, individual communications with CCMDs. CCCR planning may also influence strategic direction and guidance, either during planning or execution.

b. Per CJCSM 3130.02 the military planning and execution process is composed of four operational activities; situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment – discussed in Chapter 2-2, *Operational Activities*, that provide an operating framework for one or more planning or execution efforts. The operational activities are comprised of a sustained cycle of situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment that occurs continuously to support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command and inform civilian leadership. The planning and execution functions depict the elements, activities, and products that may be ongoing or under development. APEX leverages CCCR design, military planning and execution and the JPP framework that forms the basis for planning. The APEX process is displayed in the figure on the following page. Refer to CJCSM 3130 series documents for greater detail.


7. Integrated Planning

Integrated planning is used by the joint force to address complex strategic challenges that span multiple geographic CCMD AORs and functional CCMD responsibilities. Integrated planning synchronizes resources and integrates timelines, decision matrices, and authorities across CCMDs, the rest of the interagency, and multinational partners to achieve directed strategic objectives. Integrating plan development, in-progress reviews (IPRs), and assessment provides national leadership a holistic understanding of how a particular conflict could realistically develop, options for response, and how operations by one CCMD could affect the broader OE across the globe.

a. Globally Integrated and Coordinated. Global Integration shifts the focus of our strategic leaders from the regional model to a new paradigm of thinking globally about problems and recognizing the interrelationships between them. This ensures the Joint Force maintains a common understanding of the global operational environment, works in collaboration towards addressing threats and challenges, provides the information needed to assess and refine strategies and operations, and ensures that the Chairman is able to make informed decisions to provide military advice to coordinate joint force actions in time, space, and purpose across the globe. The Chairman, in his role as the Global Integrator, assists the Secretary in military strategic planning, writing military plans, and providing strategic guidance to the armed forces to ensure the effective conduct of operations. Global Integration drives a more holistic and integrated review process. The JSCP lays out


2-4 (Planning Functions) I. Planning

APEX Military Planning and Execution Processes



Planning During Crisis Conditions (Notional Depiction)

Figure A



Purpose. Planning under crisis conditions is intended to produce an order as the principal output. Typically, OPORDs or FRAGORDs are developed during crisis to direct the execution of military activities.

Direction. Planning is initiated when an emergent situation or crisis is identified that may warrant a near-term military response. Planning under crisis conditions may be directed by a PLANORD or ALERTORD. Planning and deployment or execution may be directed by a DEPORD or EXORD. During a crisis the direction to deploy forces or execute operations may occur at any time during planning and the APEX planning and initial execution functions conducted in parallel.

Planning Basis. During crisis the basis for planning is the ongoing situational awareness and assessment of the emergent situation. The current JIPOE, warning and current intelligence provide the context for planning. Planning during crisis will usually require less assumptions than non-crisis planning due to more facts being available for an actual vice hypothetical event.

Forces. Force requirements identified during crisis planning may be execution sourced concurrent to plan development. CCDRs may execution source assigned forces to the operations they are directed to conduct. With the approval of a COA, the Secretary may direct the allocation of additional forces to a CCDR. Plan development may then be conducted based upon actual sourced units vice planning assumptions to facilitate the transition to execution.

Deployment Plan. During a crisis deployment plans are usually documented as a TPFFDD. To meet requirements, the CCDR may task assigned forces. In the case of force shortfalls, the CCDR may request allocated forces. Force requirements are execution sourced concurrent to planning and unit and movement data are entered. The sourced TPFFDD is a deployment plan that can be executed by the supported CCMD with support from USTRANSCOM and force providers.

Plan Assessment. Given the limited planning time under crisis conditions, the feasibility analysis done during plan development may effectively be the plan assessment. Under crisis conditions, plan feasibility is assessed and the plan refined in the context of the current conditions of the OE as time allows.

Review. Planning under crisis conditions is often shaped by frequent, potentially virtual dialog between senior civilian and military leaders. Decisions and approval of planning may be initially conveyed verbally and subsequently codified in orders or directives in order to expedite the transition to execution.

II. APEX

Operational Activities

1. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Overview

APEX is defined as “the Joint capability to create and revise plans rapidly and systematically, as circumstances require.”¹ It incorporates a joint enterprise for the development, maintenance, assessment, and implementation of GCPs, CCPs and related contingency plans and orders prepared in response to Presidential, SecDef, or Chairman direction or requirements. APEX activities span many organizational levels, including the interaction between the SecDef, CCDRs, coalition, and interagency which ultimately assists the President and SecDef to decide when, where, and how to commit U.S. military forces.

a. Residing within APEX is “military planning and execution” which is shaped by strategic direction and is integrated within the national strategic framework. Civilian control of the military is exercised via this strategic direction, including the delegation of authorities and allocation of resources. A sustained civilian-military dialogue provides a common understanding of the operating environment and options for military ends, ways, means, and associated risk. Within the APEX framework, this civilian-military dialogue informs and is informed by ongoing military planning and execution. Substantive changes in the operating environment or strategic ends, ways, and means may also drive more enduring changes to strategic direction. This mutual influence is foundational to APEX and is depicted in the figure on the following page.

b. APEX Enterprise.² The APEX enterprise encompasses the full spectrum of military DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy). It is the compilation of joint policies, processes, procedures, tools, training, and education used by the JPEC to monitor, plan, execute and assess the planning and execution functions associated with joint operations. APEX integrates strategic and operational planning with execution activities of the JPEC to meet national security objectives and facilitate seamless transition from planning to execution. Operational activities and functions span many organizations at all levels of command, including interaction between the Secretary, CCDRs, subordinate forces, allied, coalition, and interagency partners. Collaboration and an integrated approach among the supported and supporting commands, Services, and other essential stakeholders is a fundamental component of APEX to achieve unified action through an understanding of the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of the JPEC stakeholders. APEX informs the entire chain of command, including the President and SecDef, facilitating informed decisions on how, when, and where to employ the military. As a scalable process APEX can be adapted to support planning and execution with or without time constraints and under changing conditions. The planning and execution functions are depicted sequentially but can be compressed or conducted in parallel in order to meet time constraints.


(1) APEX is an iterative process. Each activity and function influences and is influenced by activities and functions which are performed and reviewed at multiple echelons of commands in overlapping timeframes. Facilitating communication and understanding of strategic guidance between these echelons of command takes place in several formats: formal strategy and policy documents; the plans review process; and via specific, individual communications with CCMDs. CCDR planning may also influence strategic direction and guidance, either during planning or execution.

¹ CJCSG 3130, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Overview and Policy Framework*

² *Ibid*

(2) APEX planning leverages existing information technology (IT) tools and doctrinal processes. IT tools enable planner collaboration and access to shared authoritative data. Doctrinal processes provide planners a variety of flexible analytical techniques for framing problems and logically developing plans or orders to accomplish missions or objectives. The APEX enterprise, including joint doctrine, policies/ procedures, and IT capabilities, facilitates the transition from planning to the effective execution of military operations. Strict adherence to policies and procedures is required to achieve unified action.

(3) The military planning and execution process is composed of four operational activities (*situational awareness, planning, execution, and assessment*) that provide an operating framework for one or more planning or execution efforts. The operational activities support leader decision-making cycles at all levels of command and civilian leadership. The planning and execution functions depict the *elements, activities, and products* that may be ongoing or under development. A sustained civilian-military dialog occurs in parallel to these activities and functions to inform decision making at all levels of the chain of command and ensure alignment with current strategic guidance (see following figure).



Military Planning and Execution Process

(4) APEX leverages CCDR design, military planning and execution and the JPP framework that forms the basis for planning. The APEX Operational Activities are discussed below, Planning Functions are discussed on pp. 2-29 to 2-30, Chapters 5 and 6, with APEX Execution Functions detailed in Chapter 7.

2. Operational Activities

a. **Operational Activities:** Operational activities are persistent and interdependent activities performed continuously by commanders and staffs at all levels of the chain of command. They provide a framework under which one or more planning or execution efforts are conducted. These are discussed in detail in the following appendices.

III. APEX Planning Functions

Planning Functions Overview

APEX encompasses four operational activities, four planning functions, seven execution functions, and a number of related products. The four planning functions are: 1) *strategic guidance*, 2) *concept development*, 3) *plan development*, and 4) *plan assessment*.¹



Planning Functions Screen Shot from Military Planning and Execution Process

APEX planning functions facilitate an early understanding of the situation, problems, objectives and measures which will lead to the production of plans or orders that can be rapidly and effectively transitioned to execution and accomplish specified military objectives and to give military options to the President and SecDef as they seek to shape the environment and respond to contingencies. These planning functions are not mechanical. Planners perform JPP steps nested within these planning functions while considering the continuous operational activities that apply to each function. Effective planners also consider design, depicted as integration of the operational activities, while performing each function.

While these functions are depicted and may be performed sequentially, planning is iterative and functions may be re-visited as the planning conditions require to include planning continuing into execution. The SecDef, CJCS, CCDR, or any other CDR may direct the planning staff to refine or adapt a plan by reentering the planning process at any of the earlier functions. The time spent accomplishing each activity and function depends on the circumstances.

¹ CJCSM 3130.06, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Policies and Procedures*

Planning Functions

Planning functions can be performed in series or in parallel as the situation dictates. During a crisis, planning functions are tailored to the time available and may be truncated, compressed, or conducted in parallel with execution functions. Instead of planning assumptions, crisis planning may be based upon the actual conditions of the operating environment.

