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As the July 2019 ADPs primarily represented a publication restructuring to combine/rewrite the previous ADPs/ADRs back into single-document ADPs (instead of two separate publications), there was very little substantive change to the core doctrine (i.e., principles, fundamentals, and terminology) as previously presented in AODS6. In many cases, the only real change was to update the reference citation/source and/or page numbers. With this in mind, *Change 1 (July 2019 ADPs) SMARTupdate to AODS6* provides change pages focusing primarily on substantive doctrinal differences from the first printing, and not the exhaustive list of content, pen-and-ink edits and reference citation changes caused by the consolidation of the ADPs.

**To get the full scope of new material**, along with complete and comprehensive reference citation, terminology, and material changes from the July 2019 ADPs incorporated throughout, we recommend readers upgrade to the **NEW AODS6-1: The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (w/SMARTupdate 1)**!

*\*Pages marked with asterisks represent changed/inserted pages.*

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# (AODS6-1) Notes to Reader

## Guide to FM/ADP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of Combat Power (with SMARTupdate 1 / July 2019 ADPs)

An **operation** is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. Army forces, with unified action partners, conduct land operations to shape security environments, prevent conflict, prevail in ground combat, and consolidate gains. Army forces provide multiple options for responding to and resolving crises. Army forces defeat enemy forces, control terrain, secure populations, and preserve joint force freedom of action.

While the U.S. Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, **large-scale ground combat against a peer threat** represents the **most significant readiness requirement**. FM 3-0 expands on ADP 3-0 by providing tactics describing how theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades work together and with unified action partners to successfully prosecute operations short of conflict, prevail in large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains to win.

**Decisive action** is the continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. Army forces conduct **multi-domain battle**, as part of a joint force, to seize, retain, and exploit control over enemy forces.

**Combat power** is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. To an Army commander, Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the **warfighting functions**.

***SMARTupdate 1 to AODS6 (July 2019 ADPs)** updates/replaces material in the first printing of the AODS6 SMARTbook with new material from the Army's July 2019 ADPs, along with "pen-and-ink" reference citation and terminology changes. (Read more at [www.thelightingpress.com/smartupdates/](http://www.thelightingpress.com/smartupdates/))*

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


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# (AODS6-1) Guide to FM/ADP 3-0 Operations & the Elements of Combat Power

## Army Operations


An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to the joint fight through the conduct of unified land operations.



Chapter 1



Chapter 2



"BSS6: The Battle Staff SMARTbook"


## Chap 1: Operations (ADP 3-0)

An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme. Army forces, with unified action partners, conduct land operations to shape security environments, prevent conflict, prevail in ground combat, and consolidate gains. Army forces provide multiple options for responding to and resolving crises. Army forces defeat enemy forces, control terrain, secure populations, and preserve joint force freedom of action.

## Chap 2: Large-Scale Combat Operations (FM 3-0 w/Chg 1)

While the U.S. Army must be manned, equipped, and trained to operate across the range of military operations, large-scale ground combat against a peer threat represents the most significant readiness requirement. FM 3-0 expands on ADP 3-0 by providing tactics describing how theater armies, corps, divisions, and brigades work together and with unified action partners to successfully prosecute operations short of conflict, prevail in large-scale combat operations, and consolidate gains to win enduring strategic outcomes.



## The Elements of Combat Power



To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the **warfighting functions**. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.

## Leadership & Information

Commanders apply leadership through mission command. **Leadership** is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. **Information** enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power. Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve definitive results.




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
Information




# The Six Warfighting Functions




Chapter 3




Chapter 4




Chapter 5



Chapter 6



Chapter 7



Chapter 8

## Chap 3: Command & Control (ADP 6-0)

The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

## Chap 4: Movement and Maneuver (ADP 3-90 & others)

The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a position of advantage over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area.

## Chap 5: Intelligence (ADP 2-0)

The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations. This warfighting function includes understanding threats, adversaries, and weather. It synchronizes information collection with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders and is more than just collection. Developing intelligence is a continuous process that involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation.

## Chap 6: Fires (ADP 3-19)

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range of military operations. These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and Joint forces, as well as other unified action partners.

## Chap 7: Sustainment (ADP 4-0)

The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment.

## Chap 8: Protection (ADP 3-37)

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States and multinational military and civilian partners, to include the host nation. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations and then counters or mitigates those threats.



# (AODS6-1) References

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The following references were used to compile The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook. All references are available to the general public and designated as “approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.” The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive material restricted from public release.

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## Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs)

ADP 1-02*	Aug 2018	Terms and Military Symbols
ADP 2-0*	Jul 2019	Intelligence
ADP 3-0*	Jul 2019	Operations
ADP 3-05*	Jul 2019	Army Special Operations
ADP 3-07*	Jul 2019	Stability
ADP 3-19 *	Jul 2019	Fires
ADP 3-28*	Jul 2019	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
ADP 3-37*	Jul 2019	Protection
ADP 3-90*	Jul 2019	Offense and Defense
ADP 4-0*	Jul 2019	Sustainment
ADP 5-0*	Jul 2019	The Operations Process
ADP 6-0*	Jul 2019	Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces

## Field Manuals (FM) & Army Techniques Publications (ATPs)

FM 3-0*	Dec 2017	Operations (with Change 1)
FM 3-34	Apr 2014	Engineer Operations
FM 3-52	Oct 2016	Airspace Control
FM 3-90-1	Mar 2013	Offense and Defense, Volume 1
FM 3-90-2	Mar 2013	Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Volume 2
FM 6-0	Apr 2016	Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (w/change 2)
ATP 3-35*	Mar 2015	Army Deployment and Redeployment

## Joint Publications (JPs)

JP 3-0*	Dec 2018	Joint Operations (with Change 1)
JP 5-0	Jun 2017	Joint Planning

\* Denotes new/updated reference since first printing.



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# I. Operations (ADP 3-0, Jul '19)

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), chap. 1.*

ADP 3-0 describes how the Army conducts operations as a unified action partner using the Army's operational concept—a fundamental statement that frames how Army forces, operating as part of a joint force, conduct operations (ADP 1-01). The Army's operational concept is unified land operations. ADP 3-0 discusses the foundations, tenets, and doctrine of unified land operations, which serves as a common reference for solving military problems in multiple domains and the framework for the range of military operations across the competition continuum. It is the core of Army doctrine, and it guides how Army forces contribute to unified action.

## I. An Operational Environment

An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders at all levels have their own operational environments for their particular operations. An operational environment for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist within a specific physical area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that impact on conditions and operations there. Thus, each commander's operational environment is part of a higher echelon commander's operational environment.

Operational environments include considerations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. At the strategic level, leaders develop an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion to accomplish national objectives. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives, with the focus being on the design, planning, and conduct of operations using operational art. The tactical level of warfare involves the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. The levels of warfare help commanders visualize a logical arrangement of forces, allocate resources, and assign tasks based on a strategic purpose, informed by the conditions within their operational environments.

*See pp. 1-21 to 1-32 for a discussion of operational art.*

Broad trends such as globalization, urbanization, technological advances, and failing states affect land operations. These trends can create instability and contribute to an environment of persistent competition and conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors willing to use violence to achieve political and ideological ends. In such an operational environment, commanders must seek and exploit opportunities for success. To exploit opportunities, commanders must thoroughly understand the dynamic nature of their operational environment. Previous experience within a similar operational environment is not enough to guarantee future mission success in the current one.

Threats seek to employ capabilities to create effects in multiple domains and the information environment to counter U.S. interests and impede friendly operations. Their activities in the information environment, space, and cyberspace attempt to influence U.S. decision makers and disrupt friendly deployment of forces. Land-based threats will attempt to impede joint force freedom of action across the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. They will disrupt the electromagnetic



# Strategic-Level Context for the Army

Ref: ADP 1, *The Army* (Jul '19), pp. 2-4 to 2-6 (and ADP 3-0 (Jul '2019), pps. 1-5 to 1-6.)

## Army Strategic Roles

*The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force and unified action partners in four strategic roles: shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which the Army is organized, trained, and equipped. Strategic roles are not tasks assigned to subordinate units.*

- ADP 3-0, *Operations* (Jul '19)

Readiness for ground combat is and will remain the U.S. Army's first priority. The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force in four strategic roles: shaping operational environments, preventing conflict, prevailing in large-scale ground combat, and consolidating gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which our Army is organized, trained, and equipped. Army forces are further organized, trained, and equipped to provide specific core competencies delivering essential and enduring capabilities aligned with joint doctrine. The Army's operational concept of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0 is built on the conceptual framework established by the Army's strategic roles and its core competencies. Title 10, USC, the National Military Strategy, and DODD 5100.01 provide the overall guidance on the capabilities that the Army must provide to the Nation. The Army shapes operational environments and prevents conflict based upon the requirements of combatant commanders. The ability to prevail against any enemy during large-scale ground combat is what provides the military credibility necessary to deter war. Every operation must consolidate gains to make temporary operational success enduring and set the conditions for a sustainable and stable environment. Our non-negotiable obligation to the Nation is to win by achieving the combatant commander's operational objective when the Army is committed to any type of operation.

## Shape Operational Environments

The Army provides unique forces with capabilities to shape operational environments. Shaping operational environments allows combatant commanders to reassure partners and deter aggression while establishing conditions that support the potential employment of joint forces. Army regionally aligned forces—including special operations units, Army Reserve units, and Army National Guard units—assist partners with internal defense and develop the capabilities needed to deter adversaries and defeat enemies. Army forces further develop relationships with multinational partner land forces, share intelligence, strengthen their security forces, increase cultural awareness, and conduct bilateral and multilateral military exercises. Through efforts such as the State Partnership Program, Army National Guard and Reserve units supply unique and dual-trained Soldiers with special skills obtained as civilians to assist in medical and engineering activities, disaster preparedness, critical infrastructure management, and resource protection. Together, these efforts allow the Army to maintain a global landpower network that is critical in shaping operational environments and winning wars. Army forces conduct shaping operations through the day-to-day actions of its Service component commanders, trainers, advisors, and logistic activities as specified under Title 10, USC and support to Title 22 and Title 50, USC.

## Prevent Conflict

Preventing conflict includes all activities that deter adversary military actions which threaten allies or partners and deny them the ability to achieve objectives counter to U.S. interests. A well-trained, credible, and capable Army reduces the risk of aggression by adversaries because it raises both the risk and potential cost of military action to their forces. Moving ready and trained Army forces into a region tells adversaries that the United States is prepared and willing to protect its interests. Partner nations under external threats understand that introducing U.S. forces alters the regional military balance of power in their favor and bolsters their resolve to resist aggression. Multinational partners and adversaries recognize that Army forces—combined with the nation's joint air, maritime, and space-based forces—are dominant and therefore are a deterrence to armed conflict. This role meets the objectives described in the National Military Strategy.

## Prevail In Large-Scale Ground Combat

The Army's capability and capacity to conduct large-scale ground combat is unique and foundational to its other roles. Only the Army has the capabilities necessary for sustained ground combat anywhere in the world. The credibility inherent in its ability to conduct large-scale ground combat as part of the joint force is a critical part of U.S. conventional deterrence. It is a primary source of assurance to friendly nations and an important factor in worldwide stability. The U.S. Army conducts large-scale ground combat as part of the joint force. When it deploys and fights, the Army both enables and is enabled by the other Services when they perform their roles. An Army that can defeat any enemy worldwide requires professionally committed leadership, well-equipped and trained units, and proficiency in the conduct of joint and multinational operations. Maintaining the readiness necessary for large-scale ground combat is a difficult and continual process that consumes significant time and resources. Readiness for large-scale ground combat operations saves lives.

## Consolidate Gains

Operations to consolidate gains make temporary operational successes enduring and set the conditions to facilitate the transition of control over territory to legitimate authorities. Army forces enable the joint force commander to capitalize on operational success by following through to ensure sustainable conditions on the ground. Consolidation of gains is an integral part of winning armed conflict and is essential to retaining the long-term initiative over determined adversaries. Army forces reinforce and integrate the efforts of all unified action partners when they consolidate gains. Operations serve a higher national purpose in support of U.S. interests and are planned and executed to support that purpose at each echelon. A clear understanding of the higher purpose of the mission and operational environment determines what must happen to consolidate gains during the course of operations. How well ground forces consolidate gains determines in large part how enduring the results of operations will be. Effectively consolidating gains increases options for national leaders and contributes to decisive outcomes.

## Win

Winning is the achievement of the purpose of an operation and the fulfillment of its objectives. The Army wins when it successfully performs its roles as part of the joint force during operations. It wins when it effectively shapes an operational environment for combatant commanders and when it responds rapidly with enough combat power to prevent war through deterrence. When required to fight, the Army's ability to prevail in large-scale ground combat becomes a decisive factor in breaking an enemy's will to continue fighting. Army forces win when the enemy is defeated to the degree that it can no longer achieve their objectives or effectively contest the joint force on land. To ensure that the military results of combat are not temporary, the Army follows through with its unique capability to consolidate gains and ensure enduring outcomes that are favorable to U.S. interests.

spectrum, sow confusion in the information environment, and challenge the legitimacy of U.S. actions. Understanding how threats can present multiple dilemmas to Army forces in all domains helps Army commanders identify (or create), seize, and exploit their own opportunities.

Some peer threats have nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities and the ability to employ such weapons in certain situations. However, capability does not always equal intent to use, and it is generally presumed that most would use restraint. Preparation and planning that takes nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities into account is of paramount importance in any confrontation with an adversary armed with them. Understanding threat nuclear and chemical weapons doctrine is important, particularly during large-scale ground combat operations.

Nuclear terrorism remains a threat to the United States and to international security and stability. Preventing the illicit acquisition of a nuclear weapon, nuclear materials, or related technology and expertise by a violent extremist organization is a significant U.S. national security priority. The more states—particularly rogue states—that possess nuclear weapons or the materials, technology, and knowledge required to make them, the greater the potential risk of terrorist acquisition. Given the nature of terrorist ideologies, commanders and staffs must assume that terrorists would employ a nuclear weapon were they to acquire one.

Large-scale ground combat operations can occur below the nuclear threshold, and they are not synonymous with total war. Large-scale ground combat operations are sustained combat operations involving multiple corps and divisions. Planning for large-scale ground combat operations against enemies possessing nuclear weapons must account for the possibility of their use against friendly forces. The operational approaches employed by joint force commanders (JFCs) may thus be constrained to avoid nuclear escalation in terms of their geographic depth and the assigned objectives. Large-scale ground combat operations, while potentially enormous in scale and scope, are typically limited by the law of war and the political objectives of the conflict itself. Against nuclear armed enemies, the political objectives of a conflict are also informed by the strategic risk inherent in escalation. While the scale and scope of conventional conflict has been smaller than World War II since 1945, it retains its inherent lethality and complexity.


Successful operations against nuclear and chemically capable peer threats require units prepared to react to the employment of those capabilities and operate degraded in contaminated environments. Planning and training must include active and passive measures for protection against the effects of these weapons, as well as techniques for mitigating their effects to preserve combat power. This includes greater emphasis on dispersion, survivability, and regenerating communications between echelons. These requirements must be incorporated into every facet of doctrine and training, so units and commanders are technically and psychologically prepared for the environment they may encounter. Survivability in this environment should be a training and readiness objective.

Modern information technology makes the information environment, which includes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, indispensable to military operations. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information (JP 3-13). It is a key part of any operational environment, and it will be simultaneously congested and contested during operations. All actors in the information environment—enemy, friendly, or neutral—remain vulnerable to attack by physical, psychological, cyber, or electronic means.

No two operational environments are the same. An operational environment consists of many relationships and interactions among interrelated variables. How entities and conditions interact within an operational environment is often difficult to understand and requires continuous analysis.

# Operations (Unified Logic Chart)

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), Introductory figure. ADP 3-0 unified logic chart.



An operational environment continually evolves because of the complexity of human interaction and how people learn and adapt. People's actions change that environment. Some changes can be anticipated, while others cannot. Some changes are immediate and apparent, while other changes evolve over time or are extremely difficult to detect.

The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the friction and uncertainty inherent in military operations. Commanders must continually assess their operational environments and re-assess their assumptions. Commanders and staffs use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an operational environment to support the operations process.

## A. Operational and Mission Variables

An operational environment evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational variables to analyze and understand a specific operational environment, and they use mission variables to focus on specific elements during mission analysis.



*Refer to BSS5: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 5th Ed. (pp. 1-16 to 1-17) for further discussion of the eight operational variables (PMESII-PT: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time) and mission variables (METT-TC : mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations).*

### Operational Variables (PMESII-PT)

Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment, but also the population's influence on it.

Using Army design methodology, planners analyze an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (known as PMESII-PT).

As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit will conduct operations, they begin analyzing the operational variables associated with that location. They continue to refine and update that analysis throughout the course of operations.

### Mission Variables (METT-TC)

Upon receipt of an order, Army leaders filter information from operational variables into mission variables during mission analysis. They use the mission variables to refine their understanding of the situation. The mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables with METT-TC ensures that Army leaders consider the best available information about the mission.



## II. War as a Human Endeavor

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 1-4 to 1-5.*

War is chaotic, lethal, and a fundamentally human endeavor. It is a clash of wills fought among and between people. All war is inherently about changing human behavior, with each side trying to alter the behavior of the other by force of arms. Success requires the ability to out think an opponent and ruthlessly exploit the opportunities that come from positions of relative advantage. The side that best understands an operational environment adapts more rapidly and decides to act more quickly in conditions of uncertainty is the one most likely to win.

War is inextricably tied to the populations inhabiting the land domain. All military capabilities are ultimately linked to land and, in most cases, the ability to prevail in ground combat becomes a decisive factor in breaking an enemy's will. Understanding the human context that enables the enemy's will, which includes culture, economics, and history, is as important as understanding the enemy's military capabilities. Commanders cannot presume that superior military capability alone creates the desired effects on an enemy.

Commanders must continually assess whether their operations are influencing enemies and populations, eroding the enemy's will, and achieving the commanders' intended purpose.

When unified land operations occur among populations, they influence and are influenced by those populations. The results of these interactions are often unpredictable—and potentially uncontrollable. Commanders should seek to do less harm than good to gain the support of populations and, when possible, to influence their behaviors. Gaining support requires a combination of both coercion and incentives, the exact mix of which is unique to each case. During operations to shape operational environments and prevent conflicts, the scale is weighted heavily towards incentivizing desired behavior. However, in large-scale combat operations, coercion may play a larger role. Large-scale combat operations are extensive joint combat operations in terms of scope and size of forces committed, conducted as a campaign aimed at achieving operational and strategic objectives. Consolidating gains requires a more balanced approach. Regardless of the context, U.S. forces always operate consistently with international law and their rules of engagement.

U.S. military forces operate to achieve the goals and accomplish the objectives assigned to them by the President and Secretary of Defense. Normally, these goals and objectives involve establishing security conditions favorable to U.S. interests. Army forces do this as a function of unified action.

## B. Threats and Hazards

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 1-3 to 1-4.*

For every operation, threats are a fundamental part of an operational environment. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, organized or unorganized groups, paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. Commanders and staffs must understand how current and potential threats organize, equip, train, employ, and control their forces. They must continually identify, monitor, and assess threats as they adapt and change over time. In general, the various actors in any operational area can qualify as an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend.

### Enemy

An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war. Enemies will apply advanced technologies (such as cyberspace attack) as well as simple and dual-use technologies (such as improvised explosive devices). Enemies avoid U.S. strengths (such as long-range surveillance and precision strike missiles) through countermeasures (such as integrated air defense systems, dispersion, concealment, and intermingling with civilian populations).

### Adversary

An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).

### Neutral

During competition and conflict, a neutral is an identity applied to a party whose characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither supporting nor opposing friendly forces.

### Friendly

Finally, a friendly is an individual or group that is perceived to be supportive of U.S. efforts. Land operations often prove complex because an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another.

### Hybrid Threat

The term hybrid threat captures the complexity of operational environments, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring of traditionally regulated elements of conflict. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorists, or criminal elements acting in concert to achieve mutually benefitting effects. Hybrid threats combine traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act without constraints on the use of violence. These may involve nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors such as criminal and terrorist organizations that employ sophisticated capabilities traditionally associated with states. Hybrid threats are most effective when they exploit friendly constraints, capability gaps, and lack of situational awareness.

### Hazard

A hazard is a condition with the potential to cause injury, illness, or death of personnel; damage to or loss of equipment or property; or mission degradation (JP 3-33). Hazards include disease, extreme weather phenomena, solar flares, and areas contaminated by toxic materials. Hazards can damage or destroy resources, reduce combat power, and contribute to early culmination that prevents mission accomplishment. Understanding hazards and their effects on operations is generally done in the context of terrain, weather, and various other factors related to a particular mission.

## Peer Threat

A peer threat is an adversary or enemy able to effectively oppose U.S. forces worldwide while enjoying a position of relative advantage in a specific region. These threats can generate equal or temporarily superior combat power in geographical proximity to a conflict area with U.S. forces. A peer threat may also have a cultural affinity to specific regions, providing them relative advantages in terms of time, space, and sanctuary. They generate tactical, operational, and strategic challenges an order of magnitude more challenging militarily than other adversaries.

Peer threats can employ resources across multiple domains to create lethal and nonlethal effects with operational significance throughout an operational environment. They seek to delay deployment of U.S. forces and inflict significant damage across multiple domains in a short period to achieve their goals before culminating. A peer threat uses various methods to employ their instruments of power to render U.S. military power irrelevant. Five broad methods, used in combination by peer threats, include—

- Information warfare
- Preclusion
- Isolation
- Sanctuary
- Systems warfare

Enemies and adversaries pursue anti-access and area-denial capabilities, putting U.S. power projection at risk and enabling an extension of their coercive power well beyond their borders. As a result, the United States may be unable to employ forces with complete freedom of action. The ability of U.S. forces to deliberately build up combat power, perform detailed rehearsals and integration activities, and then conduct operations on their own initiative will likely be significantly challenged. Threats might use cyberspace attack capabilities (such as disruptive and destructive malware), electronic warfare, and space capabilities (such as anti-satellite weapons) to disrupt U.S. communications; positioning, navigation, and timing; synchronization; and freedom of maneuver. Finally, enemies may attempt to strike installations outside the continental United States to disrupt or delay deployment of forces. These types of threats are not specific to any single theater of operations, since they have few geographic constraints.

When dealing with nuclear powered adversaries, the JFC may face constraints to mitigate risk of escalation. Tensions may heighten when employing ground forces that will operate close to an enemy's border or when exploiting offensive success in ways that threaten the viability of an enemy government to maintain power. Because of the potential for nuclear escalation, Army commanders and staffs should consider tensions and the overall strategic situation as they develop operational approaches at their particular echelon.

Violent extremist organizations work to undermine regional security in areas such as the Middle East and North Africa. Such groups radicalize populations, incite violence, and employ terror to impose their visions on fragile societies. They are strongest where governments are weakest, exploiting people trapped in fragile or failed states. Violent extremist organizations often coexist with criminal organizations, where both profit from illicit trade and the spread of corruption, further undermining security and stability.



Refer to CTS1: The Counterterrorism, WMD & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook for further discussion. CTS1 topics and chapters include: the terrorist threat (characteristics, goals & objectives, organization, state-sponsored, international, and domestic), hybrid and future threats, forms of terrorism (tactics, techniques, & procedures), counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, protection planning and preparation, countering WMD, and consequence management (all hazards response).

### III. Unified Action

Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). Unity of effort is coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization, which is the product of successful unified action (JP 1). Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations. The Army's contribution to unified action is unified land operations.

The Army is the dominant U.S. fighting force in the land domain. Army forces both depend upon and enable the joint force across multiple domains, including air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace. This mutual interdependence creates powerful synergies and reflects that all operations are combined arms operations, and all combined arms operations are conducted in multiple domains. The Army depends on the other Services for strategic and operational mobility, joint fires, and other key enabling capabilities. The Army supports other Services, combatant commands, and unified action partners with ground-based indirect fires and ballistic missile defense, defensive cyberspace operations, electronic protection, communications, intelligence, rotary-wing aircraft, logistics, and engineering.

The Army's ability to set and sustain the theater of operations is essential to allowing the joint force freedom of action. The Army establishes, maintains, and defends vital infrastructure. It also provides the JFC with unique capabilities, such as port and airfield opening; logistics; chemical defense; and reception, staging, and onward movement, and integration of forces.

Interagency coordination is a key part of unified action. Interagency coordination is within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and participating United States Government departments and agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency coordination using established liaison, personal engagement, and planning processes.

Unified action may require interorganizational cooperation to build the capacity of unified action partners. Interorganizational cooperation is interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; participating United States Government departments and agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; international organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). Building partner capacity helps to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthens institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity results from comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements united by a common purpose. The Army integrates capabilities of operating forces and the institutional force to support interorganizational capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation interactions.

*See facing page for discussion of security cooperation activities.*

### A. Cooperation with Civilian Organizations

When directed, Army forces provide sustainment and security for civilian organizations, since many lack these capabilities. Within the context of interagency coordination, this refers to non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies of the U.S. Government. Other government agencies include, but are not limited to, Departments of State, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture.

# Security Cooperation & Military Engagement Activities

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 1-7 to 1-8.*

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20). Security cooperation provides the means to build partner capacity and accomplish strategic objectives.


These objectives include—

- Building defensive and security relationships that promote U.S. security interests.
- Developing capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations.
- Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations to increase situational understanding of an operational environment.

Army forces support the objectives of the combatant commander's campaign plan in accordance with appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and authorities. The plan supports those objectives through security cooperation, specifically those involving security force assistance and foreign internal defense. Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-20). Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22).

Security force assistance and foreign internal defense professionalize and develop security partner capacity to enable synchronized sustaining operations. Army security cooperation interactions enable other interorganizational efforts to build partner capacity. Army forces—including special operations forces—advise, assist, train, and equip partner units to develop unit and individual proficiency in security operations. The institutional force advises and trains partner army activities to build institutional capacity for professional education, force generation, and force sustainment. (See FM 3-22 for more information on Army support to security cooperation.)

*Refer to FM 3-22 for more information on Army support to security cooperation.*



*Refer to TAA2: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16), Interorganizational Coordination (JP 3-08), and more.*



An intergovernmental organization is an organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Intergovernmental organizations may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Examples include the United Nations and the European Union.

A nongovernmental organization is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society (JP 3-08). Their mission is generally humanitarian and not one concerned with assisting the military in accomplishing its objectives. In some circumstances, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may provide humanitarian aid simultaneously to elements of both sides in a conflict. Nevertheless, there are many situations where the interests of Army forces and NGOs overlap.

A contractor is a person or business operating under a legal agreement to provide products or services for pay. A contractor furnishes supplies and services or performs work at a certain price or rate based on contracted terms. Contracted support includes traditional goods and services support, but it may also include interpreter communications, infrastructure, and other related support. Contractor employees include contractors authorized to accompany the force as a formal part of the force and local national employees who normally have no special legal status.

*Refer to ATP 4-10 for more information on contractors.*

Most civilian organizations are not under military control, nor does the American ambassador or a United Nations commissioner control them. Civilian organizations have different organizational cultures and norms. Some may be willing to work with Army forces; others may not. Civilian organizations may arrive well after military operations have begun, making personal contact and team building essential. Command emphasis on immediate and continuous coordination encourages effective cooperation. Commanders should establish liaison with civilian organizations to integrate their efforts as much as possible with Army and joint operations. Civil affairs units typically establish this liaison.

*Refer to FM 3-57 for more information on civil affairs units.*

## B. Joint Operations

Single Services may perform tasks and missions to support DOD objectives. However, the DOD primarily employs two or more Services (from two military departments) in a single operation across multiple domains, particularly in combat, through joint operations. Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces and those Service forces employed in specified command relationships with each other, which of themselves, do not establish joint forces (JP 3-0). A joint force is a force composed of elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander (JP 3-0). Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities in multiple domains through unified action. Joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) to achieve a desired military end state. The end state is the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives (JP 3-0). Joint planning connects the strategic end state to the JFC's operational campaign design and ultimately to tactical missions. JFCs use campaigns and major operations to translate their operational-level actions into strategic results. Campaigns are always joint operations. Army forces do not conduct campaigns unless they are designated as a joint task force (JTF). However, Army forces contribute to campaigns through the conduct of land operations.

*See following pages (pps. 1-14 to 1-15) for further discussion of joint operations.*

# C. Multinational Operations

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 1-7 to 1-8.

Multinational operations is a collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance (JP 3-16). While each nation has its own interests and often participates within the limitations of national caveats, all nations bring value to an operation. Each nation's force has unique capabilities, and each usually contributes to an operation's legitimacy in terms of international or local acceptability. Army forces should anticipate that most operations will be multinational operations and plan accordingly.

Refer to FM 3-16 for more information on multinational operations.

## Alliance


An alliance is the relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 3-0). Military alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (commonly known as NATO), allow partners to establish formal, standard agreements.

## Coalition

A coalition is an arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Nations usually form coalitions for specific, limited purposes. A coalition action is an action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually in a narrow area of common interest. Army forces may participate in coalition actions under the authority of a United Nations' resolution.

Multinational operations present challenges and demands. These include cultural and language issues, interoperability challenges, national caveats on the use of respective forces, the sharing of information and intelligence, and the rules of engagement. Commanders analyze the particular requirements of a mission in the context of friendly force capabilities to exploit the multinational force's advantages and compensate for its limitations. Establishing effective liaison with multinational partners is critical to situational awareness.

Multinational sustainment requires detailed planning and coordination. Normally each nation provides a national support element to sustain its forces. However, integrated multinational sustainment may improve efficiency and effectiveness. When authorized and directed, an Army theater sustainment command can provide logistics and other support to multinational forces. Integrating support requirements of several nations' forces—often spread over considerable distances and across international boundaries—is critical to the success of multinational operations and requires flexibility, patience, and persistence.



