Chap 5

Navy Planning Overview

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), chap. 1.

Military planning is a comprehensive process that enables commanders and staffs at all levels and in all services to make informed decisions, solve complex problems, and ultimately accomplish assigned missions. Military planning is critical at every level of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—and in any situation regardless whether the threat is posed by a conventional military, an asymmetric unconventional adversary, or a combination of both. Military planning can be applied whether conditions permit a lengthy, deliberate process or if the situation forces a compressed timeline.

The Navy Planning Process (NPP)



Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, pp. 1-1 to 1-9.

Military planning, and by extension Navy planning, is the process by which a commander visualizes an end state and then determines the most effective ways by which to reach the end state. Specifically, planning helps the commander direct and coordinate the actions of a force, generate a common situational awareness, develop expectations as to how the dynamic interaction of forces will affect the outcome of an operation, and shape the thinking of the planning team.

The Navy Planning Process

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), pp. 1-4 to 1-5.

The NPP establishes procedures to progressively analyze a mission, develop and wargame courses of action (COAs) against projected enemy courses of action (ECOAs), compare friendly COAs against the commander's criteria and each other, select a COA, prepare an operation order (OPORD) for execution, and transition the plan or order to subordinates tasked with its execution.

Step I. Mission Analysis

Mission analysis drives the NPP. As the first step of the process, its purpose is to review and analyze orders, guidance, intelligence, and other information in order for the commander, planning team, and staff to gain an understanding of the situation and to produce a mission statement.

See pp. 5-17 to 5-34.

Step II. Course of Action Development

Planners use the mission statement, commander's intent, and planning guidance to develop multiple COAs. Then they examine each prospective COA for validity by ensuring suitability, feasibility, acceptability, distinguishability, and completeness with respect to the current and anticipated situation, the mission, and the commander's intent.

See pp. 5-35 to 5-46.

Step III. Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

Course of action analysis involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the enemy and the operational environment. Each friendly COA is war gamed against selected ECOAs. This step assists planners in identifying strengths, weaknesses, and associated risks, and in assessing shortfalls for each prospective friendly COA. War gaming also identifies branches and potential sequels that may require additional planning. Short of execution, COA war gaming provides the most reliable basis for understanding and improving each COA. This step also allows the staff to refine its initial estimates based on additional understanding that is gained.

See pp. 5-47 to 5-58.

Step IV. Course of Action Comparison and Decision

All retained friendly COAs are evaluated against established criteria and against each other, ultimately leading to a decision by the commander.

See pp. 5-59 to 5-66.

Step V. Plans and Orders Development

The staff uses the commander's COA decision, mission statement, commander's intent, and guidance to develop plans and/or orders that direct subordinate actions. Plans and orders serve as the principal means by which the commander expresses his decision, intent, and guidance.

See pp. 5-67 to 5-72.

Step VI. Transition

Transition is the orderly handover of a plan or order to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides staffs with the situational awareness and rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure that there is a coherent transition from planning to execution. The process, however, does not end here. The process is continuous. Staffs maintain running estimates that allow for plans and orders refinement. The planning staff continues to examine branches and sequels to plans and orders.

See pp. 5-73 to 5-76.

IV. Intelligence Preparation of the the Operational Environment (IPOE)

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), app. B.

All planners need a basic familiarity with the IPOE process in order to become critical consumers of the products produced by the intelligence community. Some steps in the IPOE are conducted in parallel with the mission analysis and require input from other members of the maritime planning group. Although the specifics of the process vary depending on the situation and force involved, there is general agreement on the four major steps of IPOE.

For a more detailed discussion of the IPOE process, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace.

Step One: Define the Operational Environment

This first step is an initial survey of the geographic and non-geographic dimensions of the operational environment. It is used to bound the problem and to identify areas for further analysis. There are generally three tasks that must be accomplished.

- Identify the AO and the area of interest
- Determine the significant characteristics of the operational environment. This sub-step is an initial review of the factors of space, time, and forces and their interaction with one another.
- Evaluate existing databases and identify intelligence gaps and priorities. In this sub-step, intelligence personnel review the information found in various automated databases, Intelink sites (the classified version of the Internet), and other intelligence sources, both classified and unclassified. Intelligence requests and requirements may take the form of priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), requests for information (RFIs), production requests (PRs), and collection requirements.

Area of Operations: Defined by LAT/LONG or displayed on a map/chart for clarity and reference. The higher headquarters normally assigns this.

Area of Interest: Adjacent geographic area where political, military, economic, or other developments have an effect within a given theater; it might also extend to the areas enemy forces occupy that may endanger the accomplishment of one's mission; in practical terms, the area of interest determines the maximum scope of intelligence-gathering activities for the geographic combatant command; any theater (of war) also encompasses the pertinent parts of the cyberspace.

Step Two: Describe the Operational Environment Effects

The purpose of this step is to determine how the operational environment affects both friendly and enemy operations. It begins with an identification and analysis of all militarily significant environmental characteristics of each operational environment dimension. These factors are then analyzed to determine their effects on the capabilities and broad COAs of both enemy and friendly forces. Sub-steps include:

- Analyze the factor of space of the operational environment
- Analyze the factor of time of the operational environment
- Determine the operational environment effects on enemy and friendly capabilities and broad COAs

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Space: military geography (area, position, distances, land use, environment, topography, vegetation, hydrography, oceanography, climate, and weather), politics, diplomacy, national resources, maritime infrastructure and positioning, economy, agriculture, transportation, telecommunications, culture, ideology, nationalism, sociology, science and technology.

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Time: preparation, duration, warning, decision cycle, planning, mobilization, reaction, deployment, transit, concentration, maneuver, accomplish mission, rate of advance,reinforcements, commit reserves, regenerate combat power, redeployment, reconstruction

Step Three: Evaluate the Enemy (Factor of Forces)

The third step is to identify and evaluate the enemy's forces and its capabilities; limitations; doctrine; and tactics, techniques, and procedures to be employed. In this step, analysts develop models that portray how the enemy normally operates and identifies capabilities in terms of broad ECOAs that the enemy might take. Analysts must take care not to evaluate enemy doctrine and concepts by mirror imaging U.S. doctrine. Sub-steps include:

- Identify enemy force capabilities
- Consider and describe general ECOAs in terms of DRAW-D (Defend, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, or Delay)
- Determine the current enemy situation (situation template)
- Identify broad COAs that would allow the enemy to achieve objectives

Summarize the Key Elements of the Factor of Forces (Enemy): defense system, armed forces, relative combat power of opposing forces (composition, reserves, reinforcements, location and disposition, strengths), logistics, combat efficiency (morale, leadership, doctrine, training, etc.)

Step Four: Develop Enemy Courses of Action

Accurate identification of the full set of ECOAs requires the commander and his staff to think as the enemy thinks. From that perspective, it is necessary first to postulate possible enemy objectives and then to visualize specific actions within the capabilities of enemy forces that can be directed at these objectives and their impact upon potential friendly operations. From the enemy's perspective, appropriate physical objectives might include own-forces or their elements, own or friendly forces being supported or protected, facilities or lines of communication, and geographic areas or positions of tactical, operational, or strategic importance. The commander should not consider ECOAs based solely on factual or supposed knowledge of the enemy intentions.

The real COA by the enemy commander cannot be known with any confidence without knowing the enemy's mission and objective, and that information is rarely known. Even if such information were available, the enemy could change or feign the COA. Therefore, considering all the options the enemy could physically carry out is more prudent.

To develop an ECOA, one should ask the following three questions: Can the enemy do it? Will the enemy accomplish his objective? Would it materially affect the accomplishment of my mission? Each identified ECOA is examined to determine whether it meets the tests for suitability, feasibility, acceptability, uniqueness, and consistency with doctrine.

No ECOA should be dismissed or overlooked because it is considered as unlikely or uncommon, only if impossible. Once all ECOAs have been identified, the commander should eliminate any duplication and combine them when appropriate. Each ECOA is evaluated, prioritized, and ranked according to the probability of adoption. This final step in the IPOE process is designed to produce, at a minimum, two ECOAs: the enemy's most likely COA and most dangerous COA, giving the commander a best estimate and a worst-case scenario for planning. However, if time allows, other ECOAs are also developed. Each ECOA usually includes a description of expected enemy activities, the associated time and phase lines expected in executing the COA, expected force dispositions, associated COGs, a list of assumptions made about the enemy when projecting the COA, a list of refined high-value targets, and a list of named areas of interest, which are geographical areas where intelligence collection will be focused.

V. Operational Art & Design

Achievement of objectives does not lend itself to mechanistic, deterministic, scientific models or simple linear processes — developing a solution requires study of the interplay of literally hundreds, if not thousands, of independent variables. In other words, developing a solution for strategic objectives is more of an art than a science.

A. Operational Art

Operational art serves as a bridge and as an interface between maritime strategy and naval tactics. It is the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs — supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience — to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and to organize and employ military forces. Operational art is the thought process commanders use to visualize how best to efficiently and effectively employ military capabilities to accomplish their mission.