APEX plans should be based upon strategic direction, reflect the current operating environment and limitations, and developed and documented in standardized products and formats that ages required to facilitate plan implementation and transition to execution.

Strategic Guidance - Function I (see pp. 5-9 to 5-20)

The President, SecDef, and the CJCS, with appropriate consultation, formulate suitable and feasible military objectives to counter threats. The CCDR may provide input through one or more CDR's Assessments. This function is used to develop planning guidance for preparation of COAs. This process begins with an analysis of existing strategic guidance (e.g., JSCP for contingency plans or a CJCS Warning Order, Planning Order or Alert Order for a crisis). The primary end product is a CDR's *Mission Statement* for contingency planning and a *CDR's Assessment* (OPREP-3PCA) or *CDRs Estimate* in a crisis.

Concept Development - Function II (see pp. 5-91 to 5-112)

During contingency planning, the supported CCDR develops the CCDR's CONOPS for SecDef approval, based on SecDef, CJCS, and Service Chief planning guidance and resource apportionment provided in the JSCP and Service documents. In a crisis, concept development is based on situational awareness guidance, resource allocations from approved contingency plans, and a CJCS Planning Order, or Alert Order. Using the CCDR's mission statement, CCMD planners develop preliminary COAs and staff estimates. COAs are then compared and the CCDR recommends a COA for SecDef approval in a CDR's *Estimate*. The CCDR also requests SecDef guidance on interagency coordination. The approved COA becomes the basis of the CONOPS containing conflict termination planning, supportability estimates, and, time permitting, an integrated time-phased database of force requirements, with estimated sustainment.

Plan Development - Function III (see pp. 6-1 to 6-14)

This function is used in developing an OPLAN, CONPLAN or an OPORD with applicable supporting annexes and in refining preliminary feasibility analysis. This function fully integrates mobilization, deployment, employment, conflict termination, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities. Detailed planning begins with SecDef approval for further planning in a non-crisis environment or a CJCS Warning Order, Alert Order or Planning Order in a crisis situation; it ends with a SecDef-approved Plan or OPORD.

Plan Assessment – Function IV (see pp. 6-27 to 6-32)

During this function, the CCDR refines the complete plan while supporting and subordinate CCDRs, Services and supporting agencies complete their supporting plans for his/her review and approval. CCDRs continue to develop and analyze branches and sequels as required or directed. The CCDR and the JS continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan revision or refinement.

a. The JS, Services, CCMDs, and Agencies monitor current readiness and availability status to assess sourcing impacts and refine sourcing COAs should the plan be considered for near-term execution.

b. The CCDR may conduct as many plan reviews as are required with the SecDef during Plan Assessment. These reviews could focus on branches/options and situational or assumption changes requiring major reassessment or significant plan modification/adaptation, but might also include a variety of other pertinent topics (e.g., information operations, special access programs, nuclear escalation mitigation).

Global Force Management (GFM)

The author and publisher would like to acknowledge and thank Mr. Timothy Conway for his subject matter expertise, contributions and thought-leader review to this publication and to this chapter on global force management.

"Because we cannot be certain when, where, or under what conditions the next fight will occur, the Joint Force must maintain a boxer's stance -with the strength, agility, endurance, resilience, flexibility, and awareness to fight and win against any potential adversary."

The global security environment presents an increasingly complex set of challenges and opportunities to which all elements of U.S. national power must be applied. To protect U.S. national interests and achieve the objectives of the NSS and NDS in this environment, the finite Joint Force will need to be used wisely.² Leaders must ensure the military instrument of national power is used wisely. The process to inform the leaders of the options, risks and COAs requires a process that evaluates the ends, ways, means, and risks of using military forces to pursue strategic and operational objectives is complex. GFM is the process to determine which forces are employed at acceptable risk to current and future strategic and operational objectives. To build the Joint Force for the future requires a continuous recalibration of its capabilities and making those additional investments allowing us to succeed in all missions. Determining the best Joint Force of the future should be informed by near term force needs and shortfalls, which is done through the GFM assessments.

GFM integrates complementary directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment, and assessment (DR4A) information into force management and force-planning constructs to support the Department's strategic direction.(Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG))

The DoD's enduring mission is to provide combat-credible military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of our nation. Should deterrence fail, the Joint Force is prepared to win. Reinforcing America's traditional tools of diplomacy, the Department provides military options to ensure the President and our diplomats negotiate from a position of strength. The experiences with operations such as Operation Urgent Response in Haiti while continuing to execute combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that even while sourcing major combat operations in one part of the world, we may be called upon to react to a crisis in disparate regions of the globe. An earthquake in one AOR while conducting major operations in another can have a rippling impact on force sourcing for current operations and long-term security planning.

Per the NDS long-term strategic competitions with our adversaries are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats these adversaries pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future. Concurrently, the Department will sustain its efforts to deter and counter rogue regimes, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate our gains while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.³ To remain dominant within this complex and uncertain security land-

¹ 2018 National Military Strategy Framework, Joseph Dunford Jr., 19th Chairman of the JCS

² National Defense Strategy (NDS)

³ Ibid.

scape the ability to **dynamically align the force pool** must improve and keep pace with the complexity of the operational environment. The wicked problem of balancing the force against global and institutional demand requires strict purposeful design to allow for timely and informed decisions and to ultimately satisfy the broadest array of objectives.

1. Purpose

This chapter provides an overview of the GFM process, which starts and ends with the SecDef. In accordance with 10 U.S.C. §§ 113, 153, 162, and 163, the SecDef directs the Services to provide ready and available forces, assigns and allocates forces/capabilities, provides planning guidance to CCMDs and provides overarching strategic guidance to CCMDs and the Chairman. The Chairman, in turn, recommends integrated solutions to employ the force to achieve the SecDef direction and develops strategic-level planning guidance including apportioned forces/capabilities to CCMDs for adaptive planning. CCMDs use apportioned forces as an assumption in developing plans and to coordinate force/capability planning requirements with the CJCS based on the SecDef's guidance.

The GFM processes directs the Services to provide sufficient ready and available forces to execute the NDS via the Directed Readiness Tables (DRT), distributes forces among the CCDR's via the assignment of forces, provides a process to temporarily adjust the distribution of forces among the CCDR's to meet dynamic challenges worldwide via the allocation process, provides apportioned forces, which is the Services' estimate of the number of forces that can reasonably be made available over a general timeline, should we be faced with executing a major operation and constantly assesses the results. The end result is a sufficient capacity of forces to execute the NDS, a risk-informed distribution of forces among the CCDRs and a starting point to begin resource-informed planning. To ensure the Joint Force remains relevant in meeting both current and future challenges, the GFM assessment processes compare supply with demands.

2. Scope

Strategic objectives are specified in strategic guidance documents, such as the NDS, DPG, and the JSCP. The Secretary also communicates strategic direction through the Chairman in the form of orders or other written or verbal communications. These strategic objectives specify the desired ends that plans and operations articulate the ways to achieve. The NDS provides a comprehensive framework to prioritize strategic objectives to shape the planning and execution of military actions to pursue the objectives. It addresses the fundamental need to focus and apply finite resources. The resources employed in military planning and execution include interagency contract, coalition, DoD Expeditionary Civilian (DoD-EC), but are predominately military forces.

The force development processes identify, prioritize, and build the size and type of future forces necessary to pursue a strategy with acceptable risk. The Secretary through directed readiness specifies the force that must be ready and available to be employed quickly and used in creative ways.

Contingency and other plans and orders to achieve these objectives propose and direct a way to achieve the specified ends. Since campaign and contingency plans often rely on the same force pool, forces need to be prepared to execute any potential operations related to the desired objectives (ends) while also executing current operations and conducting military activities in pursuit of near-term objectives. The GFM assignment and allocation processes are the command and control (C2) mechanisms the Secretary uses to posture and distribute forces (means) as one of the means to enable CCDRs to conduct operations and military activities to achieve strategic and operational objectives (ways) at acceptable risk.

The strategic environment will continue to be complex, dynamic and uncertain. The United States military will continue to be involved globally in executing GCPs, CCPs, other campaign and contingency plans, and ongoing operations, while being prepared to respond to domestic and overseas crises in support of National Security, National Defense and

National Military Strategies.⁴ Success in this environment requires a coherent use of the force pool among the competing priorities in both planning and execution. This is achieved by the integrated use of the GFM process of directed readiness, assignment, allocation, apportionment and assessment (DR4A). The goal of these processes is to provide CCDRs the forces to best support U.S. Military objectives (both current and potential future) using assigned and allocated forces to accomplish missions while mitigating military risk. Directed readiness directs the Services to provide enough ready and available forces to execute the NDS. To allow feasible plans to be developed, CCDRs are provided force planning assumptions based on analysis of the force pool. The number of forces that are reasonably expected to be available, (globally, not to a specific plan or CCDR) over a general timeframe should the plan be executed, are called apportioned forces. The US Military is tasked to execute the NDS objectives, which focus on major power competition. To restore readiness and build a credible deterrent force requires either building more forces or using the Services' capacity to field forces at less than the Services' maximum capacity. As the US Military continues to face unpredictable fiscal challenges, the wise use of forces to meet the many global demands will become more and more important.

a. CCDRs are directed by strategic guidance and direction, and various orders, to plan and execute operations and missions. CCDRs are assigned forces that are to be used to accomplish those operations and missions; however, in the dynamic world environment, competing missions may require adjusting the distribution of assigned forces among the CCDRs and Services through allocation. Each allocation decision involves tasking a CCDR, Secretary of a Military Department, or director of DOD Agency to provide a force or individual to another CCDR. This involves risk to not only the providing Service and/or CCDR, but also to other ongoing operations, campaign and contingency plans across the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC).⁵

b. Dynamic Force Employment (DFE).⁶ The NDS sets priorities to compete, deter, dissuade and, if necessary, defeat priority threats while continuing to conduct global anti-violent extremist organization operations. It focuses attention on the strategic priorities. To counter and compete with multiple adversaries while continuing to resource forces globally for continued operations requires the force to be utilized more dynamically and in a more integrated manner, this is why the NDS introduced the DFE concept.