Refer to TAA2: Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist) for further discussion. Topics include the Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0), Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist), Stability Operations (ADRP 3-07), Peace Operations (JP 3-07.3), Counterinsurgency Operations (JP & FM 3-24), Civil-Military Operations (JP 3-57), Multinational Operations (JP 3-16), Interorganizational Coordination (JP 3-08), and more.

# Joint Operations, Unified Action, & the Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

Ref: JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), *Joint Operations* (Oct '18).

Services may accomplish tasks and missions in support of Department of Defense (DOD) objectives. However, the DOD primarily employs two or more services in a single operation, particularly in combat, through joint operations. The general term, joint operations, describes military actions conducted by joint forces or by Service forces employed under command relationships. A joint force is one composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more military departments operating under a single joint force commander. Joint operations exploit the advantages of interdependent Service capabilities through unified action, and joint planning integrates military power with other instruments of national power to achieve a desired military end state.

## Unified Action

Whereas the term joint operations focuses on the integrated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States in a unified effort, the term unified action has a broader connotation. JFCs are challenged to achieve and maintain operational coherence given the requirement to operate in conjunction with interorganizational partners. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying joint force actions, since all of the elements and actions that comprise unified action normally are present at the CCDR's level. However, subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the operations of other military forces and the activities of nonmilitary organizations in the operational area to promote unified action.


Unified action is a comprehensive approach that synchronizes, coordinates, and when appropriate, integrates military operations with the activities of other governmental and nongovernmental organizations to achieve unity of effort.

When conducting operations for a joint force commander, Army forces achieve unified action by synchronizing actions with the activities of components of the joint force and unified action partners.

## The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)

The range of military operations is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns. Use of joint capabilities in military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities helps shape the operational environment and keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict while maintaining US global influence.

## Range of Military Operations



## A. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil authorities (e.g., state governors or local law enforcement). The general strategic and operational objective is to protect US interests at home and abroad.


## B. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Operations

A crisis response or limited contingency operation can be a single small-scale, limited-duration operation or a significant part of a major operation of extended duration involving combat. The associated general strategic and operational objectives are to protect US interests and/or prevent surprise attack or further conflict.

## C. Large-Scale Combat Operations

When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign normally involving large-scale combat. During **major operations**, joint force actions are conducted simultaneously or sequentially in accordance with a common plan and are controlled by a single commander. A **campaign** is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.

### Joint Combat Operation Model (Notional)



Refer to *JFODS5-1: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMART-book (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations)*. Updated for 2019, topics include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0 w/Chg 1), an expanded discussion of joint functions, joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), joint force operations (JPs 3-30, 3-31, 3-32 & 3-05), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), & more!

## IV. Land Operations

An operation is a sequence of tactical actions with a common purpose or unifying theme (JP 1). The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat operations and perform such other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be prescribed by the President or the Secretary of Defense (as described in Title 10, United States Code). The Army does this through its operational concept of unified land operations. Army doctrine aligns with joint doctrine, and it is informed by the nature of land operations. Army forces are employed in accordance with the character of the threat and friendly force capabilities. They conduct operations to preserve vital national interests, most important of which are the sovereignty of the homeland and the preservation of the U.S. constitutional form of government. Army forces are prepared to operate across the range of military operations and integrate with unified action partners as part of a larger effort.

Army forces, with unified action partners, conduct land operations to shape security environments, prevent conflict, prevail in ground combat, and consolidate gains. Army forces provide multiple options for responding to and resolving crises. Army forces defeat enemy forces, control terrain, secure populations, and preserve joint force freedom of action.

The dynamic interaction among friendly forces, enemy forces, adversaries, neutral parties, and the environment make land operations exceedingly complex. Understanding each of these elements separately is necessary, but not sufficient, to understand their relationships with each other. Understanding the context of dynamic interaction in each case helps determine what constitutes positions of relative advantage. Exploiting positions of relative advantage allows Army forces to defeat adversaries and enemies at least cost.

Joint doctrine discusses traditional war as a confrontation between nation-states or coalitions of nation-states. This confrontation typically involves small-scale to large-scale, force-on-force military operations in which enemies use various conventional and unconventional military capabilities against each other. Landpower heavily influences the outcome of wars even when it is not the definitive instrument.

Landpower is the ability—by threat, force, or occupation—to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. Landpower is the basis of unified land operations. Landpower includes the ability to—

- Protect and defend U.S. national assets and interests.
- Impose the Nation's will on an enemy, by force if necessary.
- Sustain high tempo operations.
- Engage to influence, shape, prevent, and deter in an operational environment.
- Defeat enemy organizations and control terrain.
- Secure populations and consolidate gains.
- Establish and maintain a stable environment that sets the conditions for political and economic development.
- Address the consequences of catastrophic events—both natural and man-made—to restore infrastructure and reestablish basic civil services.

### A. Army Forces—Expeditionary Capability and Campaign Quality

Swift campaigns, however desirable, are the historical exception. Whenever objectives involve controlling populations or dominating terrain, campaign success usually requires employing landpower for protracted periods. The Army's combination of



## B. Close Combat

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 1-11.*

The nature of close combat in land operations is unique. Combatants routinely come face-to-face with one another in large numbers in a wide variety of operational environments comprising all types of terrain. When other means fail to drive enemy forces from their positions, Army forces close with and destroy or capture them. The outcome of battles and engagements depends on the ability of Army forces to close with enemy forces and prevail in close combat. Close combat is warfare carried out on land in a direct-fire fight, supported by direct and indirect fires and other assets. Units involved in close combat employ direct fire weapons supported by indirect fire, air-delivered fires, and nonlethal engagement means. Units in close combat defeat or destroy enemy forces and seize and retain ground. Close combat at lower echelons contains many more interactions between friendly and enemy forces than any other form of combat.

Close combat is most often linked to difficult terrain where enemies seek to negate friendly advantages in technology and weapon capabilities. Urban terrain represents one of the most likely close combat challenges. The complexity of urban terrain and the density of noncombatants reduce the effectiveness of advanced sensors and long-range weapons. Operations in large, densely populated areas require special considerations. From a planning perspective, commanders view cities as both topographic features and a dynamic system of varying operational entities containing hostile forces, local populations, and infrastructure.

Effective close combat relies on lethality informed by a high degree of situational understanding across multiple domains. The capacity for physical destruction is the foundation of all other military capabilities, and it is building block of military operations. Army formations are organized, equipped, and trained to employ lethal capabilities in a wide range of conditions. The demonstrated lethality of Army forces provides the credibility essential to deterring adversaries and assuring allies and partners.

An inherent, complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for nonlethal purposes. In wartime, each situation requires a different mix of violence and constraint. Lethal and nonlethal actions used together complement each other and create multiple dilemmas for opponents. During operations short of armed conflict, the lethality implicit in Army forces enables their performance of other tasks effectively with minimal adversary interference.



*Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.*

expeditionary capability and campaign quality contributes sustained landpower to support unified action.

Expeditionary capability describes the ability to promptly deploy combined arms forces on short notice to any location in the world, capable of conducting operations immediately upon arrival. Expeditionary operations are entirely dependent upon joint air and maritime support. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a force can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). Adequate operational reach is a necessity for forces to conduct decisive action. Extending operational reach is a significant concern for commanders. To achieve a desired end state, forces must possess the necessary operational reach to establish and maintain conditions that define success. Commanders and staffs increase operational reach through deliberate, focused planning—well in advance of operations when possible—and the appropriate sustainment to facilitate endurance.

### **Expeditionary Capability**

Expeditionary capabilities are more than physical attributes; they begin with a mindset that permeates the force. The ability to deploy the right combination of Army forces to the right place at the right time requires unit leadership focused on the training and readiness essential to deploying. Forward deployed units, forward positioned capabilities, and force projection—from anywhere in the world—all contribute to the Army's expeditionary capabilities. Providing JFCs with expeditionary capabilities requires forces organized and equipped to be versatile and rapidly deployable, and able to sustain operations over time.

### **Campaign Quality**

Campaign quality describes the Army's ability to sustain operations as long as necessary to achieve success. Campaign quality is an ability to conduct sustaining operations for as long as necessary, adapting to unpredictable and often profound changes in an operational environment as a campaign unfolds. Army forces are organized, trained, and equipped for endurance. They are essential to the JFC for the conduct of campaigns. Campaigning requires a mindset and vision that complements expeditionary requirements. Army leaders understand the effects of protracted land operations on units and adjust the tempo of operations whenever circumstances allow to prolong their effectiveness.

# V. Seize, Retain, and Exploit the Operational Initiative

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 1-11.*

Operational initiative is the setting of tempo and terms of action throughout an operation. Army forces seize, retain, and exploit operational initiative by forcing the enemy to respond to friendly action. By presenting an enemy force multiple dilemmas across multiple domains, commanders force that enemy to react continuously until driven into an untenable position. Exploiting operational initiative pressures enemy commanders to abandon their preferred options, react to friendly actions, and make mistakes. As enemy forces make mistakes or weaken, friendly forces seize opportunities that create new avenues for exploitation.

Commanders seize operational initiative by acting across multiple domains simultaneously. Without action, seizing operational initiative is impossible. Faced with an uncertain situation, commanders naturally tend to hesitate and gather more information to reduce uncertainty. Waiting for more information might reduce uncertainty, but it never eliminates it. Waiting for perfect friendly situational awareness and synchronization provides an adaptive enemy force the time to seize or regain operational initiative. Successful commanders manage uncertainty by developing the situation through action, using reconnaissance, surveillance, and other capabilities to identify opportunities across multiple domains that can be exploited.

Seizing operational initiative means setting and dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. Commanders plan to seize the initiative as early as possible. Effective planning determines where, when, and how that happens. Enemy forces will actively try to retain operational initiative and disrupt friendly plans, so good plans rapidly executed are fundamental to seizing the initiative. During execution, commanders exploit opportunities to attack and deceive enemy command and control elements to prevent their synchronization of combat power and achieve surprise. Seizing the operational initiative usually requires accepting risk. Commanders and staffs assess if they have the initiative and determine how to seize it if they do not. These conditions generally indicate that friendly forces have operational initiative:

- Friendly forces are no longer decisively engaged or threatened with decisive engagement.
- Subordinate commanders are able to mass combat power or concentrate forces at times and places of their choosing.
- Enemy forces no longer offer effective resistance and do not appear capable of reestablishing resistance.
- Friendly forces encounter lighter-than-anticipated enemy resistance or large numbers of prisoners.
- Friendly rates of advance suddenly accelerate or casualty rates suddenly drop.

Retaining operational initiative requires sustained, relentless pressure on enemy forces. Commanders maintain pressure by synchronizing the warfighting functions to present enemy commanders with continuously changing combinations of combat power at a tempo they cannot effectively counter. Commanders and staffs use information collection assets to identify enemy attempts to regain the initiative.

Effective information management to process information quickly is essential for staying inside the enemy's decision-making cycle. Combined with effective planning, information management helps commanders anticipate enemy actions and develop branches, sequels, or adjustments.

## VI. Readiness Through Training

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 1-12 to 1-13. See also pp. 2-34 to 2-35.*


Training is the most important thing the Army does to prepare for operations. It is the cornerstone of combat readiness and the foundation for successful operations. Effective training must be commander driven, rigorous, realistic, and to the standard and under the conditions that units expect to operate in during combat. Realistic training with limited time and resources demands that commanders focus their unit training efforts to maximize repetitions under varying conditions to build proficiency. Units execute effective individual and collective training based on the Army's principles of training as described in ADP 7-0. Through training and leader development, units achieve the tactical and technical competence that builds confidence and allows them to conduct successful operations across the competition continuum. Achieving this competence requires specific, dedicated training on offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) tasks. Training continues in deployed units to sustain skills and to adapt to changes in an operational environment. (See ADP 7-0 for training doctrine.)

Army training includes a system of techniques and standards that allows Soldiers and units to determine, acquire, and practice necessary skills. The Army's training system emphasizes experiential practice and learning to build teamwork and cohesion within units. It recognizes that Soldiers ultimately fight for one another and their units. Training instills discipline. It conditions Soldiers to operate within the law of war and rules of engagement. Training prepares unit leaders for the harsh reality of land combat by emphasizing the fluid and disorderly conditions inherent in land operations. Effective training accounts for cyberspace, space, and information-related capabilities that influence the warfighting functions. Well-rounded training includes candid assessments, after action reviews, and applied lessons learned to ensure improved readiness. Adversaries assess the training readiness of Army forces continuously, which is how training helps to shape operational environments. Training creates combat credibility, which contributes to deterrence.

Regardless of the importance of technological capabilities, success in operations requires Soldiers to accomplish the mission. Demanding operational environments require professional Soldiers and leaders whose character, commitment, and competence represent the foundation of a values-based, trained, and ready Army. Soldiers and leaders adapt and learn while training to perform tasks both individually and collectively. Soldiers and leaders develop the ability to exercise judgment and disciplined initiative under stress.

The complexity of integrating all unified action partners into operations demands that Army forces maintain a high degree of proficiency that is difficult to achieve quickly.

U.S. responsibilities are global and Army forces prepare to operate in any environment. Because Army forces face diverse threats and mission requirements, commanders adjust their training priorities based on a likely operational environment. As units prepare for deployment, commanders adapt training priorities and conditions to best address tasks required by actual or anticipated operations. The Army as a whole trains to be flexible enough to operate successfully across the range of military operations. Units train to be agile enough to adapt quickly and shift focus across the competition continuum.



*Refer to TLS5: The Leader's SMARTbook, 5th Ed. for complete discussion of Military Leadership (ADP/ADRP 6-22); Leader Development (FM 6-22); Counsel, Coach, Mentor (ATP 6-22.1); Army Team Building (ATP 6-22.6); Military Training (ADP/ADRP 7-0); Train to Win in a Complex World (FM 7-0); Unit Training Plans, Meetings, Schedules, and Briefs; Conducting Training Events and Exercises; Training Assessments, After Action Reviews (AARs); and more!*

# II. Operational Art

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), chap. 2.

## I. The Application of Operational Art

### A. Operational Art

Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, and means (JP 3-0). It is the essence of applying skill, experience, and judgment when exercising military command at the operational-level of warfare, and serves two main functions—

- To ensure that military actions are aligned with, and directly support strategy.
- To ensure that tactical actions occur under the most advantageous conditions possible.

Commanders and their staffs apply operational art throughout all phases of the operations process. Army commanders use operational art, the principles of joint operations, and the elements of operational art to envision how to establish conditions that accomplish their missions and objectives. For Army forces, operational art is the pursuit of strategic objectives, in whole or in part, through the arrangement of tactical actions in time, space, and purpose. Operational art applies to all types and aspects of operations.

### B. Principles of Joint Operations

The twelve principles of joint operations represent important factors that affect the conduct of operations across the levels of warfare. The principles are broadly applied considerations and their relevance varies in each situation. They are not a checklist. Commanders generally consider all twelve principles, but they may not apply them in the same way in every operation. The principles summarize the characteristics of successful operations throughout history. Their greatest value lies in educating military professionals. While considering the principles of joint operations, commanders determine if or when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation.

*See following page (p. 1-23) for a detailed discussion on the principles of joint operations from JP 3-0.*

When applying operational art, commanders and staffs ensure a shared understanding of purpose. This requires open, continuous collaboration between commanders at various echelons to define accurately the problems and conditions of an operational environment. Effective collaboration facilitates assessment, fosters critical analysis, and anticipates opportunities and risk.


Operational art encompasses all levels, from strategic direction to tactical actions. It requires creative vision, broad experience, and a knowledge of capabilities, tactics, and techniques across multiple domains. It is through operational art that commanders translate their operational approach into a concept of operations. A concept of operations is a verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources (JP 5-0). Commanders then position and maneuver forces to perform tasks that best achieve a desired end state.

The successful application of operational art relies heavily on the science of operations. Considerations such as movement times, capability ranges, loiter times, consumption rates, available supplies, combat power status, and electromagnetic spectrum management determine whether an operational approach is feasible or not. Many operational approaches prove unhelpful for driving detailed planning because they fail to consider operational realities. The earlier details are integrated into conceptual planning, the better.

### C. Army Design Methodology

During planning, commanders and their staffs use the Army design methodology to develop an operational approach that informs detailed planning. The Army design methodology is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe unfamiliar problems and approaches to solving them (ADP 5-0). By applying the Army design methodology, commanders and staffs gain a shared understanding of the environment, and they can define the problems preventing the desired end state. This differs from mission analysis, since it is not mission specific. (See figure 2-1.) These items enable commanders and staffs using Army design methodology:

- The principles of joint operations and principles of war.
- The tenets of unified land operations
- The elements of operational art
- The defeat mechanisms
- The stability mechanisms



Ref: ADP 3-0 (Jul '19), fig. 2-1. Army design methodology.

# Principles of Joint Operations

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), table 2-1 and JP 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Joint Operations (Oct '18), pp. I-2 to I-3 and app. A.*

## Objective

Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.

## Offensive

Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

## Mass

Concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.

## Maneuver

Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

## Economy of Force

Expend minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts in order to allocate the maximum possible combat power on primary efforts.

## Unity of Command

Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

## Security

Prevent the enemy from acquiring unexpected advantage.

## Surprise

Strike at a time or place or in a manner for which the enemy is unprepared.

## Simplicity

Increase the probability that plans and operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders.

## Restraint

Limit collateral damage and prevent the unnecessary use of force.

## Perseverance

Ensure the commitment necessary to attain the national strategic end state.

## Legitimacy

Maintain legal and moral authority in the conduct of operations.




*Refer to JFODS5-1: The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMART-book (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations). Updated for 2019, topics include joint doctrine fundamentals (JP 1), joint operations (JP 3-0 w/Chg 1), an expanded discussion of joint functions, joint planning (JP 5-0), joint logistics (JP 4-0), joint task forces (JP 3-33), joint force operations (JPs 3-30, 3-31, 3-32 & 3-05), multinational operations (JP 3-16), interorganizational cooperation (JP 3-08), & more!*



## Operational Approach

Army design methodology results in an operational approach, a broad description of the mission, operational concepts, tasks, and actions required to accomplish the mission (JP 5-0). A good operational approach provides the basis for detailed planning, allows leaders to establish a logical operational framework, and helps produce an executable order. As detailed planning yields new information, leaders reassess their operational approach—and the Army design methodology that informed it—and adjust it accordingly to ensure relevancy. These actions continue throughout preparation and execution, and they inform commanders' decision-making. When assessing operations, the logic of the operational approach provides the basis for developing assessment criteria, including measures of performance and effectiveness.

The understanding developed with the Army design methodology enables commanders to develop an operational approach that establishes conditions to accomplish the mission. (See figure 2-2.) The operational approach provides a framework that relates tactical tasks to the desired end state. It provides a unifying purpose and focus to all operations.



Ref: ADP 3-0 (Jul '19), fig. 2-2. Operational approach.

## II. Defeat and Stability Mechanisms

### A. Defeat Mechanism

Defeat is to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives. Defeat has a temporal component and is seldom permanent. When developing an operational approach, commanders consider methods to employ a combination of defeat mechanisms and stability mechanisms. Defeat mechanisms relate to offensive and defensive operations; stability mechanisms relate to stability operations, security, and consolidating gains in an area of operations.

#### Destroy

When commanders destroy, they apply lethal combat power on an enemy capability so that it can no longer perform any function. Destroy is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt (FM 3-90-1). An enemy cannot restore a destroyed force to a usable condition without entirely rebuilding it.

#### Dislocate

Dislocate is to employ forces to obtain significant positional advantage, rendering the enemy's dispositions less valuable, perhaps even irrelevant. Commanders often achieve dislocation by placing forces in locations where the enemy does not expect them.

## Disintegrate

Disintegrate means to disrupt the enemy's command and control system, degrading its ability to conduct operations while leading to a rapid collapse of the enemy's capabilities or will to fight. Commanders often achieve disintegration by specifically targeting an enemy's command structure and communications systems.

## Isolate

Isolate means to separate a force from its sources of support in order to reduce its effectiveness and increase its vulnerability to defeat. Isolation can encompass multiple domains and can have both physical and psychological effects detrimental to accomplishing a mission. Isolating a force in the electromagnetic spectrum exacerbates the effects of physical isolation by reducing its situational awareness. The ability of an isolated unit to perform its intended mission generally degrades over time, decreasing its ability to interfere with an opposing force's course of action. When commanders isolate, they deny an enemy or adversary access to capabilities that enable an enemy unit to maneuver at will in time and space.

Commanders describe defeat mechanisms by the three types of effects they produce:

- Physical effects are those things that are material.
- Temporal effects are those that occur at a specific point in time.
- Cognitive effects those that pertain to or affect the mind.

Operational art formulates the most effective, efficient way to apply defeat mechanisms. Physically defeating an enemy deprives enemy forces of the ability to achieve those aims. Temporally defeating an enemy anticipates enemy reactions and counters them before they can become effective. Cognitively defeating an enemy disrupts decision making and deprives that enemy of the will to fight.

In addition to defeating an enemy, Army forces often seek to stabilize an area of operations by performing stability tasks. Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. There are six primary stability tasks:

- Establish civil security
- Establish civil control
- Restore essential services
- Support governance
- Support economic and infrastructure development
- Conduct security cooperation

*See pp. 4-4 to 4-5 for an overview and further discussion of stability tasks from ADP 3-07.*

The combination of stability tasks performed during operations depends on the situation. In some operations, the host nation can meet most or all of the population's requirements. In those cases, Army forces work with and through host-nation authorities. Commanders use civil affairs operations to mitigate how the military presence affects the population and vice versa. Conversely, Army forces operating in a failed state may need to support the local population and work with civilian organizations to restore capabilities. Civil affairs operations are essential in establishing the trust between Army forces and civilian organizations required for effective working relationships.

## B. Stability Mechanism

A stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace. As with defeat mechanisms, combinations of stability mechanisms produce complementary and reinforcing effects that accomplish the mission more effectively and efficiently than single mechanisms do alone.

The four stability mechanisms are compel, control, influence, and support. Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority. Control involves imposing civil order. Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions. Support establishes, reinforces, or sets the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.

## III. The Elements of Operational Art

In applying operational art, Army commanders and their staffs use intellectual tools to help understand an operational environment and visualize and describe their approach to conducting an operation. Collectively, these tools are the elements of operational art. They help commanders understand, visualize, and describe the integration and synchronization of the elements of combat power and their commander's intent and guidance. Commanders selectively use these tools in any operation. Their broadest application applies to long-term operations.

Not all elements of operational art apply at all levels of warfare. A company commander concerned about the tempo of an upcoming operation is probably not concerned with an enemies' center of gravity. A corps commander may consider all elements of operational art in developing a plan to support the JFC. As such, the elements of operational art are flexible enough to apply when pertinent.

As some elements of operational design apply only to JFCs, the Army modifies the elements of operational design into elements of operational art by adding Army-specific elements. During the planning and execution of Army operations, commanders and staffs consider the elements of operational art as they assess the situation. They adjust current and future operations and plans as the operation unfolds, and they reframe as necessary.

Elements of Operational Art	
Operational art consists of these elements:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• End state and conditions.</li><li>• Center of gravity.*</li><li>• Decisive points.*</li><li>• Lines of operations and lines of effort.*</li><li>• Tempo.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Phasing and transitions.</li><li>• Culmination.*</li><li>• Operational reach.*</li><li>• Basing.*</li><li>• Risk.</li></ul>
*Common to elements of operational design.	

Ref: ADRP 3-0 (2016), table 2-2. Elements of operational art.

## A. End State and Conditions

The end state is a set of desired future conditions the commander wants to exist when an operation ends. Commanders include the end state in their planning guidance. A clearly defined end state promotes unity of effort; facilitates integration, synchronization, and disciplined initiative; and helps mitigate risk.

Army operations typically focus on achieving the military end state that may include contributions to establishing nonmilitary conditions. Commanders explicitly describe the end state and its conditions for every operation. Otherwise, missions lack purpose, and operations lose focus. Successful commanders direct every operation toward a clearly defined, conclusive, and attainable end state (the objective). Most military operations require Army forces to consolidate gains to achieve a desired political end state, the exception being a punitive expedition.

An end state may evolve as an operation progresses. Commanders continuously monitor operations and evaluate their progress. They evaluate the validity of assumptions and running estimates. Commanders use formal and informal assessment methods to assess their progress in achieving an end state and determine if they need to reframe. An end state should anticipate future operations and set conditions for transitions.

## B. Center Of Gravity (COG)

A center of gravity is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act (JP 5-0). The loss of a center of gravity can ultimately result in defeat. A center of gravity is an analytical tool for planning operations. It provides a focal point and identifies sources of strength and weakness. However, the concept of center of gravity is only meaningful when considered in relation to the objectives of the mission. Because most enemies represent adaptive, complex systems, they are likely to have multiple centers of gravity. Destroying or capturing one is unlikely to win a campaign or resolve most conflicts.

Centers of gravity are not limited to military forces, and they can be physical, moral, and virtual. They are part of a dynamic perspective of an operational environment, and they may change as an environment changes. Physical centers of gravity, such as a capital city or military force, are tangible and typically easier to identify, assess, and account for than moral centers of gravity. Physical centers of gravity can often be influenced solely by military means. In contrast, moral centers of gravity are intangible and more difficult to influence. They can include a charismatic leader, powerful ruling elite, or united population. Military means alone usually prove ineffective when targeting moral centers of gravity. Affecting them requires collective, integrated efforts of all instruments of national power. Likewise, a virtual center of gravity may provide the ability to maintain unity of purpose for a disaggregated or decentralized enemy which does not require mutual physical support to accomplish objectives and is not geographically bound. Virtual centers of gravity are usually associated with violent extremist ideologies and organizations, non-nation state actors, or super-empowered individuals, although nation states could also have them.

A center of gravity has subcomponents comprising a system, such as command and control or logistics, which can be targeted for information collection and attack. This targeting can identify critical vulnerabilities in the system, such as communications or enemy morale, against which commanders can apply friendly capabilities.

Commanders analyze a center of gravity thoroughly and in detail. Faulty conclusions drawn from hasty or abbreviated analyses can adversely affect operations, waste critical resources, and incur undue risk. Thoroughly understanding an operational environment helps commanders identify and target enemy centers of gravity. This understanding encompasses how enemies organize, fight, and make decisions. It includes their physical and moral strengths and weaknesses. This understanding helps planners identify centers of gravity, their associated decisive points, and the best approach for achieving the desired end state.

## C. Decisive Points

A decisive point is a geographic place, specific key event, critical factor, or function that, when acted upon, allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy or contribute materially to achieving success (JP 5-0). Decisive points help

## D. Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 2-7 to 2-8.*

Lines of operations and lines of effort link objectives to the end state physically and conceptually. Commanders may describe an operation along lines of operations, lines of effort, or a combination of both. The combination of them may change based on the conditions within an area of operations. Commanders synchronize and sequence actions, deliberately creating complementary and reinforcing effects. The lines then converge on the well-defined, commonly understood end state outlined in the commander's intent.

Commanders at all levels may use lines of operations and lines of effort to develop tasks and allocate resources. Commanders may designate one line as the decisive operation and others as shaping operations. Commanders synchronize and sequence related actions along multiple lines. Seeing these relationships helps commanders assess progress toward achieving the end state as forces perform tasks and accomplish missions.

### Lines of Operations

A line of operations is a line that defines the directional orientation of a force in time and space in relation to the enemy and links the force with its base of operations and objectives. Lines of operations connect a series of decisive points that lead to control of a geographic or force-oriented objective. Operations designed using lines of operations generally consist of a series of actions executed according to a well-defined sequence. A force operates on interior and exterior lines. Interior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations diverge from a central point. Interior lines allow commanders to move quickly against enemy forces along shorter lines of operation. Exterior lines are lines on which a force operates when its operations converge on the enemy. Exterior lines allow commanders to concentrate forces against multiple positions on the ground, thus presenting multiple dilemmas to the enemy. Lines of operations tie offensive and defensive operations to the geographic and positional references in the area of operations.

### Lines of Effort

A line of effort is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing a desired end state. Lines of effort are essential to long-term planning when positional references to an enemy or adversary have little relevance. In operations involving many nonmilitary factors, lines of effort may be the only way to link tasks to the end state. Lines of effort are often essential to helping commanders visualize how military capabilities can support the other instruments of national power.

Commanders use lines of effort to describe their vision of operations to achieve end state conditions. These lines of effort show how individual actions relate to each other and to achieving the end state. Commanders often use stability and DSCA tasks along lines of effort. These tasks link military actions with the broader interagency or interorganizational effort across the levels of warfare. As operations progress, commanders may modify the lines of effort after assessing conditions. Commanders use measures of performance and measures of effectiveness to continually assess operations. A measure of performance is an indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment (JP 5-0). A measure of effectiveness is an indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time (JP 5-0).

### Combining Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort

Commanders use lines of operations and lines of effort to connect objectives to a central, unifying purpose. The difference between lines of operations and lines of effort is that lines of operations are oriented on physical linkages, while lines of effort are oriented on logical linkages. Combining lines of operations and lines of effort allows a commander to include stability or DSCA tasks in the long-term plan. This combination helps commanders begin consolidating gains and set the end state conditions for transitions in an operation.

commanders select clear, conclusive, attainable objectives that directly contribute to achieving an end state. Geographic decisive points can include port facilities, distribution networks and nodes, and bases of operation. Specific events and elements of an enemy force can be decisive points. Examples of such events include commitment of the enemy operational reserve and reopening a major oil refinery. Space and cyberspace-enabled capabilities may also represent decisive points.