In applying operational art, the operational commander draws on judgment, perception, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, and character to visualize the conditions necessary for success before committing forces.

Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and the skill to monitor, assess, plan, and direct. It helps commanders and their staffs order their thoughts and understand the conditions for victory. Without operational art, campaigns and operations would be a set of disconnected tactical actions.

The operational commander uses operational art to consider not only the employment of military forces, but also their sustainment and the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. This includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities.

Operational art helps the operational commanders overcome the ambiguity and uncertainty of a complex operational environment. It governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic military objectives. Among the many considerations, it requires commanders to answer the following:

- **ENDS** - What conditions are required to achieve the objectives?
- **WAYS** - What sequence of actions is most likely to create those conditions?
- **MEANS** - What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions?
- **RISK** - What is the likely cost or risk in performing that sequence of actions?

Strategic objectives/goals and the 12 principles of joint operations bound the commander's operational art, which guides war fighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war and is derived from experience across the range of military operations.

In generic terms, operational art at sea is that component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, and conducting major operations and maritime campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives in a given part of a maritime operations area. Only by applying tenets of operational art is it possible to accomplish objectives determined by national strategy and policy in the most decisive manner and with the fewest losses in personnel and material by friendly forces. The main role of operational art is to properly prioritize, sequence, and synchronize or orchestrate the use of all available military and nonmilitary sources of one's power.

See following pages (pp. 5-12 to 5-13) for discussion of the elements of operational art and design.

Elements of Operational Art & Design

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Dec '06), chap. IV.

Operational art encompasses operational design — the process of developing the intellectual framework that will underpin all plans and their subsequent execution. The elements of operational design are tools to help supported JFCs and their staffs visualize what the joint operation should look like and to shape the commander's intent. The emphasis applied to an operational design's elements varies with the theater's strategic objectives. The strategic environment is not the only factor that affects operational design. Other factors such as the availability of HNS, diplomatic permission to overfly nations and access en route air bases, the allocation of strategic mobility assets, the state of the theater infrastructure, and forces and resources made available for planning all have an impact on the operational design. In the final analysis, the goals of a sound operational design are to ensure a clear focus on the ultimate strategic objective and corresponding strategic COGs, and provide for sound sequencing, synchronization, and integration of all available military and nonmilitary instruments of power to that end.

Elements of Operational Design



Ref: FM 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, fig. IV-1, p. IV-5.

The commander and staff use the tenets of operational art and design to define the mission (what the commander has been told to do and the reason for it) and assemble/examine information relating to the mission. This information constitutes the initial estimate of the situation. Using this information the staff conducts a mission analysis and the commander formulates an operational idea. The operational idea is provided to the staff as the commander's planning guidance for the development of courses of action. Also critical for follow-on plan development, the initial estimate of the situation provides a loose collection of diverse references that the operational commander and staff can consider in the development of the basic plan and continuous estimate-of the situation refinement.

Refer to The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, chap. 3 for complete discussion of the elements of operational art and design.

VI. Design in Military Operations

Ref: JWFC Pamphlet 10, Design in Military Operations (Sept '10).

Design is a methodology for applying critical and creative thinking to understand, visualize, and describe complex, ill-structured problems and develop approaches to solve them. It is a repeatable methodology of reasoning that helps commanders understand how to change a complex-adaptive system from "what is now" to "what is feasible and better"— from the conditions in the operational environment when operations begin (the observed system) to the conditions intended when operations end (the desired system). The difference, or gap, between the current and desired system states is the problem commanders and staffs must solve — how to bridge this gap. In its purest form, design is creative and critical thinking that builds a current and coherent understanding of the relevant relationships in the target environment. Thinking about the environment in terms of complex adaptive systems can help commanders and planners understand the operational environment and key relationships.

Once they understand the environment and the true nature of the problem, commanders consider how to solve the problem. This involves determining which factors in the broad environment are relevant to the current operation and the problem at hand. "Framing" is a term sometimes used to include these relevant factors and exclude others. Commanders identify those actors, tensions, and forces that might support, oppose, or are otherwise affected by potential solutions, and then visualize a broad operational approach to achieve the best solution. They capture their understanding and visualization in their planning guidance, which subordinate commanders, staff, and others will use in subsequent detailed planning.

Because commanders and staffs cannot predict with certainty how their actions will change the environment, particularly when the opposition begins to react, they maintain a posture of skepticism toward the finality of any solution, and remain prepared to reframe their understanding of the environment, the problem, and the broad operational approach as evidence accumulates that the system is not responding as expected. We must try to understand how the actions in one part of the system can affect the system as a whole.

1. Frame the Environment

Framing the environment establishes context for describing the problem and developing an operational approach. The term "framing" is used to indicate the process of identifying the relevant aspects of the environment and distinguishing them from the aspects that are not relevant to the operations at hand. In framing the environment, commanders and staffs review relevant directives, documents, data, guidance and any assigned tasks. If required, commanders and staffs inform their higher authority of new information or the basis for differing perspectives of the environment. In particular, commanders and staffs collaborate with their superiors to resolve differences of interpretation of higher-level objectives and the suitability of available ways and means to accomplish them based on an understanding of the directing authority's motivations and intentions underlying the tasks or assigned missions. Combatant commanders and staffs, and national leaders, may have a clear strategic perspective of the problem, while operational level and tactical commanders and staffs often have a better understanding of local circumstances.

The environmental frame depicts the **observed system** (the current state of the environment), identifying the tendencies and potentials of relevant actors and operational variables that define current system behavior and possibilities for change. Based on higher guidance, the environmental frame also defines the set of conditions that constitute the **desired system** (the desired future state of the environment) that would meet the intentions of the directing authorities. A **condition** is a reflection of an aspect of observed and desired systems. In other words, the observed system is typically comprised of a number of existing conditions, while the desired system is comprised of a set of potential desired conditions.

I. Mission Analysis

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), chap. 2.

As the first step, mission analysis drives the entire planning process. Its purpose is to give the naval commander, staff, and planning team an overall assessment of the situation. Mission analysis begins with a review of orders, plans, intelligence products, and guidance provided by higher headquarters in order to produce an operations mission statement and to identify tasks necessary to accomplish the operational mission. Following the mission analysis briefing, this step in the planning process ends when the commander issues planning guidance and a warning order (WARNORD), initiating the COA development process.

I. Mission Analysis

Key Inputs	Key Outputs

▪ Higher Headquarters
  ▪ Plan, orders and guidance
  ▪ Intelligence products
  ▪ Staff estimates
▪ Navy Commander
  ▪ Initial guidance
	▪ Approved mission statement
	▪ Commander's planning guidance
	▪ Commander's intent
	▪ Commander's critical information requirements
	▪ Warning order

1. Identify Source(s) of the Mission
2. Determine Support Relationships
3. Analyze the Higher Commander's Mission
4. Determine Specified, Supplied and Essential Tasks
5. State the Purpose
6. Identify Externally Imposed Limitations
7. Analyze Available Forces and Assets
8. Determine Critical Factors, Centers of Gravity and Decisive Points
9. Develop Planning Assumptions
10. Conduct Initial Risk Assessment
11. Develop Proposed Mission Statement
12. Conduct Mission Analysis Briefing
13. Develop Initial Commander's Intent
14. Develop Commander's Critical Info. Requirements (CCIR)
15. Develop Commander's Planning Guidance
16. Develop Warning Order

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, fig. 2-1, p. 2-1.

Before the commander and planning team can begin mission analysis, they must understand the possible area of operations (AO), probable mission, available forces, and political, military, and cultural characteristics of the area. The planning team acquires information from higher headquarters, national-level intelligence sources,

1. Identify Source(s) of the Mission

The source of the mission is normally found in a higher headquarters directive (i.e., OPLAN, OPORD, or WARNORD). Depending on the scope of the operation, consider also reviewing applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), alliance directives, National Security Presidential Decision Directives, and other authoritative sources for additional information. For instance, Operation ALLIED FORCE in Kosovo and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM both involved key UNSCRs that shaped the mission of naval forces in each conflict.

2. Determine Support Relationships

It is critical for the staff and planning team to be clear in their understanding of support relationships. Support relationships typically exist at the operational level between service and/or functional component commanders (i.e., JFMCC and joint force air component commander (JFACC)) but also may be established at the tactical level (i.e., between a CSG commander and an ESG commander). By ascertaining the proper support relationship, the naval commander, staff, and planning team can determine what organization or command is the main effort for an operation. This information provides the necessary chain-of-command information and normally is found in the source of mission document(s), such as an OPORD. The support relationship may change throughout the different phases of an operation.