The Secretary assigns and allocates forces to CCMDs. For the CCMDs to employ those forces those forces need to be ready and available. The GFM process begins with direction to the Services to build enough ready and available forces to execute the NDS and keep our military advantage into the future. This direction is contained in the GFMIG in the DRT. To comply with the DRT the Services adjust their force development and force generation processes. Previously, the assignment and allocation processes began with the CCMDs submitting force requirements to execute their UCP assigned missions, tasked operations, and other military activities in their campaign plans.


The allocation process now begins with developing Top-Down Guidance that the Joint Staff, ICW the Services develop a plan to align the forces against the NDS specified strategic priorities, the Global Campaign Plans, and the CCMD campaign plans while maintaining a credible deterrent of ready and available forces. When the Chairman approves the Top-Down Guidance, the CCDRs develop and submit their requirements. The Joint Force Coordinator (JS JFC)* and JFPs consider the CCDRs submission as bottom-up refinement to the plan. The significant change postures the force against the strategic priorities first. Changes to the strategic posture in the Top-Down Guidance to pursue operational objectives are considered in light of the risks to the strategic priorities. In the end, CCMDs may not get all the forces they want and assume operational risk in order to minimize strategic

⁴ SecDef directed GFM procedures are contained in the GFMIG, NDS, NMS, CPG, and CJCSM 3130.06.

⁵ Joint Planning and Execution Community. See JP 5-0, Joint Planning

⁶ Global Force Management Implementation Guidance

Force Pool



Force Pool (GFMIG).

Service Retained Forces – AC and RC operational forces under the administrative control of respective Secretaries of the Military Departments, and not assigned to a CCDR. These forces remain under the administrative control of their respective Services and are commanded by a Service-designated Commander responsible to the Service unless allocated to a CCDR for the execution of operational missions. GFMIG


Unassigned Forces – Forces not assigned to a CCDR IAW 10 U.S.C. § 162, and instead remain under Service control in order to carry out functions of the Secretary of a Military Department IAW 10 U.S.C. §§ 3013(b), 5013(b), and 8013(b). GFMIG

Employed Forces crosses the dashed line and into the Institutional Service Forces box. Apportioned forces are calculated by subtracting global demand from the assigned forces, and the fact that some assigned forces are employed performing Service institutional missions or are performing missions for their assigned CCDR, the employed and apportioned forces in the previous figure (*Force Pool*) overlap. CCDR force requests are constantly changing to respond to world events. The number of forces employed and ordered to be employed by the CCMDs is considered in order to estimate the number of forces left that can reasonably be expected to be available, or apportioned.

b. 10 U.S.C. §§ 161, 162, 167 and 167b outline force assignment guidance and requirements. The President, through the UCP, instructs the Secretary to document his direction for assigning forces in the "Forces For." Pursuant to 10, U.S.C., § 162, the Secretaries of the Military Departments shall assign forces under their jurisdiction to unified and specified combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. Such assignment defines the Combatant Command Authority (COCOM) and shall be made as directed by the Secretary, including direction as to the command to which forces are to be assigned.

3. GFM Principles

a. DFE Force Management Framework. The following figure illustrates the conceptual force-planning construct that frames the conversation about balancing risk to strategy with risk to force inside a given fiscal year. It depicts the entire force pool and how it is being employed. It depicts the strategy-based demand signal for a ready and available credible deterrent force generated by the Secretary. The framework also captures assigned and allocated forces being employed to execute GCPs and CCDR operational missions as well as the forces undergoing reset in the Services force generation process. Finally, it depicts the institutional forces that perform Military Department statutory responsibilities. Examples of institutional forces include recruiting, training, and material commands as well as the Service HQs. The Incident Response Force (IRF) and Contingency Response Force (CRF) represent the different levels of directed readiness.



DFE Force Management Framework

Chap 3


II. Force Identification & Sourcing

a. **Overview.** Within the GFM process there are three methodologies utilized to provide CCDRs with requested capabilities for planning, assessment or execution. The intent is to provide the CCDR with the most capable forces based on stated capability requirements, balanced against risks (operational, future challenges, force management, institutional) and global priorities.

b. **Force Providers (FPs).** In accordance with the GFMIG FPs include Secretaries of the Military Departments, CCDRs with assigned forces, the United States Coast Guard, DOD agencies, and OSD organizations that provide force sourcing solutions to CCDR force requirements.

c. **Force Providing.** There are three types of forces identified within the GFM process depending upon the fidelity and endstate required; preferred force identification (planning only), contingency sourcing (plan assessment) and execution sourcing. Within the range of these methodologies, execution and contingency are most prevalent because the force sourcing process generally results in an endstate in which the JFPs identify units to satisfy a capability requirement for either assessment or execution. The following paragraphs clarify and describe the meaning of these broad categories and related terms.

d. **Preferred Force Identification.** Don't confuse preferred force identification with apportionment. The differences are discussed below and illustrated in the following figure.



Force Sourcing

1. Preferred Forces

a. **Overview.** Preferred forces are forces that are identified by the supported CCDR in order to continue employment, sustainment, and transportation planning and assess risk. These forces are planning assumptions only, are not considered "sourced" units, and do not indicate that these forces will be contingency or execution sourced.

- To the degree the CCDR is able to make good assumptions with respect to preferred forces for planning, the JFPs will begin with a higher fidelity solution should the plan be designated for contingency or execution sourcing.
- CCMD Service/functional components are encouraged to work with JFPs and their components to make the best possible assumptions with respect to preferred forces for planning.
- The preferred forces identified for the plan by the CCDR should not be greater than the forces apportioned for planning unless granted permission to do so by the CJCS or designated representative.

b. Forces found in the Apportionment Tables are types of combat and related support forces provided to CCDRs as a starting point for planning purposes only. Quarterly the

III. Force Planning

1. Force Planning and the GFM Process

a. **GFM Process during Planning.** The apportionment tables provide the number of forces reasonably expected to be available for planning. These tables should be used as a beginning assumption in planning. As the plan is refined, there may be forces identified that are required above and beyond those apportioned. Those forces should be requested, as required, to be augmented above the number apportioned for planning, or “augmentation forces.” The CJCS may approve planning to continue with the revised assumption of using the identified augmentation forces. These augmentation forces are then allotted for planning. However, should the plan be executed, planners should be prepared for the risk associated with the potential of those “augmentation forces” not being available.

(1) Throughout Concept Development and plan development functions of planning, planners continually assess and refine the plan. To enable the assessments, the planners must assume that units are allotted to the identified plan force requirements and to enable plan assessments, planners identify preferred forces. As the plan is refined, the level of analysis used to identify preferred forces usually increases. Since contingency plans rely on a foundation of assumptions, if an event occurs that necessitates execution of a contingency plan, the planning assumptions have to be re-validated. The planners will usually verify planning assumptions against the unfolding event and re-perform planning functions from Strategic Guidance to Plan Assessment, as required to adapt it to the realities surrounding the event rather than transitioning directly to execution. These planning functions may be performed very deliberately or in a time constrained environment, as time allows.

(2) As a contingency plan is either approved or nearing approval, the CJCS or, if delegated, the DJS may direct the JS JFC/JFPs to contingency source a plan to support CJCS and/or SecDef's strategic risk assessments or IPRs. CCDRs may request contingency sourcing of specific plans. These requests are evaluated by the JS J5 and a contingency sourcing schedule is presented to the GFMB. The GFMB endorses the schedule and the CJCS orders the JS JFC/ JFPs to contingency source specific plans per the schedule (see Contingency Sourcing).

b. **GFM Process during a Crisis.** The same planning steps that are used to develop contingency plans are used during a crisis, but the time to conduct the planning is constrained to the time available. For planning during a crisis, preferred force identification is used the same as it was during contingency planning. Contingency sourcing is rarely used for a crisis due to the time constraints involved, but if time allows, the option exists for the CJCS to direct JS JFC/JFPs to contingency source a plan.

(1) In planning, the difference in force planning is the level of detail done with the force requirements for the plan. With contingency plans the number of planning assumptions prevents generating the detailed force requirements needed by the JS JFC/JFPs to begin execution sourcing. During crisis planning, a known event has occurred and there are fewer assumptions. The focus of crisis planning is usually on transitioning to execution quickly. The detailed information requirements specified to support the execution sourcing process, either emergent or annual, preclude completion until most assumptions are validated.

(2) CCDRs usually have a good understanding of the availability of their assigned forces. Availability entails the readiness of the unit, as well as the unit's time in the deployment cycle and whether it meets SecDef deployment-to-dwell (D2D) ratio requirements,

I. (JIPOE) Joint Intel Prep of the Opn Environment

MISSION ANALYSIS and JOINT INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION of the OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT (JIPOE)

"Nothing is more worthy of the attention of a good general than the endeavor to penetrate the designs of the enemy."

Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses on Livy, 1517

1. JIPOE Overview

a. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE) is the analytical process used by joint intelligence organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and other intelligence products in support of the commander's decision-making process. It is a continuous process that involves four major steps: (1) defining the total operational environment; (2) describing the impact of the operational environment; (3) evaluating the adversary; and (4) determining and describing adversary potential courses of action (COAs), particularly the adversary's most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to friendly forces and mission accomplishment.

b. The process is used to analyze the physical domains (air, land, maritime and space); the information environment (which includes cyberspace), political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII) systems; and all other relevant aspects of the operational environment, and to determine an adversary's capabilities to operate within that environment. JIPOE products are used by joint force, component, and supporting command staffs in preparing their estimates and are also applied during the analysis and selection of friendly COAs.


2. JIPOE and the Intelligence Cycle

a. JIPOE is a dynamic process that both supports, and is supported by, each of the categories of intelligence operations that comprise the intelligence process.

(1) JIPOE and Intelligence Planning and Direction. The JIPOE process provides the basic data and assumptions regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that help the CDR and staff identify intelligence requirements, information requirements, and collection requirements. By identifying known adversary capabilities, and applying those against the impact of the operational environment, JIPOE provides the conceptual basis for the CDR to visualize and understand how the adversary might threaten the command or interfere with mission accomplishment. This analysis forms the basis for developing the commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), which seek to answer those questions the CDR considers vital to the accomplishment of the assigned mission. Additionally, by identifying specific adversary COAs and COGs, JIPOE provides the basis for wargaming in which the staff "fights" each friendly and adversary COA. This wargaming process identifies decisions the CDR must make during execution and allows the J-2 to develop specific intelligence requirements to facilitate those

¹ JP 2-01-3, *Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.

decisions. JIPOE also identifies other critical information gaps regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment, which form the basis of a collection strategy that synchronizes and prioritizes collection needs and utilization of resources within the phases of the operation.²



JIPOE and the Intelligence Cycle (JP 2-01.3).

(2) JIPOE and Intelligence Collection. JIPOE provides the foundation for the development of an optimal intelligence collection strategy by enabling analysts to identify the time, location, and type of anticipated adversary activity corresponding to each potential adversary COA. JIPOE products include several tools that facilitate the refinement of information requirements into specific collection requirements. JIPOE templates facilitate the analysis of all identified adversary COAs and identify named areas of interest (NAIs) where specified adversary activity, associated with each COA, may occur. JIPOE matrices are also produced that describe the indicators associated with each specified adversary activity. In addition to specifying the anticipated locations and type of adversary activity, JIPOE templates and matrices also forecast the times when such activity may occur, and can therefore facilitate the sequencing of intelligence collection requirements and the identification of the most effective methods of intelligence collection.

(3) JIPOE and Processing and Exploitation. The JIPOE process provides a disciplined yet dynamic time-phased methodology for optimizing the processing and exploiting of large amounts of data. The process enables JIPOE analysts to remain focused on the most critical aspects of the operational environment, especially the adversary. Incoming information and reports can be rapidly incorporated into existing JIPOE graphics, templates, and matrices. In this way, JIPOE products not only serve as excellent processing tools, but also provide a convenient medium for displaying the most up-to-date information, identifying critical information gaps, and supporting operational and campaign assessments.

(4) JIPOE and Analysis and Production. JIPOE products provide the foundation for the J-2's intelligence estimate. In fact, the JIPOE process parallels the paragraph sequence of the intelligence estimate format.³

² See JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence*, for a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between intelligence requirements and information requirements. See JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, for detailed guidance on the request for information (RFI) process.

³ See JP 2-01.3, *JIPOE for greater details*.

4-2 (JIPOE & IPIE) I. Joint Intel Prep of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)

CCDR may authorize the establishment of a JTF-level JIOC based on the scope, duration, and mission of the unit or JTF. A JTF JIOC is normally larger than a JISE and is responsible for complete air, space, ground, and maritime order of battle (OB) analysis; identification of adversary COGs; analysis of command and control (C2) and communications systems, targeting support; collection management; and maintenance of a 24-hour watch. Additionally, the JTF JIOC (if formed) serves as the focal point for planning, coordinating, and conducting JIPOE analysis and production at the subordinate joint force level. Most important, DIOCC forward element personnel and liaison officers from DOD intelligence organizations provide the JTF JIOC with the means to obtain national support for the JIPOE effort. The JTF JIOC conducts its JIPOE analysis in conjunction with all other appropriate joint force and component command staff elements, particularly the Geospatial Information and Services (GI&S) and METOC staff officers.

(6) Subordinate Component Commands. The intelligence staffs of the subordinate component commands should ensure that appropriate IPB products are prepared for each domain in which the component command operates. Subordinate component commands should evaluate the specific factors in the operational environment that will affect friendly, neutral, and adversary COAs in and around their operational area and impact perceptions and support within their Area of Interest (AOI). More importantly, the analysis of the operational environment should better define those who are potentially friendly, potentially neutral, and potentially adversarial and the actions which would determine their orientation. These component command IPB products provide a level of detail and expertise that the J-2 should not attempt to duplicate, but must draw upon in order to form an integrated or "total" picture of an adversary's joint capabilities and probable COAs. Accordingly, the component commands should coordinate their IPB effort with the J-2 and with other component commands that have overlapping IPB responsibilities. This will ensure their IPB products are coordinated and disseminated in time to support the joint force's JIPOE effort.

(7) The Operations Directorate (J-3) and/or the Plans Directorate (J-5) Representative. The J-3 and/or J-5 ensure that all participants in the JIPOE effort are continuously updated on planning for both current and follow-on missions as well as on any anticipated change to the operational area. The J-3 and/or J-5 representative consolidates information on our own dispositions and provides the cell a clear understanding of friendly COGs, capabilities, and vulnerabilities. The J-3 and/or J-5 will conduct wargames that test friendly COAs against the complete set of adversary COAs developed during the JIPOE process. Based on the results of these wargames, the J-3 and/or J-5 will refine and determine the probability of success of each friendly COA against each adversary COA identified during the JIPOE process, and will make a recommendation to the CDR regarding which friendly COA best accomplishes the joint mission within the CDR's guidance and intent.⁴

*"Know the enemy, know yourself -- your victory will never be endangered.
Know the ground, know the weather -- your victory will then be total."*

Sun Tzu
The Art of War, C. 500 B.C.


3. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)

a. JIPOE is a continuous process which enables CDRs and their staffs to visualize the full spectrum of adversary capabilities and potential COAs across all dimensions of the operational environment. JIPOE is a process that assists analysts to identify facts and assumptions about the operational environment and the adversary. This facilitates campaign planning and the development of friendly COAs by the joint force staff. JIPOE provides the basis for intelligence direction and synchronization that supports the COA selected by the CDR. JI-

⁴ For more detailed guidance, see JP 2-01, *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*.

4-4 (JIPOE & IPIE) I. Joint Intel Prep of the Operational Environment (JIPOE)

(1) Products developed during this step might include overlays and matrices that depict the military effects of geography, meteorological (METOC) factors, demographics, and the electromagnetic and cyberspace environments. The primary product from JIPOE produced in Step 2 is the *Modified Combined Operations Overlay* (MCOO) and is shown in the following figure. The MCOO is “a JIPOE product used to portray the effects of each battlespace dimension on military operations. It normally depicts militarily significant aspects of the operational environment, such as obstacles restricting military movement, key geography, and military objectives.”⁶ Areas of the operational environment where the terrain predominantly favors one COA over others should be identified and graphically depicted. The most effective graphic technique is to construct a MCOO by depicting (in addition to the restricted and severely restricted areas already shown) such items as avenues of approach and mobility corridors, counter-mobility obstacle systems, defensible terrain, engagement areas, and key terrain.⁷



(2) A MCOO generally has standardized overlays associated with it. However, it is not a standardized product with respect to what it should portray simply because a CDR's requirements are based on his mission and intent – and they differ with each operation. Therefore, the MCOO should portray the relevant information necessary to support the CDR's understanding of the battlespace and decision-making process in context with his mission and intent. The results of terrain analysis should be disseminated to the joint force staff as soon as possible by way of the intelligence estimate (included in the order), documented analysis of the operational area, and the MCOO.

(3) Operational environments that you may be analyzing are broken down into dimensions, as follows:


- | | |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| • Land Dimension | • Cyberspace Dimension |
| • Maritime Dimension | • Human Dimension |
| • Air Dimension | • Analysis of Weather and Effects |
| • Space Dimension | • Other Characteristics of the OE |
| • Electromagnetic Dimension | |

⁶ DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (DOD Dictionary)

⁷ Refer to Joint Pub 2-01.3 JIPOE for more information concerning the types of MCOOs generated during step 2 of JIPOE.

(a) Land Dimension.


Analysis of the land dimension of the operational environment concentrates on terrain features such as transportation systems (road and bridge information), surface materials, ground water, natural obstacles such as large bodies of water and mountains, the types and distribution of vegetation, and the configuration of surface drainage and weather. Observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, avenues of approach, and mobility corridors are examples of what is required to be evaluated to understand the terrain effects on your plan.



Land MCOO (JP 2-01.3).

(b) Maritime Dimension.

The maritime dimension of the operational environment is the sea and littoral environment in which all naval operations take place, including sea control, power projection, and amphibious operations. Key military aspects of the maritime environment can include maneuver space and chokepoints; natural harbors and anchorages; ports, airfields, and naval bases; sea lines of communications (SLOCs), and the hydrographic and topographic characteristics of the ocean floor and littoral land masses.



Maritime MCOO (JP 2-01.3).

identify the COA the adversary is most likely to adopt, and the COA that would be most dangerous to the friendly force or to mission accomplishment.