A common characteristic of decisive points is their importance to centers of gravity. Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are key to attacking or protecting centers of gravity, and they comprise parts of its system. A decisive point's importance requires an enemy force to commit significant resources to defend it. The loss of a decisive point weakens a center of gravity, and it may expose more decisive points. Identifying and attacking more decisive points can eventually lead to an attack on the center of gravity itself. Commanders identify the decisive points that offer the greatest physical, temporal, or psychological advantage against centers of gravity.

Decisive points apply to both the operational and tactical levels when shaping the concept of operations. Decisive points enable commanders to seize, retain, or exploit operational initiative. Controlling them is essential to mission accomplishment. Enemy control of a decisive point may stall friendly momentum, force early culmination, or allow an enemy counterattack.

## E. Tempo

Tempo is the relative speed and rhythm of military operations over time with respect to the enemy. It reflects the rate of military action. Controlling tempo helps commanders keep operational initiative during combat operations or rapidly establish a sense of normalcy during humanitarian crises. During combat operations, commanders normally seek to maintain a higher tempo than enemy forces do. A rapid tempo can overwhelm an enemy force's ability to counter friendly actions. During other operations, commanders act quickly to control events and deny enemy forces positions of advantage. By acting faster than the situation deteriorates, commanders can change the dynamics of a crisis and restore favorable conditions.

Commanders control tempo throughout the conduct of operations. First, they formulate operations that exploit the complementary and reinforcing effects of simultaneous and sequential operations. They synchronize those operations in time and space to degrade enemy capabilities throughout the area of operations. Second, commanders avoid unnecessary engagements. They do this by bypassing resistance and avoiding places not considered decisive. Third, through mission command, commanders enable subordinates to exercise initiative and act independently. Controlling tempo requires both audacity and patience. Audacity initiates the actions needed to develop a situation; patience allows a situation to develop until the force can strike at the most crucial time and place. Ultimately, the goal is maintaining a tempo appropriate to retaining and exploiting the initiative and achieving the end state.

Army forces expend more energy and resources when operating at a high tempo. Commanders assess their force's capacity to operate at a higher tempo based on its performance and available resources. An effective operational design varies tempo throughout an operation to increase endurance while maintaining appropriate speed and momentum. There is more to tempo than speed. While speed can be important, commanders vary speed to achieve endurance and optimize operational reach.

When considering tempo it is critical to consider the risks associated with the requirement to consolidate gains. When forces consolidate gains throughout an operation, a commander may accept the risk of slower tempo in the near term, to ensure the enemy is unable to protract the conflict with bypassed or irregular forces that avoid decisive engagement with friendly forces. There may be circumstances when a commander accepts risk by deciding to consolidate gains in a later phase during operations because of a need to conduct operations at a higher tempo initially. Regardless of where the commander accepts risk associated with tempo, the requirement to consolidate gains is inherent to almost all operations on land.

## F. Phasing and Transitions

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 2-9. See also p. 2-21.*

### Phasing

A phase is a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. A change in phase usually involves a change of mission, task organization, or rules of engagement. Phasing helps in planning and controlling, and it may be indicated by time, distance, terrain, or an event. The ability of Army forces to extend operations in time and space, coupled with a desire to dictate tempo, often presents commanders with more objectives and decisive points than the force can engage simultaneously. This may require commanders and staffs to consider sequencing operations.

Phasing is critical to arranging all tasks of an operation that cannot be performed simultaneously. It describes how the commander envisions the overall operation unfolding. It is the logical expression of the commander's visualization in time. Within a phase, a large portion of the force executes similar or mutually supporting activities. Achieving a specified condition or set of conditions typically marks the end of a phase.

Simultaneity, depth, and tempo are vital to all operations. However, forces cannot always attain them to the degree desired. In such cases, commanders limit the number of objectives and decisive points engaged simultaneously. They deliberately sequence certain actions to maintain tempo while focusing combat power at a decisive point in time and space.

Phasing can extend operational reach. When a force lacks the capability to accomplish its mission in a single action, commanders phase the operation. Each phase should strive to focus effort, concentrate combat power in time and space at a decisive point, and accomplish its objectives deliberately and logically.

### Transitions

Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities among offensive, defensive, stability, and DSCA tasks also involve transitions. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution, so the force can maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. The force is vulnerable during transitions, and commanders establish clear conditions for their execution.

A transition occurs for several reasons. Transitions occur when delivering essential services, retaining infrastructure needed for reconstruction, or when consolidating gains. An unexpected change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition between phases. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement. Typically, task organization evolves to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning must also account for changes in mission. Commanders continuously assess the situation, and they task-organize and cycle their forces to retain operational initiative. Commanders strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.

Commanders identify potential transitions during planning and account for them throughout execution. Considerations for identifying potential transitions should include—

- Forecasting in advance when and how to transition.
- Arranging tasks to facilitate transitions.
- Creating a task organization that anticipates transitions.
- Rehearsing certain transitions such as from defense to counterattack or from offense to consolidating gains.
- Ensuring the force understands the different rules of engagement during transitions.
- Commanders should appreciate the time required to both plan for and execute transitions. Assessment ensures that commanders measure progress toward such transitions and take appropriate actions to prepare for and execute them.



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## G. Culmination

The culminating point is a point at which a force no longer has the capability to continue its form of operations, offense or defense (JP 5-0). Culmination represents a crucial shift in relative combat power. It is relevant to both attackers and defenders at each level of warfare. While conducting offensive operations, the culminating point occurs when a force cannot continue the attack and must assume a defensive posture or execute an operational pause. While conducting a defense, it occurs when a force can no longer defend itself and must withdraw or risk destruction. The culminating point is more difficult to identify when Army forces perform stability tasks. Two conditions can result in culmination while performing stability tasks: units being too dispersed to achieve security and units lacking required resources to achieve the end state. While performing DSCA tasks, culmination may occur if forces must respond to more catastrophic events than they can manage simultaneously. Such a situation results in culmination due to exhaustion.

A culmination may be a planned event. In such cases, the concept of operations predicts which part of a force will culminate, and the task organization includes additional forces to assume the mission after culmination. Typically, culmination is caused by direct combat actions or higher echelon resourcing decisions. Culmination relates to the force's ability to generate and apply combat power, and it is not a lasting condition. To continue operations after culminating, commanders may reinforce or reconstitute tactical units.

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## H. Operational Reach

Operational reach reflects the ability to achieve success through a well-conceived operational approach, and it is applicable to Army forces operating as part of the joint force. Operational reach is a tether; it is a function of intelligence, protection, sustainment, endurance, and combat power relative to enemy forces. The limit of a unit's operational reach is its culminating point. Operational reach balances the natural tension among endurance, momentum, and protection. Commanders seek to extend the operational reach far enough to accomplish their objectives before culmination.

Endurance refers to the ability to employ combat power anywhere for protracted periods. It stems from the ability to organize, protect, and sustain a force, regardless of the distance from its base and the austerity of the environment. Endurance involves anticipating requirements and making the most effective and efficient use of resources. Endurance contributes to Army forces' ability to achieve decisive outcomes over time.

Momentum comes from retaining operational initiative and executing high-tempo operations that overwhelm enemy resistance. Commanders control momentum by maintaining focus and pressure. They set a tempo that prevents exhaustion and maintains adequate sustainment. A sustainable tempo extends operational reach. Commanders maintain momentum by anticipating and transitioning rapidly between any combination of offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA tasks. Momentum prevents an enemy from recovering the initiative. Sometimes commanders push the force to its culminating point to take maximum advantage of an opportunity. Exploitations and pursuits often involve pushing all available forces to the limit of their endurance to capitalize on momentum and retain the initiative.

Protection is an important contributor to operational reach. Commanders anticipate how enemy actions and environmental factors might disrupt operations and then determine the protection capabilities required to maintain sufficient reach. Protection closely relates to endurance and momentum. It also contributes to the commander's ability to extend operations in time and space. The protection warfighting function helps commanders maintain their force's integrity and combat power.

Commanders and staffs consider operational reach to ensure Army forces accomplish their missions before culminating. Commanders continually strive to extend

operational reach. They assess friendly and enemy force status and civil considerations, anticipate culmination, consolidate gains, and plan operational pauses if necessary. The use of basing can sustain operational reach in time and space.

*See related discussion on operational reach from ADP 4-0 on p. 7-33 and FM 3-0 on p. 2-13.*

## I. Basing

Army basing overseas typically falls into two general categories: permanent (bases or installations) and nonpermanent (base camps). A base is a locality from which operations are projected or supported (JP 4-0). Generally, bases are in host nations in which the United States has a long-term lease and a status-of-forces agreement. A base camp is an evolving military facility that supports the military operations of a deployed unit and provides the necessary support and services for sustained operations (ATP 3-37.10). Base camps are nonpermanent by design and designated as bases when the intention is to make them permanent. Bases or base camps may have a specific purpose (such as serving as an intermediate staging base, a logistics base, or a base camp) or they may be multifunctional. The longer base camps exist, the more they exhibit many of the same characteristics as bases in terms of the support and services provided and types of facilities developed. A base or base camp has a defined perimeter, has established access controls, and takes advantage of natural and man-made features.

Basing may be joint or single Service and will routinely support both U.S. and multinational forces, as well as interagency partners, operating anywhere along the range of military operations. Commanders often designate an area as a base or base camp and assign responsibility to a single commander for protection and terrain management within the base. Within large echelon support areas or joint security areas, controlling commanders may designate base clusters for mutual protection and to exercise command and control. (See JP 4-0 for more information on joint logistics and basing and JP 3-10 for more on joint security areas.)

*See p. 7-35 for discussion of basing from ADP 4-0.*

## J. Risk

Risk is the probability and severity of loss linked to hazards. Risk, uncertainty, and chance are inherent in all military operations. When commanders accept risk, they create opportunities to seize, retain, and exploit operational initiative and achieve decisive results. The willingness to incur risk is often the key to exposing enemy weaknesses that an enemy considers beyond friendly reach. Understanding risk requires accurate running estimates and valid assumptions. Embracing risk as opportunity requires situational awareness and imagination, as well as audacity. Successful commanders assess and mitigate risk continuously throughout the operations process.

Inadequate planning and preparation puts forces at risk, as does delaying action while waiting for perfect intelligence and synchronization. Risk averse commanders and units miss fleeting opportunities, which can actually increase the risk of greater casualties. Reasonably estimating and intentionally accepting risk is fundamental to conducting successful operations and essential to the mission command approach. Experienced commanders balance audacity and imagination against risk and uncertainty to strike at a time, at a place, and in a manner unexpected by enemy forces. This is the essence of surprise.

Commanders accept risks to create and maintain conditions necessary to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. A good operational approach considers the balances of risk and uncertainty with friction and chance. Plans and orders should provide the flexibility subordinates need take initiative when opportunities present themselves or conditions change as a hedge against risk. Plans and orders that have no tolerances for friction or deviation from how tasks might be accomplished are inherently higher risk than those that do.

# III. The Army's Operational Concept

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), chap. 3.*

## I. Unified Land Operations

Unified land operations is the Army's warfighting doctrine, and it is the Army's operational concept and contribution to unified action. Unified land operations is an intellectual outgrowth of both previous operations doctrine and recent combat experience. It recognizes the nature of modern warfare in multiple domains and the need to conduct a fluid mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or DSCA simultaneously. Unified land operations acknowledges that strategic success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of interagency and multinational partners. Army forces, as part of the joint force, contribute to joint operations through the conduct of unified land operations. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action.

The goal of unified land operations is to establish conditions that achieve the JFC's end state by applying landpower as part of a unified action to defeat the enemy. Unified land operations is how the Army applies combat power through 1) simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability, or DSCA, to 2) seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, and 3) consolidate gains. Military forces seek to prevent or deter threats through unified action, and, when necessary, defeat aggression.

## II. Decisive Action


Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authority tasks. Army forces conduct decisive action. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense.

Decisive action begins with the commander's intent and concept of operations. Decisive action provides direction for an entire operation. Commanders and staffs refine the concept of operations during planning and determine the proper allocation of resources and tasks. Throughout an operation, they may adjust the allocation of resources and tasks as conditions change.

The simultaneity of decisive action varies by echelon and span of control. Higher echelons generally have a broader focus than lower echelons when assigning responsibilities to subordinates. The higher the echelon, the greater the possibility that all elements of decisive action occur simultaneously within its area of operations. At lower echelons, an assigned task may require all the echelons' combat power to execute a specific task. For example, in some form a higher echelon, such as a corps, always performs offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authority operations simultaneously. Subordinate brigades perform some combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations, but they generally are more focused by their immediate priorities on a specific element, particularly during large-scale ground combat operations.

Unified land operations addresses combat with armed opponents amid populations. This requires Army forces to shape civil conditions. Winning battles and engagements is important, but it is not always the most significant task in a strategic context. Shaping civil conditions with unified action partners is generally important to the success of all campaigns, and thus it is a critical component of all operations.

Unified land operations span the entire competition continuum. They are conducted to support all four Army strategic roles. The relative emphasis on the various elements of decisive action vary with the purpose and context of the operations being conducted.



*The mission determines the relative weight of effort among the elements.*

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), fig. 3-1. Decisive action.*

### A. Elements of Decisive Action

Decisive action is the continuous, simultaneous execution of offensive, defensive, and stability operations or defense support of civil authority tasks. Army forces conduct decisive action. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative while synchronizing their actions to achieve the best effects possible. Operations conducted outside the United States and its territories simultaneously combine three elements of decisive action—offense, defense, and stability. Within the United States and its territories, decisive action combines elements of DSCA and, as required, offense and defense to support homeland defense.

*See following pages (pp. 1-36 to 1-37) for discussion of the elements of decisive action.*

### B. The Purpose of Simultaneity

Simultaneity is the act of doing multiple things at the same time. The purpose of simultaneity during decisive action is to create multiple dilemmas that overwhelm an adversary or enemy's ability to effectively respond. Multiple dilemmas can create a cascading effect that leaves an opponent with no good options to accomplish its objectives. Achieving simultaneity requires the ability to conduct operations in depth and to integrate them so that their timing multiplies their effectiveness across multiple domains throughout an area of operations. Commanders must consider their entire area of operations, enemy forces, and information collection activities as they synchronize combat power to conduct simultaneous operations that immobilize, suppress, or surprise enemy forces. Such actions nullify an enemy force's ability to react in a coordinated, mutually supporting fashion.

Army forces create depth in time and space through combined arms, economy of force, continuous reconnaissance, and joint capabilities. Conducting operations across large areas forces an adversary or enemy to react in multiple directions and opens up opportunities that can be further exploited to create additional dilemmas.

# C. Homeland Defense and Decisive Action

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 3-4 to 3-5.

Homeland defense is the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President (JP 3-27). The DOD has lead responsibility for homeland defense. The strategy for homeland defense (and DSCA) calls for defending U.S. territory against attack by state and nonstate actors through an active, layered defense that aims to deter and defeat aggression abroad and simultaneously protect the homeland. The Army supports this strategy with capabilities in forward regions of the world, geographic approaches to U.S. territory, and within the U.S. homeland.


During homeland defense, Army forces work closely with federal, state, territorial, tribal, local, and private agencies. Land domain homeland defense could consist of offense and defense as part of decisive action. Homeland defense is a defense-in-depth that relies on collection, analysis, and sharing of information and intelligence; strategic and regional deterrence; military presence in forward regions; and the ability to rapidly obtain and project warfighting capabilities to defend the United States, its allies, and its interests. This defense may include support to civil law enforcement; antiterrorism and force protection; counterdrug; air and missile defense; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives; and defensive cyberspace operations. It can also include security cooperation with other partners to build an integrated and mutually supportive concept of protection.



Refer to *The Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook (Protecting the Homeland / Defense Support to Civil Authority)* for complete discussion. Topics and references include homeland defense (JP 3-28), defense support of civil authorities (JP 3-28), Army support of civil authorities (ADRP 3-28), multi-service DSCA TTPs (ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2), DSCA liaison officer toolkit (GTA 90-01-020), key legal and policy documents, and specific hazard and planning guidance.



Refer to *CTS1: The Counterterrorism, WMD & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook* for further discussion. CTS1 topics and chapters include: the terrorist threat (characteristics, goals & objectives, organization, state-sponsored, international, and domestic), hybrid and future threats, forms of terrorism (tactics, techniques, & procedures), counterterrorism, critical infrastructure, protection planning and preparation, countering WMD, and consequence management (all hazards response).



Refer to *CYBER1: The Cyberspace Operations & Electronic Warfare SMARTbook (Multi-Domain Guide to Offensive/Defensive CEMA and CO)*. Topics and chapters include cyber intro (global threat, contemporary operating environment, information as a joint function), joint cyberspace operations (CO), cyberspace operations (OCO/DCO/DODIN), electronic warfare (EW) operations, cyber & EW (CEMA) planning, spectrum management operations (SMO/JEMSO), DoD information network (DODIN) operations, acronyms/abbreviations, and a cross-referenced glossary of cyber terms.

# Elements of Decisive Action

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 3-3 to 3-4 and table 3-1, p. 3-2.

Decisive action requires simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks.

## 1. Offensive Operations

An offensive operation is an operation to defeat or destroy enemy forces and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. Offensive operations impose the commander's will on an enemy.

The offense is the most direct means of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to gain a physical and psychological advantage. In the offense, the decisive operation is a sudden action directed toward enemy weaknesses and capitalizing on speed, surprise, and shock. If that operation fails to destroy an enemy, operations continue until enemy forces are defeated. The offense compels an enemy to react, creating new or larger weaknesses the attacking force can exploit.

See pp. 4-2 to 4-3 and SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed. (ADP 3-90)

## 2. Defensive Operations

A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations. Normally the defense cannot achieve a decisive victory. However, it sets conditions for a counteroffensive or a counterattack that enables forces to regain the initiative. Defensive operations are a counter to an enemy offensive action, and they seek

to destroy as much of the attacking enemy forces as possible. They preserve control over land, resources, and populations, and retain key terrain, protect lines of communications, and protect critical capabilities against attack. Commanders can conduct defensive operations in one area to free forces for offensive operations elsewhere.

See pp. 4-2 to 4-3 and SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed. (ADP 3-90)

### Offense

#### Types of Offensive Operations

- Movement to contact
- Attack
- Exploitation
- Pursuit

#### Purposes

- Dislocate, isolate, disrupt and destroy enemy forces
- Seize key terrain
- Deprive the enemy of resources
- Refine intelligence
- Deceive and divert the enemy
- Provide a secure environment for stability operations

### Defense

#### Types of Defensive Operations

- Mobile defense
- Area defense
- Retrograde

#### Purposes

- Deter or defeat enemy offensive operations
- Gain time
- Achieve economy of force
- Retain key terrain
- Protect the populace, critical assets and infrastructure
- Refine intelligence

### 3. Stability Operations

A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability involves coercive and constructive action. Stability helps in building relationships among unified action partners and promoting U.S. security interests. It can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions in an area while supporting transition of responsibility to a legitimate

#### Stability

##### Stability Operations Tasks

- Establish civil security
- Establish civil control
- Restore essential services
- Support to governance
- Support to economic and infrastructure development
- Conduct security cooperation

##### Purposes

- Provide a secure environment
- Secure land areas
- Meet the critical needs of the populace
- Gain support for host-nation government
- Shape the environment for interagency and host-nation success
- Promote security, build partner capacity, and provide access
- Refine intelligence

#### Defense Support of Civil Authorities

##### Defense Support of Civil Authorities Tasks

- Provide support for domestic disasters
- Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies
- Provide other designated support

##### Purposes

- Save lives
- Restore essential services
- Maintain or restore law and order
- Protect infrastructure and property
- Support maintenance or restoration of local government
- Shape the environment for interagency success

task executed in the homeland and U.S. territories. It is performed to support another primary agency, lead federal agency, or local authority. When DSCA is authorized, it consists of four types of operations. National Guard forces—Title 32 or state active forces under the command and control of the governor and the adjutant general—are usually the first forces to respond on behalf of state authorities. When Federal military forces are employed for DSCA activities, they remain under Federal military command and control at all times.

See pp. 4-6 to 4-7 and HDS1: Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook. (JP 3-28)

authority. Commanders are legally required to perform minimum-essential stability operations tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. These include security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment.

See pp. 4-4 to 4-5 and TAA2: *The Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook, 2nd Ed.* (ADP 3-07)

### 4. Defense Support of Civil Authority

Defense support of civil authorities is support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel, DOD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (DODD 3025.18). DSCA is a



## D. Transitioning in Decisive Action

Conducting decisive action involves more than simultaneous execution. Commanders and staffs must consider their units' capabilities and capacities relative to each element of decisive action. Commanders consider and balance the elements while preparing their commander's intent and concept of operations. They determine which elements to accomplish simultaneously and which require phasing, whether additional resources are necessary, and how to transition emphasis from one to another.

Transitions in emphasis between the elements of decisive action require careful assessment, planning, and unit preparation. Commanders first assess a situation to determine applicable elements and the priority for each. When an operation is phased, the plan includes these changes. The relative weight given to each element varies with conditions. This weight is reflected in tasks assigned to subordinates, resource allocation, and task organization.

Unanticipated changes or an improved understanding of an operational environment may result in commanders reframing a problem and adapting an operation. Unforeseen success resulting in collapse of enemy opposition illustrates one unanticipated change. Another example is a deteriorating situation during peace operations requiring a transition to the defense or offense to reestablish stability. Commanders need to adjust task organizations to support the requirements of transitions. When transitioning, subordinate commanders must clearly understand their higher echelon commander's intent, concept of operations, and desired end state. This includes how much risk to accept, and where to accept it.

## III. Consolidate Gains

The Army strategic role of consolidate gains sets conditions for enduring political and strategic outcomes to military operations. Army forces provide most of the capabilities the JFC requires to consolidate gains at scale during a campaign. Army and unified action partner forces exploit tactical and operational success for the JFC as they consolidate gains to set security conditions for the desired political end state. Activities to consolidate gains are an integral part of winning across the competition continuum and range of military operations, and they require consideration through all phases of an operation. Determining when and how to consolidate gains at the operational level, and applying the necessary resources at the tactical level to do so effectively, requires clear understanding about where to accept risk during an operation. Failure to consolidate gains generally leads to failure in achieving the desired end state, since it would represent a failure to follow-through on initial tactical successes and cedes the initiative to determined enemies seeking to prolong a conflict. The creation of governable space is necessary for transition of responsibility to a legitimate authority and the successful completion of combat operations. Army forces integrate the efforts of all unified action partners as they consolidate gains.

Army forces consolidate gains through decisive action, executing offense, defense, and stability to defeat enemy forces in detail and set security conditions required for a desired end state. Consolidate gains is not a phase. Army forces consolidate gains continuously during the conduct of operations, although not simultaneously and with varying purposes by echelons over time. Consolidating gains is focused on the exploitation of tactical success to ensure enemy forces cannot reconstitute any form of resistance in areas where they were initially defeated. This creates an enabling tempo of operations on the ground in the close, deep, and support areas.

*Refer to ADP 3-0 table 3-2, page 3-6 for a general taxonomy of purpose that reflects focus, planning considerations, and approach by echelons as they consolidate gains during combat.*

At the strategic-operational level the highest tactical echelons plan and coordinate the resources necessary to achieve the JFC's desired end state. They also provide subordinate echelons a shared visualization of the security conditions necessary for the desired political or strategic end state. Achieving the desired end state generally requires a whole of government effort with unified action partners in and out of the theater of operations. At the operational-tactical level, field armies and corps exploit division tactical success through decisive action by maintaining contact with enemy remnants, bypassed forces, and the capabilities that enemy forces could militarize to protract the conflict. Friendly forces employ lethal and non-lethal capabilities to defeat remaining enemy forces in detail and reduce the will of those forces and the local population to resist. Divisions consolidate gains through decisive action focused on the defeat of bypassed forces and security between the close area and division rear boundary to maintain freedom of movement and the tempo of the operations.

## Consolidate Gains by Echelon

Echelon	Tasks to Consolidate Gains
Strategic-operational level (joint force land component commander—corps)	Establishing the security conditions necessary to achieve the desired political end state.
Operational-tactical level (field army—corps)	Exploiting tactical success to ensure the enemy cannot mount protracted resistance by other means.
Tactical level (corps—division)	Maintaining tempo and ensuring the enemy enjoys no respite; defeating the enemy in detail.

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), table 3-2. Consolidate gains by echelon*

Consolidate gains is integral to the conclusion of all military operations, and it requires deliberate planning, preparation and resources to ensure sustainable success. This planning should ensure U.S. forces operate in a way that actively facilitates achievement of the desired post-hostilities end state and transition to legitimate authorities. Planners should anticipate task organization changes as conditions on the ground change over time, based on mission and operational variables. For example, additional engineer, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and sustainment capabilities are typically required to support the security and stability of large areas as they stabilize over time. In some instances, Army forces will be in charge of integrating and synchronizing these activities, in others Army forces will be in support. However, by backwards planning from the end state, and prioritizing the transition to legitimate authority, rather than simply planning from deployment of forces to the quick and efficient defeat of the enemy, commanders facilitate long-term success, limit mission creep, and minimize post-conflict problems.

*See following pages (1-40 to 1-41) further discussion of activities to consolidate Gains on for*

# Activities to Consolidate Gains

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 3-12 to 3-13.*

To consolidate gains, Army forces take specific actions. These actions include—

Army forces conduct a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations appropriate for their areas of operations. During combat, units consolidate gains in their areas of operations once large-scale ground combat has concluded in their area. Their initial focus is the defeat of all remaining enemy forces in detail and controlling all that could constitute a means for further resistance. This may require offensive action to defeat bypassed enemy units and secure enemy personnel, bases, equipment, and ammunition. It also requires an accurate understanding of enemy orders of battle and the capabilities that must be accounted for. As units establish area security, the balance of tasks should shift more heavily towards stability tasks focused on the control of populations and key nodes.

Area security is necessary to consolidate gains. Forces perform security tasks to protect friendly forces, routes, and critical infrastructure. Forces secure and control populations and enable freedom of friendly action within their area of operations.

Forces first perform minimum-essential stability operations tasks, then they establish a safe and secure environment to provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. Maneuver forces may require significant augmentation to their task organization to perform stability tasks effectively.

Commanders ensure sufficient combat power is positioned within their area of operations to prevent counterattacks or infiltration of forces that could disrupt ongoing efforts to consolidate gains. These actions are especially important during operations intended to re-establish the international border for a friendly state, and they may be heavily weighted towards the defense.

Forces employ civil-military operations within their capabilities until they are augmented with civil affairs capabilities. The focus is to ensure minimal interference with friendly operations.

Forces employ information-related capabilities to influence the behavior of enemy forces. They also employ information-related capabilities with the local population in ways beneficial to achieve the desired end state.

Army forces consolidate gains through decisive action, initially weighted towards offensive operations against bypassed enemy forces and remnants of defeated enemy forces. They consolidate gains to ensure the area security essential to units operating in support areas to maintain offensive tempo. Doing so requires planning for additional forces so that commanders are not forced to shift combat power away from the close and deep areas. Maintaining offensive tempo requires additional combat power to conduct detention operations, relocate displaced civilians, establish law and order, provide humanitarian assistance, and secure key infrastructure. Ending enemy resistance and denying enemy forces the respite necessary to constitute a new form of resistance that prolongs the conflict are critical to success.

Commanders establish and sustain security during transitions between phases of operations to ensure there are minimal seams or gaps that allow enemy forces time to reorganize. Army forces perform continuous reconnaissance to gain or maintain contact with remaining enemy forces to enable their defeat and retain the initiative. Accounting for all enemy forces and their supporters helps determine the level of risk within their area of operations as well as the prioritization of tasks they assign subordinates. Commanders ensure that forces are properly task organized for the tasks they assign. Capabilities such as military information support operations, public affairs, and combat camera help in this effort.

Army forces are responsible for the provision of minimum-essential stability operations tasks. Generally these stability tasks include providing security, food, water, and medical treatment. However, Army forces may not perform all the essential tasks if another organization exists that can adequately perform those tasks. Army forces execute a greater number of stability tasks as requirements and capabilities evolve. The military retains the lead to establish civil security through the performance of security force assistance in all cases. The lead for the other all tasks eventually transfers to another military or civilian organization, although Army forces may retain a supporting role.

*For more information on stability tasks, refer to ADP 3-07.*

Army forces must analyze the local capability and capacity to provide services as well as determine the ability of other U.S. government agencies, international agencies, NGOs, and contractors to provide support. The goal is to transition responsibility for humanitarian issues to entities other than Army forces as quickly as possible. This requires prior planning and coordination.

Consolidate gains may occur over a significant period and involve several changes in focus and emphasis as conditions change. An initial emphasis on defeating threat conventional forces will shift to more broadly based area security of populations and infrastructure. Eventually the emphasis and focus changes to meeting the needs of the population, influencing their perceptions, and allowing for a transition to a legitimate authority. Transitions are not generally abrupt, and units will manage different stability and security tasks concurrently until operations are complete. All activities should be prioritized towards securing and stabilizing the AO to meet the conditions necessary to achieve the desired conflict end state.

## IV. Principles of Unified Land Operations

A principle is a comprehensive and fundamental rule or an assumption of central importance that guides how an organization or function approaches and thinks about the conduct of operations (ADP 1-01). By integrating the six principles of unified land operations—mission command, develop the situation through action, combined arms, adherence to the law of war, establish and maintain security, and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy—Army commanders increase the probability of operational and strategic success. Success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of unified action partners. Success also requires commanders to exercise disciplined initiative to rapidly exploit opportunities that favorably develop the situation through action and create multiple dilemmas for the enemy.

### A. Mission Command

The Army's command and control doctrine supports its operations doctrine. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission (JP 1). Command and control is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to integrate all military activities towards a common goal—mission accomplishment.