For example, the second phase of an operation may place the main effort on an amphibious demonstration by a Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) within an ESG. The JFC would identify the JFMCC as the supported commander, and the other functional component commanders would be supporting commanders. However, the third phase of the operation may focus the main effort on an airborne forced entry into an enemy airfield. In the third phase of the JFC's establishing directive, the supported commander is now assigned to the joint force land component commander (JFLCC). The JFMCC would be a supporting commander and may be tasked to provide supporting fires or maintain maritime superiority in the AO to prevent the enemy from bringing in arms and supplies to reinforce its ground forces and conduct a counterattack at the airfield.

3. Analyze the Higher Commander's Mission

The higher commander's mission statement, which is normally contained in Paragraph 2 (mission) of the higher commander's directive, and the capabilities and limitations of the naval force must be studied. The commander must draw broad conclusions as to the character of the forthcoming military action. However, the commander should not make assumptions about issues not addressed in the higher headquarters' directive. If the higher headquarters' directive is unclear, ambiguous, or confusing, the commander must seek clarification. The following is an example of a mission statement from a higher joint force headquarters.

The higher commander's intent normally is found in Paragraph 3 (execution) of the higher commander's directive, although its location in the text may vary. Sometimes the higher commander's intent may not be transmitted at all. When this occurs, the subordinate commander and staff should derive an intent statement and confirm it with the higher headquarters. The intent statement of the higher commander should then be repeated in Paragraph 1 (situation) of the naval commander's own OPORD to ensure that the staff, supporting commanders, and subordinates understand it. Each subordinate commander's intent must be framed and embedded within the context of the higher commander's intent, and they must be nested both vertically and horizontally to achieve a common military end state throughout the command.

Mission Statement & Commander's Intent

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), pp. 2-4 to 2-5.

Example Mission Statement

The following is an example of a mission statement from a higher joint force headquarters:

When directed, commander, joint task force (CJTF) BLUE SWORD conducts multinational operations in the joint operations area (JOA) to defeat the Redland 23rd Guards Division and destroy terrorist forces and their infrastructure in Redland in order to eliminate the terrorist base of operations in the region.

Example Commander's Intent

The following is an example of a commander's intent from a JTF commander, joint force commander, or combatant commander.

GENTEXT/EXECUTION//

(U) COMMANDER'S INTENT. THE PURPOSE OF THE OPERATION IS TO ELIMINATE THE TERRORIST BASE OF OPERATIONS THAT OPERATES FREELY IN REDLAND AND THREATENS PINKLAND SOVEREIGNTY.

(U) METHOD: MY DESIRE IS TO NEUTRALIZE CONVENTIONAL REDLAND MILITARY FORCES WITH PRIMARY FOCUS IN THREE DISTINCT AREAS: ENABLERS SUCH AS REDLAND COMMAND AND CONTROL AND LOGISTICS; REDLAND GROUND, AIR, AND NAVAL FORCES STAGED TO CONDUCT AN OFFENSIVE INTO PINKLAND; AND PARAMILITARY AND TERRORIST GROUPS COLLABORATING WITH REDLAND TO ATTACK PINKLAND AND OTHER FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE REGION.

(U) TASK FORCE OPERATIONS MUST PRESERVE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF NEIGHBORING NEUTRAL COUNTRIES AND TAKE ALL NECESSARY STEPS TO MINIMIZE DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN REDLAND.

(U) WE WILL EXECUTE OPERATIONS THROUGH A JOINT, MULTINATIONAL COALITION AND WILL INTEGRATE OUR OPERATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT ARE EXERCISING OTHER MEANS OF OUR NATIONAL POWER TO BRING THIS CRISIS TO AN END. OUR COMMAND STRUCTURE WILL BE CLEAR, AND OUR CONTROL WILL PERMIT FULL AND EFFECTIVE COORDINATION AMONG SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS. WE WILL CONTINUOUSLY LIAISE WITH PINKLAND TO SYNCHRONIZE OUR RESPECTIVE OPERATIONS SINCE IT WILL NOT BE WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE COALITION TASK FORCE.

(U) WE WILL MAXIMIZE OUR ABILITY TO LEVERAGE ALL OF THE TOOLS IN OUR KIT BAG, INCLUDING SUPERIOR, PRECISION FIREPOWER AND UNRIVALED MOBILITY, TO DOMINATE THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. SPEED AND TIMING ARE ESSENTIAL— TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY IN ORDER TO GAIN MOMENTUM AGAINST REDLAND. I EXPECT MY SUBORDINATE COMMANDERS TO PROVIDE THOROUGH SOLUTIONS THAT ARE PRACTICAL BUT INNOVATIVE AND THAT KEEP THE ELEMENTS OF SPEED AND TIMING AS FUNDAMENTAL INGREDIENTS.

(U) THE END STATE FOR OUR OPERATION IS THE DEFEAT OF THE 23RD GUARDS DIVISION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF THE TERRORIST FORCES AND THEIR CAMPS IN REDLAND. CONDITIONS SHOULD EXIST FOR A STABLE ENVIRONMENT IN REDLAND IN WHICH GOVERNMENTAL AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CAN HAVE FREE ACCESS TO REDLAND TO HELP TRANSITION THEIR GOVERNMENT TO A NEW CIVIL AUTHORITY.

4. Determine Specified, Implied, and Essential Tasks

Every mission consists of two elements: the tasks to be accomplished by one's own forces and the purpose of those tasks. Before going further, it is necessary to illustrate how tasks, operations, and missions are related.

If a mission or operation has multiple tasks, then the priority of each task should be clearly expressed. Using information provided by higher headquarters and the commander's initial guidance, the planning team identifies specified and implied tasks. Specified tasks are specifically assigned to a unit by higher headquarters.



Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, fig. 2-2, p. 2-6.

Specified Tasks

Specified tasks are derived primarily from the execution paragraphs of the OPORD, but they may be found elsewhere, such as in the mission statement, coordinating instructions, or annexes. Implied tasks are not specifically stated in the higher headquarters order but must be performed in order to accomplish specified tasks.

Implied Tasks

Implied tasks emerge from analysis of the order, the commander's guidance, and the enemy. Routine, inherent, or SOP tasks are not included in the list of tasks.

Essential Tasks

Those tasks that most contribute to mission success are deemed essential, and they become the central focus for operations planning. Essential tasks are those that define mission success and apply to the force as a whole. Essential tasks can come from either specified or implied tasks. If a task must be successfully completed for the commander to accomplish his purpose, it is an essential task. Only essential tasks are included in the proposed mission statement. The following example shows the three types of tasks that a commander may experience.

Though not elaborated in this example, the planning team also must determine the follow-on tasks that may be required at a later time due to the effects of the operation, the situation in the operational environment, the enemy's actions, and the dynamic nature of the operational environment. These tasks, commonly seen in a directive or guidance as "be prepared to" or "BPT" shape the planning team's efforts as well as the specified, implied, and essential tasks.

9. Develop Planning Assumptions

Assumptions are made for both friendly and enemy situations. They encompass issues over which a commander normally does not have control. A valid assumption should answer the following questions: Is it logical? Is it realistic? Is it essential for planning to continue? Does it avoid assuming away an enemy capability?

Assumptions are used in planning at every level. Subordinate commanders must treat assumptions given by higher headquarters as facts. While commanders can assume the success of friendly supporting forces, they cannot assume success for their own. As planning continues, additional assumptions may be needed, and previous assumptions may be discarded. Keep a record of assumptions in order to track and validate them as they are confirmed or disapproved. If assumptions cannot be validated before execution, they become part of the inherent risk of the operation and may require branches. During COA development, the commander may require the planning team to develop operations branches for all assumptions pertaining to ECOAs.

Examples

Country _____ will remain neutral but will deploy the major part of its naval forces near the AO.

Country _____ will (not) permit overflight for carrier-based tactical aviation and Tomahawk land attack missile (TLAM).

Strait of _____ will remain open during hostilities for all friendly shipping.

Country _____ will (not) allow basing of ships if they do (not) conduct combat missions against country _____.

10. Conduct Initial Risk Assessment

During mission analysis, the commander conducts a personal initial risk assessment. Risk is inherent in any use of military force or routine military activity. Risk falls into two broad categories: risk to mission and risk to forces (i.e., force protection (FP)).

Commanders, their staffs, and planning teams should identify and assess potential risk so that they can take the appropriate steps to mitigate it. This can be accomplished by conducting a vulnerability analysis or vulnerability assessment. This risk may be stated or implied in higher headquarters intent or guidance. Risk also may be determined from individual staffing. While the staff is involved in the risk assessment, it is the commander who ultimately has to determine how and where risk will be accepted.

See pp. 4-16 to 4-17 for an expanded discussion of risk management.

11. Develop Proposed Mission Statement

Based on mission analysis, the planning team drafts a restated mission for the commander to review, edit, and approve in concert with (or following) the mission analysis briefing. The mission statement should be a clear and concise statement of the essential tasks along with the purpose of those tasks. If the mission contains multiple tasks, they should be listed in the sequence that they are to be accomplished. A proper mission statement should contain the following items: who (which forces) will execute the mission, what type of action (e.g., defend) is contemplated (include essential tasks only), when will the action begin, where will the action occur (AO), why (purpose) each force conducts its part of the operation (including objectives).