(1) The first activity in JIPOE Step four is to identify *the adversary's likely objectives and desired endstate* by analyzing the current adversary military and political situation, strategic and operational capabilities, and the country characteristics of the adversary nation, if applicable. The JIPOE analyst should begin by identifying the adversary's overall strategic objective, which will form the basis for identifying subordinate objectives and desired endstates.

(2) During this step, a consolidated list of all potential adversary COAs is constructed. At a minimum this list will include; (1) all COAs that the adversary's doctrine considers appropriate to the current situation and accomplishment of likely objectives, (2) all adversary COAs that could significantly influence the friendly mission, even if the adversary's doctrine considers them suboptimal under current conditions, and (3) all adversary COAs indicated by recent activities or events. Each COA is generated based on what we know of the adversary and how they operate (learned from Step three of JIPOE) to determine if the adversary can in fact accomplish the COA. If not, it is eliminated. J-2 analysts study how an adversary operates compared to the environment it must operate within, which we analyzed during Step two of JIPOE. Essentially, they superimpose the doctrinal adversary mode of operation on the environment. The result of this analysis is a full set of identified adversary COAs – time permitting. Adversary COAs that meet specific criteria are then completed. Much like friendly forces determine if their COAs meet specific criteria, J-2 personnel must also weigh the identified adversary COAs against certain criteria. The criteria generally includes: (1) *suitability*, (2) *feasibility*, (3) *acceptability*, (4) *uniqueness*, and (5) *consistency with their own doctrine*.

(3) Each COA should be developed in the amount of detail that time allows. Subject to the amount of time available for analysis, each adversary COA is developed in sufficient detail to describe, (1) the type of military operation, (2) the earliest time military action could commence, (3) the location of the sectors, zones of attack, avenues of approach, and objectives that make up the COA, (4) the OPLAN, to include scheme of maneuver and force dispositions, and (5) the objective or desired endstate. Each COA should be developed in the order of its probability of adoption, and should consist of a situation template, a description of the COA, and a listing of HVTs.

(4) A full set of identified adversary COAs are evaluated and ranked according to their likely order of adoption. The purpose of the prioritized list of adversary COAs is to provide a CDR and his staff with a starting point for the development of an OPLAN that takes into consideration the most likely adversary COA as well as the adversary COA most dangerous to the friendly force or mission accomplishment. The primary products produced in JIPOE Step four are the situation template and matrix, and the event template and matrix.⁸

Refer to JP 2-01.3, JIPOE, for a more in-depth discussion of the relationship between the JPP and JIPOE.

⁸ For more information on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, *Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment*.


Chap 4

II. (IPIE) Intel Preparation of the Info Environment

1. Intelligence Preparation of the Information Environment (IPIE)

a. Overview. IPIE continues to evolve as we realize how critical a thorough understanding of the information environment is in modern warfare, and how valuable an accurate portrayal of the information environment is in facilitating effective planning and execution of information operations. However, to be valid, IPIE must be conducted as part of the J-2's JIPOE efforts. If conducted in isolation, IPIE will fail to provide a picture of the information environment consistent with the other operating environments (i.e., land, sea, air, and space) and threat COAs generated by the J-2 staff.

Impact of the Information Environment on Military Operations




JIPOE
& IPIE

b. The information environment is where humans observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore the principal environment of decision making. This environment is pervasive to all activities worldwide, and is a common backdrop for the air, land, maritime, and space physical domains of the CDR's operational environment. The actors in the information environment include military and civilian leaders, decision makers, individuals, and organizations. Resources include the information itself and the materials and systems employed to collect, analyze, apply, disseminate, and display information and produce information-related products such as reports, orders, and leaflets. **Cyberspace** is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Within cyberspace, electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum are used to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems. Significant characteristics of the information environment can be further evaluated within physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions.

Joint Planning Process (Overview)

1. Joint Planning Process (JPP) Overview

JPP is an orderly, analytical process, which consists of a set of logical steps to examine a mission; develop, analyze, and compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a plan or order. The application of operational design as explained in Chapter IV of JP 5-0 provides the conceptual basis for structuring campaigns and operations. JPP provides a proven process to organize the work of the commander, staff, subordinate commanders, and other partners, to develop plans that will appropriately address the problem to be solved. It focuses on defining the military mission and development and synchronization of detailed plans to accomplish that mission. Commanders and staffs can apply the thinking methodology (operational art and design) to discern the correct mission, develop creative and adaptive CONOPS to accomplish the mission, and synchronize those CONOPS so that they can be executed. Together with design, JPP facilitates interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate and supporting headquarters throughout planning. JPP helps commanders and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander's intent, and develop effective plans and orders. The following figure shows the 7 Steps and 4 Functions of the JPP.



The Joint Planning Process Primary Steps and Functions

- a. The seven-step JPP process aligns with the four Planning Functions of APEX discussed in Chapter 2-3, *Planning Functions*, which culminates with a published Operations Order (OPORD) in a crisis and an OPLAN, Concept Plan (CONPLAN), Base Plan or CDRs Estimate during contingency planning.¹
- b. The four APEX Planning Functions are: *Strategic Guidance*, *Concept Development*, *Plan Development*, and *Plan Assessment*. Each of these functions is further broken down into JPP steps, 1-7 as seen in the following figures.

Planning Functions			
I. Strategic Guidance	II. Concept Development	III. Plan Development	IV. Plan Assessment
1- Planning Initiation	3- COA Development	7- Plan Development	- Refine
2- Mission Analysis	4- COA Analysis		- Adapt
	5- COA Comparison		- Terminate
	6- COA Approval		- Execute


Joint Planning Functions

The first two JPP steps (planning initiation and mission analysis) take place during the Strategic Guidance planning function. The next four JPP steps (COA development, COA analysis and wargaming, COA comparison, and COA approval) align under the Concept Development planning function. The final JPP step (plan or order development) occurs during the Plan Development planning function. While there is no JPP step associated with the Plan Assessment planning function, plans and orders are assessed with the RATE methodology in mind.

- Function I – Strategic Guidance consists of two steps: 1-Planning Initiation and 2-Mission Analysis.
- Function II – Concept Development consists of four steps: 3-COA Development, 4-COA Analysis and Wargaming, 5-COA Comparison and 6-COA Approval.
- Function III – Plan Development consists of 7-Plan or Order Development.
- Function IV – Plan Assessment. While there is no JPP step associated with the APEX plan assessment planning function, plans and orders are assessed with refine, adapt, terminate, execute (RATE) methodology in mind. See Chapter 6-3, *Plan Assessment*, and JP 5-0 Chapter VI, *Operation Assessment*.

¹ JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

c. JPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting CCDRs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the CCDR, staff, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning. JPP helps CCDRs and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and CCDR's intent, and develop effective plans and orders.



Joint Planning Process Steps and Products

d. JPP is applicable for all planning. Like operational design, it is a logical process to approach a problem and determine a solution. It is a tool to be used by planners but is not prescriptive. Based on the nature of the problem, other tools available to the planner, expertise in the planning team, time, and other considerations, the process can be modified as required. Similarly, some JPP steps or tasks may be performed concurrently, truncated, or modified as necessary dependent upon the situation, subject, or time constraints of the planning effort. For example, force planning, as an element of plan development, is different for campaign planning and contingency planning.²

e. In a crisis, the steps of JPP may be conducted simultaneously to speed the process. Supporting commands and organizations often conduct JPP simultaneously and iteratively with the supported CCMD. In these cases, once mission analysis begins it continues until the operation is complete. Moreover, steps 4-7 are repeated as often as necessary to integrate new requirements (missions) into the development of the plan.

²JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*.

II. Mission Analysis Overview & Key Steps



I. Step 2 to JPP — Mission Analysis

1. Mission Analysis Overview

The mission analysis process helps to build a common understanding of the problem to be solved and boundaries within which to solve it by key stakeholders. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the commander and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand.

a. The CDR is responsible for analyzing the mission and restating the mission for subordinate CDRs to begin their own estimate and planning efforts. Mission analysis is used to study the assigned mission and to identify all tasks necessary to accomplish it. Mission analysis is critical because it provides direction to the CDR and the staff, enabling them to focus effectively on the problem at hand. ***There is perhaps no step more critical to the JPP and a successful plan.***

b. A primary consideration for a supported CCDR during mission analysis is the national strategic endstate and that set of national objectives and related guidance that define strategic success from the President's perspective. The endstate and national objectives will reflect the broadly expressed Political, Military, Economic, Social, Informational, Infrastructure (PMESII) and other circumstances that should exist after the conclusion of a campaign or operation. The CCDR also must consider multinational objectives associated with coalition or alliance operations.

c. The supported CCDR typically will specify a theater strategic endstate. While it will mirror many of the objectives of the national strategic endstate, the theater strategic endstate may contain other supporting objectives and conditions. This endstate normally will represent a point in time and/or circumstance beyond which the President does not require the military instrument of national power as the primary means to achieve remaining objectives of the national strategic endstate.

d. CCDRs include a discussion of the national strategic endstate and objectives in their initial planning guidance. This ensures that joint forces understand what the President wants the situation to look like at the conclusion of U.S. involvement. The CCDR and subordinate JFCs typically include the military endstate in their CDR's intent statement.

e. During mission analysis, it is essential that the tasks (specified and essential task(s)) and their purposes are clearly stated to ensure planning encompasses all requirements; limitations (restraints-can't do, or constraints-must do) on actions that the CCDR or subordinate forces may take are understood; and the correlation between the CDRs' mission and intent, and those of higher, and other CDRs is understood.


f. The joint force's mission is the task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. The CCDR and staff can accomplish mission analysis through a number of logical tasks. Of these two, the purpose is preeminent. The CCDR can adjust his task to ensure he accomplishes the purpose. This is a critical aspect of mission type orders and the ability of subordinate CDRs to re-task themselves during rapidly changing circumstances and still fulfill the CDR's intent.

g. While all of these tasks will be addressed during the plan development process, it is critical to focus on the mission essential task(s) to ensure unity of effort and maximum use of limited resources. The mission essential task(s) defines success of the assigned mission.

h. Although some Key-Steps occur before others, mission analysis typically involves substantial parallel processing (spiral development) of information by the CDR and staff, particularly in a crisis situation. A primary example is the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (JIPOE). JIPOE is a continuous process that includes defining the operational environment, describing the effects of the operational environment, evaluating the adversary, and determining and describing adversary potential and most dangerous COA(s). This planning process must begin at the earliest stage of campaign or operations planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. This is also true for logistics, medical, transportation, force and deployment planning to name just a few.