Mission command is the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation (ADP 6-0). Mission command enables the Army's operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.

The mission command approach to command and control is based on the Army's view that war is inherently chaotic and uncertain. No plan can account for every possibility, and most plans must change rapidly during execution to account for changes in the situation. No single person is ever sufficiently informed to make every important decision, nor can a single person keep up with the number of decisions that need to be made during combat. Enemy forces may behave differently than expected, a route may become impassable, or units could consume supplies at unexpected rates. Friction and unforeseeable combinations of variables impose uncertainty in all operations and demand an approach that does not attempt to impose perfect order, but rather accepts uncertainty and makes allowances for unpredictability.

Mission command helps commanders capitalize on subordinate ingenuity, innovation, and decision making to achieve the commander's intent when conditions change or current orders are no longer relevant. It requires subordinates who seek opportunities and commanders who accept risk for subordinates trying to meet their intent. Subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation help manage uncertainty and enable necessary tempo at each echelon during operations.

Subordinates empowered to make decisions during operations unburden higher echelon commanders from issues that distract from necessary broader perspective and focus on critical issues. Mission command allows those commanders with the best situational understanding to make rapid decisions without waiting for higher echelon commanders to assess the situation and issue orders.

Decentralized execution is the delegation of decision making authority to subordinates, so they may make and implement decisions and adjust their assigned tasks in fluid and rapidly changing situations. Subordinate decisions should be ethically based, and within the framework of their higher echelon commander's intent. Decentralized execution is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative during operations in environments where conditions rapidly change and uncertainty is the norm. Rapidly changing situations and uncertainty are inherent in operations where

commanders seek to establish a tempo and intensity that enemy forces cannot match.

Commanders determine the appropriate level of control, including delegating decisions and determining how much decentralized execution to employ. The level and application of control is constantly evolving and must be continuously assessed and adjusted to ensure the level of control is appropriate to the situation. Commanders should allow subordinates the greatest freedom of action commensurate with the level of acceptable risk in a particular situation.

Different operations and phases of operations may require tighter or more relaxed control over subordinate elements than others. Operations that require the close synchronization of multiple units, or the integration of effects in a limited amount of time, naturally require more detailed coordination, and may be controlled in a more centralized manner. Examples of this include combined arms breaches, air assaults, and wet gap crossings. Conversely, operations that do not require the close coordination of multiple units, such as a movement to contact or a pursuit, offer many opportunities to exercise initiative. These opportunities may be lost if too much emphasis is placed on detailed synchronization. Even in a highly controlled operation, subordinates must still exercise initiative to address unexpected problems and achieve their commander's intent when existing orders no longer make sense in the context of execution.

*See chap. 3, Command and Control Warfighting Function, for further discussion.*

## **B. Develop the Situation through Action**

During operations, commanders develop the situation through action. Developing the situation requires information. Commanders fight for information while in contact with enemy forces and gather information through close association with a population. Developing the situation through action to collect information is inherently part of displaying disciplined initiative. Commanders enhance situational awareness and understanding by assigning information collection tasks (reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations) to collect information requirements.

Often information can only be provided by close combat that forces enemy forces to reveal their capabilities, locations, and intent. When units encounter an enemy force or obstacle, then they must quickly determine the nature of the threat they face. Units share the enemy's dispositions, activities, and movements, along with an assessment, to their higher echelon headquarters and with the other units in their formation.

During planning, commanders identify information gaps, develop information requirements, and then assign collection tasks to subordinates. Information collection and analysis allows staffs to develop options for the commander who uses them to further seize opportunities and maintain initiative.

Commanders take enemy capabilities and reaction times into account when making decisions. They ensure that plans delegate decision-making authority to the lowest echelon possible to obtain faster and more suitable decisions. Subordinates use their initiative to further their higher echelon commander's intent.

During execution, commanders make decisions quickly, usually with incomplete information. Commanders who can make and implement decisions faster than enemy commanders, even to a small degree, gain an accruing advantage that becomes significant over time. Commanders should not delay a decision in hopes of finding a perfect solution to a military problem. By the time the slower commander decides and acts, the faster one has already altered the tactical situation, making the slower one's actions less effective or irrelevant. The faster commander maintains the initiative and dictates the tempo of operations.

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## C. Combined Arms

Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially. Combined arms integrates leadership, information, and each of the warfighting functions and joint capabilities through mission command. Used destructively, combined arms integrates different capabilities so that counteracting one makes the enemy vulnerable to another. Used constructively, combined arms uses all assets available to multiply the effectiveness and efficiency of Army capabilities used in stability or DSCA.

Combined arms uses the capabilities of all Army, joint, and multinational weapons systems—in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains—in complementary and reinforcing ways. Complementary capabilities protect the weaknesses of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different one. During maneuver, the fires warfighting function complements the movement and maneuver warfighting function. Ground maneuver can make enemy forces vulnerable to joint weapon systems, while joint capabilities can enable maneuver. Electronic warfare capabilities can prevent enemy forces from communicating or relaying information about friendly maneuver. Information obtained from NGOs can facilitate effective distribution of supplies during humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities in the same warfighting function to increase the function's overall capabilities. In urban operations, for example, infantry, aviation, and armor units (movement and maneuver elements) working closely together reinforce the protection, maneuver, and direct fire capabilities of each unit type while creating cascading dilemmas for enemy forces. The infantry protects tanks from enemy infantry and antitank systems, while tanks provide protection and firepower for the infantry. Attack helicopters maneuver above buildings to protect ground formations, while other aircraft help sustain, extract, or air assault ground forces. Army artillery can be reinforced by close air support, air interdiction, air defense, and naval surface fire support, greatly increasing both the mass and range of fires available.

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## D. Adherence to Law of War

The law of war is that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities (JP 1-04). The law of war's evolution was largely humanitarian and designed to reduce the evils of war.

Soldiers consider five important principles that govern the law of war when planning and executing operations: military necessity, humanity, distinction, proportionality, and honor. Three interdependent principles—military necessity, humanity, and honor—provide the foundation for other law of war principles—such as proportionality and distinction. Law of war principles work as interdependent and reinforcing parts of a coherent system. Military necessity justifies certain actions necessary to defeat enemy forces as quickly and efficiently as possible. Humanity forbids actions that cause unnecessary suffering. Proportionality requires that even when actions may be justified by military necessity, such actions may not be unreasonable or excessive. Distinction underpins the parties' responsibility to distinguish between the armed forces and the civilian population. Lastly, honor supports the entire system and gives parties confidence in it.

Rules of engagement are directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered (JP 1-04). Rules of engagement always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. These rules vary between operations and types of units in the same area of operations, and may change during an operation.

*Refer to HDS1: The Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook for discussion on rules for the use of force.*



## E. Establish and Maintain Security

Army forces perform area security to ensure freedom of action and to deny enemy forces the ability to disrupt operations. Commanders combine reconnaissance tasks and offensive, defensive, and stability operations to protect friendly forces, populations, infrastructure, and activities critical to mission accomplishment. Army forces integrate with partner military, law enforcement, and civil capabilities to establish and maintain security. The Army's ability to establish control is critical to consolidating gains in the wake of successful military operations.

Security operations prevent surprise, reduce uncertainty, and provide early warning of enemy activities. Warning provides friendly forces with time and maneuver space with which to react and develop the situation on favorable terms. Security operations prevent enemies from discovering the friendly plan and protect the force from unforeseen enemy actions. Security elements focus on preventing enemy forces from gathering essential elements of friendly information. Security is a dynamic effort that anticipates and thwarts enemy collection efforts. When successful, security operations allow the force to maintain the initiative.

*See p. 2-79 for an overview of security operations from ADP 3-90.*

## F. Create Multiple Dilemmas for the Enemy

Simultaneous operations across multiple domains—conducted in depth and supported by military deception—present enemy forces with multiple dilemmas. These operations degrade enemy freedom of action, reduce enemy flexibility and endurance, and upset enemy plans and coordination. Such operations place critical enemy functions at risk and deny enemy forces the ability to synchronize or generate combat power. The application of capabilities in a complementary and reinforcing fashion creates more problems than the enemy commander can hope to solve, which erodes both enemy effectiveness and the will to fight.

Deception is a critical supporting enabler for creating multiple dilemmas, achieving operational surprise and maintaining the initiative. Successful deception operations degrade the ability of threat commanders to decide and act on accurate information. Deception inhibits effective enemy action by increasing the time, space, and resources necessary to understand friendly courses of action. Well executed deception creates a cumulative effect on decision-making cycles, and can cause inaction, delay, misallocation of forces, and surprise as enemy forces react to multiple real and false dilemmas. Deception is a force multiplier when properly resourced and executed.

Forcible entry operations can create multiple dilemmas by creating threats that exceed an enemy force's capability to respond. The capability to quickly project power across operational distances presents enemy forces with difficult decisions about how to array their forces in time and space. Rapid tactical maneuver to operational depth to exploit a penetration or envelopment creates similar effects.

Creating multiple dilemmas requires the recognition of opportunities to exploit. Understanding enemy dispositions and capabilities, and the characteristics of the terrain and population, informs situational understanding and course of action development. Employing mutually supporting forces along different axes to strike from unexpected directions creates dilemmas, particularly when Army and joint capabilities converge effects against enemy forces in multiple domains simultaneously. Commanders seek every opportunity to make enemy forces operate in different directions against massed capabilities at the time and locations of their choosing.

# V. Tenets of Unified Land Operations

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 3-12 to 3-13.

Tenets of operations are desirable attributes that should be built into all plans and operations and are directly related to the Army's operational concept (ADP 1-01). The tenets are interrelated and mutually supporting. Tenets of unified land operations describe the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power across the range of military operations during decisive action. An operation is a military action, consisting of two or more related tactical actions designed to accomplish a strategic objective in whole or in part. A tactical action is a battle or engagement employing lethal and nonlethal actions designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entities. Operations can include an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and the training of other militaries to enable security forces as part of building partner capacity. In the homeland, Army forces apply the tenets of operations when supporting civil authorities to save lives, alleviate suffering, and protect property.

Army operations are characterized by four tenets:

## Tenets of Unified Land Operations



**Simultaneity**



**Depth**



**Synchronization**



**Flexibility**

### A. Simultaneity

Simultaneity is the execution of related and mutually supporting tasks at the same time across multiple locations and domains. Army forces operating simultaneously across the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains presents dilemmas to adversaries and enemies, while reassuring allies and influencing neutrals. The simultaneous application of joint and combined arms capabilities across the range of military operations overwhelms the enemy physically and psychologically. Simultaneity requires creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force. Commanders synchronize the employment of capabilities while balancing tempo against sustainment capacity to produce simultaneous results.

### B. Depth

Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose to achieve definitive results. Army forces engage enemy forces throughout their depth, preventing the effective employment of reserves and disrupting command and control, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy's decision cycle. They contribute to protection by destroying enemy capabilities before enemy forces can use them. Empowering subordinates to act with initiative

decentralizes decision making and increases tempo to achieve greater depth during operations.

Cyberspace operations, space-based capabilities, and psychological operations provide opportunities to engage adversaries and enemies across the depth of their formations. Each have planning considerations with regard to timing, authorities, and effects relative to physical actions in the land domain that should be factored into friendly courses of action.

## C. Synchronization

Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). Synchronization is not the same as simultaneity; it is the ability to execute multiple related and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time. These actions produce greater effects than executing each in isolation. For example, synchronization of information collection, obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires results in the destruction of enemy formations during a defense. When conducting an offensive operation, synchronizing forces along multiple lines of operations forces enemy forces to distribute their capabilities instead of massing them.

Information networks and commander's intent enable synchronization. Networks facilitate situational awareness and rapid communication. Subordinate and adjacent units use their understanding of the commander's intent to synchronize their actions with other units without direct control from higher echelon headquarters. Neither networks nor commander's intent guarantee synchronization, but when used together they provide a powerful tool for leaders to synchronize their efforts.

Commanders determine the degree of control necessary to synchronize their operations. They balance synchronization with agility and initiative, but they never surrender the initiative for the sake of synchronization. Excessive synchronization can lead to too much control, which limits the initiative of subordinates and undermines mission command.

## D. Flexibility

Flexibility is the employment of a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. Commanders must be able to adapt to conditions as they change and employ forces in a variety of ways. Flexibility facilitates collaborative planning and decentralized execution. Leaders learn from experience (their own and that of others) and apply new knowledge to each situation. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances in operations.

Flexibility and innovation are essential elements of any successful operation, and they are products of creative and adaptive leaders. Army forces continuously adapt as operational environments change across the range of military operations. Flexibility is a critical ingredient of mission analysis, plans, and operations.

## VI. Success through Unified Land Operations

Conducting unified land operations requires—

- A clear commander's intent and concept of operations that establishes the role of each element and its contribution to accomplishing the mission.
- A flexible and redundant command and control system.
- A shared understanding of an operational environment and the purpose of the operation.
- Proactive and continuous information collection and intelligence analysis.
- In depth planning for, and when authorized, conduct of cyberspace operations.
- Aggressive security operations.
- Rapid task organization and re-task organization.
- Disciplined initiative within the commander's intent.
- The ability to move quickly, operate dispersed, and sustain maneuver over distance.
- Planned, responsive, and anticipatory sustainment.
- Combat power applied through combined arms.
- Well-trained, cohesive teams and bold, imaginative leaders.
- Accepting risk as opportunity while mitigating risk to the mission and force.
- The ability to coordinate operations with unified action partners.
- The ability to consolidate gains.

Commanders change tactics, modify their exercise of command and control, change task organization, and adjust the weight placed on each element of decisive action throughout an operation. This helps to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Commanders base decisions on their understanding of the situation, available resources, and the force's ability to conduct operations. Commanders assess the progress of ongoing operations, changes in the situation, and the force's combat effectiveness. Commanders also assess how well a current operation is shaping conditions for subsequent missions.

*See related discussion "Paths to Victory (Win)" from FM 3-0 on p. 2-22.*

# IV. Operations Structure

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), chap. 4.*

The operations structure consists of the operations process, combat power, and the operational framework. This is the Army's common construct for unified land operations. It allows Army leaders to organize efforts rapidly, effectively, and in a manner commonly understood across the Army. The operations process provides a broadly defined approach to developing and executing operations. The warfighting functions provide a common organization for critical functions. The operational framework provides Army leaders with conceptual options for organizing forces and visualizing and describing operations.

## I. The Operations Process

The operations process is a commander-led activity informed by mission command principles. It consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing an operation. These activities may be sequential or simultaneous. They are rarely discrete and often involve a great deal of overlap. Commanders use the operations process to drive the planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their unique operational environments; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

*See following page (p. 1-51) for an overview of the operations process from ADP 5-0.*

**Planning** is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning consists of two separate but interrelated components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. Successful planning requires the integration of both components. Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning: the Army design methodology, the military decision-making process, and troop leading procedures. Commanders determine how much of each methodology to use based on the scope of the problem, their familiarity with the methodology, the echelon, and the time available.

*See p. 1-56 for an overview of the Army planning methodologies.*


**Preparation** consists of activities that units perform to improve their ability to execute an operation. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces' opportunities for success. It requires commander, staff, unit, and Soldier actions to ensure the force is trained, equipped, and ready to execute operations. Preparation activities help commanders, staffs, and Soldiers understand a situation and their roles in upcoming operations and set conditions for successful execution.

**Execution** is the act of putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and adjusting operations based on changes in the situation (ADP 5-0). Commanders and staffs use situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. In execution, commanders and staffs focus their efforts on translating decisions into actions. They apply combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage. This is the essence of unified land operations.

**Assessment** is determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Assessment precedes and then occurs during the other activities of the operations process. Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes with actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Assessment helps commanders determine progress toward achieving a desired end state, accomplishing objectives, and performing tasks.

## II. Elements of Combat Power

To execute operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through warfighting functions using leadership and information. See pp. 1-60 to 1-61 for an overview and discussion of the elements of combat power (and the six warfighting functions).



## III. Army Operational Framework

An operational framework is a cognitive tool that commanders and staffs use to visualize and describe the application of combat power, in time, space, purpose, and resources, as they develop the concept of operations. An operational framework organizes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the commander and provides a way to describe the employment of forces. The framework illustrates the relationship between close operations, operations in depth, and other operations in time and space across domains.

### Army Operational Framework

- A** Area of Operations
- B** Deep, Close and Support Areas
- C** Decisive, Shaping, and Sustaining Operations
- D** Main and Supporting Efforts

See following pages (pp. 1-52 to 1-53) for an overview and further discussion.

# Activities of the Operations Process

Ref: ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Jul '19), pp. 2 to 6. See also pp. 3-14 to 3-15.

The Army's framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process. The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations (planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing).

## The Operations Process (Underlying Logic)

### Nature of Operations

Military operations are inherently human endeavors representing a contest of wills, characterized by violence and continuous adaption by all participants, conducted in dynamic and uncertain operational environments to achieve a political purpose.

*To account for the nature of operations, the Army's philosophy of command and control is...*


### Mission Command

The Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

*The Army's framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the...*

### Operations Process

The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation.



### Central idea...

Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand their operational environment; visualize and describe the operation's end state and operational approach; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

### Principles

*Guided by...*

- Drive the operations process.
- Build and maintain situational understanding.
- Apply critical and creative thinking.



Refer to BSS5: *The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning & Conducting Military Operations)* for discussion of the operations process. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.



# The Army Operational Framework

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 4-2 to 4-5. See also AODS6 pp. 2-14 to 2-21.

Army leaders are responsible for clearly articulating their concept of operations in time, space, purpose, and resources. They do this through an operational framework & associated vocabulary. An operational framework is a cognitive tool used to assist commanders and staffs in clearly visualizing and describing the application of combat power in time, space, purpose, and resources in the concept of operations (ADP 1-01). An operational framework establishes an area of geographic and operational responsibility for the commander and provides a way to visualize how the commander will employ forces against the enemy.


The operational framework has four components. First, commanders are assigned an area of operations for the conduct of operations. Second, a commander can designate a deep, close, and support areas to describe the physical arrangement of forces in time and space. Third, within this area, commanders conduct decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to articulate the operation in terms of purpose. Finally, commanders designate the main and supporting efforts to designate the shifting prioritization of resources.

## Area of Operations

An area of operations is an operational area defined by a commander for land and maritime forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions and protect their forces (JP 3-0). For land operations, an area of operations includes subordinate areas of operations assigned by Army commanders to their subordinate echelons. In operations, commanders use control measures to assign responsibilities, coordinate fire and maneuver, and control combat operations. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions (ADP 6-0). One of the most important control measures is the assigned area of operations. The Army commander or joint force land component commander is the supported commander within an area of operations designated by the JFC for land operations. Within their areas of operations, commanders integrate and synchronize combat power. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, commanders designate targeting priorities, effects, and timing within their areas of operations.

## Area of Influence

Commanders consider a unit's area of influence when assigning it an area of operations. An area of influence is a geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control (JP 3-0).



Understanding the area of influence helps the commander and staff plan branches to the current operation in which the force uses capabilities outside the area of operations.

## Area of Interest

An area of interest is that area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission (JP 3-0). An area of interest for stability or DSCA tasks may be much larger than that area associated with the offense and defense.

## Deep, Close, Support and Consolidation Areas

- The **deep area** is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat. Operations in the deep area involve efforts to prevent uncommitted enemy forces from being committed in a coherent manner. A commander's deep area generally extends beyond subordinate unit boundaries out to the limits of the commander's designated area of operations. The purpose of operations in the deep area is often tied to setting conditions for future events in time and space.
- The **close area** is the portion of the commander's area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat. Operations in the close area are within a subordinate commander's area of operations. Commanders plan to conduct decisive operations using maneuver and fires in the close area, and they position most of the maneuver force in it.
- A **support area** is the portion of the commander's area of operations that is designated to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of base sustainment assets required to sustain, enable, and control operations.
- The **consolidation area** is the portion of the land commander's area of operations that may be designated to facilitate freedom of action, consolidate gains through decisive action, and set conditions to transition the area of operations to follow on forces or other legitimate authorities.

## Decisive, Shaping, and Sustaining Operations

Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations lend themselves to a broad conceptual orientation.

- The **decisive operation** is the operation that directly accomplishes the mission. The decisive operation is the focal point around which commanders design an entire operation. The decisive operation is designed to determine the outcome of a major operation, battle, or engagement. Multiple subordinate units may be engaged in the same decisive operation across multiple domains. Decisive operations lead directly to the accomplishment of the commander's intent.
- A **shaping operation** is an operation at any echelon that creates and preserves conditions for success of the decisive operation through effects on the enemy, other actors, and the terrain. Information operations, for example, may integrate engagement tasks into an operation to reduce tensions between Army units and different ethnic groups. In combat, synchronizing the effects of aircraft, artillery fires, and obscurants to delay or disrupt repositioning forces illustrates shaping operations. Shaping operations may occur throughout the area of operations and involve any combination of forces and capabilities across multiple domains. Shaping operations set conditions for the success of the decisive operation. Commanders may designate more than one shaping operation.
- A **sustaining operation** is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power. Sustaining operations differ from decisive and shaping operations in that they focus internally (on friendly forces) rather than externally (on the enemy or environment).

Throughout decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations, commanders and their staffs need to ensure that forces maintain **positions of relative advantage**, operations are **integrated with unified action partners**, and **continuity** is maintained throughout operations.

## Main and Supporting Efforts

Commanders designate main and supporting efforts to establish clear priorities of support and resources among subordinate units.

- The **main effort** is a designated subordinate unit whose mission at a given point in time is most critical to overall mission success. It is usually weighted with the preponderance of combat power. Typically, commanders shift the main effort one or more times during execution. Designating a main effort temporarily prioritizes resource allocation. When commanders designate a unit as the main effort, it receives priority of support and resources in order to maximize combat power.
- A **supporting effort** is a designated subordinate unit with a mission that supports the success of the main effort. Commanders resource supporting efforts with the minimum assets necessary to accomplish the mission. Forces often realize success of the main effort through success of supporting efforts.

## IV. Integrating Processes

Ref: ADP 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Jul '19), pp. 1-15 to 1-17.

Commanders and staffs integrate the warfighting functions and synchronize the force to adapt to changing circumstances throughout the operations process. They use several integrating processes to do this. An integrating process consists of a series of steps that incorporate multiple disciplines to achieve a specific end. For example, during planning, the military decision-making process (MDMP) integrates the commander and staff in a series of steps to produce a plan or order. Key integrating processes that occur throughout the operations process include—

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield
- Information collection
- Targeting
- Risk management
- Knowledge management

### Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the systematic process of analyzing the mission variables of enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in an area of interest to determine their effect on operations (ATP 2-01.3). Led by the intelligence officer, the entire staff participates in IPB to develop and sustain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPB helps identify options available to friendly and threat forces.

IPB consists of four steps. Each step is performed or assessed and refined to ensure that IPB products remain complete and relevant. The four IPB steps are—

- Define the Operational Environment
- Describe Environmental Effects On Operations/*Describe The Effects On Operations*
- Evaluate the Threat/*Adversary*
- Determine Threat/*Adversary* Courses Of Action

IPB begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. IPB results in intelligence products used to aid in developing friendly COAs and decision points for the commander. Additionally, the conclusions reached and the products created during IPB are critical to planning information collection and targeting. A key aspect of IPB is refinement in preparation and execution.

*Refer to ATP 2-01.3 for a detailed discussion of IPB.*

### Information Collection

Information collection is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). It integrates the functions of the intelligence and operations staffs that focus on answering CCIRs. Information collection includes acquiring information and providing it to processing elements. It has three steps:

- Collection management
- Task and direct collection
- Execute collection

Information collection helps the commander understand and visualize the operation by identifying gaps in information and aligning reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence assets to collect information on those gaps. The “decide” and “detect” steps of targeting tie heavily to information collection.

*Refer to FM 3-55 for a detailed discussion of information collection to include the relationship between the duties of intelligence and operations staffs.*

## Targeting

Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities (JP 3-0). Targeting seeks to create specific desired effects through lethal and nonlethal actions. The emphasis of targeting is on identifying enemy resources (targets) that if destroyed or degraded will contribute to the success of the friendly mission. Targeting begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. The steps of the Army's targeting process are—

- Decide
- Detect
- Deliver
- Assess

This methodology facilitates engagement of the right target, at the right time, with the most appropriate assets using the commander's targeting guidance.

Targeting is a multidiscipline effort that requires coordinated interaction among the commander and several staff sections that together form the targeting working group. The chief of staff (executive officer) or the chief of fires (fire support officer) leads the staff through the targeting process. Based on the commander's targeting guidance and priorities, the staff determines which targets to engage and how, where, and when to engage them. The staff then assigns friendly capabilities best suited to produce the desired effect on each target, while ensuring compliance with the rules of engagement.

*See pp. 6-26 to 6-27 for discussion of fires and targeting (D3A). Refer to ATP 3-60 for a detailed discussion of Army targeting to include how Army targeting nest within the joint targeting cycle.*

## Risk Management

Risk—the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss—is inherent in all operations. Because risk is part of all military operations, it cannot be avoided. Identifying, mitigating, and accepting risk is a function of command and a key consideration during planning and execution.

Risk management is the process to identify, assess, and control risks and make decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits (JP 3-0). Commanders and staffs use risk management throughout the operations process to identify and mitigate risks associated with hazards (to include ethical risk and moral hazards) that have the potential to cause friendly and civilian casualties, damage or destroy equipment, or otherwise impact mission effectiveness. Like targeting, risk management begins in planning and continues through preparation and execution. Risk management consists of the following steps:

- Identify hazards
- Assess hazards to determine risks
- Develop controls and make risk decisions
- Implement controls
- Supervise and evaluate

## Knowledge Management

Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making (ADP 6-0). It facilitates the transfer of knowledge among commanders, staffs, and forces to build and maintain situational understanding. Knowledge management helps get the right information to the right person at the right time to facilitate decision making. Knowledge management uses a five-step process to create shared understanding. The steps of knowledge management include—

- Assess
- Design
- Develop
- Pilot
- Implement

*Refer to ATP 6-01.1 for discussion on knowledge management.*

# V. Army Planning Methodologies

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 4-2.*

**Planning** is the art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about (ADP 5-0). Planning consists of two separate but interrelated components: a conceptual component and a detailed component. Successful planning requires the integration of both these components. Army leaders employ three methodologies for planning: the Army design methodology, the military decision-making process, and troop leading procedures.

## A. The Army Design Methodology (ADM)

The Army design methodology is useful as an aid to conceptual thinking about unfamiliar problems. To produce executable plans, commanders integrate the Army design methodology with the detailed planning typically associated with the military decision-making process. Commanders who use the Army design methodology may gain a greater understanding of an operational environment and its problems. Once they have an understanding of the environment, they can better visualize an appropriate operational approach. This greater understanding allows commanders to provide a clear commander's intent and concept of operations.

Army design methodology is iterative, collaborative, and continuous. As the operations process unfolds, the commander, staff, subordinates, and other partners continue collaboration to improve their shared understanding. An improved understanding may lead to modifications to the commander's operational approach or an entirely new approach altogether.

*Refer to ATP 5-0.1 for more information on Army design methodology.*

## B. The Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP)

The military decision-making process is an iterative planning methodology. It integrates activities of the commander, staff, subordinate headquarters, and other partners. This integration enables them to understand the situation and mission; develop, analyze, and compare courses of action; decide on the course of action that best accomplishes the mission; and produce an order for execution. The military decision-making process applies to both conceptual and detailed approaches. It is most closely associated with detailed planning.

For unfamiliar problems, executable solutions typically require integrating the Army design methodology with the military decision-making process. The military decision-making process helps leaders apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge, so they understand situations, develop options to solve problems, and reach decisions. This process helps commanders, staffs, and others to think critically and creatively while planning.

## C. Troop Leading Procedures (TLP)

Troop leading procedures is a dynamic process used by small-unit leaders to analyze a mission, develop a plan, and prepare for an operation. Heavily weighted in favor of familiar problems and short planning periods, troop leading procedures are typically employed by organizations without staffs at the company level and below. Leaders use troop leading procedures to solve tactical problems when working alone or with a small group. For example, a company commander may use the executive officer, first sergeant, fire support officer, supply sergeant, and communications sergeant to help during troop leading procedures.




*Refer to BSS5: The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Guide to Designing, Planning & Conducting Military Operations) for complete discussion of the three Army planning methodologies. Additional related topics include the operations process, integrating processes and continuing activities, plans and orders, mission command, rehearsals and after action reviews, and operational terms and military symbols.*

# V. Elements of Combat Power

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), chap. 5.

## I. The Elements of Combat Power

Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Operations executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA operations require the continuous generation and application of combat power. To an Army commander, Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that are integrated and synchronized with the commander's objectives to achieve unity of effort in sustained operations.



Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), fig. 5-1. The elements of combat power.

To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The elements facilitate Army forces accessing joint and multinational fires and assets. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.

Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential. Factors that contribute to generating and maintaining combat power include reserves, force rotation, network viability, access to cyberspace and space enablers, and joint support. Commanders balance the ability to mass lethal and nonlethal effects with the need to deploy and sustain the units that produce those effects. They balance the ability to accomplish the mission with the ability to project and sustain the force.

## Leadership

Commanders apply leadership through mission command. Leadership is a multiplying and unifying element of combat power. The Army defines leadership as the activity of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). An Army commander, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals.

*See facing page for an overview of leadership from ADP 6-22.*

## Information

Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions about the application of combat power and achieve definitive results. Knowledge management enables commanders to make informed, timely decisions under ambiguous and time-constrained conditions. Information management helps determine what among the vast amounts of information available is important. Information management uses procedures and information systems to facilitate collecting, processing, storing, displaying, disseminating, and protecting knowledge and information.