Example: Carrier Strike Group (CSG)-Level Mission Statement

Mission Statement: On order (when), CTF BLUE SWORD (who) supports Deception Plan X-Ray and establishes maritime superiority (what) in the BLUE SWORD JOA (where) in order to facilitate the defeat of the 23rd Guards Division and the destruction of the terrorist forces and their infrastructure in Redland (why).

12. Conduct Mission Analysis Briefing

The planning team presents a mission analysis briefing to the commander and staff to obtain approval of the mission statement, intent, and follow-on planning guidance. The mission analysis briefing reviews the specific products developed and refined during mission analysis before proceeding to COA development. Additionally, consider reviewing the following: operational environment situation update; intelligence estimate and IPOE products (including enemy COGs, ECOAs, and DPs); higher headquarters mission and commander's intent; commander's guidance, purpose, and tasks (specified, implied, essential); assumptions, limitations (restraints and/or constraints), and ROE; force structure and shortfalls (combat forces, support resources, subject matter experts); initial staff estimates across functional areas (logistics; transportation; communications system support; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); personnel; etc.); friendly COG analysis to include DPs, request for information (RFI), and operational information requests; recommended commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs), priority intelligence requirement (PIR), and friendly force information requirement (FFIR); and proposed mission statement.

The mission analysis briefing ensures a common and thorough understanding of the proposed mission and tasks along with the underlying mission analysis. The briefing focuses on relevant conclusions reached throughout the analysis process and creates a common understanding and focus for the follow-on planning. The briefing format reflects some of the typical information often found in a mission analysis briefing. Exact content varies based upon the level of command, type of operation, organization SOP, and the commander's needs.

See facing page (p. 5-29) for sample briefing format.

13. Develop Initial Commander's Intent

A commander's intent is broader than the mission statement; it is a concise, free-form expression of the purpose of the force's activities, the desired results, and how actions will progress toward that end. It is a clear and succinct vision of how to conduct the action. In short, the commander's intent links the mission and the CONOPS. The intent expresses the broader purpose of the action that looks beyond the why of the immediate operation to the broader context of that mission, and it may include how the posture of the force at the end state of the action will transition to or facilitate further operations (sequels).

Commander's intent is not a summary of the CONOPs. It should not tell specifically how the operation is being conducted but should be crafted to allow subordinate commanders sufficient flexibility and freedom to act in accomplishing their assigned mission(s) even in the "fog of war." While there is no specified joint format for commander's intent, a generally accepted construct includes the purpose, method, and end state.

Purpose

The reason for the military action with respect to the mission of the next higher echelon. The purpose explains why the military action is being conducted. This helps the force pursue the mission without further orders, even when actions do not unfold as planned. Thus, if an unanticipated situation arises, participating commanders understand the purpose of the forthcoming action well enough to act decisively and within the bounds of the higher commander's intent.

Method

The "how," in doctrinally concise terminology, explains the offensive form of maneuver, the alternative defense, or other action to be used by the force as a whole. Details as to specific subordinate missions are not discussed.

End State

Describes what the commander wants to see in military terms after the completion of the mission by the friendly forces.

Sample Mission Analysis Briefing

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), fig. 2-3, p. 2-10.

BRIEFER	SUBJECT
CofS or N-5/N-3	Purpose and Agenda Area of Operations (AO)
J-2/N-2	Initial Intelligence Estimate Brief: terrain analysis, meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) analysis, threat integration with situation templates, enemy's COGs, and enemy ECOAs.
J-5/J-3, N-5/N-3	Higher Headquarters' Mission and Intent Facts: Source(s) of the mission, and supporting and supported command relationships
	Assumptions; Limitations: restraints, can't do and/or constraints, must do
	Specified, implied, and essential tasks
	Available forces and assets and noted shortfalls (U.S. and coalition)
	Centers of gravity DPs (friendly)
	Initial force movement control center (FMCC) force structure analysis
	Risk assessment and vulnerability assessment
	End state; Proposed mission statement; Proposed initial CCIR
	Time analysis including projected planning milestones
	Conclusions: shortfalls and war-stoppers, recommendations
J-1/N-1	Current Manning
	Facts: personnel strengths and morale, replacements and medical returned to duty (RTD), critical shortages
	Assumptions: replacements, coalition support, other
	Conclusions: projected strengths on D-day, projected critical Navy enlisted
	classification (NEC) status on D-day, shortfalls, war-stoppers, recommendations
J-4/N-4	Sustainment
	Facts: Class I, II, III(p), IV, VI, VII, X status, status of supply services, critical shortages
	Assumptions: resupply rates, host nation support, other
	Conclusions: projected supply level status on D-day, shortfalls, warstoppers, projected treatment capability, recommendations, ordnance/weapons
	Facts: Class V status, distribution system, restrictions, critical shortages
	Assumptions: resupply rates, host nation support, other
	Conclusions: projected supply status on D-day, projected distribution system,
	shortfalls and war-stoppers, and recommendations
	Fueling
	Facts: Class III(b) status, distribution system, restrictions, critical shortages
	Assumptions: resupply rates, host nation support, other
	Conclusions: projected supply status on D-day, projected distribution system, shortfalls and war-stoppers, recommendations
	Fixing
	Facts: maintenance status (equipment readiness); class IX status; repair times, evacuation policy, and assets; critical shortages
	Assumptions: coalition support, other
	Conclusions: projected maintenance status on D-day
J-6/N-6	Communications Architecture and Status
	Facts: operational status of communications circuits and command, control, communications, computers & intelligence (C4I) systems; bandwidth allocation; communications paths for various C2 functions; planned outages and degradations
	Assumptions: bandwidth stability, C4I system reliability Conclusions: projected C4I systems and communications status during operations, impact of loss or degradation of C4I systems or communications
Medical	Facts: MEDEVAC procedures, lay down of medical treatment capabilities and resources, and critical environmental health concerns (prevalent diseases, hazardous animals, pollutants, potability of local water sources)
	Assumptions: aircraft to move injured or sick, shore-based med. facilities w/i flying distance
	Conclusions: critical shortages in supplies or personnel, number of wounded and sick that organic medical services can handle
Others	Others as Appropriate to the Mission
COS or J-3/N-3	Proposed Restated Mission; Commander's Guidance Requested

II. Course of Action Development

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), chap. 3.

A COA is any concept of operation open to a commander that, if adopted, would result in the accomplishment of the mission. For each COA, the commander must visualize the employment of his forces and assets as a whole—normally two levels down—taking into account externally imposed limitations, the factual situation in the AO, and the conclusions previously reached during mission analysis.

II. COA Development

Key Inputs	Key Outputs

▪ **HIGHER HEADQUARTERS**
  ▪ **WARNORD**
  ▪ **OPORD**
▪ **NAVY COMMANDER**
  ▪ **Mission Statement and Commander's Intent**
  ▪ **Commander's Planning Guidance**
  ▪ **Updated IPOE**
  ▪ **ECOAs**
	▪ **Approved COAs**
	▪ **Refined ECOAs**
	▪ **Wargaming Guidance**
	▪ **Evaluation Criteria**
	▪ **Initial Staff Estimates**

1. **Analyze Relative Combat Power**
2. **Generate COA Options**
3. **Test for Validity**
4. **Recommend C2 and Support Relationships**
5. **Prepare COA Sketch & Statement**
6. **Prepare COA Briefing**
7. **Develop COA Analysis & Evaluation Guidance**

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, fig. 3-1, p. 3-1.

After receiving guidance, the planning team develops COAs for analysis and comparison. The commander should involve the entire planning team in COA development. The commander's guidance and intent focus the planning team's creativity to

Commander/Staff Interaction During/After Course of Action Development

Ref: NWC Maritime Component Commander's Handbook (Feb '10), p. 2-13.

COA development should consider all joint force capabilities and focus on contributing to the defeat/neutralization of the enemy's center of gravity (COG) and the protection of the friendly COG. At the completion of COA development, the commander provides additional guidance to the OPT to advance to the COA analysis step. The OPT will have brainstormed and developed a set of friendly COAs that describe different ways to accomplish the objectives.

The commander considers each COA and decides which one(s) to continue to develop it. The commander also decides whether the options developed span the possible ways to attack the problem. Although not a formal brief like the MA brief, this is a reality check for the OPT. Do the options meet the commander's expectations? Now is the time to eliminate some of the COAs or direct the OPT to develop different options. Ensure the COAs conform to previous guidance and adequately present methods for mitigating or assuming risk. Identify if conditions (HHQ guidance, the OE, assumptions) changed that require additional options. The commander should review previous guidance and intent to evaluate whether the options conform. The commander should test each COA for validity:

- **Suitable**. Does the COA accomplish the mission and comply with guidance?
- **Feasible**. Does the COA accomplish the mission with the forces and functions provided and within the time and space constraints?
- **Acceptable**. Do the COA's advantages justify the cost? (Risk)
- **Distinguishable**. Do the COA's differ significantly from each other? Are the COA's broad enough to span the possible? The task organization may define the uniqueness of the COA.
- **Complete**. Is there enough detail to describe actions two command levels down?