2. Planner Organization

Organizing the planning team and setting goals and objectives within a specific timeline can sometimes be as time consuming as the plan itself. If you enter the planning process with the following information/guidelines defined and understood, the actual planning process will go much smoother:



Identifying Centers of Gravity

Understanding PMESII systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships will change over time will increase the JFC's knowledge of how actions within a system can affect other system components. Among other benefits, this perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources from which to gain indications and warning, and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex interaction of friendly, adversary, and neutral systems. A systems understanding also supports operational design by enhancing elements such as centers of gravity, LOOs, and decisive points. This helps commanders and their staffs visualize and design a broad approach to mission accomplishment early in the planning process, which makes detailed planning more efficient. For example, the figure on the right (JP 5-0) depicts the critical capabilities, critical requirements, and critical vulnerabilities associated with two of the adversary's strategic and operational COGs.



Analyzing Critical Factors

"The traditional military-centric single center of gravity focus that worked so well in the cold war doesn't allow us to accurately analyze, describe, and visualize today's emerging networked, adaptable, asymmetric adversary. This adversary has no single identifiable 'source of all power.' Rather, because of globalization, the information revolution, and, in some cases, the non-state characteristic of our adversary, this form of adversary can only be described (and holistically attacked) as a system of systems."

*Insights on Joint Operations: The Art and Science,
Gen (Ret) Gary Luck, September 2005.*


d. Center of Gravity Determination.⁴⁰ (The discussion which frames the COG analysis process is provided mainly by Dr. Patrick Sweeny, Professor at the NWC and Citadel). While primarily a strategic and operational level concern, the identification of both the enemy and friendly COG is an essential element of any plan. If the staff gets this part wrong, the operation will at best be inefficient and, at worst, end in failure. The commander and staff should be deeply involved in a dialogue with the higher joint force headquarters planning staff during this critical analysis. While tactical-level organizations may not be party to the formulation of a COG analysis, they most certainly will be participants in the execution of the resulting tactical objectives and tasks that are derived from the analysis. Therefore, even tactical commanders and their planning staffs should be familiar with the process and reasoning used for the COGs analysis in order to place their own operations in the proper context.

e. The purpose of this section is to provide the planner with a brief review of each of the information requirements displayed earlier in this chapter. This section is not intended to replace the extensive study of the nuances of COG analysis that all planners should strive to master; rather, it is intended to identify information requirements and to offer some considerations in the application of the collected data. The reader will note that the JPP has the staff collecting information for both the enemy and friendly COGs. Neither can be identified nor considered in a vacuum—a common staff planning mistake. The struggle between opposing forces employing their unique means and ways to achieve their respective ends (objectives) is a dynamic that can only be appreciated if they are viewed collectively. While the explanations and examples provided below are for enemy COGs analysis, the process is the same for determining and analyzing friendly COGs. The only differences are in the planning actions taken once the analysis is completed. Planners develop courses of action that focus on defeating the enemy's COG while at the same time mitigating risks to their own COG.

f. The Center of Gravity Flow Chart, on the following page, illustrates the flow used to identify a COG and to determine the ways in which it can be attacked. Each step of the process, as it corresponds to the numbers in the figure is described below. Later in this section an example, Desert Storm Enemy COG Analysis, is provided.

(1) Step 1: Identifying the Objective(s). Identifying the objective is a critical first step. Before one can determine a COG, the objective(s) must be identified. If this portion of the analysis is flawed, then the error infects the remainder of the process. The planner should first determine the ultimate (strategic or operational) objectives and then the supporting intermediate (operational or major tactical) objectives. The operational objectives should show a direct relationship to the strategic objectives. If this linkage between strategic and operational objectives cannot be established, the objectives are suspect. Objectives, and particularly strategic objectives, usually have requirements/tasks that fall primarily into the responsibility of instruments of power other than the military. These are still important to identify since the military may have a supporting role in their accomplishment.

⁴⁰ Sweeny, Dr. Patrick C., *Naval War College, NWC 4111H, Joint Operations Planning Process Workbook and NWP 5-01, Navy Planning.*



Center of Gravity Flow Chart

(2) **Step 2: Identify Critical Factors.** Critical factors are those attributes considered crucial for the accomplishment of the objective. These factors that in effect describe the environment (in relationship to the objective) must be identified and classified as either sufficient (critical strength) or insufficient (critical weakness). Critical factors are a cumulative term for critical strengths and critical weaknesses of a military or nonmilitary source of power; they can be quantifiable (tangible) or unquantifiable (intangible). Critical factors are present at each level of war; they require constant attention because they are relative and subject to changes resulting from the actions of one's forces or of the enemy's actions. It is important while conducting the analysis for this step that planners maintain a sharp eye on the objectives identified in the first step—each level of war has critical factors that are unique to that level.

(a) The questions that should be asked when determining critical factors for the enemy are:

- "What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the enemy has and must use in order to attain his strategic (operational) objective?" *These are critical strengths. The second question is,*
- "What are the attributes, both tangible and intangible, that the enemy has and must use in order to achieve his strategic (operational) objective, but which are weak and may impede the enemy while attempting to attain his objective?" *These are critical weaknesses.*

(b) The answers to these two questions will produce a range of critical strengths and critical weaknesses associated with specific levels of war. One should note that, like the close relationship expected to be found between strategic and operational objectives, there will undoubtedly be some critical strengths and critical weaknesses that have a similar close relationship between the corresponding critical factors. For example, a strategic critical weakness, such as a strategic leader having a tenuous communications link to his

d. From the perspective of unified action, there are many diplomatic, economic, and informational activities that can affect the sequencing and conduct of military operations along both physical and logical LOO. Planners should consider depicting relevant actions or events of the other instruments of national power on their LOO diagrams.

(1) A LOO connects a series of DPs over time that lead to control of a geographic objective or defeat of an enemy force as illustrated in Figures A and B. *CDRs use LOO to connect the force with its base of operations and objectives when positional reference to the enemy is a factor.*

Operations designed using LOO generally consist of a series of cyclic, short-term events executed according to a well-defined, finite timeline. Major combat operations are typically designed using LOOs. These tie offensive and defensive operations to the geographic and positional references of the AO. CDRs synchronize activities along complementary lines of operation to attain the endstate. LOO may be either *interior* or *exterior*.⁶




Figure A. Sample Physical Line of Operation (JP 5-0).




Figure B. Lines of Operation.

⁶ FM 3-0, Operations.

(a) **Interior and Exterior Lines.** The concept of interior and exterior lines applies to both maneuver and logistics. If a force is interposed between two or more adversary forces, it is said to be operating on interior lines. Thus the force is able to move against any of the opposing forces, or switch its resources over a shorter distance than its adversary. Such a concept depends on the terrain and the state of mobility of both sides. In Figure C below the defending force (Force B) has a shorter distance to move in order to reinforce its force elements in contact. The attacking force (Force A) has a greater distance to travel to switch resources across its three operations (A1, A2, A3).⁷




Figure C. Interior and Exterior Lines.⁸

(b) A force operates on *interior lines* when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate adversary forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the adversary, and provide increased security to logistical support operations. Interior lines usually represent central position, where a friendly force can reinforce or concentrate its elements faster than the enemy force can reposition. With interior lines, friendly forces are closer to separate enemy forces than the enemy forces are to one another. Interior lines allow an isolated force to mass combat power against a specific portion of an enemy force by shifting capabilities more rapidly than the enemy can react.

(c) A force operates on *exterior lines* when its operations converge on the adversary. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent. Assuring strategic mobility enhances exterior LOO by providing the JFC greater freedom of maneuver.⁹

1 The relevance of interior and exterior physical lines depends on the relationship of time and distance between the opposing forces. Although an adversary force may have interior lines with respect to the friendly force, this advantage disappears if the friendly force is more agile and operates at a higher operational tempo. Conversely, if a smaller force maneuvers to a position between larger but less agile adversary forces, the friendly force may be able to defeat them in detail before they can react effectively.

⁷ Joint Doctrine Publication 01 (JDP 01), United Kingdom.

⁸ FM 3-0, Operations.