Commanders and their units must coordinate what they do, say, and portray. Fundamental to this coordination is the development of information themes and messages. An information theme is a unifying or dominant idea or image that expresses the purpose for military action. A message is a narrowly focused communication directed at a specific audience to support a specific theme (JP 3-61). Themes and messages are tied to objectives, lines of effort, and end state conditions. Information themes are overarching and apply to capabilities of public affairs, military information support operations, and audience engagements. Commanders employ themes and messages as part of planned activities designed to influence foreign audiences in support current or planned operations.

*See pp. 3-16 to 3-21 for discussion of information operations from FM 3-0.*

Every operation also requires **cyberspace electromagnetic activities**. Cyberspace electromagnetic activities is the process of planning, integrating, and synchronizing cyberspace and electronic warfare operations in support of unified land operations. (This is also known as CEMA.) Cyberspace operations is the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace (JP 3-0). Electronic warfare is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (JP 3-13.1).

Army **cyberspace and electronic warfare operations** are conducted to seize, retain, and exploit advantages in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. These operations support decisive action through the accomplishment of six core missions: offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, DOD information network operations, electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support.

*See pp. 2-6 to 2-7 for further discussion of Army cyberspace and electronic warfare operations (multi-domain extended battlefield) from FM 3-0. See also p. 6-19.*

## II. The Six Warfighting Functions

A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Warfighting functions are the physical means that tactical commanders use to execute operations and accomplish missions assigned by superior tactical-and operational-level commanders. The purpose of warfighting functions is to provide an intellectual organization for common critical capabilities available to commanders and staffs at all echelons and levels of warfare. Commanders integrate and synchronize these capabilities with other warfighting functions to accomplish objectives and missions.

*Each of the six warfighting functions has a corresponding chapter within AODS6.*




# Leadership (as an Element of Combat Power)

**Leadership** is the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.

As an **element of combat power**, leadership unifies the other elements of combat power (information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment and protection). Confident, competent, and informed leadership intensifies the effectiveness of the other elements of combat power.


## Army Leadership Requirements Model



Ref: ADP 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession* (Jul '19), fig. 2, p. 5.

Among American professions, the Army Profession has unique characteristics because of the lethality of our operations. The Nation tasks the Army to do many things besides combat operations, but ultimately as ADP 1 states, the primary reason the Army exists is to fight and win the Nation's wars through prompt and sustained land combat, as part of the joint force. The Army must always be prepared to accomplish this mission through the application of lethal force.

Leaders serve to provide purpose, direction, and motivation. Army leaders work to lead others; to develop themselves, their subordinates, and organizations; and to accomplish missions. The competencies take on different nuances and complexities as leaders move from direct leadership positions to the organizational and strategic leader levels. Continuously refining values and attributes, as well as acquiring professional knowledge, is only part of becoming a competent leader. Leadership succeeds when the leader effectively acts and applies the core leader competencies.




Refer to TLS5: *The Leader's SMARTbook, 5th Ed. (Military Leadership & Training)* for complete discussion of Military Leadership (ADP/ADRP 6-22); Leader Development (FM 6-22); Counsel, Coach, Mentor (ATP 6-22.1); Army Team Building (ATP 6-22.6); Military Training (ADP/ADRP 7-0); Train to Win in a Complex World (FM 7-0); Unit Training Plans, Meetings, Schedules, and Briefs; Conducting Training Events and Exercises; Training Assessments, After Action Reviews (AARs); and more!

# Elements of Combat Power

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), chap. 5 (and figure 5-1).

**Combat power** is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Operations executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or DSCA operations require the continuous generation and application of combat power. To an Army commander, Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. Combat power includes all capabilities provided by unified action partners that are integrated and synchronized with the commander's objectives to achieve unity of effort in sustained operations.

## Elements of Combat Power



To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection. The elements facilitate Army forces accessing joint and multinational fires and assets. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as **warfighting functions**. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using **leadership and information**.

Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential. Factors that contribute to generating and maintaining combat power include reserves, force rotation, network viability, access to cyberspace and space enablers, and joint support. Commanders balance the ability to mass lethal and nonlethal effects with the need to deploy and sustain the units that produce those effects.

### Leadership & Information

Commanders apply leadership through mission command. **Leadership** is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. The Army defines leadership as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization (ADP 6-22). An Army commander, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. **Information** enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power.

See previous page (p. 1-59) for an overview of leadership from ADP 6-22. See pp. 3-16 to 3-21 for discussion of information operations from FM 3-0. See also p. 6-20.

# The Six Warfighting Functions

## 1. Command and Control

The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of combat power (leadership, information, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, and protection) to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

*See chap. 3 for further discussion.*

## 2. Movement and Maneuver

The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver directly gains or exploits positions of relative advantage. Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum

*See chap. 4 for further discussion.*

## 3. Intelligence

The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment. Other significant aspects of an operational environment include threats, adversaries, and operational variables, which vary with the nature of operations. The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection with primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders, and it involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation.

*See chap. 5 for further discussion.*

## 4. Fires

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the adversary or enemy to enable operations across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and joint forces, as well as other unified action partners.

*See chap. 6 for further discussion.*

## 5. Sustainment

The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolong endurance. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number of options available to the commander. Sustainment is essential for retaining and exploiting the initiative.

*See chap. 7 for further discussion.*

## 6. Protection

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Commanders incorporate protection when they understand and visualize threats and hazards in an operational environment. This allows them to synchronize and integrate all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States, unified action partners, and host nations.

*See chap. 8 for further discussion.*

# III. Organizing Combat Power

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 5-7 to 5-8.*

Commanders employ three means to organize combat power: force tailoring, task-organizing, and mutual support.

## A. Force Tailoring

Force tailoring is the process of determining the right mix of forces and the sequence of their deployment in support of a joint force commander. It involves selecting the right force structure for a joint operation from available units within a combatant command or from the Army force pool. Commanders then sequence forces into the area of operations as part of force projection. JFCs request and receive forces for each campaign phase, adjusting the quantity of Service component forces to match the weight of effort. Army Service component commanders tailor forces to meet land force requirements as determined by JFCs. Army Service component commanders also recommend forces and a deployment sequence to meet those requirements. Force tailoring is continuous. As new forces rotate into the area of operations, forces with excess capabilities return to the supporting combatant and Army Service component commands.

*See p. 2-46.*

## B. Task Organization

Task-organizing is the act of designing a force, support staff, or sustainment package of specific size and composition to meet a unique task or mission. Characteristics to examine when task-organizing the force include, but are not limited to, the mission, training, experience, unit capabilities, sustainability, the operational environment, and the enemy threat. Task-organizing includes allocating assets to subordinate commanders and establishing their command and support relationships. This occurs within tailored force packages as commanders organize subordinate units for specific missions and employ doctrinal command and support relationships. As task-organizing continues, commanders reorganize units for subsequent missions. The ability of Army forces to task-organize gives them extraordinary agility. It lets commanders configure their units to best use available resources. It also allows Army forces to match unit capabilities to tasks. The ability of sustainment forces to tailor and task-organize ensures commanders have freedom of action to change with mission requirements.

*See p. 3-30.*

## C. Mutual Support

Commanders consider mutual support when task-organizing forces, assigning areas of operations, and positioning units. Understanding mutual support and the time to accept risk during operations are fundamental to the art of tactics. In Army doctrine, mutual support is a planning consideration related to force disposition, not a command relationship. Mutual support has two aspects—supporting range and supporting distance. When friendly forces are static, supporting range equals supporting distance.

**Supporting range** is the distance one unit may be geographically separated from a second unit yet remain within the maximum range of the second unit's weapons systems. It depends on available weapons systems and is normally the maximum range of the supporting unit's indirect fire weapons. For small units (such as squads, sections, and platoons), it is the distance between two units that their direct fires can cover effectively. Visibility may limit the supporting range. If one unit cannot effectively or safely fire to support another, the first may not be in supporting range, even though its weapons have the required range.

**Supporting distance** is the distance between two units that can be traveled in time for one to come to the aid of the other and prevent its defeat by an enemy or ensure it regains control of a civil situation. The following factors affect supporting distance: terrain and mobility, distance, enemy capabilities, friendly capabilities, and reaction time.

# Mission Command Overview

Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (Jul '19) and ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 5-3.

## I. Command & Control Warfighting Function


The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0). The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions. The command and control warfighting function consists of the command and control warfighting function tasks and the command and control system.

### Command and Control Warfighting Function

*The related tasks and a system that enables commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power.*

#### Tasks

- Command forces
- Control operations
- Drive the operations process
- Establish the command and control system



#### Command and Control System

- People
- Processes
- Networks
- Command posts

Ref: ADP 6-0 (Jul '19), Figure 1-2. Combat power model.

The command and control warfighting function tasks focus on integrating the activities of the other elements of combat power to accomplish missions. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force through the mission command warfighting function:

- Command forces (see p. 3-10)
- Control operations (see p. 3-10)
- Drive the operations process (see p. 3-14)
- Establish the command and control system (see p. 3-12)



Refer to BSS5: The Battle Staff SMARTbook, 5th Ed. for further discussion. BSS5 covers the operations process (ADRP 5-0); commander's activities (Understand, Visualize, Describe, Direct, Lead, Assess); the military decisionmaking process and troop leading procedures (FM 6-0: MDMP/TLP); integrating processes and continuing activities (IPB, targeting, risk management); plans and orders (WARNOs/FRAGOs/OPORDs); mission command, command posts, liaison; rehearsals & after action reviews; and operational terms & symbols.

# Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces

*Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (May '12), preface and introduction.*

*ADP 6-0, Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces*, provides a discussion of the fundamentals of mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting function. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art and science of command and control to understand situations, make decisions, direct actions, and lead forces toward mission accomplishment.

This revision to ADP 6-0 represents an evolution of mission command doctrine based upon lessons learned since 2012. The use of the term mission command to describe multiple things—the warfighting function, the system, and a philosophy—created unforeseen ambiguity. Mission command replaced command and control, but in practical application it often meant the same thing. This led to differing expectations among leadership cohorts regarding the appropriate application of mission command during operations and garrison activities. Labeling multiple things mission command unintentionally eroded the importance of mission command, which is critical to the command and control of Army forces across the range of military operations. Differentiating mission command from command and control provides clarity, allows leaders to focus on mission command in the context of the missions they execute, and aligns the Army with joint and multinational partners, all of whom use the term command and control.

**Command and control**—the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces—is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single specialized military function, either by itself or combined with others, has a purpose without it. Commanders are responsible for command and control. Through command and control, commanders provide purpose and direction to integrate all military activities towards a common goal—mission accomplishment. Military operations are inherently human endeavors, characterized by violence and continuous adaptation by all participants. Successful execution requires Army forces to make and implement effective decisions faster than enemy forces. Therefore, the Army has adopted mission command as its approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.

**Mission command** requires tactically and technically competent commanders, staffs, and subordinates operating in an environment of mutual trust and shared understanding. It requires building effective teams and a command climate in which commanders encourage subordinates to take risks and exercise disciplined initiative to seize opportunities and counter threats within the commander's intent. Through mission orders, commanders focus their subordinates on the purpose of an operation rather than on the details of how to perform assigned tasks. This allows subordinates the greatest possible freedom of action in the context of a particular situation. Finally, when delegating authority to subordinates, commanders set the necessary conditions for success by allocating resources to subordinates based on assigned tasks.

Commanders need support to exercise command and control effectively. At every echelon of command, commanders are supported by the command and control warfighting function—the related tasks and a system that enables commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power. Commanders execute command and control through their staffs and subordinate leaders.

ADP 6-0 provides fundamental principles on mission command, command and control, and the command and control warfighting function. Key updates and changes to this version of ADP 6-0 include—

- Combined information from ADP 6-0 and ADRP 6-0 into a single document.
- Command and control reintroduced into Army doctrine.

- An expanded discussion of command and control and its relationship to mission command.
- Revised mission command principles.
- Command and control system reintroduced, along with new tasks, and an updated system description.
- Expanded discussion of the command and control system.

## Mission Command (Logic Map)

### Nature of War

Military operations are inherently human endeavors representing a contest of wills, characterized by violence and continuous adaption by all participants, conducted in dynamic and uncertain operational environments to achieve a political purpose.

*Operations must account for the nature of war. As such the Army's operational concept is...*

### Unified Land Operations

The simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action.

*The Army's operational concept is enabled by....*

### Mission Command

**The Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation.**

*Enabled by the principles of...*

Competence | Mutual trust | Shared understanding | Commander's intent  
Mission orders | Disciplined initiative | Risk acceptance

*Command and control is fundamental to all operations...*

### Command and Control

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.

#### Elements of Command

- Authority
- Responsibility
- Decision making
- Leadership

#### Elements of Control

- Direction
- Feedback
- Information
- Communication


*Executed through...*

### Command and Control Warfighting Function

The related tasks and a system that enables commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power.

#### Tasks

- Command forces
- Control operations
- Drive the operations process
- Establish the command and control system



#### Command and Control System

- People
- Processes
- Networks
- Command posts

Ref: ADP 6-0 (Jul '19), Introductory figure-1. Logic map.



## II. Mission Command

*Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.*

*- General George S. Patton, Jr.*

Army operations doctrine emphasizes shattering an enemy force's ability and will to resist, and destroying the coherence of enemy operations. Army forces accomplish these things by controlling the nature, scope, and tempo of an operation and striking simultaneously throughout the area of operations to control, neutralize, and destroy enemy forces and other objectives. The Army's command and control doctrine supports its operations doctrine. It balances coordination, personal leadership, and tactical flexibility. It stresses rapid decision making and execution, including rapid response to changing situations. It emphasizes mutual trust and shared understanding among superiors and subordinates.

Mission command is the Army's approach to command and control that empowers subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation. Mission command supports the Army's operational concept of unified land operations and its emphasis on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.

The mission command approach to command and control is based on the Army's view that war is inherently chaotic and uncertain. No plan can account for every possibility, and most plans must change rapidly during execution to account for changes in the situation. No single person is ever sufficiently informed to make every important decision, nor can a single person keep up with the number of decisions that need to be made during combat. Subordinate leaders often have a better understanding of what is happening during a battle, and are more likely to respond effectively to threats and fleeting opportunities if allowed to make decisions and act based on changing situations and unforeseen events not addressed in the initial plan in order to achieve their commander's intent. Enemy forces may behave differently than expected, a route may become impassable, or units could consume supplies at unexpected rates. Friction and unforeseeable combinations of variables impose uncertainty in all operations and require an approach to command and control that does not attempt to impose perfect order, but rather accepts uncertainty and makes allowances for unpredictability.

Mission command helps commanders capitalize on subordinate ingenuity, innovation, and decision making to achieve the commander's intent when conditions change or current orders are no longer relevant. It requires subordinates who seek opportunities and commanders who accept risk for subordinates trying to meet their intent. Subordinate decision making and decentralized execution appropriate to the situation help manage uncertainty and enable necessary tempo at each echelon during operations. Employing the mission command approach during all garrison activities and training events is essential to creating the cultural foundation for its employment in high-risk environments.

### Subordinate Decision Making

Successful commanders anticipate future events by developing branches and sequels instead of focusing on details better handled by subordinates during current operations. The higher the echelon, the more time commanders should devote to future operations and the broader the guidance provided to subordinates. Subordinates empowered to make decisions during operations unburden higher commanders from issues that distract from necessary broader perspective and focus on critical issues. Mission command allows those commanders with the best situational understanding to make rapid decisions without waiting for higher echelon commanders to assess the situation and issue orders.

Commanders delegate appropriate authority to deputies, subordinate commanders, and staff members based upon a judgment of their capabilities and experience. Delegation allows subordinates to decide and act for their commander in specified areas. Delegating decision-making authority reduces the number of decisions made at the higher echelons and reduces response time at lower echelons. In addition to determining the amount of decision-making authority they will delegate, commanders also identify decisions that are their sole responsibility and cannot be delegated to subordinates.

When delegating authority to subordinates, commanders strive to set the necessary conditions for success. They do this by assessing and managing risk. Taking risk is inherent at all levels of command. Commanders and staffs assess hazards and recommend controls to help manage risk, rather than forcing unnecessary risk decisions on subordinates. While commanders can delegate authority, they cannot delegate responsibility. Subordinates are accountable to their commanders for the use of delegated authority, but commanders remain solely responsible and accountable for the actions of their subordinates.

## Decentralized Execution

Decentralized execution is the delegation of decision-making authority to subordinates, so they may make and implement decisions and adjust their assigned tasks in fluid and rapidly changing situations.

Subordinate decisions should be ethically based and within the framework of their higher commander's intent. Decentralized execution is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the operational initiative during operations in environments where conditions rapidly change and uncertainty is the norm. Rapidly changing situations and uncertainty are inherent in operations where commanders seek to establish a tempo and intensity that enemy forces cannot match.

Decentralized execution requires disseminating information to the lowest possible level so subordinates can make informed decisions based on a shared understanding of both the situation and their commander's intent. This empowers subordinates operating in rapidly changing conditions to exercise disciplined initiative within their commander's intent. Generally, the more dynamic the circumstances, the greater the need for initiative to make decisions at lower levels. It is the duty of subordinates to exercise initiative to achieve their commander's intent. It is the commander's responsibility to issue appropriate intent and ensure subordinates are prepared in terms of education, training, and experience to exercise initiative.

The commander's intent provides a unifying idea that allows decentralized execution within an overarching framework. It provides guidance within which individuals may exercise initiative to accomplish the desired end state. Understanding the commander's intent two echelons up further enhances unity of effort while providing the basis for decentralized decision making and execution throughout the depth of a formation.

## Levels of Control

Determining the appropriate level of control, including delegating decisions and determining how much decentralized execution to employ, is part of the art of command. The level and application of control is constantly evolving and must be continuously assessed and adjusted to ensure the level of control is appropriate to the situation. Commanders should allow subordinates the greatest freedom of action commensurate with the level of acceptable risk in a particular situation. The mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) influence how much control to impose on subordinates. Other considerations include—

- Enemy disposition and capabilities
- Level of synchronization and integration required
- Higher echelon headquarters constraints
- Level of risk

# III. Principles of Mission Command

Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (May '12), pp. 1-6 to i-13.

## Competence

Tactically and technically competent commanders, subordinates, and teams are the basis of effective mission command. An organization's ability to operate using mission command relates directly to the competence of its Soldiers. Commanders and subordinates achieve the level of competence to perform assigned tasks to standard through training, education, assignment experience, and professional development. Commanders continually assess the competence of their subordinates and their organizations. This assessment informs the degree of trust commanders have in their subordinates' ability to execute mission orders in a decentralized fashion at acceptable levels of risk.

Training and education that occurs in both schools and units provides commanders and subordinates the experiences that allow them to achieve professional competence. Repetitive, realistic, and challenging training creates common experiences that develop the teamwork, trust, and shared understanding that commanders need to exercise mission command and forces need to achieve unity of effort.

Leaders supplement institutional and organizational training and education with continuous self-development. Self-development is particularly important for the skills that rely on the art of command, which is further developed by reading and studying the art of war. These skills can also be developed through coursework, simulations and experience.

## Mutual Trust

Mutual trust is shared confidence between commanders, subordinates, and partners that they can be relied on and are competent in performing their assigned tasks. There are few shortcuts to gaining the trust of others. Trust is given by leaders and subordinates, and built over time based on common shared experiences. It is the result of upholding the Army values, exercising leadership consistent with Army leadership principles, and most effectively instilled by the leader's personal example.

Mutual trust is essential to successful mission command, and it must flow throughout the chain of command. Subordinates are more willing to exercise initiative when they believe their commander trusts them. They will also be more willing to exercise initiative if they believe their commander will accept and support the outcome of their decisions. Likewise, commanders delegate greater authority to subordinates who have demonstrated tactical and technical competency and whose judgment they trust.

## Shared Understanding

A critical challenge for commanders, staffs, and unified action partners is creating shared understanding of an operational environment, an operation's purpose, problems, and approaches to solving problems. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADP 3-0).

Shared understanding starts with the Army's doctrine and professional military education that instills a common approach to the conduct of operations, a common professional language, and a common understanding of the principles of mission command. Army professionals understand the most current Army doctrine to ensure a minimum level of shared understanding for the conduct of operations. It is this shared understanding that allows even hastily task-organized units to operate effectively.

Commanders and staffs actively create shared understanding throughout the operations process (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment). They collaboratively frame an operational environment and its problems, and then they visualize approaches to solving those problems.

## Commander's Intent

The commander's intent is a clear and concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired military end state that supports mission command, provides focus to the staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to achieve the commander's desired results without further orders, even when the operation does not unfold as planned (JP 3-0). The higher echelon commander's intent provides the basis for unity of effort throughout the force. Each commander's intent nests within the commander's intent two levels up. During planning, the initial commander's intent drives course of action development. During execution, the commander's intent establishes the limits within which a subordinate may exercise initiative.

## Mission Orders

Mission command requires commanders to issue mission orders. Mission orders are directives that emphasize to subordinates the results to be attained, not how they are to achieve them. Mission orders enable subordinates to understand the situation, their commander's mission and intent, and their own tasks. Subordinate commanders decide how to accomplish their own mission. The commander's intent and concept of operations set guidelines that provide unity of effort while allowing subordinate commanders to exercise initiative in planning, preparing, and executing their operations.

A mission order is not a separate type of order; rather, it is a technique for writing orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of action in accomplishing missions. Mission orders should succinctly state the mission, task organization, commander's intent and concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, and minimum essential coordinating instructions. Tasks to subordinate units include all the standard elements (who, what, when, where, and why) with particular emphasis on the purpose (why).

## Disciplined Initiative

Disciplined initiative refers to the duty individual subordinates have to exercise initiative within the constraints of the commander's intent to achieve the desired end state. Simply put, disciplined initiative is when subordinates have the discipline to follow their orders and adhere to the plan until they realize their orders and the plan are no longer suitable for the situation in which they find themselves. This may occur because the enemy does something unforeseen, there is a new or more serious threat, or a golden opportunity emerges that offers a greater chance of success than the original course of action. The subordinate leader then takes action on their own initiative to adjust to the new situation and achieve their commander's intent, reporting to the commander about the new situation when able to do so.

Leaders and subordinates who exercise disciplined initiative create opportunity by taking action to develop a situation without asking for further guidance. Commanders rely on subordinates to act to meet their intent, not simply adhere to a plan that is no longer working. A subordinate's initiative may be the starting point for seizing, retaining, and exploiting the operational initiative by forcing an enemy to respond to friendly action.

## Risk Acceptance

In general terms, risk is the exposure of someone or something valued to danger, harm, or loss. Because risk is part of every operation, it cannot be avoided. Commanders analyze risk in collaboration with subordinates to help determine what level of risk exists and how to mitigate it. When considering how much risk to accept with a course of action, commanders consider risk to the force and risk to the mission against the perceived benefit. They apply judgment with regard to the importance of an objective, time available, and anticipated cost. Commanders need to balance the tension between protecting the force and accepting and managing risks that must be taken to accomplish their mission.

While each situation is different, commanders avoid undue caution or commitment of resources to guard against every perceived threat. An unrealistic expectation of avoiding all risk is detrimental to mission accomplishment.

## IV. Command and Control

Ref: ADP 6-0, *Mission Command* (May '12), pp. 1-6 to 1-13.

Mission command is the Army's approach to command and control. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of mission (JP 1). Command and control (also known as C2) is fundamental to the art and science of warfare. No single activity in operations is more important than command and control. Command and control by itself will not secure an objective, destroy an enemy target, or deliver supplies. Yet none of these activities could be coordinated towards a common objective, or synchronized to achieve maximum effect, without effective command and control. It is through command and control that the countless activities a military force must perform gain purpose and direction. The goal of command and control is mission accomplishment.

The focal point of command and control is the commander. Commanders assess situations, make decisions, and direct action. They provide purpose, direction, and motivation to instill the will to win. Commanders seek to understand the situation, visualize an end state and operational approach, and describe

that end state and operational approach in their commander's intent and planning guidance. During execution, commanders direct the actions of subordinates and adjust operations based on changes to the situation and feedback from subordinate units, external organizations, and their staffs.

The Army's framework for organizing and putting command and control into action is the operations process. The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations (planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing). Commanders, supported by their staffs, employ the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.

### Relationship Between Command and Control

Command and control are interrelated. Command resides with commanders and includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of missions. It also includes responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. Command emphasizes a commander's lawful assignment of authority and the responsibility that accompanies that authority.

Effective command is impossible without control. Control is inherent in command and includes collecting, processing, displaying, storing and disseminating relevant information. Commanders, supported by their staffs, control operations by receiving and communicating information to build shared understanding and to direct, coordinate, and synchronize the actions of subordinate units. Commander's intent, orders, control measures, and standard operating procedures all assist with the control of operations. Determining the appropriate level of control in a particular situation is a critical command responsibility.

Command and control is not a one-way, top-down process. In application, command and control is multidirectional, with feedback from lower echelons, from higher echelons, laterally, and from sources outside the chain of command. It includes the reciprocal flow of information between commanders, staffs, subordinates, and other organizations in an area of operations as they work to achieve shared understanding and adjust to continuously changing circumstances in an operational environment.

# Levels of Control

Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (May '12), pp. 1-5 to 1-6.

Determining the appropriate level of control, including delegating decisions and determining how much decentralized execution to employ, is part of the art of command. The level and application of control is constantly evolving and must be continuously assessed and adjusted to ensure the level of control is appropriate to the situation. Commanders should allow subordinates the greatest freedom of action commensurate with the level of acceptable risk in a particular situation. The mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations) influence how much control to impose on subordinates. Other considerations include—

- Enemy disposition and capabilities
- Level of synchronization and integration required
- Higher echelon headquarters constraints
- Level of risk
- Level of legal and ethical ambiguity
- Rules of engagement
- Level of unit cohesion
- Level of training
- Level of trust
- Level of shared understanding

<div> <div>←</div> <div>More control</div> <div>→</div> <div>Less control</div> <div>→</div> </div>		
	Considerations	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Predictable</li> <li>• Known</li> </ul>	Situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unpredictable</li> <li>• Unknown</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inexperienced</li> <li>• New team</li> </ul>	Unit Cohesion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Experienced</li> <li>• Mature team</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Untrained or needs practice</li> </ul>	Level of Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Trained in tasks to be performed</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Being developed</li> </ul>	Level of Trust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Established</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Top down</li> <li>• Explicit communications</li> <li>• Vertical communications</li> </ul>	Shared Understanding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Reciprocal information</li> <li>• Implicit communications</li> <li>• Vertical and horizontal communications</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Restrictive</li> </ul>	Rules of Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Permissive</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Optimal decisions later</li> </ul>	Required Decision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Acceptable decisions sooner</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Science of war</li> <li>• Synchronization</li> </ul>	Appropriate To	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Art of war</li> <li>• Orchestration</li> </ul>

Ref: ADP 6-0 (Jul '19), Figure 1-1. Levels of control.

Different operations and phases of operations may require tighter or more relaxed control over subordinate elements than other phases. Operations that require the close synchronization of multiple units, or the integration of effects in a limited amount of time, may require more detailed coordination, and be controlled in a more centralized manner. Conversely, operations that do not require the close coordination of multiple units, such as a movement to contact or a pursuit, offer many opportunities to exercise initiative.

## A. Command

Command is the authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of missions. It also includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

Command is personal. In Army regulations and doctrine, an individual is given the authority to command, not an institution or group. The legal and ethical responsibilities of a commander exceed those of any other leader of similar rank who is serving in a staff position. The commander alone is responsible for what the command does or fails to do.

### Elements of Command

The elements of command are authority, responsibility, decision making, and leadership. The definition of command refers explicitly to authority. With authority comes the responsibility to carry forward an assigned task to a successful conclusion. Commanders exercise their authority by making decisions and leading their command in implementation of those decisions. Successful commanders develop skill in each element through maturity, experience, and education.

Command is more art than science because it requires judgment and depends on actions only human beings can perform. The art of command comprises the creative and skillful exercise of authority through timely decision making and leadership. Commanders constantly use judgment gained from experience and training to delegate authority, make decisions, determine the appropriate degree of control, and allocate resources. Proficiency in the art of command stems from years of schooling, self-development, introspection, and operational and training experiences. It also requires a deep understanding of the science of war.

### The Role of Commanders in Operations

Commanders are the central figures in command and control. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within their headquarters and across the force as they exercise command and control. Throughout operations, commanders balance their time between leading their staffs through the operations process and providing purpose, direction, and motivation to subordinate commanders and leaders.

The Army's framework for exercising command and control is the operations process—the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). Commanders use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment and the operation's end state; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess operation.

*See pp. 3-14 to 3-15 for further discussion of the role of commanders in operations and the operations process from FM 3-0.*

## B. Control

Within command and control, control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander's intent. Commanders exercise control to direct and adjust operations as conditions dictate. Unlike aspects of command, which remain relatively similar among echelons, control functions increase in complexity at each higher echelon. Control extends over the entire force and may include control of the airspace over an area of operations below the coordinating altitude.



Control allows commanders to monitor and receive feedback regarding the situation during operations. Based on this information, commanders can modify their visualization and direct changes to an operation as necessary. In the broadest terms, control helps commanders answer two questions:

- What is the actual situation compared with the desired end state?
- Are adjustments to the plan necessary to reconcile the situation with the desired end state?

Control, as contrasted with command, is more science than art. As such, it relies on objectivity, facts, empirical methods, and analysis. The science of control supports the art of command. Commanders and staffs use the science of control to understand the physical and procedural constraints under which units operate. Units are bound by such factors as movement rates, fuel consumption, weapons effects, rules of engagement, and other legal considerations. Commanders and staffs strive to understand aspects of operations they can analyze and measure, such as the physical capabilities and limitations of friendly and enemy organizations.