Additionally, the commander can provide evaluation criteria and war-gaming guidance. Decision criteria are those governing factors by which a COA will eventually be assessed in the COA comparison step. These criteria can normally be discerned from the commander's intent. For war-game guidance:

- Identify which friendly COA and enemy COA to war-game
- Identify war game methodology
- Identify specific critical events to focus on; e.g., "gain and maintain maritime superiority" might be specifically war-gamed if it is required to occur early in the operation and is a prerequisite to follow-on operations

Once again, the time available will often be a primary consideration for this guidance. If planning time is not compressed, greater breadth and depth can occur during the COA analysis step.

The commander needs to thoroughly review the established preliminary command and control arrangements between forces for each COA. This structure should consider the types of units to be assigned to a headquarters or component. The maritime component commander's span of control and decision authorities need to be considered while making C2 arrangements. C2 arrangements should take into account the entire OE organization. They should also account for the special C2 requirements of operations that have unique needs, such as amphibious landings or special operations.

The commander should also consider CCIRs, COG, intent, and the OE. Are collection resources answering CCIRs? Are planning CCIRs becoming execution CCIRs? Are there any changes/modifications to the evaluation of COG or the OE?

Example of Joint Task Force Course of Action Sketch and Statement

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), fig. 3-2, p. 3-6.



Ref: NWP 5-01 Navy Planning, fig. 3-2, p. 3-6.

COA STATEMENT

The airborne forced entry COA is an aggressive offensive operation aimed at neutralizing the Redland 23rd Guards Division in order to attack and destroy the terrorist organization in Redland. This COA is conducted in six phases.

Example of Joint Task Force Course of Action Narrative

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), fig. 3-3, p. 3-7.

Phase 0 (shaping) begins with elements of the JTF forces participating in exercise Freedom Assurance (FA) with Pinkland and coalition partners in order to demonstrate coalition resolve to Redland and to finalize status of forces agreement (SOFA) and host nation (HN) agreement with Pinkland for use as an intermediate staging base (ISB). During this phase, all aspects of coalition power will be exercised in order to ensure interoperability and to establish SOPs and common tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). JFMCC is the main effort during Phase 0 with all others supporting. Phase 0 ends if or when the Redland situation stabilizes or if events warrant moving to Phase 1.

Phase 1 (deterrence) begins with the JTF conducting deterrence ops in the vicinity of (IVO) Redland in order to (IOT) deter Redland aggression. The JFLCC will stage airborne forces at ISB ALPHA in Pinkland. The JFACC establishes air superiority over ISB ALPHA, protects air lines of communications (ALOCs), supports flow of JFLCC forces into ISB with STRATAIR, and prepares to support Phase 2 airborne forced entry operations. JFMCC conducts a maritime show of force IVO Redland territorial waters, protects SLOCs, and prepares to support amphib ops into objective (OBJ) CAT or RAT. JFSOCC conducts special reconnaissance (SR) in Redland in support of (ISO) the JTF collection plan and prepares to conduct direct action (DA) against terrorist camps. The JTF establishes an operational HQ onboard a JFMCC command ship. JFMCC show of force is the main effort during Phase 1 with all others supporting. Phase 1 ends if Redland resumes aggression or stands down.

Phase 2 (seize the initiative) begins with JTF forces seizing the initiative in preparation for subsequent decisive ops. On order (O/O), JFLCC conducts airborne forced entry into Redland airfield and seizes OBJ DOG; O/O flow in follow-on forces, and BPT to accept TACON of MEU after amphib ops into OBJ CAT and RAT. JFACC establishes air superiority over Redland, supports the JFLCC airborne op, disrupts movement of Redland forces into JFLCC AO in priority of 2nd, 3rd, and 1st Red Guard brigades (BDEs) (RGB), supports JFSOCC DA ops, and BPT to support JFMCC amphib ops. JFMCC establishes sea control in the Redland Sea, BPT to conduct amphib ops to establish blocking positions in either OBJ CAT or RAT, supports Deception Plan X-Ray in southern Redland, and B/BPT to release TACON of MEU to JFLCC. JFSOCC destroys terrorist camp complex, denies Redland force movement along northern portion of Hwy 15, and destroys remnants of the terrorist force. JFLCC is the main effort in Phase 2 with all others supporting. Phase 2 ends when JFACC has gained air superiority over the objective areas, the enemy threat at the AIRFIELD and DOG are neutralized, and JTF force build-up is sufficient for transition to decisive ops.

Phase 3 (dominance) begins with the JFLCC conducting offensive operations IOT destroy Redland ground forces. The JFLCC will transition to stability and support operations (SASO) as Redland forces capitulate. JFACC maintains air superiority over Redland and the ISB and provides close air support (CAS) to the JFLCC. JFMCC maintains maritime sea control in the Redland Sea and BPT to support MEU amphib ops into OBJ CAT or RAT based on disposition of Redland forces. JFLCC continues to be the main effort in this phase with all others supporting. Phase 3 ends when Redland forces have been destroyed or surrender to the JTF.

Phase 4 (stability) begins with the JTF HQ transitioning from the afloat HQ to a land based HQ in Redland. JFLCC conducts SASO throughout Redland and reestablishes critical infrastructure. JFMCC supports SASO and O/O redeploys nonessential maritime assets. JFACC continues to provide CAS to JFLCC and JFSOCC ops, and O/O redeploys nonessential assets. JFSOCC continues to kill or capture fugitive terrorists, conducts sensitive site exploitation (SSE), and O/O redeploys nonessential assets. Joint psychological operations (PSYOP) task force (JPOTF) conducts PSYOP IOT influence the Redland population to cooperate with security forces and directs displaced personnel to coalition aid stations. JFLCC continues to be the main effort in Phase 4 with all others supporting. Phase 4 ends when security conditions are adequate to transfer authority to a legitimate Redland government.

Phase 5 (enable civil authority) begins by enabling a legitimate Redland government to assume control of its sovereign territory. The JTF will provide support to DOS and O/O transition control to an international organization, stand down the JTF, and redeploy. JFLCC forms and trains new Redland security force, conducts joint security patrols and operations with the security forces, and O/O redeploys forces. JFACC continues to provide CAS and supports redeployment via STRATAIR. JFMCC supports SASO, redeploys forces as situation permits, and transitions port security to new Redland maritime/coast guard. JFLCC continues to be the main effort in Phase 5 with all others supporting. Phase 5 ends when a legitimate Redland government has control of its sovereign territory, and an international organization has assumed responsibility for Redland security and stabilization.

III. Course of Action Analysis (Wargaming)

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), chap. 4.

The heart of the NPP is the analysis of opposing courses of action. In the previous steps of the planning process, enemy courses of action (ECOAs) and COAs were examined relative to their basic concepts—ECOAs were developed based on enemy

III. COA Analysis (Wargaming)

Key Inputs	Key Outputs
▪ **NAVY COMMANDER** ▪ **Refined Commander's intent** ▪ **Wargaming guidance** ▪ **Approved COAs** ▪ **Refined ECOAs** ▪ **Initial staff estimates**	▪ **Wargame results** ▪ **List of critical events and decision points** ▪ **Updated IPOE** ▪ **Subordinate Commander's estimate of supportability** ▪ **Branches and sequels identified for further planning**

1. **Organize for Wargaming**
2. **List all Friendly Forces**
3. **Review Assumptions**
4. **List Known Critical Events**
5. **Determine the Governing Factors**
6. **Select the Wargaming Method**
7. **Record and Display Results**
8. **War Game the Combat Actions and Assess the Results**
9. **Refine Staff Estimates**
10. **Update and Refine Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment Products**

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, fig. 4-1, p. 4-1.

capabilities, objectives, and the estimate of the enemy's intent, and COAs were developed based on friendly mission and capabilities. In this step, the planning team conducts an analysis of the probable affect that each ECOA has on the chances of success of each COA. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of the COA. Analysis also provides the planning team with a greatly improved understanding of its COAs and the relationship between them.

Course of action analysis identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission while positioning the force for future operations. It helps the commander and staff to

- Determine how to maximize combat power against the enemy while protecting the friendly forces and minimizing collateral damage
- Have as near an identical visualization of the combat action as possible
- Anticipate operational environment events and potential reaction options
- Determine conditions and resources required for success
- Determine when and where to apply the force's capabilities
- Focus intelligence collection requirements
- Determine the degree of flexibility in each COA

Course of action analysis is conducted using wargaming. The war game is a disciplined process, with rules and steps that attempt to visualize the flow of the operation. Specifically, war gaming

- Considers the results from the friendly COG determination, friendly COAs, enemy COG determination, enemy COAs, as well as the characteristics of the physical environment.
- Relies heavily on joint doctrinal foundation, tactical judgment, and operational experience.
- Focuses the planning team's attention on each phase of the operation in a logical sequence.
- Highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with operational possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve.
- Is an iterative process of action, reaction, and counteraction. War gaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered.
- War gaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated more time than any other step. At a minimum, each retained COA should be war gamed against both the most likely and the most dangerous ECOA.
- While the focus is on the analysis portion of the war gaming process, this stage also allows the various staff components to refine their estimates. Refined estimates help the planning team in determining feasibility and acceptability.