⁹ JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

III(b). Course of Action (COA) Development




1. Step 3 to JPP — COA Development

a. COA Development. A COA is any force employment option open to a CDR that, if adopted, would accomplish the desired strategic and military ends; mission. The staff supports the commander through in-depth analysis and presentation of a range of options for future military and non-military actions. One-way staffs help commanders refine their visualization is to develop *alternative* COA to execute the commander's envisioned operational approach and achieve the objectives. For each COA, the CDR must envision the employment of own/friendly forces and assets as a whole, taking into account externally imposed limitations, the area of operations (AO), and the conclusions previously drawn during the mission analysis and the CDR's guidance. Prior to actually developing the alternative Courses of Action we must also consider the time available, any political considerations, planned or on-going flexible deterrent options and LOO (see Chapter 5-3a, *Concept Development*).

b. Defining the COA. Each COA is a broad statement of a possible way to accomplish the mission. A COA consists of the following information:

- WHO (type of forces) will execute the tasks/take the action?
- WHAT type of action or tasks are contemplated?
- WHEN will the tasks begin?
- WHERE will the tasks occur?
- WHY (for what purpose) the action is required (relate to endstate)?
- HOW will the available forces be employed?

Wargaming Steps



Course of Action Analysis and Wargaming.

Step 1-Prepare for the Wargame

- Gather tools.
- List and review friendly forces.
- List and review enemy forces.
- List known critical events.
- Determine participants.
- Determine enemy COA to oppose.
- Select wargame method. (manual, computer).
- Select method to record and display wargaming results (narrative, sketch and notes, wargame worksheets, synchronization matrix).

Step 2 - Conduct the Wargame and Assess the Results

- Purpose of the Wargame (identify gaps, visualization, etc.).
- Basic methodology (action, reactio, counteraction).
- Type of method to be used: Based on CDR's guidance.

Step 3-Output of Wargame

- Results of the Wargame Brief: potential decision points, evaluation criteria (those criteria that the CDR deems critical to mission accomplishment), potential branches and sequels.
- Revised staff estimates.
- Refined COAs.
- Feedback through the COA Decision Brief.

3. Determine the Comparison Method and Record

Actual comparison of COAs is critical. The staff may use any technique that facilitates reaching the best recommendation and the CDR making the best decision. There are a number of techniques for comparing COAs. The most common technique is the decision matrix, which uses evaluation criteria to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of each COA. Here are examples of several decision matrices:

a. Weighted Numerical Comparison Technique. The example below provides a numerical aid for differentiating COAs. Values reflect the relative advantages or disadvantages of each COA for each of the criterion selected. Certain criteria have been weighted to reflect greater value (Figure A and B are examples).

b. Determine the Weight of each Criterion Based on its Relative Importance and the CDR's Guidance. The CDR may give guidance that result in weighting certain criteria. The staff member responsible for a functional area scores each COA using those criteria. Multiplying the score by the weight yields the criterion's value. The staff member then totals all values. However, he must be careful not to portray subjective conclusions as the results of quantifiable analysis. Comparing COAs by category is more accurate than comparing total scores.





Figure A. Example Numerical Comparison.

Each staff section does this separately, perhaps using different criteria on which to base the COA comparison. The staff then assembles and arrives at a consensus for the criterion and weights. The Chief of Staff/DCJTF should approve the staff's recommendations concerning the criteria and weights to ensure completeness and consistency throughout the staff sections.

VI. Course of Action (COA) Selection & Approval



1. Step 6 to JPP — COA Approval

COA Recommendation. Throughout the COA development process, the CDR conducts an independent analysis of the mission, possible courses of action, and relative merits and risks associated with each COA. The CDR, upon receiving the staff's recommendation, combines his analysis with the staff recommendation resulting in a selected COA. The forum for presenting the results of COA comparison is the CDR's *Decision Brief*. Typically this briefing provides the CDR with an update of the current situation, an overview of the COAs considered, and a discussion of the results of COA comparison.

2. Prepare the COA Decision Briefing

Prepare the COA Decision Briefing. This briefing often takes the form of a CDR's Estimate so take good notes of the CDR's comments. This information could include the current status of the joint force; the current JIPOE; and assumptions used in COA development. The CDR selects a COA based upon the staff recommendations and the CDR's personal estimate, experience, and judgment.

"Our flag does not fly because the wind moves it. It flies with the last breath of each soldier who died protecting it."

- Unknown

I. Plan or Order Development (Step 7)



1. Function III — Step 7: Plan or Order Development

After completing Functions I and II and Steps 1-6 of the JPP, we now have a document that's been well staffed which will aid us in developing our plan. Function III and Step 7 to the JPP is Plan or Order Development.

During this Function the CDR and staff, in collaboration with subordinate and supporting components and organizations, expand the approved COA into a detailed OPLAN or OPORD utilizing the CONPLAN, which is the centerpiece of the OPLAN or OPORD.

a. For plans and orders developed per APEX, the CJCS, in coordination with the supported and supporting CCDRs and other members of the JCS, monitors planning activities, resolves shortfalls when required, and reviews the supported CCDR's OPLAN for adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, completeness, and compliance with policy and guidance. The supported CCDR will have IPR discussions as required (see Chapter 6-2, *Plan Review Process*) to confirm the plan's strategic guidance and receive approval of assumptions, the mission statement, the concept, the plan, and any further guidance required for plan refinement. Normally at this time the Chairman and USD(P) will include issues arising from, or resolved during, plan review (e.g., key risks, decision points). The intended result of these discussions is SecDef approval of the basic plan and required annexes, the resolution of any remaining key issues, and approval to proceed with plan assessment (as applicable) with any amplifying guidance or direction.

(5) What resources will be made available and what forces or capabilities require cross-CCMD reprioritization or reallocation to enable operations?

(6) What are the operational limitations (constraints and restraints)?

f. As this process is ongoing, planning continues to proceed and adjusts based on changes in the strategic guidance and discussions.

5. In-progress Reviews

a. The majority of plan reviews will be to update existing plans.

b. Timing. IPRs are scheduled to support the SecDef's requirements. To ensure integration across the Joint Force, SecDef IPRs will be preceded by staffing through Joint Planning Boards (JPBs), DASD socializations, (USD(P) reviews, and Tanks. These lower-level meetings are part of the planning process and should not be in addition to current planning requirements.

c. As the plan is updated, CCMD planners should use JPBs and electronic means (e.g. e-mail) to confirm planning to date, ensure policy guidance and assumption are current, and identify changes and updates to resourcing.

(1) CCMD planners should use JPBs to inform the Joint Staff of any additional requirements necessary for success of the plan. Required increases in forces, authorities, or changes to assumptions should be identified early through JPBs to ensure they can be adequately answered before plan completion.

(2) The JPB and OPSDEPs seek to identify the military implications of operations on the Joint Force.

(3) As a participant in the JPB, the DASD Plans can also identify to CCMD planners any policy changes that will affect the plan.

d. As plan development progresses, the CCMD should conduct regular IPRs to ensure the plan remains consistent with SecDef requirements.

(1) The Joint Staff J-5 will ensure CCMDs have the opportunity to address the Joint Staff and OSD leadership throughout plan development.

(2) CCMDs should ensure the plan is reviewed at the appropriate level at key points in plan development, such as COA selection.

(3) OPSDEPs and JCS Tanks will be scheduled to ensure military leadership is informed at critical points in the planning process.

e. The DASD Plans is responsible for hosting DASD socializations. Attendees will include representatives from regional and functional offices within OSD and the Joint Staff JS. DASD socializations should reveal the policy implication of gaps resulting from military operations. The DASD socialization is part of an IPR and should occur after a JPB.

f. IPRs can be focused to cover portions of the proposed plan in order to ensure critical elements are addressed in sufficient detail.

(1) An initial discussion and review should address the overall concept to provide background for later in-depth discussions.

(a) This should include a discussion of the strategic and operational environment to include threats, allies, and partners, and US ability to positively affect US national objectives (US willingness to continue / increase campaign activities).

(b) An assessment of ongoing operations, activities, and investments and their impact on national objectives.

(2) Subsequent discussion might provide more in-depth discussion on key elements of the plan. Examples of detailed discussions for the JPBs and IPRs are:

III. Plan Assessment (Function IV)

I. PLANNING FUNCTION IV – PLAN ASSESSMENT

1. Feedback Overview

Plan assessment is a continuous activity of the operations process and a primary feedback mechanism that enables the command as a whole to learn and adapt. Effective assessment relies on an accurate understanding of the logic used to build the plan. Plans are based on imperfect understanding, assumptions and an operational approach on how the CDR expects a situation to evolve. The reasons or logic as to why the CDR believes the plan will produce the desired results are important considerations when determining how to assess the operation/plan. Continuous assessment helps CDRs recognize shortcomings in the plan and changes in the operational environment. In those instances when assessment reveals minor variances from the CDR's visualization, CDRs adjust plans as required. In those instances when assessment reveals a significant variance from the CDR's original visualization, CDRs reframe the problem and develop an entirely new plan as required.¹

a. During plan assessment, the CDR extends and refines planning while supporting and subordinate CDRs complete their plans for review and approval. The CDR continues to develop branch plans and other options for the SecDef and the President as required or directed. When required by the supported CDR, supporting commands and agencies submit supporting plans within 60 days after SecDef approval of the base plan. Service component supporting plans should be reviewed by the respective Military Department(s) for an assessment of Service Title 10 requirements. The CDR and the Joint Staff (JS) continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would "trigger" plan refinement, adaptation, termination, or execution (RATE). During the Plan Assessment stage, if the plan requires refinement or adaptation and depending on the amount of change required, the CDR may direct his planning staff to reenter the planning process at any of the earlier stages.


b. Under APEX, "triggers" will alert the planning community to reassess and revise, if necessary, plans, thereby keeping them in a "living" state. These triggers include, but are not limited to, changes associated with:

- (1) Implied or stated plan assumptions.
- (2) Force or enemy military structure and/or capabilities.
- (3) Readiness levels and availability of forces.
- (4) COA timelines/concept/phases.
- (5) Strategic guidance.
- (6) Intentions (U.S. and enemy).
- (7) Alliances.
- (8) Key planning factors.

c. During assessment the CDR will conduct as many IPRs as required to maintain plans in a living state, see Chapter 6-2, *Plan Review Process*. Top-priority plans, directed by the CPG and JSCP unique to specific CDRs are required to be reviewed every six months at a minimum. Further, these plans require a review if there are significant changes in the following: strategy, risk and/or tolerance of risk, assumptions, U.S. capabilities, enemy and/or adversary intent or capabilities, resources, or alliances.