### Elements of Control

Commanders use control to direct and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces to meet their intent. They communicate information and receive feedback from subordinates to achieve greater shared understanding of the situation. This allows commanders to update their visualization with respect to the current situation, the end state or their operational approach, and adjust operations to reflect those changes. The elements of control are direction, feedback, information, and communication.

Control requires a realistic appreciation of time and distance factors, including the time required to initiate, complete and assess directed actions. There is art in anticipating likely points of friction and factors beyond subordinate control that invariably lead to delays during execution. The higher the echelon and the larger a formation, the longer it takes to complete assigned tasks, which in turn requires an earlier decision to achieve a desired effect or end state. The planning necessary to facilitate adequate control should always incorporate time tolerances that account for the friction inherent in operations.

Commanders, aided by staffs, use control to regulate forces and the functions of subordinate and supporting units. Staffs give commanders their greatest support in providing control. However, for control to be effective, commanders must actively participate in exercising it.

### Guides to Effective Control

The guides to effective control govern how commanders use the elements of control to accomplish missions. Effective control enables a command to adapt to change. Because of feedback, control is cyclic and continuous, not a series of discrete actions. It is a process of dynamic, interactive cooperation. Control begins in planning and continues throughout the operations process. The guides to effective control are—

- Allow subordinates maximum freedom of decision and action.
- Create, maintain, and disseminate the COP.
- Use common doctrinal procedures, graphics, and terms.
- Encourage flexibility and adaptability.

# C. Command and Control System

Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (May '12), pp. 1-20 to 1-21 and chap. 4.

Commanders need support to effectively exercise command and control. At every echelon of command, each commander establishes a command and control system—the arrangement of people, processes, networks, and command posts that enable commanders to conduct operations. The command and control system supports the commander's decision making, disseminates the commander's decisions to subordinates, and facilitates controlling forces. Commanders employ their command and control system to enable the people and formations conducting operations to work towards a common purpose. All the equipment and procedures exist to achieve this end. Commanders organize the four components of their command and control system to support decision making and facilitate communication. The most important of these components is people.

## People

A commander's command and control system is based on people. The human aspects of operations remain paramount regardless of the technology associated with the system. Therefore, commanders base their command and control systems on human characteristics more than on equipment and processes. Trained personnel are essential to an effective command and control system. Technology cannot support command and control without them.

## Processes

Commanders establish and use processes and procedures to organize activities within their headquarters and throughout the force. A process is a series of actions or steps taken to achieve a specific end, such as the military decision-making process. In addition to the major activities of the operations process, commanders and staffs use several integrating processes to synchronize specific functions throughout the operations process.

*See pp. 1-36 to 1-37 for discussion of the integrating functions from ADP 3-0.*

Procedures are standard, detailed steps that prescribe how to perform specific tasks (CJCSM 5120.01). Processes and procedures can increase organizational competence, for example, by improving a staff's efficiency or by increasing the tempo.

## Networks

Generally, a network is a grouping of things that are interconnected for a purpose. Networks enable commanders to communicate information and control forces. Networks enable successful operations. Commanders determine their information requirements and focus their staffs and organizations on using networks to meet these requirements. These capabilities relieve staffs from handling routine data, and they enable extensive information sharing, collaborative planning, execution, and assessment that promote shared understanding. Each network consists of—

- End-user applications
- Information services and data
- Network transport and management

## Command Posts

Command posts provide a physical location for the other three components of a command and control system (people, processes, and networks). Command posts vary in size, complexity and focus. Command posts may be comprised of vehicles, containers, and tents, or located in buildings. Commanders systematically arrange platforms, operation centers, signal nodes, and support equipment in ways best suited for a particular operational environment.

*See pp. 3-31 to 3-36 for further discussion of command posts.*

# I. Command & Control Warfighting Tasks

*Ref: FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec '17), pp. 2-23 to 2-34.*

The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and a system that enable commanders to synchronize and converge all elements of combat power (ADP 3-0). The primary purpose of the command and control warfighting function is to assist commanders in integrating the other elements of combat power to achieve objectives and accomplish missions.

*\*Editor's Note: FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec '17) predates the more recent ADP 6-0, Mission Command (Jul '19) which renamed the "Mission Command Warfighting Function" to the "Command and Control Warfighting Function." For clarity, the following material from FM 3-0 still uses the term "mission command" when discussing warfighting function tasks.*

## Command & Control Warfighting Tasks (from FM 3-0\*)

While staffs perform essential functions, commanders are ultimately responsible for accomplishing assigned missions. Throughout operations, commanders encourage disciplined initiative through a clear commander's intent while providing enough direction to integrate and synchronize the force at the decisive place and time. To this end, commanders perform three primary mission command warfighting function tasks. The commander tasks are—

- Drive the operations process through the activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations.
- Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with unified action partners.
- Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations.

Staffs support commanders in the exercise of mission command by performing four primary mission command warfighting function tasks. The staff tasks are—

- Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess.
- Conduct knowledge management, information management, and foreign disclosure.
- Conduct information operations.
- Conduct cyberspace electromagnetic activities.

Six additional tasks reside within the mission command warfighting function. These tasks are—

- Conduct CA operations.
- Conduct military deception.
- Install, operate, and maintain the DODIN.
- Conduct airspace control.
- Conduct information protection.
- Plan and conduct space activities.

*An overview and discussion of commander, staff and additional functions can be found on pp. 3-8 to 3-12.*

*See following pages (pp. 3-13 to 3-24) for specific discussion of key warfighting function tasks from FM 3-0, Operations (Oct '17).*

# I. Conduct the Operations Process

Ref: FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec '17), pp. 2-24 to 2-26. See also pp. 1-49 and 1-51.

The Army's framework for exercising mission command is the operations process—the major mission command activities performed during operations: planning, preparing, executing, and continuously assessing the operation (ADP 5-0). The operations process is a commander-led activity, informed by the philosophy of mission command. Commanders, supported by their staffs, use the operations process to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe their operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess operations.

The operations process serves as an overarching model that commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders use to integrate the warfighting functions across all domains and synchronize the force to accomplish missions. This includes integrating numerous processes such as the intelligence process, the military decision-making process, and targeting within the headquarters and with higher echelon, subordinate, supporting, supported, and adjacent units.

## The Operations Process

### Plan

The art and science of understanding a situation, envisioning a desired future, and laying out effective ways of bringing that future about.

### Prepare


Those activities performed by units and Soldiers to improve their ability to execute an operation.

### Execute

Putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission.

### Assess

The continuous determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating an effect, or achieving an objective.



Ref: FM 3-0 (Oct '17), fig. 2-7. The operations process

The activities of the operations process (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) are not discrete; they overlap and recur as circumstances demand. Planning starts an iteration of the operations process. Upon completion of the initial order, planning continues as leaders revise the plan based on changing circumstances. Preparing begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts a plan into action by applying combat power to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and consolidate gains. Assessing is continuous and influences the other three activities. The operations process, while simple in concept, is dynamic in execution—especially in fast-paced, large-scale combat operations. Commanders must organize and train their staffs and subordinates as an integrated team to simultaneously plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations.

# Communications Planning Considerations

Planning for successful communications requires detailed planning by every staff member, not just the assistant chief of staff, signal (G-6) or battalion or brigade signal staff officer (S-6). Considerations include:

- Communications capability requirements for each warfighting function.
- Capabilities and limitations of all available communications systems.
- Potential joint, inter-organizational and multinational communications requirements.
- Detailed line of sight analysis.
- Redundancy in means to communicate.
- Integration of all available signal assets.
- Method of deployment (assets are sequenced to coincide with the arrival of forces).
- Locations of all command post nodes.
- The use of retransmission, digital network links, and node placement.
- Satellite communications requirements.
- Spectrum requirements for emitters, sensors, radars, or any other assets.
- Initial task organization and expected changes.
- Proper signal and communications security procedures.
- Conduct of communications rehearsals.

## Primary, Alternate, Contingency, and Emergency (PACE) Plans

A PACE plan is a key requirement for communications planning. A PACE plan establishes the primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency methods of communications for each warfighting function, typically from higher to lower echelons. Establishing a PACE plan requires care that an alternate or contingency method of communications does not rely solely on the primary method. For example, having voice over internet protocol as an alternate method of communications would be a poor choice if the primary is network data, because when a primary is down the alternate may be as well. The key to a good PACE plan is to establish redundancy so that communications are always available. Most units will have two PACE plans; one for communications to higher echelon headquarters and one for subordinate units. A PACE plan for a higher echelon headquarters will likely be established by the higher headquarters.

The PACE plan should be as simple as possible, yet it should maintain flexibility to provide communications support as reliably as possible during dynamic operations. If at all possible, PACE plans should revolve around warfighting functions; this assists units in delineating differences in reporting requirements for each warfighting function as each function reports, receives, and processes information differently than the other. There are four principal war fighting functions for the purposes of PACE planning: movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, and sustainment. The G-6 or S-6 does not dictate PACE plans for these warfighting functions, but assists the staff in developing them.

Units should identify appropriate PACE systems for each phase of the operation and publish them in the signal annex. An emergency means of communications does not always have to be equipment; it may be a procedure such as moving back to the last known effective communications point or linking up at a grid coordinate. The PACE concept has always been a valuable tool to ensure that there is a backup communications plan in place in case the primary plan fails.

# III. CP by Echelon and Type of Unit

Ref: FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec '17), table 2-2, p. 2-35.

Cmd & Control  
(ADP 6-0)

Echelon or Type of Unit	Description	Command Posts
Theater army	<p>A theater army headquarters is the Army Service component command assigned to a geographic combatant commander. It is organized, staffed, and equipped to perform three roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Theater army for a geographic combatant commander.</li> <li>Joint task force headquarters (with augmentation) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> <li>Joint force land component headquarters (with augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> </ul>	<p>Main command post (CP)</p> <p>Contingency CP</p> <p>Mobile command group</p>
Field army	<p>A field army headquarters is the Army component assigned to a subordinate unified command. The field army headquarters is staffed and equipped to perform three roles:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Army component and ARFOR for a subordinate unified commander.</li> <li>Joint force land component headquarters (with augmentation) for large-scale combat operations.</li> <li>Joint task force headquarters (with augmentation) for crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> </ul>	<p>Main CP</p> <p>Operational CP</p> <p>Mobile command group</p>
Corps	<p>A corps headquarters is the Army's most versatile headquarters. The corps headquarters is staffed and equipped to—</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Serve as the joint force land component commander (or multinational) headquarters (with augmentation) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> <li>Serve as a joint task force headquarters in a crisis response or limited contingency operation.</li> <li>Serve as a tactical headquarters in large-scale combat operations.</li> </ul>	<p>Main CP</p> <p>Tactical CP</p> <p>Support area CP</p> <p>Early entry CP</p> <p>Mobile command group</p>
Division	<p>A division headquarters operates as a tactical headquarters under operational control of an Army corps or Marine expeditionary force headquarters. The division headquarters is staffed and equipped to—</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Serve as a tactical headquarters in large-scale combat operations.</li> <li>Serve as the joint force land component headquarters (or multinational) headquarters (with augmentation) in crisis response and limited contingency operations.</li> <li>Serve as a joint task force headquarters in a crisis response or limited contingency operation.</li> </ul>	<p>Main CP</p> <p>Tactical CP</p> <p>Support area CP</p> <p>Early entry CP</p> <p>Mobile command group</p>
Brigade combat team	<p>The brigade combat team headquarters operates as a tactical headquarters normally under operational control of an Army division.</p>	<p>Main CP</p> <p>Tactical CP</p> <p>+Mobile command group</p>
Multifunctional brigade	<p>A multifunctional brigade headquarters coordinates support for brigade combat teams and other forces.</p>	<p>Main CP</p> <p>Tactical CP</p>
Functional brigades and battalions	<p>Functional brigade and battalion headquarters coordinate a single function or capability.</p>	<p>Main CP</p> <p>Tactical CP</p>
Combined arms and infantry battalions	<p>Combined arms and infantry battalion headquarters operate as tactical headquarters assigned or attached to a brigade combat team.</p>	<p>Main CP</p> <p>Tactical CP</p> <p>Combat trains CP</p> <p>Field trains CP</p>

FM 3-0, table 2-2 lists the types of CPs typically employed by echelon and type of unit. Specific echelon and type of unit publications provide detailed information on CP organization and operations for specific units. For example, FM 3-96 provides doctrine for the organization and employment of the brigade main CP. (Organization varies extensively. See specific doctrine for each type of unit.)

# Movement & Maneuver Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 5-4

The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver directly gains or exploits positions of relative advantage. Commanders use maneuver for massing effects to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination of fires and movement. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes these tasks:

- Move.
- Maneuver.
- Employ direct fires.
- Occupy an area.
- Conduct mobility and countermobility.
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Employ battlefield obscuration.

The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements of personnel and materiel. Those movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function.

*Editor's note: Tactical commands normally employ a combination of the six basic forms of maneuver—envelopment, flank attack, frontal attack, infiltration, penetration, and turning movement—in their performance of the four offensive tasks (see pp. 2-85). Forms of the maneuver are discussed on pp. 2-90 to 2-91. Tactical enabling tasks are addressed on pp. 2-66 to 2-67; tactical mission tasks are on pp. 4-17 to 4-22.*

*For the purposes of The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, an overview of the following tasks of decisive action (see pp. 1-36 to 1-37) and topics are represented as they relate to the movement and maneuver warfighting function:*

- I. *Offense and Defense*, pp. 4-2 to 4-3.
- II. *Stability Operations*, pp. 4-4 to 4-5.
- III. *Defense Support of Civil Authorities*, pp. 4-6 to 4-7.
- IV. *Special Operations*, pp. 4-7 to 3-8.
- V. *Deployment/Force Projection Operations*, p. 4-10.



Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.



# I. Offense and Defense (Decisive Action)

*Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Jul '19).*

ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense, articulates how Army forces conduct the offense and defense. It contains the fundamental tactics related to the execution of these elements of decisive action. Tactics employs, orders arrangement of, and directs actions of forces in relation to each other. Commanders select tactics that place their forces in positions of relative advantage. The selected tactics support the attainment of goals. Tactics create multiple dilemmas for an enemy allowing the friendly commander to defeat the enemy in detail. Successful tactics require synchronizing all the elements of combat power.

Tactics is the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other. Tactics always require judgment and adaptation to a situation's unique circumstances. Techniques and procedures are established patterns or processes that can be applied repeatedly with little judgment to various circumstances. Together, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and staffs with the fundamentals to develop solutions to tactical problems. The solution to any specific problem is a unique combination of these fundamentals, current TTP, and the creation of new TTP based on an evaluation of the situation. Commanders determine acceptable solutions by mastering doctrine and current TTP. They gain this mastery through experiences in education, training, and operations.

## The Tactical Level of War

The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on achieving assigned objectives through the ordered arrangement, movement, and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to enemy forces. The strategic and operational levels of warfare provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations become disconnected from operational end states and strategic goals.

## The Offense

The offense is the decisive form of war. The offense is the ultimate means commanders have of imposing their will on enemy forces. Army forces conduct the offense to defeat and destroy enemy forces as well as gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. Commanders may also conduct the offense to deceive or divert an enemy force, develop intelligence, or hold an enemy force in position. Commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative when conducting the offense. Specific operations may orient on an enemy force or terrain objective to achieve a position of relative advantage. Taking the initiative from an enemy force requires the conduct of the offense, even in the defense.

The main purposes of the offense are to defeat enemy forces, destroy enemy forces, and gain control of terrain, resources, and population centers. Additionally, commanders conduct the offense to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt his attack, and to set the conditions for future successful operations.

## The Defense

While the offense is more decisive, the defense is usually stronger. However, the conduct of the defense alone normally cannot determine the outcome of battles. Army forces generally conduct the defense to create conditions favorable for the offense.

The purpose of the defense is to create conditions for the offense that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting the defense include retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to an enemy, attriting or fixing an enemy as a prelude to the offense, countering enemy action, and increasing an enemy's vulnerability by forcing an enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces.

A defensive operation is an operation to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability operations (ADP 3-0).

The inherent strengths of the defense are the defender's ability to occupy positions before an attack and use the available time to improve those defenses. A defending force stops improving its defensive preparations only when it retrogrades or begins to engage enemy forces.

# **Enabling Operations**

Commanders perform enabling operations to help in the planning, preparation, and execution of any of the four elements of decisive action. Enabling operations are never decisive operations. Enabling operations discussed in ADP 3-90 include reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement operations, and urban operations. Other publications discuss other enabling operations. For example, FM 3-13 discusses information operations, ATP 3-90.4 discusses mobility operations, and ATP 3-90.8 discusses countermobility operations.

Elements of Decisive Action			
<b>Offensive operations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Movement to Contact<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Search and Attack</li><li>Cordon and Search</li></ul></li><li>• Attack<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Ambush</li><li>Counterattack</li><li>Demonstration</li><li>Feint</li><li>Raid</li><li>Spoiling attack</li></ul></li><li>• Exploitation</li><li>• Pursuit<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Frontal</li><li>Combination</li></ul></li></ul>	<b>Defensive operations</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Area Defense</li><li>• Mobile Defense</li><li>• Retrograde<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Delay</li><li>Withdraw</li><li>Retirement</li></ul></li></ul>	<b>Stability operations tasks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Establish civil security</li><li>• Support to civil control</li><li>• Restore essential services</li><li>• Support to governance</li><li>• Support to economic and infrastructure development</li><li>• Conduct security cooperation</li></ul>	<b>Defensive support of civil authorities tasks</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provide support for Domestic disasters</li><li>• Provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents</li><li>• Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies</li><li>• Provide other designated domestic support</li></ul>
<b>Enabling operations</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Reconnaissance</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Area</li><li>Reconnaissance in force</li><li>Route</li><li>Special</li><li>Zone</li></ul></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Passage of lines</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Forward</li><li>Rearward</li></ul></li><li>• <b>Troop movement</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Administrative movement</li><li>Approach march</li><li>Tactical road march</li></ul></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Relief in place</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Sequential</li><li>Simultaneous</li><li>Staggered</li></ul></li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Security</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Screen</li><li>Guard</li><li>Cover</li><li>Area</li></ul></li></ul>
<b>Tactical Mission Tasks</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Ambush</li><li>• Attack by fire</li><li>• Block</li><li>• Breach</li><li>• Bypass</li><li>• Canalize</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Clear</li><li>• Contain</li><li>• Control</li><li>• Counterreconnaissance</li><li>• Destroy</li><li>• Defeat</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Disengagement</li><li>• Disrupt</li><li>• Exfiltrate</li><li>• Fix</li><li>• Follow and assume</li><li>• Follow and support</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Interdict</li><li>• Isolate</li><li>• Neutralize</li><li>• Occupy</li><li>• Reduce</li><li>• Retain</li></ul>
<b>Forms of Maneuver and Forms of the Defense</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Envelopment</li><li>• Frontal assault</li><li>• Infiltration</li><li>• Penetration</li><li>• Turning movement</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Defense of a linear obstacle</li><li>• Perimeter defense</li><li>• Reverse slope defense</li></ul>		

Ref: ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Jul '19), Figure 2-1. *Taxonomy of Army tactics.*



Refer to SUTS3: *The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations)* for complete discussion of offensive and defensive operations. Related topics include tactical mission fundamentals, stability & counterinsurgency operations, tactical enabling operations, special purpose attacks, urban operations & fortifications, and patrols & patrolling.

## II. Stability Operations (Decisive Action)

Ref: ADP 3-07, *Stability* (Jul '19).

Ultimately, stability is the set of conditions in which a local populace regards its governance institutions as legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable. Actions to maintain or reestablish stability first aim to lessen the level of violence. These actions also aim to enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. Lastly, these actions encourage the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior. A stability operation is an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief (ADP 3-0). A stability operation occurs as part of decisive action in a joint operation or as an activity (often in peacetime). Stability operations tasks are those tasks executed by an Army commander to successfully accomplish stability operations. These tasks may be the focus of the operation's mission, be performed as tasks (specified or implied) in an operation focused on combat, or be performed as activities (often in peacetime). Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. Stabilization also includes efforts to counter an adversary's attempts to consolidate its gains in a region or to reassert its influence. While long-term development requires stability, stability does not require long-term development. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and by building the capacity of local institutions.

### Primary Army Stability Tasks

Six Army stability operations tasks correspond to the stability sectors adopted by the DOS.

**1. Establish Civil Security.** Establishing civil security involves providing for the safety of the host nation and its population, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing civil security provides needed space for host-nation and civil agencies and organizations to work toward sustained peace.

**2. Establish Civil Control.** Establishing civil control supports efforts to institute rule of law and stable, effective governance. Civil control relates to public order—the domain of the police and other law enforcement agencies, courts, prosecution services, and prisons (known as the Rule of Law sector).



**3. Restore Essential Services.** The restoration of essential services in a fragile environment is essential toward achieving stability. The basic functions of local governance stop during conflict and other disasters. Initially, military forces lead efforts to establish or restore the most basic civil services: the essential food, water, shelter, and medical support necessary to sustain the population until forces restore local civil services. Military forces follow the lead of other USG agencies, particularly United States Agency for International Development, in the long restoration of essential services.

**4. Support to Governance.** When a legitimate and functional host-nation government exists, military forces operating to support the state have a limited role. However, if the host-nation government cannot adequately perform its basic civil functions—whatever the reason—some degree of military support to governance may be necessary. Military efforts to support governance focus on restoring public administration and resuming public services.

**5. Support to Economic and Infrastructure Development.** Military efforts to support the economic sector are critical to sustainable economic development. The economic viability of a host nation often exhibits stress and ultimately fractures as conflict, disaster, and internal strife overwhelms the government.

**6. Conduct Security Cooperation.** Security cooperation is all DoD interactions with foreign security establishments to build security relationships that promote specific United States security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations (JP 3-20).

# Stability Underlying Logic



These operations must be founded in the stability fundamentals ...

Conflict transformation    Unity of effort    Host-nation ownership

Building host-nation capacity and capability

US    United States    USG    United States Government

Ref: ADP 3-07, *Stability* (Jul '19), Introductory figure-1. *Stability underlying logic.*



Refer to TAA2: *Military Engagement, Security Cooperation & Stability SMARTbook (Foreign Train, Advise, & Assist)* for further discussion. Topics include the *Range of Military Operations (JP 3-0)*, *Security Cooperation & Security Assistance (Train, Advise, & Assist)*, *Stability Operations*, *Peace Operations*, *Counterinsurgency Operations*, *Civil-Military Operations*, and more!

# III. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Decisive Action)

*Ref: ADP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Jul '19).*

ADP 3-28 clarifies similarities and differences between defense support of civil authorities (DSCA) and other elements of decisive action. DSCA and stability operations are similar in many ways. Both revolve around helping partners on the ground within areas of operations. Both require Army forces to provide essential services and work together with civil authorities. However, homeland operational environments differ from those overseas in terms of law, military chain of command, use of force, and inter-organizational coordination among unified action partners.

The utilization of military forces during periods of domestic emergency is not undertaken lightly. The military however brings with it unique abilities, in terms of both capability and capacity which provide respondents with the resources needed to respond to an incident. The use of military forces in the responses to hurricanes Andrew in 1992 and Katrina in 2005 illustrate some of the different responses the U.S. military can provide. They also led the government to realize that additional coordination was required before an incident to ensure a successful response.

## Army Support of Civil Authorities

The support the Army provides to civil authorities falls into four main tasks: Provide support for domestic disasters, provide support for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents, provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies, and provide other designated support. Due to legal limitations such as the Posse Comitatus Act, the purpose for which the military can respond to these incidents is constrained, allowing a military response only to; save lives, restore essential services, maintain or restore law and order, protect infrastructure and property, support maintenance or restoration of local government, or shape the environment for intergovernmental success. Both state and federal laws detail how support is requested, provided and limited in both scope and duration.

Military forces provide civil support at federal and state levels. Federal military forces are active Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force; mobilized Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force Reserve; and National Guard mobilized for federal service under title 10, United States Code (USC). State National Guard forces under state control perform DSCA tasks when serving under title 32, USC.

Army leaders ensure that Army units supporting civil authorities in the homeland are guided by core purposes. These purposes are to—

- Save lives.
- Restore essential services.
- Maintain or restore law and order.
- Protect infrastructure and property.
- Support maintenance or restoration of local government.
- Shape the environment for intergovernmental success.

## Homeland Defense

Homeland defense, as defined by JP 3-27, is “the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President.” The Army deters and defeats attacks through decisive action, in support of homeland defense and DSCA operations, conducted across all domains (land, air, sea, space, and cyber) as part of the joint team in the forward regions, in the approaches, and in the homeland. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility for homeland defense, which may be executed by DOD alone (e.g., Ballistic Missile Defense) or include support from other USG departments and agencies.

# DSCA (Logic Chart)

## All-of-Nation approach

to incident management  
(in national preparedness doctrine)

The military's primary contribution is  
**defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).**

DSCA definition

Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. (DODD 3025.18)

## Primary purposes

- Save lives.
- Restore essential services.
- Maintain or restore law and order.
- Protect infrastructure and property.
- Support maintenance or restoration of local government.
- Shape the environment for intergovernmental success.

## Primary characteristics

- State and federal laws define how military forces support civil authorities.
- Civil authorities are in charge, and military forces support them.
- Military forces depart when civil authorities are able to continue without military support.
- Military forces must document costs of all direct and indirect support provided.

## Army organization

Tiered, unified response

State governors command

### State National Guard forces

(National Guard in Title 32 duty status)

President commands

### Federal military forces

(National Guard in Title 10 duty status,  
Regular Army, and Army Reserve)

## Primary Army tasks

- Provide support for domestic disasters.
- Provide support for domestic civilian law enforcement agencies.
- Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents.
- Provide other designated domestic support.

**Movement & Maneuver**

Ref: ADP 3-28, *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Jul '19). Introductory Figure. ADP 3-28 logic chart.



Refer to HDS1: *The Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook*. Topics include homeland defense, (JP 3-28), defense support of civil authorities (JP 3-28), Army support of civil authorities (ADRP 3-28), multi-service DSCA TTPs (ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2), DSCA liaison officer toolkit (GTA 90-01-020), key legal and policy documents, and specific hazard and planning guidance.

## IV. Special Operations

*Ref: ADP 3-05, Special Operations (Jul '19).*

Joint force commanders--a combatant commander or a joint task force commander--identify objectives that may require special operations force capabilities. Army special operations maneuver units will conduct combat operations as part of a special operations joint task force or a joint special operations task force, which may or may not be subordinate to a joint task force. A joint special operations task force may be the highest special operations echelon for limited contingency operations, but large-scale combat operations require a special operations joint task force.

Army special operations units conducting military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations, do so under forward-based and distributed command and control nodes; the forces and their command and control elements operate under the operational control of the Commander, theater special operations command.

Army special operations units with the mission to close with and destroy an enemy/are the U.S. Army Special Forces Groups, Special Mission Units (a generic term to represent an organization composed of operations and support personnel that is task-organized to perform highly classified activities [JP 3-05]), and the 75th Ranger Regiment. Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units provide unique capabilities in support of both Army special operations maneuver units, conventional forces, and U.S. Ambassadors.

### Principles of Special Operations

Army special operations forces' ability to operate in small teams in permissive, uncertain, or hostile environments allows the development and execution of special operations based on core principles. The core principles of discreet, precise, and scalable special operations enable the achievement of objectives unilaterally, or with or through indigenous forces and populations. These principles enable the force to conduct a wide range of missions that often have high risk, are clandestine, or require a posture of low visibility and help characterize special operations. Discreet, precise, and scalable operations provide combatant commanders and ambassadors a flexible application of military capabilities in politically sensitive and culturally complex environments.


### Core Activities

Special operations forces conduct core activities using unique capabilities under conditions in which other forces are not trained or equipped to execute. Army special operations forces are specifically organized, manned, trained, and equipped to accomplish twelve U.S. Special Operations Command directed activities:

- Civil Affairs operations
- Countering weapons of mass destruction
- Counterinsurgency
- Counterterrorism
- Direct action
- Foreign humanitarian assistance
- Foreign internal defense
- Military information support operations
- Preparation of the environment
- Security force assistance
- Special reconnaissance
- Unconventional warfare
- Hostage rescue and recovery (select Army special operations units only)



# Army Special Operations



Ref: ADP 3-05, Special Operations (Jul '19), Introductory Figure. ADP 3-05 Logic Chart.



Refer to CTS1: The Counterterrorism & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook for related discussion. Counterterrorism is one of the core tasks of the US special operations forces (SOF), and their role and additive capability is to conduct offensive measures within Department of Defense's (DOD's) overall combating terrorism (CbT) efforts.

**Movement & Maneuver**

# V. Force Projection/Deployment Operations

Ref: ATP 3-35 (FM 3-35), *Army Deployment and Redeployment* (Mar '15).

*Note: The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements. These movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function.*

ATP 3-35 is the Army's authoritative doctrine for planning, organizing, executing, and supporting deployment and redeployment.

## Force Projection

Force projection is the ability to project the military instrument of national power from the United States or another theater, in response to requirements for military operations. (JP 3-0) It is a demonstrated ability to alert, mobilize, rapidly deploy, and operate effectively anywhere in the world. The Army, as a key member of the joint team, must be ready for global force projection with an appropriate mix of combat forces together with support and sustainment units.

Force projection encompasses a range of processes including mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. These processes have overlapping timelines, are continuous, and can repeat throughout an operation. Force projection operations are inherently joint and require detailed planning and synchronization. See pp. 2-47 and 7-34 for related discussion.

## Deployment Operations

Deployment is composed of activities required to prepare and move forces, supplies, and equipment to a theater. This involves the force as it task organizes, tailors itself for movement based on the mission, concept of operations, available lift, and other resources.