Inputs

- Refined commander's intent
- Commander's wargaming guidance
- Approved COAs
- Refined ECOAs
- Initial staff estimates

Process

During COA analysis, the planning team evaluates the effectiveness of each friendly COA against all of the ECOAs by using the naval commander's evaluation criteria. The planning team makes adjustments to identified problems and weaknesses of the friendly COAs and identifies branches and sequels. Each friendly COA is war gamed independently against each selected ECOA. Course of action analysis helps

Commander/Staff Interaction During/After Course of Action Analysis

Ref: NWC Maritime Component Commander's Handbook (Feb '10), p. 2-15.

The heart of the commander's estimate process is the analysis of different courses of action. Analysis is nothing more than war gaming — either manual or computer assisted. The aim is to develop a sound basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of the COA's. Analysis also provides the planning staff with a greatly improved understanding of their COA's and the relationship between them.

During war gaming, the staff attempts to capture an operation's dynamics through a series of action/reaction/counteraction sequences. During that process, the staff attempts to capture key elements that collectively define the synchronization of the operation.

The commander may decide to receive an optional back brief after COA analysis, to be updated on planning status and potentially provide additional guidance. War gaming is a "what if" game of friendly versus enemy COA's. The COA analysis identifies which COA best accomplishes the mission while also identifying any gaps and seams in the plan. During COA analysis the commander and staff identify potential:

- Advantages
- Disadvantages
- Risk
- Branches and sequels
- Decision points
- Commander's critical information requirements

The commander should put the appropriate level of emphasis on wargame participation. Since the non-OPT staff has a significant role in the depth of the research, lack of adequate participation may cause substandard results. The commander is not required to analyze each of the wargaming results but could review the synchronization matrix and critical event list. Once again, consider each friendly COA for validity in light of the analysis. Specifically, is the JFMCC scheme of maneuver and assignment of tasks feasible with the forces/capabilities available, or does it rely too heavily on RFFs to execute? Has the OPT recommended that specific COAs be discarded?

The commander should identify if new gaps and seams have been identified. Is there a need for additional forces? Are the assumptions still valid? Were the staff estimates mature enough to provide detail to conduct the COA analysis?

CCIRs should change from planning to execution-type CCIRs. Planning CCIRs are information requirements to continue planning. Execution CCIRs are information requirements during the conduct of the operation to drive a decision. A decision support matrix should be developed to identify the commander's decisions and possible branch plans for deviations from the plan.

- Ensure collections are looking at PIRs
- Ensure the information management (IM) plan reflects CCIR priorities
- Consider and track higher command's CCIRs

War gaming stimulates ideas and provides insights that might not otherwise be discovered. It highlights critical tasks and provides familiarity with operational possibilities otherwise difficult to achieve. War gaming is a critical portion of the planning process and should be allocated more time than any other step.

Wargaming Roles & Responsibilities

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), p. 4-13.

General Role of Staff Members

Each of the primary staff officers has a distinct role during the war game. Though the size and composition of the command may differ, the general role of the staff members is as follows:

- **Planning team chief or chief of staff (COS)**: Acts as the unbiased controller for the war game and ensures that the staff stays within a timeline and accomplishes the goal of the war game
- **J-1/N-1**: Provides input as to how personnel support will be provided during an operation and how the operation may affect personnel status
- **J-2/N-2**: Has a dual role during the war game. First, role-plays the enemy commander and develops critical enemy decision points, projects enemy reactions to friendly actions, and determines enemy losses. Also is responsible for capturing the results of the enemy actions and counteractions in a war game worksheet. If the naval command is large enough, there may be a Red Cell that can assume the task of role-playing the enemy. Second, the J-2/N-2 provides input such as RFIs, named areas of interest (NAIs), target areas of interest (TAIs), high-value targets (HVTs) and high-payoff targets (HPTs). Also refines situation templates.
- **J-3/N-3**: Acts as the friendly force and ensures that the war game covers all of the operational aspects of the mission
- **J-4/N-4**: Provides analysis of logistics feasibility; identifies potential supply, transportation, and sustainment issues; and assesses the logistics functions that must be conducted in order to support the COA
- **Special staff**: In addition to the staff members listed above, the war game should include special staff personnel such as the Judge Advocate General or legal advisor to cover legal and ROE issues, the public affairs officer to handle questions about press guidance and themes, and a medical officer to determine if a COA may incur losses that would need additional medical support.

Role and Responsibility of the Red Cell

Ideally, the Red Cell consists of individuals of varied operational backgrounds and specialties. Combining their own operational experience with enemy tactics, weapons, and doctrine, the Red Cell provides enemy reactions to the friendly COAs during the COA war game. To be successful, the Red Cell must function as an extension of the J-2/N-2. The primary purpose of the Red Cell is to provide additional operational analysis of the enemy, tailored to the needs of the planning team. During the war game, the Red Cell employs ECOAs against the friendly COAs. Although the Red Cell is used principally at the JFMCC and NCC level and above, it can also be scaled for use by smaller units such as CSG, destroyer squadron, or air wing.

The objective of the Red Cell is not to defeat friendly COAs during the war game, but to assist the development and testing of friendly COAs. The Red Cell makes friendly COAs stronger and more viable for execution in battle. The J-2/N-2, in coordination with the J-3/N-3, determines the composition of the Red Cell and often provides a number of its analysts. The J-2/N-2 oversees the functioning of the Red Cell, as its analysis of the enemy must be coordinated with the J-2/N-2 staff. The J-2/N-2 provides the Red Cell with the initial detailed information on enemy location, weapons, tactics, doctrine, order of battle, and assessed COAs. Differences in analysis between the Red Cell and the J-2/N-2 must be identified and resolved. To be effective, the planning team and the Red Cell must exchange information and analysis continuously throughout the planning process.

IV. Course of Action Comparison & Decision

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), chap. 5.

During the comparison step of the NPP, the planning team considers each retained COA for advantages and disadvantages. Each COA is evaluated in terms of the naval commander's previously established governing factors and, if modified, is tested a final time for feasibility and acceptability. This step is repeated until the naval commander selects the COA that offers the greatest prospect of accomplishing the mission.

IV. COA Comparison

Key Inputs	Key Outputs
▪ COA War Game Worksheet ▪ Updated IPOE ▪ Decision Support Matrix ▪ Refined Staff Estimates ▪ Governing Factors	▪ COA Decision ▪ CONOPs ▪ Updated IPOE ▪ Refined Staff Estimates ▪ WARNORD

1. Perform Course of Action Comparison
2. Perform Course of Action Evaluation
3. Make Final Tests of Feasibility and Acceptability
4. State Commander's Decision
5. Prepare Synchronization Matrix
6. Develop the Concept of Operations
7. Refine Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, fig. 5-1, p. 5-1.

Inputs

To help ensure that the COA comparison is thorough, the required input during this step is the COA war game worksheet, which includes the COA sketch, narrative, and war game results. The commander's governing factors are a critical input. Other information useful in this phase includes updated IPOE products, refined staff estimates, decision support matrix, and any branches and sequels identified for further planning. Additional information that may be useful includes: planning support tools,

updated CCIRs, synchronization matrix, initial task organization, list of critical events and decision points, subordinate commander's estimates of supportability, identification of assets required, and shortfalls.

Process

1. Perform Course of Action Comparison

The actual comparison of the COAs is critical. A number of varying techniques exists for conducting the comparison, but each of them must assist the commander in reaching a sound decision. While many of the comparison techniques offer a numerical value, staffs must remember that these are simply decision aids. The greatest utility of these comparison techniques is not which COA has the highest score; rather, it is the insight into the strengths and weaknesses of each COA relative to a given governing factor.

The most common technique is to use a decision comparison matrix to facilitate the process. Four types of comparison decision matrices used are weighted numerical, nonweighted numerical, plus/minus/neutral, and advantages and disadvantages. Regardless of the comparison matrix used, each of the governing factors or evaluation criteria chosen must be clearly defined so that staff and commanders understand why a particular factor is weighted as high or low. This is vital to ensure that the process is completed correctly. For example, simplicity might be selected as a factor. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding. However, simplicity might be a negative factor if it will not facilitate mission execution.

1. Non-weighted Numerical

The non-weighted method numerically portrays subjectively chosen governing factors that are compared/evaluated on their individual merits and are all treated equally.