¹FM 5-0 Overview, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate.

d. Depending on the nature or significance of triggers, plans may only require refinement. Refining a plan to keep it in a living state does not require an additional IPR. However, an IPR is required if the plan requires a more complex adaptation, is recommended for termination, or is required for execution. The CCCR may conduct as many IPR(s) with the SecDef during Plan Refinement as required. These IPR(s) would likely focus on branches and sequels, updated intelligence, and changes in assumptions or the situation that requires major reassessment or significant plan modification. This meeting may include a variety of other pertinent issues (e.g., information operations, Special Access Programs (SAP), sensitive targets, nuclear escalation mitigation, and Annex V considerations).



Planning Functions

2. Plan Assessment Overview

a. Plan assessment is part of planning and the plan review process (Chapter 6-2, *Plan Review Process*). Effective plan assessment measures progress toward mission accomplishment (achieving intermediate military objectives (IMOs) as applicable and progress toward end states), identifies changes in the operational and strategic environment, and risk associated with the potential requirement to execute contingency plans. Accordingly, assessment considerations should:

- Be developed in concert with mission success criteria;
- Help guide operational design of campaign and contingency plans;
- Employ common methods that can be developed and applied across all planning and assessment requirements, and be briefed during plan reviews.

b. CCRDs are tasked to develop campaign plans that integrate security cooperation and other foundational activities with operations and contingency plans IAW the strategic policy guidance provided by the CPG and JSCP. Campaign plans also provide for conducting a comprehensive assessment of how the CCMDs activities are contributing to the achievement of intermediate objectives (IMOs), and how those activities best deter, shape, or mitigate the potential to execute assigned plans. Accordingly, plan assessments should:


- Provide the basis for the RATE recommendation during IPRs.
- Ensure that assessment of subordinate campaign and contingency plans nest under the assessment of the CCCR's CCP, as well as the FCP they support. This nesting provides the mechanism to synchronize assessment activities across the CCCR's planning requirements and eliminate redundant or contradictory activities.

II. PLAN ASSESSMENT - PLANNING FUNCTION

1. Plan Assessment

a. Plan Assessment. This function deliberately measures a completed plan's effectiveness in accomplishing prescribed objectives. A plan assessment may also identify changes in the OE or strategic direction that may impact the plan, and provide risk-informed recommendations to senior leaders regarding subsequent planning or execution options.

b. Plan assessment is an input to the assessment operational activity informing the commander's decision cycle. Plan assessment is also part of the plan review process and is orchestrated by the JS J-5 in support of the Chairman's statutory responsibility to review and assess plans. Further discussion of plan assessment policy can be found in CJCSI 3141.01 *Management and Review of Campaign and Contingency Plans*.



Planning Function – Plan Assessment

(1) Plan Assessment Concurrent to Plan Development. During plan development, a plan or order is analyzed for its feasibility and the plan refined to address identified shortfalls. When planning under crisis conditions, this feasibility analysis may supplant a more deliberate assessment of the completed plan. Under these circumstances, the results of the feasibility analysis are shared by the supported CCDR with the JS and OSD in order to expedite plan approval by the Secretary. If a crisis situation does not prompt immediate execution of a plan or order, a more deliberate plan assessment maybe conducted following plan development.

(2) Plan Assessment Outcomes. The results of a plan assessment may lead to a decision to pursue one of four outcomes for the plan: **refine, adapt, terminate, or execute (RATE)**. All four outcomes can be applied to contingency plan assessments while campaign plan assessments generally do not consider termination as they are in constant execution.


(3) Refine, Adapt, Terminate, Execute [RATE].² Commanders continually review and evaluate the plan; determine one of four possible outcomes: refine, adapt, terminate, or execute; and then act accordingly. Commanders and the JPEC continue to evaluate the

²JP 5-0, *Joint Planning*

I. APEX Execution Functions

1. Overview

APEX execution functions are the required elements for implementing military activities as directed by the President or Secretary. Execution, in this context, applies to the range of military activities including but not limited to operations, exercises, and security cooperation. There are seven functions that comprise APEX execution: allocation, mobilization, deployment, distribution, employment, re-deployment, and de-mobilization. While depicted sequentially in the following figure these functions can be accomplished in parallel and steps can be combined or truncated depending on the time available. During crisis, execution functions may be conducted in parallel with planning functions to rapidly respond to an emergent event. Throughout execution, the operational activities (situational awareness, planning, and assessment) continue and execution functions are adapted to changes in the operating environment.



2. Initiate Execution

Initiating Execution. The execution of military activities begins with the direct or delegated authority of the President or Secretary to conduct or execute that military activity. The decision to execute will often be presented as an examination of options in response to a developing crisis or action by a competitor state or adversary. Based upon the character of the activities to be conducted, the distinct vehicles used to convey execution authorities will vary and are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.

Levels of Mobilization


Source of Authority	Level of Approval	Intended Use	Limitations
10 USC 12301(a) Full Mobilization	Congress	Rapid expansion of Armed Forces to meet an external threat to National Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No personnel limitation - Duration plus 6 months - Applicable to all reservists (inactive & retired)
10 USC 12302 Partial Mobilization	President	Manpower required to meet external threat to national emergency or domestic emergency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maximum 1M Ready Reservists on AD - Not more than 24 consecutive months - Used for OIF/OEF contingency operations
10 USC 12304 Presidential Reserve Call-Up		Augment AC for operational missions or support for domestic response to WMD/terrorist attacks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Maximum 200K Ready Reservists on AD - Maximum 30K IRR - Limited to 365 days AD - Prohibited for support of Federal or State government during man-made or natural disasters
10 U.S.C. 12406 and 331-333 Federalized National Guard		Domestic Emergency	Limited to Term of enlistment or commission
10 USC 12304(a) Reserve Emergency Call-Up		Emergency response to National Emergency/disaster	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- No personnel limitation -- Limited to continuous period of not more than 120 days -- No access to National Guard
10 USC 12301(b) 15-Day Statute	Secretary Of Defense	Annual Training (AT) or Operational Mission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 15 days active duty once per year - Governor's consent required for National Guard (NG)
10 USC 12301(d) Active Duty for Operational Support		Operational missions (Volunteers)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Applicable to Ready Reserve - No Duration - Governor's consent required for NG
10 USC 12304(b) Reserve Call-Up		Augment AC for missions in support of Combatant Command requirements	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -- Maximum 60k on active duty at any one time -- Limited to 365 consecutive days -- Manpower and costs are specifically included and identified in the defense budget for anticipated demand -- Budget information include description of the mission and the anticipated length of time for involuntary order to AC -- Secretary invoking 12304(b) must submit to Congress a written report detailing circumstances of the Call-Up
10 U.S.C. 688(a) Recall retirees		Any level of emergency (with or without declaration)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> --Regular or Reserve retirees with 20+ years of active service --Limited to 12 month AD

(2) The JS JFC and JFPs monitor mobilization process to ensure timelines support the orders in the GFMAP.

d. **Mobilization Reporting.** Military Departments report unit and individual activation and mobilization information through the *Defense Manpower Data Center and Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)*. This reporting, combined with the coordinated advice of the Chairman, informs the President and Secretary of the status of mobilization and enables them to make their statutory reporting to Congress.²⁴

5. Execution Function - Deployment

Deployment encompasses preparing forces and individuals for an an assigned mission as well as their movement from origin (or home station) to the port of debarkation, through JR-SOI to their point of employment location. The process of deployment is depicted below.^{25,26}



Execution Function - Deployment

a. **Deployment Planning.** As execution is authorized and the forces are identified to support a CCDR's requirements, deployment planning is conducted to execute the deployment of those forces. Requirements for deployment may be based upon CCDR employment of assigned and allocated forces to conduct authorized activities, emergent operational requirements ordered in the GFMAP, joint exercises, or Service training/ activities. Deployment planning is based upon the deployment concept and the supported CCDR's CONOPS. Upon establishment of the identified force requirements, the supported CCDR creates a TPFDD reflecting the time-phased movement of those forces required to support the planned CONOPS.

(1) **TPFDD Build Process.** A TPFDD may be based upon a notional TPFDD with the addition of execution sourced forces and unit refined movement data. FPs develop unit-refined movement/ embarkation data within the corresponding Service systems, creating their portion of the deployment and movement plan. The deployment and movement plan is consolidated as unit level movement data is then exported into JOPES IT. The FP then verifies the movement requirements confirming it is correct and satisfies the GFMAP ordered sourcing.

(2) **Supported CCDR Service Components.** Movement requirements, documented and verified in the TPFDD by FPs, are then reviewed by the appropriate supported CCDR Service component. The supported CCDR Service component verifies that the execution

²⁴ U.S.C., Title 10

²⁵ JP 4-01, *The Defense Transportation System*.

²⁶ JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.

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
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