The Joint deployment process is divided into four phases -- deployment planning; predeployment activities; movement; and JRSOI. The terminology used to describe the Army deployment phases is in synch with the Joint process. The Joint process includes a planning phase at the outset whereas the Army considers planning to be woven through all the phases. Moreover, the movement phase in the Army process is discussed in two segments -- fort to port and port to port. The Army relies on U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to provide the strategic lift to and from the port of embarkation (POE).

## Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, & Integration (RSOI)

RSOI is the process that delivers combat power to the Joint Force Commander (JFC) in the operational theater.

**Reception** is the unloading of personnel and equipment from strategic transport, marshaling them, transporting them to staging areas, and if required, providing life support services. **Staging** is the assembling, holding, and organizing arriving of personnel, equipment, and basic loads into units; preparing the units for onward movement; and providing life support until the unit becomes self-sustaining. **Onward Movement** is moving units from reception facilities and staging areas to TAAs or other theater destinations; placing arriving nonunit personnel to gaining commands; and providing sustainment to distribution sites. **Integration** is the synchronized transfer of authority of units to a designated component or functional commander for employment in the theater of operations.



Refer to SMFLS4: *The Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Warfighter's Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support)* for complete discussion of deployment; reception, staging, onward movement and integration (RSOI); and redeployment operations.

# II. Tactics and Tactical Mission Tasks

*Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense & Defense (Jul '19), chap. 1 and ADP 1-02, Terms and Military Symbols (Aug '18), chap. 9.*

## I. The Tactical Level of War

Tactics is the employment, ordered arrangement, and directed actions of forces in relation to each other. Tactics always require judgment and adaptation to a situation's unique circumstances. Techniques and procedures are established patterns or processes that can be applied repeatedly with little judgment to various circumstances. Together, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) provide commanders and staffs with the fundamentals to develop solutions to tactical problems. The solution to any specific problem is a unique combination of these fundamentals, current TTP, and the creation of new TTP based on an evaluation of the situation. Commanders determine acceptable solutions by mastering doctrine and current TTP. They gain this mastery through experiences in education, training, and operations.

The tactical level of warfare is the level of warfare at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on achieving assigned objectives through the ordered arrangement, movement, and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to enemy forces. The strategic and operational levels of warfare provide the context for tactical operations. (See JP 3-0 and ADP 3-0 for more discussions on strategic and operational levels of warfare.) Without this context, tactical operations become disconnected from operational end states and strategic goals.

*See pp. 3-2 to 3-3 for related discussion and an overview of the offense and defense.*

An **engagement** is a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelon maneuver forces (JP 3-0). Brigades and lower echelon units generally conduct engagements. Engagements result from deliberate closure with or chance encounters between two opponents.

A battle is a set of related engagements that lasts longer and involves larger forces than an engagement. Battles affect the course of a campaign or major operation, as they determine the outcome of a division or corps echelon achieving one or more significant objectives. The outcomes of battles determine strategic and operational success and contribute to the overall operation or campaign achieving a strategic purpose. The outcomes of engagements determine tactical success and contribute to friendly forces winning a battle.

Echelons of command, sizes of units, types of equipment, or components do not define the strategic, operational, or tactical levels of warfare. Instead, the level of warfare is determined by what level objective is achieved by the action. National assets, including space-based and cyberspace capabilities previously considered principally strategic, provide important support to tactical operations.



*Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.*

## II. The Art and Science of Tactics

Army leaders at all echelons master the art and science of tactics—two distinct yet inseparable concepts—to solve the problems they will face on the battlefield. A tactical problem occurs when the mission variables—mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (known as METT-TC)—of the desired tactical situation differ from the current situation.

### A. The Art

The art of tactics is three interrelated aspects: the creative and flexible array of means to accomplish missions, decision making under conditions of uncertainty when faced with a thinking and adaptive enemy, and the understanding of the effects of combat on Soldiers. An art, as opposed to a science, requires exercising intuition based on operational experiences and cannot be learned solely by study. Leaders exercise the art of tactics by balancing study with a variety of relevant and practical experiences. Repetitive practice under a variety of realistic conditions increases an individual's mastery of the art of tactics.

Leaders apply the art of tactics to solve tactical problems within their commander's intent by choosing from interrelated options, including—

- The types of operations, forms of maneuver, and tactical mission tasks.
- Task organization of available forces and allocation of resources.
- The arrangement and choice of control measures.
- Controlling the tempo of the operation.
- The level of necessary risk.

Combat is a lethal clash of opposing wills and a violent struggle between thinking and adaptive commanders with opposing goals. Commanders strive to defeat their enemies. Defeat is to render a force incapable of achieving its objectives (ADP 3-0). Commanders seek to accomplish missions that support operational or strategic purposes while preventing their enemies from doing the same.

### B. The Science

The science of tactics is the understanding of those military aspects of tactics—capabilities, techniques, and procedures—that can be measured and codified. The science of tactics includes the physical capabilities of friendly and enemy organizations and systems. It also includes techniques and procedures used to accomplish specific tasks. The science of tactics is straightforward. Much of what subordinate doctrine publications contain are the science of tactics—techniques and procedures for employing the various elements of the combined arms team. A combined arms team is a team that uses combined arms—the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each element was used separately or sequentially (ADP 3-0).

## III. Tactical Mission Tasks

A tactical mission task is a specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. A tactical mission task may be expressed as either an action by a **friendly force** or **effects on an enemy force** (FM 7-15). The tactical mission tasks describe the results or effects the commander wants to achieve.

Not all tactical mission tasks have symbols. Some tactical mission task symbols will include unit symbols, and the tactical mission task "delay until a specified time" will use an amplifier. However, no modifiers are used with tactical mission task symbols. Tactical mission task symbols are used in course of action sketches, synchronization matrices, and maneuver sketches. They do not replace any part of the operation order.

*See following pages (pp. 4-20 to 4-21) for tactical mission tasks.*

# Tactical Doctrinal Taxonomy

Ref: Adapted from ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Jul '19), fig. 2-1, p. 2-3.

The following shows the Army's tactical doctrinal taxonomy for the four elements of decisive action (in accordance with ADP 3-0) and their subordinate tasks. The commander conducts tactical enabling tasks to assist the planning, preparation, and execution of any of the four elements of decisive action. Tactical enabling tasks are never decisive operations in the context of the conduct of offensive and defensive tasks. (They are also never decisive during the conduct of stability tasks.) The commander uses tactical shaping tasks to assist in conducting combat operations with reduced risk.

## Elements of Decisive Action (and subordinate tasks)

### Offensive Operations

#### Movement to Contact

Search and attack  
Cordon and search

#### Attack

Ambush\*  
Counterattack\*  
Demonstration\*  
Spoiling attack\*  
Feint\*  
Raid\*

*\*Also known as special purpose attacks*

#### Exploitation

#### Pursuit

Frontal  
Combination

### Forms of Maneuver

Envelopment  
Frontal attack  
Infiltration  
Penetration  
Turning Movement

### Defensive Operations

#### Area Defense

#### Mobile Defense

#### Retrograde

Delay  
Withdraw  
Retirement

#### Forms of the Defense

Defense of linear obstacle  
Perimeter defense  
Reverse slope defense

### Stability Operations

Civil security  
Civil control  
Restore essential services  
Support to governance  
Support to economic and infrastructure development  
Conduct security cooperation

### Defense Support to Civil Authorities

Provide support for domestic disasters  
Provide support for domestic CBRN incidents  
Provide support for domestic law enforcement agencies  
Provide other designated support

**Movement & Maneuver**

## Enabling Operations

### Reconnaissance Operations

Area  
Reconnaissance in force  
Route  
Special  
Zone

### Security

Screen  
Guard  
Cover  
Area

### Passage of Lines

Forward  
Rearward

### Troop Movement

Administrative movement  
Approach march  
Road march

### Encirclement Operations

### Relief in Place

Sequential  
Simultaneous  
Staggered

### Other Enabling Operations (Examples)

Information Operations (FM 3-13)  
Mobility Operations (ATP 3-90.4)  
Countermobility Operations (ATP 3-90.8)

## Tactical Mission Tasks

### Actions by Friendly Forces












Attack-by-Fire  
Breach  
Bypass  
Clear  
Control  
Counterreconnaissance  
Disengage  
Exfiltrate  
Follow and Assume  
Follow and Support

Occupy  
Reduce  
Retain  
Secure  
Seize  
Support-by-Fire















### Effects on Enemy Force

Block  
Canalize  
Contain  
Defeat  
Destroy  
Disrupt  
Fix  
Interdict  
Isolate  
Neutralize  
Suppress  
Turn

## A. Actions by Friendly Forces










Attack by Fire		<i>Attack-by-fire</i> is a tactical mission task in which a commander uses direct fires, supported by indirect fires, to engage an enemy without closing with him to destroy, suppress, fix, or deceive him.
Breach		<i>Breach</i> is a tactical mission task in which the unit employs all available means to break through or secure a passage through an enemy defense, obstacle, minefield, or fortification.
Bypass		<i>Bypass</i> is a tactical mission task in which the commander directs his unit to maneuver around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of the operation while deliberately avoiding combat with an enemy force.
Clear		<i>Clear</i> is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to remove all enemy forces and eliminate organized resistance within an assigned area.
Control	No graphic	<i>Control</i> is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to maintain physical influence over a specified area to prevent its use by an enemy or to create conditions for successful friendly operations.
Counterrecon	No graphic	<i>Counterreconnaissance</i> is a tactical mission task that encompasses all measures taken by a commander to counter enemy reconnaissance and surveillance efforts.
Disengage	No graphic	<i>Disengage</i> is a tactical mission task where a commander has his unit break contact with the enemy to allow the conduct of another mission or to avoid decisive engagement.
Exfiltrate	No graphic	<i>Exfiltrate</i> is a tactical mission task where a commander removes soldiers or units from areas under enemy control by stealth, deception, surprise, or clandestine means.
Follow and Assume		<i>Follow and assume</i> is a tactical mission task in which a second committed force follows a force conducting an offensive operation and is prepared to continue the mission if the lead force is fixed, attrited, or unable to continue. The follow-and-assume force is not a reserve but is committed to accomplish specific tasks.
Follow and Support		<i>Follow and support</i> is a tactical mission task in which a committed force follows and supports a lead force conducting an offensive operation. The follow-and-support force is not a reserve but is a force committed to specific tasks.
Occupy		<i>Occupy</i> is a tactical mission task that involves moving a friendly force into an area so that it can control that area. Both the force's movement to and occupation of the area occur without enemy opposition.
Reduce	No graphic	<i>Reduce</i> is a tactical mission task that involves the destruction of an encircled or bypassed enemy force.
Retain		<i>Retain</i> is a tactical mission task in which the cdr ensures that a terrain feature controlled by a friendly force remains free of enemy occupation or use. The commander assigning this task must specify the area to retain and the duration of the retention, which is time- or event-driven.
Secure		<i>Secure</i> is a tactical mission task that involves preventing a unit, facility, or geographical location from being damaged or destroyed as a result of enemy action. This task normally involves conducting area security operations.
Seize		<i>Seize</i> is a tactical mission task that involves taking possession of a designated area by using overwhelming force. An enemy force can no longer place direct fire on an objective that has been seized.
Support by Fire		<i>Support-by-fire</i> is a tactical mission task in which a maneuver force moves to a position where it can engage the enemy by direct fire in support of another maneuvering force. The primary objective of the support force is normally to fix and suppress the enemy so he cannot effectively fire on the maneuvering force.

## B. Effect on Enemy Forces

Block		<i>Block</i> is a tactical mission task that denies the enemy access to an area or prevents his advance in a direction or along an avenue of approach.
		<i>Block</i> is also an engineer obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to stop an attacker along a specific avenue of approach or prevent him from passing through an engagement area.
Canalize		<i>Canalize</i> is a tactical mission task in which the commander restricts enemy movement to a narrow zone by exploiting terrain coupled with the use of obstacles, fires, or friendly maneuver.
Contain		<i>Contain</i> is a tactical mission task that requires the commander to stop, hold, or surround enemy forces or to cause them to center their activity on a given front and prevent them from withdrawing any part of their forces for use elsewhere.
Defeat	<i>No graphic</i>	<i>Defeat</i> occurs when an enemy has temporarily or permanently lost the physical means or the will to fight. The defeated force is unwilling or unable to pursue his COA, and can no longer interfere to a significant degree. Results from the use of force or the threat of its use.
Destroy		<i>Destroy</i> is a tactical mission task that physically renders an enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt.
Disrupt		<i>Disrupt</i> is a tactical mission task in which a commander integrates direct and indirect fires, terrain, and obstacles to upset an enemy's formation or tempo, interrupt his timetable, or cause his forces to commit prematurely or attack in a piecemeal fashion.
		<i>Disrupt</i> is also an engineer obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to cause the enemy to break up his formation and tempo, interrupt his timetable, commit breaching assets prematurely, and attack in a piecemeal effort.
Fix		<i>Fix</i> is a tactical mission task where a commander prevents the enemy from moving any part of his force from a specific location for a specific period. Fixing an enemy force does not mean destroying it. The friendly force has to prevent the enemy from moving in any direction.
		<i>Fix</i> is also an engineer obstacle effect that focuses fire planning and obstacle effort to slow an attacker's movement within a specified area, normally an engagement area.
Isolate		<i>Isolate</i> is a tactical mission task that requires a unit to seal off-both physically and psychologically-an enemy from his sources of support, deny him freedom of movement, and prevent him from having contact with other enemy forces.
Neutralize		<i>Neutralize</i> is a tactical mission task that results in rendering enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering with a particular operation.
Suppress		<i>Suppress</i> is a tactical mission task that results in the temporary degradation of the performance of a force or weapon system below the level needed to accomplish its mission.
Turn		<i>Turn</i> is a tactical mission task that involves forcing an enemy element from one avenue of approach or movement corridor to another.
		<i>Turn</i> is also a tactical obstacle effect that integrates fire planning and obstacle effort to divert an enemy formation from one avenue of approach to an adjacent avenue of approach or into an engagement area.



## C. Mission Symbols

Counterattack (dashed axis)		A form of attack by part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, with the general objective of denying the enemy his goal in attacking (FM 3-0).
Cover		A form of security operation whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body.
Delay		A form of retrograde in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged (JP 1-02, see delaying operation).
Guard		A form of security operations whose primary task is to protect the main body by fighting to gain time while also observing and reporting information and preventing enemy ground observation of and direct fire against the main body. Units conducting a guard mission cannot operate independently because they rely upon fires and combat support assets of the main body.
Penetrate		A form of maneuver in which an attacking force seeks to rupture enemy defenses on a narrow front to disrupt the defensive system (FM 3-0).
Relief in Place		A tactical enabling operation in which, by the direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit.
Retirement		A form of retrograde [JP 1-02 uses <i>operation</i> ] in which a force out of contact with the enemy moves away from the enemy (JP 1-02).
Screen		A form of security operations that primarily provides early warning to the protected force.
Withdraw		A planned operation in which a force in contact disengages from an enemy force (JP 1-02) [The Army considers it a form of retrograde.]

# III. Reconnaissance

*Ref: ADP 3-90, Offense and Defense (Jul '19), chap 5, pp. 5-1 to 5-2 and FM 3-90-1, Reconnaissance, Security, and Tactical Enabling Tasks, Vol. 2 (Mar '13), chap. 1.*

Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographical characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance accomplished by small units primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. It is performed before, during, and after operations to provide commanders and staffs information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process so they can formulate, confirm, or modify courses of action (COAs).



**Movement & Maneuver**

*Reconnaissance is a process of gathering information to help the commander shape his understanding of the battlespace. Reconnaissance uses many techniques and technologies to collect this information, but it is still largely a human endeavor. (Dept. of Army photo.)*

## Reconnaissance Objective

Commanders orient their reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective within an area of operations (AO). The reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, enemy force, adversary, or other mission or operational variable about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. Every reconnaissance mission specifies a reconnaissance objective that clarifies the intent of the effort, and prioritizes those efforts, by specifying the most important information to obtain. Commanders assign reconnaissance objectives based on priority information requirements resulting from the IPB process and the reconnaissance asset's capabilities and limitations. A reconnaissance objective can be information about a specific geographical location, such as the cross country trafficability of a specific area, to confirm or deny a specific activity of a threat, or to specify a specific location of a threat.

# Reconnaissance

Ref: ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Jul '19), pp. 5-1 to 5-2.

Reconnaissance is a mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical, or geographical characteristics of a particular area (JP 2-0). Reconnaissance accomplished by small units primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is a focused collection effort. It is performed before, during, and after operations to provide commanders and staffs information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process so they can formulate, confirm, or modify courses of action (COAs).

## Types of Reconnaissance

The five types of reconnaissance: route, zone, area, reconnaissance in force, and special.

### Forms of Reconnaissance



**Route Reconnaissance**



**Zone Reconnaissance**



**Area Reconnaissance**



**Reconnaissance in Force**



**Special Reconnaissance**

The responsibility for accomplishing reconnaissance does not reside solely with reconnaissance units. Every unit has an implied mission to report information about the terrain, civilian activities, and friendly and enemy dispositions. Troops in contact with an enemy and reconnaissance patrols of maneuver units, at all echelons, collect information on enemy units and activities. In echelon support and consolidation areas, reserve maneuver forces, functional and multifunctional support and sustainment elements, other governmental agencies, and multinational forces observe and report civilian, adversary, and enemy activity and significant changes in terrain trafficability. Although all units conduct reconnaissance, ground cavalry, aviation attack reconnaissance units, scouts, and special forces are specifically trained to conduct reconnaissance operations. Some branches, such as the Corps of Engineers and Chemical Corps, conduct specific reconnaissance operations that complement the force's overall reconnaissance effort. However, BCT, division, and corps commanders primarily use their organic or attached reconnaissance—ground or air—and intelligence elements to accomplish reconnaissance.

## A. Route Reconnaissance

Route reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation to obtain detailed information of a specified route and all terrain from which the enemy could influence movement along that route. Route reconnaissance provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy, adversary, and civilian activity along the route.

## B. Zone Reconnaissance

Zone reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. Obstacles include existing, reinforcing, and areas with CBRN contamination. Commanders assign a zone reconnaissance mission when they need additional information on a zone before committing other forces. Zone reconnaissance is the most time-and resource-intensive form of reconnaissance

## C. Area Reconnaissance

Area reconnaissance is a type of reconnaissance operation that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. Commanders assign an area reconnaissance when information on the enemy situation is limited or when focused reconnaissance will yield specific information on the area in question. An area reconnaissance differs from a zone reconnaissance in that the unit conducting an area reconnaissance starts from an LD.

## D. Reconnaissance in Force

A reconnaissance in force is a type of reconnaissance operation designed to discover or test the enemy's strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information. A commander assigns a reconnaissance in force when an enemy force is operating within an area and the commander cannot obtain adequate intelligence by other means. The unit commander plans for both the retrograde or reinforcement of the friendly force (in case it encounters superior enemy forces) and for the exploitation of its success.

## E. Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance is reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or diplomatically and/or politically sensitive environments to collect or verify information of strategic or operational significance, employing military capabilities not normally found in conventional forces (JP 3-05). Special reconnaissance provides an additional capability for commanders and supplements other conventional reconnaissance and surveillance actions.

Reconnaissance is characterized as either stealthy or aggressive. A key factor in executing reconnaissance is the time available to conduct the mission. The commander recognizes the increased risk to both the reconnaissance element and the main body when accelerating the pace of reconnaissance. This risk can be somewhat offset by employing air reconnaissance and technical means to cover open terrain or areas of lower threat. (*FM 3-90-2, pp. 1-13 to 1-14.*)



*Refer to SUTS3: The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook, 3rd Ed., completely updated with the latest publications for 2019. Chapters and topics include tactical fundamentals, the offense; the defense; train, advise, and assist (stability, peace & counterinsurgency ops); tactical enabling tasks (security, reconnaissance, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement, and troop movement); special purpose attacks (ambush, raid, etc.); urban and regional environments (urban, fortified areas, desert, cold, mountain, & jungle operations); patrols & patrolling.*

## II. Reconnaissance Fundamentals

### 1. Ensure Continuous Reconnaissance

Effective reconnaissance is continuous. The commander conducts reconnaissance before, during, and after all operations. Before an operation, reconnaissance focuses on filling gaps in information about the enemy and the terrain. During an operation, reconnaissance focuses on providing the commander with updated information that verifies the enemy's composition, dispositions, and intentions as the battle progresses.

### 2. Do Not Keep Reconnaissance Assets in Reserve

Reconnaissance assets, like artillery assets, are never kept in reserve. When committed, reconnaissance assets use all of their resources to accomplish the mission. This does not mean that all assets are committed all the time. The commander uses his reconnaissance assets based on their capabilities and METT-TC to achieve the maximum coverage needed to answer the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). At times, this requires the commander to withhold or position reconnaissance assets to ensure that they are available at critical times and places.

### 3. Orient on the Reconnaissance Objective

The commander uses the reconnaissance objective to focus his unit's efforts. Commanders of subordinate reconnaissance elements remain focused on achieving this objective, regardless of what their forces encounter during the mission. When time, limitations of unit capabilities, or enemy action prevents a unit from accomplishing all the tasks normally associated with a particular form of reconnaissance, the unit uses the reconnaissance objective to focus the reconnaissance effort.

### 4. Report Information Rapidly and Accurately

Reconnaissance assets must acquire and report accurate and timely information on the enemy, civil considerations, and the terrain over which operations are to be conducted. Information may quickly lose its value. Reconnaissance units report exactly what they see and, if appropriate, what they do not see. Seemingly unimportant information may be extremely important when combined with other information.

### 5. Retain Freedom of Maneuver

Reconnaissance assets must retain battlefield mobility to successfully complete their missions. If these assets are decisively engaged, reconnaissance stops and a battle for survival begins. Reconnaissance assets must have clear engagement criteria that support the maneuver commander's intent. They must employ proper movement and reconnaissance techniques, use overwatching fires, and standing operating procedures.

### 6. Gain and Maintain Enemy Contact

Once a unit conducting reconnaissance gains contact with the enemy, it maintains that contact unless the commander directing the reconnaissance orders otherwise or the survival of the unit is at risk. This does not mean that individual scout and reconnaissance teams cannot break contact with the enemy. The commander of the unit conducting reconnaissance is responsible for maintaining contact using all available resources. That contact can range from surveillance to close combat.

### 7. Develop the Situation Rapidly

When a reconnaissance asset encounters an enemy force or an obstacle, it must quickly determine the threat it faces. For an enemy force, it must determine the enemy's composition, dispositions, activities, and movements and assess the implications of that information. For an obstacle, it must determine the type and extent of the obstacle and whether it is covered by fire. Obstacles can provide the attacker with information concerning the location of enemy forces, weapon capabilities, and organization of fires. In most cases, the reconnaissance unit developing the situation uses actions on contact.

# Intelligence Warfighting Function

*Ref: ADP 2-0, Intelligence (Jul '19), chap. 2; ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 5-4 to 5-5; and FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec '17), pp. 2-42 to 2-45.*

The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operations environment. Specifically, other significant aspects of an operational environment include threats, adversaries, and operational variables, depending on the nature of operations. The intelligence warfighting function synchronizes information collection with the primary tactical tasks of reconnaissance, surveillance, security, and intelligence operations. Intelligence is driven by commanders and is more than just collection. Developing intelligence is a continuous process that involves analyzing information from all sources and conducting operations to develop the situation. The Army executes intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance through the operations and intelligence processes, with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise, and information collection. The intelligence warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Provide support to force generation.
- Provide support to situational understanding.
- Conduct information collection.
- Provide intelligence support to targeting and information operations.

## Fighting for Intelligence

Information collection begins immediately following receipt of mission. Units must be prepared to fight for intelligence against a range of threats, enemy formations, and unknowns. These challenges include integrated air defense systems (IADSS) and long range fires, counter reconnaissance, cyberspace and EW operations, deception operations, and camouflage. It may be necessary for commanders to allocate maneuver, fires, and other capabilities to conduct combat operations to enable information collection.

Priority intelligence requirements, information requirements, and targeting requirements inform the integrated information collection plan. All units (maneuver, fires, maneuver support, and sustainment units) are part of the information collection effort. Commanders and staffs integrate and synchronize all activities that provide useful information as a part of the information collection effort, including Soldier and leader engagements, patrols, observation posts and listening posts, convoys, and checkpoints.

During planning, combat information and intelligence is especially useful in determining the viability of potential courses of action. For example, a commander who lacks the intelligence to know where most of the enemy's units and systems are located cannot conduct a deliberate attack. The unit must collect more information, conduct a reconnaissance in force, a more risky movement to contact, or a hasty attack.

During the execution phase of the operations process, a layered and continuous information collection effort ensures detection of any enemy formations, lethal fires capabilities, or specialized capabilities that provide the enemy advantage. In turn, this allows the commanders and staffs to adjust the scheme of maneuver and fires as the enemy situation develops.

# I. Intelligence Overview

Ref: ADP 2-0, *Intelligence* (Jul '19), preface and pp. 1 to 2.

Operations and intelligence are closely linked. The intelligence process is continuous and directly drives and supports the operations process. This principle will remain true well into the future. Intelligence will continue to be a critical part of the conduct-planning, preparing, executing, and assessing--of operations. Future operations will be difficult. They will occur in complex operational environments against capable peer threats, who most likely will start from positions of relative advantage. U.S. forces will require effective intelligence to prevail during these operations.

Intelligence supports joint and Army operations across unified action, the Army's strategic roles, unified land operations, and decisive action at each echelon--from the geographic combatant command down to the battalion level. Specifically, intelligence supports commanders and staffs by facilitating situational understanding across all domains and the information environment. Commanders and staffs use situational understanding to identify and exploit multi-domain windows of opportunity and to achieve and exploit positions of relative advantage.

Intelligence is inherently joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational. Every aspect of intelligence is synchronized, networked, and collaborative across all unified action partners. This synchronization occurs through national to tactical intelligence support. The Army both benefits from and contributes to national to tactical intelligence and focuses the Army intelligence effort through the intelligence warfighting function, which is larger than military intelligence. Critical participants within the function include commanders and staffs, decision makers, collection managers, and intelligence leaders.

Despite a thorough understanding of intelligence fundamentals and a proficient staff, an effective intelligence effort is not assured. Large-scale ground combat operations are characterized by complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty. The fluid and chaotic nature of large-scale ground combat operations causes the greatest degree of fog, friction, and stress on the intelligence warfighting function. Threat forces will attempt to counter friendly collection capabilities by using integrated air defense systems, long-range fires, counterreconnaissance, cyberspace and electronic warfare operations, camouflage and concealment, and deception.

Ensuring an effective intelligence effort is a challenge described as fighting for intelligence.

## Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)




Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and other aspects of an operational environment within a specific geographic area. Led by the intelligence officer, the entire staff participates in IPB to develop and sustain an understanding of the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. IPB helps identify options available to friendly and threat forces. IPB consists of four steps. Each step is performed or assessed and refined to ensure that IPB products remain complete and relevant. The four IPB steps are—

- Define the Operational Environment
- Describe Environmental Effects On Operations/*Describe The Effects On Operations*
- Evaluate the Threat/*Adversary*
- Determine Threat/*Adversary* Courses Of Action

See p. 1-54 for discussion of IPB as an integrating process.



# Intelligence Logic Map



Ref: ADP 2-0, Intelligence (Jul '19), introductory figure. ADP 2-0 logic chart.

## II. The Commander's Role in Intelligence

Ref: FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec '17), pp. 2-43 and 2-45.

Close interaction between the commander and G-2 or S-2 is essential as the staff supports unit planning and preparation through the integrating processes and continuing activities. The G-2 or S-2 supports the commander's ability to understand the operational environment and visualize operations by leading the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process and portraying the enemy throughout the military decision-making process, developing the information collection plan, updating the intelligence running estimate, and developing intelligence products and reports. The commander's role is to direct the intelligence warfighting function through his relationship with the G-2 or S-2.

Commanders must stay constantly engaged with their G-2 or S-2. The following are examples of actively engaging the intelligence warfighting function:

### During PLANNING, the commander—

- Builds an effective staff team and fosters a collaborative environment that encourages critical thinking, candor, and cooperation which empowers the entire staff.
- Accepts prudent risks and some operational uncertainty. Intelligence cannot eliminate uncertainty.
- Prioritizes resources and capabilities to support information collection. The commander must resource the intelligence architecture adequately to provide adequate network capability (for example, bandwidth) and access. Network access and effective unit communications are especially critical.
- Allocates adequate time for information collection or determines the appropriate balance between the time allotted for collection and operational necessity. It takes time and tactical patience to collect information and then develop effective intelligence products.
- Provides the staff initial guidance and then later, intent and concept of the operation. It is important that the G-2 or S-2 understands the commander's guidance and both share the same perspective of the operation and the operational environment.
- Must own the priority intelligence requirement. The commander personally engages in the development and approval of priority intelligence requirements that are clear, answerable, focused on a single question, and necessary to drive an operational decision.
- Ensures that information collection and intelligence activities are fully integrated into plans and operations.
- Ensures the staff exploits information and intelligence from higher echelons, other units, and unified action partners. Intelligence sharing and an enterprise approach are important factors that facilitate cooperation and access to critical reinforcing intelligence capabilities during operations.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 leads the rest of the staff (who must actively contribute to the process) through IPB. IPB is a critical systematic and thorough analysis of the terrain, weather, threat, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment. The commander must help shape the focus and scope of IPB to effectively drive the rest of the military decision-making process.