2. Weighted Numerical

The weighted technique numerically portrays subjectively chosen and subjectively weighted governing factors. Each staff member may use an individual matrix or recommend a personal choice of governing factors based on the respective functional area. The commander reviews this list and adds to or deletes from it. The list need not be a lengthy one; there should only be a few governing factors, though enough to differentiate between the COAs.

The primary consideration when assigning relative weights is to ensure that the selected factors are in balance and not artificially inflated. Comparing COAs by category is more accurate than attempting to aggregate a total score for each COA.

3. Plus/Minus/Neutral

The plus/minus/neutral matrix is used when credible quantitative (numeric) scores for how well each COA satisfies each governing factor are not relatively apparent, and instead qualitative scores must be used. The governing factors for each of the COAs are rated with a (+) for a positive influence, (-) for a negative influence, and (0) for a neutral influence in comparison to the baseline COA.

4. Advantages and Disadvantages

In completing the advantage and disadvantages matrix, staff members list the advantages and disadvantages of each COA retained. This is perhaps the most important comparison step and should be used in conjunction with one or more of the previous matrices. As the advantages and disadvantages are listed, the staff will begin to see where trade-offs or modifications will have to be made to a COA.'

Refer to NWP 5-01, Naval Planning, app. G for sample comparison matrices.

Other than the first choice, any modified or new COA selected should be analyzed fully (to the maximum extent that planning time allows), to include wargaming. The commander may need to rely heavily on the planning team's professional judgment and experience; however, the ultimate decision is the commander's alone. The commander also bears the responsibility that goes along with the decision of selecting a COA.

The decision is a clear and concise statement by the commander setting forth the selected COA. The commander translates the COA selected into a brief statement of what the force as a whole is to do. The commander may amplify the statement with other elements of the mission as appropriate. Each of these elements should be explained in writing in relation to the physical environment in which the expected action is to take place. The wording of the decision is not bound by rigid form.

Lesson Learned

Observe two general rules in wording the commander's decision: Express it in terms of what is to be accomplished, and use simple language so that the meaning is unmistakable. The results of the COA comparison are briefed to the commander for his final approval on a COA.

Sample Decision Brief

BRIEFER	SUBJECT
J-5/N-5	Higher headquarters intent
	Restated mission
J-3/N-3	Status of own forces
J-2/N-2	Updated intelligence estimate
	Terrain analysis
	Weather analysis
	Enemy situation
J-3/N-3	Own COAs
J-3/N-3, J-2/N-2	Assumptions used in planning
J-1/N-1, J-4/N-4, J-6/N-6	Results of staff estimate
J-5/N-5	Advantages and disadvantages (including risk) of each COA (with decision matrix or table showing COA comparison)
	Recommended COA (may differ from other staff)
	COS Recommended COA

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, fig. 5-2, p. 5-4.

5. Prepare Synchronization Matrix

Based on the commander's decision and final guidance, the decision-making portion of the NPP is completed. The staff and planning team now transition to operational planning, refine the COA, and prepare to issue the order. In order for the staff to issue the plan or order, it must first turn the selected COA into a clear, concise CONOPS. This is aided by completing a synchronization matrix, which is initially created during the war gaming step of the NPP and is now refined. This internal staff planning tool is used in much the same manner as the war gaming synchronization matrix. The commander can use the COA statement as the CONOPS statement. The COA sketch can become the basis for the operation overlay. In addition, the staff assists subordinate staffs with their planning and coordination as needed.

Refer to NWP 5-01, Naval Planning, app. H for further discussion of synchronization matrixes.

The Concept of Operations (CONOPS)

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), pp. 5-5 to 5-6.

Using the synchronization matrix, the planning team expands and integrates the available information and provides the CONOPS—an elaboration of the selected COA. It should include the commander's vision of how major events are expected to occur in the forthcoming combat action and the commander's intent. The CONOPS must be developed quickly so that subordinate commanders have the time necessary to prepare their own plans and units for the impending action. Having already identified the risks associated with the selected COA, the naval commander refines what level of risk is acceptable to accomplish the mission and approves measures to reduce the risks. If there is time, there is a discussion of acceptable risks with lateral and senior commanders. However, the higher commander's approval must be obtained prior to accepting any risk that might imperil the higher commander's intent.

The CONOPS describes how arrayed forces will accomplish the commander's intent. It is the central expression of the commander's operational design and governs the development of supporting plans or annexes. Planners develop a scheme of maneuver by refining the initial array of forces and using graphic control measures to coordinate the operation and to show the relationship of friendly forces to one another, the enemy, and geography. During this step, units are converted from generic to specific units, such as the specific CSGs and ESGs. The CONOPS includes:

- The purpose of the operation
- A statement of where the commander will accept risk
- Identification of critical friendly events and phases of the operation (if phased)
- Designation of the decisive operation, along with its task and purpose
- Designation of shaping operations, along with their tasks and purposes, linked to how they support decisive operations
- Naval warfare functions (i.e., USW, SUW, AD, Strike, etc.)
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance and protection operations
- An outline of the movements of the force
- Identification of options that may develop during an operation
- Location of engagement areas (surface, air, and subsurface) and objectives
- Responsibilities for AO and operating areas
- Concept of fires (i.e., employment of TLAM, carrier-based tactical aviation)
- Determined IO and/or deception concept of support and objectives
- Command and control attack priorities
- Prescribed formations or dispositions when necessary
- Priorities for logistics and sustaining operations
- Considerations of the potential effects of enemy WMD on the force.

V. Plans and Orders Development

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), chap. 6.

The plans and orders development step in the NPP communicates the commander's intent, guidance, and decisions in a clear, useful form that is easily understood by those executing the order. Operation plans are normally produced at the combatant command or JTF level with subordinate service or functional component commands (such as Navy component commands) producing supporting plans. In the case of a JFMCC or NCC, this would be the maritime supporting plan. Before proceeding, it is necessary to distinguish between plans and orders:

Plan

A plan is prepared in anticipation of operations and normally serves as the basis for an order. The procedures for producing a plan should therefore closely mirror the preparation of an order.

Order

An order is a written or oral communication that directs actions and focuses a subordinate's tasks and activities toward accomplishing the mission.

Various portions of the plan or order, such as the mission statement and staff estimates, have been prepared during previous steps of the NPP. The chief of staff or executive officer, as appropriate, directs plans or orders development. Plans or orders contain only critical or new information, not routine matters normally found in standing operating procedures. A good plan or order is judged on its usefulness, not its weight.

V. Plans & Orders Development

Key Inputs	Key Outputs
▪ Task organization ▪ Mission statement ▪ Commander's intent ▪ CONOPs ▪ Staff estimates	▪ OPORD/OPLAN ▪ Refined IPOE ▪ Planning support tools

1. Prepare Plans and Orders
2. Reconcile Plans and Orders
3. Backbrief and Crosswalk Plans and Orders
4. Commander Approves and Issues Plan or Order

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, fig. 6-1, p. 6-1.

In the previous phase of the NPP, the planning team integrated the commander's selected COA with the staff estimates and planning support tools (developed in parallel) into a fully developed CONOPS. The planning team now translates the CONOPS into a clear, concise, and authoritative directive. This directive, whether it is a maritime supporting plan or an OPORD, is then back-briefed to the higher commander and cross-walked to other service and/or functional components to ensure that it is synchronized, understood, and meets the higher commander's intent. A well-written directive possesses important characteristics that help assure understanding of the directive and the accomplishment of the mission:

- **Clarity**: Each executing commander should be able to understand the directive thoroughly. Write in simple, understandable English and use proper military (doctrinal) terminology.
- **Brevity**: A good directive is concise. Avoid superfluous words and unnecessary details, but do not sacrifice clarity and completeness in the interest of brevity alone. State all major tasks of subordinates precisely but in a manner that allows each subordinate sufficient latitude to exercise initiative. Short sentences are more easily and quickly understood than longer ones.
- **Authoritativeness**: In the interest of simplicity and clarity, the affirmative form of expression should be used throughout all combat orders and plans.
- **Simplicity**: This requires that all elements are reduced to their simplest forms. All possibilities for misunderstanding must be eliminated.
- **Flexibility**: A good plan leaves room for adjustments that unexpected operating conditions might cause. Normally, the best plan provides the commander with the most flexibility.
- **Timeliness**: Plans and orders must be disseminated in enough time to allow adequate planning and preparation on the part of subordinate commands. Through the use of WARNORDs, subordinate units can commence their preparation before the receipt of the final plan or order. Concurrent planning saves time.
- **Completeness**: The plan or order must contain all the information necessary to coordinate and execute the forthcoming action. It also must provide control measures that are complete, understandable, and that maximize the subordinate commander's initiative. Only those details or methods of execution necessary to ensure that actions of the subordinate units concerned are synchronized with the CONOPS for the force as a whole should be prescribed.
- **Provides for the necessary organization**: A good plan clearly establishes command-and-support relationships and fixes responsibilities.