*Refer to BSS5: The Battle Staff SMARTbook and ATP 2-01.3 for doctrine on IPB.*

- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 is focused on managing, directing, and coordinating the intelligence effort while the military intelligence commander is focused on commanding his unit and conducting intelligence operations.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 and G-3 or S-3 develops the information collection plan, which includes how the intelligence section operates, what requests for information

are necessary, and how organic assets will answer the priority intelligence requirement. The collection plan should include contingency plans and meet the principles of cue, mix, and redundancy.

*Refer to ATP 2-01 for doctrine on planning requirements and assessing collection.)*

- Ensures the G-6 or S-6 is integral to planning adequate network access during the operation as a critical enabler to operations and the intelligence warfighting function. Therefore, the G-2 or S-2 and G-6 or S-6 must coordinate closely throughout all planning activities.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2, in coordination with the staff, especially the G-6 or S-6, develops a thorough intelligence architecture that describes how each intelligence discipline, complementary intelligence capability, processing, exploitation, and dissemination capability, and multinational partners support intelligence operations.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 is actively involved with all integrating processes, continuing activities, and the military decision-making process. For example, the G-2 or S-2 must actively participate in the targeting process with IPB products, especially named areas of interest (NAIs), time phase lines, event template matrix, high-value targets, and target areas of interest (TAIs) recommendations. The G-2 or S-2 thoroughly integrates battle damage assessment and targeting requirements with the other requirements in the collection plan.

### **During PREPARATION, the commander—**

- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 is actively involved in all rehearsals and portrays a sophisticated, capable, and realistic enemy.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 and the G-3 or S-3 have issued all information collection orders in a timely manner, tracked the preparation of all information collection assets, coordinated airspace and other key control measures, and resynchronized ongoing collection and processing, exploitation, and dissemination requirements, as needed.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 and G-6 or S-6 coordinate to ensure the network is operational and responsive.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 has completed information sharing coordination with unified action partners and ongoing processes are in place for subsequent phases of the operation.

### **During EXECUTION and ASSESSMENT, the commander—**

- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 and G-3 or S-3 are able to assess ongoing operations against the IPB products and information collection plan. As the situation dictates, the S-2 or G-2 and S-3 or G-3 modify the information collection plan, prompt commander decisions, and recommend branches or sequels as necessary.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 continually assesses the enemy and operational environment, answers priority intelligence requirements, and updates the running estimate.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 and fire support coordinator are tracking battle damage assessment and providing operational context based on the battle damage assessment.
- Ensures the G-2 or S-2 and G-3 or S-3 allow adequate time to plan for the next operation based on the results of the current operation.

Operations, targeting, intelligence, and communications are inextricably linked. Therefore, the commander must drive the operations process and enable the intelligence warfighting function. Commanders use their staff to synchronize intelligence with the other warfighting functions in order to visualize the operational environment and disrupt the threat simultaneously throughout an AO. Successful intelligence is a result of carefully developed requirements, staff integration and synchronization, continuous information collection, and when necessary, the willingness to fight for information.

Ensuring an effective intelligence effort is a challenge described as fighting for intelligence. The following aspects of fighting for intelligence are critical:

- Effective intelligence requires developing an effective intelligence architecture well before large-scale combat operations.
- The commander must own the intelligence effort.
- The commander and staff-
  - Must forge an effective relationship and excel in staff integration.
  - Must understand intelligence limitations, especially collection gaps, at their echelon overcome or mitigate those limitations through effective information collection.
  - At times, may have to conduct combat operations or find creative solutions to enable information collection.
- The unit must adjust the information collection plan, adapt to threat counter-collection measures, and maintain a layered and aggressive information collection effort.

### III. Intelligence Warfighting Function Tasks

The intelligence warfighting function is the Army's contribution to the joint intelligence effort. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, civil considerations, and other significant aspects of the operational environment (ADP 3-0). Specifically, other significant aspects of the operational environment include threats, adversaries, the operational variables, and can include other aspects depending on the nature of operations.

Intelligence Warfighting Function Tasks		
Intelligence tasks ►	Commander's focus ►	Commander's decisions
<b>Provide intelligence support to force generation:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provide intelligence readiness.</li><li>• Establish an intelligence architecture.</li><li>• Provide intelligence overwatch.</li><li>• Generate intelligence knowledge.</li><li>• Tailor the intelligence force.</li></ul>	Orient on contingencies.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Should the unit's level of readiness be increased?</li><li>• Should the operation plan be implemented?</li></ul>
<b>Provide support to situational understanding:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Perform IPB.</li><li>• Perform situation development.</li><li>• Provide intelligence support to protection.</li><li>• Provide tactical intelligence overwatch.</li><li>• Conduct police intelligence operations.</li><li>• Provide intelligence support to civil affairs operations.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Plan an operation.</li><li>• Prepare.</li><li>• Execute.</li><li>• Assess.</li><li>• Secure the force.</li><li>• Determine 2d and 3d order effects on operations and the populace.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Which COA will be implemented?</li><li>• Which enemy actions are expected?</li><li>• What mitigation strategies should be developed and implemented to reduce the potential impact of operations on the population?</li></ul>
<b>Conduct information collection:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Collection management.</li><li>• Direct information collection.</li><li>• Execute collection.</li><li>• Conduct intelligence-related missions and operations.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Plan information collection for an operation, including PED requirements.</li><li>• Prepare.</li><li>• Execute.</li><li>• Assess.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Which DPs, HPTs, and HVTs are linked to the threat's actions?</li><li>• Are the assets available and in position to collect on the DPs, HPTs, and HVTs?</li><li>• Have the assets been repositioned for branches or sequels?</li></ul>
<b>Provide intelligence support to targeting and information operations:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Provide intelligence support to targeting.</li><li>• Provide intelligence support to information operations.</li><li>• Provide intelligence support to combat assessment.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Create lethal or nonlethal effects against targets.</li><li>• Destroy, suppress, disrupt, or neutralize targets.</li><li>• Reposition intelligence or attack assets.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Are the unit's lethal and nonlethal actions and maneuver effective?</li><li>• Which targets should be re-engaged?</li><li>• Are the unit's information operations effective?</li></ul>

Ref: ADP 2-0 (Jul '19), table 2-1. Overview of intelligence warfighting function tasks.

# Fires Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP 3-19, Fires (Jul '19), chap. 1 and ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 5-5.

*Editor's Note: In addition to combining information from ADP 3-09 and ADRP 3-09 into one publication, the redesignated publication ADP 3-19 (Jul '19) redefined the fires warfighting function (as outlined below) from what was originally presented in FM 3-0. ADP 3-19 also includes discussion on all capabilities that contribute to create effects, including Army, joint, and multinational capabilities.*

## I. The Fires Warfighting Function

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that create and converge effects in all domains against the threat to enable actions across the range of military operations (ADP 3-0). These tasks and systems create lethal and nonlethal effects delivered from both Army and Joint forces, as well as other unified action partners. The fires warfighting function does not wholly encompass, nor is it wholly encompassed by, any particular branch or function. Many of the capabilities that contribute to fires also contribute to other warfighting functions, often simultaneously. For example, an aviation unit may simultaneously execute missions that contribute to the movement and maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, protection, and command and control warfighting functions. Additionally, air defense artillery (ADA) units conduct air and missile defense (AMD) operations in support of both fires and protection warfighting functions.

Commanders must execute and integrate fires, in combination with the other elements of combat power, to create and converge effects and achieve the desired end state. Fires tasks are those necessary actions that must be conducted to create and converge effects in all domains to meet the commander's objectives. The tasks of the fires warfighting function are:

Integrate Army, multinational, and joint fires through:

- Targeting.
- Operations process.
- Fire support.
- Airspace planning and management.
- Electromagnetic spectrum management.
- Multinational integration.
- Rehearsals.
- Air and missile defense planning and integration.

Execute fires across all domains and in the information environment, employing:

- Surface-to-surface fires.
- Air-to-surface fires.
- Surface-to-air fires.
- Cyberspace operations and EW.
- Space operations.
- Multinational fires.
- Special operations.
- Information operations.

## II. Fires Overview

Ref: ADP 3-19, *Fires* (Jul '19).

Success in large-scale combat operations is dependent on the Army's ability to employ fires. Fires enable maneuver. Over the past two decades, potential peer threats have invested heavily in long-range fires and integrated air defense systems, making it even more critical that the U.S. Army possess the ability to maneuver and deliver fires in depth and across domains.

### Fires in Support of Unified Land Operations

The Army operational concept for conducting operations as part of a joint team is unified land operations. Unified land operations is the simultaneous execution of offense, defense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities across multiple domains to shape operational environments, prevent conflict, prevail in large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains as part of unified action (ADP 3-0). The goal of unified land operations is to achieve the JFC's end state by applying landpower as part of unified action. Commanders employ fires to set conditions for the successful employment of other elements of combat power to conduct unified land operations. The targeting process can help commanders and staffs to prioritize and integrate assets to create effects that allow for achievement of the commander's objectives within unified land operations.

The Army's primary mission is to organize, train, and equip its forces to conduct prompt and sustained land combat to defeat enemy ground forces and seize, occupy, and defend land areas. During the conduct of unified land operations, Army forces support the joint force through four strategic roles:

- Shape OEs.
- Prevent conflict.
- Prevail during large-scale ground combat.
- Consolidate gains.


### Fires in Support of Large-Scale Combat Operations

The Army, as part of the joint force, conducts large-scale combat operations. The preponderance of large-scale combat operations will consist of offensive and defensive operations initially, although some stability operations will occur simultaneously as part of consolidating gains. Commanders employ fires as part of large-scale combat operations by creating effects to enable joint force freedom of action.

Commanders use Army and joint targeting to select and prioritize targets, integrating lethal and nonlethal effects from different capabilities in support of large-scale combat operations. Commanders may converge effects from multiple systems, either simultaneously or in close succession, to create an even greater effect than would have been achieved if each effect was created individually. Convergence is the massing of capabilities from multiple domains to create effects in a single domain. Convergence overwhelms the enemy, giving them too many dilemmas to address simultaneously, which creates gaps for exploitation by the joint force. The convergence of multiple effects within an area requires careful synchronization prior to execution to ensure effects don't interfere with one another or pose a risk to the force.

To effectively enable joint force freedom of action during large-scale combat operations, commanders must synchronize the effects created with fires with the actions of the rest of the joint force. This synchronization initially takes place during planning, where commanders and their staffs determine the timing of the creation of the effect and link that timing to a clearly defined, conditions-based trigger. Commanders must also plan for assessment of the effects and determine alternate courses of action if the effects are not created as planned.

# Fires Logic Diagram



Ref: ADP 3-19, Fires (Jul '19), introductory figure, ADP 3-19 Logic chart.

During large-scale combat operations, multiple Army echelons must synchronize and deconflict their activities, including the creation of effects. The use of deep and close areas can help with dividing responsibilities among echelons within an AO. The close area is the portion of the commander's area of operations where the majority of subordinate maneuver forces conduct close combat (ADP 3-0). The deep area is where the commander sets conditions for future success in close combat (ADP 3-0). Commanders may focus the effects of fires in their deep area to execute shaping operations against enemy forces not in contact with friendly forces in the close area, while subordinate units are responsible for creation of effects in the close area the commander has assigned to them.



# III. Fires Across the Domains

Ref: ADP 3-19, *Fires* (Jul '19), pp. 1-4 to 1-5. See also pp. 6-11 to 6-20.

The Army operates within all **domains**: land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace (including the electromagnetic spectrum) as well as in the information environment.

Commanders use fires to create effects in support of Army and joint operations.

**Cross-domain fires** are fires executed in one domain to create effects in a different domain. Cross-domain fires provide commanders with the flexibility to find the best system to create the required effect and to build redundancy into their plan.

**Multi-domain fires** are fires that converge effects from two or more domains against a target. Multi-domain fires may produce synergistic effects that are greater than the sum of the individual effects that would have been created separately. Surface-based fires converged with other effects across domains creates multiple dilemmas, taxing the enemy's ability to effectively respond. For example, a commander may employ offensive cyberspace operations to attack an enemy air defense network while surface-to-surface fires destroy enemy air defense radars and air-to-surface fires destroy the air defense command and control nodes. The converged effects provide reduced risk to allied operational aircraft.

The **land domain** is the area of the Earth's surface ending at the high water mark and overlapping with the maritime domain in the landward segment of the littorals (JP 3-31). The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is the supported commander within the land area of operations (AO) designated by the joint force commander (JFC). Within the designated AO, the JFLCC has the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires in order to integrate and synchronize maneuver, fires, and interdiction.

The **air domain** is the atmosphere, beginning at the Earth's surface, extending to the altitude where its effects upon operations become negligible (JP 3-30). The JFC normally assigns joint force air component commander responsibilities to the component commander having the preponderance of forces and the ability to effectively plan, task, and control joint air operations. In addition, as all component commands will need to utilize the air domain to some extent, the JFC normally designates the joint force air component commander as the airspace control authority to promulgate airspace coordinating measures to deconflict the multiple users on behalf of the JFC. The Army air-ground system is the Army's system to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate air-ground operations, joint air support, and airspace.

The **maritime domain** is the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals (JP 3-32). Naval and maritime forces operate on (surface), under (subsurface), or above the sea (air). Fires from the maritime domain support the land scheme of fires with traditional naval surface fires, and joint fires to include cruise missile and anti-ship missiles, as well as protecting global shipping lanes and friendly maritime assets to maintain freedom of maneuver.

The **space domain** is the space environment, space assets, and terrestrial resources required to access and operate in, to, or through the space environment (FM 3-14). Space is a physical domain where military operations are conducted. Space capabilities include the ability to access information collection; environmental monitoring; early warning, satellite based sensors and communications; and positioning, navigation, and timing.

**Cyberspace** is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 3-12.) Commanders will generally create effects in the cyberspace domain through offensive and defensive cyberspace operations. However, they may also create effects on the physical network layer of cyberspace.

# The Sustainment Warfighting Function

*Ref: ADP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '19), chap. 1 and ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), pp. 5-5 to 5-6.*

The sustainment warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extended operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations (ADP 3-0). Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number of options available to the commander. Sustainment is essential for retaining and exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting function consists of four elements: logistics, financial management, personnel services and health service support as shown in the sustainment warfighting function logic chart:

- Logistics
- Financial management
- Personnel services
- Health service support

## A. Logistics

Logistics is planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: design and development; acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of materiel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services. The explosive ordnance disposal tasks are discussed under the protection warfighting function. Army logistics elements are:

- Maintenance
- Transportation
- Supply
- Field Services
- Distribution
- Operational contract support
- General engineering

*See pp. 7-7 to 7-10 for discussion of logistics.*

## B. Financial Management

Financial management leverages fiscal policy and economic power across the range of military operations. Financial management encompasses finance operations and resource management.

*See pp. 7-11 to 7-12 for discussion of financial management.*



*Refer to SMFLS4: Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Warfighter's Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support) -- updated with the latest doctrinal references (ADRP 4-0 Sustainment, ATP 4-93 Sustainment Brigade, JP 4-0 Joint Logistics, and more than 20 other joint and service publications) -- for complete discussion of strategic, operational, and tactical logistics, force projection, deployment and redeployment, and RSO&I operations.*

## II. Sustainment Overview

Ref: ADP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '19).

ADP 4-0, Sustainment, is the Army's doctrine for sustainment in support of operations. The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment and is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. Sustainment provides the support necessary to maintain operations until mission accomplishment. The relationship between sustainment and operation is depicted in introductory figure-1 the facing page.

### Fundamentals of Sustainment


For the Army, sustainment is the provision of logistics, financial management, personnel services, and health service support necessary to maintain operations until successful mission completion. Sustainment is accomplished through the coordination, integration, and synchronization of resources from the strategic level through the tactical level in conjunction with our joint and multinational partners.

Sustainment operations enable force readiness. Sustainment operations maintain Army forces by equipping it with materiel, funding it with required resources, staffing it with trained Soldiers and leaders, and by providing it with the force health protection needed.

Army sustainment is based on an integrated process (people, systems, materiel, health service support, and other support) inextricably linking sustainment to operations. The concept focuses on building an operational ready Army, delivering it to the CDR as part of the joint force, and sustaining its combat power across the depth of the operational area and with unrelenting endurance.


### Principles of Sustainment

The principles of sustainment shown below are essential to maintaining combat power, enabling strategic and operational reach, and providing Army forces with endurance. While these principles are independent, they are also interrelated and must be synchronized in time, space, and purpose. The principles of sustainment and the principles of logistics are the same.



Ref: ADP 4-0 (Jul '19), fig. 1-1. Principles of sustainment

# Sustainment Underlying Logic



Refer to SMFLS4: Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support). Includes ATP 4-94 Theater Sustainment Command, ATP 4-93 Sustainment Brigade, ATP 4-90 Brigade Support Battalion, Sustainment Planning, JP 4-0 Joint Logistics, ATP 3-35 Army Deployment and Redeployment, and more than a dozen new/updated Army sustainment references.

# III. Sustainment Considerations during Large-Scale Combat Operations

Ref: FM 3-0 (w/Chg 1), Operations (Dec '18), pp. 2-48 to 2-49.

## Logistics during Large-Scale Combat Operations

Logisticians support operational tempo by delivering supplies and materiel as far forward as possible. They use throughput distribution and preplanned and preconfigured packages of essential items to do this. Logisticians maintain constant contact with operational units to determine requirements for supporting operations. Operational units also provide logisticians with support estimates for contingencies and requirements for cross-loading of supplies to prevent all of one type of supply from being destroyed by the loss of a single system.

Supplies and materiel should remain close to the maneuver force to ensure short response times for supplies and services. This includes uploading critical materiel—such as water, petroleum, oils, and lubricants and ammunition—in order to anticipate attempted occupation of a piece of terrain by more than one unit. Commanders must make risk decisions regarding logistics preparations and avoidance of enemy detection, since logistic preparations may give indications of friendly tactical plans.

The availability of supplies and materiel to sustain tactical unit operations becomes critical to extend operational reach as large-scale combat operations progress. Operational reach is reduced when supplies fail to keep up with the demand of tactical units. Slow or limited resupply may require commanders to use controlled supply rates for various classes of supply to reduce unit expenditures. When those controlled supply rates are not sufficient to continue operations, the force culminates.

During large-scale combat operations supply lines of communication are strained, and requirements for repair and replacement of weapon systems increase. Requirements for petroleum, oils, and lubricants increase during the offense. Conversely, requirements for munitions tend to be higher in the defense than in the offense. Sustainment units must be as mobile as the forces they support. One way to provide continuous support is to task organize elements of sustainment units or complete sustainment units with their supported maneuver formations as required by the mission.

The variety and complexity of possible situations arising during an attack requires sustainment operators to establish a flexible and tailorable distribution system in support of tactical commanders. There may be a wide dispersion of forces and lengthening of lines of communication. Required capabilities to support longer lines of communications include movement control, in-transit visibility, terminal operations, and mode operations.

Field maintenance assets move as forward as possible to repair inoperable and damaged equipment to return it to service as quickly as possible. Crews perform preventive maintenance checks and services as modified for the climate and terrain in which they find themselves. Battle damage assessment and repair restores the minimum essential combat capabilities necessary to support a specific combat mission or to enable the equipment to self-recover. Crews and maintenance and recovery teams conduct battle damage assessment and repair to rapidly return disabled equipment to battlefield service using field expedient components and means.

Establishing aerial resupply and forward logistics base camps may be necessary to sustain operations. This is especially true in the offense, if an attack transitions to exploitation and pursuit conducted at great distances from unit sustaining bases. Aerial resupply,

either by rotary-wing or parachute, delivers critical supplies to the point of need during an entry operation, deep inland operation, or to a rapidly moving unit. The unit or support activity at the airlift's point of origin is responsible for obtaining the required packing, shipping, and sling-load equipment. It prepares the load for aerial transport, prepares the pickup zone, and conducts air-loading operations. The unit located at the airlift destination is responsible for preparing the landing zone to accommodate aerial resupply and for receiving the load.

*See pp. 7-31 to 7-34 for discussion of logistics.*

## **Personnel Services during Large-Scale Combat Operations**

During large-scale combat operations, the key subordinate functions of staffing the force that are important are personnel accountability and strength reporting. The subordinate functions of provide human resource services including postal operations, finance services, and casualty operations, continue during large-scale combat operations. Human resource planning and operations are the means by which human resources are addressed in the military decision-making process and in the attack operations plan. This includes casualty forecasts necessary to inform commanders and staffs.

*See pp. 7-35 to 7-38 for discussion of personnel services.*

## **Health Service Support during Large-Scale Combat Operations**

Large-scale combat operations place an incredible burden on medical resources due to the magnitude and lethality of the forces involved. Medical units can anticipate large numbers of casualties in a short period of time due to the capabilities of modern conventional weapons and the possible employment of weapons of mass destruction. These mass casualty situations can exceed the capabilities of organic and direct support medical assets without careful planning and coordination. Casualty evacuation must occur concurrently with operations. Units that cease aggressive maneuver to evacuate casualties while in enemy contact are likely to both suffer additional casualties while stationary and fail their mission.

Effective management of mass casualty situations depends on established and rehearsed unit-level mass casualty plans and detailed medical planning. There are a number of other variables which can ensure the success of a unit's mass casualty response plan. These include, but are not limited to—

- Coordination and synchronization of additional medical support and augmentation and their dispositions and allocations, such as medical evacuation support, forward resuscitative and surgical teams, combat support and field hospitals, casualty collection points, ambulance exchange points, and established Class VIII resupply.
- Predesignating casualty collection points.
- Quickly locating the injured and clearing them from the battlefield.
- Providing effective emergency medical treatment for the injured.
- Accurate triage and rapid medical evacuation of the injured to medical treatment facilities at the next higher role of care.
- Use of alternative assets when the number of casualties overwhelms the capacity of available medical evacuation systems.

*See pp. 7-39 to 7-43 for discussion of health service support.*

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## C. Personnel Services

Personnel services are those sustainment functions related to Soldiers' welfare, readiness, and quality of life. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel. Personnel services include—

- Human resources support
- Legal support
- Religious support
- Band support

*See pp. 7-13 to 7-14 for discussion of personnel services.*

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## D. Health Service Support

Army Health System (AHS) support includes both health service support and force health protection that are critical capabilities embedded within formations across all warfighting functions. The force health protection mission falls under the protection warfighting function and will not be covered in this publication (see ADP 3-37).

Health service support encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the behavioral and physical well-being of Army personnel and as directed, unified action partners (UAPs). Health service support includes the following—

- Casualty care, which encompasses a number of medical functions, including:
  - Medical treatment (organic and area medical support).
  - Hospitalization.
  - Dental care (treatment aspects).
  - Behavioral health/neuropsychiatric treatment.
  - Clinical laboratory services.
  - Treatment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear patients).
- Medical evacuation (including medical regulating).
- Medical logistics (including blood management).

*See pp. 7-15 to 7-18 for discussion of health service support.*



# Protection Warfighting Function

*Ref: ADP 3-37, Protection (Jul '19) and ADP 3-0, Operations (Jul '19), p. 5-7.*

Protection safeguards friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure and is inherent to command. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power through the integration of protection capabilities throughout operational preparation, operations to shape, operations to prevent, large-scale ground combat operations, and operations to consolidate gains.

## I. The Protection Warfighting Function

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission. Commanders incorporate protection when they understand and visualize threats and hazards in an operational environment. This allows them to synchronize and integrate all protection capabilities to safeguard bases, secure routes, and protect forces. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants) and physical assets of the United States, unified action partners, and host nations. The protection warfighting function enables the commander to maintain the force's integrity and combat power. Protection determines the degree to which potential threats can disrupt operations to counter or mitigate those threats before they can act. However, protection is not a linear activity—planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is a continuous and enduring activity. Effective physical security measures, like any defensive measures, overlap and deploy in depth. Prioritization of protection capabilities are situationally dependent and resource-informed. Protection activities include developing and maintaining the protection prioritization list.

The protection warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Conduct survivability operations.
- Provide force health protection.
- Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations.
- Provide explosive ordnance disposal support.
- Coordinate air and missile defense support.
- Conduct personnel recovery.
- Conduct detention operations.
- Conduct risk management.
- Implement physical security procedures.
- Apply antiterrorism measures.
- Conduct police operations.
- Conduct population and resource control.
- Conduct area security.
- Perform cyberspace security and defense.
- Conduct electromagnetic protection.
- Implement operations security.

*See pp. 8-5 to 8-20 for an overview and further discussion of these protection tasks.*

Protection closely relates to endurance and momentum. It also contributes to the commander's ability to extend operations in time and space.

## II. Protection (Overview)

*Ref: ADP 3-37, Protection (Jul '19), pp. 1 to 2.*

Protection is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area (JP 3-0). Protection serves as an Army warfighting function. A shared understanding of the joint protection function (see JP 3-0) enables Army leaders to integrate the Army's protection warfighter function with unified action partners. Army leaders must anticipate that joint support will be limited in larger-scale ground combat operations and must protect the force utilizing a combination of measures. The joint protection function focuses on preserving the joint force fighting potential in four primary ways:

- Active defensive measures to protect friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure.
- Passive defensive measures to make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy when active measures are limited or unavailable.
- The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide.
- Emergency management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters

Protection is not linear – planning, preparing, executing, and assessing protection is continuous and enduring. The protection warfighting function tasks are incorporated into the operations process in a comprehensive, layered, and redundant approach to achieve enduring force protection. Protection preserves capability, momentum, and tempo which are important contributors to operational reach. Synchronizing, integrating, and organizing protection capabilities and resources throughout the operations process preserves combat power and mitigates the effects of threats and hazards to enable freedom of action.

### Role of Protection


Army forces gain, sustain, and exploit control over land to deny its use to an enemy. They do this with combined arms formations, possessing the mobility, firepower, and protection to defeat an enemy and establish control of areas, resources, and populations. Military activities and operations are inherently hazardous. Commanders and leaders conducting unified land operations must accept prudent risks every day based on the significance of the mission, the demand of the operation, and opportunity. In warfare, this reality defines the sacred trust that must exist between leaders and Soldiers regarding mission accomplishment and force protection. Force protection is preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information (JP 3-0). A commander's inherent duty to protect the force should not lead to risk aversion or inhibit the freedom of action necessary for maintaining initiative and momentum or achieving decisive results during operations. Leaders must balance these competing responsibilities and make risk decisions based on experience, ethical and analytical reasoning, knowledge of the unit, and the situation.

Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources to preserve combat power and identify and prevent or mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection integrates all protection capabilities to safeguard the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and its mission partners. In addition to the primary protection task, commanders and staffs must coordinate, synchronize, and integrate additional protection capabilities and resources of unified action partners.

The goal of protection integration is to balance protection with the freedom of action throughout the duration of military operations. This is achieved by integrating reinforcing or complementary protection capabilities to mitigate or assume risk for identified and prioritized vulnerabilities.

### \* 8-2 (Protection) Warfighting Function

# Protection Logic Map



Ref: ADP 3-37 (Jul '19), fig. 1-1. Protection logic map.

## Protection in Support of Army Operations

The Army accomplishes its mission by supporting the joint force in four strategic roles: shape OEs, prevent conflict, conduct large-scale ground combat, and consolidate gains. The strategic roles clarify the enduring reasons for which the United States (U.S.) Army is organized, trained, and equipped. The Army conducts operations across multiple domains and the information environment. All Army operations are multi-domain operations, and all battles are multi-domain battles. Multi-domain operations include airborne and air assault operations, air and missile defense, fire support, aviation, cyberspace electromagnetic activities, information operations, space operations, military deception, and information collection. Large-scale ground combat operations such as these entail significant operational risk, synchronization and capabilities convergence, and high operational tempo. Protection is a key consideration for operating in multiple domains.

Protection emphasizes the importance of planning and expanding protection priorities, to include protecting mission partners, civilian populations, equipment, resources, infrastructure, and cultural landmarks across the range of military operations. The synchronization, integration, and organization of protection capabilities and resources to preserve combat power from the effects of threats and hazards are essential. When properly integrated and synchronized, the tasks and systems that relate to protection effectively protect the force, preserve combat power, and increase the probability of mission success.

Protection is achieved through commanders and their units by changing tempo, taking evasive action, or maneuvering to gain positional advantage in relation to a threat.


Formations often derive protection by exploiting terrain and weather conditions, or by using the cover of darkness to mask movement. The use of key physical terrain features supports protection measures and complements the positioning of forces during planning. The ability to protect and preserve the force and secure the AO is vital in seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative to shape the OE, prevent conflict, consolidate gains, and win wars as a part of unified action.

# III. Protection Integration in the Operations Process

Ref: ADP 3-37, Protection (Jul '19), fig. 1-2, p. 1-4.

Protection is integrated throughout the operations process to provide a synchronization of efforts and an integration of capabilities. The protection warfighting function tasks are incorporated into the process in a layered and redundant approach to complement and reinforce actions to achieve force protection.

## Protection within the Operations Process



Ref: ADP 3-37 (Jul '19), fig. 1-2. Integration of protection throughout the operations process.

**A. Plan** (see pp. 8-21 to 8-30). Planning is the first step toward effective protection. Commanders consider the most likely threats and hazards and decide which personnel, physical assets, and information to protect.

**B. Prepare** (see pp. 8-31 to 8-34). During the preparation phase, protection focuses on deterring and preventing the enemy or adversary from actions that would affect combat power and the freedom of action. The implementation of protection tasks with ongoing preparation activities assists in the prevention of negative effects.

**C. Execute** (see pp. 8-35 to 8-36). The continuous and enduring character of protection makes the continuity of protection tasks and systems essential during execution. Commanders implement control measures and allocate resources that are sufficient to ensure protection continuity and restoration.

**D. Assess** (see pp. 8-37 to 8-38). Assessing protection is an essential, continuous activity that occurs throughout the operations process. While a failure in protection is typically easy to detect, the successful application of protection may be difficult to assess and quantify.



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
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
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
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