Inputs

The initial task organization, mission statement, commander's intent, CONOPS, staff estimates, specified tasks, and implied tasks are the required inputs for orders development. Other inputs may include:

- Updated intelligence and IPOE products
- Planning support tools
- Updated CCIRs
- Staff estimates
- Identified branches for further planning
- WARNORD
- Existing plans, standing operating procedures, and orders
- Chief of staff or executive officer orders development guidance

Operation Plans & Orders (OPLANs/OPORDs)

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), pp. 6-3 to 6-4.

Directives most frequently use the standard five-paragraph format, briefly described below. In complex operations, much of the information required in the order is contained or amplified in the appropriate appendixes and annexes, such as synchronization and decision support matrices and logistics and sustainability analyses.

However, the essential form of the commander's CONOPS, including the commander's intent, command and control, task organization, and essential tasks and objectives, should be contained in the body of the order. The format for OPLANs and OPORDs is contained in CJSM 3122.03A JOPES Vol. II. The five basic paragraphs for all plans and orders are:

Paragraph 1: Situation

This paragraph, the commander's summary of the general situation, ensures that subordinates understand the background for planned operations. It often contains subparagraphs describing enemy forces, friendly forces, and task organization, as well as higher headquarters guidance.

Paragraph 2: Mission

The commander inserts his own restated mission developed during mission analysis. This is derived from the mission analysis step and contains those tasks deemed essential to accomplish the mission.

Paragraph 3: Execution

This paragraph expresses the commander's intent for the operation, enabling subordinate commanders to better exercise initiative while keeping their actions aligned with the operation's overall purpose. It also specifies the objectives, tasks, and assignments for subordinate commanders. It should articulate not only the objective or task to be accomplished but also its purpose, so that subordinate commanders understand how their tasks and objectives contribute to the overall CONOPS.

Paragraph 4: Administration and Logistics

This paragraph describes the concepts of support, logistics, personnel, public affairs, civil affairs (CA), and medical services. The paragraph also addresses the levels of supply as they apply to the operation.

Paragraph 5: Command and Control

This paragraph specifies command relationships, succession of command, and the overall plan for communications and control.

Refer to NWP 5-01, Annex L for sample orders (warning order, basic operation order format, and basic fragmentary order format). The format for OPLANs and OPORDs is contained in CJSM 3122.03A JOPES Vol. II. concepts of support, logistics, personnel, public affairs, civil affairs (CA), and medical services.

Refer to The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interagency Operations), chap. 3 for discussion of joint operation planning, to include operation plans and orders production (with sample formats).

VI. Transition

Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning (Jan '07), chap. 7.

The purpose of transition is to ensure a successful shift from planning to execution. A good transition enhances the situational awareness of those who will execute the order, maintains the intent of the CONOPS, promotes unity of effort, and generates tempo. Transition facilitates the synchronization of plans between higher and subordinate commands and aids in integrated planning by ensuring the synchronization of the war-fighting functions. Transition requires free flow of information between commanders and staffs by all available means.



Ref: NWP 5-01, Navy Planning, fig. 7-1, p. 7-1.

At higher echelons, where the planners may not be involved in plan execution, the commander may designate a representative as proponent for the plan or order. Normally this is the current operations representative to the planning team. After orders development, the proponent takes the approved plan or order forward to the staff charged with supervising execution. As a full participant in the development of the plan, the proponent can answer questions, aid in the use of the planning support tools, and assist the staff in determining necessary adjustments to the plan or order. Transition occurs at all levels of command. A formal transition normally occurs on staffs with separate planning and execution teams. Planning time and personnel may be limited at lower levels of command, or planners may be the same personnel as the executors.

Inputs

For transition to occur, an approved plan or order must exist. The approved plan or order, along with additional staff products, forms the input for transition. These inputs

may include refined intelligence and IPOE products, planning support tools, outlined FRAGORDs for branches, information on possible future missions (sequels), and any outstanding issues.

Process

Successful transition ensures that those charged with executing the order have a thorough understanding of the plan. Regardless of the level of command, transition ensures that those who execute the order understand the commander's intent, the CONOPS, and NPP planning aids. Transition may be internal or external in the form of briefings or drills. Internally, transition occurs between future plans or future and current operations. Externally, transition occurs between the commander and his subordinate commands.

In the specific case of a naval command, the transition that occurs from planning to execution of an operation is done through a variety of formats. At an operational or operational-tactical level such as a JFMCC, NCC, or CTF, a commander may use such things as a daily intentions messages (DIMS), forums such as a warfare commanders' board or other meeting during the battle rhythm, or even voice communications with the force.

Further down at the tactical units such as a ship, the commander may use meetings, one-on-one communications, or night orders.

Role of the Planning Team

During transition, the planning team may perform the following:

- Conduct the internal transition briefing.
- Brief all tools (decision support matrix, synchronization matrix, execution checklist), enemy situation, CONOPS, and supporting concepts (intelligence, fires, logistics, maneuver) in detail. Current operations can conduct transition drills using this information.
- Assist the commander in the transition/execution drill.
- Coordinate with subordinate commanders on the confirmation briefing of their plan to the higher commander so that he/she can identify discrepancies between his subordinate commander's plans.
- Provide a transition proponent to current operations.

1. Transition Briefing

At the higher levels of command, transition may include a formal transition briefing to subordinate or adjacent commanders and to the staff supervising execution of the order. At lower levels, it might be less formal. The transition briefing provides an overview of the mission, commander's intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation. The briefing ensures that all actions necessary to implement the order are known and understood by those executing the order. The commander, deputy commander, or chief of staff may provide transition briefing guidance, including who will give the briefing, the briefing content, sequence, and who is required to attend. Time available dictates the level of detail possible in the transition briefing. Orders and supporting materials should be transmitted as early as possible before the transition briefing. The briefing may include items such as higher headquarters mission (tasks and intent), approved mission statement and commander's intent, CCIRs, EEFIs, task organization, situation (friendly and enemy), approved CONOPS (with supporting concepts), execution (including branches and potential sequels), coordinating instructions, decision points, and planning support tools (decision support template/matrix and synchronization matrix).

Planning Roles of the FPC, FOPS, COPS (and Internal/External Transition)

Ref: NWC Maritime Component Commander's Handbook (Feb '10), p. 2-25.

Future Plans Center (FPC)

The future plans center (FPC) conducts deliberate long-term operational planning; that is, planning that is focused on a time period beyond the scope covered by COPS and FOPS. Typically, the emphasis of the FPC is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current operation. In a campaign, this could be planning the next major operation (the next phase of the campaign) or re-planning the initial effort based on assessments. The FPC is manned by personnel who are familiar with the Navy Planning Process and associated JOPES products. During an emergent crisis, FPC could be directed to lead the staff's effort to develop the JFMCC's OPLAN or OPORD.

Future Operations (FOPS)

FOPS conducts operational-level planning for near-term operations between those covered by the FPC and COPS. Typically, the emphasis of FOPS is on conducting planning in the current phase to include anticipated branch plans and crisis planning to deal with unanticipated circumstances. When it is assessed that the operation is not progressing as planned, it will fall to FOPS to adjust the plan to get back on track. Any operational plans developed by FOPS need to be synchronized and coordinated with the FPC and COPS. FOPS has primary responsibility for changing force allocation and resourcing approved plans. FOPS operates continuously and is composed of experts in various warfare areas who are assembled as the director of FOPS deems necessary to perform planning, commander's guidance development, orders preparation, and liaison with subordinates and other components.

Current Operations (COPS)

COPS' primary focus is on monitoring and assessing ongoing operations for compliance with the commander's intentions. COPS is responsible for overseeing execution of operations. COPS is the central point for all B2C2WG to forward and to receive information related to the execution of operations. COPS is responsible for monitoring the current situation and reflecting any changes to the execution of assigned orders by all subordinate forces. COPS must be capable of short-term operational planning, usually through a CAT and the development of associated FRAGORDS. COPS must also monitor the CCIRs. Lastly, COPS should be responsible for keeping track of the command relationships of subordinate maritime forces.

Transition

Transition is the final step of the NPP to ensure successful shift to execution. The commander's role is to ensure adequacy of the turnover of responsibility to the full staff and subordinate commands for execution. The commander needs to ensure that all aspects of the plan are discussed thoroughly. Possible branches and sequels and the status of their planning should be included. A methodical process considering each command's responsibilities is essential. There are two types of transition:

- **Internal Transition**. Internal transition moves the plan from **FPC to FOPS** or from **FOPS to COPS**. It is recommended to determine as much as possible how and when a plan will transition at the outset of plan development. The transition provides an overview of the mission, commander's intent, task organization, and enemy and friendly situation.
- **External Transition**. External transition is where FOPS briefs subordinate tactical commanders and staff. Subordinate tactical commanders may then have to provide a confirmation brief to the JFMCC, to ensure understanding and alignment with the JFMCC plan.